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<Title page>

How can ethnomethodology be Heideggerian?

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to begin to try to understand the extent to which ethnomethodology (EM) might be informed by some concepts and ideas from the work of the philosopher Martin Heidegger. This is done in two parts. The first looks at Heidegger's later work and compares his conception of the ontological difference with Garfinkel's work on the difference between EM and formal sociological analysis (FA). The second part turns to Heidegger's earlier work (around Being and Time) and works through a number of affinities between the analysis of Dasein and ethnomethodological versions of everydayness.

How can ethnomethodology be Heideggerian?

1. Introduction

According to one source, over the last fifteen years, in occasional lectures and addresses, Harold Garfinkel has been mentioning Heidegger's well-known example of the broken hammer.ⁱ Just as, for Heidegger, the example illustrates the ordinary mundane work of hammering, so, for Garfinkel, various kinds of incongruities such as bodily impairments and injuries can bring into relief the perceivedly normal course of everyday affairs. There is an elliptical reference to this, though, in Garfinkel's published paper "Ethnomethodology's Program" (1996). Here, Garfinkel makes the claim that at least part of the EM program is "Heideggerian." He refers in particular to certain of EM's perspicuous demonstrations – presumably naturally-occurring breach studies – in the following way: "EM's 'Heideggerian' uses of incongruities of bodily impairments and brain injuries and illnesses are perspicuous in revealing the ('hidden') transparent work of achieved coherence" (1996, p. 17).

Exactly what these studies are, Garfinkel does not elaborate on just here; but the implication is that the term "Heideggerian" is to mean something like revealing; and, in particular, revealing something – namely the work of achieved coherence – to be both "hidden" and "transparent." So while the term "Heideggerian" in this context may refer in particular to "injuries and illnesses," it also carries with it more general relevancies concerning procedures (of any kind) for "revealing ... achieved coherence." And since "revealing achieved coherence" is one of the many glosses that Garfinkel uses for EM's work in general, it may be worth considering the extent to which EM – again, in general – could be "Heideggerian."ⁱⁱ

But how could this be? Surely, EM is a highly empirical social science while Heideggerian thought eschews contemporary science. Instead it ponders such transcendental matters as “the meaning of Dasein’s being” – what it means to be “a being of the same ontological sort that we are” (Okrent 1988, p. 3) – and, later, “the truth of being” – “the aletheia, opening, or lighting of being” (Okrent 1988, p. 9). On this rough-and-ready version, few things could be further from each other: to the EMist, Heideggerian work would seem to have all the hallmarks of what Garfinkel calls “constitutive theorizing”; and to the Heideggerian, by the same token, EM would come out sounding like empirical social psychology – a form of “idle chatter” that has fallen for the lure of the merely scientific. But on closer inspection this caricature may conceal a closer affinity between the two.

Historically, too, we know that Heidegger’s early inquiries were established as responses to the “mentalism” of Husserlian phenomenology. In Being and Time (1962) he attempts to resituate Husserl’s version of intentionality away from consciousness and towards temporality (purposive courses of action).ⁱⁱⁱ In this respect, the early Heideggerian project is not unlike Garfinkel’s uptake, in Studies in Ethnomethodology (1967), of Schütz’s (1962) pragmatization of Husserl. All three thinkers (Heidegger, Schütz and Garfinkel), that is, appear to reject an account of being in the (social) world as primordially situated in inner subjective states. But can this simple and negative coincidence of anti-mentalism account for EM being Heideggerian? While it does, I think, give us a beginning, in the sections that follow, I want to pursue what might be a deeper and more sustained sense in which Garfinkel comes to call (at least part of) the EM enterprise “Heideggerian.”

2. The ontological difference

Crucial to Heidegger’s later thinking is what he calls the ontological difference. This distinction, he argues (Heidegger 1975) is crucial to the thinking of the Homeric Greeks and, to some extent, still readable in the work of the pre-Socratics

but has become all but lost since the dawn of classical Greek philosophical thinking. It is, he argues further, utterly absent from contemporary forms of scientific thought. What is this crucial difference?

In his Introduction to Metaphysics (1959), Heidegger writes of the early Greeks' understanding of being as physis via the metaphor of a flower opening. Physis is "self-blossoming emergence (e.g. the blossoming of a rose), opening up, unfolding, that which manifests itself in such unfolding and preserves and endures in it" (1959, p. 14). Already then, there is a difference here: the difference between the unfolding as such and "that which manifests itself" in the unfolding. Elsewhere, Heidegger (1982, p. 227) refers to this as "being in distinction from beings"; hence a separation between "the ontical consideration of beings [and] the ontological thematization of being" (1982, p. 227). Moreover the understanding of being (as such, as opposed to the merely ontic) belongs to Dasein's particular "ontological constitution" (1982, p. 227). Dasein is the only kind of thing which is ontologically constituted such that it can understand being (as the unfolding, rather than what merely unfolds).

In briefer terms, the ontological difference is the difference between "coming to presence" and "that which is present." And Heidegger's interest lies in an effective return to the former: "What is most thought-provoking for Heidegger is the coming to presence of whatever presents itself, the Being of beings, the εον [eon] of εοντα [eonta]" (Krell 1975, p. 8); and this as opposed to what merely exists, the ontic. This interest in eon, in coming to presence or, more simply, in being as such, distinguishes Heidegger's thought from any modern – particularly any formal or scientific – concern with being-as-that-which-is-merely-present.

In "Ethnomethodology's Program" and elsewhere Garfinkel makes a distinction between EM and formal sociological analysis (FA) in quite similar terms. Just as, for Heidegger, science is blind to the ontological difference since it only recognises "that which is present" (always already) so, for Garfinkel, FA

takes society as the totality of already-constituted social facts, thereby ignoring their local, in situ processes of coming-to-be. So while there is a strongly popular conception of EM as a purely empirical and descriptive science of “social processes” (a kind of social phenomenology), it may in fact be much more than this, if only because, in Heideggerian terms “coming to presence” must strictly be outside the grasp of any of today’s empirical sciences. Following this line of thought, EM may turn out to be an alternative to all other social theories; one that offers an understanding (or “thematization”) of both the ontological domain (coming to presence) and perhaps even of the ontological difference as such in the social sphere – an understanding of the difference between “coming to presence” and “that which is merely present” as “social facts.”

This seems to be the upshot of, for example, Garfinkel’s analysis of a social object called “the phone ringing” (Garfinkel & Wieder 1992). In this demonstration, Garfinkel has his students collect audio-taped instances of telephones ringing under quite specific and local circumstances. For example, a phone ringing “for me” (the student) as against it ringing “for someone else,” or else either of these two situations being simulated for the sake of an audio recording, or again a phone “just” ringing for no-one in particular: each of these has its own kinds of productional features. Each comes to presence in specific ways. Yet FA, in each case, can only hear one thing: ring, ring, ring, ring.... It can only hear that which is merely and empirically present on the tape.

So while, for FA, “the phone ringing” would constitute a given social fact, subsequently subjectable to interpretation, Garfinkel takes EM’s interest in this “object” to be, by contrast, the local work of producing it as a fact (indeed, as more than a single fact) in the first place. And his perspicuous demonstration shows the critical difference between the two. To adapt Garfinkel’s own (“tick bracketing”) notation, we could write the difference this way:

(P) => The phone ringing as an already-constituted social fact

{P} => The phone ringing as the work of fact production (for example, “the phone ringing just for me” or “the phone ringing for someone else” as locally situated work)

While EM’s analytic interest lies in the latter, {P}, its social-theoretical import lies in its demonstrable differences from FA’s interests:

{P} / (P)

And, in a crucial sense, this is very close to (if not identical with) the difference between “coming to presence” and “that which is present.” If so, (a) Heidegger’s ontological difference and (b) his interest in “the coming to presence of whatever presents itself” are at least directly analogous to (a’) Garfinkel’s critical distinction between EM and FA and (b’) his interest in {P} over (P).

However, our investigation so far merely draws a parallel. So far, it cannot remove the general differences between EM and Heideggerian interests mentioned above. In particular, it cannot circumvent the possibility that Heidegger’s interests in being are part of a transcendental investigation while EM’s interests are situated and empirical. But at the same time, it is also clear that Heidegger wants to establish the general conditions under which things – “gods and men, temples and cities, sea and land, eagle and snake, tree and shrub, wind and light, stone and sand, day and night” (1975, p. 40) – come to presence. Then, when Garfinkel glosses EM’s interest as taking up what “the FA procedure ignores,” namely “the enacted, unmediated, directly and immediately witnessable details of immortal ordinary society” (1996, p. 8) we can also see an interest in conditions of a sort. As it were, the “witnessable details” are all that could possibly pass for conditions on this account. That is, for EM, whatever claims are made about social being, the grounds of those claims must be the “immediately witnessable details of immortal ordinary society” – or, as Garfinkel (1964) once put it, “the routine grounds of everyday activities.”

If we wanted to press this comparison further, we would have to show how Heidegger’s project (the general conditions of coming to presence) and EM’s

(the immediately witnessable details of coming to presence as grounds) were closer than they appear on this initial account. Is that possible? One way to approach this question would be to ask how the early Heidegger's position on the general conditions of being might ultimately be pragmatic in orientation. If the conditions, at least for the form of being that is Dasein, turn out to be pragmatic, then there is a much better possibility of them coinciding with EM's notion of "witnessable details" as grounds.

3. Heidegger's pragmatism

As it turns out, over the last two decades an influential group of philosophers has begun to read Heidegger as primarily a pragmatist in orientation. These include Brandom (1983), Guignon (1983) and Okrent (1988). Rorty (1993 p. 356) puts the position well: "These writers agree in thinking that the recognition ... that social practice is determinative of what is and is not up to social practice is Heidegger's crucial insight in this work [Being and Time]." Perhaps the fullest treatment of this position is Okrent (1988) whose clearly stated goal is to offer an explication of Heidegger's arguments for more Anglo-American and pragmatic tastes than Heidegger's own prose often permits. Accordingly, my argument in this section draws quite heavily Okrent's reading.

Okrent begins with Heidegger's notion of Dasein which he usefully glosses as "a being of the same ontological sort that we are" (1988, p. 3). He wants to show how Dasein can be read against the grain of mentalism by configuring it as an alternative to traditional accounts of intentionality. Dasein is, to be sure, a certain sort of being, characterized by its intentional agency in the world. But that intentionality cannot be secured by characterizing intention as a kind of mental state. Rather, intention is eminently pragmatic. Hence: "to be an intentional agent is to be a certain sort of organized activity itself, not to be a thinking thing that happens to have private mental states such as beliefs and desires" (Okrent 1988, p. 7). From the start, then, the grounding of Dasein is clearly the organization of

activity, and so a comparison with Garfinkel's early account of what it is to be a "member" is enticing. If to be Dasein is "to be a certain sort of organized activity itself," then to be a "member," for Garfinkel:

has to do with organizationally situated action in its course. That is what "member" means. It does not mean a person. It means a course of activity, recognizable for its directionality, its origins, its motivated character, by a procedure for demonstrating that that is what is going on (Garfinkel 1968, p. 119).

"A certain sort of organized activity"; "organizationally situated action in its course": in each case respectively, the "organizational" conception of being displaces the centrality of internal states and acts of consciousness, and moves the practical organization of activity to center stage.

Expanding on this basic groundwork, Okrent examines the role of understanding in what it is to be Dasein. For Heidegger, he argues, understanding (verstehen) is always self-understanding (1988, p. 24). But, by now, this cannot mean an internal or psychological capacity to reflect on some already-constituted or to-be-constituted activity. Rather understanding must be essentially bound in some way to practical activity itself. As it turns out, the two could not be more related, for, in Heidegger, self-understanding is eminently practical in the first place.

One way of seeing this would be to argue that Heideggerian self-understanding is highly commensurate with the central EM idea of practices' self-accounting properties which we find in Garfinkel's work under the title of "reflexivity" or "incarnateness." If Dasein, that is, is social (if it is in some senses a member, or if it has the same conditions as membership does), then self-understanding in Heidegger may indeed be highly akin to reflexivity in Garfinkel's equally counter-mentalistic sense. But before we can go on to see how this is, we need to satisfy ourselves that – contrary to Schütz's (1962, pp. 186-7) suspicions of solipsism in Heidegger – being social is just as crucial to Dasein as

self-understanding is. After this first step (below), we can then move on to look at how understanding, in Heidegger, is reflexive.

Is Dasein social? If Rorty and the other philosophers he mentions are right, then – even though Heidegger speaks more often of “I” and “one” than of “we” and “many” – this “I/one” works contrary to the Cartesian tradition of thinking of the human subject as a special kind of substance (one with special properties such as “consciousness” and so on). Against this version of “I/one”, Heidegger uses it to mean both Dasein and any particular Dasein. The two are effectively inseparable. In this sense Dasein (in and as its self-understanding) is essentially a social category. In a sense it is much less a “person” or a “self” than it is what happens socially, concertedly, in the first place; for “to be Dasein ... one must be a member of ... a group of beings ... who establish standard ends and communally shared ways of achieving those ends” (Okrent 1988, p. 5). Or as Brandom (1983, pp. 396-397) puts it: “the first point, of course, is that Dasein’s Being is social in nature: So far as Dasein is at all, it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being.” And we could add: in being-with-one-another, among other things, Dasein has its understanding.

In defining Heidegger’s understanding of understanding, moreover, Okrent turns to a distinction which is common enough also in the EM literature: the distinction (often attributed to Gilbert Ryle) between “knowing how” and “knowing that,” between practical and propositional forms of knowledge. He writes: “It is certainly the case that when Heidegger talks about understanding he is always using the word in a way that is meant to be somehow akin to the ordinary practical use of the word” (Okrent 1988, p. 24) – and then goes on to quote Heidegger as follows:

In German we say that someone can vorstehen something – literally stand in front or ahead of it, that is, stand at its head, administer, manage, preside over it. This is equivalent to saying that he versteht sich darauf, understands in the sense of being skilled or expert at it, has the know how

of it. The meaning of the term “understanding” ... is intended to go back to this usage in ordinary language (Heidegger 1982, p. 276).

At the heart of our everyday existence, then, lies not a set of fixed mental predicates but a variety of practical social capacities: capacities for self-managing or self-administering.

In this sense, understanding, or being towards oneself, is not superadded to merely existing: for it “constitutes the being of Dasein and is not something like an additional capacity to observe oneself over and above just existing. Existing is precisely this being towards oneself...” (Heidegger 1984, p. 189). It is on the basis of such an identity between practical existence and understanding that Garfinkel draws a distinction between EM (which observes that identity) and FA (which does not and cannot). That is, while EM understands understanding as the self-accounting properties of practical actions, FA understands society as what exists – but such that it, FA, has to provide an understanding of it “over and above” its existence – an interpretation. Along with Heidegger, by contrast, EM understands society’s existence as society’s being towards itself, its existing-as-already-understood (because already-self-accounted) in the sense that it has irremediable reflexive properties as its ground and constitution. Not only do members (cf. Dasein) not add an extra level of understanding to their mere “behaviour,” neither do the human sciences need to add yet a further level of interpretation.^{iv} As Garfinkel puts it:

EM is not in the business of interpreting signs. It is not an interpretive enterprise. Enacted local practices are not texts which symbolize “meanings” or events. They are in detail identical with themselves, and not representative of something else. The witnessably recurrent details of ordinary everyday practices constitute their own reality. They are studied in their unmediated details and not as signed enterprises (Garfinkel 1996, p. 8).^v

Connecting this pragmatic version of understanding with the idea of “revealing,” we can begin to see how this figures in socio-pragmatic readings of Heidegger. That is, “revealing” is synonymous with “understanding” on this argument; for understanding is disclosedness (revelation, unconcealment). But unlike certain representationalist forms of analysis which take the idea of unconcealment as a way of getting to some hidden truth (unavailable to everyday practitioners themselves), Okrent (1988 p. 29) glosses it as das Umwillen – the for-the-sake-of-which. In other words revealing is a bringing about of some end; it is purposiveness, what makes things serviceable. Dasein, in this sense, is “purposing,” and, moreover, it requires equipment, the availability of methods or tools for the manipulation of whatever is ready-to-hand (Zuhanden) in local and practical affairs (1988, pp. 30-32). In this sense, revelation (as das Umwillen) is nothing mystical; it is what connects intentionality to practical purposes (1988, p35). That is, it is not the prerogative of the professional formal analyst after the fact of practical actions; rather it is a property of practical actions through and through. It is their self-revealing (or self-accounting) properties.

It is at this point that Okrent’s reading brings Heidegger’s thinking to the center of EM territory; because it follows directly from the above that a practice and its situation are mutually constitutive. And this is the central EM tenet of reflexivity – the mutual constitutivity of accounting practices and the local situations they account for.^{vi} In Garfinkel’s well-known rendition, the reflexive or “incarnate” character of accounting practices and accounts means that: “the activities whereby members produce and manage settings of organized everyday affairs are identical with members’ procedures for making those settings ‘accountable’” (Garfinkel 1967, p. 1; my emphasis). So: activities are identical with their self-accounting procedures. In Okrent, furthermore, a very similar reflexivity defines practical understanding towards an end (purposiveness). It is the essence of intention-as-practice. That is, if we remember that, in this context, the idea of the tool includes all everyday equipment and methods generally, then the

following gloss on Heidegger clearly shows that a central feature of Dasein is its reflexivity in something closely akin to Garfinkel's sense:

Practical understanding of a tool is the capacity to use the tool in a variety of practical contexts for a variety of purposes.... The capacity to act in such a way is part of what it is to be Dasein, and every Dasein, as Dasein, is always actually acting coherently [cf. methodically] in some way or another so as to achieve some end or another. It is thus always displaying its practical understanding of tools (Okrent 1988, p. 38; my emphasis).

This accounting/displaying of coherence is important for, as we noted earlier, if one of the central terms connecting EM and Heidegger is "revealing" then what is to be revealed is, according to Garfinkel (1996, p. 17), "the ('hidden') transparent work of achieved coherence." Coherence or methodicalness is, therefore, achieved reflexively in and as the accounting for, or display of, practical understandings. But why is this work both hidden and transparent? To many this double would appear contradictory; but the Heideggerian version of revealing suggests otherwise. For the purposiveness of a project, das Umwillen, is the purpose or end that one understands oneself as. And that end is not something thought or explicitly willed separately from the project itself (for a split here would be precisely a split between understanding and action and thus in contradiction of both Heidegger's and Garfinkel's starting points). In short, neither "member" nor "Dasein" means "I think about it" at least in this sense: neither is a matter of that "which in phenomenology is called inner perception as contrasted with outer" (Heidegger 1982, p. 159); neither needs "a special kind of observation, nor does it need to conduct a sort of espionage on the ego in order to have the self" (Heidegger 1982, p. 159).

Hence the utter familiarity of everyday events; and this utter familiarity, in its turn, may conceal their artfulness (or "work") as practical self-understandings. In this case, it is completely in line with Heidegger's position to consider them as both hidden and transparent. Indeed, their constitution in (and as) familiar

practice would seem to make this double predicate necessary. In this respect, as Dreyfus (1991, p. 35) points out, the Heideggerian hidden/transparent double is similar to Wittgenstein's version of the matter when he writes:

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck him. – And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and powerful (Wittgenstein 1953, #129).

So, what is it to act in such a way? Okrent goes on to say that I, the one who so-acts, am the for-sake-of-which (das Umwillen). In bringing about the end that I will be (for example, the one who has hammered, or spoken, or read) I don't, in a separate and distinct act of consciousness, think about this end. Rather I have a projection (Entwurf) (Okrent 1988, p. 36; cf. Schütz 1967, p. 59); and this is not so much a thought-out scheme or plan as a pro-jection: a throwing of existence ahead of itself. And this projected end is always (only ever) a possibility rather than a definite calculation. Hence:

Projecting has nothing to do with comports oneself towards a plan that has been thought out, and in accordance with which Dasein arranges its being. On the contrary, any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities (Heidegger 1962, p. 185).

Moreover, this cannot be reduced to "the given contents of what we have in mind" (Heidegger 1962, p. 185). In this way, "our self-understanding is ... our practical understanding of things; and the end that we understand ourselves as is the end that is implicit in the activities in which we are engaged" (Okrent 1988, pp. 36-37; my emphasis). So social being, as such, turns out to be what one pursues and cares for: "In everyday terms, we understand ourselves and our

existence by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care of” (Heidegger 1982, p. 159).

In Heidegger’s later work (for example his lectures on the pre-Socratics) this aspect of social being appears as a crucial feature of the ancient accounts of coming-to-presence. There (1975), Heidegger refers to it as Ruch (“reck”) and makes it clear that reck (as care, heed, consideration or regard) is a fundamental property of order: “we shall speak of $\tau\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$ [tisis] as the reck corresponding to $\delta\iota\kappa\eta$ [dike], order” (1975, p. 47). In this sense order (including social order) is effected by, and in its turn effects, what it is we “pursue and care for,” our “reck.” This is one way of approaching “equipment” (and hence “methods”); for we have a practical understanding of equipment (as tools and their proper know-how) and this practical understanding is exactly the same as the self-understanding of Dasein as the purposes “implicit in its activity with the tools” (Okrent 1988, p. 38).

Again in parallel with Garfinkel (and his notion of a gestalt contexture as the field of reflexive activity), Heidegger posits a “functionality contexture” (Bewandtniszusammenhang) (Okrent 1988, p. 40) such that the notion of world (cf. “plenum” in Garfinkel’s recent work) can be understood as the totality of functionality contextures. It is this “relational totality” that Heidegger calls “significance” (Okrent 1988, p. 43). Hence significance is not a property of secondary interpretations – on the part of members or analysts – just as, for Garfinkel, “everyday practices [are] not ... signed enterprises.” Rather “we display our understanding of significance whenever we display our practical understanding of things, whenever we use them appropriately” (Okrent 1988, p. 43).

Accordingly, we can summarize the pragmatic reading of Heidegger as follows. Dasein is, from the start, and through and through, social. It is never not social. Its mark is its intentionality as self-understanding. Self-understanding is practical, functional, understanding towards an end. The totality of this functionality is the world which is organized typically. Typicality means the

proper or competent use of tools/methods by, in, or as, a society. In turn “a society” is “who uses the same tools in the same way – typically,” in “everyday being with one another” (Okrent, 1988, p. 50). In a crucial sense, as we have seen, this is extremely close to what Garfinkel means by “member” and “membership” in his early work. It is a collection of methods, tools, equipment, pragmata. “Member,” in this sense, glosses not only “Dasein” but “they” [das Man] – it is both Heidegger’s and EM’s central topic, “the ... being of everydayness”:

In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the newspaper, every Other is like the next.... We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the “great mass” as they shrink back; we find “shocking” what they find shocking. The “they,” which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness (Heidegger 1962, p. 164).^{vii}

More importantly, perhaps, Dasein does not depend on either a prior inner capacity or on a pre-given external world for its being. Instead, as social practice, it makes its own being reflexively – and this in a sense closely akin to Garfinkel’s use of the term. That is, in making itself, Dasein uses equipment (tools and methods for their use) and, in and as that use, it constantly displays its own competence in the use of equipment – such that the activity of using and the displaying (or in Garfinkel, accounting) are identical. This reflexivity is not just an epiphenomenon of the being of everydayness; it is at its core.

4. Concluding remarks

At the outset of this investigation it would probably have seemed to most ethnomethodologists absurd to argue (1) that EM’s topic and resource can be called “understanding” and (2) that understanding is a kind of revelation (in fact it is self-revelation). This would no doubt have appeared unduly psychologistic in

the first case and mystical in the second. But having come this short way through Heidegger's later work on the ontological difference and then his earlier work on Dasein's understanding, it may now be possible to glimpse what Garfinkel could possibly have meant by the term "Heideggerian." Of course, there must be caveats.

Firstly, we must remember that reading Heidegger as a pragmatist is only one possible reading. The Heidegger we have encountered here is indeed a "transcendental" Heidegger (Okrent 1988, p. 9). But he is also, at the same time, "anti-mentalistic, verificationist, pragmatic, and anti-metaphysical" (Okrent 1988, p. 9) and so he at least equates with most versions of EM on four out of five predicates. The question of the transcendental, then, remains to be investigated on another occasion and may or may not prove a crucial difference.

Secondly, it's unclear whether the kind of pragmatics we find in EM is quite on all fours with Heidegger's said pragmatism. That pragmatism is, after all, a philosophical position (in fact a pragmatist ontology) in search of the general underlying conditions of everydayness. That is why Heidegger's topic is "the kind of being of everydayness" whereas, in the case of EM, we may have to elide the words "kind of" (as we did above). That is, EM may not, in quite the same sense as Heidegger-pragmatist, be looking for kinds of anything, let alone for categories of being (Brandom 1983); albeit that the grounding conditions of everydayness (as witnessable details of methodic, accountable actions) are central to it. So while EM (at least in Garfinkel's version of it) appears to share something like Heidegger's view of what those general conditions are, it is still the case that EM takes a very different interest in those conditions – an interest which might (as we have seen, in contradistinction to a "pragmatism") be called a "pragmatics." Its interest is much more in the description of the particulars of everydayness. Indeed we might say that what Heidegger and EM respectively "pursue and care for" are very different things. And, to that extent, we are dealing with different communities. But the differences are, in another sense, minimal; for we could

think of both the Heideggerian and the EM projects as motivated by a mutual interest in revealing the self-revealing properties (EM) or the self-revealing conditions (Heidegger) of the (kind of) being of everydayness.

With this said, however, it is still important to keep in mind that, as we saw earlier, EM's interest may lie in both the witnessable details of coming-to-presence (as one side of the ontological difference) and in assembling constant reminders of the ontological difference itself as it operates despite the apparent blindness towards it of mainstream social science (FA, as Garfinkel calls it). In this sense, EM, as a kind of analytics of coming-to-presence, opens up a very broad range of social phenomena invisible to FA. But, perhaps more importantly, as a kind of social theory that thematizes the ontological difference, it also opens up a possibility of thinking about social being that is utterly unique. In fact, EM might be the only extant example of what sociology would look like when certain Heideggerian concerns are taken into account, and, if so, this will be the case whether or not it was "designed" or "intended" to be so.^{viii}

Notes

1. My source is one of the anonymous reviewers for Human Studies. I have not had the privilege to attend these events as directly witnessable occasions—though I did hear Garfinkel deliver his account of “tick bracketed” phenomena (Garfinkel and Wieder 1992) in Calgary in 1989. In this and many other respects I am very grateful to the journal’s reviewers. They have prompted me to produce a different paper from my initial and tentative notes, and one which I hope is stronger but not unduly over-confident.
2. Another point of entry into the same question would be Dreyfus’s (1991, p. 34) cryptic statement: “In Division I Heidegger elaborates what he calls an interpretation of Dasein in its everydayness. The understanding in everyday practices and discourse, overlooked by the practitioners, has become the subject of much recent hermeneutic investigation. Harold Garfinkel in sociology ... pursue[s] this type of hermeneutic concern.” After this, Dreyfus makes no further mention of Garfinkel and does not elaborate on his putative uptake of Heidegger.
3. In referring to Husserl’s “mentalism”, we must be careful to avoid reading this as covering the totality of Husserl’s thought. That is, we need to distinguish his “mentalistic” epistemic position from his “social” ontic framework. All elements of the former category (subjective acts of consciousness) are embedded in the latter (the lifeworld) and, on some readings at least, the latter precedes and is the sine qua non of the former. The “critique” of mentalism, then, properly begins with the question of whether we need this division at all. My thanks to Professor Horst Ruthrof for this important caveat.
4. One way of putting this is to say, with Schütz (1964) that social phenomena come “pre-interpreted”, unlike natural phenomena. This is Schütz’s distinction between first- (natural) and second- (social) order constructs. There is a similar distinction between ontological categories in Division One of Being and Time. Here we find Vorhandene (what is present at hand) distinguished from Zuhandene (what is ready to hand). The former consist of “the objective person-independent, causally interacting subjects of natural scientific inquiry” (Brandom 1983, p. 387); the latter of “those which a neo-

Kantian would describe as having been imbued with human values and significances” (Brandom 1983, p. 387). Dasein is yet a third category of being, “in whose structure the origins of the [previous] two thing-ish categories are to be found” (Brandom 1983, p. 387). Hence the non-traditional ontological prioritisation by Heidegger of Zuhandene.

5. There is still a possibility in this argument that members’ natural understandings being identical with their practical actions and not superadditions is a quite different matter from the superaddition of explanations (after the fact) by professional investigators. In addition, whether members’ practical actions constitute understandings or (at least in one sense) interpretations is a thorny problem in its own right. On this matter see Colebrook and McHoul (1996).

6. Again, I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers who has reminded me that the primary sense of “reflexivity” in Garfinkel refers to the reflexivity of accounting practices. Extended accounts of the concept can be found in Ashmore (1989), Lynch (1993), Czyzewski (1993) and Peyrot (1982).

7. This is from the standard translation. Okrent (1988, p. 50) modifies this to some extent and includes a typographical error (“literature and art” becomes “literature and are”).

8. This final sentence is a paraphrase of remarks by one of the journal’s reviewers. I could not put it better.

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