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The Economic, Political, and Social Implications of Environmental Crises

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The Economic, Political, and Social Implications of Environmental Crises

- 4 Workshop title: Environmental Crises as Economic, Political, and Social Crises
- 5 What: An interdisciplinary group of scientists working on human-environment
6 interactions discussed the state of knowledge on the economic,
7 political, and social implications of environmental crises and identified
8 pathways for future research
- 9 When: August 5–6, 2019
- 10 Where: Georg Eckert Institute, Braunschweig, Germany

11

12 Global environmental crises are intensifying to a worrisome degree, and increasingly
13 intertwined. Anthropogenic climate change, for example, threatens human security through
14 more frequent and intense extreme weather events like heat waves, droughts, and floods.
15 At the same time, it aggravates problems related to soil degradation, biodiversity loss, and
16 water scarcity, among others. These developments have been hypothesized to affect
17 patterns of economic development, political stability, and human mobility. But while the
18 underlying ecological, climatological, and (geo)physical changes are undeniable,
19 environmental crises are perceived and framed by experts, decision makers, and broader
20 publics in heterogeneous ways. This further complicates research on, and action upon, these
21 growing environmental problems.

22 An interdisciplinary workshop¹ was held in summer 2019 at the Georg Eckert Institute
23 in Braunschweig, Germany, to discuss the interlinked economic, political, and social
24 consequences of environmental crises, and the role of discourses and perceptions in this
25 context.

26

27 **The Social Construction of Environmental Crises**

28 The speakers in the first session distinguished between two dimensions—if not deeper
29 understandings—of environmental crises. First, and in line with a realist epistemology, the
30 part of nature that surrounds human societies (the environment) is rapidly changing. These
31 changes are man-made and—as humans depend on a broad range of ecosystem services—
32 will profoundly affect human societies. Second, drawing on a constructivist epistemology,
33 the framing of a given environmental change—including the question of whether it even
34 constitutes a crisis at all—is heterogeneous and often contested.

35 For instance, a presentation on two coastal cities in Germany that are similarly
36 vulnerable to a rise in sea levels illustrated diverging public debates about the local impact of
37 climate change. In Lübeck, the potential flooding of the old city is securitized as a major
38 concern that is closely linked to the identity of the city as an important cultural center. The
39 local media in Rostock, by contrast, highlights the increased prospects of tourism that a
40 changing climate could provide for the economically weak city, thus foregoing securitization.

41 Different social constructions of environmental crises are deeply tied to political
42 struggles. An assessment of climate security discourses showed that in the United States,

¹ The workshop was co-organized by the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research (GEI), by the GIGA German Institute for Global Area Studies, and by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK). The workshop was funded by and linked with the Leibniz Association's research alliance [Crises in a Globalised World](#).

43 climate change has been increasingly tied to issues of national security and political
44 instability. This has increased overall awareness of climate-related risks, but also limited the
45 influence of traditional environmental actors. The German discourse, by contrast, focuses on
46 human security; until very recently, it constructed populations in the Global South as
47 requiring the assistance of benevolent Western saviors, risking the reproduction of colonial
48 imaginations.

49 Portrayals of environmental crises in the education sector were found to be political as
50 well. For instance, many states in the Middle East and North Africa tend to utilize their
51 education systems to portray themselves as competent and successful in addressing
52 environmental challenges. School textbooks rather blame individual citizens or outsiders for
53 environmental degradation, hence providing legitimacy to political and economic elites.

54

55 **Human Mobility During and After Environmental Crises**

56 The second session focused on migration, flight, and displacement in the context of
57 environmental crises. Interest in human mobility as a second-order effect of climate change
58 has increased continuously over the last few decades, and fluctuates between taking
59 securitization, depoliticization, and migration-friendly perspectives. The session showcased
60 and brought into dialogue different methodological and epistemological approaches to the
61 topic.

62 Using numerical models of climate-induced migration, the first contribution argued
63 that climate change has an impact on mobility patterns but is not the largest driver thereof.
64 The underlying causal connections and intervening variables are also not well understood
65 yet. However migration is, after all, a process that starts on the individual or household level,
66 illustrating the need for qualitative research on the topic. This was shown by means of an

67 ethnography of the Ewe Diaspora in/from Ghana, which discussed how environmental
68 changes are narrated in affected populations—hence decentering debates about
69 environment and migration. Similarly, a methodological framework of legal anthropology is
70 helpful in understanding climate change-related migration within and from the Pacific
71 Islands. Insights from in-depth field research provided arguments for more migration-
72 friendly solutions and the inclusion of local voices in research and policy.

73 The last contribution utilized the concept of the Anthropocene to rethink how we even
74 understand “climate-induced migration.” The concept questions the nature-culture divide
75 that was foundational for the thinking of the Enlightenment; what is more, it asks how
76 human transformations of the Earth exacerbate inequalities that may lead to displacement,
77 and how these transformations are produced by economies, institutions, discourses, and
78 practices. It thus helps to uncover issues of power and social stratification underlying
79 different levels of (im)mobility.

80 In the discussion, the workshop participants not only assessed how natural and social
81 sciences have treated climate-related migration so far—including via critical engagement
82 with determinism, alarmism, and the prominent role of causality. They also exchanged views
83 on the relationship between academia and policymaking. Herein they reflected on how
84 research topics are chosen, and how insights from environment-migration research are
85 employed in political debates.

86

87 **Environmental Crises and Political Instability**

88 Given the magnitude of current-day environmental crises, the presenters agreed that
89 they are likely to impact patterns of political instability and especially intrastate violence. For
90 climate-related disasters in particular, such a link is relatively well established. However, as

91 for human mobility environmental stress is only a marginal driver of conflict when compared
92 to economic and political factors. Also, disaster-conflict links can only be detected in a
93 relatively small number of cases characterized by preexisting vulnerability profiles such as
94 poverty and ethnic exclusion.

95 Important knowledge gaps on the topic continue to exist. Teleconnections between
96 environmental crises and instability remain underexplored, with a nexus between droughts
97 in Russia, rising grain prices in the Middle East, and the Arab Spring just one example.
98 Research also focuses strongly on the macroeconomic level (e.g. resource scarcity, economic
99 growth). Micro-level, physiological, psychological, and sociological explanations connecting
100 climate change to violence—for example via heat-induced aggression—deserve further
101 exploration meanwhile. Finally, examples like the de-escalation of the civil wars in the
102 aftermath of Typhoons Sendong in 2011 and Haiyan in 2013, which was a prerequisite for
103 the delivery of humanitarian aid, demonstrate that environmental crises can also have a
104 positive impact on peace and security. Such possibilities, however, are often marginalized,
105 especially in security-oriented national discourses on the topic like those prevalent in the US.

106 The latter insight is also true for debates on climate change of the Group of Twenty
107 (G20), which the last presentation of the session addressed. While the G20 has discussed
108 anthropogenic climate change since 2008, and issues of peace and security since 2013 (if not
109 earlier), no intersections between both phenomena have been recognized so far. In line with
110 this, while climate change is described as a great challenge it is nevertheless not constructed
111 as a crisis. Rather, the G20 emphasizes routine procedures to deal with the problem (e.g.
112 climate financing, the UNFCCC framework).

113

114 **Economic Impacts of Environmental Crises**

115 The session provided ample evidence for the adverse economic impact of extreme weather
116 events—sudden and often scarcely predictable environmental crises. In countries with a low
117 gross domestic product, hydrometeorological droughts can reduce economic growth for up
118 to fourteen years. This effect is stable across a number of model specifications, and for all
119 world regions. Similarly, very harsh winters (*dzud*) put a heavy burden on all but the richest
120 herding households in Mongolia. Sample data show a livestock mortality rate of up to 71
121 percent, which decreases food security and the chance that children complete basic
122 education. This effect is significant in the decade after a *dzud*, again underscoring the
123 potential long-term economic effects of extreme weather events. While wealth plays a key
124 intermediary role, future research should identify additional factors that make countries and
125 households more resilient to such events.

126 In line with the insights gained during other discussions, discourses and perceptions
127 were identified as crucial to understanding the economic impacts of environmental crises.
128 Stock markets, for example, react to more than just the severity and economic effects of
129 hurricanes. Low media coverage of hurricanes in the US and frequent reference to a more
130 devastating earlier event (Hurricane Katrina) have been found to be associated with positive
131 reactions among stock prices.

132 The final presentation touched upon the economic consequences of societal efforts to
133 mitigate climate change. An ambitious coal phaseout in Germany, for instance, is predicted
134 to decrease both employment and wage levels in the three extracting regions to at least to
135 some degree, hence potentially leading to conflicts between economic, climate, and social
136 policies. This finding tied back to the two previous sessions, in noting that the impacts of
137 human mitigation and adaptation efforts vis-à-vis environmental crises on mobility and
138 violent conflict remain understudied.

139

140 **Conclusion**

141 Environmental crises increasingly interact with one another in complex and hard to predict
142 ways, such as potentially critical interactions between planetary boundary transgressions in
143 the dimensions of anthropogenic climate change and biosphere integrity loss. They have
144 various impacts on human societies that again intersect with each other, for instance when
145 weather extremes reduce economic growth—thus increasing the violent-conflict risks that
146 make migration more likely. Such societal impacts can again be severe enough to result in
147 multiple crises, but also mitigate such dynamics in certain contexts too (e.g. migration as
148 adaptation, less violence after typhoons).

149 Debates during the workshop made clear that a comprehensive understanding of
150 these interlinkages is only possible if the ecological, climatological, (geo)physical, as well as
151 socially constructed dimensions of environmental crises are all taken into consideration.
152 Seeking a broader understanding such as this will enable scientists to lay bare the political
153 implications of various framings of environmental crises, and to devise mitigation and
154 adaptation measures sensitive to local cultures and knowledge stocks. Such an endeavor is
155 certainly ambitious, and will require continuous interdisciplinary cooperation across multiple
156 methodological, epistemological, and ontological positions. Nevertheless, it ultimately
157 promises to be a worthwhile pursuit indeed.