Partial belief as a solution to the logical problem of holding simultaneous, contrary beliefs in self-deception research
Gibbins, K. (1997) Partial belief as a solution to the logical problem of holding simultaneous, contrary beliefs in self-deception research. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20 (1). pp. 115-116.
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Abstract
A major worry in self-deception research has been the implication that people can hold a belief that something is true and false at the same time: a logical as well as a psychological impossibility. However, if beliefs are held with imperfect confidence, voluntary self-deception in the sense of seeking evidence to reject an unpleasant belief becomes entirely plausible and demonstrably real.
Item Type: | Journal Article |
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Murdoch Affiliation(s): | School of Psychology |
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press |
Copyright: | © 1997 Cambridge University Press |
Notes: | Commentary |
URI: | http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/5490 |
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