Partial belief as a solution to the logical problem of holding simultaneous, contrary beliefs in self-deception research

Gibbins, K. (1997) Partial belief as a solution to the logical problem of holding simultaneous, contrary beliefs in self-deception research. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20 (1). pp. 115-116.

Abstract

A major worry in self-deception research has been the implication that people can hold a belief that something is true and false at the same time: a logical as well as a psychological impossibility. However, if beliefs are held with imperfect confidence, voluntary self-deception in the sense of seeking evidence to reject an unpleasant belief becomes entirely plausible and demonstrably real.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Murdoch Affiliation(s):	School of Psychology
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Copyright:	© 1997 Cambridge University Press
Notes:	Commentary
URI:	http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/5490

Item Control Page

Downloads