Just traditions? Deconstruction, critical legal studies, and analytic jurisprudence
Briggs, R. (2001) Just traditions? Deconstruction, critical legal studies, and analytic jurisprudence. Social Semiotics, 11 (3). pp. 257-274.
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Abstract
At the time of its presentation, Derrida's 'Force of law' represented deconstruction's perhaps most direct statement on the possibility of justice and its most explicit engagement with law. The ensuing responses to that paper have typically focused on deconstruction's position regarding the force and authority of law, and especially on what is taken as Derrida's theory of justice. As such, 'Force of law' is often discussed in isolation to mainstream legal philosophy or is otherwise understood to represent a radical counter to that tradition. It is possible to take a different direction, however, by considering the event of that paper's presentation and reception in relation not only to the existing disciplines of legal studies, but also to the problematic of discipline itself. Re-reading some of the work of contemporary legal philosophy in the light of that problematic may thus enable a certain questioning of the disciplinary divisions whose very institution underscores the 'radical' nature of deconstruction's 'critique' of traditional understandings of law. Such a re-reading may even allow a speculation upon a certain (trans)disciplinarity of deconstruction, reconsidering the latter's relation to traditions.
Item Type: | Journal Article |
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Publisher: | Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group |
Copyright: | © 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd. |
URI: | http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/34887 |
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