

## Heretical Reading of Arendt: The Space of Thinking

---

Lubica Učník  
Philosophy, Murdoch University

In this paper, I shall consider Hannah Arendt's analyses of the *vita contemplativa*, focusing mainly on her discussion of the mental faculty she calls thinking and her 'utilisation' of work and *homo faber* in relation to 'knowledge' that she derives from the *vita activa*, the "three fundamental human activities: labor, work, and action".<sup>1</sup>

Arendt's work is defined by her attempt to rethink the space of freedom and the problematic nature of 'objective' of knowledge. To rethink these problems, many philosophers turned to the Ancient Greek heritage to rethink the role and place of humans in the world.<sup>2</sup> One of those attempts is Arendt's work. As I will argue in this paper, her project is inconsistent. Her animosity towards 'professional philosophers', especially Plato and Edmund Husserl, makes her heedless to the presuppositions that she tries to unravel.

Throughout her life, Arendt refused to be labelled a philosopher. According to her, philosophers are hostile to the sphere of action, that is, the political realm, which she argues is – as all action – unpredictable. No acting is done in isolation; every act is a beginning of something new. Yet each act interferes with the acting of others, hence no one can predict the outcome of one's own actions.<sup>3</sup> No man in the singular, but men in plural "live and move and act in this world".<sup>4</sup> Beginning with Plato, philosophers were not content with the unpredictability of action. They attempted to rework the free political space and secure it using the utilitarian mentality of *homo faber*. Instead of accepting action, as the fundamental characteristic of the political space, they began to 'produce' models of political systems. Political philosophy is, Arendt claims, a redefinition of politics on the model of production, where the end is foreseeable, as when one produces a vase, there is a clear *telos* of the process, the vase itself. The archetypal example for her is Plato.<sup>5</sup> At his old age, he went three times to "the tyrant of Syracuse" to teach him how to become "a philosopher king".<sup>6</sup>

According to Arendt, in his opposition to the unpredictability of the political action, Plato's king-philosopher is an attempt to put a tyrant in charge of public affairs,<sup>7</sup> by changing the political space into the space of production.<sup>8</sup>

I suggest that, in order to consider her 'subject matter,' Arendt actually adopts the *homo faber's* order of 'means and ends', which she accuses Plato of using in his restructuring of the space of action and which – she maintains – is a defining characteristic of the beginning of modern science. In other words, her analysis is framed by the methodology of modern scientific inquiry. She unwittingly accepts the scientific standpoint of an 'outside, disinterested' observer, based on the means and ends categories of *homo faber* while she also affirms the modern separation between mind and body. She accepts the space of the *ego*, where she places her faculty of thinking, without considering Husserl's critique of psychologism. For her, body is related to labour, one of the active characteristics of the *vita activa*, while thinking is a non-active human characteristic of the *vita contemplativa*, an *ego* outside of time and place. Her concern with "thinking and other invisible and soundless activities" is framed as a question concerning the possibility of their appearance. Is it possible for thinking to "find an adequate home in the world"?<sup>9</sup> Arendt's question is, in fact, a question about 'it'; thinking is something that one investigates, not an activity that one actually does. Her inquiry presupposes the split between thinking and the world, between mental states (to use the modern terminology) and the world where we encounter things in our everyday living. She implicitly accepts the modern philosophy of subjectivity with its pendant of scientific objectivity,<sup>10</sup> with no attempt to take into account Husserl's attempt to rethink it.

According to Arendt, Husserl's "positive philosophy"<sup>11</sup> is based on "the anti-historical and anti-metaphysical implications of the slogan '*Zu den Sachen selbst*' [back to things themselves]".<sup>12</sup> His attempt is to console us about something which is impossible, "namely, that man is forced to affirm a Being that he did not create and that is alien to his very nature."<sup>13</sup> As she writes, modern human experience is homeless, because it is defined by objectivity of knowledge and subjectivity of

mental processes. It is the outcome of the “twofold flight[:] from the earth into the universe and from the world into the self”.<sup>14</sup> In other words, when a God ceases to be the creator of the world and the guarantor of knowledge, the ground of knowledge is banished into the consciousness. Consciousness supposedly affirms and grounds the existence of what is outside of it, namely, extended things in the world. Husserl’s naïve philosophy wants to affirm “what man cannot be: the creator of the world and of himself.” Arendt insists that in his “arrogant modesty,” Husserl’s concept of consciousness takes the place of “God: in the role of the ‘lord of Being’”.<sup>15</sup>

Jan Patočka’s rethinking of the modern philosophy of subjectivity might be helpful in this regard. In his book *Body, Community, Language, World*, he explains the difference between Greek philosophy and its modern counterpart, inaugurated by the Cartesian doubter. For the Ancients, “*psychē* is ... understood ... always in the third person, impersonally, as a vital function”.<sup>16</sup> Patočka notes that “Ancient philosophy is a philosophy of the thing”, overlooking the structure of ‘I-you-it’, not noticing that our experience is always personal.<sup>17</sup> René Descartes discovers what we call today consciousness – *ego cogito* – the certainty of our own thinking. Regardless of this important discovery, he leaves the *ego* behind, concentrating on the certainty of *res extensa* that *cogito* assures. Modern science continues in this spirit. Science looks at objects of its investigations – *res extensa* – from the third person perspective, stripped of all personal attributes.<sup>18</sup> Whereas the Ancient Greeks overlooked the personal, as Patočka notes, the modern scientific method *deliberately* excludes the personal as subjective, supposedly unreliable, lacking an objective attitude.

To return to Arendt’s inquiry, her question “What are we ‘doing’ when we do nothing but think?”<sup>19</sup> is meaningful only if we realise that the matter to be ‘investigated’ is ‘thinking’. Thinking ceases to be the thinking of a person, you or me, and becomes thinking as such. Arendt eliminates the personal situation. It is not a forgetting of the personal dimension of ‘I-you-it’, as the Ancient philosophy did, but it is the point of view of an observer, considering from the outside this ‘thing’, which she calls the faculty of thinking.

For Arendt, the “objectivizing thought” – in other words, the search for knowledge – is *not* thinking. She alleges that, in the modern age, thinking becomes “the hand-maiden of science, of organized knowledge” because the fundamental premise of this age is that “I can know only what I myself make”.<sup>20</sup> In order to rehabilitate thinking, she posits a complete, non-negotiable disjunction between knowledge and thinking. Rather than to question the modern status of knowledge, she accepts it. Knowledge deals with things present and aims at truth. Thinking is occupied with something that is not present, for example, as to think about a colour of a rose that is not here. Thinking deals with invisibles and aims at meaning. Yet, “even thinking cannot manage without experience; it needs the garden and the roses, but perceives something else in them. How strange that we have to see in order to perceive what we cannot see”.<sup>21</sup> So, she asks Heidegger: “What is experience, really, and its Janus face?”<sup>22</sup> The issue of thinking becomes a problem of a relation between thinking and experience that for Kant constitutes our finite knowledge.

In her last book, *The Life of the Mind*,<sup>23</sup> she takes two different approaches to thinking and its relation to experience, making her separation between thinking and knowledge problematic.<sup>24</sup> One route is defined by the Socratic ‘two-in-one’, a dialogue of me with myself, where the ‘internal’ unity and harmony of thinking is important. In other words, it is a dialogue between me and my conscience. In her other approach, she considers thinking in its relation to appearances. Despite her best intentions, she overlooks that to think about invisibles, as she calls thinking, means to take into account experience in this double aspect; to think this ‘Janus face’ of experience. To think about appearances means to recall experience that is no more, yet it once was. It is not the pure Kantian reason. In this instance, meaning and knowledge cannot be easily separated, if they can be separated at all. To recall Kant, “Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind”.<sup>25</sup>

### **The Gap in Time**

I have a feeling of futility in everything I do. Compared to what is at stake, everything looks frivolous. I know this feeling disappears when I let myself fall into the gap between past and future, which is the proper temporal locus of thought.<sup>26</sup>

In *LoM*, reflecting on where we are when we think, she suggests that a consideration of thinking is “valid only within the realm of mental phenomena”. Thinking forms the “small non-time space in the heart of time”.<sup>27</sup> This thinking time is *nunc stans*, “the clash of past and future”,<sup>28</sup> where “the activity of thinking gathers the absent tenses, the not-yet and the no-more, together into its own presence”.<sup>29</sup>

In 1946, Arendt thinks of a different gap. She reflects on the span of time between “the fateful year of 1914 onwards, until the death factories of Europe”, when the “chain” of tradition of “two thousand years is broken” creating a gap “between a past which we have irretrievably lost and the future which is not yet at hand”. For her, the collapse of the tradition opened “an abyss of empty space and time,” revealing “a kind of historical no-man’s land...which can be described only in terms of ‘no longer and not yet’.”<sup>30</sup>

Arendt returns to this gap in our tradition in 1961,<sup>31</sup> when she identifies this gap with “an experience in thinking” and uses Kafka’s parable *He* to explain it.<sup>32</sup> Kafka’s ‘He’ stands between “the clashing waves of past and future”, trying to win his present by jumping out of the fighting line to become an umpire of these two forces that have been crushing him from both sides.<sup>33</sup> ‘He’ wants to jump out of time to some imagined place outside of the movement that human life is.

In *LoM*, Kafka’s story of “He” is a metaphor for “the activity of thinking.” The fight of Kafka’s protagonist against *his* past and *his* future – the time of no more and not yet – stands for “a fight against time”.<sup>34</sup> In this fighting zone defined by Arendt as ‘now’, as “this present which is timeless”, the forces of a bellicose past and future ambush ‘him’.<sup>35</sup> According to her, “time is the thinking ego’s” biggest adversary, not only because the past and the future are crushing him from both sides, but also because the thinking *ego* is incarnated in the physical body, and body always disrupts the *ego*’s thinking quietude.<sup>36</sup> For Arendt, then, to think the past and the future ceases to be a harmonious dialogue between me and myself, where thinking confronts its own impossibility to know and becomes thinking of the gap between the past and the future.

## The Space of Thinking

Truth is what we are compelled to admit by the nature either of our senses or of our brain. The proposition that everybody who is “was meant to be” can easily be refuted; but the certainty of the I “was meant to be” will survive refutation intact because it is inherent in every thinking reflection on the I-am.<sup>37</sup>

In *LoM*, returning to the modern age and the conviction that “I can know only what I myself make”,<sup>38</sup> which is, according to Arendt, cognition derived from the mentality of *homo faber*, she proposes to address thinking, willing, and judging.

As noted, thinking and cognition are different human abilities and they are not compatible. In addition, logical reasoning is “a sort of brain power” which she equates with “the labor power [that] the human animal develops in its metabolism with nature.” She insists that we can measure the “mental processes which feed on brain power we usually call intelligence,” in the same way as we can measure “bodily strength”. For Arendt, the laws of logic and the laws of nature are the same and they are “ultimately rooted in the structure of the human brain”. Our brain structure forces us to agree that  $2+2=4$ .<sup>39</sup> Modern science is an outcome of mathematics. In mathematics, “the mind appears to play only with itself...delivering the key to those laws of nature and the universe that are concealed by appearances”.<sup>40</sup> She claims that “this type of intelligence” is “a mere function of the life process itself”. For Arendt, “this brain power and the compelling logical processes it generates are not capable of erecting a world”, because they are “as wordless as the compulsory processes of life, labor, and consumption”.<sup>41</sup>

Logical reasoning and labour are driven by biological life, while cognition, or intellect, corresponds to the category of making, derived from the mentality of *homo faber*. It seems, then, that the last category, thinking, or the Kantian reason, should have its roots in action. Yet, this match is problematic and Arendt offers no explanation. On the one hand, action presupposes men acting together in the space of the multitude; on the other hand, the thinking of the timeless *ego* resides in the gap between the past and the future. There is no possibility of interdependence between action and thinking. Yet, this is what she wants to establish.<sup>42</sup>

It might be argued that Arendt's model for thinking is *praxis* and for cognition *poiesis*, while 'logical reasoning' is a biological function. So, the brain functions the same way as humans function when securing the means of sustenance, while "the cognitive process", as *poiesis*, always strives for some final result and after reaching the end, after a solution is found, ceases to be. By contrast, thinking, as *praxis*, "has neither an end nor an aim outside itself, and it does not even produce results".<sup>43</sup>

Thinking curls up upon itself in the gap in time: 'no longer and not yet'.

For Arendt, there is no link between the world of our senses and thinking.<sup>44</sup> Thinking engages with what is no more and not yet. When a thinker enters the world and engages with others, she stops thinking. Here is the problematic tension between the two different modes of thinking: either thinking is a two-in-one dialogue or thinking thinks about appearances, which cease to be in real time by perceiving "something else in them". But what is a connection between thinking about invisibles and thinking as a two-in-one dialogue?<sup>45</sup> If thinking is this dialogue of the two-in-one, a dialogue of questions and answers, it cannot be timeless. Yet, for Arendt, thinking is in no time. It proceeds, so to speak, in *nunc stans*. In this "abiding now" in "the instant that knows no temporal articulation".<sup>46</sup> Thinking swirls in this gap between past and future.<sup>47</sup>

It seems that Arendt, despite her objections (and in opposition to Heidegger) agrees with Husserl's conception of the "immortality of the transcendental ego",<sup>48</sup> when she writes, the "ego is sheer activity and therefore ageless, sexless, without qualities, and without a life story". For her, "the thinking ego is not the self".<sup>49</sup> Yet, if the thinking *ego* is not the self and it is without a life story, how can the *ego* unravel yesterday's thinking and what would the dialogue of the two-in-one be about? How could the harmony and consistency of thinking be maintained if there is no 'a life story'?

Another problem is how to reconcile this thinking *ego* without a life-story and Arendt's stress on plurality of action? If thinking curls up upon itself in the gap, which is not only timeless, but outside of time, how can 'thinking' (and putting it in the third person does not solve the problem) undo what thinking thought yesterday?<sup>50</sup>

How can thinking unravel beliefs passed on by the tradition, if timelessness is the law of the thinking *ego*? After all, to unravel old beliefs must be in time.

## Time

At the heart of Arendt's project is the problem of time: the time of thinking as well as the historical time of her analysis of the human condition.

According to Arendt, thinking thinks outside of time, in this 'abiding now', in the *nunc stans*. However, as Aristotle says, "if there were no time, there would be no 'now', and vice versa".<sup>51</sup> Therefore, to say 'time' and 'now' is already a human judgment from the position of the human finite time limited by birth and death. 'Now' nullifies timelessness as well as the cyclical movement of nature – the perpetual swinging of day and night, of seasons, of growth and decay.<sup>52</sup> 'Now' is a part of a rectilinear movement, which human life is, cutting across cyclical time.

Moreover, to say that 'now' is outside of the chronologically measured time by calendars or clocks does not mean that 'now' is in no time at all. If we unravel our thinking of yesterday, as Penelope did her work each morning, then we are talking time.

Perhaps Husserl's discussion of internal time consciousness might help. The 'now' of thinking is not informed by the past, present and future that is measured by mechanical clocks. Husserl insists that 'now' always retains the past in the present while anticipating the future.<sup>53</sup> To put it differently, 'now' is an amalgam of retention and protension. Our thinking – even if it deals with 'invisibles' – is still structured by (what Husserl calls) the consciousness of internal time. The best (and the simplest) example is melody. We simply do not hear 'now', in other words, one tone. We do not hear single tones succeeding each other but we hear a melody. Our thinking synthesises what went before and what we anticipate. In other words, thinking is not outside of time.

Husserl's critique of psychologism, anthropologism, and naturalism can help also with Arendt's equation of logical reasoning and brain processes. His critique of



psychologism should give us pause in reducing logical reasoning to brainpower. According to Patočka, already in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, Husserl suggests that “the characteristic trait of mathematical formations” is “that they... must be freely *constituted by a spontaneous activity*”,<sup>54</sup> which means that the thought ‘operation’ of  $2+2=4$  cannot be “physically located in the brain”, as Arendt claims.<sup>55</sup>

I suggest that the tension between timeless thinking and the human action is a result of the difficulty of reconciling Arendt’s commitment to rethink political theory, which, according to her, came to an end,<sup>56</sup> and her need to rethink ideas passed on by the tradition. The answer to this problem is not easy to indicate, since she never finished her last volume on the human ability to judge. It might also be – as I suggested in this paper – Arendt’s problematic acceptance of the epistemic split between thinking and the world and her dual conception of thinking.

Perhaps, her unfinished volume would have offered the way to deal with the double aspect of thinking and experience, mentioned above. After all, freedom is a human ability to think what is no more and not yet. As Patočka notes, humans are free in regard to what is given to them because they stand “on the boundary between what is and what cannot be described as existent”; what is and what is no more. Humans can think what is no more because they relate to the past, present and future by standing among things, which are different than they are.<sup>57</sup> Humans are not *partes extra partes*. Humans are free.

## Postscript

To end my diachronic dialogue with Arendt, I have to admit that I am still unclear what she means by *thinking*. Time and thinking are related; one is impossible without the other. To *think* through ideas of past thinkers, a dialogue must be synchronic and diachronic at the same time. The timeless *ego*, in a dialogue with ‘itself’, would not be able to unravel what others thought. To unravel ideas presupposes an engagement with thinkers in *their* time as well as in ours. Only then, would we be able – perhaps – to *understand* why they thought what they did. To engage with earlier thinking can reveal – if we are open to the ideas of the past – why certain questions were important

then and ceased to be now. To engage with thinking means to think the past that for us is shrouded in darkness.

By prioritising events at the expense of ideas, Arendt's story passes over an important dimension of the human world.

## Works Cited

- Arendt, Hannah. "The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern." *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968a, 41-90.
- Arendt, Hannah. "Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought." Trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston. *Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954. Uncollected and Unpublished Works by Hannah Arendt*. Ed. Jerome Kohn. First Complete ed. New York, San Diego, London: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994 [1954], 428-447.
- Arendt, Hannah. *Crises of the Republic. Lying in Politics. Civil Disobedience. On Violence. Thoughts on Politics and Revolution*. San Diego, New York, London: A Harvest/HBJ Book; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1972a.
- Arendt, Hannah. *The Human Condition*. Second ed. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998 [1958].
- Arendt, Hannah. "Introduction Into Politics." *The Promise of Politics*. Ed. Jerome Kohn. New York: Schocken Books, 2005a, 93-200.
- Arendt, Hannah. *The Life of the Mind. One/Thinking. Two/Willing*. Ed. Mary McCarthy. One-volume ed. San Diego, New York, London: A Harvest Book, Harcourt Brace & Company, 1978.
- Arendt, Hannah. "Martin Heidegger at Eighty." Trans. Albert Hofstadter. *The New York Review of Books*. Vol. 17. No. 6. October 21 1971, 50-54.
- Arendt, Hannah. "No Longer and Not Yet." *The Nation*. 14 September 1946, 300-302.
- Arendt, Hannah. "Preface: The Gap between Past and Future." *Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968b, 3-15.
- Arendt, Hannah. "Remarks on the Crisis Character of Modern Society. Highlights of the Afternoon Session." *Christianity and Crisis*. Vol. 26. No. 9. 30 May 1966, 112-114.
- Arendt, Hannah. "A Reply to Eric Voegelin." Trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston. *Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954. Uncollected and Unpublished Works by Hannah Arendt*. Ed. Jerome Kohn. First Complete ed. New York, San Diego, London: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994 [1953], 401-408.
- Arendt, Hannah. "Socrates." *The Promise of Politics*. Ed. Jerome Kohn. New York: Schocken Books, 2005b, 5-39.
- Arendt, Hannah. "Thoughts on Politics and Revolution. A Commentary." *Crises of the Republic*. San Diego, New York, London: A Harvest/HBJ Book; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1972b, 199-233.
- Arendt, Hannah. "The Tradition of Political Thought." *The Promise of Politics*. Ed. Jerome Kohn. New York: Schocken Books, 2005c, 40-62.
- Arendt, Hannah. "Truth and Politics." *Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968c, 227-264.
- Arendt, Hannah. "What is Existential Philosophy?" Trans. Robert and Rita Kimber. *Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954. Uncollected and Unpublished Works by Hannah Arendt*. Ed. Jerome Kohn. First Complete ed. New York, San Diego, London: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994 [1948], 163-187.
- Arendt, Hannah and Martin Heidegger. *Letters 1925-1975: Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger*. Trans. Andrew Shields. Ed. Ursula Ludz. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 2004.
- Aristotle. "Physics." Trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye. *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Sixth Printing, with Corrections ed. Bollingen Series LXXI, 2. Vol. Two. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Burt, Edwin Arthur. *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science: A Historical and Critical Essay*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd [Bibliolife], 1925.

- Foucault, Michel. *The Care of the Self. The History of Sexuality*. Trans. Robert Hurley. Vol. 3. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1990.
- Foucault, Michel. "The Ethics of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom." Trans. J. D. Gauthier s.j. *The Final Foucault*. Eds. James Bernauer and David Rasmussen. An Interview with Michel Foucault on January 20, 1984 conducted by Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, Helmut Becker, Alfredo Gomez-Müller. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: The MIT Press, 1994, 1-20.
- Foucault, Michel. *Fearless Speech*. Ed. Joseph Pearson. Semiotext(e). Foreign Agents. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001.
- Foucault, Michel. *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège De France 1981 - 82*. Trans. Graham Burchell. Ed. Frédéric Gros. New York, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 2005.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy*. Trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi. San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984.
- Heidegger, Martin. "On the Essence and Concept of Φύσις in Aristotle's *Physics* B, I." Trans. Thomas Sheehan. *Pathmarks*. Ed. William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998 [1939], 183-230.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Parmenides*. Trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998.
- Heidegger, Martin. "Plato's Doctrine of Truth." Trans. Thomas Sheehan. *Pathmarks*. Ed. William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998 [1931/32, 1940], 155-182.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Plato's Sophist*. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- Heidegger, Martin. *What is a Thing?* Trans. W. B. Barton Jr. and Vera Deutsch. Eugene T. Gendlin, an Analysis. Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1985.
- Heller, Agnes. "Hannah Arendt on the 'Vita Contemplative'." *Hannah Arendt: Thinking, Judging, Freedom*. Eds. Gisela T. Kaplan and Clive S. Kessler. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989, 144-159.
- Husserl, Edmund. "The Apodicticity of Recollection." Trans. Deborah Chaffin. *Husserl Studies*. Vol. 2. 1985, 3-32.
- Husserl, Edmund. *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*. Trans. John Barnett Brough. Ed. Rudolf Bernet. Edmund Husserl: Collected Works. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar. Unified (with all variants from the 1781 and 1787) ed. Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company Inc, 1996 [1781].
- Kouba, Pavel. "Svět lidského Společenství v Díle Hanny Arendtové." *Rubrika Informace. Filosofický Časopis*. No. 4. 1990, 547-557.
- Loewald, Hans W. "Comments on Religious Experience." *Psychoanalysis and the History of the Individual*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978.
- Patočka, Jan. *Aristotelés: Přednášky z Antické Filosofie*. Eds. Ivan Chvatík and Pavel Kouba. Praha: Vyšehrad, spol. s r.o., 1994.
- Patočka, Jan. *Body, Community, Language, World*. Ed. James Dodd. Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1996a.
- Patočka, Jan. "Galileo Galilei a Konec Starověkého Kosmu." *Vesmír*. Vol. 33. No. 1. 1954, 27-29.
- Patočka, Jan. *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History*. Trans. Erazim Kohák. Ed. James Dodd. Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1996b.
- Patočka, Jan. *An Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology*. Trans. Erazim Kohák. Ed. James Dodd. Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 1996c.
- Patočka, Jan. "Negative Platonism: Reflections Concerning the Rise, the Scope, and the Demise of Metaphysics-and Whether Philosophy Can Survive It." Trans. Erazim Kohák. *Jan Patočka*.

- Philosophy and Selected Writings*. Ed. Erazim Kohák. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989 [1953], 175-206.
- Patočka, Jan. *Plato and Europe*. Trans. Petr Lom. Cultural Memory in the Present. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002.
- Patočka, Jan. "Pokus o Českou Národní Filosofii a Jeho Nezdár." *Tři Studie o Masarykovi*. Edice Váhy. Praha: Mladá Fronta, 1991 [1977], 21-52.
- Patočka, Jan. *Sókratés: Přednášky z Antické Filosofie*. Eds. Ivan Chvatík and Pavel Kouba. Praha: Státní Pedagogické Nakladatelství, 1991.
- Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth. *Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982.

<sup>1</sup> Arendt, 1998 [1958], 7

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Heidegger, 1985; Heidegger, 1997; Heidegger, 1998; Heidegger, 1998 [1931/32, 1940]; Heidegger, 1998 [1939]; Heidegger, 1984; Patočka, 1989 [1953]; Patočka, 1991; Patočka, 1994; Patočka, 1996a; Patočka, 1996b; Patočka, 2002; Foucault, 1990; Foucault, 1994; Foucault, 200; Foucault, 2005.

<sup>3</sup> Arendt, 1968a, 84

<sup>4</sup> Arendt, 1998 [1958], 4

<sup>5</sup> Arendt, 1978, I, 94

<sup>6</sup> Arendt, 1971, 53

<sup>7</sup> As she also claims that Heidegger "once succumbed to the temptation to change his 'residence' and to get involved in the world of human affairs. As to the world, he was served somewhat worse than Plato, because the tyrant and his victims were not located beyond the sea, but in his own country" (ibid).

<sup>8</sup> See her discussion in Arendt, 1998 [1958].

<sup>9</sup> Arendt, 1978, I, 23

<sup>10</sup> For a similar claim, see Heller, 1989 and Kouba, 1990.

<sup>11</sup> Arendt, 1994 [1948], 166

<sup>12</sup> Arendt, 1978, I, 9

<sup>13</sup> "to comfort us about the very point in which all modern philosophy can take no comfort whatsoever, namely, that man is forced to affirm a Being that he did not create and that is alien to his very nature" (Arendt, 1994 [1948], 166).

<sup>14</sup> Arendt, 1998 [1958], 6

<sup>15</sup> "to place man where Schelling, in a typical misunderstanding of his own thinking, placed God: in the role of the 'lord of Being'" (Arendt, 1994 [1948], 167).

<sup>16</sup> Patočka, 1996a, 8

<sup>17</sup> As he writes, "we can speak only within a personal situation, defined by the structure I-thou-it" (Patočka, 1996a, 9-10).

<sup>18</sup> See Patočka, 1954, 2; Burt, 1925, 92-9; Patočka, 1996a, 11. See also Patočka, 1996a, 20.

<sup>19</sup> Arendt, 1978, I, 8

<sup>20</sup> Arendt, 1978, I, 7

<sup>21</sup> Arendt and Heidegger, 2004, Letter 128, 20 March 1971, 174

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. In the same letter, she continues, "It is at least possible that a book I am working on – a kind of second volume of the *vita activa* – will still work out after all. On non-active human activities: thinking, wanting, judging. ...But if it does work out – may I dedicate it to you?" (Arendt and Heidegger, 2004, Letter 128, 20 March 1971, 175).

<sup>23</sup> From now on referred to as *LoM*.

<sup>24</sup> See also Kouba, 1990, Section III.

<sup>25</sup> Kant, 1996 [1781], A51, B75

<sup>26</sup> Arendt to McCarthy, 9 February 1968, cited in Young-Bruehl, 1982, 421, italics in original.

<sup>27</sup> Arendt, 1978, I, 210

<sup>28</sup> Ibid

<sup>29</sup> Arendt, 1978, I, 211

<sup>30</sup> Arendt, 1946, 300-301

<sup>31</sup> "When the thread of tradition finally broke, the gap between past and future ceased to be a condition peculiar only to the activity of thought and restricted as an experience to those few who made thinking their primary business. It became a tangible reality and perplexity for all; that is, it became a fact of political relevance" (Arendt, 1968b, 14).

<sup>32</sup> She presents this story also in her "Preface: The Gap between Past and Future" in *Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought* as well as in *The Life of the Mind*. See ibi; Arendt, 1978, 202ff.

<sup>33</sup> Arendt, 1968b, 14

<sup>34</sup> Arendt, 1978, I, 206

<sup>35</sup> Arendt, 1978, I, 210

<sup>36</sup> Arendt, 1978, I, 206

<sup>37</sup> Arendt, 1978, I, 61

<sup>38</sup> Arendt, 1978, I, 7

<sup>39</sup> Arendt, 1998 [1958], 171. See Arendt's repeated claim on "brain power" in *LoM*, Arendt, 1978, I, 61. See also Arendt, 1978, I, 52.

<sup>40</sup> Arendt, 1978, I, 7

<sup>41</sup> Arendt, 1998 [1958], 172

<sup>42</sup> She writes, "thoughtlessness – the heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of 'truths' which have become trivial and empty – seems to me among the outstanding characteristics of our time" (Arendt, 1998 [1958], 5).

<sup>43</sup> Arendt, 1998 [1958], 170

<sup>44</sup> Arendt, 1978, I, 52

<sup>45</sup> Arendt, 1978, I, 185

<sup>46</sup> Loewald, 1978, 65

<sup>47</sup> Arendt, 1968b, 13

<sup>48</sup> Husserl, 1985, §10, 24

<sup>49</sup> Arendt, 1978, I, 43

<sup>50</sup> As she writes, "the business of thinking is like Penelope's web; it undoes every morning what it has finished the night before" (Arendt, 1978, I, 88).

<sup>51</sup> Aristotle, 1995, IV, 220a 1

<sup>52</sup> See Arendt's claim concerning 'birth' and 'death': "Nature and the cyclical movement into which she forces all living things know neither birth nor death as we understand them. The birth and death of human beings are not simple natural occurrences, but are related to a world into which single individuals, unique, unexchangeable, and unrepeatable entities, appear and from which they depart. Birth and death presupposes a world which is not in constant movement, but whose durability and relative permanence makes appearance and disappearance possible, which existed before any one individual appeared into it and will survive his eventual departure. Without a world into which men are born and from which they die, there would be nothing but changeless eternal recurrence, the deathless everlastingness of the human as of all other animal species" (Arendt, 1998 [1958], 96-97).

<sup>53</sup> Husserl, 1991, §11, 32

<sup>54</sup> Patočka, 1996c, 25, italics in original

<sup>55</sup> Arendt, 1978, I, 52

<sup>56</sup> See Arendt, 196; Arendt, 1968; Arendt, 1968; Arendt, 1968; Arendt, 1972; Arendt, 1972; Arendt, 1994 [1953]; Arendt, 1994 [1954]; Arendt, 2005; Arendt, 2005; Arendt, 2005c

<sup>57</sup> "Svoboda je však zároveň prostor pro myšlení, t.j. pochopení, že svoboda není věc mezi věcmi, že svobodná bytost stojí na mezi mezi tím, co jest, a tím, co nelze nazvat jsoucím, poněvadž to právě člověka ze souvislosti věcí vylamuje, aby je mohl chápat a stavět se tak mimo ně, rozumel jin a svému postavení mezi nimi" (Patočka, 1991 [1977], 22).