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Conviction and punishment: Free press and competitive election as deterrents to corruption

Tian, X. and Lo, V.I. (2009) Conviction and punishment: Free press and competitive election as deterrents to corruption. Public Management Review, 11 (2). pp. 155-172.

Link to Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14719030802685479
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Abstract

Democratic institutions are not equally effective in curbing corruption. Using a criminal behavior model, this study formulates the hypothesis that corruption offenders, being risk-inclined, are deterred more by conviction-reinforcing democratic institutions than by punishment-reinforcing democratic institutions. Evidence based on cross-country regressions strongly supports this hypothesis, indicating that compared with competitive election, free press is a more effective deterrent to corruption. While shedding light on why corruption remains rampant in some electoral democracies – particularly the illiberal democracies – this study identifies a key to corruption control.

Item Type: Journal Article
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Copyright: © 2009 Taylor & Francis
URI: http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/33084
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