Politics, power, resources
and the
political economy of plural policing

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I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research. It contains as its main content work which has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary education institution.

[Signature]

Fabio Scarpello
Acknowledgments

A PhD is a huge task, a grinding undertaking that tests personal commitment, stamina, intellectual capacity, sanity and relationships. It is also an undertaking difficult to achieve without supporting colleagues, friends and family. In my case the long list of acknowledgements needs to start with those that, unwittingly, planted the seeds for this study.

Indeed, the seeds of this study were planted in the eight years I spent reporting on Southeast Asia’s political and security issues for various publications. It was through the encounters with criminals, gangs, rebel groups, police and military officers, religious leaders, politicians, business people, academics, activists and residents in places such as Mindanao, Sulu, Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Manila, Jakarta and Aceh, among others, that I came to appreciate the intimate relationship between struggles over the political economy and how various actors deploy coercive force to extract resources at the local level. My interest in explaining the dialectical relations between the broader political economy and plural policing was a consequential step in the journey. I am thus deeply indebted to all of those that talked to me, on and off the records. This extends to the sources interviewed during the fieldwork for this study.

My second heartfelt thank you goes to the scholars that influenced the trajectory from the initial idea to this dissertation. The work on Indonesia by Vedi Hadiz and Ian Wilson, in particular, resonated with my experience in the country. It was thanks to them that I choose the Asia Research Centre (ARC) to pursue both my Masters and PhD, and it was thank to them that I became interested in a specific approach of political economy.
Very influential were also two scholars I met during a workshop on the role of security actors in governance in Asia and Africa I attended in Leiden in January 2012. The first was Bruce Baker. Through conversations with him, and by later studying his work, I was able to locate my initial observations within the literature of plural policing. The second was Christian Lund. His advice that any PhD student should read a major book on theory that is unrelated to his topic led me to read Bourdieu’s *Outline of a Theory of Practise*. As it turned out, Bourdieu’s sociology became one of the key theoretical streams I built upon in my research. As I set out on my PhD journey, however, the key scholarly influence was Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams’ work on private security. Their work broadened my understanding of policing, and my approach to studying it. My research developed in a way that greatly departs, and indeed critiques, their ‘global security assemblages’ framework. But it is unquestioned that this study builds upon their work. I am simply indebted.

The PhD journey was not easy, but it was pleasant and incredibly enriching at various levels. My gratitude for this goes to all of those associated with the ARC. Indeed, as noted, I chose the ARC for the reputation of his scholars. What I soon came to equally appreciate is the collegial and supportive environment of the Centre.

The ARC has an open-door policy with PhD students. Over the years I have often knocked at the door of Mark Beeson, James Boyd, Vedi Hadiz, Kevin Hewison, Jane Hutchison, Carol Warren, James Warren, Jeffrey Wilson and Jacqui Baker. Not once was I turned down. The possibility to exchange ideas in an informal manner and on a daily basis with senior scholars is an asset, and a privilege, for the students of the Centre for which I am very grateful. This
collegiality extends to the associates of the Centre. Kelly Gerard and, especially, Lee Jones have been very helpful. Lee, who I consider a mentor and a friend, is simply a genius and his ability to narrow down on the nuts and bolts of theories unlocked the usefulness of Jessop’s strategic relational approach for my research. For this, and more, I am grateful.

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From an academic perspective, however, the largest debt of gratitude is with my supervisors: Ian Wilson, Caroline Hughes and Garry Rodan. Collectively, they have turned what was a confused idea into a coherent academic product. Individually, they have each brought different strength to the project.

The relationship with Ian has gone beyond that of supervisor-student. Over the years, Ian has become a friend that has not only provided clear direction and insightful comments for the empirical side of my work, but also a friendly ear. Our almost daily chat over coffee was as helpful to develop my research as in getting a break from it.
Caroline supervised the first 18 months of my research. Her contribution, however, extends beyond what I had achieved by the time she left. Caroline was the main thrust in the process of deconstructing me as a problem-solving journalist, and reconstructing me into a critical political scientist.

Garry took over from Caroline and was instrumental in harnessing my conceptual and theoretical roaming into a coherent scholarly work. He brought consistency, academic rigour and laser-sharp attention to details. He was the right academic at the right time. In addition, Garry’s passion for academia, his general approach to learning, his work-ethic and his belief of universities as a public good have deeply affected me. In short, he has been a role model.

Then there is Shahar Hameiri. Shahar was not one of my supervisors, but his influence was at least as important. Shahar is a friend that happens to be a brilliant, young scholar. Shahar has helped me understanding facets of political theory; he has read countless drafts of my first attempts of journal articles, and he has generally been there when the going got tough. He has basically been a mentor that has made my transition into academia smoother. He has been also my closest friend during my time in Perth. Because all of this, and more, I will always be grateful.

Beyond academia, friends and family have made the process smoother.

Mauro Garavoglia and Christy Aryani Sunaryo opened their house to me while doing fieldwork in Bali. I am also grateful to Guido Berretta and Sri Dewi and Carla Ardian and Vincent Chanliau for the chats, the food, and the laughs in Bali, and to Cameron Bates, Ratna Budiarti and Peter Milne for the chats, the food and the laughs in Jakarta. Peter was the first to suggest I pursued postgraduate studies and ha has also edited the final version of this dissertation, greatly
improving its fluidity. I am also extremely grateful to the late Richard James Simons, a friend that read and commented on the drafts of the first chapters. You are always missed and never forgotten, my friend.

Marzita Ardiantina straddles the friend-family divider. Zita was one of my assistants during my days as a journalist in Indonesia and she stayed on as I moved to academia. Her help has been, simply, invaluable. While I have appreciated Zita’s help, however, I have appreciated her friendship and support even more. She has been my little rock, just a Skype call away.

My gratitude extends to my friends and family in Palermo, Brighton, Florence and London. They have followed me from afar since I left home in 1989, but they have always remained close.

Notwithstanding all of the above, and unsurprisingly, the greatest debt I have is to my wife, Ingebjørg (Inga) Helland Scarpello. Inga and I have spent over a decade together. She has followed me to Southeast Asia and Australia and supported me in what has been a less-than-ordinary life, with the obvious positive and negative sides that this has entailed. It has been exciting and rewarding, but also hard and unsettling at times. Inga has been the one who, throughout it all, made any house feel like a home, while enduring my stress and fatigue-induced bad temper. I hope she has not regretted it all, and regardless of what life holds, I will always be grateful.

This PhD is, however, dedicated to my daughter, Malena Soleil Scarpello. It is because of Malena that I decided to change career, leave Southeast Asia behind and gamble on academia. Indeed, the PhD is my attempt to provide her with a set of social relations that will broaden her choices in life. Time will tell if it was worth it.
Abstract

Plural policing is broadly understood as the multifaceted practices, sanctions and logics that regulate a specific segment of society and result from how a variety of policing providers and auspices relate to, oppose and enrol each other. A multidisciplinary plural policing literature has, in the last decades, made strides in conceptualizing plural policing and explaining its security function and some of its political implications. This notwithstanding, none of the plural policing paradigms and frameworks have fully addressed the dialectical relations between struggles over the broad political economy and plural policing. That is the gap this study aims to address via developing and applying the Political Economy of Plural Policing framework (PEPP).

PEPP appropriates elements of neo-Gramscian state theory and Bourdieu’s sociology and sees ‘interests,’ ‘conflict,’ ‘competition’ and ‘coalitions’ as analytically central in explaining social dynamics and how political economy and plural policing affect each other. This allows for conceptually framing plural policing as a facet of state society relations and explaining the political economy-plural policing dialectical relations.

Thus seen, PEPP is an epistemological and theoretical contribution to the plural policing literature. The added analytical value of PEPP is exemplified in several case studies that explain how struggles over the broader political economy in Indonesia affect, and are partly affected by, how by whom and for whose benefits policing is delivered.
### Acronyms and Glossary of Key Foreign Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABRI</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, <em>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</em></td>
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<td>ABUJAPI</td>
<td>Indonesia Security Industry Association, <em>Asosiasi Badan Usaha Jasa Pengamanan Indonesia</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Adat</td>
<td>Beliefs strongly linked to alleged local ancestral history</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ahmadi</td>
<td>Members of the Ahmadiyah Islamic group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ahmadiyah</td>
<td>Minority Islamic group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ajeg Bali</td>
<td>Literally ‘Bali erect’ or ‘Bali standing strong,’ It signifies a conservative ideology and sociopolitical movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amar Ma’ruf Nahi Munkar</td>
<td>Commanding right and forbidding evil</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armada Racun</td>
<td>Poisonous Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bali aman</td>
<td>Bali safe and peaceful</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baliseering</td>
<td>Balinization. Colonial policies aimed at reinvigorating Balinese traditions</td>
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<td>Banjar</td>
<td>Hamlet</td>
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<tr>
<td>BASS</td>
<td><em>Barungu Aneka Sistem Sekuriti</em></td>
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<td>BPS</td>
<td>Central Statistics Agency, <em>Badan Pusat Statistik</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>BSS</td>
<td>Bali Security Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demokrasi Terpimpin</td>
<td>Guided Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Desa Adat</strong></td>
<td>The religious and traditional branch of the governance system in Bali</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Desa Dinas</strong></td>
<td>The administrative and secular branch of the governance system in Bali</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Desa Pakraman</strong></td>
<td>See <em>Desa Adat</em></td>
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<td><strong>DIIS</strong></td>
<td>Danish Institute for International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Diparda</strong></td>
<td>Bali Provincial Tourism Office, <em>Diparda Provinsi Bali</em></td>
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<td><strong>Disnakertrans-Bali</strong></td>
<td>Bali Manpower and Transmigration Office, <em>Dinas Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi Provinsi Bali</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DPA</strong></td>
<td>Presidential Advisory Council, <em>Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden</em></td>
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<td><strong>DPD</strong></td>
<td>People’s Representative Council, <em>Dewan Perwakilan Daerah</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DPR</strong></td>
<td>House of Representatives, <em>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DPRD</strong></td>
<td>Regional House of Representatives, <em>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</em></td>
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<td><strong>FAKTA</strong></td>
<td>Anti-Apostasy Movement Forum, <em>Forum Antisipasi Kegiatan Pemurtadan</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fatwa</strong></td>
<td>Islamic legal edict</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FBR</strong></td>
<td>Forum of Betawi Brotherhood, <em>Forum Betawi Rembug</em></td>
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<td><strong>Forkami</strong></td>
<td>Indonesian Muslim Communication Forum, <em>Forum Komunikasi Muslim Indonesia</em></td>
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</table>
FPD  Forum of the Concerned Citizens of Denpasar, *Forum Peduli Denpasar*

FPI  Islamic Defenders’ Front, *Front Pembela Islam*

FUI  Islamic People’s Forum, *Forum Umat Islam*

FUUI  Forum of Scholars of the Islamic Nation, *Forum Ulama Umat Islam*

Garis  Islamic Reformist Movement, *Gerakan Islam Reformis*

Gerindra  Greater Indonesia Movement Party, *Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya*

GIP  Indonesian Tourism Industry Association, *Gabungan Industri Pariwisata Indonesia*

GRIB  Peoples Movement for a New Indonesia, *Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia Baru*

*Habab*  Individuals who claim family lineage from the Prophet Mohammed

*Habib*  Singular for *habab*

*Hadrami*  Native Indonesians with Arabic-Yemeni origins

*Halal*  Foods and other products permissible for Muslims under Islamic law

Hankamrata  Total People’s Defence, *Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta*

Hansip  Civil Defence Force, *Pertahanan Sipil*

Hanura  People’s Conscience Party, *Hati Nurani Raky*

HRW  Human Rights Watch
HTI
ICG
ICMI
IMF
Jago
Jemaah Islamiyah
JIE
JIL
JIP
Kelian
Kipem
Korlap
Koter
KMPBP
KPK
Laskar Bali
LDII

Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia
International Crisis Group
Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals,
Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia
International Monetary Fund
Local tough man
Literally Islamic community. It is an Islamic terrorist
group operating mostly in Indonesia
Emancipatory Islam Network, Jaringan Islam
Emansipatoris
Liberal Islam Network, Jaringan Islam Liberal
Progressive Islam Network, Jaringan Islam Progresif
Head of the Desa Pakraman
Temporary Residents Identity Card, Kartu Identitas
Penduduk Musiman
Field coordinators of Ormas, KoordinatorLapangan
Territorial Command, Komando Teritorial
National Committee for Overcoming the Threat of
Apostasy, Komite Nasional Penanggulangan Bahaya
Pemurtadan
Corruption Eradication Commission, Komisi
Pemberantasan Korupsi
Bali Militia, or Bali warriors
Institute of Indonesian Islamic Propagation, Lembaga
Dakwah Islam Indonesia
Linmas  Civilian Protection Force, Perlindungan Masyarakat

LPPI  Institute for Islamic Studies and Research, Lembaga Penelitian Dan Pengkajian Islam

Lumpenproletariat  Used originally in Marxist theory to describe the members of the proletariat who lacked class consciousness

Mengamankan Bali  A discourse that emphasizes the need to ‘physically’ secure Bali

MCP  Multi-choice Policing

MUDP  General Assembly Customary Village, Majelis Utama Desa Pakraman

MUI  Indonesian Ulama Council, Majelis Ulama Indonesia

Nahi Mungka  See Amar Ma’ruf Nahi Munkar

NII  Islamic State of Indonesia, Negara Islam Indonesia

NU  Nahdatul Ulama

Nyepi  A religious day when Balinese residents are forbidden to leave their homes, to cook or to light fires

OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OPC  Oodua People’s Congress

Ormas  Mass organisations, organisasi masyarakat

P3M  Pesantren and Community Development Association, Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat
PAN  National Mandate Party, Partai Amanat Nasional

Pancasila  The philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state

PBB  Balinese Youth United, Pemuda Bali Bersatu

PDI-P  Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan

PDP  People's Democratic Party

Pecalang  Bali traditional guards

Pendatang  Temporary resident

Pesantren  Islamic boarding school

PHDI  Indonesia Hinduism Society, Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia

PHRI-Denpasar  Denpasar Hotel and Restaurant Association, Perhimpunan Hotel dan Restoran Indonesia Kota Denpasar

PKB  National Awakening Party, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa

PKI  Indonesian Communist Party, Partai Komunis Indonesia

PKS  Prosperous Justice Party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera

Polda  Police base for a province, Kepolisian Daerah

Polres  Police base for a district or a big city, Kepolisian Resor

Polri  Indonesian National Police, Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia

Polsek  Police base for a subdistrict, Kepolisian Sektor
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<td>Pospol</td>
<td>Police base for villages, <em>Pos Polisi</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Preman</td>
<td>Tough man, or criminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>United Development Party, <em>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC(s)</td>
<td>Private Security Company(ies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puri Pemecutan</td>
<td>One of the royal families of Denpasar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puri Satria</td>
<td>One of the royal families of Denpasar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reformasi</td>
<td>Student-led manifestations that called for democratic reforms, and the democratisation process that followed the end of the Suharto regime in Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satgas</td>
<td>Special Units, <em>Satuan Tugas</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Satpam</td>
<td>Private Security Guards, <em>Satuan Pengamanan</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satpol PP</td>
<td>The Civil Service Police Units, <em>Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>Social conflict approach of political economy</td>
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<td>Sishankamrata</td>
<td>People’s Defence and Security System, <em>Sistem Pertahanan dan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta</em></td>
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<td>Siskamling</td>
<td>Neighbourhood-Watch Program, <em>Sistem Keamanan Lingkungan</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sharia</td>
<td>Islamic law</td>
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<td>SRA</td>
<td>Strategic-Relational Approach</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tipikor</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Court, <em>Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNI</td>
<td>Indonesia National Army, <em>Tentara Nasional</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Ummah</em></td>
<td>Islamic community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOC</td>
<td>United East Indian Company, <em>Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie</em></td>
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CHAPTER 1

The study

Plural policing—the policing resulting from how various auspices and providers relate to, oppose and enrol each other—is a phenomenon ubiquitous throughout the world. It has a security function and a political dimension. This study engages with the latter and more specifically with the dialectical relations between struggles over the broad political economy and how policing is delivered, by whom and for whose benefit.

1-1 – Hypothesis and aim

Plural policing is broadly understood as the multifaceted practices, sanctions and logics that regulate a specific segment of society and that result from how a variety of policing providers and auspices relate to, oppose and enrol each other (e.g., A. Crawford 2008: 192; T. Jones and Newburn 2006: 1). It implies recognition that policing has a security function and a political dimension.

Plural policing is a phenomenon difficult to ignore, indeed, it is ubiquitous throughout the world.

In the Global South, strongmen, militias, gangs vigilante groups of different sizes and sources of identification exercise forms of power, whether as an extension of the state or in opposition to it, and are active in regulating communities (Kirsch and Grätz 2010; Pratten and Sen 2008). But vigilantes, militias and gangs, whether criminal or not, are also prominent actors in the urban
areas of most industrialized countries of the North where they have a noticeable impact on localized power dynamics and in regulating communities (Decker et al. 2009; Klein et al. 2006).

At a different level, the Western-initiated mantra of community policing has led to a variety of pre-existing policing practices being incorporated into state-framed policing systems in a manner that only superficially blankets over historically-contingent discourses through which power relations are mediated in both the Global North and the Global South (Brogden 2004). In Tanzania, for example, this has led to the sungusungu vigilante movement being incorporated into the state-framed policing system (Abrahams 1987; Fleisher 2000), while in Australia it has led to long-standing aboriginal self-policing initiatives being partly absorbed into state-led community policing (Blagg and Valuri 2004; Chantrill 1998).

Concurrently, the spread of neoliberal modes of governance has led to the well-documented global rise of private security companies (Ronald van Steden and Sarre 2007). Abrahamsen and Williams (2009: 2) note that private security personnel now outnumber the public police in the UK, the United States, Brazil and India, among others, and are a familiar feature of the urban landscape in the African continent. In some contexts, private security companies have come to intertwine with the state coercive apparatus in ways that have given rise to new loci of power that transcend the state and non-state, and the local and global dividers (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011); in other cases, they have risen to represent and enforce the unequal distribution of wealth in society (e.g., Blakely and Snyder 1997).
The growing interests with the dynamics shaping how auspices and providers of plural policing relate to, oppose and enrol each other has, in the last decades, given rise to a multi-disciplinary plural policing literature whose main contribution to date is represented by several influential paradigms and theoretical frameworks. Nodal Governance, Anchored Pluralism, Multi-Choice Policing, the Political Economy of Private Security, Global Security Assemblages and Policing as Order-Making have, in their entirety, usefully conceptualized the pluralisation of policing and explained facets of its political nature. They represent a paradigm shift in how policing is understood and studied, and in the relation between academia and policymaking. However, this study argues that there is a dialectical relation between struggles over power and resources taking place in the political economy and how policing is delivered, by whom and for whose benefit. It also argues that none of the existing plural policing paradigms and frameworks sufficiently addresses such dialectical relations. This is the gap this study addresses.

Political economy-plural policing dialectical relations and PEPP

At its most basic a focus on the political economy-plural policing dialectical relations requires applying political economy questions about power and resource to policing, hence the questions of ‘how, by whom and for whose benefit is policing delivered’? However, engaging with these questions requires a holistic conceptualization of policing that should not be seen as a stand-alone set of practices, but as a facet of state-society relations. In other words, it requires explaining how struggles over the broader political economy affect policing, but also how policing is a site for these struggles. It also requires explaining how
policing actors are embedded in broader sociopolitical coalitions, but also how, occasionally, they force their way into the calculations of the sociopolitical coalitions. Furthermore, engaging with the political economy-plural policing dialectical relations means to explain why and how various policing arrangements come to be constituted; what the drivers and interests that shape them are; why some policing actors, practices and ideologies are favoured over others; and how policing actors come to play a role.

This study makes a contribution by developing and applying a novel framework—the Political Economy of Plural-Policing framework (PEPP)—specifically geared at addressing these questions. By appropriating elements of neo-Gramscian state theory and Bourdieu’s sociology, PEPP conceptually frames plural policing as a facet of state society relations and provides analytical tools to engage with the political economy-plural policing dialectical relations. In such a way, PEPP both builds on and transcends the existing plural policing paradigms and frameworks: it endorses a plural understanding of policing; it recognizes that policing has both a security function and a political facet, but focuses on explaining how struggles over power and resources taking place in the political economy affect, and are affected by, how policing is delivered. Thus seen, and as explained below, PEPP has its roots in concerns voiced by critical criminologists, but is a political framework that contributes to the multi-disciplinary plural policing literature. Indeed, beyond empirical findings, PEPP is both an epistemological contribution (‘how to view plural policing’) and a theoretical contribution (‘how to study plural policing’) to the plural policing literature.
1-2– Locating plural policing

Policing is a contested term. It is open to various interpretations in regards to what the scope of policing is and who sponsors and delivers policing.

In regards to the scope, policing at its simplest refers to organized order maintenance, peace keeping, rule or law enforcement, crime investigation and prevention, and other forms of investigation and associated information brokering, which may involve the conscious exercise of coercive power (Newburn 2008: 217). It is thus considered a non-excludable public good from which society at large benefits. Mainstream criminologists have focused on this interpretation of policing and looked at police strategies to improve how order is maintained and crime limited (Beckman et al. 2003; Beckman et al. 2005; Brad et al. 2009).

But policing also entails practices, discourses, arrangements and modes of governance that define the very nature of state-society relations and affect how power is exercised, by whom, and for whose benefit. It is thus inherently political and a governance approach that favours some sociopolitical groups over others. Critical criminologists have investigated and explained how the state, the police or a social class frame understandings of crime and law to sustain power relations skewed in regards to class, gender and race (Crowther 2000; DeKeseredy 2010; Grover 2008). Neocleous (2000), for example, explained the power struggles that have led to the construction of the concept of policing. He argues that policing—a term he expands to reflect the expansive set of state institutions through which the process of social security takes place—was instrumental in forming a new understanding of social order that, in essence, allowed the capitalist class to assert control over the urban proletariat. Critical criminologists have thus paid attention to how broader struggles over how power and resources are accessed and
distributed shape policing, and how the policing of state institutions is a means through which power inequalities are maintained. However, this attention to the dialectical relations between the broader political economy and policing has not been fully replicated by scholars who, in the last decades, have left behind a state-centred view of policing with its emphasis on the police force, and focused on a plural understanding of policing as resulting from the relations between a multitude of auspices and providers.

*Between the breadbox of the police and the elephant of social control*

The plural understanding of policing has mitigated the narrow and broad interpretations of who the auspices, sponsors and providers of policing are.

According to the narrow interpretation, policing defines the functions of the police, the institution that has the legitimate monopoly of coercive power and is tasked with state-sanctioned law and order duties, and some negotiable social service (Reiner 2010: 3; Walker 1999: 75). Some variations stress the police’s role in controlling political order (Manning 2005), but the key characteristics remain: the police represent the state—the key sponsor and auspice—and have the normative monopoly and legitimacy to use force. This narrow, institutionalist view is the mainstream interpretation of policing and, as noted above, it has led to both problem-solving studies looking at the police efficiency and critical engagement with the political role of the police.

The broadest interpretation equates policing to social control. Social control is also a contested term, but here it will suffice to notice that the least contentious interpretation views it as the process through which the behaviour of individuals and groups are regulated via repressive and coercive means, as well as via softer
ideological forms of control that operate through the shaping of ideas, values and attitudes (Innes 2003; Marshall 1998). Through this lens, Waddington (1999: 11) says that policing is fundamentally a function of serving the community and disciplining behaviour, which must be practically supported by an army of institutions like families, churches, schools, sport clubs and so on. Thus seen, the coercive role of the police is subdued within a larger project of social control in which non-coercive means have a role in regulating communities. This interpretation broadens the scope of who is engaged in policing beyond the police and includes actors that have no coercive force. It also broadens the scope of the auspices of policing to include anyone that has a stake in maintaining a specific order.

The plural interpretation of policing sits between the two. In particular, and as noted, plural policing is broadly understood as:

the multifaceted practices, sanctions and logics that regulate a specific segment of society and that result from how a variety of policing providers and auspices relate to, oppose and enrol each other (e.g., A. Crawford 2008: 192; T. Jones and Newburn 2006: 1).

This interpretation, therefore, moves its focus beyond the police to include any policing actor or individuals, groups and institutions organized to have a role in security maintenance, at least a nominally.

Moreover, instead of studying policing actors in isolation, this interpretation directs the attention to how policing providers and auspices relate to, oppose and enrol each other. This leads to an understanding of the policing landscape constituted by many actors, and affected by different logics, sources of power and
rationalities (Kyed and Albrecht 2015: 4). Thus seen, as Bayley and Shearing (1996: 586) make it clear, plural policing moves the analytical attention beyond “the breadbox of the police” although not as far as “the elephant of social control,” and as Crawford (2008: 192) notes, represents “both a new way of looking at policing, which is no longer police centred, and a new set of things to look at—namely, the growing role of the non-state sector.”

The detail of policing auspices and provider is a matter of empirical investigations. However, providers include paramilitary, vigilante and militia groups; civil society organizations, such as community, religious and voluntary organizations; private security companies, various strands of community policing, as well as the military, the police, other state policing units and interstate institutions such as Interpol, Europol etc (B. Baker 2008a; Bayley and Shearing 2001: 5-6; Dupont et al. 2003; Reiner 2010: 5-6). Among the auspices are the central and local state and their institutions; business interests, both legal and illegal, and at local, national and international level; interstate organizations, such as the UN and NATO; as well as individuals and communities, the latter intended in geographical or cultural terms (B. Baker 2008a: 5-6; Bayley and Shearing 2001: 5-11; Dupont et al. 2003; Reiner 2010: 5-6).

Plural policing may thus regulate a geographical area (a neighbourhood, a city, a nation-state); a trans-boundary sector (the environmental sector, the nuclear sector, etc.); or social realms that need regulating (morality, family affairs, and the virtual world, among others). Plural policing can thus take place within a nation state, or refer to supranational spaces that need regulating.
1-3– The structure of the study

This study includes a theoretical section, constituted by Chapter 2 and 3, and a case study section, which includes Chapters 4 to 7.

Chapter 2 engages with the plural policing literature. It first traces the emergence of this literature on how criminologists responded to the debates over the effects of globalisation on state sovereignty and modes of governance. It then focuses on the key paradigms developed by criminologists (Nodal Governance, Anchored Pluralism and Multi-Choice Policing), and on three theoretical frameworks developed by social scientists (the Political Economy of Private Security, the Global Security Assemblage, and Policing as Order-Making). The key finding of the chapter is that, despite each of the paradigms’ and frameworks’ considerable utility, none are specifically developed with the intention of fully explaining the dialectical relations between the broader political economy and complex plural-policing landscapes. This chapter, therefore, highlights the gap existing in the literature.

Chapter 3 addresses this gap by introducing PEPP. The framework is based on an understanding of institutions as resulting from contestations among sociopolitical groups competing to maintain, or change, a specific order. This ontological position dictates that PEPP sees the broader political economy as often shaping how, by whom and for whose benefit policing is delivered. Crucially, however, the conceptual and analytical scope of the framework recognizes ‘policing’ as a key site of struggles for the political economy, where power relations are maintained, challenged and changed; and it recognizes that policing actors are often embedded in broader sociopolitical coalitions but occasionally also affect how power is distributed. This means that PEPP places
the analysis of power relations at the core of the political economy-plural policing dialectical relations. The way in which power relations are explained owes to how PEPP appropriates elements of neo-Gramscian state theory and Bourdieu’s sociology.

Chapter 4 provides the historical background for the remaining chapters by critically examining the existing literature on Indonesia through PEPP’s conceptual and analytical prisms. The chapter reveals that in Indonesia there has historically been a close correlation between struggles over the broader political economy and how, by whom and for whose benefit policing is delivered. It also shows that policing has been influential in how power relations are maintained, challenged and changed. The chapter further reveals that the processes through which some policing actors have been embedded in sociopolitical coalitions have changed through the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods, but that policing has remained a set of practice through which dominant groups maintain order (security function), but mostly access resources (political economy function).

Chapter 5 focuses on contemporary Indonesia and reveals important elements of continuity and of change with the past. It reveals that there still is a strong dialectical relation between struggles over the political economy and how and by whom policing is delivered. An important practice that ensures such continuity is the ad-hoc implementation of the law that shapes how the field of politics and that of policing relate to each other. The chapter, however, also reveals that democratization has meant that policing is a less influential site for contestations over the political economy, and that the compounded effects of democratization, decentralization, and the ongoing processes of urbanization and
globalization have resulted in a fragmentation of the relations between dominant sociopolitical groups and policing actors. These latter are also called to more strongly articulate their security function.

Chapter 6 engages with three villages in Bali and explains how multilayered struggles over the spoils of the tourism-related industry have been channelled within a conservative and xenophobic discourse that goes back to colonial constructed traditions, and have led to very close dialectical relations between the struggles over the political economy and policing. In particular, it explains that the policing actors favoured are those that associate themselves with the xenophobic discourse, but also that the field of policing has become a site of struggles for local, poorly educated men bent on accessing some of the tourism-related resources.

Chapter 7 focuses on the struggles over Islam in contemporary Indonesia and explains, from one perspective, how the policing of morality is one of the means through which a broad conservative alliance attempts to shape state-society relations to its advantage. However, from another perspective, it explains how the policing of morality is concurrently a practice that strengthens the conservative turn noted in Indonesia in the last decade. In addition, through the case study of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) the chapter explains how being ‘Islamic’ is not enough to be embedded in dominant conservative groups and that the policing actors favoured are those able to frame their role in a manner that is unthreatening to the existing power structures.

Chapter 8 summarizes the epistemological, theoretical and empirical advances of this study and engages with how PEPP can contribute beyond plural policing and in policymaking.
1-4– Methodology, methods and case study selection

This study is a part of an ongoing theory-building research agenda that combines a deductive and an inductive approach to research.

The deductive inclination is represented by the political economy approach favoured that marks the fields of explorations, suggests a number of causal relationships and places the emphasis on ‘interests,’ ‘conflicts,’ ‘competition’ and ‘coalitions’ as central analytical terms to explain social dynamics and how political economy and plural policing affect each other. However, this deductive inclination only frames the broad causal relationships and does not clearly explain the nature of the interests, conflicts, competitions and coalitions, or the detail of how power is contested and resources accessed and distributed. These have to be examined and verified by an inductive empirical approach that favours research methods centred on the analysis of both primary- and secondary-source material and to field observations, this latter as a strategy of reflexive learning.

Among the secondary-source materials analysed are a vast array of academic materials—books, book chapters, journal articles and conference papers—as well as policymaking reports and official documents. The research benefited greatly also from the wealth of media articles available on Indonesia, both in Indonesian and in English. Primary-source material was gathered during a four-month long field trip to the Balinese villages of Kuta, Legian and Seminyak, started in November 2013. In total 85 semi-structured interviews were gathered, each averaging one hour in length. These included 17 interviews with Balinese residents, 17 with Indonesian non-Balinese residents and 15 with expatriate residents. They also included 18 interviews with security actors, including
members of vigilante groups, police officers, community policing officers and private security guards; and 18 interviews with scholars, activists, and religious and traditional leaders. The initial pool of sources was drawn from the existing contacts of the author, who lived in Bali for six years until 2011. This group started a snowball effect where each source interviewed introduced several more. An effort was made to balance the sources interviewed in regards to ethnicity and gender, since those are important factors in shaping how sources view and experience policing. Sources were informed on the nature of the research; confidentiality was maintained when requested or when the author evaluated that this was beneficial for the source. Interviews were conducted either in English or in Indonesian with an interpreter, according to the wish of those interviewed. The interviews directly informed the content of chapter six, but have also been useful both for hypothesis-testing and for generalizing beyond the particular case study.

**Portability and case studies selection**

Plural policing is ubiquitous. However, PEPP is likely to be more useful in investigating sociopolitical contexts where policing is highly politicized.

Within a figurative spectrum that sees policing as a public good at one end, and as a governance approach to access resources at the other, it is suggested that some factors contribute to shifting the balance towards the latter. These include, but are not limited to, capitalist development; a high degree of political contestations; a weak system of checks and balances on state institutions, in particular on the justice and security apparatus; diversity and pluralism of socio-legal institutions; and noticeable social inequalities. It is through this prism that several case studies from Indonesia have been selected to exemplify PEPP’s
added analytical value. Indonesia, in turn, exemplifies political dynamics taking place in many other contexts, mostly in the Global South.¹

Indonesia has been progressively integrated into the global capitalist system since the Dutch colonial period, which started in the 16th century. This trajectory mirrors that of many among the other countries of the Global South that were subjected to European colonialism and imperialism (Kohli 2004). Indonesia was further integrated into the global capitalist system since the early days of the Suharto regime, which took hold of power in 1965. The end of the authoritarian regime also brought an increase in the political contestations and a degree of convergence between social groups contesting for political power and those contesting for a share of the market. This has been affected, on the one hand by discourses on democratisation, good governance, aid effectiveness etc., while on the other by how these discourses are embraced, rejected or mediated locally. This reflects also dynamics taking place in other parts of the world, most specifically in the Global South (Abrahamsen 2000; Buono and Lara 2007; J. D. Jones 2009; Mensah 2008; Taylor 2006).

The high degree of political contestation in Indonesia has been augmented by the process of decentralization started in 2001. This has been extremely important in affecting the power dynamics between the centre and the peripheries, as well as how political economy and plural policing affect each other at the local

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¹ ‘Global South’ belongs to the family of invented terms, including ‘Third World’ and ‘Periphery,’ that denote regions outside Europe and North America, mostly (though not all) low-income (Dados and Connell 2012: 12). Australia, New Zealand and Japan, geographically in the southern hemisphere, are considered members of the rich Global North. The prominence of the socio-economic signifier of the term is underlined by The Global South, a peer reviewed journal concentrating on the literature and cultures of the Global South defined as “those parts of the world that have experienced the most political, social, and economic upheaval and have suffered the brunt of the greatest challenges facing the world under globalization: poverty, displacement and diaspora, environmental degradation, human and civil rights abuses, war, hunger, and disease.” [http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/the_global_south/](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/the_global_south/). Last accessed January 9, 2013.
level. This is also indicative of dynamics that have affected India (Mitra and Singh 2009; Sathyamurthy 1996; Singh 2008), Brazil (Falleti 2010; Samuels 2003), many African states (G. Crawford and Hartmann 2008; Jackson 2011) and the broader developing world (Falleti 2010; Ichimura and Bahl 2009; Shah 2006).

Indonesia’s high degree of political contestation is also due to the rise of identity politics with sociopolitical groups politicizing ethnic and religious ideologies in their quest for power and resources. This is unsurprising in a country that has a population of almost 250 million people, according to the 2010 census, with over a thousand ethnic and sub-ethnic groups speaking hundreds of languages and dialects, professing five legally recognized religions—Islam, Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism—and many more faiths drawing from pre-existing animist beliefs. Identity politics also strongly affect the political dynamics in countries such as Nigeria (Casey 2008; HRW 2004b; Olaniyi 2011), South Africa (Ntsebeza 2005; Piombo 2009) and India (Natrajan 2012; Nussbaum 2008; Sidharth 2002), among many others.

The politicization of policing in Indonesia is also strongly fuelled by the weak system of checks and balances that regulate Indonesia’s state institutions. The Indonesian national police, in particular, are grossly inefficient, corrupt and violent. This hugely affects the pluralisation of policing and the politicization of the police and of the broader policing landscape. It is a structural problem shared by many other countries (Costa 2011; D. E. Davis 2006; Guttschuss 2010; Hagedorn et al. 2013; Hautzinger 2007; Hinton 2005; HRW 2008; Peters 2006). Likewise, Indonesia’s broader justice system has developed in such a way that it provides political elites with the means to control civil society, rather than with an
impartial adjudicator of justice. Again, this is not unique of Indonesia, but indicative of many socio-political contexts in the Global South (Jayasuriya 2006).

Lastly, Indonesia, like Brazil, China, Russia, India and South Africa, among others (OECD 2009; Roett 2010; L. A. Winters and Yusuf 2007), is an uneven middle income country. This means that while the overall per-capita income is increasing, the distribution of resources remains skewed, as explained in Chapter 5. This increases social tension and the likelihood of social conflict as well as the rise of identity politics and of informal policing actors bent on regulating localized orders.

The above-mentioned factors do not affect the dialectical relations between political economy and plural policing uniformly throughout the archipelagic country, though. For example, a divider exists between urban and rural contexts. In the latter, it is hypothesized that capitalist development has had a less forceful impact on the local dynamics; politics is less linked to the distribution of resources and societal norms more influential in moderating communal behaviours. In this study, therefore, the choice of case studies within Indonesia reflects spaces of contestation strongly affected by capitalist development, political contestation and social inequalities.

A note on spelling, names and currency conversion

This study follows UK spelling from the online version of the Oxford dictionary at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/. In the use of compound adjectives describing a noun, these are generally hyphenated to help the reader. For example, "plural-policing literature" is hyphenated. However, where more than two adjectives are used to describe a noun hyphenating is generally not used.
Many Indonesians do not use their surnames. Standard practice calls for shortening personal names by using the first name. Thus Megawati Sukarnoputri is shortened to Megawati. This study, however, refers to the ‘second’ name when this is the most commonly used in Indonesia. Thus Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is shortened to Yudhoyono. Other contractions that are commonly used in Indonesia, such as “Gus Dur” for Abdurrahman Wahid, are avoided in this study.

The conversion rate from Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) to US dollars (USD) follows the one used in the original source. When this is not provided, it refers to the conversion rate provided by Indonesia’s central bank, Bank Indonesia, at http://www.bi.go.id/en/moneter/informasi-kurs/referensi-jisdor/Default.aspx
CHAPTER 2

The ‘gap’ in the literature

Criminologists have conceptualized the plural understanding of policing and laid the foundations for the plural-policing literature. A growing interest among political scientists has led to explanatory frameworks that engage with the politics of private security and with the lowest level political dimension of the broader phenomenon. No existing framework, however, is able to fully explain the dialectical relations between the broad political economy and complex plural-policing landscapes.

2-1– Introduction

The genesis of the plural policing literature is traceable to how criminologists have responded to the broad theoretical debates over the effects of globalization on state sovereignty and modes of governance.

Indeed, as social scientists reflected on the shift from a modern to a postmodern society (for example, Baudrillard 1994; Giddens 1999), and new theories of governance articulated the replacement of hierarchical social structures by horizontal networks (Castells 1996; Kooiman 1993), criminologists reflected on what these changes meant for the way in which policing is delivered. For example, Reiner (1992a, 1992b) questioned whether free-market dynamics would
lead to a residual role for the police with serious consequences for the fair
delivery of security services.²

At the same time, as social scientists debated whether the state was being
hollowed out (Rhodes 1994), now steering rather than rowing (Osborne and
Gaebler 1993), governing at a distance (Rose and Miller 1992), or governing
without a government (Rhodes 1996), criminologists questioned the Weberian
premise of state monopoly of the legitimate coercive power in contexts where
private security was becoming more prominent. In particular, Shearing and
Stenning (1992) argued that the emergence of mass private property—epitomized
by commercial districts, residential estates, and shopping complexes—led to
private security gaining similar power to the police. This, they argued, meant an
end to the public-private distinction. The interest in private security soon led to
broader considerations of who sponsors, authorizes and delivers policing. In time,
it led to a shift from police to policing (Loader 2000: 323-4), or to the plural
interpretation of policing. It is this interpretation that planted the seeds for the
multidisciplinary plural-policing literature.

It was noted in Chapter 1 that this literature has come to be characterized by
a shared recognition of a plurality of sponsors, authorizers and providers of
policing; an analytical focus on explaining the various facets of the policing
landscape; and by a relational understanding of policing. As Kyed and Albrech
(2015: 4) note, instead of studying one specific institution or discrete system in
isolation, the focus is on exploring how a variety of policing providers and

² This line of inquiry was developed along the lines of the gated communities-versus-ghettos
literature, which is based on the argument that elites are taking refuge in the former, while the
underclass are being consigned to the latter. This is a vast literature. See Blakely and Snyder
others.
auspices relate to, oppose and enrol each other. This leads to an understanding of the policing landscape constituted by many actors, and affected by different logics, sources of power and rationalities.

This chapter frames this study within this multidisciplinary literature, in particular in reference to the key paradigms and theoretical framework that have emerged to conceptualize and explain plural policing. What emerges is that none of the existing plural policing paradigms and theoretical frameworks sufficiently engages with the dialectical relations between the broader political economy and complex policing landscapes. This is substantiated over two further sections.

Section 2.2 focuses on three paradigms hailing from criminology: Nodal Governance, Multi-Choice Policing (MCP), and Anchored Pluralism. It explains how these have been instrumental in conceptualizing empirical observations of the plurality of policing, and in providing some explanatory lens to understand facets of its political dimension. But they have not been geared specifically to address the political economy-plural-policing dialectical relations.

Section 2.3 engages with three theoretical frameworks hailing from the broader social sciences: the Political Economy of Private Security (PEPS), the Global Security Assemblages (GSA), and the Policing as Order-Making frameworks. It explains that these have more directly engaged with facets of the political dimension of plural policing, but are limited by either a normative stance, a focus on the ripple effects of globalisation in policing, or a bottom-up political-ethnography approach. This means that they also are not geared to address the political economy-plural-policing dialectical relations.
2-2– The criminology paradigms

Nodal Governance, MCP and Anchored Pluralism have given shape to empirical observations of policing as being authorized, sponsored and delivered by various actors, and have firmly moved the focus away from the police and towards the relational nature of policing landscapes. They have thus consolidated the plural understanding of policing. They have also been instrumental for the future development of the political frameworks. As will become apparent, Nodal Governance and Anchored Pluralism have influenced the PEPS and GSA. MCP has instead influenced policing as order-making framework. This notwithstanding, the criminology paradigms maintain either largely a problem-solving approach aimed at describing how policing is delivered and how it can be improved, or a normative stance auspicing how it should be delivered. While they provide interesting insights into the power relations that shape policing arrangements and how the broader political context affects policing, they don not sufficiently engage with the dialectical relations between the broader political economy and plural policing.

*Nodal Governance*

Nodal governance was developed by Shearing (2001, 2005) and a group of scholars associated with him, including Johnston (2005, 2006), Wood (Wood 2006; Wood and Shearing 2007) and Dupont (2004; Dupont et al. 2003). It represents the first quantum leap in the conceptualization of plural policing and a pillar upon which the plural policing literature is built.

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3 As Cox (1981: 128-9) explains “problem-solving theory takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as their given framework of action. The general aim of problem-solving is to make these relationships work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sorts of trouble.”
Nodal governance traces the roots of the pluralization of policing to the shift in the economy structure ensued by the fiscal crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, and by the spread of neoliberal modes of governance (White 2012: 87). However, it argues that the proliferation of nodes indicates that the pluralization has gone beyond neoliberal-driven privatization and globalization-induced trans-nationalism (Johnston 2006: 33). Nodal governance scholars see nodes as neither state nor non-state, but as new forms of governance outside the state parameters (Johnston 2006: 33). They thus take a society-centred view of the internal composition of the nodes and how they are aggregated, and reject a state-centred view of governance—a paradigm that Shearing (2006: 13) argues “needs to be eclipsed.” To be precise, nodal governance allocates no normative or analytical priority to the state (C. Shearing and Wood 2003a: 404), and rejects the state-centred concepts of citizenship and common good. The paradigm instead relies on Hammar (1990)’s concept of ‘denizen’—a term that denotes rights and duties of individuals as they live, work and play within and across spaces (C. Shearing and Wood 2003a: 418). Multiple affiliations result in multiple denizenships of different duration and involving different degrees of responsibility and rights. Denizenship leads to a re-conceptualization of the liberal ‘common good’ into smaller, parochial contracts that “through loose chains and interlaced networks, constitute contemporary social order” (C. Shearing and Wood 2003b: 210).

The conceptual roots of the paradigm are multifaceted. It draws on Castells’ (1996, 2000) network governance theory, on Vincent and Elinor Ostrom’s (E. Ostrom 1990; V. Ostrom 1997) polycentrism, as well as on Shearing and Stenning’s (1992) work on private security and on Shearing and Bayles’ (1996) work on multilateralization of policing. From here, the nodal school developed by
borrowing, among others, from the literature on hybrid governance (Murray and Scott 2002) and human security (Commission on Human Security 2003), and from the insights of Braithwaite (2002, 2004) and Drahos (2004, 2005) on the need to develop modes of governance that benefit disadvantaged populations. A common thread is a Foucauldian and Latourian conception of power as something coming from below (Foucault 1978: 94), and something that draws others into association (Latour 1986: 265). Power is thus important in nodal governance. However, the way in which nodal scholars engage with it leads to unsatisfactory explanations of the political economy-plural policing dialectical relations.

At its simplest, Wood and Shearing (2007: 27) describe nodal governance as

a conceptual tool used as a framing device to understand the distribution of power of polycentric governance arrangements through exploring the ‘mentalities, institutions, technologies and practices’ of ‘nodes.’

Burris (2004: 341-2) explains that a node:

need not be a formally constituted or legally recognised entity, but it must have sufficient stability and structure to enable the mobilization of resources, mentalities, and technologies over time. A street gang can be a node, as can a police station, or even a particular shift at a firehouse.

The paradigm’s main objective is to map security arrangements, analyze how they relate to each other, and address specific deficiencies.\(^4\) Normatively it aims to

\(^4\) On nodal governance’s methodology see Wood (2006).
mediate the imbalance between the haves and have-nots in regards to the provision of security services (Wood and Shearing 2007: 97-113). The clearest example of how this can be done successfully is the Zwelethemba project—a community-based approach at mediation and restorative justice, operating in South Africa and Argentina, that empowers local communities to self-regulate via the allocation of block grants (Kempa et al. 2002; Roche 2002).

However, the approach favoured by the paradigm means that nodal governance takes the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized as its framework of action and looks for solutions to given problems. Nodal scholars hence do not fully engage with questions related to how nodes are affected and may affect the broader political economy in which are embedded. For example, in describing who plays a role in policing contemporary South Africa, Shearing and Berg (2006) list the police, municipal policing services and private security, as well as unauthorized security entities. In narrowing the focus on Cape Town business district, they describe the ‘node,’ or the set of relations that have developed over the years between the police, private security companies and other institutions. There is little engagement with questions related to the politics that shape these nodes, why and how such a node comes to being constituted, what are the drivers and interests that shape it, or why this specific node emerged instead of others. Similar limits are evident in other case studies applying the paradigm (e.g., Marks and Wood 2007; van Sluis et al. 2011).
Overall, nodal governance represents a quantum leap in the development of a plural understanding of policing and has led to a rich stream of research. It has also been influential in bridging the gap between academia and policymaking. The paradigm has, for example, been the conceptual map of a project implemented by the Victoria Police in Australia (C. Shearing and Marks 2010; Wood and Bradley 2009), and a reference point for policymaking on policing in Canada (Law Commission of Canada 2006), Jamaica (Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) Strategic Review Panel 2008), and post-conflict Northern Ireland (Independent Commission on Policing 1999). Its influence on how to think about policing—or the ‘governance of security’ as Shearing and Johnston (2013: 9-13) refer to it—is undoubted. Yet, it remains a heuristic device unable to fully explain the political economy-plural policing dialectical relations.

Multi-Choice Policing

MCP is the only paradigm developed explicitly for the Sub-Saharan reality. It was developed by Africanist and social-legal scholar Baker (2004a, 2008a).

The paradigm is influenced by Africanist political scientists moving away from Weberian notions of the state as a set of key functions, and towards Tillyan models of the state arising from contested and often violent processes (Meagher 2012), and by new approaches to governance crystallized around the concepts of ‘twilight institutions’ (Lund 2006b), ‘governance without government’

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6 Prior to Baker, Clapham (1999) had argued that the police in Africa was at the service of elites and should also be considered ‘private. Hence, he theorized a conception of policing that did not distinguish between public and private but only between alternative forms of private systems. His concern was with conceptually locating the rise of private military companies on the continent, and he did not engage with the various other facets that shape the policing landscape in Africa.
(Raeymaekers et al. 2008), ‘mediated states’ (Hagmann and Péclard 2010, 2011; Menkhaus 2008), ‘hybrid political orders’ (Boege et al. 2009), and ‘fragmented sovereignties,’ (Gazit 2009). At the centre of these concepts, as Meagher (2012: 1075) notes, is the observation that since weak or failed states have not given way to complete anarchy in most parts of Africa, we need to pay greater attention to the local forms of order and authority that have been holding African societies together. Baker has built on this and MCP is developed as a problem-solving, policy-oriented paradigm.

MCP’s starting point is the perspective of the citizens as consumers of policing, and its methodology calls for mapping who the auspices and providers of policing are. What emerges is a picture of a fluid, diverse and overlapping policing landscape. As Baker (2004b: 170) explains it:

> As people move about their daily business, or as the time of day changes, so they may move from the sphere of one security agency to which they would naturally look for protection to another, or may be faced at times with a choice of agency to be made in terms of personal experience, preference for mentality (surveillance or punishment), cost or communal status. The extended family may protect the compound, but it is the street committee that sorts out the assault at the shebeen, a spontaneous mob that handles the bus station pickpocket, the commercial security guard that secures the entrance to the city centre office, and the state police that are called if a colleague is murdered at the bank at lunchtime. Policing, as it is experienced, is not just diverse or private, it is a complex pattern of overlapping agencies.
MCP, therefore, considers any form and method of policing, whether it is formal or informal, legal or illegal, effective or inept, fair or partisan, restrained or brutal (B. Baker 2008a: 5). In some detail Baker (2008a: 5-6 and 19) notes that:

policing may be authorized by a variety of sponsors: economic interests (both legal and illegal); residential communities; cultural communities: individuals; and governments […] and a whole array of formal and informal groups in Africa exercise policing functions as part of, or as their primary, role. State policing bodies include not only the State police and gendarmerie, but internal security units, presidential guards, local militias, anti-corruption police, anti-organised crime paramilitaries, forest guards and tax fraud officers. State approved community-based policing can include customary structures, Neighbourhood Watch groups, Community Policing Forums, local government crime prevention bodies and street patrols. Informal or autonomous citizen groups (that do not have official approval), such as anti-crime groups, religious police, ethnic militias, car guards and vigilantes are also common. Finally there are the commercial security operations, offering armed or unarmed protection, debt collectors and security equipment installers.

However, MCP is essentially another problem-solving, heurist device aimed at mapping policing arrangements and improving them.

For example, in Multi-choice policing in Africa, Baker (2008a) describes who authorizes and delivers policing in contemporary Africa, but he does not clearly engage with how policing is a site of struggle for the broader political economy, nor fully explains how struggles in the broader political economy affect policing. This transpires even more clearly as he details the policing actors in
Uganda (B. Baker 2005b). Here he describes the functions of local councils, police, military, crime prevention panels, traders’ associations, commercial security groups and mob justice, as well as when and how citizens would choose one over the other. But he does not explain why and how certain policing actors have come to play a role, what the drivers that facilitated them are, and whether they are linked to broader contestations over power and resources. The same approach is evident in other case studies (B. Baker 2005a, 2007, 2009).

Overall, MCP usefully captures the reality of the pluralization of policing in contexts where the state is not necessarily the main provider. It has thus inspired a rich stream of research, and influenced the tentative intellectual shift in the Security Sector Reform policy agenda towards including non-state actors in policing provisions. However, MCP is not geared at explaining how plural policing is affected and affects the broader political economy.

**Anchored Pluralism**

Anchored pluralism is the brainchild of Loader and Walker (2001, 2007) and represents the most influential state-centred, plural policing paradigm.

The paradigm is conceptually and empirically rooted in the reality of the industrialized liberal democracies of the West and, at its simplest, is an attempt to claim the centrality of the state within plural-policing landscapes. This normative

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7 Among others see Albrecht and Buur (2009), Dinnen and McLeod (2009), Dinnen and Allen (2012) and Forsyth (2011).

8 This is evidenced in documents of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC 2007, 2010; Scheye 2006), the British Department for International Development (Clegg et al. 2000; DHD 2004; Golub 2003; Nyamu-Musembi 2003), the Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Derks 2012; Scheye 2009, 2011), and some of the agencies of the Danish government (Albrecht et al. 2011; DDC 2010; DIIS 2008, 2010). International organizations, such as the UN (UNDP 2007; Wojkowska 2006), and the World Bank (2004, 2008, 2011) have also lately engaged with the plurality of justice and security actors.
stance is most clearly detailed in Loader and Walker’s *Civilising Security* (2007), but is already apparent in previous works co-authored by the two scholars (2001, 2006). It has its origins in Loader’s studies on the commodification of security (1999) and his arguments that policing has a social meaning that goes beyond its anti-crime function (1997) and that the state plays an essential role in democratising the governance of policing (2000).

In *Civilising Security*, Loader and Walker put their argument forward by affirming that the state is still at the core of policing, and that it should stay there for the ‘common good.’

At one level, they argue that the diffusion of crime control responsibilities to sub-national tiers of government, and to international and transnational institutions and networks, represents a reshuffling of cards within the state, rather than a diffusion of power to non-state actors (2007: 20-1). They also argue that the proliferation and global diffusion of crime-control strategies still afford the police a privileged space, whether in the form of intelligence-led, problem-solving, private-public partnerships or community policing strategies (2007: 20-1). These considerations lead them to argue that while the state may not do all the policing, it enrolls non-state actors in partnerships that remain under state auspices. This places anchored pluralism within the neoliberal rationalities of ‘governing-at-a-distance’ (Rose and Miller 1992), and the ‘regulatory state’ (Braithwaite 2000). Proponents of these rationalities argue that states are now doing the steering, while leaving the rowing to others, but claim that they are being strengthened in the process, not weakened (Osborne and Gaebler 1993: 47-8).
At another level, Loader and Walker (2007: 161-9) argue that security is important, not just as an entitlement or a right of citizenship, but as a ‘thick public good’, or a good that has a constitutive dimension within state-society relations. On these bases, they see state-provided security as both a civilizing agent and one that needs civilizing (2007: 7-18). It is civilizing because it produces forms of trust and solidarity among citizens who then start caring for each other’s security as a prerequisite for a democratic society. It needs civilizing because the state may be a threat to citizens. Conceptually, therefore, security as a ‘thick public good’ has clear roots in the classical republicanism’s view of the ‘common good’ that rejects the Hobbesian Leviathan as the way to avoid chaos, and arches back to Rousseau’s social contract. Rousseau (2004: 12) argues that human beings are capable of resisting the impulses of nature, but that “it is not enough to say to the citizens: be good. They must be taught to be so.”

Loader and Walker (2007: 182-92) identify several anchoring points that states have in steering plural policing. These include the state capacity to mobilize and dispense public funds; to deliberate on and regulate security matters; and the commitment to coercively enforce rules and directives.

Anchored pluralism, therefore, sees plural policing firmly within the broader political economy in which it is embedded. However, the paradigm focuses on the political norms that should frame policing, and remains conceptual and normative in nature, rather than explanatory. In other words, it engages with how plural policing ought to be delivered in order to shape state-society relations, rather than explaining how plural policing is delivered and how it is affected and affects the political economy context.
The paradigm is particularly problematic in the Global South where the state is not always the main auspice/provider of policing and policing landscapes often result from contested processes shaped by politics, rather than normative hierarchy (B. Baker 2004b, 2008b). Furthermore, the paradigm’s roots in the industrialized, liberal democracies of the Global North imply a conceptualization of the state, and of state institutions, operating via formal and legal rationalities and practices. This is not always the case. In particular, the police are in most of the world often violent and suffering from a chronic lack of accountability and transparency. This means that the paradigm neglects that policing in most of the world is structured by power dynamics shaped by ideas of class, race, religion and gender and delivered via informal and illegal practices (see also Grabosky 2008).

Overall, anchored pluralism is the conceptual prism through which governments see the switch from police to policing, and it is at the core of policing strategies such as the state-framed community policing initiatives pushed within the donor-driven democratic policing-policy agenda. The conceptual and policymaking relevance of anchored pluralism is undoubted and was, for example, reiterated in the recent Policing for a Better Britain report. This states that policing is undertaken by many providers, but remains a public good, and argues that “it is a public good in the deeper sense of being connected to the idea that security is the elementary DNA of society, something that citizens prioritise and pursue in common even if they disagree on how this should be achieved”

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10 Democratic policing is normally understood as the normative attributes that should define police work in a democratic country. The debate is characterised by a liberal and narrowly focused approach limited to the police and community policing initiatives. Bayley (2005: 208) summarises the attributes of democratic policing as accountability to law; safeguarding of human rights; external
This reiteration notwithstanding, the paradigm is limited by a normative and North-centric stance that neglects the contested political nature of policing and has limited explanatory value.

2-3 The political frameworks

PEPS and GSA have explained the political economy of state-private security policing arrangements, although at different scales of analysis. The Policing as Order-Making framework has instead explained how policing practices on the ground affect local and national politics. Overall, the three frameworks developed, respectively, in 2010, 2011 and 2015, represent a clear advance in the plural-policing literature and a tangible sign of the growing interest in the political dimensions of the phenomenon. However, none is able to fully explain the dialectical relations between the broad political economy and complex plural-policing landscapes. PEPS is limited by its normative stance; GSA by its conceptual basis that limits the pluralisation of policing to the ripple effects of globalization; and Policing as Order-Making by the political ethnographic approach it favours that captures the politicization of policing in everyday situations, but not its dialectical relations with the broader political economy.

The Political Economy of Private Security

PEPS was developed by political scientist White (2010, 2012) and is aimed at explaining the mutually constitutive relation between economy and politics in shaping the dynamics between the state and the private security industry.

The framework is based on three assumptions: the first is that there are state-centric political norms about how security ought to be delivered that
structure the actions of state and private security actors; the second is that the actions of the private sector are structured by the shifts in supply and demand; and the third is that both the state and the private security industry have a high degree of political agency (White 2010: 34-7). Within the plural policing literature, these assumptions place the framework on a continuum with nodal governance and anchored pluralism, from which it borrows conceptually and methodologically.

Indeed, White (2010: 25-8) endorses the economic explanations of the rise of private security broadly supported by the nodal governance school. These are centred on the shifting laws of supply and demand in the domestic security sector that ensued with the fiscal crises of the 1970s and 1980s, and in the emergence of neoliberal modes of governance. But White (2010: 25-8) also endorses anchored pluralism’s state-centric political norms based on the belief that security ought to be provided by the state, sheltered from market interference.

Thus seen, the framework is, basically, a synthesis of nodal governance and anchored pluralism narratives framed within a pluralist view of political economy. This sees politics as being about conflict over power, and the competing forces and interests as the reflections of functional role specialisation and, therefore, amenable to negotiated settlements. In particular, White borrows from the new political economy movement associated with the New Political Economy journal, which advocates a methodology that breaks down the structure and agency, and the market and state, barriers, among others (Gamble et al. 1996: 5-6). From

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11 Pluralists focus on the importance of social groups, civil society and political cultures to explain the emergence of specific institutions, and argue that different social interests compete to assert influence over institutions (see Alagappa 2004; Cohen and Arato 1994; Diamond et al. 1993; M. Jensen 2011; Linz and Stepan 1996; Mavrikos-Adamou 2010).

12 In the first issue of the journal, Gamble et al. (1996: 5-6) declared that a new stage in the development of the world economic and political system has commenced leading to a new kind of world order. To understand this new world order, they claimed, required “new modes of analysis and new theories, and a readiness to tear down intellectual barriers and bring together many
these bases, White focuses on the economic and political contexts of domestic security, and on the corresponding rationalities. He suggests that the first are to be mapped according to the nodal governance methodology, while the latter are to be extrapolated via anchored pluralism’s historically-grounded cultural investigations (White 2012: 95-6). The result, White argues, sheds some light onto questions such as: How have private security companies become so prominent? What motivates them? How can they be controlled? What does their increasingly ubiquitous presence in twenty-first century societies tell us about the future of security provision (White 2010: 4)?

Engaging with these questions denote a shift towards the politics that shapes the arrangement between the state and PSCs. This transpires in White’s empirical work and especially in his main book *The Politics of Private Security* where he has taken a chronological approach to explain the political negotiations between the state and the private security industry in Britain.

Particularly telling is his explanation of the UK neoliberal experiment of outsourcing policing (2010: 102-20). This coincided with the election of Margaret Thatcher in May 1979 and the introduction of quasi-market logics into the public service delivery chain. In the private security field, this New Public Management (NPM, see Gruening 2001) approach led to a change in the logic that mediated the negotiations with the state. In the preceding decades, the private security industry was pushing to gain statuary regulation via supporting the introduction of draft laws on the matter. The logic underwriting this approach was political, as it was approaches, methods and disciplines which for too long have been apart.” They thus promoted a “new” political economy” based on a methodology that “rejects the old dichotomy between agency and structure, and states and markets, which fragmented classical political economy into separate disciplines” and “seeks instead to build on those approaches in social science which have tried to develop an integrated analysis, by combining parsimonious theories which analyse agency in terms of rationality with contextual theories which analyse structures institutionally and historically.”
believed that a law would legitimize PSCs’ *au pair* with the police (White 2010: 80-101). The government responded with measures that allowed self-regulation under the overall control of the state.

However, once the NPM approach took hold, the private security industry was content with self-regulation. It strove to portray itself as the provider of just another service. This was facilitated by the switch in the broad political economy that saw the state contracting out traditional security services to the private sector; the construction of shopping malls and other forms of mass property opening space for PSCs’ financial gain; and the effects of NPM in other sectors of the economy leading to the phasing-out of many jobs that had a social control function, such as ticket inspectors and groundsmen. This also opened up economic opportunities for PSCs (White 2010: 105).

White’s framework, therefore, usefully explains how the broad political-economy context affected the private security industry. In so doing, it has been influential in orienting this study. It suffers from some weaknesses, nonetheless.

The key problem is the state-centric, normative assumptions upon which the framework is built and that, as White admits (2012: 100, footnote 5), are patchy and uneven in the Global South.

At one level, these assumptions mean that PEPS is unsuited to study PSCs that only partly operate within a state-centred frame. In South Africa, for example, there have been attempts through the state to regulate and supervise the industry through an on-going process of negotiations (Berg 2007; Gumedze 2007). But the industry is also represented by PSCs operating outside such a state-centred framework and, indeed, on the margin of the law (B. Baker 2002a: 37-8).
The *Mapogo a Mathamaga* is a PSC-cum-vigilante group that epitomizes this typology of actors (Oomen 2004).

At another level, the assumptions make it difficult to expand its analytical usefulness to explain the politics of gangs, vigilantes, militias, paramilitaries and strongmen, among others. As the literature hailing from the Global South in particular demonstrates, the relationship between these policing actors and the state is often seesawing between open contestation to formal or informal cooperation (Buur 2006; Manwaring 2009; Sundar 2010). PEPS’ emphasis on negotiations and regulations is unsuited to capture this degree of fluidity and contestation.

At yet another level, the assumptions neglect the reality that the politicization of ideologies shaped by religion and ethnicity—rather than fluctuations in the market of security—are important factors in mediating who plays a policing role in most of the world. In the southwest of Nigeria, for example, the *Oodua People’s Congress* (OPC), which emerged in the late 1990s, relied on ethnic and coercive capital to gain recognition as a political vehicle and vigilante group among the *Yoruba* ethnic group, the majority group in the area (Guichaoua 2009b; Nolte 2007).

Finally, PEPS explains *how* state-PSC arrangements take certain forms (White 2010: 41-163), but does not engage with the question of *who* benefits from them. In so doing it misses the opportunity to view policing as a facet of state-society relations and to explain questions about *how* power is exercised, by *whom* and for *whose* benefit.
Overall, PEPS is a clear advance in the plural policing literature, but still leaves too many actors unaccounted for, and too many important questions unanswered.

*Global Security Assemblages*

GSA is the first framework to explain the private security facet of plural policing in a relational dynamic with the local and global political economy. It was developed by international relations scholars Abrahamsen and Williams (2009, 2011) who have a background in African studies and political theory, respectively.

At its simplest, the framework is a successful attempt at explaining how neoliberal globalization has led to new loci of power resulting from the merging of public and private security providers. This is achieved with a sophisticated framework that pairs elements of Sassen’s (2006) theory of globalization with elements of Bourdieu’s (1977, 1986) sociology, but also borrows methodologically from nodal governance while accepting anchored pluralism’s view that the state matters (on the latter see Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 126).

Abrahamsen and Williams’s key arguments are that commodification shifted security from being a public good to being a service that can be traded globally, while the entrenching of the risk mentality has led to professional private security actors becoming sought after as part of any business or investment activities (on risk mentality see Beck 1992 [1986]). Taken together, these dynamics have led to a shift in the way security is provided and, importantly, in the way security is thought about, with PSCs becoming accepted.
The conceptual basis of their argument is drawn from globalization theorists’ explanations of the reconfiguration of power between the state and private entities. In particular, they lean on Sassen (2006) who suggests that we are witnessing a three-fold movement in contemporary political structures. This is explained via a process of ‘disassembly’ in which previously public functions are increasingly transferred to private actors; followed by a process of development of ‘capacities’ by private actors that allow them to act at a global level; and, finally, a process of ‘reassembly’ whereby these new actors and capabilities become part of ‘global assemblages’ that are embedded in national settings but operate at a global scale (Sassen 2006: 21). Abrahamsen and Williams argue that the result of this three-fold process in the field of security has led to the formation of the global security assemblages.

In order to explain how global security assemblages develop within a historically-contingent approach, Abrahamsen and Williams pair the Sassen-derived conceptual basis with Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘field’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 101) and ‘capital’ (1986). Bourdieu is also important in the way he qualifies their acknowledgement that the state matters.

According to Bourdieu, the social world is divided into fields, and a field is a social space structured by the operation and distribution of particular forms of capital, both material (economic capital) and non-material (cultural, social and symbolic capital). Bourdieu sees the ability to move in a field as tied to an agent’s possession of the relevant forms of capital. In the case of the global security assemblages, Abrahamsen and Williams use field and capital to explain how PSCs have acquired context-specific forms of symbolic and cultural capital that were previously the domain of the state, such as a layer of legitimization and
technological skills. In so doing, they explain (2011: 102-11) how the understanding of what constitute the field of security has changed and how actors, whether state and non-state, are engaged in fluid negotiations to both shape the field and gain the necessary capital to compete within it. This leads them to convincingly argue (2009: 3) that ‘global security assemblages’ are:

new and complex sites of power in which a range of different security agents and normativities interact, cooperate and compete to produce new institutions, practices and forms of security governance

They see (2009: 218) them as ‘boundary fields’ constituted by, and operating through, diverse forms of power which are neither purely private, nor public; neither local, nor global; but mark analytical spaces that lie between these common distinctions and require their own empirical investigations. The role of the state is thus recognized, but the Bourdeausian approach to empirically assess how power is accrued, exchanged or lost allows the scholars to explain how security is provided, rather than whether it is provided by the state as the ‘legitimate’ provider. Indeed, Abrahamsen and Williams (2011: 235) recognize this when they state that:

where the legitimacy of the state in the security field is already under question, the provision of security by private actors need not necessarily be socially corrosive. Instead, it can be stabilizing and conservative, preserving the existing social and political order.
Explanations of how the global security assemblages operate are sought in analyses that look at the relations between local, national and global political-economy. Their case-study of the petrol enclave in the Niger Delta, summarized in some details below, is emblematic (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 126-48).

The analytical starting point is the nature of the Nigerian state and its rent economy. At its simplest, the discovery of petrol in Nigeria has led to the state becoming dependent on it; politics an intra-elite zero-sum struggle of winner takes all; and institutions largely as a means to allocate patronage. This politics of plunder is accompanied by a highly unequal society with some 80 per cent of oil revenues accrued by 1 per cent of the population, and 70 per cent of private wealth held abroad. At the same time, about 70 per cent of Nigeria’s population lives below the poverty line, with deprivation acute in parts of the oil-producing states.

In the Niger Delta this political economy translates into virtually no development and people are constricted to a life of subsistence and unemployment. The situation is exacerbated by the widespread environmental damage caused by petroleum extraction and has led to vigilante groups, militias and, especially, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, targeting multinational companies, which are seen as intertwined with the state.

The global political economy comes into this situation in various ways. The oil industry in Nigeria is centralized via the Nigeria National Petroleum Company. This, however, operates in joint ventures with several global oil companies, such as Shell, Exxon Mobil and Chevron. Also, most of the Niger Delta’s oil is

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13 Abrahamsen and Williams cite a wealth of documents to support their argument. Refer to original for detail.
exported to the West, and western engineers make up the bulk of the senior staff who keeps the industry going.

The security situation is so dire that most of the oil extraction takes place in fortified enclaves. This is where global security assemblages have emerged in manners that blur the local, national, and global divide, as well as the public and private one. Private security companies (PSCs) are key players in global security assemblages, but in the Niger Delta they are prevented from carrying firearms. This has led forms of cooperation with the police whereby police officers are seconded to PSCs, integrated into their everyday operations, paid supplementary wages by the companies and supervised by PSC officers, while still taking orders from their own commanders.

Also, PSCs cooperate with the so-called supernumerary or ‘spy’ police at the direct request of the oil companies. They are deployed as an unarmed police force under the direct pay and control of the oil companies, and with police powers only on company property. Shell alone has 1,200 at its operations; ExxonMobil deploys between 700 and 1,000, and Chevron about 250. Oil companies have also integrated armed components of the police with arrangements that significantly blur the authority between company security officials and public officers. In addition, private security personnel interact on a daily basis with the military forces, or government security forces, which are increasingly used to protect oil operations defined as ‘national key assets.’ In such a way, these global security assemblages affect the broader political economy.

Thus viewed, the framework represents a clear advance of the plural policing literature on many levels.
First, GSA is not hampered by state-centric, normative constraints and is able to explain the nature of global security assemblages in any socio-political context. Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) engage with the realities in the Niger Delta, in post-conflict Sierra Leone, in the South African city of Cape Town and in Nigeria’s capital Nairobi. But the Sassen/Bourdieu-inspired framework would allow them to explain the politics of global security assemblages in the Global North with the same fluidity, if they so wished.

Second, although Abrahamsen and Williams do not systematically set out to explain who benefits from the global security assemblage, GSA has a more critical and direct focus on power and on the power structures that shape policing arrangements. It is thus able to disclose insights into the winners and losers of the global security assemblages. Particularly telling is the case study of Cape Town where their analysis of the globalization-induced rise in business development districts reveals how the policing practices associated with them are biased against the poor and marginalized (2011: 175-96). This means that, at least partially, the framework sees plural policing as a facet of state-society relations useful for explaining questions about how power is exercised, by whom and for whose benefit.

Third, GSA broadens the analysis beyond the borders of nation-states—a focus that characterizes most of the plural policing literature.

Notwithstanding all of the above, GSA is limited by its conceptual basis that places globalization as the driver of policing pluralization. This makes it unsuitable to explain the politics of complex plural-policing landscapes.

The starting point of Abrahamsen and Williams is the noted three-fold, globalization-induced process of disassembly, development of capacities and
reassembly. It is this process that leads to new loci of power transcending the state and non-state, and local and global divides. While this conceptual platform is useful to help thinking about power arrangements involving state and private security companies, it is less so in thinking about power arrangements amongst the state, vigilantes, militias, gangs, warlords and the several other policing actors whose claim to a role is rooted in the ripple effects of democratization, authoritarianism, decentralization, urbanization, or the global discourse around religious revival or the empowering of customary rules, among others. These represent important drivers of policing pluralisation that the GSA partly obfuscates. In addition, most policing actors do not develop the ‘capacities’ that allow them to act at a global level. Indeed, they often have no interest in doing so and their role is instead shaped by localized interests and political dynamics. The Mapogo a Mathamaga and the OPC, to cite two examples already noted, exemplify this local dimension.

Overall, GSA arguably represents the second quantum leap in the plural policing literature but it is unsuitable to engage with complex plural-policing landscapes.

Policing as Order-Making

Policing as Order-Making is the first political framework able to accommodate any policing actor. It was developed by Kyed and Albrecht (2015), two researchers of the Danish Institute of International Studies with long-standing interests, respectively, in state formation in Southern Africa, and security sector reform in Sierra Leone.
The starting point of the framework is Baker’s non-normative view of the plurality of policing. This means taking into consideration the practices deriving from any actor, whether operating formally, informally or illegally. Kyed and Albrecht then stress the relational nature of policing, not just in regards to other policing actors, but crucially also in regards to the sociopolitical context in which they are embedded. In particular, they note (2015: 15) that:

Policing actors form part of wider socio-political arenas. In these arenas policing actors and their supporters, adversaries and clients take part in often contested articulations of right and wrong, and of who and what constitutes a threat to society. Not any one fixed normative system drives these articulations. Rather they are expressions of context-specific clusters of rules, norms and institutions that have evolved together through relationships of interdependence, opposition and appropriation.

It is this set of relationships that lays the foundation for their framework. In particular, the framework is developed by borrowing from Lund (2006b)’s concept of ‘twilight institutions’, and from the methodology and concepts developed by political anthropologists that have engaged with the fragmented and contested nature of de facto sovereignty.

Twilight institutions are based on the premise that the ‘state idea’ matters, even when ‘state institutions’ are not efficient. It is, in essence, an analytical tool to explain how public authority is exercised in contexts where it is not the exclusive possession of government institutions, and where institutional

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14 The distinction between state idea and state institutions was popularized by Abrams ([1977] 1988) who argued against the reifying of the state as an object of study, and in favour of studying the hidden political and ideological realities that make the state as an idea.
competition is intense and a range of ostensibly apolitical situations become actively politicized (Lund 2006b: 674). In particular, Lund (2006b) argues that in such contexts a number of actors take on state-like roles, not only by performing functions that are usually the domain of the state, but also because they vie for public authority. He also argues (2006a: 686) that public authority—or ‘stateness’—can wax and wane, and that as a consequence, state institutions are never definitively formed, but that a constant process of formation takes place. Such institutions operate in the twilight between state and society, and between public and private (Lund 2006a: 686). In order to explain how twilight institutions operate, Lund (2006b: 674) argues, there is a need to look at public authority ‘from below,’ from the variety of concrete encounters between forms of public authority, and the mundane practices of ordinary people. It is thus analytically important to observe how language, style and symbols of the state are revered or contested at local level (Lund 2006a). Thus seen, distinctions between state and non-state, or public and private, are unhelpful (2006a).

According to Kyed and Albrecht (2015: 5) policing actors are twilight institutions as they often take on state-like functions by seeking to establish authority over a territorially defined relative majority. This is based on the invocation of transcendent qualities, such as community, tradition, ethnicity or religion. Kyed and Albrecht, therefore, use the concept to explain the political nature of policing actors as they engage in making and re-making public authority at the local level.

The second part of the Policing as Order-Making framework borrows from political anthropological studies on vigilantism to explain the “violent performances and moral ambiguity of policing actors” (Kyed and Albrecht 2015: 5).
7), or how policing actors are, at one and the same time, agents of security and insecurity. Particular useful for Kyed and Albrecht is Comaroff and Comaroff’s concept of ‘partial sovereignty’. As the Comaroffs argue (2008: 35):

Because of their historical predicaments, postcolonies tend not to be organized under a single, vertically integrated sovereignty sustained by a highly centralized state. Rather, they consist in a horizontally woven tapestry of partial sovereignties: sovereignties over terrains and their inhabitants, over aggregates of people conjoined in faith or culture, over transactional spheres, over networks of relations, regimes of property, domains of practice, and, quite often, over various combinations of these things; sovereignties longer or shorter lived, protected to a greater or lesser degree by the capacity to exercise compulsion, always incomplete.

This plural understanding of sovereignty allows Kyed and Albrecht to move from a *de jure* to a *de facto* conceptualization of sovereignty (Hansen and Stepputat 2005), and explain the often visible role that violence plays in everyday policing as acts of sovereign practices

Overall, the framework is aimed at explaining how policing contributes in order-making in urban Global South, where citizens often consider public policing inadequate and organize themselves to fill the gap. Kyed and Albrecht employ a political ethnographic methodology that requires extensive fieldwork and direct observation of the language of stateness, symbols and practices that policing actors deploy in their attempts to establish, define and enact localized social order. In so doing, the framework engages with two levels of the relationship between policing and politics. The first is policing as an expression of the *political* in the
underlying processes through which localized social order is defined and enacted (Kyed and Albrecht 2015: 18), and the second is in how policing is often implicated in politics, via the relations between policing actors and politicians, bureaucrats, businesspeople and so on (Kyed and Albrecht 2015: 18).

For example, in the Indonesian island of Lombok, Telle (2015: 45) explains that the vigilante group Amphibi has progressively moved away from unrestrained violence to become more state-like by producing artefacts of modern state power (laminated membership cards, ledgers, seals and military-style uniforms). It has also adopted a territorial form of organisation that emulates those of state institutions, with departments for security, law, proselytization, economy, welfare and communication.

Jensen and Hapal (2015: 24-39) instead provide an ethnographic analysis of how community policing in one of Manila slums has been affected by family and community relations, as well as by local electoral politics. This latter usefully explains how the results of local elections may lead to changes to the beneficiaries of patronage and in those who are allowed to play a role in policing.

A similar detailed ethnographic account is provided by Kyed (2015: 57-17) who explains how a civilian community policing group in the low-income neighbourhood of Mbhuleni, Swaziland, turned itself into a political vehicle for some of its members via successfully combating crime. This, Kyed argues, has given the group status as ‘informal sovereign’ of the area, and granted the ability to both aid and challenge the de jure superior authority of the state police. In so doing, the group has become order-making.

In summary, policing as order-making has filled an important gap in the literature as it is able to explain some of the political dimensions of policing,
regardless of the actors involved and whether policing is delivered formally, informally or illegally. The framework is particularly well-suited to explain the blurring of these dichotomies and the multifaceted contestations that take place at the local level, where policing actors meet the citizens. The scale of politics and the political ethnographic approach favoured, however, means that the policing as order-making framework is unsuited to explain the dialectical relations between the broad political economy and plural-policing landscapes.

2-4 Conclusion

This chapter has placed this study within the multidisciplinary plural-policing literature. It has explained that criminologists have predominantly conceptualized the plural understanding of policing, while the growing interest among political scientists has led to explanatory frameworks that engage with the politics of private security and some political dimensions of the broader phenomenon. It has also explained, however, that no framework is fully able to explain the dialectical relations between the broad political economy and complex plural-policing landscapes.

In particular, nodal governance, MCP, and anchored pluralism have given shape to empirical observations of policing as being authorized, sponsored and delivered by various actors, and have firmly moved the focus away from the police and towards the relational nature of policing landscapes. They have also provided important insights into how politics shapes policing and the inequalities of policing arrangements. But their engagement with the dialectical relations between the broad political economy and plural policing remains limited and filtered through either a problem-solving approach or a normative stance.
On the other hand, PEPS and GSA have explained the political economy of the state-PSC arrangements, but are either normatively or conceptually unable to engage with more complex policing landscapes. The policing as order-making framework has instead captured the politicization of policing in everyday situations, but its ethnographic focus clouds the dialectical relations between the broader political economy and policing. This is thus the gap that PEPP engages with in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3

The Political Economy of Plural-Policing framework

The Political Economy of Plural-Policing framework views policing as a facet of state-society relations and provides some tools to explain the dialectical relations between the broad political economy and complex plural-policing landscapes. It thus offers insights into how, by whom and for whose benefit policing is delivered and is an epistemological and theoretical contribution to the plural policing literature.

3-1 – Introduction

This chapter introduces the Political Economy of Plural-Policing framework (PEPP) as part of an ongoing theory-building research agenda. The framework provides a novel perspective in viewing policing as a facet of state-society relations and analytical tools to explain how the broad political economy and complex plural-policing landscapes may affect each other, especially in sociopolitical and economic contexts affected by rapid capitalist development, a high degree of political contestation, weak checks and balances on state institutions, legal pluralism and social inequalities.

Drawing on neo-Gramscian state theory, PEPP’s starting point is an understanding of institutions as resulting from contestations among sociopolitical groups competing to maintain, or change, a specific order. More explicitly, how
power and resources are distributed in society is the dynamic outcome of
contestations between sociopolitical coalitions, whose relative strength is largely
shaped by historically contingent structures of social, economic and political
inequality, rooted in the political economy. Within these contestations, the
material and the ideational realm are seen as complexly interwoven and mutually
interdependent.

From the above, it follows that PEPP sees the broader political economy as
often shaping how, by whom and for whose benefit policing is delivered. Crucially, however, the conceptual and analytical scope of the framework
recognizes ‘policing’ as a key site of struggle in the political economy, where
power relations are maintained, challenged and changed; and it recognizes that
policing actors are often embedded in broader sociopolitical coalitions and,
ocasionally, affect how power is distributed. This means that PEPP places the
analysis of power relations at the core of the political economy-plural policing
dialectical relations. Hence, while at its simplest the phrase ‘contestations over
power and resources’ indicates struggles over political office and/or over control
of channels of economic resource distribution, more broadly, it is meant to draw
attention to how systemic and agential forms of power affect how, by whom and
for whose benefit policing is delivered. PEPP combines the neo-Gramscian state
theory with elements of Bourdieu’s sociology to better account for the dynamic
and fluid nature of how individual and groups contest for power and for the
contested nature of plural policing arrangements. The first frames the broad frame
of analysis and links struggles over the broader political economy to policing; the
latter facilitates explaining the dynamics through which the struggles take place
and power is accrued, lost or maintained. In so doing, PEPP also addresses
questions related to: why and how policing arrangements come to be constituted; what the drivers and interests that shape them are; why some policing actors, practices and ideologies are favoured over others; how policing actors come to play a role; and what their source of power and legitimacy is.

Appropriating the neo-Gramscian and Bourdieusian theoretical streams here indicates that the “theories have been critically evaluated with the view of taking them over and use [them] for the purpose of this study” (Moi 1991: 1019). Indeed, it is recognized that the two streams present differences difficult to reconcile, not least the different views of class. This notwithstanding, and in a manner that it will become clearer, it is also argued that they have enough commonalities to maintain theoretical and conceptual coherence, and that they are useful to explain different facets of the research agenda, at different levels of analysis. They thus complement each other. Hence, PEPP does not represent a synthesis of the two theoretical streams, but is rather a framework that uses specific concepts from these streams to elucidate different aspects of the research agenda pursued.15

PEPP is developed over four additional sections.

Section 3.2 appropriates elements of neo-Gramscian political economy and state theory to delineate the initial analytical field and frame policing as a facet of state-society relations. In particular, it appropriates elements of Jessop’s strategic relational approach (SRA) to explain how sociopolitical groups contest over control of institutions, and how policing actors may be involved in such contestations.

Section 3.3 appropriates elements of Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘field’ and ‘capital’ to flesh out the details of how individual and groups contest for power and resources and why some actors may be favoured by dominant coalitions. Bourdieu is also useful to conceptualize an inclusive view of plural policing that moves beyond dichotomies, such as state and non-state, formal and informal, legal and illegal, religious or secular dichotomies.

Section 3.4 focuses on the relationship between the concept of strategic selectivity, hailing from the SRA, and the concept of the ‘most relevant’ capital, hailing from Bourdieu’s sociology. It explains how the two concepts interact and affect each other and their usefulness in explaining the dialectical relations between the broader political economy and plural policing.

Section 3.5 builds on the previous section and explains how change in the relations between the broader political economy and policing may take place. It does so by looking at how political struggles taking place at different levels and originating within different social fields, may affect each other over time and lead to new policing arrangements, or to new logics favouring some policing actors over others.

3-2 – The strategic relational nature of institutions and policing

There are certainly differences in how Marxists analyse power, but the main concern of scholars from this tradition is with power relations as manifestations of a specific mode or configuration of class domination (Jessop 2012: 3). Marxists are aware of other types of subjectivity, identity, antagonism and domination, but they consider these phenomena largely in terms of their relevance for, and their overdetermination by, class domination (Jessop 2012: 4). Different Marxist
approaches locate the bases of class power primarily in the social relations of production, in control over the state, or in intellectual hegemony over hearts and minds (Jessop 2012: 4). The focus is thus on systemic forms of power and the economy is largely seen as the regulator of power relations. The SRA has partly moved beyond these.


The SRA was initially conceived to explain power relations in the capitalist state, but eventually developed into one of several attempts to move beyond structuralism and intentionalism, towards a more different explanatory account of the structure and agency relation. In this regard it has moved beyond structuration theory (Giddens 1984) and critical-realism approaches (Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1975). Structuration theory methodologically bracketed structure and agency (Giddens 1984), while critical-realist approaches separated them ontologically into different domains (Archer 1995). SRA, on the other hand, does transcend the structure-and-agency dualism and conceptually sees neither as existing in isolation from the other. According to Hay (2002: 94) structure entails “context and refers to the setting within which social, political and economic events occur and acquire meaning”; and agency refers to action or “political conduct,” which entails the
“ability or capacity of an actor to act consciously, and in so doing, to attempt to realize his or her intentions.” The key argument the SRA brings forward is that structure and agency have a relational existence; they are interwoven, mutually constituting each other (Hay 2002: 127). To explain this, and to build bridges between structure and agency, the SRA introduces the concepts of ‘strategically-selective context’ and ‘structurally-constrained actors.’ As Jessop (2005: 48) explains:

To treat structures as strategically-selective involves examining how a given structure may privilege some actors, some identities, some strategies, some spatial and temporal horizons, some actions over others. Likewise, to treat actions as structurally-constrained requires exploring the ways, if any, in which actors (individual and/or collective) take account of this differential privileging through ‘strategic-context’ analysis when undertaking a course of action” (see also Hay 2002: 127).

Concepts such as ‘structural constraints,’ ‘strategic contexts,’ ‘interests,’ and ‘power’ are thus always located within a system of social relations (Jessop 2008: 44).

It follows that the SRA’s initial focus is on power as the capacity of a given force to produce an event that would not otherwise occur and as Jessop (2009: 374) argues, the more strongly structured social relations are, the more constraints there are on the various possible outcomes and on potential sequences of events. But while this view maintains a focus on systemic forms of power, it also recognises that actors have space for manoeuvre. In particular, actors can engage in an ex ante strategic context analysis and an ex post review of how well they
have succeeded in their objectives and what this implies for the next round of *ex ante* calculations (Jessop et al. 2009 [2006]).

The SRA, therefore, accounts for both the constraining effects of the historically contingent context, and the capacity of actors to affect the parameters of what is “socially, politically and economically possible” (Hay 2002: 185). Power is thus also seen as being about the ability of actors to influence or have an effect “upon the structures which set contexts and define the range of possibilities” (Hay 2002: 185). This is a more explicit view of power than most previous Marxist theorising.

In addition, the SRA origin in Gramsci’s work has meant that the approach takes non-material forms of power seriously. Particularly influential in this regard is Gramsci's concept of ‘hegemony,’ or ideological domination.

Gramsci saw hegemony as suppressing, often with the support of coercive force, any other ways of explaining reality. According to Gramsci, hegemony is transmitted by language since the words we use to speak and write have been constructed by social interactions through history and shaped by the dominant ideology of the times. Thus they are loaded with cultural meanings that condition us to think in particular ways, and to not be able to think very well in other ways (Gramsci 1999 [1971]).

Hay has built on this to explain how ideas, narratives and discourses play a role in mediating social structuration, and has explored how discursive paradigms may favour some interlocutors and discursive strategies over others (Hay 1996, 1998). This has led Hay (2001) to claim that, “just as structures and agents do not exist in isolation, so too the material and the ideational are complexly interwoven
and mutually interdependent.” In other words, Hay has included struggles related to semiosis into a strategic-relational analysis of power relations.

Jessop and Sum (2006a, 2006b, 2010; 2013a, 2013b) have also pursued this theoretical line in developing the ‘cultural political economy’ approach. This includes concern with semiosis in political economy analysis (Jessop 2010: 336). As Sum (2005: 1) argues, broadening the SRA to include culture means that:

agency [but power in general] is seen as having both material and discursive bases and, although economic power is grounded in control over economic resources and state power is grounded in coercion, struggles among competing forces and interests in these domains are normally waged as much through the battle for ideas as through the mobilization of primarily material resources and capacities. Success in these struggles typically depends on the capacity to articulate compelling visions that combine political, intellectual, and moral leadership with a flow of material rewards.

The SRA thus provides the tools to explain the state, or any other institution, as a site of social contestation that favours some groups, ideologies and practices over others. The contestation is primarily about material resources, but non-material forms of power are important in shaping power relations and the strategic selectivity of institutions. Thus seen, the approach is useful for explaining the complex mutual interrelations between ‘state’ and ‘society’ and to move beyond both strict state-centred and society-centred explanations (Mürekkep 2002). It is also useful for moving beyond tendencies within Marxism which are deterministic and over reliant on material forms of power.
A growing number of scholars have applied, appropriated or built upon the SRA.\textsuperscript{16} In regards to this study the SRA frames the centrality of the struggles over the political economy, but also opens the conceptual and analytical space to include policing actors in the broader sociopolitical coalitions contesting for power and resources. This provides the space to explain why some policing actors, practices and ideologies are favoured over others; and ultimately how politics and policing may affect each other. Furthermore, the SRA’s partial cultural turn allows accounting for how semiosis, discourses and ideologies—non-material forms of power—play a role in shaping power relations. This is particularly relevant in explaining the political economy-plural policing dialectical relations because, as Chapter 6 and 7 demonstrate, struggles over the meaning attached to *adat* or even Islam are important in favouring the interests of specific sociopolitical groups and policing actors.

Analytically, therefore, this approach directs attention to ‘interests,’ ‘conflict,’ ‘competition,’ and ‘coalitions’ which are seen as central in explaining social dynamics. The work required is to identify the conflicts and the convergences of interests and alliances between groups contesting for power and resources and policing actors; identify the ideologies or interests around which the convergence of interests and alliances are mobilized, and which social and political order they reflect; and identify the strategic selectivity that favours the articulation of power of some alliances, groups and interests rather than others. These lines of inquiry provide the context within which political and policing actors are situated, and the institutional landscape which they must negotiate. In

other words, it frames policing in relation to the political economy context and as a facet of state-society relations, and provides the analytical lines to answer how, by whom and for whose benefit policing is delivered. The SRA’s focus on the historical contingency of state-society relations also means that, while the approach is widely applicable, the outcome of the analyses of policing landscapes may vary across time and space.

Despite the noted advance, the agency side of the SRA remains underdeveloped, as admitted by Jessop (Jessop et al. 2009 [2006]), and the approach does not fully explain how contestations take place. In particular, and specifically in regards to the dialectical relations between the broader political economy and plural policing context, the ex ante strategic context analysis and ex post review of how actors have succeeded are exactly that—ex ante analysis and ex post review—and they cloud over the actual processes through which struggles take place and the richness of the forms of power that individuals and groups may draw upon. It is for this reason that we now turn to Bourdieu.

3-3 – Policing as a Bourdieusian field

Bourdieu’s sociology is also largely about explaining the unequal distribution of power, and what the structural forces that maintain elite domination are. Indeed, the concepts of ‘field and ‘capital’ appropriated here are part of a metatheory he developed to explain domination.\(^{17}\) Rather similarly to the SRA, Bourdieu also

\(^{17}\) Such a metatheory also includes the concepts of ‘habitus’ and ‘symbolic violence,’ among others. Bourdieu (1977: 72) defines habitus as “systems of durable, transposable dispositions” where disposition express “first the result of an organizing action, with a meaning close to that of words such as structure” and a “way of being, a habitual state […] a predisposition, tendency, propensity, or inclination” (1977: 274, footnote 1). Habitus is thus seen as “a structuring structure” (1977: 72) a way of being that individuals, groups or institutions inherit from the social contexts in which they are situated, and which works to partly shape their actions (see also Maton 2008). Symbolic violence is seen as “the violence that is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity” (Webb et al. 2002: 25). It is thus the consequence of misrecognition of the reality,
maintains that most social struggles are aimed at accessing or maintaining economic resources (Bourdieu 1986: 47-54), and places the accent on other forms of power as important in explaining class domination. In particular, he focuses on how the production of meanings and the allocation of cultural capital—that is, resources which have cultural as distinct from economic value—are important to regulate human activities and in structuring power relations (Webb et al. 2002: 12). Bourdieu’s initial focus is thus also on systemic forms of material and non-material power. However, he pairs his with a view of agency that is better suited for explaining how actors contest for power and resources, as well as the fluidity and plurality of policing landscapes.

Indeed, plural policing landscapes are populated by a large number of actors, contesting and negotiating for a role. The first step in theorizing this plurality and fluidity is to think of plural policing as a set of practices taking place within a Bourdieusian field and in which actors contest for a role by drawing on various forms of capital.\(^\text{18}\)

For Bourdieu, the social world is divided into fields, each with its forms of capital (1977, 1986; see also Moore 2008; Thomson 2008). He sees a field as the rules of the game or a partially structured social space with its own rules of engagement, schemes of domination, legitimate opinions, discourses, practises and so on. In his own words with Wacquant (1992: 101):

\[^\text{18}\] The author has benefitted greatly from the work of scholars that have previously appropriated Bourdieu’s concepts in criminology, governance, and security studies. Besides the acknowledged work by Abrahamsen and Williams, particularly useful were Bigo (2011; Bigo et al. 2007), Chan (2004), Dupont (2004) Leander (2005, 2011), Loader (1997), Mérand (2010), Stuvøy (2009) and Villumsen (2008).
The field as a structure of objective relations between positions of force undergirds and guides the strategies whereby the occupants of these positions seek, individually or collectively, to safeguard or improve their position and to impose their principle of hierarchization most favourable to their own [...].

A field therefore stands for both a set of patterned practices, which suggests competent actions in conformity with rules and roles, and a playing field in which agents try to advance their positions (Guzzini 2006: 165; Thomson 2008). Thus understood, fields are not too dissimilar to institutions as a strategic relational site of contestation that also favours some actors, practices and ideologies over others.

Fields are populated by actors that possess various capitals. For Bourdieu capital is a form of power. He accounts for a primary form of material capital, which he terms ‘economic’ capital, and a series of immaterial forms of capital, the most important of which are ‘cultural’ and ‘social’ capital (Bourdieu 1986; Moore 2008). Through the concept of ‘symbolic’ capital—which Bourdieu sees as the form that all types of capital take once they are recognised by others via deference, obedience or services—he also draws attention to the fact that the value of any capital depends, in part, upon social recognition.

Economic capital is anything that can be converted into money. Bourdieu considers economic capital as the most important form of capital and any other form of capital as a derivate of, or means to get to, economic capital (Bourdieu 1986: 47-54). Cultural capital, on the other hand, consists of the competencies, skills and qualifications that may enable holders to mobilize authority and be considered experts (Bourdieu 1986: 47-54), while social capital is based on social connections, networks of contacts, and membership of groups. Class associations
is one way in which such relationships are socially instituted and guaranteed, as are also families, tribes, schools, and political parties (Stuvøy 2009: 131). This means that social capital has two components: the size of an individual’s network and the volume of the capital that the other parts of the network have, to which the individual gains access (Ihlen 2005: 494).

Bourdieu recognises that forms of capital are field-specific, so that while they are relevant in one field they are not necessarily relevant in another. In his work he also refers to family, religious, political, moral and state capital, among others (Swartz 1997: 79). The various forms of capital are not mutually exclusive; they are often entwined, providing actors with different capacities (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 117). Crucially, capital can be accrued, exchanged or lost. The analytical attention on the various forms of capital makes no distinction between whether the bearer is a state or a non-state actor and whether the capital is employed in a formal or informal, legal or illegal manner, and so on. What need to be ascertained empirically are the forms of capital—hence power—policing actors draw upon, and how they accrue and exchange these.

Thus seen, and as explained below, the concepts of field and capital provide the analytical tools to explain how policing actors—or any actor, for that matter—tangibly contest for power and resources. The combination of the two concepts also allows for the conceptualization of policing landscapes unconstrained by dichotomies, and for accounting of any possible variations in the nature of the policing actors and of their practices.
3-4 – Politics, policing, strategic selectivity and the most ‘relevant’ capital

The analytical convergence between the field of exploration suggested by the SRA and the empirical richness provided by Bourdieu resides in the relationship between the strategic selectivity of the broader political economy context and the ‘most relevant’ capital in the field of policing.

Indeed, several forms of capital are likely to be influential in shaping most plural policing landscapes. However, forms of capital do not weigh the same. There is always a hierarchy amongst them, and the highest ranked capital—or the ‘most relevant’ capital—is the one that often leads the bearer to being favoured by dominant sociopolitical coalitions. This leads to accruing what Dupont (2004: 85) terms ‘political’ capital and defines as

the advantages deriving from the proximity of actors to the machinery of government and their capacity to influence or direct this machinery toward their own objectives.  

In other words, the ‘most relevant’ capital echoes the elements that shape the strategic selectivity, and the strategic selectivity often favours the most relevant capital, although it is not limited by it.

An important capital in most policing landscapes is coercive capital, or the capacity and willingness of actors to use violence to impose their will. This means that coercive capital has both a material and a symbolic manifestation. The latter

19 In some of his work Bourdieu mentioned ‘political capital’ and defined it as “A form of symbolic capital, credit founded on credence or belief and recognition or, more precisely, on the innumerable operations of credit by which agents confer on a person (or on an object) the very powers that they recognize in him (or it).” However, as Schugurensky (2000: 4) notes, Bourdieu’s political capital is limited to the power enjoyed by politicians from the trust that followers place in them. This is clearly a too limited view of political capital as it precludes the advantages that actors may gain from their proximity with politicians.
is constituted by signs of capacity and willingness to use coercive force, and it exists only as far as it is recognised by others. The ability of actors to intimidate others, without actually resorting to violence, is in itself a sign of possessing a degree of coercive capital. The police have coercive capital, but so do gangs, militias, paramilitary groups, criminal organisations etc. In some contexts, such as most Brazilian slums, coercive capital is the most relevant form of capital and groups able to ‘control’ and ‘protect’ the favelas— and extract resources—are often those gaining the tacit support of segments of the police and political establishment. This means that in the relations between political economy and plural policing in the Brazilian slums, coercive capital is among the form of capital favoured by some sociopolitical groups and can be exchanged with political capital. Logan’s (2007: 28) snapshot is indicative of these dynamics.

Most favelas are under the control of an ‘owner’ who employs a highly-organized network of young men to maintain a sense of law and order. While often preventing crimes such as theft, rape, assault and murder by providing their own brand of security, these gangs also protect criminal enterprises, such as the illicit drug trade, from invading police and rival gang factions. Because formal state policing does not occur in gang controlled favelas, favela residents have come to rely on the owner for protection. In many cases, police officers broker an agreement with the favela owner, whereby the police accept payments in exchange for protection” (see also Arias 2004; da Silva 2000).

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20 Bourdieu was largely unconcerned with coercive capital. He (1994) mentioned capital of physical force as one of the forms of capital inscribed on the state, while Chan (2004) on her Bourdeausian analysis of the Australian police mentioned physical capital as “strength, physique and tolerance of harsh conditions.”
Cultural capital is another important form of capital for the police, as they lay claim to the highest hierarchical position in most policing landscapes based on their competency and skills. In a reverse fashion, however, cultural capital is also at the core of policing actors claiming a role to ‘fill the gap left by the police.’ The often-heard argument in this regard is that since the police do not have the skills and capacity to prevent crime and keep the peace, other groups should step in. In the state of Anambra, southeast Nigeria, the inefficiency of the police in the early 2000s led to the local governor, Mbadinuju, taking the unprecedented step of inviting in the notorious Bakassi Boys vigilante group from the neighbouring state of Abia (B. Baker 2002b). The coercive capital of the Bakassi Boys, paired with the lack of cultural capital of the police, were thus among the most relevant forms of capital and constitute part of the strategic selectivity that mediated the political economy-plural policing relations in Anambra and led to the vigilante group gaining some political capital.

Importantly, cultural capital may take various hues when individuals, groups and policing actors claim competence in regards to existing or invented religious, ethnic or traditional systems of value. Cultural capital can thus take the form of traditional capital or Islamic capital, among others, and represent a way through which ideologies are politicized across social fields. This is particularly widespread and influential in the Global South and is a manifestation of how immaterial forms of power are important in establishing power relations and policing practices and discourses.

In southwest of Nigeria, for example, ethnic and coercive capital are key for the role played by the controversial Oodua People’s Congress (OPC, Akinyele
2001; Guichaoua 2009a, 2009b; Nolte 2007). This organisation emerged in the late 1990s and has since gained recognition as a political vehicle and vigilante group among the Yoruba ethnic group, the majority group in the area. The OPC has accrued ethnic capital by supporting an ethno-nationalist discourse as Yoruba have been marginalized in national politics. It has paired this with a growing vigilant role (coercive capital), on the back of police inefficiency and corruption (lack of cultural capital). The process of accruing ethnic and coercive capital eventually led to the OPC being included in broad political alliances both with the state government and with members of the originally reluctant federal state of Nigeria (HRW 2003). In this context, ethnic capital grew to become among the most relevant capitals, which facilitated the OPC gaining political capital. The dynamics behind this show how struggles within the field of policing may, on occasion, force sociopolitical coalitions to alter the strategic selectivity that mediates which policing actor they favour.

Social capital is another important capital in the field of policing as no actor is likely to play a durable role without support. This includes the police. The global trend towards community policing strategies is a symptom of the police’s efforts to increase their trustworthiness—i.e., social capital—within the community (Grabosky 2009; Hawdon 2008; Wisler and Onwudiwe 2008). On the other hand, vigilantism is often seen as resulting from groups responding to the needs of the local community. This implies a degree of social capital. Social capital does not always need to be paired with the coercive capital that vigilantes rely on, though. For example, in his study of Cicadas, a densely populated neighbourhood in Indonesia’s Bandung, Barker (2009: 49) explains how actors owning a high amount of social capital have risen to play a central role in
mediating the relationship between the state, the police and the local population in
the last two decades. In particular, he explains that in democratic Indonesia
informal leaders are people such as Ujang Ompong, who had for years acted as
the elected leader of an association of street vendors and former market vendors
(Barker 2009: 69-70). This means that in Cicadas, the most relevant capital is the
ability to network within the community and be recognised as a representative of
local interests. This social (and symbolic) capital enables individuals such as
Ujang Ompong to regulate behaviours and is what allows them to become a
reference point for bureaucrats, local politicians and the police. Said differently,
the strategic selectivity that regulates the political economy-plural policing
dialectical relations in Cicadas favours specific forms of social capital.

Another important capital in the field of policing is bureaucratic capital, or
one that derives from operating within the state-recognized framework. The
police obviously possess bureaucratic capital. But to various degrees so do the
many strands of community policing, and the licensed private security companies.
In many contexts, members of community policing units gain a degree of
recognition that allows them also to access resources beyond the policing
function.

Identifying the forms of capital policing actors draw upon, and recognizing
which one is the most relevant, is thus useful to link struggles within the field of
policing to the strategic selectivity of the broader institutional context and vice
versa. In other words, it is useful to link the Jessopian macro analysis to the
Bourdiesrian micro analysis and explain how the broader political economy often
dictates *how*, by *whom* and for *whose* benefit policing is delivered but also how
policing actors are embedded in broader sociopolitical coalitions and how,
occasionally, they force their way into the calculations of the sociopolitical coalitions.

3-5 – Multilevel struggles and change

The dialectical relations between the broader political economy and plural policing can be quite fluid and dynamic. While this fluidity rarely represents changes in the power dynamics that structure society, it is an important phenomenon that needs to be explained in more detail.

The SRA accounts for at least three levels of political struggles that lead to either change in who is embedded in the broad sociopolitical groups, or to progressive changes of the strategic selectivity that affects who is favoured and who is not.

The first level of struggle is amongst social groups competing within the constraints imposed by the strategic selectivity (Jessop et al. 2009 [2006]). This is the simplest and most common form of struggle and one unlikely to lead to changes to the strategic selectivity of the state and institutions. It is a matter of actors adjusting their strategies to gain access to state power and resources. In the Brazilian favelas, semi-criminal groups battle each other to gain local prominence. The group who has the most coercive capital, the most relevant capital, wins and is likely to gain political connections.

The second level of struggle is what Jessop describes as “struggles at a distance from the state to modify the balance of forces within the state and among those with privileged access to it” (Jessop et al. 2009 [2006]). This form of struggle may result in previously excluded social groups and interests entering into the political calculation of those with direct access to state power and
resources (Jessop et al. 2009 [2006]). It is a level of struggle that takes place over the medium to long term and that may lead to some changes to the strategic selectivity of the state and institutions. The noted trajectory of the OPC is indicative of this level of struggle.

The third level of struggle, meanwhile, is about transforming the strategic selectivity (Jessop et al. 2009 [2006]). This takes place over a long period of time and may be affected by the contingent historical trajectory. Explanations need to pay attention to structural processes such as colonization, industrialization, urbanisation, globalisation, and the agent-driven political action brought through struggles for independence, or to democratize and decentralize governance. Analyses also need to account for critical junctures that favour or hinder the articulation of power by some actors rather than others. These are not structural processes, but historical moments that produce situations that shape behaviours.

It was noted, for example, that in democratizing and bureaucratizing Indonesia social capital has become the most relevant capital in mediating the relationship between the state and the local population in contexts such as Cicadas. Barker (2009) also explains how during the authoritarian regime, which lasted from 1965 until 1998, coercive capital was the most relevant capital and strongmen were the middle-men between the state and the population. The change in the most relevant form of capital is thus linked to a broader, historical process that has seen Indonesia moving from an authoritarian system to a democratic one.

Changes therefore take place via a series of cause-and-effect relations and across a spatio-temporal dimension. The concept of field is useful in theorizing
how even apparently unrelated struggles, taking place in different social fields, may affect each other.  

*The interdependency of fields*

Fields are not sealed social spaces. They have porous borders, with actors, capital, ideologies, practices etc., moving across fields; they exist in relation to other fields. Some fields are also related, with some functioning both independently and as subfields of more dominant fields (Thomson 2008: 72-3). The field of the state, for example, includes the subfields of government, while the field of government includes the subfields of a ministry of religion, of a ministry of economy, and so on. The field of the ministry of the economy operates independently and has its own logic, capital, practices, etc. But it is also, of course, closely related to the parent field of the government. Each field, therefore, has its own dynamics, logic, capital, practices and strategic selectivity, and is shaped by the contestations taking place within the field. But it is also affected by the dynamics, forms of capital, actors, and contestations taking place elsewhere.

The field of policing is not an exception. Like any other field, it also exists in relation to others, it intersects and overlaps in different ways and in different spaces with many other fields and is strongly affected by the actors, capital, logics and contestations taking place in more dominant fields and by the strategic selectivity of the broader political economy context, among others.

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21 It should be noted that Bourdieu explains change via how the habitus interacts with field. Habitus, Bourdieu, argues, is created through a social, rather than individual process leading to patterns that are enduring and transferrable from one context to another, but that also shift in relation to specific contexts and over time. Habitus is thus not fixed or permanent, and can be changed under unexpected situations or over a long historical period. The interaction between field and habitus is however inadequate to account for the fluidity and dynamism of the dialectical relation between political economy and plural policing. On habitus see also Bourdieu (1977, 1992), Calhoun (1993), Crossley (2005: 104-13), Maton (2008) and various chapters in the volume edited by Shusterman (1999).
The outcome of political struggles in other fields may affect the field of policing. For example, a change in government may lead to changes to which policing actor is granted political capital, or proximity to the political leaders. A cut in the state budget may lead to a reduced number of police deployed in a neighbourhood and to vigilantes rising in prominence.

Of course, contestations within the field of policing may affect dynamics in more dominant fields, although to a lesser degree. The rising tensions between gangs competing for control of a neighbourhood may prompt the authorities to divert funds to the local police. This may lead to more police officers being deployed in the contested area and to a diminished role of the gangs.

Through a longer perspective, changes in the strategic selectivity of the state may also lead to important changes in the field of policing. In the case of South Africa, for example, the endorsing a neoliberal project in the late 1990s (Peet 2002) led to a progressive change in the strategic selectivity of the state to favour capital, practices and discourse associated with the neoliberal view of state-society relation. These imply a view of the state as a set of institutions to support the market, and of individuals as combining two subjectivities—that of client and that of citizens (Hutchison et al. 2014: 59). In their role as ‘client,’ individuals are seen as consumers of existing public services much in the same way as they are seen as consumers of chicken and rice. However, in their role as ‘citizens,’ individuals can lobby the government when public services are inadequate.

In the field of policing the neoliberal emphasis on fiscal discipline, value for money, efficiency, and a reduced role for the state meant that the police were required to work in partnership with other agencies and that public security functions were outsourced (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007; Schönteich et al. 2007).
2004). Through this prism, it is possible to add an historically contingent political explanation to the rise of the PSCs industry in the country, which has grown into being the world’s largest as a percentage of GDP in recent decades (Berg and Nouveau 2011: 23).

Viewing the field of policing in such a way, therefore, adds explanatory lenses to appreciate how struggles originating in some other social field may lead to change in the field of policing and, in some rare cases, also vice versa.

3-6 – Conclusion

This chapter has introduced PEPP as a framework to view policing as a facet of state-society relations and explain elements of the dialectical relations between the broader political economy and complex plural-policing landscapes. This, in turn, sheds light on how, by whom and for whose benefit policing is delivered.

The framework is an epistemological and theoretical advance in the plural-policing literature. From an epistemological standpoint it suggests viewing policing not as a stand-alone field, but in a dialectical dynamic within the broader political context. From a theoretical standpoint it provides analytic tools to explain how politics affects policing and how policing may affect politics. This means accounting for and explaining how the broader political economy often dictates how, by whom and for whose benefit policing is delivered but also how policing actors are embedded in broader sociopolitical coalitions and how, occasionally, they force their way into the calculations of the sociopolitical coalitions.

The framework is developed by appropriating elements of neo-Gramscian political economy and state theory, and Bourdieu’s sociology. The neo-Gramscian
theoretical stream marks the field of exploration and suggests a number of causal relationships. Most tellingly, it frames policing within the broader political economy and as a facet of state-society relations. It suggests a deductive approach to research and places the analytical attention on ‘interests,’ ‘conflict,’ ‘competition,’ and ‘coalitions’ as central in explaining social dynamics and how political economy and plural policing affect each other.

Bourdieu’s sociology allows exploring the complexity of how actors contest for power in a tangible manner, and the complexity of plural policing landscapes both in terms of the actors that populate it and of the forms of power they rely on. He thus adds an inductive methodological approach that favours empirical work and that is useful to make PEPP relevant to study specific practices, such as policing.

The analytical link between the theoretical streams is the relationship between the strategic selectivity of institutions and the most relevant capital in the field of policing. The way in which they relate to each other is also at the core of how change can be explained. This is achieved by analysing political struggles originating in various social fields within a cause-and-effect relation, and across a spatio-temporal dimension.

Overall, the framework firmly places the emphasis on the political nature of policing and its relational dynamic with the broader political struggles in a manner than none of the existing plural policing paradigms and framework do.
CHAPTER 4

The political economy of policing in Indonesia: a historical view

This chapter focuses on the interests, coalitions and conflicts that have historically contested for power and resources in Indonesia, and on the strategic selectivity that has allowed policing actors to be embedded in such coalitions. PEPP shows that while auspices and providers of policing have changed from the pre-colonial period through the colonial and the post-colonial periods, policing has always been influential in shaping state-society relations.

4-1 – Introduction

Specialists on Indonesia have long been interested in the relations between elites, vigilantes and militias. Schulte Nordholt (1991) traced how thugs, referred to as jago, played a role in maintaining some kind of order in both the pre-colonial kingdoms and colonial time; Cribb (1991) explained how the jago joined the pro-independence militias during the revolutionary period and many scholars, including Ryter (2002) and Barker (1999a), have drawn attention to how jago-type figures, then referred to as preman, were used as proxies of Suharto’s authoritarian state.

These streams of literature have mostly treated the various policing actors in isolation. Here, the various streams are critically examined to explain how the variety of policing providers and auspices related to, opposed and enrolled each
other and, in particular, how the broader political economy affected policing and policing affected the broader political economy. This is achieved by placing the analytical attention on the interests, coalitions and conflicts over power and resources, and by explaining the strategic selectivity that has favoured some policing actors over others. Although the macro-analysis provided inevitably neglects some localized dynamics, three key findings emerge:

First, Indonesia’s history has been characterized by a very close dialectical relation between struggles to access and control state power and resources, and how, by whom and for whose benefit policing is delivered. This has led to a high degree of politicization of policing actors and to an ad-hoc implementation of the law, largely in favour of elite interests. The internalization of this latter practice—what Bourdieu calls the rules of the game—has meant that policing actors have often neglected their security function.

Second, the strategic selectivity mediating the political economy-plural policing dialectical relations has changed over the decades, shaped by the ripple effects of colonialism, post-colonial state-building, authoritarianism and Indonesia’s progressing embedding into the global capitalist system. However, these processes have changed who the auspices and providers of policing are, but has had no meaningful effect on the instrumental use of policing as a means for elite groups to access resources.

Third, the ad-hoc implementation of the law and the closely related weak system of checks and balances on state institutions has been an important structuring force in the politicization of policing throughout Indonesia’s history.
These findings are substantiated over three sections that engage, respectively, with the pre-colonial and colonial period, the Sukarno era, and the 32-year period of authoritarianism under Suharto.

4-2 – Pre-colonial and colonial Indonesia

What is today known as Indonesia was subject to external influences long before the Dutch, the eventual colonial power, appeared on the scene. Links with India, for example, go back at least 2,500 years, and Indians were influential from about 200 BC to 1600 (Bevan et al. 1999: 195). They introduced legal practices, agricultural innovations and both Buddhism and Hinduism (Bevan et al. 1999: 195). At that time, the archipelago was dotted with small, competing kingdoms with highly hierarchical social structures, which were also very fluid and contested (Ricklefs 2001: 24). Most had a king that delegated power at various levels where subaltern elites employed coercive capital to appropriate manpower, land and taxes (Ricklefs 2001: 18-25). The land belonged to the king. Hence, the symbolic capital of the other ruling groups did not stem from the ownership of the means of production, but from the social and bureaucratic capital deriving from the relation with the king (Mortimer 1969: 2).

However, the authority and legitimacy of the king, and of the ruling groups, were highly contested and dependant on the coercive capital at their disposal. Subaltern elites had their own entourage of followers, which provided them with a separate and partially autonomous power base (Howe 2006: 22). They occasionally became more powerful than their overlords, and claimed autonomy or incited rebellion. Even men with obscure origins sometimes accumulated followers (social and coercive capital), converted these into rank and titles
(symbolic capital) and, through war, marriage alliances and other means, established their own little kingdoms in competition with others (Howe 2006: 22). Hence, Schulte-Nordolt (1991: 75) notes that politics was:

a struggle for control over comparatively scarce resources, such as manpower, food, access to trade, wealth and protection [...] in which the right of the strongest was the rule and violence and intimidation were common (see also Henley 2004).

From these early stages, therefore, policing resulted from struggles between social groups bent on accessing resources and drawing on various sources of power. But policing was also a crucial site of struggle that shaped the broader political economy. The sociopolitical groups able to garner the most coercive capital were those in a better position to access resources. There was thus a clear dialectical relation between struggles over the political economy and policing.

In the fifteenth century, traders introduced Islam, which gradually replaced Hinduism and Buddhism as the main religions of the kingdoms. Europeans arrived in the sixteenth century: first the Portuguese in 1511, then the Dutch in 1596, and the English during various periods from 1675 (Bevan et al. 1999: 195). The Dutch played the largest role and maintained a presence until 1941, first under the flag of the United East Indian Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VOC)—a private stock company that had been granted monopoly trading rights as well as the right to make treaties, maintain law and order, wage war, build forts and operate a judicial system—and from 1795 directly under the Dutch government.
The Netherlands was a predatory colonial power bent on exploiting local resources. It did so first by implementing policies that led to the compulsory export-crop production of coffee, sugar, tea and tobacco, and from 1870, to the exploitation of rubber, copra, tin and oil (Bevan et al. 1999: 197). These economic policies allowed the Dutch to integrate Indonesia more deeply into the capitalist, European-dominated system of trade that had emerged and linked the Americas, the Caribbean and West Africa as well (Dobbs 2007: 108).

The changes in the economy led to changes in the social structure, with stratification evolving to include colonial authorities, local elites associated with the colonial power, and various other layers. Among the latter, the codification of land ownership led to the establishment of a landowner class, while the ethnic-Chinese—who operated as the Dutch middlemen—emerged as a semi-capitalist class (Bevan et al. 1999: 197; Utrecht 1984: 36). The peasant labour remained at the bottom of the social ladder.

**Policing colonial Indonesia**

Colonial order was imposed via the indirect-rule approach to governance. This saw the Dutch providing military protection, gifts and salaries to local elites that delivered crops or services in return (Bevan et al. 1999: 196). At the local level, elite groups relied on a variety of actors to maintain order and extract resources. These included locally raised armies and colonial forces, as well as the *jago*, or tough man. The source of *jago* power was a combination of coercive capital, and the cultural capital deriving from alleged proficiency in esoteric knowledge.

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22 For broader analyses of the class structure in colonial Indonesia see Mortimer (1969), Robison (2009 [1986]: 3-35) and Sutherland (1979).
However, *jago* had to continuously reassert his role within a highly contested field with many such *jago* possessing coercive and esoteric capital.

The dialectical relationship between politics and policing during colonial time was thus clear. The key auspices of policing were the colonial authorities and the local elite, while among the providers were the colonial armies, locally raised groups, eventually the police, as well as *jago*, vigilante groups and quasi-criminal networks (Tyson 2013: 205). The field of policing was contested and mediated by two layers of strategic selectivity. The first regulated the embeddedness of the local elite into the Dutch-controlled system. At this level, the relevant capital was the social capital manifested in an ideologically affiliation with the colonial power, as well as the mixture of coercive and social capital needed to extract resources locally. Yet, at another level, local elite groups accrued some of their capital by embedding into their system of patronage *jago*, local vigilantes and similar groups (Schulte Nordholt 1991). It follows that how, by whom and for whose benefit policing was delivered reflected a three-tiered system of relations, convergence of interest, and coalitions; the field of policing was strongly affected by broader contestations over power and resources, but was also instrumental in maintaining the overall exploitative system. In other words, policing was also an important site for the struggles over the broader political economy.

An important practice that supported such a system was the ad-hoc implementation of the law. This has contributed in shaping the *rules of the game* of the dialect relation between political economy and policing in Indonesia to this day, and is thus worth exploring in slightly more detail.
The Dutch imposed a legal system that incorporated and subjugated the various pre-existing *adat* (traditional) and Islamic systems. This imposed legal system, however, was chiefly an exercise in claiming control over the varied ‘other’ peoples of the Indonesian archipelago (Lukito 2013: 24), and a way to map the territory and determine the rules of engagement according to the interests of the colonial power.\(^\text{23}\) It was hardly about law and order or justice.

Indeed, colonial policy recognised the existence of distinct population groups: Europeans, Indonesians, Chinese and other ‘foreign Orientals,’ mostly Arabs (Lev 1965: 282), and loosely regulated these via a byzantine, plural legal system that reflected this societal stratification.\(^\text{24}\) This meant that there was a huge degree of discretion in the application of civil and criminal law (Lev 1965: 282-3), and that the Dutch did not see the law as an arena for arbitration between subjects, and between subjects and the state (Cribb 2011: 36).

The situation improved slightly when a misdemeanours court was created for all residents of the colony in 1914, and when a common criminal code was promulgated in 1918 (Lev 1973: 3). However, by far and large, during the colonial period violence remained the key practice through which order was

\(^{\text{23}}\) In summarizing the argument that John and Jean Comaroff have detailed across various texts (Jean Comaroff and Comaroff 2008; John Comaroff and Comaroff 2004; J. L. Comaroff 1998), Lukito (2013: 24) explains that there were basically five ways in which this was accomplished. *First*, it was on the basis of law that the colonial geography was mapped, changed, and transformed into a new territory, by which process colonial possession and rule was facilitated. *Second*, it was by means of legal instruments that legal matters and relations such as economic rights, entitlements, labour relations, and contracts were regulated and negotiated. *Third*, it was in legal terms that colonial power and knowledge were constructed and perfected. *Fourth*, it was also in accordance with legal provisions that the nature of the colonial subject was defined and construed. And *fifth*, it was in the legal arena that the original authority of the native community was reduced and subordinated to the interests of foreign administration.

\(^{\text{24}}\) The highest court of law, the Supreme Court in Batavia, dealt with appeals from monitoring judges and courts throughout the colony. The several Councils of Justice dealt mostly with crime committed by people in the European legal class, and only indirectly with the indigenous population, while the Land Councils dealt with civil matters and less serious offences, such as estate divorces, and matrimonial disputes (Lev 1985: 59-60). The indigenous population was subject to their respective *adat* law and to indigenous regents and district courts, unless cases were escalated before Dutch judges.
maintained (Locher-Scholten 2002; Nawawi 1971; Pluvier 1972; Schulte Nordholt 2002), and the vast majority of Indonesians did not consider state law relevant in their lives (Cribb 2011: 36). Essentially this meant that there were few to no check and balance systems in place to regulate state institutions and how coercive force was used by the colonial state. This situation, paired with the ongoing relevance of Islamic and traditional systems of justice, contributed in swelling the ranks of the policing actors entering the field to ‘fill’ the gap left by the colonial state and to the highly contested and politicized nature of the field.

4-3 – Sukarno’s Indonesia (1945-65)

Indonesia declared independence on 17 August 1945, with *Pancasila* as the philosophical foundation of the state. The Netherlands conceded in December 1949. In between, a violent conflict took place. The revolution had its genesis in the improved education of segments of the colonial subjects and their organizing politically, and in the ripple effects of the Second World War. The interlude of Japanese control of the archipelago, between 1942 and 1945, was particularly important, as the occupying forces fostered Indonesian nationalism to stave off Dutch resistance (Benda 1956). The key figure around which the pro-independence movement coalesced was Sukarno, who eventually was elected as Indonesia’s first president.

Sukarno’s Indonesia lasted until 1965 and can be neatly divided into two periods: the democratic experiment, which lasted from 1950 until 1957, and the

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25 *Pancasila*’s five pillars, which were then enshrined in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, are: Belief in the one and only God; just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives; social justice for all of the people of Indonesia.

guided democracy period (Demokrasi Terpimpin), which stretched until Suharto took power in 1965.

The democratic years were characterized by intense sociopolitical conflicts. Governments fell in rapid succession due to ideological fissures, with nationalists advocating for a secular state, Islamists for an Islamic state, and communists for a socialist state. Violent rebellions broke out in West Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh, where Islamists gathered under the Darul Islam movement and declared the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII). Further fissures were evident within the military, between those originating from the colonial-era, and those from the Japanese period. Former members of the Dutch army led uprisings in South Sulawesi and Maluku in support of federalism. Sukarno eventually blamed parliamentarianism for the multilayered struggles and moved Indonesia towards an authoritarian system of government, centred on his persona (Feith 2007 [1967]).

Guided democracy was presented as a political project to accommodate the armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI), the Islamic groups, and the Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) into a structure that reproduced the traditional village system of discussion and consensus mediated by the village elders. In reality, it was an authoritarian system centred on the president, and in which parliament and political parties had peripheral roles. The declaration of martial law in March 1957 sealed the end of democracy.

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Note that during the Sukarno era the Indonesian military consisted of three services—the army, the navy and the air force. After the fall of Sukarno, Suharto integrated the police into the military and the new, four-service military forces were named the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI). In April 1999, the police force was again separated from the military and the name ABRI was replaced with TNI. For the sake of simplicity this study uses TNI to refer to the armed forces, regardless of the historical period.
Only the TNI and the PKI were allowed to contest for access to the president, while Islamic groups were progressively sidelined.\(^{28}\)

It was thus no surprise that guided democracy failed to put an end to the sociopolitical conflicts. On the contrary, the situation worsened with the intensification of the PKI-TNI polarization and Sukarno’s aggressive foreign policy, first against the Dutch because of their protracted control over Papua, then Irian Jaya (Kroef 1961; Penders 2002), and then against the newly created state of Malaysia (Mackie 1974). It deteriorated further from 1963 when Sukarno’s call for implementation of land reform led to the PKI announcing a policy of ‘direct action’ that unilaterally dispossessed landlords and distributed the land to peasants. At the national level, this signalled Sukarno’s veering towards the PKI and away from the TNI (Mortimer 2006 [1974]), while at the local level it accentuated the tension among various social forces.

Indonesia’s politics was also greatly affected by the Cold War. Initially, the US resented Sukarno’s non-aligned stance, but as Indonesia progressively took a pro-Beijing stance, and the TNI become increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union, Washington actively attempted to force Sukarno’s downfall. Aggressive operations by the CIA in support of the rebellions in Sulawesi and Sumatra were carried out during the Dwight D. Eisenhower presidency (1953-61) (Ricklefs 2001: 318-9). John F. Kennedy (1961-63) instead employed diplomatic strategies, aiding anti-communists and anti-Sukarnoists in the TNI and in politics. Then Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-69) supported the Suharto-led military takeover, which

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\(^{28}\) This had started at the onset of the republic when Sukarno sided with more secular forces and rejected Islamists’ requests to insert the Jakarta Charter into the 1945 Constitution—a proviso that would have obligated Muslims to practice Islamic law (Hefner 2000: 42). This decision was a critical juncture in shaping Indonesia’s state-Islam relations. Chapter 7 engages with this in detail.
eliminated both Sukarno and the PKI in one of the bloodiest massacres of the twentieth century.  

Independent Indonesia had inherited a commodity-based export economy in decline with plantations and industrial installations damaged, and widespread dissatisfaction with the continuing economic domination by Dutch corporations and ethnic-Chinese business people (Bevan et al. 1999: 209). The intense sociopolitical conflict of the Sukarno years did nothing to improve the situation. These tensions notwithstanding, independence led to changes in the social structure.

The end of the colonial regime meant that Dutch capitalists were no longer guaranteed protection, or privileged access to land and labour, in Indonesia (Robison 1988: 59). This created a vacuum for an indigenous capitalist class to emerge. However, the existing, local capital-owning class was concentrated in the petty trading and small-scale commodity production sectors, and split into indigenous Muslim and ethnic-Chinese elements (Robison 1988: 59). It proved disinterested in filling the gap, which was eventually filled by the state (Robison 1988: 59). The social structure of Sukarno’s Indonesia thus still comprised influential Dutch and ethnic-Chinese capitalists (Robison 1978: 19), but evolved to include secular elites that gained political power first by relying on mass-based parties and, from 1957 onwards, by increasingly siding within the military (Robison 1978: 19). It also included a small, politically weak, indigenous capitalist, and a largely exploited peasantry.

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29 For more on the US’ anti-Sukarno actions see Jones (2002), Kahin and Kahin McTurnan (1997), Kim (2002) and Wardaya (Wardaya 2012). The involvement of the US in the massacre is documented in some of the just listed scholarly work, as well as in Chomsky (1998) and Scott (1985), among others.
Policing Sukarno’s Indonesia

The intensity and fluidity of the sociopolitical conflicts meant that power relations varied enormously throughout the archipelago, and that local power structures mediated the relationship between the central state and the local society (see also Robinson 1995: 182-3). This led to fragmentation of the field of policing with different, localized dynamics through which the political economy affected policing, and policing affected the broader political economy. Indeed, from the colonial structure characterized by the above-noted double strategic selectivity, independent Indonesia presented quite a kaleidoscope of political economy-plural policing dynamics.

In Sumatra and Sulawesi, for example, strong local groups were able to pose a direct political and military threat to the central state, as the insurgencies here in the 1950s demonstrated. This affected the local policing arrangements. In places such as Bali, on the other hand, the weakness of the local political structures meant that Jakarta exercised more control and influence on the local political landscape and how, by whom and for whose benefit policing was delivered (Robinson 1995: 182-3).

The contested process of postcolonial nation-building marked also a period of flux in the strategic selectivity of the state. More specifically, as the nature of the state was contested, the ideological affiliation with the colonial power—the then most relevant form of social capital—was substituted by, at least, three different forms of social capital deriving from the association with the three, main sociopolitical groups contesting for access to state power and resources: the PKI, the Sukarnoists and the TNI. Each of these ideologies was politicized across social field to also include policing actors.
For example, politically-oriented mass organisations (*organisasi masyarakat*, Ormas) became prominent policing actors in some contexts. In Bali, Robinson (1995: 188) notes that:

The militancy and pervasiveness of Ormas mobilization went far beyond anything known in the years of parliamentary democracy, and was one of the structural causes of the political polarization and open conflict that characterized the final years of the Old Order [Sukarno era].

In Jakarta, Fauzi (2010: 49) explains that Lt Col Imam Sjafe’I, Sukarno’s minister of security affairs, relied on *jago* to terrorize anti-government demonstrators and that the *jago*, in exchange, were granted control of urban spaces in collaboration with the police (M. Fauzi 2010: 49). This shows how *jago* were able to exchange their coercive capital for political and economic capital.

It was, nonetheless, the military in the late Sukarno years that grew to play a central role in politics, and in shaping the political economy of policing. As Crouch (2007 [1978]: 22) explains:

After the introduction of martial law in 1957, the army and the other branches of the armed forces became deeply involved in politics, civil administration and economic management […]. As a political organisation the army sought to strengthen its own position at the expense of its rivals, while the expansion of the military’s role into the economy gave army officers a personal stake in many business enterprises. As a consequence,
military men became part of the political and economic elite with an interest in defending the existing social order.  

The military relied on huge quantities of coercive, social, symbolic and bureaucratic capital. This, eventually, allowed the institution to gain the upper hand over the PKI, and allowed TNI officers to grow into centres of power around whom alliances were established at central and local levels.

The TNI also gained a progressively stronger influence over localized policing landscapes. Here, the military-bureaucratic alliances relied heavily on youth groups, vigilantes and gangs that shared, or at least did not openly oppose, the militaristic ideology. This latter form of social capital, paired with the obvious coercive capital, became the most relevant form of capital that constituted the strategic selectivity of the state.

The on-going problem with the implementation of the law was an important factor in shaping the political economy-plural policing dialectical relations.

During the Japanese occupation the court system was rationalized, unified and secularized (Lev 1973: 7). Also, new legislation promulgated during the revolution made no distinction between population groups (Lev 1965: 286). Particularly important was the introduction of Basic Agrarian Law No. 5/1960, promulgated under the guided democracy system. This law de facto eliminated

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30 The TNI politicization was rooted in General Abdul Haris Nasution's "Middle Way" (Jalan Tengah) concept, whereby TNI officers played a role in all civilian areas but did not seek positions of exclusive domination.

31 For an historical view of the relations between the TNI and informal groups, especially Pemuda Pancasila, see Ryter (2002).

32 These actors had also been given a vague legal foundation by a proviso of the 1945 Constitution, which called on citizens to defend the nation. This represented a vague form of bureaucratic capital.
legal pluralism based on racial and indigenous categories of rightful access to land, and established a single unitary land law (for detail of this period see Lev 1973). However, these changes only worked, and then only partly, in the main cities of Java. Beyond these, customary courts varying in make-up from area to area persisted (Lev 1973: 7). Also, the turn to authoritarianism saw Sukarno introducing the ‘revolutionary law’ approach. Under this approach, courts and judges were targeted for obstructing presidential and executive prerogative (Butt and Lindsey 2011: 204). This eventually led to the introduction of Law No. 19/1964 on Judicial Power that rejected the separation of powers, including the principle of judicial independence; stated that the courts were an instrument of the national revolution; and enabled the president to interfere in, and retrospectively alter, any decision of any Indonesian court for the sake of the ‘on-going revolution or national interests’ (Butt and Lindsey 2011: 204). In other words, while the legal and judiciary system was no longer codified and structured in racial terms, it progressively became institutionalized as a tool of the state. There were thus still minimal [systems of] checks and balances in place to regulate state institutions, including the military. The combination of the rise of the military and the institutionalization of the judiciary as a tool of the executive strongly affected the future trajectory of the country and how the broader political economy context effected plural policing and vice versa.
4-4 – Suharto’s Indonesia (1965-98)

A former major-general in the TNI, Suharto rose to power on the back of a coup attempt that took place on 30 September 1965 and that was blamed on the PKI. With the support of the US, Suharto organized a successful counter-coup, and cemented his power by masterminding the massacre of between 500,000 and 3 million alleged communists and left-wing sympathizers. This laid the foundations for a regime of terror that prevented political alternatives from emerging for three decades. Thus seen, it was a critical juncture in the history of Indonesia, and an essential reference for any analysis of the sociopolitical dynamics that followed.

The politics of the New Order went through different phases, with different groups gaining access to the dictator. Initially, Suharto relied on the military and was supported by elements of the rural elite and the urban middle class. These were social forces either threatened by the politics of the PKI, or harmed by Sukarno’s autarchic economic policies (Hadiz 2004). Excluded from the circles of power were progressive social forces—the PKI and left-wing ideologies had been outlawed—and Islamic groups. Suharto viewed Islam as a force capable of opposing his rule and worked towards depoliticizing it. His decision in 1973 to force Islamic parties to merge into a state-controlled party, the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) is one example of this approach.

Over time, however, Suharto came to rely on a restricted number of oligarchs, nourished and organized by him personally (J. A. Winters 2011a: 139-

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93). The rise of this oligarchy is most comprehensively explained by Robison (2009 [1986]). He sees capitalism, rather than communism or socialism, as the most revolutionary force in the Global South; and he explains the rise of the capitalist class in Indonesia within the growing conglomerates run by ethnic-Chinese businessmen and the families of those who held bureaucratic power and with which these conglomerates were closely allied.\(^{35}\)

The rise of the oligarchy fostered uneasiness among the TNI elite, and within the urban middle class, which saw its growing aspirations stifled by the glass ceiling posed by New Order nepotism (Hadiz and Khoo 2011). To accommodate these social forces, from the late 1980s Suharto started a politics of gradually opening up to Islamic groups. One such example was the establishment of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (\textit{Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia}, ICMI), which became a vehicle to bureaucratic power for members of the new Muslim middle class (Hefner 1993; Liddle 1996).

Shifting political alliances had little effect on the instrumental approach to capitalist development that Suharto pursued. Suharto opened up Indonesia to foreign investment, initiating a process of industrialization that led to a period of robust economic development, with an average growth of 7 percent per annum throughout the 1970s (Hill and Narjoko 2010). However, economic policies invariably favoured the social forces close to Suharto, as Robison (1988: 71-2) explains:

\begin{quote}
the relations between state and capital were characterized by the emergence of a pact of domination among the politico-bureaucrats who
\end{quote}

\(^{35}\) On the key role of the ethnic-Chinese in the Indonesian economy during the Suharto period and beyond, see also Chua (2008). For a critique of this view see Winters (1988).
control the state apparatus, an upper bourgeoisie of major domestic client corporate groups, and those elements of international corporate capital that are integral to the state's industrial strategy: the oil companies and the manufacturing investors. This pact has been founded on policies of highly regulated, nationalist policies of state-led industrialization that place the levers of economic power firmly in the hands of the politico-bureaucrats and guarantee the economic position of domestic corporate clients.

The surge of oil prices in the 1970s, for example, led to Indonesia moving beyond import substitution industrialization and underwriting a massive drive into the upstream manufacture of steel, petrochemicals, fertilisers, aluminium, cement, engineering and technology, as well as in developing infrastructure, public utilities and industrial estates (Robison and Hadiz 2004: 51). However, such a drive was paired with pervasive and protective trade and industry regimes, and the strategic allocation of contracts and licences that worked to insulate the ministries from the pressure of the market, and to entrench the authority of the state and its officials over the full range of economic life (Robison and Hadiz 2004: 51). The agency for logistics, state banks, and state-owned enterprises became key centres for determining priorities in the economy and allocating rents. Overall, therefore, the progressive incorporation of Indonesia into the global economy was mediated at the local level via state-sanctioned rent-seeking, gate-keeping and corruption that favoured the interests of those close to Suharto.

The turn to capitalist industrialization had a profound effect on the social structure. Besides the families of the wealthy politico-bureaucrats, which included elements of the military and the ethnic-Chinese tycoons, industrialization and urbanisation gave rise to a new, urban middle class, a broader working class,
including a *lumpenproletariat*, and an ethnic-Chinese bourgeoisie (Hadiz and Khoo 2011).

**Policing Suharto’s Indonesia**

The dialectical relation between the broader political economy and policing in Suharto’s Indonesia strengthened progressively.

Suharto built on what was bestowed by the late Sukarno years, namely a rising military, a malleable justice system and a strategic selectivity that placed coercive capital and the social capital represented by the association with the military as the most relevant capital for policing actors aspiring to partake in the spoils of the new regime. He built on this, and developed a policing landscape aimed at maintaining order (security function); preventing political opposition from rising and at extracting resources (political economy function).

Suharto policed Indonesia via a three-pronged approach that included militarization, comprehensive domestic political surveillance, and intermittent, but persistent, state terror (Tanter 1991: 3). On the ground, control was achieved largely by extending the territorial command structure *Komando Teritorial*, Koter)—a system that saw TNI officers deployed throughout the territory, creating a parallel administration to the civilian one. In such a way, the TNI

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38 Koter was devised during the war against the Dutch as part of the People’s Defence and Security System (*Sistem Pertahanan dan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta*, Sishankamrata). The Sishankamrata doctrine was itself based on the doctrine of Total People’s Defence (*Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta*, Hankamrata) according to which Indonesians will spontaneously rise up against any threat to the independence and sovereignty of the nation and fight with the military to overcome that threat. Koter was expanded in the 1950s and 1960s, as Indonesia faced separatist
cemented its position at the core of the policing system, and TNI officers at the local level operationalized the strategic selectivity that mediated the embeddedness of policing actors in the dominant regime. Such a system lasted for over thirty years. One of the reasons for its durability was that each of the actors involved were able to accrue economic capital.

TNI officers were allowed to engage in income-generating activities on the condition that a share of the revenue made its way up to the highest layer of the regime (McLeod 2011: 56). At the local level, TNI officers were also those vetting which vigilante group, influential person or militia should be embedded in the policing system. The association with the regime allowed the chosen policing actors to operate localized rackets as long as they also channelled most of the proceeds into formal government structures (I. Wilson 2011: 242). They were thus able to exchange their social and coercive capital with economic capital.

This type of arrangement was particularly relevant in resource-rich contexts, like urban settings, tourist areas and natural-resource enclaves. One example of the latter is the policing arrangement of the Grasberg mining complex, West Papua. This is still operated by PT Freeport Indonesia, the local subsidiary of US-

39 The New Order’s grip on power did not mean that power was monolithic, though. Tanter (1991) explains that Suharto’s totalitarian ambition was never fully realized; Wilson (2011: 242) notes that communities did, from time to time, oppose the existing power structure and the role of the preman; Warren (1993) explains that Balinese communities played a role in shaping the system of authority; and Barker (2006: 205) shows that, in some cases, neighbourhood-watches, preman, and private security guards acted relatively independently of the regime, and occasionally stood in outright defiance of its authority.

40 These relationships were given an added layer of formality—hence bureaucratic capital—by the imposition of a neighbourhood-watch program (sistem keamanan lingkungan, Siskamling). Siskamling was introduced as a response to what was seen as the growing uncontrollability of some gangs and ex-con networks, and forced state control over local policing practises (Barker 1999a; Cribb 2000; Ryter 2002; I. Wilson 2006).
based Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold, in partnership with the Indonesian government who owns about 10% of it.\(^{41}\)

Freeport, however, arrived in Indonesia in 1967 as Suharto had just risen to power. At that time Suharto had little social and symbolic capital, especially on the international stage. Freeport, meanwhile, was a powerful, global player backed by influential political groups in the United States. For example, the chairman of Freeport Sulphur was, for a time, powerful Republican John Hay "Jock" Whitney. Jock had founded the *New Republic* magazine, became editor-in-chief of the *New York Herald Tribune*, owned a company that had contracts with the Defense Department, and had financially supported the Eisenhower presidential campaign (Leith 2002: 70-1).

Negotiations between Suharto and Freeport were thus not on an equal footing. In April 1967, Freeport became the first foreign company to sign a contract with the new government and gained very favourable terms. As detailed by Leith (2002: 73), Freeport was given mining rights for thirty years within a 250,000 acre concession with a three-year corporate tax holiday. There were no Indonesian equity requirements, and Freeport was not under any obligation to the traditional Papuan owners of the land, the Amungme and Kamoro peoples. The company was not required to pay compensation to the traditional landowners, nor was it obliged to participate in local or provincial development. Finally, there were no environmental restrictions and the TNI was to provide the security arrangements.

\(^{41}\) A 2010 regulation by the Indonesian government required Freeport-McMoRan to divest some of its stake in its Indonesian subsidiary to the government. The divestment will be carried out in two stages. The first will be a 10.6 per cent stake in October 2015 and the second will be the remaining 10 per cent in 2016 (Salim 2015).
The contract, however, added a layer of legitimation to the Suharto regime. In many ways, thus, Suharto gained social and symbolic capital, while Freeport gained the lion share of the economic capital and the coercive capital to safeguard its investment.

Even as the power relations between Suharto and Freeport changed over time, and as Freeport was eventually partly incorporated into the resources of the Suharto-led oligarch system, the policing arrangement did not change.42

The TNI remained the main policing actor and TNI officers accrued economic capital via direct payments from Freeport and other illegal activities (Global Witness 2005; Perlez and Bonner 2005). The TNI also operated with impunity. This was particularly relevant as Papuans, who had rejected Indonesia annexing the island via a controversial, UN-organized referendum in 1969 (Drooglever 2009), grew resentful of the political economy of the resource enclave. This contributed to the emergence of the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdaka, OPM) rebel group. The OPM has allegedly targeted the mining complex on occasions, and the TNI has responded with extreme violence and disregard of human rights (Global Witness 2005: 9-10).

The weak systems of checks and balances on the security apparatus and on the state were replicated throughout the archipelago, although to different degrees of severity. Crucial to such an approach was how Suharto rejected Sukarno’s

42 Leith (2003: 69-70) explains that in 1991, for example, when Freeport signed its second contract, a new foreign investment law stipulated that foreign companies had to divest 20 percent of their ownership in Indonesian nationals within twenty years. With the government already owning 10 percent, an Indonesian buyer had to be found for the remaining 10 percent. This buyer, Bakrie Brothers, was selected by the government. Aburizal Bakrie was known to be a close personal friend of Suharto. Bakrie paid only US$ 40 million of the US$ 212 million purchase price, with the rest being jointly guaranteed by Freeport-McRoRan Inc and Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc. A year later, before the next repayment was due, Bakrie Brothers sold 50 percent of their holding back to Freeport McRoRan for approximately US$ 210 million, meaning that Freeport-McRoRan paid Bakrie close to the original purchase price for half the number of shares. This deal gave Bakrie ownership of 5 percent of Freeport for virtually nothing, and a return of US$ 200 million on an investment of US$ 40 million.
‘revolutionary law’ approach, but built a different system that ensured the compliance of the judiciary.

At one level, Suharto imposed compliance by exercising bureaucratic control over individual judges and administrative control over the judiciary. Most of Indonesia’s judges were civil servants and, as such, were formally required to support government policy. They could even be disciplined for breaching civil service regulations, which required adherence to the state ideology (Pancasila), the state and the government, and the prioritizing of the interests of the state over those of groups or individuals (Butt and Lindsey 2011: 204-5). In addition, the Ministry of Justice had ultimate control over matters critical to the functioning of the courts and to the personal well-being of judges, such as the allocation of budgets, promotions, transfers, and dismissal (Butt and Lindsey 2011: 204-5).

At another level, Suharto integrated the judiciary into what McLeod (2011: 49-50) describes as a ‘franchise system.’ This included the main components of the public sector for the purpose of using the coercive power of government privately to tax the general public and redistribute the revenue to a small elite. In regards to the judiciary, Suharto imposed very low salaries for judges relative to comparable private sector levels, so that judges would be forced to play by the rules of the franchise if they were to enjoy a standard of living commensurate with their professional status (McLeod 2011: 55).

The net outcome of the state subjugation of the judiciary was the institutionalization of judicial corruption and a skewed interpretation of the law that favoured the regime (see also McLeod 2000). There remained thus a very weak system of checks and balances on the state and policing was still seen
mostly as a means through which the regime maintained control of channels of resource distribution.

4-5 – Conclusion

This chapter has shown how in Indonesia there has historically been a close correlation between struggles over the broader political economy context and how, by whom and for whose benefit policing is delivered. Hence, policing has always been an important field for struggle in the political economy, influential in how power relations are maintained, challenged and changed and it is an interesting window through which to understand broader political dynamics.

PEPP also focused on the interests and coalitions contesting for power and resources and on the strategic selectivity that has allowed policing actors to be embedded in such coalitions. It has shown that, as the strategic selectivity changed through the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods, the auspices and providers of policing also changed. This demonstrated that policing actors have often been embedded in broader sociopolitical coalitions. The chapter showed also that elite groups have consistently seen policing as a set of practice to maintain order (security function) but also to access resources (political economy function).

These insights could not be provided by the existing paradigms and frameworks. The limits of those have been extensively explained in Chapter 2, and will be further highlighted in the remaining chapters. Here it suffices to reiterate that anchored pluralism has a state-centred normative aim and is not explanatory in nature. On the other hand, nodal governance and multi-choice policing could, in their own way, describe the plurality of policing in Indonesia,
but could not explain the close dialectical between political economy and policing.

A different set of limitations restricts the usefulness of the political frameworks. PEPS suffers from similar state-centred and normative limits to those noted for anchored pluralism, while GSA is best geared at explaining globalization as a driver of the pluralisation of policing. This leads specifically to focus on large PSCs. Here the key drivers have instead been colonialism, post-colonialism, authoritarianism and capitalism. These have led to the proliferation of actors such as the jago, vigilantes, militias, as well as the police and the military. Lastly, the policing as order-making framework could fruitfully engage with the localized forms of policing and how these are linked to politicians and may affect localized forms of order. It could not, however, capture the macro dimension of the political economy-plural policing dialectical relations.
CHAPTER 5

The political economy of policing in contemporary Indonesia

This chapter focuses on contemporary Indonesia and reveals important elements of continuity and change with the past. The elements of continuity are the practices and logics that structure the relationship between the broad political economy and the state security apparatus. The elements of change are a fragmentation of the strategic selectivity that mediates how policing actors partake in the policing landscapes.

5-1 – Introduction

The transition from authoritarian rule to democracy started in 1998 and led to a shift in the scholarship on Indonesia from a focus on the regime—and how policing actors related to it—to broader interests with oppositional movements, and longer term struggles for popular empowerment, good governance and social justice both at national and local level (J. T. Sidel and Vickers 2015: 257-8). Political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists, among others, were paired by a growing number of influential think-tanks and international organizations in focussing also on issues related to the management of ethnic and religious diversity and the redistribution of wealth in the democratizing and decentralizing country (J. T. Sidel and Vickers 2015: 257-8). Islam, in particular, became an important topic of study both in relation to its sociological impact in Indonesia and its political capital.
Democratization, and the process of decentralization that followed soon after, also led to a growing interest in issues related to how policing actors were affected by these structural changes. Wilson (2006, 2015), among others, engaged with the changing faces of vigilantism from the authoritarian to the democratic period; several scholars focused on relations between local elites and vigilantes in decentralizing Indonesia (i.e., Telle 2013; Tyson 2013); Baker (2011, 2013, 2015b) provided an insightful political ethnography of the Indonesian National Police (Kepolisian Nasional Indonesia, Polri), Muradi (2014) delved on how Polri’s separation from the TNI impacted on the institution’s relationships with the national and local governments, and with the TNI, and Jansen (2008, 2010) focused on the organizational relationships between Polri and various other policing actors in the region of Yogyakarta.

This chapter critically engages with these various strands of post-authoritarian literature through the lens of PEPP. The aim is to provide a macro analysis of the political economy-policing dialectical relations in contemporary Indonesia. The analytical attention is thus again placed on the interests, coalitions and conflicts over power and resources, and on explaining the strategic selectivity that favours some policing actors over others. Four key findings emerge:

First, the country maintains important elements of continuity with the past. In particular, the broad political economy is strongly affected by an oligarchy largely interested in accessing state power and resources for personal benefit; and policing is still, although to a lesser degree, skewed towards supporting elite groups’ access to resources. There is thus an ongoing strong dialectical relations between struggles in the broad political economy and how, by whom and for
who benefit policing is delivered. Policing is still an important site for these struggles and a window into state-society relations.

Second, such dialectical relations benefit greatly from what Cribb (2011) describes as a ‘system of exemptions.’ This has historical roots and entails an ad-hoc implementation of the law that favours elites and that guarantees policing actors ample room to manoeuvre.

Third, despite the above, the changes brought by democratisation and decentralization have partly empowered policing actors who now take a more proactive role in the broader coalitions contesting for power and resources.

Fourth, the broadened political space and the increased influence of identity politics in decentralising Indonesia has led to ideologies being politicized across social fields and to immaterial forms of capital becoming important in shaping power dynamics in some contexts. Here this is evidenced by looking at the relationships between the strategic selectivity and the most relevant capital.

These findings are substantiated over two further sections.

Section 5.2 engages with Indonesia’s contemporary political economy. It explains how democratisation has helped Indonesia to move beyond authoritarianism, and has led to a more fluid, dynamic and fragmented field of politics. But also how these changes have not fundamentally altered the end-game of political contestations, and arguably only partially those groups that are structurally favoured to participate.

Section 5.3 looks at how the broader political economy affects contemporary policing and vice versa. The attention is focused in particular on Polri, the phenomenon of vigilantism and the PSC industry. Polri is seen as integral to the ‘system of exemptions’ that underpins Indonesia’s overall political
economy and the institution’s relations with the broader policing landscape. Vigilantism is framed within the intensification of the political contestations post-Suharto, and as the clearest example of how immaterial forms of capital have become important in shaping power dynamics and the political economy-policing dialectical relations. The PSC industry offers an interesting insight into how democratisation and neoliberal modes of security governance have been mediated in Indonesia by the rules of the game of the field of policing and led to various segments of the industry being regulated by different strategic selectivity and capitals.

5-2 – The political economy of contemporary Indonesia

The downfall of Suharto in May 1998 was brought about by the confluence of various factors. At its most basic level, the regime fell under the weight of riots and protracted student-led manifestations that called for democratic reforms, or reformasi. The movement, however, was a ripple effect of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis that led to a steep decline in Indonesia’s macroeconomic position and unravelled the business model of close state-business relations built up by Suharto. The crisis had also brought to the fore the intra-elite struggles over dissatisfaction with the Suharto family’s increasingly larger share of the resources. The end of the Cold War was another influential factor: it meant that Washington no longer saw Suharto as an essential bastion against communism, but as someone who should be replaced to democratise Indonesia and establish a better working liberal economic system.43

Reformasi led to important institutional changes. These included constitutional revisions that amended 84 percent of the original articles and pluralized the basic structure of the political system; the adoption of a direct, popular election of the president and vice-president as from 2004; and the establishment of elections as the sole source of formal political power, which included the removal of appointed military and police officers and of other unelected representatives from legislative bodies. Reformasi also led to the insertion of a chapter on human rights, the establishment of a bicameral national legislature, and of a constitutional court. Several new laws broadened the space for political contestation by granting freedom of the press and lifting the restrictions on establishing trade unions and political parties—except communist parties. Two umbrella laws on decentralisation and local autonomy, promulgated in 1999 and implemented in 2001, devolved administrative powers to cities, towns and regencies, and redistributed tax revenue from the central government to the peripheries. These changes led to a more competitive field of politics at central and local level. It also led to a partial devaluation of the social capital associated with the military, and to the rise in prominence of the social capital associated with political parties.

Reformasi, however, did not lead to immediate stability. On the contrary, between May 1998 and October 2004, four presidents rotated at the helm of a country in which shifting alliances contested power within the new democratic framework. Social conflict also took on sectarian colours with localized conflicts and separatist wars leaving thousands dead, especially between 1999 and 2001 (Bertrand 2004; J. T. Sidel 2007 [2006]; van Klinken 2007).
The interregnum of BJ Habibie, from May 1998 until October 1999, and the ten months in power of Abdurrahman Wahid were particularly tumultuous (O'Rourke 2002). Relative stability was achieved during the presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri, from July 2001 until October 2004, and cemented with the two terms of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, which ended in October 2014.

By the time Yudhoyono was succeeded by Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, Indonesia was stable and the field of politics contested by a number of political forces. Alternative societal forces had also grown to play a more important role in politics and push for important reforms in some sectors (Aspinall 2013b, 2014c; Mietzner 2012a). These advances, as highlighted by scholars favouring a pluralist approach to political economy, led to growing politics from below in Indonesia. These are important insights. However, they are not indicative of larger transformative changes to who is structurally favoured to partake in politics in Indonesia, and what the aim of this politics is. An analytical framework able to grasp the macro structures that constrain this politics from below is provided by the oligarchy theory developed by Hadiz and Robison.44

Hadiz and Robison (2013: 37) see the oligarchy as a system of power relations that enables the concentration of wealth and authority, and its collective defence. Oligarchy is thus not considered a type of economic or political regime, and is not tied to any specific type of regime (Hadiz and Robison 2013: 38).45 Oligarchs in Indonesia developed under the authoritarian Suharto regime, as noted

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44 For a review of the different analytical interpretation of Indonesia’s politics since 1998 see Mietzner (2015: 5-9).

45 For a different take of the oligarchy theory see Winters (2011a, 2011b, 2013) and for a detailed explanation of the differences between the two see Ford and Pepinsky (2013). Here suffice to note that Winters favours a focus on individual actors, while Hadiz and Robison focus on the oligarchy’s systemic power and the oligarchy’s communal defense of their wealth. This latter is seen as providing more explanatory leverage in linking the broader political economy to policing.
in Chapter 4, but have survived and are thriving in democratic Indonesia. Hadiz and Robison argue (2004) that reformasi focused on institutions but left untouched deeper, pre-existing power relations built during the Suharto tenure. Reforms have thus changed the means of political contestation, but they have not altered its aim, which still sees the elite scrambling to control institutions for the purpose of private accumulation. They argue that oligarchs have captured and harnessed Indonesia’s democratisation process to their advantage. After Suharto, the focus of the oligarchs’ strategy has shifted from a struggle to maintain proximity with the ruler to one centred on capturing state power, mostly via party-politics (Robison and Hadiz 2004). In other words, the oligarchy theory argues that power relations remained largely untouched but that the most relevant capital was no longer the social capital represented by the proximity with Suharto or the TNI, but the one that sociopolitical groups could accrue via association with political parties. This social capital could thus take different hues in different contexts.

The oligarch theory, therefore, recognises the importance of institutions in influencing political behaviour, but sees institutions within the power structures that affect how they operate (Hadiz and Robison 2013: 39). Moreover, while it places primacy on the economy as the main driver of social change, it acknowledges the importance of non-material factors such as nationalism, populism and corporatism as bound in complex relationships that affect contestations over power and resources (Hadiz and Robison 2013: 40). The oligarchy theory thus acknowledges the importance of immaterial forms of capital, but sees these as a means to accrue economic capital. In addition, and linking back to the important work of pluralist political scientists, it
accommodates the growing role of new societal groups—and the various forms of capital they may draw upon—but understands these as constrained by the logics of existing power structures (Hadiz and Robison 2013: 40). These logics represent the rules of the game of the field of politics.

In other words, yes, Indonesia has a more fragmented, contested and pluralized field of politics in which more actors, drawing on various forms of capital, contest, negotiate and relate to each other. This fluidity, dynamism and fragmentation has been acerbated by the process of decentralisation started in 2001 and by the direct election for majors, district heads, governors and local parliamentarians that followed from 2004 until 2014. And, yes, Indonesia’s elite is no longer a unitary bloc and since reformasi intra-elite struggles have multiplied with the elite establishing short-term, instrumental coalitions to overpower each other to access state resources. These coalitions may be based on the politicizations of ideologies across social fields to include segments within the urban middle class and the poor and policing actors. The fluidity and instrumentality of the alliances have been duplicated at sub-national level where fiscal decentralisation and direct elections have led to the emergence of coalitions between the business and political elites to control the resource-rich posts of district head, mayor and to a lesser extent governor. But the rules of the game still shape the field in such a way as to maintain the system that favours oligarchs’ access to state resources.


47 See above.

48 This overall assessment seems shared even by pluralists. Hence, Aspinall while underlining the role of popular forces in Indonesian politics, recognizes that Indonesia’s democracy is ‘illiberal or stunted’ (2013b), and a political system in which patronage distribution as a means of cementing
Oligarch control of politics

There are several practices and logics that shape the rules of the game. These include legislations that make it difficult to undertake the establishment of bottom-up parties; the rising cost of campaigning for political positions; the collusion between politicians and big business, and the ad-hoc implementation of the law. Each is briefly analysed below.

At one level, legislation promulgated post-Suharto has further strengthened elite control of the machinery of political power. For example, the law obliging political parties to have a nationwide presence has made it impossible to establish representative parties from the bottom up. This has, de facto, left the field of electoral politics to parties linked to powerful individuals. The only sizable parties to emerge in the post-Suharto era are the People’s Conscience Party (Hati Nurani Raya, Hanura), the Greater Indonesia Movement (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Gerindra), the Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat, the Nasdem Party (Partai Nasdem), and the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS). Among these, however, only the Islamic PKS offered a different approach to politics by basing its support on grassroots recruitment (Hamayotsu 2011; Machmudi 2006; Permata 2008). Hanura is the political vehicle of Gen (ret) Wiranto, Gerindra the party of Lt Gen (ret) Prabowo, the Democrat Party the political vehicle of Lt Gen (ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and the Nasdem political affiliations coexist with neoliberal economic model (2013a). Similarly, Mietzner while noting the role of pro-democracy activists (2012a), acknowledges that in Indonesia democracy has stagnated at best (2012b). Within the imaginary trajectory that should lead Indonesia to a liberal democratic system others have defined Indonesia democracy has ‘collusive’ (Slater 2004), ‘consolidated but patrimonial’ (Webber 2006), ‘low-quality’ (Mietzner 2009a), and ‘freedom with democratic deficit’ (Törnquist 2006).

Here I consider the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) and the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) extensions of existing organisations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama respectively.
Party is closely associated with Surya Paloh. As former TNI generals Wiranto, Prabowo and Yudhoyono were members of Suharto’s inner circle. Meanwhile, Surya Paloh is a media tycoon who also owes his fortunes to his roots in the New Order’s sociopolitical alliance. This is an example of how the change in the relation between the strategic selectivity and the most relevant capital that mediate access to state power has not led to significant changes to the broad power dynamics.

At another level, elite control is guaranteed by the surging cost of campaigning. In 1999, the cost associated with an individual running for one of the legislative bodies, the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD) or the Regional House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD), was IDR 20-50 million (Wibowo 2012) [roughly USD 2,295 – 5,737]; in 2014, estimates for a DPR campaign varied from IDR 787 million [roughly USD 64,286] to IDR 9.3 billion [USD 759,679], while for a DPRD campaign estimates ranged between IDR 320 million and IDR 3 billion [USD 26,139 – 245,057] (Dewi 2014). This makes politics beyond the reach of all but a few, considering that the World Bank estimates the GNI per capita in Indonesia in 2013 at USD 3,580.\(^{50}\) It also strengthens the collusion between politicians and the big businesses that bankroll their campaigns, and between the field of politics and that of the economy.

At yet another level, this collusion facilitates the oligarchs’ control of the economy. *Reformasi* did not meaningfully alter Indonesia’s approach to capitalist

development either. The 1997/98 financial crisis opened the door to further liberalize the Indonesian economy via policies devised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that required deregulation, dismantling of the state-owned sector, introducing institutional reforms in banking and public management and, significantly, diluting central state authority. However, while these policies further integrated Indonesia into the global economic system, they failed to lead to the free market anticipated by the IMF. In some cases, liberalization measures have been pursued in a manner that protects national capitalists (Tongzon 2012; Widodo 2008). In others, reforms have been all but impossible to implement due to the resistance of elite interests (Hadiz and Robison 2005; Robison and Hadiz 2004; Rosser 2003, 2014). The collusion between politics and capital remains ingrained at every level, neoliberal practices have been incorporated within a polity controlled by the existing power structure (see also Aspinall 2013a). It is thus unsurprising that reformasi has failed to achieve a fairer distribution of wealth. Indonesia has the fastest growth rate of millionaires in Asia, in US dollars terms. An estimate, for example, claims that between 2010 and 2015 the number of Indonesian millionaires has tripled to 100,000 (Mietzner 2015: 14), and another estimate has forecasted a further 64 per cent increase by 2019 (Harjani 2014). Yet, 43 per cent of Indonesians live on less than USD 2.00 a day (Alatas et al. 2013). Democratic Indonesia remains highly stratified with urban poor and peasant labour at the bottom of the social ladder. The ethnic-Chinese still represent the dominant capitalist class, although native tycoons have easier access to state resources. Both operate in alliances with the powerful politico-

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bureaucratic class. The country now has a broader, politicized urban middle class and working class, both in the main cities and in the roughly 170 medium-sized, provincial towns of the archipelago.52

The last, and probably crucial, factor that ensures that the oligarchy controls Indonesia’s broad political economy is the historically rooted ongoing, murky and arbitrary implementation of the law. In analysing the conduct of Indonesia’s courts, Butt and Lindsey (2011: 192) usefully distinguish between ‘internal illegality’ and ‘external illegality.’ The first indicates actions performed by judges when exercising their judicial functions, such as judicial corruption and lack of judicial independence in decision-making. The second occurs when judges perpetuate or legitimize the illegality of the actions of parties to litigation by not enforcing or upholding the law (Butt and Lindsey 2011: 192). They note that these two types of illegality are usually linked, because external illegality is typically preceded by internal illegality, such as when judges are bribed or succumb to government pressure, leading to a prearranged outcome in cases involving state officials (Butt and Lindsey 2011: 192). But they distinguish between them because they argue that, while internal illegality has not significantly decreased overall, external illegality has declined since the fall of Suharto in 1998. They substantiate their argument by noting that post-Suharto the organisational, administrative and financial control of the lower courts was transferred to the Supreme Court (Butt and Lindsey 2011: 207). This means that the state can no longer directly influence the promotion and relocation of judges, or the budget allocation to courts, for example. Also important was the 2003

52 The importance of this provincial middle class has been explained in a project by the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, KITLV). See van Klinken and Berenschot (2014) and http://www.kitlv.nl/home/Projects?id=14. Last accessed 13 June, 2013.
establishment of the independent Anti-Corruption Court (Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi, Tipikor) to hear cases investigated and prosecuted by the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK). Tipikor and the KPK are bequeathed with important powers, and have used them to effect. Most of the KPK’s roughly 400 arrests since its inception have been of politicians, government officials, lawmakers and members of the legal and security apparatus (Bayuni 2012; Butt 2012: 35-48; Kapoor and Fabi 2013). An argument can thus be made that there is less direct subservience of the judiciary to the state.

However, the persistence of internal illegality means that the law remains skewed in favour of those who can pay. As succinctly put by Winters (2011b), in post-authoritarian Indonesia:

> on matters of property, wealth, economy, corruption, and criminality of all kinds, the law bends to individual oligarchs and elites rather than the reverse. The simple reason is that they have the resources at their fingertips to buy the legal system, from the police and prosecutors up to the judges and politicians.

53 Unlike the general courts, where three career judges sit on most panels, Tipikor is designed with five-judge panels, comprising two career judges drawn from the general courts and three so-called ad hoc judges. These are legal experts, usually academics, practitioners and retired judges, employed to sit on Tipikor trials. The rationale for their inclusion was that, because they work outside the existing, largely corrupt judiciary, they were less likely to seek or accept bribes to fix the outcomes of cases (Butt 2012: 2). The KPK is institutionally independent of government. It can investigate and prosecute most corruption cases itself and can take over corruption investigations and prosecutions from police and prosecutors. It has investigative powers that the police do not. For example, it can wiretap suspects’ phones without seeking court approval, freeze bank accounts and issue travel bans. The KPK is also restricted in ways that ordinary police and prosecutors are not. For example, once the KPK names a person as a suspect, which is equivalent to charging that suspect, the KPK must proceed to trial, even if subsequent evidence shows that the suspect is innocent. This is to preclude KPK officers being bribed to drop a case before trial (Butt 2012: 2).
Indeed, Butt and Lindsey (2011: 207) recognise that private parties in disputes against the state might now be on such a level playing field that they are able to defeat the state by offering illicit payments to the judges hearing their cases.

The extent of internal illegality of the judiciary is difficult to gauge, but the frequent reports by the local media indicate that it permeates every level of the judicial and prosecutor system. Some credible studies have indicated that corruption is not merely a matter of corrupted judges; it is a systematic and institutionalized web of relations with illicit payments filtering into patronage networks within which the recipient’s superiors take percentages (Butt and Lindsey 2011: 189). For this reason the Indonesian justice system is often described as a ‘mafia’ (Indah S. 2011; Satuan Tugas Pemberantasan Mafia Hukum 2012). The field of the law and justice is a dominant field whose capital, practices and logic affect the dynamics of many other social fields and most aspects state-society relations. This gives rise to what Winters (2013: 173) describes as ‘democracy without law,’ and Cribb defines as ‘a ‘system of exemptions’. According to Cribb (2011: 33):

Indonesia is not a lawless society, but rather one in which law is unevenly implemented [...] the central characteristic of the Indonesian system is that law matters but only to some people and only in some circumstances.
Thus seen, the ‘system of exemptions’ is not a symptom of state weakness, but an important practice that allows Indonesia’s elite groups to maintain control of the social order.54

*The rules of the game in practice*

There are several recent examples that show the perniciousness of the practices and logics that shape the *rules of the game* in Indonesia.

One such example is the descending parable of the PKS. It was noted that the PKS was the only sizable, post-Suharto’s party that offered a different approach to politics by basing its support on grassroots recruitment (Hamayotsu 2011; Machmudi 2006; Permata 2008). In the 2004 and 2009 elections PKS ran a populist campaign, drawing heavily upon anti-corruption rather than Islamic issues, and became renowned for its hard-line stance against graft. However, in the past few years the party has been enveloped in the same money politics and web of corruption that represents one of the key logics of the field of politics in Indonesia (Kramer 2014; Sufa 2013). The PKS could not change the system; the system changed the PKS.

A preliminary reading of the political trajectory of President Widodo is also indicative of how the logics of the field of politics constrain new political forces. The rise of Widodo shows that politics in Indonesia is today rather open and competitive, but also that oligarchs play a central role in shaping the overall

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54 In this aspect, this study takes a different view from Cribb. Cribb (2011) indicates three reasons for why the system of exemption has taken roots. *First*, the historical and on-going state-weaknesses—i.e. lack of state capacity to enforce the law. *Second*, the historical mismatch between law and moral values started with the Dutch favouring of legal pluralism and disregard of the law as a forum within which subjects might obtain redress against the state. And *third*, the weakness of ideas of social contract also started during the Dutch time. This study agrees with the latter two points, and has made ample use of them in this chapter, but disagrees with the first one because, as noted in the main text, sees the ad-hoc implementation of the law as a practices that favours some social groups over others, and not as a sign of state weakness.
dynamics. Widodo is said to have been raised in a bamboo shack in a Javanese slum (AAP 2014), and has a past as a furniture dealer, with no clear links to political dynasties and elites from the Suharto era (Gee 2014). His rise to power was unthinkable a decade ago and is proof of the more pluralized, fragmented field of politics. Widodo was first elected as major of Solo in 2005, and he held that office until 2012, when he was elected as governor of Jakarta benefitting from the direct election system and the considerable social and symbolic capital deriving from the wide appeal he has at grassroot level, but also, at least in the case of Jakarta, from the capital deriving from the support of entrenched elites, e.g. Lt Gen (ret) Prabowo Subianto, Megawati Sukarnoputri etc (J. A. Winters 2013: 23-5). Widowo’s ability to garner these different form of capital turned him into the frontrunner for the 2014 presidential election (McRae 2013) where he was very reluctantly supported by Megawati’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P) and pitted against his other former supporter, Prabowo, a candidate representing the interests of a group of old elites and openly advocating a return to a Sukarno-style guided democracy (Aspinall and Mietzner 2014a, 2014b; Mietzner 2015; Ritonang 2012). Widodo’s victory was thus rightly heralded as essential for the survival of Indonesian democracy (Aspinall and Mietzner 2014c; Mietzner 2014). This notwithstanding, it did not represent a fundamental change in the rules of the game of the field of politics.\footnote{For a pluralist reading of the rise of Widodo see Mietzner (2015)} This was confirmed immediately after the election, as the old elite reared its ugly head.

Only a few days before Widodo’s inauguration in October 2014, the outgoing parliament passed legislation eliminating direct elections for provincial
governors, district heads and mayors. This meant that leaders of regional
government leaders would be once again appointed by locally elected legislatures,
de facto shifting the balance of power away from the people and towards party
officials. In other words, it was a naked attempt at a power grab by the
conservative elite groups bent on preventing another “Jokowi” from arising (Joe
2014; Mietzner 2015: 49). 56 A public outcry led to the then still in-office
president, Yudhoyono, promulgating a presidential decree to reinstate direct
elections, despite his party having been instrumental in the original decision. That
parliament later passed this into law only partly conceals the oligarchs’ intent and
concerted effort (Aritonang and Jong 2015; Sihaloho and Paat 2015).

The strength of the existing power structure was again on display when
Widodo announced his disappointing first government line-up. This included
many faces from the old regime. Aspinall (2014b) admitted that Widodo had
failed his first test. He noted that:

it’s a cabinet with the standard mixture we have come to expect in
democratic Indonesia: a few decent reformers are located in technocratic
posts, but many party hacks also get seats. More appointments are
surprisingly bad than are surprisingly good.

Aspinall criticised in particular the appointment of conservative New Order Gen
(ret) Ryamizard Ryacudu to the post of minister of defence and of corruption
suspect Rini Soewandi to the post of minister of state-owned enterprises. He
(2014b) concluded by noting that:

56 For a partly differing view see Buehler (2014b).
these appointments show that Jokowi has had to make compromises with the political parties who backed his presidential campaign and whose support he will need in parliament (see also Mietzner 2015: 50-1).

Moreover, a Prabowo-led coalition has managed to gain the speakership of the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR), Indonesia’s main consultative body, and all chairmanships of the parliamentary commissions, the key bodies in the decision-making process (Mietzner 2015: 50). As Mietzner (2015: 50) recognizes:

This left Jokowi’s camp without representation at the top leadership level of parliament, and threatened his presidency with the prospect of executive-legislative deadlock.

The way in which the existing power relations constrained Widodo is, in essence, the core of the oligarch theory (see also Tapsell 2015; The Economist 2014).

The oligarchs have also acted in concert to maintain the system of exemption. For example, they have acted to undermine Tipikor and the KPK. Butt (2012) provides comprehensive explanations of these concerted efforts. Here suffice to note that they consist of challenges by the Constitutional Court on Tipikor’s definition of corruption; the KPK’s right to investigate old cases; and the constitutionality of Tipikor itself, hence on its right to exist; it also consists of the dilution of the two agencies’ power via the new law on the corruption court promulgated by a hostile parliament in 2009; and of the targeting of KPK senior officers by the police and politicians.
Another example that shows how the oligarchs struggle collectively to maintain the system of exemption is the politics surrounding the nomination of the new National Police Chief. Widodo was placed under huge pressure to nominate graft suspect Comr. Gen. Budi Gunawan, a protégée of Megawati (Bandoro 2015: 52; Mietzner 2015; Sihite et al. 2015). A public outcry forced Widodo to backtrack. But his final choice, while certainly better, did not represent a break with the past. Comr. Gen. Badrodin Haiti, who was sworn in as the new Polri chief in April 2015, is also among the senior police officers suspected of having unusually large bank accounts, and is close to tycoon Surya Paloh (Globe 2015; Jacques 2015; Tempo.co.id 2015). In addition, Comr. Gen. Budi Gunawan was eventually quietly sworn in as Indonesia's deputy police chief, showing just how little space of manoeuvre Widodo had (J. Baker 2015a; Reuters 2015). The double appointment ensures continuity with the system of exemptions, which is not only a key practice through which the oligarchy maintains control of the political economy of the country, but also a key practice and logic in shaping the political economy-policing dialectical relations. This is explained further below.

5-3– Policing contemporary Indonesia

The degree of both change and continuity in the broad political economy has affected the dialectical relations between the broad political economy and policing.

The state, or more specifically the sociopolitical alliances that contest for state power and resources, is the key auspice of policing in democratizing and decentralizing Indonesia, whether at central or local level. Local communities and private interests still play an important role. Among the providers of policing are
the state coercive apparatus, most notably the TNI and Polri, a string of actors operating within the broad umbrella of community policing, militias and vigilante groups of various sizes and sources of identification, and private security companies.

The strategic selectivity that mediates which policing actor is favoured to play a role and that may be embedded in broader political coalitions, has changed. In Suharto’s Indonesia, coercive capital and the social capital represented by the association with the military were the most relevant capitals. But the broadening of the political space and the associated democratic discourse have meant that the favoured policing actors are now often those that can allegedly control and deliver votes, while more clearly articulate their security function. This often requires coercive capital, various hues of social capital and bureaucratic capital. Policing actors accrue the latter by framing their role within the various, vague legal provisions that have left the door open for informal groups to claim a policing role in Indonesia. These include article 30 of the 1945 Constitution, which states that every citizen has a right and obligation to defend the state; State Defence Law No.3/2002, which changed the concept of ‘total people’s security’ and allows a role for citizens in law enforcement; and Police Law No.2/2002, promulgated post-Suharto, which stipulates that in the carrying out of its policing role, the police will be assisted by ‘voluntary civilian security groups’ (Robison et al. 2007: 29). The result is that, for example, most vigilante groups register as mass organizations (Ormas) and enjoy a legally recognized status that facilitates their claim to a policing role for the ‘good of the people’ and in cooperation with the police (L. Wilson and Nugroho 2012). Bureaucratic capital has also risen in prominence as the state has attempted to regulate the booming private security
sector and has co-opted many of the existing policing actors by granting state sanction, or by recruiting individuals into various state policing units (Robison et al. 2007: 31). In many contexts, however, bureaucratic capital only adds a veneer of formality and legality to a field that remains strongly affected by informality and illegality and by the system of exemptions. The field of policing, moreover, remains an important site where struggles over the broader political economy are contested.

Below, the attention is focused on Polri, on vigilantes and on the private security industry. The aim is to further explain how the transition to democracy and decentralization has not only affected the broad political context, but also the dialectical relations between this and policing.

Polri

Prior to reformasi, Polri was subsumed within the TNI and largely submitted to the political and fiscal decisions of the military, the leading branch within the TNI. It had little capital and influence. Reformasi started the progressive rise of Polri within the policing landscape, as part of the democratic restructuring of the state coercive apparatus. This has profound implications on Polri’s ability to accrue capital, affect the politics-policing dialectical relations and mediate the broad political landscape.

Polri formally separated from the TNI in 1999 and gradually took over primary responsibility for public security. Before the split, Polri had been relegated to criminal investigation and traffic management, while after the split, its responsibilities grew to include public security, maintenance of order, law enforcement, public protection and service to the communities (ICG 2012: 2). The
formal restructuring was paired with an increased flow of national budget funds to Polri from IDR 5.3 trillion in 2001 to 47.2 trillion in 2015 (Adam et al. 2014; J. Baker 2013: 137), and a strengthening of Polri’s presence throughout the territory, from a force of around 180,000 in 1998 to some 400,000 officers in 2012 (Kompas 2011). During such a period, therefore, Polri accrued coercive, economic and political capital and has grown to be recognized as the key policing actor, both by the other policing actors and by the sociopolitical elites. This is symbolic capital.

As explained before, during the Suharto regime the TNI was the key policing actor mediating the politics-policing relationship. This rested greatly on the ad-hoc drafting and implementation of laws and on the common interest in maintaining the dominant order and extract resources. The field of policing was thus an important field in how the dominant social group maintained power. Despite democratization, and the often-heard calls to good governance and transparency that shape part of the political discourse in Indonesia, the dialectical relations between Polri and elite groups remains strongly affected by the same practices and aims and the field of policing remains influential in shaping the power relations of the broader political economy.

On the ground, Polri does not operate according to Weberian rationalities or the logic of law and order. As Baker (2011: 2) explains:

it operates according to the fluid and often conflicting requirements of the complex web of relations that Polri as an institution, or Polri officers on an individual basis, knit with senior officers and military generals, ethnic-Chinese patrons, politicians, political parties, indigenous capitalists and
traders, goons and Ormas, illicit casino operators, timber barons, religious leaders and claimants to representing ‘the people.’

The requirements emanating from this web of relations lead to practices, discourses and schemes of domination that blend the formal and informal, and the legal and illegal. In particular, at every organisational level Polri operates on the fringe of the law and is unaccountable for some of its sources of finance, hugely corrupt, often violent and enjoying impunity. Such a modus operandi is one of the main practices through which the field of politics and the field of policing affect each other. In particular, this modus operandi is what allows Polri, and its officers, to access resources, and what links Polri to the broader, elite-dominated system of exemptions.

The relation between the elite and Polri is not a patron-client relationship, though, but one based on elements of synthesis, complementarity and independence-dependence. At its simplest, Polri does not work on behalf of the elite, but benefits from the same system, so it works to protect it. Hence, within the structural framework that shapes Indonesia’s state-society relations, Polri is part of the structure and a key agent in shaping it. The relationship between the elite and Polri is thus a mutually reinforcing one, with Polri having a vested interest in maintaining the established elite-dominated ‘system of exemptions’ order.

Polri’s rise to a central position within the field of policing means also that the modus operandi of the institution, and of its officers, affects the broader

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57 Local media, both in English and in Bahasa Indonesia, frequently report cases of police abuse, corruption or excessive force. Here note also the reports by Amnesty International (2009a, 2012a), International Crisis Group (2012) and Baker (2013, 2015b).
policing landscape and the relations, conflicts and coalitions between Polri and other policing actors, especially vigilante groups.

At one level, the relationships between Polri and vigilante groups are mediated by the ability of the latter to fulfil a degree of security function. At another level the relationships are part of the contestations over turf. Polri officers are generally aware of policing actors operating, often illegally, in specific areas, and focus their energy on finding common ground and interests, rather than to stifle them. Beyond the nominal security function of policing actors, thus, an important mediating factor is whether these latter have the ability to accrue economic capital.

For example, in East Kalimantan immigrants from Madura are often involved in illegal activities. Nooteboom (2011: 225) details how the police there protect their businesses and informally facilitate illegal activities. Examples include running semi-legal stone quarries and excavations of clay for the brick industry, running brothels, organising cockfights and other forms of gambling, running protection rackets, and even engaging in petty crime such as pickpocketing, organising pyramid schemes, and stealing. For each activity, the participants need to pay regular premiums to the police officers who routinely visit them. The relationship with the police is also crucial for members of the Madurese gangs to gain jobs as security guards in gambling dens, bars, discotheques, and brothels (Nooteboom 2011: 226). In such a case, the system of exemption shapes a relation through which the support of the police is an important capital for the local, semi-criminal groups who are then able to make money. In exchange, the police accrue economic capital and a degree of control over the semi-criminal groups that facilitates limiting more serious types of crime.
The relationship includes thus a security and a political economic function, although skewed in favour of the latter.

This pattern is widely spread throughout Indonesia. The power relation between Polri and other actors vary, though. Other elements that mediate this are the relative size and strength (coercive capital) and connections (social and political capital) of policing actors, and the immediate resources (various forms of capital) available to Polri. In situations where a policing actor possesses a high volume of social capital and is legitimized by the community, Polri officers have limited room for negotiation. Likewise, in localities where Polri’s presence on the ground is thin, the collaboration with policing actors is unavoidable and Polri’s bargaining power restricted. Still, the structuring force of the system of exemption is paramount.

In one district of South Jakarta, for example, the local branch of the Forum of Betawi Brotherhood (Forum Betawi Rembug, FBR) is a major financial contributor to the under-resourced local police station (I. Wilson 2011: 257). According to FBR members, in return for financial support, police officers turn a blind eye to occasional “excesses” on the part of the group and allow them to manage many day-to-day policing tasks such as the apprehension of petty criminals (I. Wilson 2011: 257). The FBR has accrued ethnic and social capital by bringing forward a discourse in favour of the interests of Jakarta’s ethnic-Betawi people, and by providing some services to this community (D. Brown and Wilson 2007; I. Wilson 2005: 10-5). The relationship with the police means that the group balances a security and a political economy function, which also benefits the local police.
Importantly, however, in democratic Indonesia Polri holds a reserve card vis-à-vis vigilante groups and militias, constituted by the laws and regulations deriving from the criminal code, police-enacted provisions, the law on Ormas and locally-enacted public order laws. This bureaucratic capital is essential in Polri’s role as the key mediator of the overall policing landscape. The ad-hoc implementation of this legal framework—read also, the ‘system of exemptions’—allows Polri, both as an institution and via its officers, to act against policing actors that step outside the unspoken boundaries of the agreement, or lose the social political capital (see also Barker 2009; I. Wilson 2011).

Democratization has thus led to Polri accruing huge amounts of capital and gaining a central position within the policing landscape. This has allowed the institution, and its officers, to play an important role in affecting the political economy-policing dialectical relations and the overall policing landscape. Democratization has reshuffled how policing actors relate, contest and enrol each other, but not fundamentally altered the murky practices through which the broad political economy and the state coercive apparatus affect each other. Elements of this continuity, but also of important change, are discernible also focusing on the phenomenon of vigilantes and on the PSC industry.

Vigilante and militia groups

Vigilantes have arguably proliferated in post-Suharto Indonesia; they have broadened their inventory of capital and gained a more proactive role in affecting the dialect relations between political economy and policing, especially at local level. Indeed, they are no longer simply embedded in the pro-regime coalition to control the territory and extract resources. They are instead often seen as able to
deliver votes and are therefore sought after by the sociopolitical coalitions contesting for power and resources. In such a way, contestations taking place in the broader political economy are mirrored in the field of policing.

An important reason for the proliferation of vigilantes and militias is the increased level of communal violence that coincided with the end of the authoritarian regime.58 This created uneasiness at the community level and led to the proliferation of various groups intent on protecting their turf. In such a case, groups that could master a degree of coercive capital would also accrue social capital via the support of the community. This would put them in good stead to operate as mediator between the community interests and the aspirations of sociopolitical coalitions.

Another reason for the proliferation of vigilantes and militias is the heightened feeling of communal identity that followed the process of decentralisation. This has led to an increase in identity politics in Indonesia, reflected also in the establishment of ethnic- and religious-based groups (Santikarma 2003a; Telle 2015; I. Wilson 2015: 30-2). These groups gained various hues of social capital and, again, placed themselves in a good position to play a political role in mediating the aspirations of the sociopolitical coalitions and the interests of their community.

The relationship between vigilante groups and the community most often refers to the latter in a geographical sense. However, in post-Suharto Indonesia some vigilante groups claim to represent the interest of communities intended as shared interests. The two main such ‘ideological’ communities are those centred

on the revival of *adat*—real and/or invented traditions—and on conservative Islam. In some cases, the vigilante groups particularly successful in accruing *adat* or Islamic capital have been embedded in sociopolitical coalitions attempting to shape state-society relations via imposing a specific view of order. The key field of struggle for these ideologies is that of the law, seen by Bourdieu as the field that sanctions the efforts of dominant, or rising, groups to impose an official representation of the social world, which sustains their own world view and favours their interests (Bourdieu 1987: 848). Examples of how these dynamics have played out are developed in Chapter 6 and 7.

More broadly, however, the politicization of capital-rich vigilante and militia groups is closely linked to the increasingly contested nature of politics, especially at the local level. Here sociopolitical coalitions have often a militarized wing or seek the support of existing vigilante groups who are seen as important in either garnering votes or preventing the opponent coalition from doing so. Lombok is a good illustration.

Lombok is one of Indonesia’s most densely populated islands and one of its poorest. It is overwhelmingly Muslim, and religious leaders, known as *tuan guru*, play a powerful political role thanks to large amount of social capital. Among its 3.2 million inhabitants, ethnic-Sasak Muslims constitute 92 percent of the population, but there are also significant minorities of Balinese Hindus, Sasak Buddhists, as well as a small number of ethnic-Chinese Buddhists, and non-Sasak Christians (ICG 2003b: 11). The island has a history of communal violence, and the high level of poverty is often indicated as a structural reason that facilitates mobilizing masses (Kingsley 2012: 54). In such a context, the increased political competition for local office brought on with *reformasi* enhanced inter-ethnic
competition and intra-elite struggles. Militias able to garner the relevant capital are an intrinsic means through which these struggles are contested. Indeed, as Tyson (2013: 203) notes, the local proliferation of vigilante and militias groups in Lombok “is less about security and more about political expediency and voter mobilization.”

One example is the power struggles between the two daughters of local religious leader Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid, locally known as Maulana Syaikh.

Madjid was the leader of the influential Nahdlatul Wathan Islamic group. After his death in 1997, his daughter Raehanun was elected to lead the group, but the other daughter, Rauhun, opposed her sibling’s ascent. Since then, and until 2010, the sisters and their followers sided with different political elite groups, established their own militias, Hizbullah and Satgas Hamzanwadi, respectively, and clashed violently (Fahrurrozi 2010; ICG 2003b: 15). In this case, both militias relied on the same forms of capital—social, Islamic and coercive—and the field of policing was an extension of the struggles over the broader political economy.

Indeed, the two militias were deployed to control the territory and prevent the other coalition from seeking votes and support in each other’s areas. There were more than 1,000 Hizbullah and Satgas command posts in Lombok in 2008 (B. J. Smith 2012: 256) and the deployment of coercive capital was an instrumental part of the struggle for political supremacy by the two coalitions. Controlling Nahdlatul Wathan means gaining strategic selectivity and strongly influencing the local politics (Hamdi and Smith 2012; ICG 2003b: 13). Over 700 Nahdlatul Wathan-associated schools are run in the province, mosques throughout Lombok sport Nahdlatul Wathan branch signs out front, and droves of
government office-holders, including the governor, are affiliated to Nahdlatul Wathan (Fogg and Ending 2011). The list is almost unending if one includes the heads of offices and bureaus in the provincial and district/city governments, which are almost all dominated by Nahdlatul Wathan’s cadres (Fogg and Ending 2011). Hence, whoever controls Nahdlatul Wathan has a strong say in how local resources are distributed.

The militarization of the political conflict within the Nahdlatul Wathan is not the exception in Lombok. Kingsley (2012) explains the intertwining of militias, violence, religion and politics leading to the 2008 gubernatorial elections, while Tyson underlines the link between several militias and political groups. He (2013: 215) notes that:

Asmara Jaya, Lombok’s newest Pamsuwakarsa [vigilante group], was inaugurated by H. Zaini Arony, bupati (mayor) of West Lombok, as recently as July 2012. Similarly, HM Suhaili, the bupati of Central Lombok, has co-opted the [vigilante groups known as] Amphibi, Elang Merah, and Yatofa, grouping them under the ironically titled Forum Masyarakat Peduli (Community Care Forum). It is widely believed that local Pamsuwakarsa leaders such as Haji Abdul Qadir Jaelani of Amphibi are handsomely paid to mobilize support for HM Suhaili and his deputy, HL Normal Suzana, to intimidate political opponents and, if necessary, act as a parallel police force.

And Lombok is no exception in Indonesia. The involvement of vigilante and militia groups in broader political struggle takes place elsewhere, at different politics of scale and intensity.
In Jakarta, former governor Sutiyoso and his deputy, Fauzi Bowo, proactively sought the support of the FBR. The association with Sutiyoso helped the FBR to accrue political capital useful to deflect police attention and to cement its position as an important local policing actor. In Cakung, a sub-district in East Jakarta, the FBR controls some 115 security posts (I. Wilson 2005: 11-12). In Bali, both the incumbent governor Made Mangku Pastika and the challenger, Anak Agung Puspayoga, mobilized Ormas during their hotly contested 2013 election. This allowed the two contestants to validate their political platform based on ‘securing Bali,’ and helped the Ormas to cement their position as legitimate policing actors (Chapter 6). At a national level, Wilson (2014b) explains how the People’s Movement for a New Indonesia (Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia Baru, GRIB), established in 2011 by notorious hard man Hercules as a social organisation dedicated to ‘defending and empowering the poor and the oppressed,’ actually operated as an organisational umbrella in 2014 to organise presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto’s networks of gangsters, local strongmen, Islamist vigilantes, ex-militias and martial arts groups. The aim was to garner votes.

Vigilante groups have thus grown to play a relatively significant role in the post-authoritarian political economy-policing dialectical relations. State-vigilante relations are no longer top-down and monolithic in nature, but more fragmented and dual-relational, and vigilantes have often positioned themselves as brokers between the community and sociopolitical coalitions. This has become particularly relevant where political contexts are shaped by identity politics and immaterial forms of capital are influential in shaping power relations. The alliances between sociopolitical coalitions and vigilantes groups are, however,
often short-lived and instrumentally sought both by elite groups and vigilante groups. Shifts in the constellation of political power may affect the topography of policing actors on the ground, while changes in the topography of policing actors on the ground may benefit specific groups or individuals contesting for political power.

**Private security**

No firm data exist in regards to the size of the industry, but Polri says that there are some 500 PSCs in Jakarta alone (Media Indonesia 2010), while the Indonesia Security Industry Association (*Asosiasi Badan Usaha Jasa Pengamanan Indonesia*, ABUJAPI) claims to have 632 PSCs on its books in Jakarta, and almost 1,000 nationwide (Tribun News 2013). This includes international operations, such as G4S and PT Shields, and small-scale localized operations. The industry is said to employ up to 650,000 private security guards (*satuan pengamanan*, Satpam), although this is likely to be the tip of the iceberg considering the many, smaller and informal PSCs operating throughout the territory. For example, of the 368 PSCs operating in West Java in 2014, 206 were unregistered (Maulud 2014). In Bali, the number of registered PSCs is 56, but in preliminary research the author was able to account for a dozen unregistered PSCs in the villages of Kuta, Legian and Seminyak. Hence, while the size of the regulated security market alone is estimated at some USD 100 million per year (PT. Satria Raksa Buminosa 2011), the overall market is likely to be several times higher.

While the data is scarce, it is clear that PSCs have risen to play an important role and that the industry presents various segments, each affected differently by
the changes brought by democratization, decentralization and globalization. Indeed, different strategic selectivities constrain and mediate which PSCs are favoured to play a role within a specific context and, on the ground, PSCs operate within a continuum that, at one end is constituted by the efficiency and professionalism anticipated by neoliberal, decentralised forms of security governance, while at the other end is constituted by a thin coat of bureaucratic capital glossing over old patterns of contestation over localized resources. This means that some PSCs fulfil a strictly security function, while others are highly politicized. It also means that segments of the industry are strongly affected by the system of exemption.

The rise of small- to medium-sized PSCs coincided with the end of the Suharto regime and the increase in violence that also facilitated the rise of vigilantism. In the urban areas, this was paired with the ripple effects of urbanization and social stratification. Traditionally, for example, Indonesian neighbourhoods and villages organized themselves in providing security. This included night patrols (ronda malam) provided partly voluntarily by the community and partly in collaboration with Polri. However, ronda malam has lost its community feeling in many urban contexts where policing is being reframed along class lines. The growth of privately guarded, gated communities (Hishiyama 2010; Leisch 2002) has limited its scope in affluent parts of cities, and in less affluent areas, families that can afford it, have since long paid low-income youths to do their share of patrolling (Reksodiputro and Purnianti 1993: 96). This type of small PSCs tends to be locally recruited, and the strategic selectivity that regulates them is often linked to social and coercive capital. The professionalization of these PSCs also varies. They all perform a security
function, but in some cases this is partly a thin veneer over pre-existing forms of local extortion. This means that many amongst the small size PSCs operate within the system of exemption.

Putra Perkasa, a PSC operating in the greater Jakarta area is located at the less professional end of the spectrum. As described by Wilson (2011: 256), Putra Perkasa is linked to Abraham Lunggana, a former gang leader who, post-Suharto, has become a legislator with the Islamic PPP, and a deputy leader of an umbrella organisation for Betawi groups. In this way, Putra Perkasa has accrued cultural, social and political capital. Putra Perkasa’s main selling point is not the professionalism of its staff, however, but the social capital it accrues through its close connection with the community. The rationale behind the company is, in fact, to select and employ local preman to avoid them feeling aggrieved by the presence of security actors from the outside.

This type of PSCs performs a security function, but it is at the same time part of the security solution and part of the security problem since it is unclear whether local residents could freely opt for different security providers. This type of PSCs thus shows how some policing actors have negotiated the changes brought by democratization and urbanization by re-framing old patterns of local power relations through the lens of the commercialization and alleged professionalization of security services (see also I. Wilson 2011: 255). Moreover, the close association between Putra Perkasa and Abraham Lunggana reiterates the dialectical relations between political economy and policing. Indeed, Putra Perkasa partly relies on the political and social capital that Abraham Lunggana accrues in his political activities. Concurrently, Abraham Lunggana benefits from the coercive and social capital that Putra Perkasa accrues locally.
Bali Security Services (BSS) is a relatively more professional PSC, while also maintaining uncomfortable elements of convergence with old forms of vigilantism.\(^{59}\) BSS was established in the early 2000s in response to the growing tourism trade in Bali and the increase in demands for security following the terrorist attacks that targeted the island in 2002 and 2005. The owner has a past from the local *preman* scene. He is also the son of a senior, local politician—political capital that has aided BSS to obtain a licence—and a close associate of the chairman of the *Laskar* Bali, arguably the most violent Ormas on the island.

Within such a web of relations, BSS operates as a conduit for *Laskar* Bali members to gain economic and social capital via means of a job. *Laskar* Bali, on the other hand, brings the coercive capital and, to a certain extent, the symbolic capital that BSS needs to claim a stake in the market. The association with the *Laskar* Bali is also part of the strategic selectivity that favours BSS in some contexts. Indeed, as the owner of BSS stated:

> In some parts of Bali, if you want formal and legal security you have to come to me, and if you want informal and illegal security you still have to come to me.\(^{60}\)

Employees of BSS remain members of *Laskar* Bali, occupying a space blurred by ambiguous and multiple layers of authority. While operating under BSS they are regulated by a code of conduct, but this is undoubtedly weakened by the close

\(^{59}\) The information on Bali Security Services was collected by the author during fieldwork in Bali between October 2013 and February 2014. It draws from interviews with the owner of BSS, interviews with several members of *Laskar* Bali, and interviews with several business owners, residents and activists.

\(^{60}\) Interview with the owner of BSS, Seminyak, 21 November 2013.
association between the PSC and the *Laskar* Bali. BSS has not been politicized thus far, but the blurring between PSC-Ormas leaves such a door open.

At the other hand of the PSC industry spectrum are the much bigger, professional PSCs, most of which are associated with international PSCs. The rise of these PSCs was affected by the ripple effects of the terrorist attacks that have bloodied the country since 2000, and the introduction of neoliberal modes of governance in the security sector.

The terrorist attacks led to large, mostly foreign-owned, companies hiring private guards in Jakarta and the other major urban and tourist centres of the archipelago. Adi Mahfouz, president director of Gardatama Nusantara PT Security Services, said he was “overwhelmed” by the number of new prospective clients that contacted him following the 17 July 2009 terrorist attack on Jakarta’s JW Marriott-Ritz Carlton Hotel (Melayutiionghoa 2010). In such a case, the nature of the auspices of policing—large, foreign-owned companies—contributed to a process of professionalization and legitimation of the industry as these companies favoured legally recognized and professional PSCs. This strategic selectivity pushed many local operators to accrue bureaucratic capital and the cultural capital associated with professionalization.

But the rise of bureaucratic and cultural capital also owes to the introduction of the concept of ‘good governance’ in the security apparatus. In particular, following the 1997 East Asian crisis, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pushed Indonesia to liberalize and decentralize services, while introducing technocratic means of measuring effectiveness (see, for example, Fane and McLeod 2002; Wells 2007). As noted, the results of such

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61 On these attacks see the various reports by ICG (2002b, 2003a, 2005, 2006, 2009b).
initiatives are debatable (Robison and Hadiz 2004; Siswati 2013), but these modes of governance created a discursive space for a ‘professionalization’ of non-state policing that placed bureaucratic and cultural capital at the core of the strategic selectivity of the market. All the major international PSCs operating in Indonesia fit within this type of PSCs.

In between the small, locally recruited PSCs and the large, professional PSCs are many medium to large PSCs. This segment has also been strongly affected by the restructuring of the state security apparatus initiated with reformasi. Besides leading to the rise of Polri, this abolished the military prerogative to occupy military and civilian positions simultaneously, and limited the TNI’s involvement in business. ⁶² TNI-owned businesses had generated significant income for both military personnel and the military as an institution during the authoritarian period, both legally and illegally. ⁶³ Laws introduced with reformasi barred the military from running businesses, although they did not prohibit the TNI from operating cooperatives or foundations (HRW 2010; Scarpello 2014: 145-47). Within this shrinking space of manoeuvre, the expansion of PSCs afforded disgruntled military officers a new avenue to access resources within the parameters of democratisation and the donor-driven security-sector reform program. Indeed, most medium-to-large PSCs have former military personnel on their management boards, or in some other senior capacity (J. Baker 2011: 123; Masaaki unpublished). Retired police officers also figure prominently. Both former TNI and Polri officers add the social capital—i.e. network—relevant


⁶³ International and Indonesian NGOs have been active in researching the illegal facet of the TNI businesses. See, for example, Global Witness (2005), Human Rights Watch (2006a) and KontraS (2004). Note also Barber and Talbott (2003)
in mediating the entry-point of PSCs in a highly competitive and lucrative market. TNI Marines Corps Maj Gen (ret) Halim Hermanto, for example, is an advisor of PT Garuda Prima Security, one of the largest PSCs in the country. PT Garuda is owned by Prabowo; it is headquartered in Jakarta and provides services across the archipelago to multinationals such as Caltex Pacific, General Motors, Total E&P, Eni, Siemens, Glaxosmithkline and Seaworld, as well as to local entities, such as the port authority in Belawan, Medan (Sciascia 2013).

The TNI, or Polri, connection is also evident in medium-sized, professional PSCs such as *Barungu Aneka Sistem Sekuriti Co. Ltd* (BASS) and PT Global.

BASS, as profiled by Masaaki (unpublished: 5-9), was established in August 1999 in response to the security needs of the Japanese business community. It benefitted from Japanese economic capital and, crucially, the social and symbolic capital it gained from its partnership with YASMAR, a foundation of the TNI Marine Corps. YASMAR also provided the necessary political capital that allowed BASS to obtain its licence. BASS prides itself on the competencies, skills, professionalism and qualifications—i.e. cultural capital—of its employees, accumulated and transmitted through higher levels of selection and training. BASS has converted this into symbolic capital, in the form of reputation, and economic capital via means of contracts. The PSC is estimated to have 2,600 members of staff and, among its clients, it counts the Japanese embassy and several Japanese corporate entities (Halo Jepang! 2013). BASS has a strictly security function and eschews involvement in politics.

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PT Global, which operates in Bali, maintains a good relationship with Polri by employing several police officers as consultants. This social capital allows PT Global to operate in a crowded market that includes 56 registered PSCs and many more unregistered ones. PT Global has built a reputation (symbolic capital) on the back of the professional service it provides (cultural capital), which is based on strict recruitment procedures, training and continuous monitoring of staff. For example, PT Global refuses to employ individuals associated with the many violent Ormas active in Bali and appraises its staff monthly. PT Global also views security strictly in terms of crime prevention and the product they sell as strictly security related.

Finally, the PSC industry in Indonesia also includes the policing arrangements that have emerged in the resource enclaves following the structural changes brought by globalization and democratization.

It was noted, for example, that the Grasberg mining complex was policed by the military and benefitted the Suharto regime and Freeport politically and financially. However, as Suharto’s position crumbled, and Indonesia became a more open society, the scrutiny on Freeport’s environmental, human rights and development records increased exponentially. In other words, Freeport lost some of the political capital that had allowed it to operate in a largely unregulated manner in Papua. This also affected the policing arrangements.

In democratizing Indonesia, the TNI coercive force is no longer sufficient as policing actors are called to comply more closely with the discourse of good governance, human rights protection and so on. These calls have been

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65 The information on PT Global was collected by the author during fieldwork in Bali between October 2013 and February 2014. It draws from interviews with a senior member of PT Global, one member of staff and one client.
strengthened by Indonesia’s progressive entrenchment in the global financial system and by the combined result of the pressure brought on mining companies to operate ethically and the entrenchment of neo-liberal modes of governments.

In 2000, Freeport-McMoRan joined other oil and gas and mining companies, governments and human rights organizations in endorsing the joint U.S. Department of State-British Foreign Office Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. This promotes the implementation of a set of principles that guide oil, gas and mining companies in providing security for their operations in a manner that respects human rights.\(^{66}\) It signalled, at least in theory, a more focused attention on how policing is delivered as expressed in the Human Rights Policy approved by the Freeport-McMoRan Board of Directors in February 2015.\(^{67}\)

The policing arrangement of the Grasberg mining complex have since developed along the lines of the global security assemblage. Freeport now has its own security force for internal security, in 2014 consisting of approximately 730 unarmed personnel and approximately 260 unarmed private security contractors and transportation/logistics personnel on a rotational basis. These are paired with approximately 1,350 host country security personnel (police and military). The cooperation between the two segments is regulated by norms and procedures that lead to a blurring of the state and non-state, and local and global dichotomy. Freeport has also established a Memorandum of Understanding with the Provincial Commander of the National Police, which was revised and signed in


2013. 68 This details the working relationship, including areas of support, coordination and commitment to Freeport Indonesia policies and procedures. Freeport’s share of support costs for the government-provided security was US$ 27 million for 2014. There is thus a straightforward exchange of economic and coercive capital between Freeport and various layers of the Indonesian security apparatus. But the new policing arrangement shows also that the bureaucratic and cultural capitals have become important in the strategic selectivity that mediates this specific policing arrangement.69 The changes have improved the practice through which policing is delivered in the mining complex, although allegations of abuse and illegality persist (Global Witness 2005; HRW 2006a: 47-51; Michels 2011; Perlez and Bonner 2005; Rifai-Hasan 2009).

Overall, the PSC industry is a microcosm of Indonesia’s broader policing landscape as it presents several segments mediated by different strategic selectivities and different relevant form of capital. Some PSCs arch back to power structures mediated mostly by coercive capital that characterized the authoritarian regime, while other PSCs presents substantial amounts of the cultural capital associated with professionalization and decentralized forms of security governance. The industry is nonetheless strongly affected, and partly affects, the political economy dynamics, whether at the local, national or, indeed, global level.

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68 Ibis

69 A similar strategic selectivity shapes the global security assemblage of the BP-operated Tangguh LNG Project in Papua's western Bird's Head region.
5-4– Conclusion

PEPP has shown in this chapter that Indonesia’s contemporary policing landscape presents some important elements of continuity with the past, but also some noteworthy changes. The macro analysis provided has focused on the interests and coalitions contesting for power and resources and on the strategic selectivity that allows policing actors to play a role and, in some cases, be embedded in such coalitions. It has emerged that there remain rather strong dialectical relations between the political economy context, whether at national or local level, and policing. However, it has also emerged that democratization, decentralization and the ongoing processes of urbanization and globalization have resulted in a fragmented strategic selectivity mediating the various segments of the policing landscape.

A key element of continuity with the past is a marked, although decreased, politicization of policing actors. This is facilitated by the entrenchment of the system of exemptions that devalues the cultural capital associated with professionalization. This is epitomized by how such a system of exemptions frames the elite-Polri relations. Democratization has led to the police replacing the TNI at the core of the policing landscape, but there remains a strong common political interests in regards to how policing is delivered and for whose benefit.

The key change is represented by the fact that sociopolitical developments have forced policing actors to more clearly articulate their security function, and diversify their portfolio of capital. In other words, coercive capital is no longer sufficient; policing actors need to more closely align themselves with their communities (social capital) and operate, at least nominally, within the state-
recognized framework (bureaucratic capital). This follows the rise in identity politics and of the increased bureaucratization of the state.

In light of these findings, it is possible to expand on the added value of PEPP in regards to the existing paradigms and theoretical frameworks.

For example, anchored pluralism’s state-centred, normative approach could have assessed the anchoring points between the state and the various recognised policing arrangements operating in Indonesia, as well as the state capacity and commitment to use coercive power to enforce its rules and directives. But the paradigm is conceptually unsuitable to account for policing actors operating outside of the state framework and could not have explained the political nature of policing. Meanwhile, nodal governance could have described how the various policing actors are enmeshed in nodes, but it could not have explained the political nature that underpins nodes. Similarly, MCP could have gauged the support the various policing actors enjoy among the community and it could have mapped who the policing actors are, but it could not have explained how these actors relate to the wider contestation over power and resources, or why some play a role and others do not.

Among the political frameworks, the limits of the new PEPS and of GSA are still linked to the state-centred and normative position the former takes, and the globalization-derived conceptual basis of the latter. The bottom-up and ethnographic approach of policing as an order-making framework could have added some nuances to the relations between some local politicians and vigilante groups, but it could not have explained the role of Polri within the broader political economy, nor how the dominance of the oligarchy affects the political
economy of policing, or how democratization, decentralization and globalization have led to such a fragmented PSC industry.
CHAPTER 6
The political economy of policing in Bali’s tourist hub

This chapter focuses on three villages in Bali. It shows how the contingent historical trajectory has led to the rise of coercive and adat capital becoming the most relevant capital and to very close dialectical relations between the broad political economy and policing. It explains also why and how the policing landscape that has ensued is skewed in regards to ethnicity, gender and class.

6-1 – Introduction
Tourism is, by far, the main industry in Bali and the main factor in the island’s capitalist-driven development. The industry has been developing since the 1920s, although the rate of growth has increased exponentially from the 1970s (Lewis and Lewis 2009: 43-78; Picard 2003). In 1968, the number of tourists visiting Bali only reached 10,997 people. This had increased to 170,505 in 1983. In 2013, 3.2 million foreign tourists and about 6 million national tourists arrived on the island (De Suriyani 2014). Between 2008 and 2012, it contributed an average of about 66 percent of the economy annually (Erviani 2013a). Its impact is even higher in the villages of Kuta, Legian and Seminyak where virtually all economic activities are either directly or indirectly linked to tourism. Kuta, Legian and Seminyak cover some 13 square km, and together with Tuban and Kedonganan, they comprise the subdistrict of Kuta, district of Badung. They represent Indonesia's
most tourism-intensive area are the beating heart of the island’s overall tourism and tourism-related economy.

The success of the industry, however, has led to intense struggles over its spoils, and a close correlation between these struggles and how, by whom, and for whose benefit policing is delivered. More specifically, as PEPP’s analysis discloses, a complex relationship between tourism, culture, religion and security, in globalizing and decentralized Bali, has led to a political economy shaped by the commodification of culture and to a high degree of contestation over the spoils of tourism. In this context, ethnic and religious differences have been exacerbated and have become a means through which groups ‘legitimize’ their rights to jobs, funds and business opportunities. In regards to the dialectical relations between this political economy and policing, two key findings emerge:

First, the historical trajectory in Bali has led to coercive and adat capital rising to prominence and becoming the most relevant forms of capital. These are the forms of capital also favoured by the strategic selectivity that mediates the local state-society relations and political economy-policing relations.

Second, the prominence of coercive and adat capital have shaped a policing landscape biased in terms of ethnicity, class and gender.

These findings are substantiated over five further sections.

Section 6.2 engages with the broad political economy. It explains how the success of the tourism industry has led to multilayered struggles over how resources are distributed and that pit, in short, Balinese against non-Balinese
business owners, and natives of Kuta, Legian and Seminyak against Balinese from other parts of the island, Indonesians and foreigners.\(^{70}\)

Section 6.3 explains how the struggles over the allocation of the resources have been politicised by a conservative movement. The ideology of this movement goes back to colonial policies and has been able to harness to its advantage the ripple effects of decentralisation and the 2002 and 2005 terrorist attacks conducted in Bali by Islamic militants.

The remaining sections engage with some of the policing actors. In particular, Section 6.4 engages with the civilian protection force (*Perlindungan Masyarakat*, Linmas), the most prominent among the community policing actors;\(^{71}\) Section 6.5 engages with the traditional guards known as *pecalang*; and Section 6.6 engages with the security-oriented Ormas, Bali Militia (*Laskar Bali*), *Baladika* and Balinese Youth United (*Pemuda Bali Bersatu*, PBB).\(^{72}\)

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\(^{70}\) This section benefits greatly from the service provided by *balidiscovery.com*. This tour operator has for over 15 years aggregated and translated local news and policy documents relevant to the tourism industry. The author has communicated extensively with the main writer of *balidiscovery.com*, John M. Daniels, and randomly checked the accuracy of the news aggregated and their translations. These were found of very high quality.

\(^{71}\) In 2014 Linmas absorbed the registered civil defence force (*Pertahanan Sipil*, Hansip) which was another layer of community policing officers (Tempo.co.id 2014). The difference between the two was that Linmas used to operate at village level, while Hansip operated at *banjar* level. The interviews for this chapter pre-date the change. This notwithstanding, here Linmas is used also to describe those that identified themselves as Hansip at the time of the interview. This is to facilitate readability and because there are no substantial differences in the sources of power Linmas and Hansip draw from or in how they operate.

\(^{72}\) The policing actors dealt with here do not represent the full gamut of those involved in Bali. The chapter, for example, does not concern itself with private security companies, despite acknowledging that these play an important policing role. There are, in fact, at least 56 registered private security companies, as well as a large number of unregistered ones operating within the continuum explained in Chapter 4. In addition, the military maintains a presence via its territorial structure, and there are also several Civil Service Police Units, operating at province and district level, collectively known as Satpol PP (*Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja*). These latter are tasked to monitor prostitution, gambling, unlicensed housing and market-stall placement.
The political economy of Bali’s tourist hub

The success of the tourism industry in Bali has led to multilayered and multifaceted struggles over its spoils. One dimension of the struggle is between non-Balinese investors and Balinese business owners.

Hotels, villas, condominiums and resorts continue to be built at a fast rate in the three villages of reference and supply is outpacing demand (Balidiscovery.com 2015b; Suriyani 2010d). Accommodation data published by the Provincial Tourism Office (diparda provinsi Bali, Diparda) claim a mere 1.3 percent increase in starred, non-starred and home-stay rooms between 2010 and 2012. The Diparda figures count only 26,025 rooms in 2012. The official figures, however, are generally seen as an unreliable reflection of the number of rooms being offered on the market, with a 20 percent increase over the same two-year period viewed as a truer reflection of the accommodation situation. There are other tourism observers who put the number of rooms available on the market in Bali at 85,000 (Balidiscovery.com 2012b, 2014c; Kelly 2013a).

As a result, price competition has become intense with simpler, traditional accommodation providers being overwhelmed by their professionally managed competitors. Surveys have indicated that over 70 percent of international tourists stay in the starred hotels (Balidiscovery.com 2013c, 2013d). Locally-owned hotels, unable to meet their costs with declining revenues, are beginning to close their businesses (Balidiscovery.com 2014c). This leaves little to the locals.

The majority of the starred hotels are owned by non-Balinese. This is part of a well-documented trend started with Suharto who created the conditions for his associates to gain lucrative land contracts in the tourist industry in Bali (Aditjondro 1995). In recent decades, international hotel chains have joined...
Jakarta-based tycoons at the top-end of the market. For example, at the time of writing the opulent 500-room resort ‘The Mulia’ was being built in Nusa Dua by a company owned by Jakarta tycoon Djoko Sugiarto Tjandra, who is a fugitive, implicated in various corruption scandals (Alexander 2013; Balidiscovery.com 2011b). At the same time, a Sheraton hotel was being built in Kuta, and the Marriott-managed The Stones Resort in Legian (Kelly 2013a). Only recently, the secretary general of the Denpasar Hotel and Restaurant Association (Perhimpunan Hotel dan Restoran Indonesia Kota Denpasar, PHRI-Denpasar), Adhi Ardhana said that of the IDR 7 trillion (USD 700 million) investment that poured in Bali in 2012, only 5 percent came from local investors (Balidiscovery.com 2013b).

In Indonesia, foreigners cannot buy land. However, it is a common practice for many to use a local nominee to circumnavigate this limitation. The tourism market is also flooded by foreigners who use this practice to invest in the cottage industry of private villas. This is also contributing in squeezing the locals out of tourism-generated profits. In addition, top-end hotels and villas are often built ignoring local regulations (Balidiscovery.com 2014e). The best example is the Best Western Resort Kuta, a hotel that continues to operate despite violating local zoning laws, lacking a building permit and the absence of an operating license (Balidiscovery.com 2013e).

_Bali’s South-North [and beyond] divide_

The situation is complicated by a south-north divide within the island, with virtually all the benefits of tourism concentrated in the villages of Kuta, Legian and Seminyak, as well as the nearby Sanur and Nusa Dua.
The south of the island enjoys arguably the highest standard of living in Indonesia. The rest of the island is a different matter. The gap within the island is huge, and growing. Provincial statistics estimated in 2011 that there were 183,100 impoverished residents living in Bali. This was an increase of 10.6 percent from six months before (Balidiscovery.com 2012c).\textsuperscript{73} For example, 33 villages in the northern regency of Buleleng are officially classified as ‘impoverished’, which makes Buleleng the district with the highest number of poor communities on the island (Balidiscovery.com 2012d). Bali ranks second only after Jakarta for the highest percentage of poor at the national level (Balidiscovery.com 2012c).

This regional divide leads to a continuous flux of internal migrants from the north and the west towards the south. The attractiveness of Bali as a job market extends beyond Bali. Thousands non-Balinese Indonesians flock to the southern part of the island at any given time. The Renon area of Bali's capital city of Denpasar is a good indicator of this influx. According to a recent survey by the local authorities, migrants now outnumber local Balinese by a factor of 5:1 in Renon (Balidiscovery.com 2014b). Renon is close to the three village of reference for this study and it is easily assumed that a good number of the migrants work in the many tourism related activities. In 2012, Kuta counted 156 hotels, Legian 80 and Seminyak 88 (Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Badung 2013a: 85). There are also hundreds of restaurants, bars and nightclubs in the three villages. This results in demographic pressure on Kuta, Legian and Seminyak, and an increasing disparity between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots,’ living in close proximity.

\textsuperscript{73} Indonesia’s Central Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS) has set the poverty line, at IDR 233,740 per capita per month, which is less than USD 28. Here poverty is defined as an income of less than USD 2 per person per day, as suggested by The World Bank and the Asia Development Bank, among others.
According to official statistics, the combined population of the three villages is of about 20,000 Indonesians (Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Badung 2013b: 8). The real tally, however, is several times higher if considering the constant flux of tourists, the workers commuting from places such as Renon, and the thousands of expatriate residents strangely unaccounted for in the official statistics. Rubbing shoulder to shoulder in Kuta, Legian and Seminyak are millionaires, wealthy individuals and spendthrift Indonesian and foreign tourists, as well as a large contingent of poor, struggling to make ends meet. For example, the provincial government of Bali admits it is being overwhelmed in trying to deal with the increasing number of beggars dotting the roadsides of the tourist areas (Balidiscovery.com 2012c).

**Competitive job market**

The flux of immigrants, both skilled and unskilled, has turned the job market in Kuta, Legian and Seminyak into a very competitive one.

In early 2014, the unemployment rate in Bali fell to 1.37 percent, the lowest in the country. However, good jobs are hard to come by and the per capita income of the island was still relatively low, at around IDR 20 million [USD 1,736] per capita (Atmodjo 2014). This is inadequate in the tourist areas where as governor Made Mangku Pastika argues, “the price of people’s daily needs becomes more expensive and, particularly for the poor, unaffordable” (Balidiscovery.com 2012c). In 2013, the minimum wage in Bali was set at IDR 1,181,000 [USD 123.02]. In the much cheaper city of Medan, North Sumatra, it was set at IDR 1.46 million [USD 152] (Erviani 2012). In addition, job security is relatively weak in Bali where about 60 percent of the workforce is employed in
the informal sector. This means that the majority of Bali workers have loose or informal connections to their employment (Balidiscovery.com 2014a).

Migrants from Java and beyond have monopolized the low-end job market. They work on the many construction sites and have also come to dominate the street and beach trade in hats and counterfeit watches, ornaments, bracelets and necklaces, toys and watches (Hitchcock and Darma Putra 2007: 66). Many of the more skilled migrants play an important part in the tourism industry, working in the many hotels of the island. This includes foreigners who occupy the bulk of the most senior positions within the industry (Balidiscovery.com 2013a). The competitiveness of the market has made it more difficult for the Balinese to gain remunerative jobs. Indeed, many young Balinese continue to travel abroad in search of lucrative employment and career opportunities otherwise not available in Bali. The Bali Manpower and Transmigration Office (Dinas Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi Provinsi Bali, Disnakertrans-Bali) calculates that on the average 150 Balinese job-seekers depart the island for abroad each day (Balidiscovery.com 2012a). Among those most dissatisfied are both Balinese holding college degrees and looking for employment as civil servants (Balidiscovery.com 2005, 2011a), and poorly educated males. These latter have usually completed junior or senior-high school, which means that they finished their education at either 13 or 17 years old. As this study was able to document, the frustration of this social group is augmented by a sense of entitlement to the spoils of tourism and to the goods of a modern, globalized society. It is thus another source of tension.

In sum, the political economy of the villages of Kuta, Legian and Seminyak is heavily affected by the way in which societal groups contest for the spoils of the
tourism industry. These contestations have led to tensions that broadly pit local, small business owners against international and, mostly Jakarta-based large conglomerates; and native of the three villages against migrants from the north of the island and beyond. A social group that has particularly suffered is that constituting of young, poorly educated males who aspire to partake in the consumerist lifestyle of the three villages, but do not have the necessary skills to gain jobs to finance such a lifestyle.

6-3 – History, the ajeg Bali and the rise of the field of policing

The multifaceted struggles over the spoils of the tourism industry have been exacerbated by an historical commodification of culture, which is now seen as in danger, and by the 2002 and 2005 terrorist attacks that cloaked the economy-related ‘us’ versus ‘them’ tensions under the guise of a ‘security threat.’ In particular, these factors have led to the rise of coercive and adat forms of capital as the most relevant capitals. A good place to start is the colonial idea of ‘Bali aman’—Bali safe and peaceful.

The ‘Bali aman’ idea was carefully constructed in the 1920s and 1930s by the Dutch cultural and educational policies known as Baliseering (Balinization) that aimed at ‘restoring’ and ‘preserving’ Balinese culture, tradition and religion to stem the spread of Islam and nationalism from neighbouring Java (J. Sidel 1997: 188). The traditions restored and preserved were largely invented, and served to strengthen the position of the pro-Dutch elite, proxies in the colonial indirect-rule approach to governance. Despite their constructed nature, these traditions were progressively internalized by the locals who came to believe that Bali was an island in which culture, religion and tradition blended into a
harmonious and peaceful coexistence (Howe 2006: 18-37). The idea of Bali *aman* was then promoted by a long list of anthropologists and artists\(^7\) and, over time, it became a constitutive element of Balinese identity, almost as something that could be displayed, performed, and sold (Picard 2003, 2008). It was a clear example of how a specific meaning making was favoured over others by the colonial state in Bali and affected other social fields. The ‘existence’ of ‘goods’ represented by the blurring of culture, tradition and religion was sanctioned by the introduction of the dual governance system of the *desa dinas* and *desa adat*, this latter renamed *desa pakraman* from 2001 (Warren 1993, 2007). *Desa dinas* are bestowed with administrative, secular authority; *desa pakraman* with religious, customary authority. This separation facilitated Balinese in viewing *adat*—real or invented traditions—as a form of ‘capital’ that contributes social support, economic wellbeing, aesthetic satisfaction and spiritual protection (Warren 2007: 178). The Bali *aman* idea and the adat capital became part of the foundation for the tourist industry that came to dominate the economy. They remain as such up to now (Picard 2003).

Robinson (1995)’s book, *The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali* called the bluff by providing a historically rich account of the political violence that in Bali has manifested itself along class, caste and ideological lines. In so doing, as noted by Winters (1997), Robinson challenged the interpretive hegemony of ‘culture’ in understanding Bali, and suggested a materialist perspective emphasizing class conflict. The book contributed in moving the

\(^{7}\) For a critical review of the large literature that contributed in constructing the Bali *aman* idea, see Boon (1976, 1977) and Vickers (1989).
academic discourse forward.\textsuperscript{75} But among most Balinese, the Bali \textit{aman} idea has persisted as an idyllic past they long for. Indeed, none among the Balinese residents interviewed was aware of, or acknowledged, the island’s violent past. Conversely, they all yearned for an unspecified past “when things were better,” “the island more prosperous” and “the Balinese more in touch with nature and God.”\textsuperscript{76} This ill-defined yearning is at the core of the \textit{ajeg} Bali discourse, ideology and movement, which first emerged in the late 1990s.

There is a growing literature on the fuzzy \textit{ajeg} Bali.\textsuperscript{77} Here suffice to note that it is fomented by real and perceived threats to Bali, its people and its \textit{adat} capital, brought by the ripple effects of globalisation and decentralisation. Above was noted how most Balinese are unhappy with how tourism-related resources are allocated. The \textit{ajeg} Bali movement conceptualized and developed this unhappiness into a list of threats that include those posed to the environment by unrestrained tourism, and those posed to the \textit{adat} capital by Bali’s exposure to global influences.\textsuperscript{78} The \textit{ajeg} discourse, however, stutters in wanting to maximize tourism and protecting the island’s natural resources and culture at the same time. This inherent contradiction is well-encapsulated in Schulte Nordholt (2007)’s

\textsuperscript{75} Useful critical references for this study that have benefitted from Robison’s influence are Howe (2006), Lewis and Lewis (2009), Picard (Picard 2003, 2011), Reuter (2005, 2011) and Schulte Nordholt (2007).

\textsuperscript{76} A noticeable exception is the current governor Bali governor Made Mangku Pastika who has, on several occasions, said that he is uncomfortable with pronouncements proclaiming Bali as a “heavenly island” or “The Island of Paradise.” He said that while many foreign visitors consider Bali as a “heaven” it is still an island plagued by many problems, endured to a great extent, by Bali’s poor. As quoted by Balidiscovery.com (2015a), he added that “I am embarrassed if Bali is called a ‘paradise’, because poverty, ignorance, unemployment and homes unsuitable for human habitation still prevail in many parts of the Island.”


\textsuperscript{78} The negative effects of mass tourism in Bali have attracted the attention of national and international media recently. See, for example, Bachelard (2013), De Suriyani (2014), Kelly (2013a, 2013b, 2014), Milne and Milne (2014) and Philip (2012).
words that the Balinese aim to turn Bali into an “open fortress”, and has led to two
vague and interrelated calls for action, well-distilled by MacRae (2009: 272-3).

The first calls is for the Balinese to strengthen their culture from within by
reinvigorating traditional institutions, practices and economic development. It is,
basically, a call that strengthens the relative value of the adat capital in Bali,
regardless of the veracity of the traditions that it claims to embody. This call has
been very successful and has led to adat capital—a form of cultural capital—and
the discourses, individuals and groups associated with it, rising to prominence. In
other words, it has turned adat capital into one of the most relevant forms of
capital in most social fields. The ajeg Bali, for example, is now an inescapable
‘concern’ for any Balinese politician. In such a way, adat capital has become
influential in regulating the struggle over localized power and resources, and to
accrue symbolic, social, political and economic capital. The ajeg Bali is thus a
clear example of how an immaterial form of capital can be parlayed into other
forms of power. It is also a clear example of how language and meaning making
are also sifted through the strategic selectivity that regulates state-society
relations.

The second call is for the Balinese to defend Bali against destructive outside
influences, which include Javanese Muslim migrants; the central government in
Jakarta and the large capital investments made in Bali by non-Balinese; and
‘Western’ or ‘foreign’ cultural influences such as drugs and prostitution (MacRae
2009: 272-3). This call is basically aimed at redistributing the tourism-related
wealth in favour of the Balinese via framing the struggles over resources within
abstract calls to preserve culture and tradition. It thus further strengthens the
discourse through which Balinesness and adat capital can be converted into
material forms of capital, while discourses and meanings critical of the *ajeg* Bali are marginalized. Gde Putra, a local activist, notes that the *ajeg* Bali extend to the rejection of any progressive view, whether political or artistic in nature. In his words:

> It is not only against the Javanese. It is a discourse and a politics that is also against the Balinese like me, those that criticise the culture. Because I cannot play *gamelan* and I like playing punk music, they say that I am a fake Balinese. Basically, the *ajeg* Bali is also against Balinese that look different or that do not support the status quo. If you criticise your culture, or talk about issues of gender, they assume that you are an atheist or a communist, and then you are attacked.\(^{79}\)

Some of the supporters of the *ajeg* Bali are driven by genuine concerns for the various plights of the island, whether it being water scarcity, pollution, commodification of the culture or similar.\(^{80}\) However, the way in which the discourse and the ideology have been politicized has led to a movement oozing with xenophobic and conservative undertones.

It is xenophobic because it ‘others’ the non-Balinese, and in the specifics of the three villages of reference for this study, it ‘others’ the non-native. It is conservative because it is based on a heightened sense of (a constructed) Hindu tradition that supports a view of society skewed along caste and patriarchal lines. In regards to the latter, recently the General Assembly of Customary Villages (*Majelis Utama Desa Pakraman*, MUDP), an important institution for all that is

\(^{79}\) Interview with Gde Putra, Sanur 6 December 2013

\(^{80}\) See the already cited literature on the *ajeg* Bali.
‘traditional’ in Bali, acknowledged the rights of women to inherit family property, entitlement rights to children’s custody and to obtain marital assets (Suriyani 2010a). However, the view of society that the ajeg Bali supports still does not give women the right to make important decisions in their families and communities, prevents them from being involved in community meetings in their villages (Suriyani 2010a), and discriminates against their accessing education, jobs and loans, for example (Suriyani 2012). At the same time, women are socially obliged to comply with hefty religious and ceremonial duties (Bagus 2010; Nakatani 2005).

The rise of coercive capital

From such a conservative basis, the 12 October 2002 terrorist attack that killed 202 people, mostly foreigners, in Kuta was the critical juncture that led to the securitization of the ajeg Bali and to rise of coercive capital in the local hierarchy. The attack was carried out by Javanese Muslims associated with the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group. In short, the ethnic-religious identity of the perpetrators, combined with the devastating effect the attack had on the local economy, led to the ajeg Bali morphing into a mengamankan Bali, or a discourse that emphasizes the need to ‘physically’ secure Bali. A second attack in 2005 strengthened the identification of the threat along ethnic-religious lines.

The mengamankan Bali thus signalled the rise of coercive capital as important in defending Bali, its culture and its people. It also led to much closer dialectical relations between the multilayered contestations over power and

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81 On a different perspective of the securitization of Bali see Lisle (2013).
resources, and policing. It meant that capitals, discourses and actors associated with ‘securing’ and ‘policing’ Bali—such as coercive capital and policing actors—became influential in mediating other social fields. Similarly to what has been described in regards to the adat capital, the ability to accrue coercive capital to ‘secure’ and ‘police’ Bali are now inescapable parts of the political rhetoric. At the 2008 gubernatorial elections, the winning pair Made Mangku Pastika and Anak Agung Puspayoga campaigned on a pro-ajeg Bali and pro-mengamankan Bali discourses. These discourses contained as its key campaign promise establishing an island-wide security system that meets international standards, and could create a safer island and rehabilitate the island's image as a world-class tourist destination (The Jakarta Post 2008). Similar rhetoric was employed in the 2013. Broadly, both elections demonstrated how important is for politicians to include policing actors in their broad coalitions.

In such a context, policing actors able to accrue coercive and adat capital have been favoured by the dominant coalitions. This strategic selectivity has thus reiterated the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ contraposition that characterises the broad political economy and has contributed in shaping a policing landscape in which non-locals are targeted and policing is seen as a means through which to access the spoils of the tourism-related industry. This has meant that the security function of policing is obfuscated by its political economy function. This is evident, for example, in the case of the Linmas, the pecalang, and the security-oriented Ormas Laskar Bali, Baladika and PBB.

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83 On the ajeg Bali and the election see also MacRae and Darma Putra (2007, 2008, 2009) and Hauser-Schäublin (2011).
6-4 – Linmas: bureaucratic capital and anti-poor migrant policing

Linmas are the main policing presence in Kuta, Legian and Seminyak. Administratively, Linmas are under the supervision of Satpol PP and their main source of power derives from the bureaucratic capital of being part of the state-recognised policing framework. This is converted into economic capital through the collection of compulsory security fees from all private houses, villas or business entities within the village of competence. Linmas officers tend to be recruited from the villages in which they operate, and the institution has been an important source of employment for local men most of whom are poorly educated. Non-locals can supposedly be recruited, but a clear preference is for native men. This implies a strengthening of the Balinese identity within the policing unit via the conversion of social capital into economic capital.

Linmas have a clear security function. The institution, and its officers, is well recognised throughout the territory and Linmas’ duties include patrolling the constituency and liaising with the residents and the police, if necessary. Their patrolling, in particular, is meant to deter crime and probably does so, although this is difficult to substantiate. Linmas officers are also often called upon to mediate in small disputes amongst residents. Most of the Balinese and expatriate residents interviewed had a positive view of Linmas’ role. However, the ripple effects of the ajeg-mengamankan Bali discourse have strongly shaped the policing

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84 Kuta has 31 Linmas officers, Legian 30 and Seminyak 22 (Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Badung 2013a: 40).
85 The legal bases of Linmas are to be regulated by forthcoming local government regulations (Primandari 2014).
86 Interview with Subrata, head of desa dinas of Legian. Legian 1 January 2014.
87 Ibis
priorities and practice of the Linmas in such a way that it partly obscures its security-related function.

Linmas patrolling is a pre-emptive policing practice. The institution, however, has two clear proactive policing priorities that target temporary residents (*pendatang*) and the homeless people and beggars (*gelandangan pengemis, Gepeng*). Each is nominally justified under Linmas’ security function, but this justification barely hides political and economic undertones.

*Pendatang* covers both the Balinese living away from their native village, and individuals hailing from elsewhere in Indonesia. Linmas identify the *pendatang* as a ‘security risk,’ but the reality is that *pendatang* are a source of income for the Linmas and a weak social group within Bali’s overall political economy. This was made clear by Subrata, head of *desa dinas* of Legian.

Subrata explained that Linmas’ basic monthly pay is IDR 1.5 million, but that their average take-home pay is about IDR 4.5 million. The difference is made up by the IDR 8,000 incentive Linmas officers receive for each *pendatang* they find without an up-to-date temporary residents’ identity card (*Kartu Identitas Penduduk Musiman, Kipem*). The Kipem is compulsory for every *pendatang*, whether Balinese or non-Balinese, and needs to be renewed regularly—i.e., every three months for non-Balinese and every six for Balinese.88 This is why, as Subrata explains, Linmas officers spend their time checking *pendatang* for their Kipem:

> We check who is late in renewing their Kipem, and who does not have a Kipem. [...] There are about 446 new *pendatang* each month; sometimes it...

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88 The cost to renew varies from *banjar* to *banjar*. The average, however, seems to be of about IDR 100,000 for non-Balinese and IDR 15,000 for Balinese.
reaches 1,000 *pendatang*, if we include the ones that need to extend their Kipem. [...] that is why they [the Linmas] really go after the *pendatang*. The main job for Linmas is to go around and check (people's) documents.89

This policing practice is not merely skewed against non-natives. It is also skewed in regards to class. Linmas only target low-income *pendatang*, while capital-owning *pendatang* are spared. A millionaire, ethnic-Chinese Javanese, owner of a five-star hotel in Seminyak and resident in Bali, remarked that she had never been asked to show her Kipem.90 Similarly, the Javanese partner of a European expatriate, both long-term residents in Legian, recounts how Linmas officers had told her that “you do not need to show your Kipem because you live in a villa.”91 A working-class, Javanese female, on the other hand, had a very different experience, worthy of printing in full:

I have been harassed many times. Once in particular, I remember that it was about 11pm, and I was about to fall asleep when I heard loud banging on my gate. I opened the door and saw five Linmas in their green uniforms standing outside my gate. There were also two *pecalang* in their customary uniform, and the *kelian* [the head of the *desa pakraman*] still sitting on his motorbike. The group also included one policeman in uniform. One of the Linmas demanded I show my Kipem. I presented it and while he was checking it, I was bombarded with questions, such as where my husband was; whether I slept alone at night; whether I felt lonely or not. One told me that “If you want company, we can provide it.” I felt disgusted, but when I confronted

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89 Interview with Subrata, head of *desa dinas* of Legian. Legian 1 January 2014.
90 Confidential interview, Seminyak 6 December 2013.
91 Confidential interview, Legian, 12 December 2013.
him by saying that what he asked is not related to the Kipem, he shouted back “What do you know, you woman! If you don’t like it (here), you can move back to Java.” The others joined in with similar insults. They returned several other times, always between midnight and 3am. I now feel scared, angry, and powerless. Some of my friends have had similar experiences. Single women are particularly targeted.92

*Pendatang* are asked to pay bribes, and there are allegations of policing actors demanding sexual favours from sex workers caught in the raids.93

The second policing priority of Linmas is the Gepeng. Again, these are seen as a security risk and as Subrata argues, they are rounded up because they “may potentially commit crime.”94 This pre-crime targeting is also nominally justified under Linmas’s security function, but the reality is that Gepeng are seen as harming Bali’s image as a tourist and conference destination. Beggars and the homeless caught in Kuta, Legian and Seminyak hail both from outside Bali (mostly Java and Madura) and from the Balinese districts of Bangli, Klungkung and Karangasem, the island’s poorest (Balidiscovery.com 2014d). This policing of the poor is incentivised at provincial level. Made Sukadana, head of Bali Satpol PP, said:

> We urge the district and the subdistricts and municipalities to make local regulations on beggars, giving them three months imprisonment when they are arrested for panhandling. Why do we want to do this? So that they will be deterred from begging in the future (Balidiscovery.com 2012e).

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92 Confidential interview, Denpasar 18 December 2013.
93 The author was not able to directly confirm this with sexual workers.
94 Interview with Subrata, head of *desa dinas* of Legian. Legian 1 January 2014.
Linmas, therefore, perform an important security function, but their policing role and practices are strongly affected by the multifaceted struggles over the spoils of tourism-related resources and by the ideology embodied by the ajeg-mengamankan Bali discourses. The key targets of Linmas are the non-native poor, whether pendatang or Gepeng, and this policing of the ‘other’ is structured within a system of incentives that works as a means to redistribute some of the tourism-related resources to poorly educated local men.

6-6 – Tradition and hoodlums: the forms of capital of the pecalang

Another important policing actor in Bali is the pecalang, the key policing actor under the desa pakraman. Pecalang members operate at banjar level and are staffed by local males handpicked by the adat council. Each of the banjar in Kuta, Legian and Seminyak has pecalang units. The pecalang is also recognised by Polri as part of its community policing system. Pecalang thus have social capital (community affiliation), bureaucratic capital (state-recognized role) and adat capital. This latter is their most relevant capital, but derives from a largely constructed genealogy that views them as the ‘traditional’ guards of Balinese culture and religion. This needs further elaboration.

None of the people interviewed could locate the origin of the pecalang. Some vaguely claimed that pecalang members were active during the Dutch period, others that they were guarding palaces in the pre-colonial kingdoms, while yet others said that they emerged during the New Order (see also Santikarma 2003b). Similarly vague in locating the origins of the pecalang is the booklet published by the Bali Department of Culture in 2000, in cooperation with the
Indonesia Hinduism Society (*Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia*, PHDI) and meant as the official source on the institution, on how its members should be recruited and should operate (Widnyani and Widia 2002: 31).

Through the mist, what is known is that *pecalang*-like actors played a ritualistic role during the New Order when they patrolled the streets during the holiday known as *nyepi*; a day when Balinese residents are forbidden to leave their homes, to cook or to light fires. The traditional guards would ensure that they observed the rules (ICG 2003b).

What is also known is that the first large-scale policing deployment of *pecalang* members dates back to October 1998, on the occasion of the founding congress of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*, PDI-P). In the immediate post-Suharto era, the PDI-P did not trust the state coercive apparatus and organised its own security force, recruiting from local gangs and dressing these young men in traditional attire. The *pecalang* was thus another example of how vigilantism mirrored political contestations.

What has happened more recently is that the process of decentralisation and the rise of the *ajeg* Bali movement led to the ‘traditional’ angle catching on, and to most villages in Bali establishing *pecalang* units, facilitated also by the provincial parliament recognizing in 2001 the *pecalang* as a ‘traditional security force’ (*satgas keamanan tradisional*), and by a set of political decisions that empowered the *desa pakraman*. These latter provided the funds and the economic justification for the *pecalang*, and are worth noting in more detail.

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95 This was *Peraturan daerah* (Perda) 3 2001.
The division of authority between *desa pakraman* and *desa dinas* goes back to the Dutch period, but the weight that each of the two asserts in sociopolitical dynamics has seesawed ever since. The Dutch introduced the division to stave off political discontent at the local level, but Suharto progressively subordinated the *desa adat* (*desa pakraman*) to the *desa dinas* (Reuter 2011: 65). Reformasi and decentralisation turned this situation upside down. In particular, the legislative autonomy allowed the Balinese provincial parliament to issue several provincial regulations that have juridified the *desa pakraman* to the extent that it has become the major source of law at the village level (Ramstedt 2012; 2014: 61 and 73).

This passage was crucial in the rise of *adat* capital and of the discourses, individuals, groups and institutions related to it. One example is how this juridification allowed the *desa pakraman* to gain full authority over village land, and how villages can now request a share of government income from tourist ‘objects’ such as temples located within their village (Reuter 2011: 65). They also demand payments from nearby hotels, provide credit, set up local businesses and attract investors (Reuter 2011: 65); and they have become the main recipient of provincial- and district-level government funding (Reuter 2011: 66). In 2013, for example, the Bali provincial government allocated IDR 100 million to each of the 1,480 *desa pakraman* (Pemerintah Provinsi Bali 2012). This shows how in decentralized Bali, institutions and individuals able to accrue *adat* capital are also able to convert this into a considerable amount of political and economic capital. Through this process, the language and ideology associated with *adat* and with the *desa pakraman* have become important in shaping power relations. In regards to policing, it has led to the motivation to establish *pecalang* units to ‘protect’ the village *adat* capital.
Thus seen, the genealogy of the pecalang has little to do with tradition. It faintly hangs on the patrolling during nyepi that villagers used to do, but is best understood as emerging from the convergence of forms of vigilantism endemic on the island, and the emergence of the ajeg Bali in post-authoritarian and decentralising Indonesia. This is reflected also in the policing practices of the pecalang.

Security function and thuggish practices of a less-than-equal actor

The pecalang police religion-related ceremonies and they are also routinely called upon by the police to help secure international events (Republika 2013; The Jakarta Post 2013b). Moreover, and among many other policing practices, they are included in a joint security task force that patrols parts of Kuta together with the police and the military (Erviani 2011) and they are also hired by political parties to secure rallies (G. Fauzi 2014; Gatranews 2015). Their security role is recognized by most of the Balinese and the expatriates interviewed. However, as it transpires, most of the pecalang policing is unrelated to their supposedly traditional role and is better explained as a ripple effect of the multilayered struggles over the spoils of tourism. Thus seen, the traditional-sacred role of the pecalang blurs into old patterns of rent-seeking practices.

There are several processes through which pecalang officers convert their adat capital into economic capital. In some cases, adat capital opens the door to business opportunities within the policing landscape. Gede is one example. He has been a senior pecalang member for several years. He is also a mid-rank member of the PBB Ormas. He lives in the banjar of Taman, which lies in Kerobokan, but operates in Seminyak. He admits that the status he has acquired from being a
pecalang, and his ability to draw from members of the PBB, has facilitated the step towards establishing an unregistered PSC that now provides security to a string of bars in Seminyak.\textsuperscript{96}

Made Sudhana is another example. He was the deputy head of the pecalang in the banjar of Basangkasa while also an active police officer. Once he retired in 2008, he became the head of the pecalang in that same banjar, as well as the banjar’s head of special units (satuan tugas, Satgas). Made Sudhana argues that his role as pecalang helped him to gain status (symbolic capital) and, eventually, a position as the chief of security of a four-star hotel in Seminyak.\textsuperscript{97}

In some other cases, however, members of the pecalang convert their adat capital into economic capital via illegal practices. Several sources said that pecalang act as guards for brothels; and provide protection for bars, nightclubs and illegal cockfighting meetings. They are also paid by five-star hotel owners to prevent local protest over land or labour issues, and join the police and Linmas in the raids to check Kipem (see also ICG 2003b: 2-10; Santikarma 2003b; The Jakarta Post 2002). Sources interviewed largely agreed that the pecalang involvement in illegal security practices has increased exponentially since the first Bali bombing—the conjectural point that led to the rise of the mengamankan Bali discourses. Bali resident, Guido Beretta argues that this is also reflected in the individuals that are now recruited as pecalang members:

Some twenty years ago the pecalang were recruited from the elderly, respected individuals of the banjar. If they asked you to do something, you listened to them. Now pecalang are rough, tattooed young males that spend

\textsuperscript{96} Interview with Gede, Seminyak, 22 November 2013.
\textsuperscript{97} Interview with Made Sudhana, Seminyak, 11 November 2013.
their day at the gym. They no longer ask you to do something. They demand it with arrogance. And it is often about money.\textsuperscript{98}

The MUDP has acknowledged that many pecalang members exceed their functions and misuse their authority and, in response, it has recently issued guidelines to regulate their code of conduct (Suriyani 2014). Thus seen, the security function of the pecalang in Kuta, Legian and Seminyak is obfuscated by a marked political economy function and the pecalang are not much different to other vigilante groups active in Indonesia that employ coercive force to access channels of resource distribution under the guise of some form of identity politics.\textsuperscript{99}

The pecalang is nonetheless a less than equal vigilante group. The key difference is that in Bali the pecalang is a highly regarded institution among most Balinese, who see it as a tangible example of the ajeg Bali ideology and a key institution in the defence of Bali’s culture and tradition. Most of the Balinese interviewed played down the pecalang’s thuggish practices and underlined instead the institution’s role in defending Bali’s culture. As Santikarma (2003b) astutely notes:

Rather than being demonised in the national and international press, as have so many other militant ‘security’ groups have been, especially those who

\textsuperscript{98} Interview with Guido Beretta, Sanur 22 December 2013. Several other sources held similar views.

\textsuperscript{99} The author did not have the opportunity to observe the pecalang in rural areas. However, according to conversations with Balinese residents hailing from inland villages, pecalang have a much more limited role in these villages where they are restricted, essentially, to religious ceremony-related duties. The ability of pecalang to accrue economic capital is thus much less pronounced in these contexts, although they are still able to accrue symbolic and social capital.
draw upon religion to legitimise themselves, they have been lauded. They have become a kind of ‘model militia.’

Overall, the pecalang is one policing actor among many in a highly contested and politicized policing field. The institution, and its members, benefit from the strategic selectivity that favours policing actors able to accrue coercive and adat capital, but operate largely as another means through which local, poorly educated men access some of the spoils of the tourism industry. Within the broader politics-policing dialectical, the pecalang is a product of the ajeg-mengamankan Bali discourses and a key element in perpetuating such discourses by allegedly providing security cloaked in tradition.

6-5 – Politics and coercive capital: the rise of the Ormas

The Laskar Bali, Baladika and PBB are the most established and active security-oriented Ormas in Bali, but not the only ones. The Ormas-cum-vigilantes-cum-militias phenomenon in Bali is characterized by fluid dynamics that see groups being established and dissolved in rapid succession. It is also characterized by a tendency towards smaller and smaller, localized groups. Hence, while Laskar Bali, Baladika and PBB have a wide reach, they contend for a role with smaller groups, claiming allegiance to a banjar or village.

_Laskar_ Bali, _Baladika_ and PBB share a similar structure: they are overseen by an executive committee and divided into semi-autonomous groups with field coordinators responsible for specific areas (koordinator lapangan, Korlap). Korlap is also conversationally used to indicate the geographic areas Ormas
operate in. *Baladika* has the most Korlap throughout the island, but *Laskar* Bali is the most prominent in Kuta, Legian and Seminyak.

The dialectical relation between the broad political economy and Ormas is clear. Ormas groups justify their role within the *mengamankan* Bali discourse, and have been influential in strengthening the pro-security political discourse of local elites. At the same time, the strengthening of such discourse has worked as justifier for Ormas involvement in policing. In such a way, Ormas are strongly affected, and partly affect the field of politics.

*Origin and source of power*

*Baladika* and PBB are offshoots of the *Laskar* Bali. The genealogy of the *Laskar* Bali is in the gangs and martial art groups close to the *puri Pemecutan* royal family of Denpasar and that have been active for decades. These coalesced into a more organised group in the late 1990s and took the ‘*Laskar* Bali’ name in 2001.100 *Laskar* Bali rose to relative prominence after the 2002 terrorist attack when it asserted a role in policing within the *mengamankan* Bali discourse.101 Ketut Rochineng, Secretary General of *Laskar* Bali, makes a direct link between the *ajeg* Bali and the *Laskar* Bali policing by arguing that “without the shield of the *Laskar* Bali there would be many attacks intended to destroy Bali.”102

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100 Interview with Ketut Rochineng, Secretary General of *Laskar* Bali. Denpasar 9 December 2013.

101 Interestingly, calls for the group to play a more central role in security also came from NGOs activists. Viebeke Lengkong, a veteran human-rights activist, recalls that: “After the [2002] bombs, insecurity was so high and the place was so crazy that we helped Agung Alit [the chairman of the *Laskar* Bali] and his friends to get organised. He came here with ten people, to my house, and I told him “you need to organise yourself, you need to register so your group does not get infiltrated.” I donated IDR 14 million to help him register the *Laskar* Bali.” Interview with Viebeke Lengkong, Seminyak, 12 December 2013. Viebeke has since become more critical of the *Laskar* Bali and the other Ormas, but still recognises their policing role.

102 Interview with Ketut Rochineng, Secretary General of Laskar Bali, Denpasar 9 December 2013.
PBB was established in 2002, but started playing a more prominent role in 2005, while Baladika was established in 2004. Both PBB and Baladika have also claimed a role within the mengamankan Bali discourse. For example, Made Muliawan Arya, vice president of PBB, states that the aim of PBB is to call young people in Bali to unite to protect and save Bali from those who do not like the island. He adds that “we have nothing in Bali but our culture, and we need to protect that.”\(^{103}\)

Ormas’ coercive capital is what has allowed this category of policing actor to gain a degree of legitimacy within a cross-class segment of Balinese society. Balinese are actually split on Ormas. While many of those interviewed lamented the rising role of the Ormas, an equal number argued that Ormas are needed to keep Bali safe; some even said that “Muslim Ormas would invade Bali if we did not have our own Ormas”. The latter argument builds on the ‘othering’ of the Muslim threat and was cemented in late 2013 when the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), a militant Islamic group most active in Java, threatened to land in Bali to prevent the ‘sinful’ holding of the Miss World pageant competition. The Laskar Bali, Baladika and PBB jumped at the opportunity to state their willingness to confront the FPI. The diatribe gained some media attention in Bali and further strengthened the Ormas role and symbolic capital (Inilah.com 2013; Mahbub 2013; Ningtyas 2013).

Besides the coercive capital supposedly at the service of the mengamankan Bali discourse, Ormas benefit from a small quantity of adat capital.

Ormas have constructed a traditional-religious side to their role by presenting references to Hindu mythology in their logos. Laskar Bali’s logo is the

\(^{103}\) Interview with Made Muliawan, PBB vice president, Seminyak 25 January 2014.
trishula, or ‘three-pronged spear’ in Sanskrit, and the weapon wielded by the Hindu god Shiva. Laskar Bali says it symbolises the power to self-defend; to defend Bali and the community.\textsuperscript{104} Baladika draws on old Hindu notions of the sacred but divine warrior (Bachelard 2014), while PPB identifies with the Moksala, another weapon linked to Hindu mythology and to Dewa Rudra in particular. PBB argues that it symbolises how the group defends justice and the righteous, and calls on the Balinese youth to unite.\textsuperscript{105}

But, Ormas’ appeal draws also from parallel and contradictory discourses of modernity, consumerism and machismo. Body-builder-type physiques are a recognizable trait of Ormas members, and a reminder that coercive capital is of paramount importance. Ormas members, moreover, endorse a lifestyle that includes alcohol, drugs and violence. The combination of the coercive capital with the (rhetorical) sacred and of the profane, has struck a chord with young Balinese who see Ormas as the ‘kiri Bali’ or the left, alternative face, of the pro-Bali, pro-Hindu movement.\textsuperscript{106}

Finally, and probably most importantly, the social capital Laskar Bali, Baladika and PBB have accrued rests on their proven ability to accrue economic capital for its members. Indeed, senior members of Laskar Bali and PBB interviewed for this study stated that the main objective of their organisation was to provide work for (economic capital), and restore the pride of (symbolic capital),

\textsuperscript{104} Laskar Bali statute, article 17

\textsuperscript{105} Telephone communication with Putu Gde Mahardika, vice chairman of PBB, 7 November 2014.

\textsuperscript{106} Interview with Gde Putra, NGO activist, Sanur 6 December 2013. The author confirmed this view during informal discussions with several Balinese teenagers.
the many young unemployed. Mantarsa, a member of *Laskar Bali*, confirms that joining the Ormas has been beneficial for him, at many levels. In his words:

I was nobody before joining the *Laskar* Bali Legian Korlap, and people mocked me. But now people respect me. If I do not have money and I ask people for money for food, they always give it to me, while before they used to close their door on me. That is because of *Laskar* Bali; because of respect, status. However now I do not need money. Thanks to *Laskar* Bali I have several jobs and I earn about IDR 8 million a month.

Thus seen, Ormas groups are another vehicle for the poorly educate males to access some of the tourism-related resources.

*Straddling policing and criminality*

Ormas’ role in policing Kuta, Legian and Seminyak is controversial. Similar to the *pecalang*, Ormas are routinely asked by the police to secure international events and to contribute to the day-to-day policing of the island (Beritabali.com 2013; Rhismawati 2014). On some occasions they wear state-like authority. Ormas also constitute the main recruitment pool for most of the small-to-medium-scale registered and unregistered PSCs in Bali; and they control the security market for the night-time entertainment industry. Ormas thus have a security function, whether formal or informal; directly or by proxies. However,

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108 Interview with Mantarsa, Legian 19 January 2014.

109 Outside of Legian, Kuta and Seminyak Ormas, especially the *Laskar* Bali, also control the protection racket of small business owners. Interview with a Korlap leader of *Laskar* Bali, Denpasar 9 November 2013.
Ormas’ policing practices often take place in a space in which legality blurs with illegality.

Restaurants and bars owners explain how Ormas impose their staff as security guards with the implicit threat that refusing to employ them would lead to problems. A French national, owner of a several restaurants in Seminyak, remarked that “it is not a racket because the staff does come to work. But it is still a forced arrangement.”\textsuperscript{110} In some cases, Ormas members working as security officers in nightclubs use their position to gain control over drug dealing within the establishment.\textsuperscript{111} Ormas also engage in violent credit-recovery activities, often against expatriate residents.

Susi Johnston recalls that up to 100 Ormas members surrounded her house, walked in, smashed furniture, and changed her locks.\textsuperscript{112} The Ormas members were recruited by a nominee owner of her property who was trying to claim it from her. “Ormas members were paid IDR 250,000 a day each; I saw them being paid,” she recalled.\textsuperscript{113} Johnston argued that Ormas are not loyal and that when there is a ‘business opportunity’ they collaborate. “In my case, members of Laskar Bali, Baladika and PBB were all involved.” The Johnston case, on-going at the time of writing, is also instructive to further elucidate on the ties connecting Ormas and police officers: In Johnston’s words:

Members of the police were also in the house in plain clothes. I recognised them. They were not only complicit; they were involved from the very

\textsuperscript{110} Confidential interview with business owner, Seminyak 14 November 2013.
\textsuperscript{111} A senior Ormas member confirmed that individuals within his group “may” be involved in drug dealing in the place where they work.” He was adamant that this is not condoned by the Ormas leadership. Confidential interview, Seminyak 3 January 2014.
\textsuperscript{112} Interview with Susi Johnston, Canggu, 8 January 2014.
\textsuperscript{113} Interview with Susi Johnston, Canggu, 8 January 2014.
beginning. It was evident when I went to the local police station to report the fact and they refused to act. They were obviously aware of what was happening and involved in the possible spoils.\textsuperscript{114}

Johnston’s is not an isolated case (Bachelard 2014; Cassrels 2013; Riera 2013). Explanations of how Ormas are able to straddle the policing-crime divide need to account for their role within the broader alliances contesting for political power.

\textit{Politics and coercive capital}

It has been explained that Ormas have benefitted from the rise of coercive capital. But they have also benefited greatly from the convergence of interests with local political elites contesting for local state power. These relations have been crucial in granting Ormas a degree of legitimacy and sheltering them from possible police harassment.

Politicians across the divide have called on Ormas to partake in policing. This has contributed to broadening the societal acceptance of Ormas and shaping the field of policing in such a way that Ormas are considered legitimate actors. The benefit for politicians is that they are seen as taking security seriously, something that is indispensable in Bali’s field of politics. Ormas’s coercive capital, and the alleged grassroots appeal and reach that they claim to have (social capital), have also turned Ormas into attractive coalition partners for local engaged in electoral politics. \textit{Laskar} Bali and \textit{Baladika} have been particularly active in pursuing political alliances. These are shaped by personal ties, rather than party or ideological lines.

Laskar Bali’s founder and chairman, Agung Alit, hails from the puri Pemecutan royal family of Denpasar. This family has historically been close to the Golkar party, the former political vehicle of Suharto (on Golkar see Tomsa 2008). When established, Laskar Bali’s leadership thus was loosely associated with Golkar (Schulte Nordholt 2007: 405-6). Baladika, on the other hand, was established in 2004 as factions within Laskar Bali became dissatisfied with how money was distributed within the group and broke away.115 With Laskar Bali loosely associated with Golkar, Baladika veered towards the PDI-P. This was strengthened as Baladika attracted many members of the Forum of the Concerned Citizens of Denpasar (Forum Peduli Denpasar, FPD), a pro-ajeg Bali social-group-cum-Ormas that had been active since the 1999 elections in support of the PDI-P party and of the PDI-P mayor of Denpasar Anak Agung Puspayoga.116 Puspayoga, major from 2000 until 2008, was also close to the puri Satria royal family, the historical rivals of the puri Pemecutan.

The politicization of Ormas increased with the first direct election for governor held in Bali in 2008. The intense competition for votes meant that dominant elite groups favoured policing actors that had also the ability to garner votes, or so they claimed. In the run-up to the election, Laskar Bali sided with Made Mangku Pastika, the former Bali chief-of-police between 2003 and 2005, while Baladika strengthened its alliance with Puspayoga. As it happened, Pastika

115 Confidential interview, Denpasar 7 January 2014.
116 FPD’s stated vision and mission was to enhance the security and unity of Denpasar. The group had its origin in the criminal gang known as Poisonous Army (Armada Rancun) active in Denpasar in the 1970s and 1980s. In exchange of the FPD support for Puspayoga, the group was given the green light to use Ubung, the city’s busiest bus terminal, to secure payments from drivers. Although still nominally active, FPD has been dormant for years and many members are now active in Baladika (Bali Post 2002; ICG 2003b: 10; Schulte Nordholt 2007: 405-6).
and Puspayoga were paired in a ticket under the PDI-P and the two Ormas found themselves on the same side of the political barricade.

The convergence of interests between the two Ormas and the two politicians is clear. The Pastika-Puspayoga pair was a strong supporter of the *ajeg* Bali and of the *mengamankan* Bali discourses and, as noted above, their key campaign promise was to establish an island-wide security system (The Jakarta Post 2008).

For Pastika and Puspayoga the association with the two Ormas was another brick in the wall of their *mengamankan* Bali political discourse, and another vehicle to access votes through Ormas’ network (social capital) or intimidation (coercive capital). For the two Ormas, the association with Pastika and Puspayoga was a ticket to a legitimate policing role and shelter from police harassment.

Pastika-Puspayoga won by a landslide and, unsurprisingly, their term in office coincided with the period in which Ormas’ role in policing was strengthened and legitimized. Indeed, it was during this period that Ormas in general, and *Laskar* Bali and *Baladika* in particular, grew in size, confidence and reach. Several sources mentioned how Ormas were hardly mentioned or known in Bali prior to the Pastika-Puspayoga term, and how they have since become popular. Clear examples of the increasingly high profile of the Ormas are the street posters the various Ormas regularly use to commemorate festivities, mark anniversaries or simply as a sign of territorial presence.

However, the enmity between *Laskar* Bali and *Baladika* never subsided and the two Ormas continued to clash over control of territory and influence. In the

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117 On the *ajeg* Bali and the election see also MacRae and Darma Putra (2007, 2008, 2009).

118 This change was also noted by the author who returned to Bali for fieldwork after a three year absence.

119 Interview with Ketut Rochineng, Denpasar 9 December 2013 and confidential interview with *Laskar* Bali Korlap leader, Seminyak 18 December 2013.
field of politics, the rivalry re-emerged in 2011 as Pastika and Puspayoga started positioning for the 2013 election in which both ran for the top chair (Wayan 2012).

The election campaign was, once again, framed within the *ajeg* Bali and the *mengamankan* Bali discourses, and presented clear alliances between Pastika and *Laskar* Bali, and between Puspayoga and *Baladika* (Metrobali 2013; Vivanews 2013). It turned out to be an extremely closely contested race, ultimately won by Pastika by a 996-vote margin, after the Constitutional Court rejected a lawsuit filed by the PDI-P (Erviani 2013b; Erviani and Juniarta 2013). The *Laskar* Bali distinguished itself for the concerted and, rather surprisingly, cohesive effort in support of Pastika exemplified by the unprecedented step of expelling a Korlap leader, Nyoman Suwanta, who had aligned himself with Puspayoga.\(^{120}\)

Pastika’s victory led to clear benefits for the *Laskar* Bali within the field of policing, where it has since risen to being an almost *de facto* arm of the local government’s coercive apparatus. As the secretary general of the *Laskar* Bali, Ketut Rochinen, explained:

> When there is an international event, such as a World Trade Organisation meeting, a Miss World competition, or an APEC meeting, the *Laskar* Bali and the police work together. But when there is trouble, the police are the first line and *Laskar* Bali is the second line. However, when there is anarchic behaviour, such as demonstrations, *Laskar* Bali will be at the front to stop it.\(^{121}\)

\(^{120}\) Interview with Ketut Rochineng, secretary general of *Laskar* Bali. Denpasar 9 December 2013 and confidential interview with *Laskar* Bali Korlap leader, Seminyak 18 December 2013.

\(^{121}\) Interview with Ketut Rochineng, secretary general of *Laskar* Bali. Denpasar 9 December 2013.
Laskar Bali members were deployed alongside the police to control the anti-globalisation protests during the WTO meeting held in Bali in December 2013, and to contain protests by a coalition of NGOs opposing Pastika’s plan to develop the marine area of Benoa (Bali Post 2013).

The association with Pastika has thus allowed the Laskar Bali to accrue social, political and symbolic capital useful in strengthening its overall role in policing and in glossing over its illegal activities. At the same time, the association with Laskar Bali has allowed Pastika to accrue coercive capital deployable in a manner that is unaccountable and strictly linked to political aims. In such a way, Ormas have also been a means through which local politicians have mediated the constraints of the process of democratisation that now prevent the deployment of the police for political reasons.

Ormas groups are thus another example of how policing actors are embedded in broader sociopolitical alliances and are a means through which local, poorly educated men access some of the spoils of tourism. It also shows how the field of policing is also an important site for contestations over the broader political economy.

6-8 – Conclusion

In this chapter PEPP has provided an analysis of the dialectical relations between politics and policing in the main touristy villages of Bali: Kuta, Legian and Seminyak. This has disclosed that multilayered struggles over the spoils of the tourism-related industry have been channelled within a conservative and xenophobic discourse that goes back to colonial constructed traditions, and to an

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122 Witnessed by the author.
invented idea of Bali as a ‘paradise.’ This channelling has contributed to the rise of coercive and adat forms of capital to become the most relevant capital. Dominant sociopolitical groups have thus favoured policing actors that can accrue these forms of capital. The pecalang and the security-oriented Ormas are the clearest examples of this dynamic. The policing landscape that has developed has clear winners and losers.

Among the winners are the conservative political elites that have monopolized the political debate around the notion of security; the wealthy residents who benefit from the blurring of the legal and illegal divide in an extremely commodified policing landscape, and the natives of the villages of Kuta, Legian and Seminyak who are spared the nastiest side of a policing biased in regards to ethnicity and class. Also benefitting from the policing landscape are the poorly educated young males who through the Linmas, the pecalang and the Ormas, have had the opportunity to tap into the wealth generated by tourism.

The key losers are the low-income migrants hailing from other parts of Bali or Indonesia. This socioeconomic group is targeted and exploited with little or no means of recourse. Women have also been penalized. The inherent gender-bias of the ajeg Bali movement is reflected in the field of policing via the hegemony of male policing actors, the masculine, aggressive connotation of the predominant policing practices, and the neglect of the private sphere as an area that needs policing, despite the on-going high level of domestic violence (Suriyani 2010b, 2010c, 2013; Winarti 2013).

For the reasons already stated in the previous chapters, the insights summarized here could not have been provided by applying the existing plural-policing paradigms or theoretical frameworks.
CHAPTER 7

The political economy of policing morality in Islamising Indonesia

This chapter focuses on the broad struggle over the field of Islam in Indonesia and shows that the policing of morality carried out by some Islamic groups is one of the means through which a conservative coalition strives to affect state-society relations. It also shows, however, how the strategic selectivity mediates which Islamic policing actor is embedded in the conservative coalition.

7-1 – Introduction

Islam matters in Indonesia well beyond its religious precincts. At least 88 per cent of Indonesians consider themselves Muslims, according to the 2010 census, but Islamic capital has risen to prominence in most social fields. As explained below, it affects education, banking, pop-culture and politics, among others.

The field of Islam in Indonesia is, however, a contested field with two broad coalitions contesting for power. While these coalitions defy strict dichotomies and easy grouping, at its simplest, they can be understood as one liberal-orientated coalition and one illiberal-conservative alliance.

The liberal-orientated alliance espouses an inclusive understanding of Islam, favours the separation of religion and state practices, and places ideologies associated with liberalism at the core of state-society relations. These include protection of human rights and pluralism, and are politicized across fields behind
calls for the supremacy of the law, freedom of religion and the upholding of *Pancasila*. This group favours a pluralist political system and liberal-economic approach with less state intervention.

The conservative alliance, on the other hand, espouses an exclusivist understanding of Islam, places religion at the centre of state-society relations and promotes Islam as the only solution to the multiple crises facing the country: religious, cultural and political (Sirry 2013: 110). The religious underpinning of such an ideology is politicized across fields through what Hadiz (2013) calls ‘new Islamic populism.’ This has emerged in recent decades in most of the Muslim world as part of the broader populist responses to the contradictions of neoliberal, globalized capitalism, and operates by mobilizing a cross-class constituency in struggles over control of the state (Hadiz 2013: 125 and 33). This alliance is weary of plural political systems and is, in principle, opposed to liberal economic policies and to the withering of the state.

The contestation over Islam has also strongly affected, and is partly affected by, the policing of morality. The dialectical relations between the contestations over Islam and the policing of morality is the focus of this chapter. PEPP’s analysis discloses three key findings:

*First*, the policing of morality is one means through which the conservative alliance contests for power within the broader struggle over Islam.

*Second*, these dialectical relations are mediated by a strategic selectivity that favours those policing actors policing morality in a manner that is unthreatening to the elite groups. Here this is explained via the case study of the Islamic Defenders’ Front (*Front Pembela Islam*, FPI).
Third, beyond religion, the convergence of interest between the conservative groups and the FPI has material benefits for both.

These findings are substantiated in three more sections.

Section 7.2 explains the broad political economy of Islam. In particular, it takes an historical approach to explain how Islamic capital has risen to prominence in Indonesia.

Section 7.3 delves more on the struggle over the field of Islam in contemporary Indonesia and explains how the conservative coalition has lately gained a relative edge.

Section 7.4 explains how the policing of morality fits within the broader political economy of Islam. In particular, it focuses on the FPI and explains how the group policing of morality feeds from, and contributes to, the conservative turn; why the FPI is sought after by the conservative elite groups; and who benefits from the FPI policing.

7-2 – The political economy of Islam: an historical overview

Scholars have traced the gestation of the rise of Islamic capital in Suharto’s approach to the religion.123 Suharto depoliticized Islam, but he concurrently encouraged Muslim piety. This stifled political Islam, but led to the mushrooming of Muslim associations that came to be centres for discussion on politics and public morality. Hefner (2000) termed this facet of Islam as ‘civil’ Islam to indicate its role as a source of ethical and cultural guidance. The result was that Islamic capital gained a relatively high standing within Indonesia’s social context. Put differently, Islam mattered, although not in the field of politics.

Islamic capital became even more central from the late 1980s when Suharto coddled Islamic groups to stave off calls for change from disenfranchised segments of the military and from the emerging educated, urban middle class. Examples of this new polity are the promulgation of the education law and the religious justice law. The first gave a more central position to Islam within the curriculum, while the second granted new powers to the religious courts, thus raising their status within the judiciary system. Suharto’s regime also became a patron for Islamic activities and infrastructure, and Suharto himself became adept at showing his Islamic faith. This included his well-publicized, first trip to Mecca in 1993, and the adding of Mohammad to his name (Lee 2004: 96). The rising importance of Islamic capital—and of the associated discourses, logics, institutions, individuals and groups—was further exemplified with the establishment of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI), a state institution that allowed members of the new Muslim middle class to access state resources (Hefner 1993; Liddle 1996).

In the late Suharto years, Islam also became a means to politicize the masses. The processes of industrialisation and urbanisation, favoured by Suharto from the 1970s, led to a progressive swelling of the proletariat in urban and peri-urban settings. These societal groups, however, grew disaffected with the limits on social mobility imposed by the regime (Hadiz and Khoo 2011). In the absence of left-wing political forces, outlawed by the regime, Islam became a key ideology behind which calls for social justice were articulated. Sidel (2007 [2006]: 52) puts this nicely when he notes that “the underclass was available for mobilisation not
as a proletariat of the PKI, but as the *Ummat* (people, nation) to those that claimed to represent Islam."

One example of this emerging Islamic-tinted class struggle is the dynamics that led to the Tanjung Priok riots in which the arrest of a local Muslim leader was the spark for disenfranchised members of the middle and lower class to descend onto the streets and call for political change (Hadiz 2010a; Raillon 1993). It ended up in tragedy with up to 200 people killed, but shows how Islam was politicised across social fields, and how Islamic capital become progressively important in mediating social relations.\(^{124}\)

Overall, the rise of Islamic capital owes to its religious underpinning, but also to how Islam has been used instrumentally by individuals and groups in their quest for political power and resources over the decades.

7-3 – The political economy of contemporary Islam

The weight of Islamic capital continued to grow post-Suharto. This is because on the one hand, the increased pace of modernization left disoriented city-dwellers open to the comfort provided by religion, while on the other, the more open sociopolitical sphere facilitated the articulation of political aspirations under the

\(^{124}\) The riots took place on 12 September 1984. The spark was the arrest of a local Muslim leader, but the swelling of anger that sent demonstrators onto the streets was linked to the frustration of the new urban middle and lower classes over the glass ceiling imposed by the regime on social mobility. Amir Biki, a key agent in the demonstrations, personified these frustrations. Amir was a former student activist who had supported the Suharto regime, as well as an entrepreneur linked to the state oil company, Pertamina. For a long period, he was associated with the New Order. His turning was due to the New Order’s favourable treatment of ethnic-Chinese businessmen. Locally, Amir was well respected for his track record in business but also because of his religious zealously. In particular, he had grown a reputation for organising Koranic lectures with an anti-government tone. The Tanjung Priok riots took political tones when, on the eve of the riots, local teenagers were invited to a Koranic recitation during which Amir attacked the government on issues of expropriation of land, birth control and the bill on Ormas that was about to oblige all organisations to insert *Pancasila* into their articles of association. When many descended onto the streets, therefore, the call to free the Muslim leader was intertwined with calls for social justice. Up to 200 people may have died as the police fired on the protesters. Amir was one of the first to fall (Hadiz 2010a; Raillon 1993).
guise of Islam. This *islamization* trend is widely acknowledged, and is affecting virtually every social field. Indeed, as Fealy and White argue, Islam has risen to play an important role in reaching into and shaping the lives of Indonesia’s Muslims in various ways. In their (2008: 2-3) words:

Some don traditional Islamic dresses, buy only *halal* products, put their money in Sharia accounts, log on to Islamic websites, observe their voluntary prayers and engage in charitable work for Islamic organisations. Others wear Western-style clothing or the latest Muslim fashion, watch television broadcasts of their favourite preachers, take part in mass religious ceremonies, make pilgrimages to the burial sites of Islamic saints and buy Islamic arts to display in their homes and workplace. Some activists seek to strengthen the role of Islam in the state and society through laws and regulations and place great emphasis on the need to guard Islamic morality [...] Others engage in intellectual discourse, challenging traditional interpretations of Islamic teaching.\(^{125}\)

In the field of education, for example, the integrated Islamic school (*sekolah Islam terpadu*) have expanded immensely with the full-day boarding school system (Noorhaidi Hasan 2009). The sheer volume of Islamic-themed movies, music and books now flooding the market shows also that there is a growing interest in all that is Islamic in the field of pop-culture and literature (Bev 2008; Hoesterey and Clark 2012; Muzakki 2008a, 2008b). The field of electoral politics has not been immune.

\(^{125}\) The various chapters of this edited volume offer a wealth of information in support of this general trend.
Islamic and Muslim-based parties have been only marginally successful in achieving electability in democratic Indonesia. At the 2014 legislative election, for example, the main four such parties—the PKS, the PPP, the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional*, PAN) and the National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, PKB)—garnered just under 30 percent of the vote overall (Fukuoka and Thalang 2014: 232). It was even worse in 2009 when they managed a total of 24.1 percent of the votes. Despite these meagre results, Islamic capital and its associated discourses, symbolisms and rhetoric, among others, have become important factors in the struggle that shapes the field of politics. Even more so, Islamic capital has become a commodity that no politicians or political party can do without. It is undoubtedly the most relevant capital in Indonesia and a key element of the strategic selectivity that mediates access to state power and resources. This clearly takes Islam beyond religious concerns and places it at the core of state-society relations. Two important ripple effects are discernible.

At one level, the rise of Islamic capital has blurred the distinction between Islamic parties and secular parties. In today’s Indonesia secular parties have adopted some kind of ‘nationalist–religious’ platform (Platzdasch 2009) in what Sukma (2009: 328) has described as the process of “mainstreaming Islam into the heart of Indonesia’s politics.” Also, all the main secular parties—the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*, PDI-P), Golkar and the Democrat Party (*Partai Demokrat*)—have an Islamic wing. The PDI-P, for example, set up a *Baitul Muslimi* (the house of the faithful) to promote Islamic education and assist members that want to travel to Mecca, and the Democrat Party established the *Nurussalam Dhikir* (the light of peace council) to
organise Islamic events (Hwang 2013: 92). More broadly, politicians have been extremely wary of being seen as anti-Islam. As Tanuwidjaja (2010: 37) notes:

In democratic societies such as Indonesia, in which access to power depends on the support of the people, elites have to accommodate the demands and aspirations of the people. As the electorate becomes more concerned with religious issues, elites have to be more accommodative towards them. The result is the persistent, if not increasing influence, of religion in Indonesian politics.

At another level, the rise of Islamic capital has also increased the degree of contestation as to what kind of Islam Indonesia should follow and what signifier Islamic capital should carry. It was briefly introduced above that a liberal-oriented alliance and a conservative-oriented alliance are contesting to shape the orientation of Islam and hence of state-society relations. Members of the progressive group are found within Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s largest traditionalist and modernist Muslim organisations, respectively, \(^{126}\) as well as in most political parties. There are also progressive academics and numerous civil society groups, such as the Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL), the Pesantren and Community Development Association (Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat, P3M), the Emancipatory Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Emansipatoris, JIE) and the Progressive Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Progresif, JIP) (see also Raillon 2011: 92; Soguk 2010: 180; Wahid 2011).

\(^{126}\) For a background on the NU see Fealy and Barton (1996). On Muhammadiyah see Federspiel (1970) and Fuad (2004).
Conservative elements are also found in most Islamic organisations and within most political parties. PKS and PPP remain particularly conservative in outlook, as does the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), a partly state-funded institution dealt with below.

In the past decade, the conservative coalition has gained a relative upper hand, leading to what some scholars have defined the ‘conservative turn’ (van Bruinessen 2013). This has had a clear effect not only on the religious meaning attached to Islamic capital, but also in the strategic selectivity that favours one group in accessing state power and resources.

*The conservative turn*

The clearest example of the conservative turn is the rise of conservative figures within some of the country’s main Islamic organisations. The MUI is a case in point, although not the only one.127

The MUI is a partly state-funded institution influential in setting the Islamic discourse in the country. It is meant to represent the full landscape of Islamic organisations, but is not a unitary block. It is a field in itself with currents, alliances and struggles over power and influence. However, from 2000, the rise to senior positions within the MUI of elements hailing from the very conservative Islamic People’s Forum (Forum Umat Islam, FUI), and the Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), has meant that the institution has taken on conservative tints (Ichwan 2013: 62-3; Platzdasch 2011: 8).

The conservative turn of the MUI has been an important factor in shaping the overall conservative discourse in Indonesia. Beyond religion, it has also had

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127 Conservatives have also taken senior positions within NU and Muhammadiyah, although to lesser degrees (Diani 2006; Guharoy 2009; Sahrasad 2006).
important consequences for how resources are accessed and distributed. This includes the MUI itself.

The MUI was established during the Suharto era to co-opt segments of the Islamic community, but has taken a much more independent approach since reformasi. Democratisation has also brought a level of uncertainty, as well as some possibility in regards to funding channels for the institution that is only partly funded by the state. It is within this context that the MUI has banked on its Islamic capital to proposition itself as the representative of the ummah (Islamic community), and as an indispensable institution in mediating state-ummah relations. The conservative turn meant that the MUI increased its influence in the field of Islam and beyond. Former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, for example, identified the MUI as the representative of the ummah and favoured its political reach (Platzdasch 2011: 8). Six months into his first term, he said:

We want to place MUI in a central role in matters regarding the Islamic faith, so that it becomes clear what the difference is between areas that are the preserve of the state and areas where the government or state should heed the fatwa from the MUI and ulama (Setara Institute 2010: 114).

He then reinforced the MUI’s mandate in 2007 by adding that:

The MUI issues fatwas. The president cannot issue a fatwa. But after a fatwa is issued, the tools of the state can do their duty. Hopefully our cooperation will deepen in the future….We must all take strict measures against deviant beliefs (ICG 2008: 9).

128 For background on the MUI, see Hasyim (2011) and Ichwan (2005, 2013).
Yudhoyono also included MUI chairman, Ma’ruf Amin, in the Presidential Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden, DPA), thus further granting political capital to the MUI and strengthening its influence in policymaking.

The Islamic capital the MUI has accrued since *reformasi* has been converted into economic capital with the institution extending its influence into matters of Islamic finances, Islamic insurance, the certification of *halal* products—foods and other products permissible for Muslims to eat or drink under Islamic law—and the pilgrimage to Mecca (Lindsey 2012). This is reflected in a range of regulatory changes that have institutionalized the MUI *fatwa* as a form of quasi-legislation for the Islamic community (Lindsey 2012: 259). Such a role has brought a huge increase in the MUI sources of income, with MUI members now sitting in well-remunerated bodies linked to Islamic finance organisations, and the MUI being entitled to charge a fee to businesses seeking *halal* certification (Lindsey 2012: 205; I. Wilson 2008: 205).

The conservative turn has also benefitted the conservative elites both at national and local levels.

In general, the conservative trend is conducive to Indonesia’s ongoing oligarchy system (Chapter 5). Oligarchs are resistant to specific forms of change, in particular those aimed at privatisation of state assets, and broadly oppose a liberal, pluralistic political system. As explained in Chapter 5, their approach to neoliberal economic policies is contradictory and mediated by practices that favour their harnessing of the advantages of capitalist development.

The conservative turn also strengthened the hands of conservative Islamist parties in the horse-trading that characterizes the allocation of state resources at
central and local government levels. For parties such as PKS and PPP it is vital to
obtain the control of some state ministries as the resources deriving from these are
essential to maintain the patronage system their support base is built upon
(Hamayotsu 2013). It is uncontroversial to argue that their ability to consistently
being allocated ministries would be reduced in a more liberal, progressive
Indonesia.

At the local level, the conservative trend has led to unholy alliances between
local politicians and conservative Islamic groups, with the first appealing to the
latter through the implementation of Sharia regulations in exchange for support
during elections (Buehler 2008, 2011, 2014a). These Sharia-inspired laws concern
issues of morality—dress code for women, gambling and the selling of alcohol—
and have been enacted mostly in districts where the legislative assemblies are
dominated by secular parties (Bush 2008; M. Crouch 2009a; Noordhaidi Hasan
2007). Hence, they are clearly less about religious fervour and more about the
commodification of Islam for political purposes.

One of the means through which the conservative elites have gained the
relative upper hand is via embedding in their coalition radical, militant Islamic
groups bent on policing morality. This is mediated by the strategic selectivity that
places Islamic capital alongside an acceptance of the existing power structure, as
explained below.

**7-4 – The FPI and the political economy of policing morality**

Policing morality under the guise of Islam is not, in itself, sufficient for being
embedded into the conservative coalition. Indeed, the Indonesian government—
supported by both the liberal and the conservative coalitions—has a history of opposing radical Islamic groups.

For example, the government and the political establishment have been resolute in their hard-nosed approach against the Jemaah Islamiyah, an Islamic radical group advocating for an Islamic state both by violent and non-violent means (ICG 2002a, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009a). Likewise, Indonesian authorities forced the Laskar Jihad to disband in 2002, despite the group having initially enjoyed the support of elements within the military and the political establishment. The Laskar Jihad was a paramilitary group comprising of several thousand fighters that emerged in 1998 and played an important role in the sectarian violence that bloodied the Maluku Islands between 1999 and 2001. The group’s demise was caused by the confluence of a peace agreement signed in the Maluku Islands; the rise of President Megawati Sukarnoputri and her coddling of the TNI; and the pressure brought by Washington after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack in New York. Within the new sociopolitical milieu, the Laskar Jihad’s militarism and pro-sharia stance—exemplified by the stoning to death of a member accused of rape—no longer found space to manoeuvre (M. Davis 2002; Noorhaidi Hasan 2006). The conservative elite has also not embraced groups such as the Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), a group that is quite active in policing morality in contemporary Indonesia but whose objective is to include Indonesia into a global caliphate (Munabari 2010). While not outlawed, HTI is ostracized by mainstream Muslim organizations and does not enjoy the support of the political establishment. Similarly, groups such as the Indonesian Mujahideen Council (Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia, MMI) and Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), which aim to subvert the current social order in favour of an Islamic theocracy,
are only barely tolerated and operate in the margins of mainstream politics. On the other hand, the FPI is largely embraced by the conservative elite.

The FPI emerged during the turbulent period that marked the end of the Suharto regime.\textsuperscript{129} The group entered the arena as part of the government-sponsored, civilian security forces formed to fight demonstrators opposed to the administration of then president B.J. Habibe, Suharto’s successor, but has since carved a space for itself by posturing as the ‘defender of Islam,’ especially in regards to morality. The FPI rhetorical call to arms is, fundamentally, against the ills of modern society, particularly drugs, prostitution, alcohol and gambling. This is framed within a religious discourse encapsulated in the slogan ‘\textit{amar ma’ruf nahi munkar},’ (commanding right and forbidding evil), which works as a justifier for the raids against bars, nightclubs, brothels and similar ‘sinful places’ for which the FPI is particular renowned. The FPI sees itself as having the right to police morality in Indonesia. Indeed, in 2002 FPI chairman Al Habib Rizieq told the author that “obscenities and sinful actions take place in public and if we don't intervene we are deemed sinners ourselves, and we shall suffer from the punishment of God” (Scarpello 2002). He concluded by stating that the “The FPI will never lay down” (Scarpello 2002). In the past few years, FPI actions have included assaults against religious minorities, mostly Christians or non-mainstream Muslims such as the \textit{Ahmadiyah}.\textsuperscript{130} These are still framed within a discourse shaped by the dichotomy of what is moral behaviour and what is not.


\textsuperscript{130} This is an Islamic religious revivalist movement, founded in Qadian, Punjab, originating with the teachings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908). It began its presence in the Indonesian island of Sumatra in 1925, and was legally registered in Jakarta in 1953 (HRW 2013: II).
Amongst the other Islamic groups bent on policing morality, the FPI has distinguished itself for two reasons: its ability to accrue Islamic capital despite being a relatively small group, having a weak coercive arm and rather minimal impact on the country’s religious discourse; and—crucially—the ability to frame its role in a manner that is unthreatening to the existing power structure.

The strategic selectivity of the state and the FPI

The FPI accrues Islamic capital via highly choreographed activities and via networking with like-minded groups.

FPI imposes no particular code on its members, who hail from various backgrounds and diverge in religious practices and commitment. This relaxed policy allows the FPI to attract a cross-class support base that includes moral conservatives, the educated middle class, the urban poor and the depoliticized, religious working class (Al-Zastrouw 2006). This support base grants the group its initial, limited Islamic capital.

The FPI multiplies this Islamic capital via how it acts and projects itself. Any FPI activity, whether a raid against a bar, a protest against a Christian church or something else, is framed within a high degree of choreographed religious symbolism that unfailingly includes white-robed men sporting long beards and

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131 The FPI claims to have 4 million members and branches in 28 provinces is contested. Hefner (2009: 284) in 2002 estimated that the group had up to 50,000 active members in a handful of large cities, while in 2005 Wilson (2006: 283) estimated the group’s membership at around 100,000. This is small in comparative terms in Indonesia. The Amphibi vigilante groups in Lombok, for example, counts on up to 200,000 members (Telle 2015), while the FBR in Jakarta is said to have some 100,000 members in the Greater Jakarta only (D. Brown and Wilson 2007). Also, the FPI is renowned for its violent raids, and commentators have defined it as a thug-for-hire militia or terrorist group (ICG 2008: 13; Woodward et al. 2012). The reality, however, is that the FPI has a weak coercive arm; it targets venues not associated with powerful individuals or groups and, in the rare event that it encounters resistance, it withdraws (Jaya Pos 2012; Karana 2012; NU Online 2006). Finally, FPI leader, Riziq, has produced a number of writings that position the group within the salafi Islamic tradition (Riziq 2000, 2011, 2012). But these are yet to make an impression in Indonesia’s religious discourse, and doctrinally the FPI is dwarfed by groups such as NU and Muhammadiyah.
turbans, wielding sticks and creating havoc while chanting *Allahu Akbar*—God is
great. Activities are also rarely violent enough to force a stern response from the
security apparatus, but often crude enough to work as a constructive discourse to
strengthen the FPI’s credentials as a tough Islamic group active in patrolling
morality. Through this prism, the FPI’s coercive capital is instrumentally
deployed to accrue and validate its religious symbolism and gain further Islamic
capital. Moreover, although the FPI’s activities are often ad-hoc and lack
consistency, the group mobilizes frequently and the relentless media coverage its
activities attract strengthens the impression of a group committed on the ground.
This allows the FPI to accrue further layers of Islamic capital.

The FPI also coordinates its tactics with like-minded radical groups. The
network collaborates on specific issues; they organise rallies, assert political
pressure and both threaten to, and do, apply coercive capital to achieve their aims
(ICG 2008; Setara Institute 2010). Their shared conservative views mean that the
actions taken by the members, whether individually or collectively, amplify each
other’s Islamic capital. It is often difficult to distinguish the voice of the FPI from
that of the other groups, and the perception is that the FPI is a very religiously
committed, large and active group.

132 Following Hamayotsu (2013: 17) ‘radical’ here indicate groups that do not hesitate to employ
violent means and intimidation to achieve their goals, and aspire to achieve radical and drastic
changes, including the creation of an Islamic state based on dogmatic and narrow interpretation of
Islamic law. The radical network the FPI is part of includes the Indonesian Muslim
Communication Forum (*Forum Komunikasi Muslim Indonesia*, Forkami), Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia
(HTI), the Islamic Reformist Movement (*Gerakan Islam Reformis*, Garis), the Institute for Islamic
Studies and Research (*Lembaga Penelitian Dan Pengkajian Islam*, LPPI), the Forum of Scholars
of the Islamic Nation (*Forum Ulama Umat Islam*, FUUI), Indonesian Council of Islamic
Propagation (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*, DDII), the Institute of Indonesian Islamic
Propagation (*Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia*, LDII) and the Anti-Apostasy Movement Forum
(*Forum Antisisapi Kegiatan Pemurtadan*, FAKTA). Since 2005, the network established the
Islamic People’s Forum (*Forum Umat Islam*, FUI), an umbrella organisation that works as a
coordinating agent (Jawa Pos 2006).
Crucially, however, the FPI pursues a state-centred approach to policing morality that blends with nationalism fervour and does not reject the state, the police or democracy. This contributes to placing the group on a different level then most of the other radical groups and makes it particularly sought after by the conservative elites.

The FPI has been a registered Ormas with the Ministry of Home Affairs since 14 November 1998. The registration implies an acceptance of the idea of the Indonesian state and a support of the ideology that underpinning it, *Pancasila* (Munajat 2012: 70). More so, the FPI rarely loses an opportunity to display its nationalism (Kompas 2013a). At a symbolic level, for example during the celebration of the FPI’s anniversary, which coincides with the Indonesian celebration of Independence Day, FPI members wave the FPI green-white flags together with the red-white flag of Indonesia (Munajat 2012: 78). This differs from most other radical groups that proclaim either an anti-nationalist message or strive to recreate Indonesia on a basis fundamentally different from the existing *Pancasila*-based one (Elson 2010: 334). Conversely, the FPI articulates its pro-Sharia stance as praxis of life and not as a means to establish an Islamic state (Antara 2011; Rizieq 2012). The main political objective of the FPI is a return to the Jakarta Charter, a proviso that Islamists tried to include in the 1945 Constitution and that would have obligated Muslims to practice Islamic law. This has still strong currency and levels of sympathy within Indonesia as it does not undermine *Pancasila*, and is an option generally not considered ‘radical’ within Islamic discourse.

Equally important is the FPI’s acceptance of the police as the institution tasked with law and order. The FPI does not challenge, or ignore, the police’s
symbolic authority but articulates its policing role within a discourse of collaboration with the police (Kawilarang and Huda S. 2010; Okezone 2012).

Lastly, the FPI does not reject democracy outright. It rejects liberal democracy and calls for majoritarian democracy that grants Muslims a bigger say. In Rizieq (FPI 2007)’s words:

In Indonesia, as a country with a Muslim majority, it is fair and clearly acceptable for Muslims to have the majority and a higher bargaining position [...] It is also fair if Muslims demand their collective rights from government, which include the adoption of Islamic values.

Despite its radicalism, the FPI is thus not viewed as a threat to the existing power structure by the elite. Indeed, it is seen as a means through which conservative elites can prevent challenges from arising. There is thus a clear dialectical relation between the FPI’s policing of morality and the conservative struggle for the broader political economy of Islam. From one perspective, the FPI’s policing of morality aids the continuous rise of Islamic capital, and in particular the signifier and interests attached to it by the conservative turn. From the other perspective, the platform that allows the FPI to play a role is the prominence of Islamic capital and, especially the conservative tones associated with the discourses, logics etc. favoured by the conservative elite groups.

There are many examples that show how the FPI has been embedded in broader conservative alliances. Below the attention is focused briefly on the convergence of interests between the FPI and the MUI, as well as between the FPI
and Suryadharma Ali, the former chairman of PPP, and Tifatul Sembiring, the former chairman of PKS.

_The FPI and the broader conservative coalition_

The convergence of interests between the MUI and the FPI coincided with the conservative turn within the MUI, and it materialised in what the International Crisis Group (2008: 15) has defined as an “interlocking directorate of radical movements.” 133 This sees the MUI providing the ideological guidance and legitimisation for the FPI’s policing of morality, and the FPI providing the coercive capital for the MUI’s posturing within the field of Islam and of the state. In this way, the MUI contributes to the FPI accruing Islamic capital, while the FPI adds weight to the MUI’s claim that there is a need for an institution that regulates the ummah.

A perfect example is the _fatwa_ (legal opinions) that the MUI promulgated in July 2005 against the Ahmadiyah (M. Crouch 2009b; I. Wilson 2008), and against liberalism, pluralism and secularism (Gillespie 2007; Sirry 2013). These are indicative of how conservative, illiberal ideologies have been politicised across social fields and of how both the FPI and the MUI benefited from the practice. As Wilson (2008: 205) comments:

> [the _fatwa_] provided an external source of theological legitimisation for the FPI’s _nahi mungkar_ campaign 134 […] MUI also benefited from the alliance.

With no authority to enforce the _fatwa_[…], MUI could rely on the FPI to

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133 This study focuses on the FPI, but the directorate can be extended to all the groups that are members of the radical network dealt with later in this chapter.

134 This is the noted ‘_amar ma’ruf nahi munkar_,’ or commanding right and forbidding evil, which materializes mostly via the FPI’s calls for a conservative view of morality.
exert political pressure on its behalf. The support of militant groups like the FPI has helped MUI to establish itself as an independent Islamic institution while remaining on the government payroll (see also Woodward et al. 2012).

The legitimizing tool in this case was the National Committee for Overcoming the Threat of Apostasy (Komite Nasional Penanggulangan Bahaya Pemurtadaan, KMPBP), established by the MUI in 2006 (Ichwan 2013: 70). The actors behind the KMPMB were CH Cholil Ridwan, Amin Diamaluddin and Abu Deedat who hail from the radical groups DDII, LDII and FAKTA, respectively. Similar dynamics have framed the discursive and coercive actions carried out by the FPI and others against unregistered Christian churches, or those that led to the shutting down of Playboy Indonesia (Kitley 2008; Pausacker 2012); to the promulgation of the illiberal 2008 Anti-Pornography (Pam Allen 2007); and to the banning of so-called heretical sects (Alfitri 2008; Olle 2006). These are legal processes that have tinted state-society relations with conservative Islamic tones.

As it was noted, the conservative turn paid dividends for the MUI that has increased its influence in the field of Islam and beyond, leading to the institution and its members gaining access to the lucrative process of halal certification, and to the equally lucrative fields of Islamic finances (Lindsey 2012). In a sign of its growing prominence, the MUI has moved its headquarters from the basement of a

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135 This study focuses on the FPI, but the MUI convergence of interests extends with all the groups part of the noted radical network.
major mosque, to an expensive new office tower in the heart of Jakarta (Gelling 2008).

The conservative coalition includes also Suryadharma Ali and Tifatul Sembiring, and their parties, the PPP and PKS. Suryadharma and Tifatul were appointed minister of religious affairs and minister of communication and information technology, respectively, by Yudhoyono in 2009. PPP and PKS represent the most Islamist of the main parties in Indonesia but, beyond religion, the two parties are expressions of Indonesia’s conservative elite.

The politicking of Suryadharma and Tifatul is largely focused in pushing for a conservative view of Islam to be at the centre of state-society relations.

Suryadharma, for example, has taken a strong stance against religious organisations he deems to be heretical (HRW 2013: 41). In 2011, he helped mobilize anti-Ahmadiyah campaigns by repeatedly calling Ahmadiyah practices blasphemous and by asking the Yudhoyono government to ban the group (HRW 2013: 41; The Jakarta Post 2010a). He has also authorized a string of legal actions against individuals deemed to have insulted Islam, and against religious minorities (HRW 2013: 41). These attacks clearly undermine the freedom of assembly and religion and, more broadly, a pluralistic view of society.

Similarly, Tifatul has aggressively sought to use his position to regulate media, communication and information channels in order to advance a conservative religious vision (Hamayotsu 2013: 12). As Hamayotsu (2013: 12) notes, Tifatul supported tighter enforcement of the existing legal framework to control ‘harmful’ and ‘immoral’ content on the Internet; and he proposed an additional bill to extend state control over Internet servers, the content of IT communications and media hardware.
In their politicking, therefore, Suryadharma and Tifatul have benefitted from the FPI’s policing of morality and the conservative turn this has contributed to. They are not the only ones that have sought after the FPI. In the leading up to the 2014 elections, for example, several representatives of the conservative political elite sought the support of the FPI. As summarized by Wilson (2014a: 6):

Home Minister Gamawan Fauzi, who less than ten months earlier had threatened to forcibly disband the FPI via recently revised laws governing non-government organisations, followed Suryadharma’s lead in stating in October 2013 that the FPI was now a ‘national asset’ and that regional and national leaders should work in partnership with them. Prabowo Subianto, considered a potential presidential frontrunner, responded positively to Gamawan’s call by suggesting that the FPI could and should be “embraced”.

Not all of the above-mentioned individuals have Islamic credentials. Prabowo, in particular, is not known for his religious leaning, but more renowned for antagonising liberal democracy and favouring a nationalistic economy (Aspinall and Mietzner 2014b; Fealy 2014). His ultimately unsuccessful bid for the presidency included the cobbling together of a conservative alliance that incorporated some of the country’s wealthiest politico-business elites and economic oligarchs, such as Aburizal Bakrie, Hary Tanoesoedibjo, Hashim Djojohadikosumo, and Titiek Suharto, the daughter of the former New Order dictator, as well as anti-capitalist Islamic radicals such as the FPI (Slater 2014; Warburton 2014).
The convergence of interests with the MUI and the conservative groups has been beneficial for the FPI as well. This is evident on at least three different levels:

*First*, the MUI, Suryadharma and Tifatul and their parties, among others, have often endorsed and defended the FPI. This has led to the FPI being granted some degree of leniency by the security apparatus and the judiciary (see, for example, Siahaan 2010; The Jakarta Post 2010b). Indeed, the FPI has often been involved in violent incidents (Antara 2012; Kompas 2013b; Laksamana 2001; Sohirin 2013), but the police response has been ad-hoc in nature and, while dozens of FPI members have been arrested over the years—including the leader, Rizieq, who has been jailed twice—they have often been let off the hook or afforded privileged treatment when brought to justice. A good example is the sentence of only three to six months in prison given to 12 members of radical groups, including the FPI, accused of having killed three members of the *Ahmadiyah* sect on 6 February 2011 (M. Crouch 2012; HRW 2011). The ambivalent relationship between the police and the FPI is compounded by the fact that senior police officers often coddle the FPI, and members of the FPI and the police often conduct joint operations at the local level (Fitria 2011; The Jakarta Post 2010c; The Wahid Institute 2010). In other words, the FPI relations with politicians have contributed to the extension of the system of exemptions to include the FPI.

*Second*, the convergence of interests has allowed the FPI a role in shaping the *politics* of morality that far exceeds what the FPI’s size, coercive ability to

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police morality, and doctrinal influence would warrant. This rather inflated role transpires if considering that the FPI was among the few invited by a parliamentary committee to discuss the new law on Ormas, and by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Home Affairs to discuss the problem of the Ahmadiyah (Simamora and Saragih 2011; Simanjuntak 2011; VOA-Islam 2011). The FPI was also involved in pressuring the deputy governor of Jakarta—a Christian—to drop the portfolio of Islamic institutions; in forcing the mayors of Bekasi and Depok, two satellite suburbs of Jakarta, to act on specific demands, as well as in convincing the Jakarta police to cancel a Lady Gaga concert in 2012 (Afrianti and Ruqoyah 2012; Salam Online 2012; VOA-Islam 2010).

Third, and building on the first two points, the convergence of interests has allowed the FPI to accrue a substantial amount of Islamic capital for its members who have then be able to convert this into various forms of economic capital. For example, for some of the habib members of the FPI, the group is also a vehicle to network with members of the military, the business community and the political establishment and hence gain funds and business opportunities (Al-Zastrouw 2006: 117-8). Habib are individuals who claim family lineage from the Prophet Mohammed and are part of the Hadrami community, or native Indonesians with Arabic-Yemeni origins. Likewise, among the educated, urban Muslim middle class joining the FPI, some do so because the group provides an efficient and quick vehicle to gain the necessary Islamic capital to access social networks and job opportunities (Al-Zastrouw 2006: 122). Finally, among the urban poor that join the FPI, some see the group as a legitimizing source for actions that may include coercion, violence and even crime. It is this segment that most often is

7.5 – Conclusion

In this chapter PEPP has focused on the struggle over the field of Islam in contemporary Indonesian and has showed how the policing of morality is one of the means through which a broad conservative alliance attempts to shape state-society relations to its advantage. PEPP has also showed that the convergence of interests between the conservative alliance and the radical Islamic groups bent on policing morality is mediating by a strategic selectivity that places great emphasis on with accepting the current power structures. This was explained via the case study of the FPI, a group that has a proven record of accruing Islamic capital—the most relevant capital—and of framing its role within a state-centred approach to policing morality that is unthreatening to the existing power structure. In addition, PEPP shows that, beyond alleged religious aims, the convergence of interest is beneficial for the conservative elites as it strengthens the conservative turn that favours them in accessing resources, and it is beneficial for the FPI because it partially shelters them from police harassment, allows them to influence the politics of morality, and facilitates their members’ accessing funds, business opportunities and social mobility.
CHAPTER 8
Conclusion: Contributions and implications

PEPP is an epistemological and theoretical contribution to the plural policing literature. The framework can also be useful beyond the field of policing and has potential policymaking implications.

8-1– Introduction
Plural policing is virtually ubiquitous all over the world. The multidisciplinary plural policing literature has made enormous strides in the last decades towards conceptualizing and understanding both the security function and the politics of plural policing. This study has contributed to that literature by introducing PEPP, a framework geared at explaining the political economy-plural policing dialectical relations. This chapter summarises the epistemological, theoretical and empirical advances achieved, as well as the policymaking implications of this study. It also briefly explains how PEPP can be applied beyond policing.

Section 8.2 highlights how PEPP represents an epistemological and theoretical advance of the plural-policing literature into critical political economy.

Section 8.3 focuses on the empirical contributions of this study. The framework has demonstrated that policing is often shaped by the struggles over the broader political economy, but also how policing is in itself a site for these struggles and may affect how power and resources are accessed and distributed.
Section 8.4 notes PEPP’s policymaking implications. These are related to how PEPP’s focus on the politics that shape how policing is delivered leads to questions on the wisdom of technocratic reforms.

Section 8.5 then briefly explains how PEPP could be useful beyond policing. In particular, how the framework could contribute in better explaining the dynamics shaping complex political crisis in which power is partly contested via coercive force.

8-2– Epistemological and theoretical contributions

PEPP views policing as a facet of state-society relations; it directs the attention to how struggles over the broad political economy affect policing, but also to how policing is an important site of these struggles and power relations are maintained, challenged and changed. PEPP also recognizes that policing actors are often embedded in broader sociopolitical coalitions, but that occasionally they force their way into the consideration of dominant sociopolitical groups. Thus seen, PEPP is first and foremost a novel way to look at plural policing, and an epistemological contribution to the plural policing literature.

The epistemological contribution is paired with theoretical tools that facilitate explaining the dialectical relation between the broader political economy and plural policing. In particular, viewing institutions as strategic relational sites of contestation that favour some groups, interests and ideologies over others, opens the conceptual and analytical space to include policing actors into these contestations, and—indeed—to explain policing as part of the struggles taking place in the political economy. This is achieved via appropriating concepts from the neo-Gramscian and Bourdieusian theoretical streams to draw the attention
onto ‘interests,’ ‘conflict,’ ‘competition’ and ‘coalitions’ as central analytical terms in explaining social dynamics at the macro and micro level. The two streams are reconciled via explaining how the ‘strategic selectivity’ of institutions and the ‘most relevant capital’ in the field of policing relate and affect each other. Change is explained by analysing how political struggles originating in various social fields, and across a spatio-temporal dimension, affect such a relationship.

Thus framed, PEPP adds a conceptual and analytical lens to the existing plural policing paradigms and frameworks and contributes in explaining the political facet of plural policing.

8-3– Empirical contributions
From an empirical standpoint, PEPP has demonstrated that policing is one important site for how broader power relations are maintained, challenged and changed. This insight was extrapolated in case studies drawing from Indonesia, a country whose political dynamics are indicative of those in many other contexts, especially in the Global South.

It was showed, for example, how struggles over the control over the broader political economy took place mostly in the field of policing in pre-colonial Indonesia; and how policing was a key practice through which the Dutch asserted control over large swathes of the archipelago from 1675 until 1941. Independence led to a more fragmented relationship between struggles over the political economy and how and by whom policing was delivered. But the rise of Suharto meant a return to a rather strict and hierarchal relation between how power and resources were accessed at the broad level and policing. This partly changed with democratization and decentralization. In contemporary Indonesia policing is still
an important site of struggle that shapes how power and resources are accessed and distributed. But the fragmentation of the polity, and the discourses and logics introduced with the historical changes, have meant that policing is less politicized and the strategic selectivity that mediates which policing actors are embedded in the dominant coalitions is often reflective of local contingency. The relationship between struggles over the broader political economy and policing was further explained in the case studies of Bali and of the field of Islam.

Another important empirical contribution of this study relates to the findings of Chapter 6. This study is the first that has investigated the political economy of policing in Bali and the information revealed regarding the role of the Linmas, Pecalang and Ormas represent a contribution to area studies, as well as to the broader literature on vigilantism and plural policing. At a broad level the chapter demonstrated that in the villages of Kuta, Legian and Seminyak policing is strongly affected by, and partly affects, the broader struggles over the allocation of tourism-related resources. More specifically it explained that struggles over the broad political economy that pit local, small-business owners against Jakarta-based tycoons, international chains and foreign-owned villas, and native of the three villages against migrants from the north of the island, elsewhere in Indonesia and abroad, have led to a policing landscape that is biased in terms of gender, class and ethnicity. It also explained, however, how the struggles within the field of policing further strengthened the broader power relations in Bali and how policing is a means through which poorly educated local men access some of the spoils of tourism. This was exemplified by revealing the policing priorities of the Linmas that consist in rounding up temporary residents and the poor; that pecalang officers exchange their adat capital with economy capital in legal and
illegal means; and that Ormas groups have been embedded in dominant coalitions contesting for local power on the back of calls to protect Bali.

8.4– PEPP beyond policing

PEPP is, in essence, a political framework that explains how struggles in the political economy affect how coercive power is withheld and deployed, and for whose benefit. In this study the focus is on policing, and policing actors. But the conceptual and analytical lines of the framework—i.e, how it marks specific fields of explorations; how it suggests a number of causal relationships, and directs the analytical focus on interests, conflict, competition and coalitions—is much more widely applicable. For example, PEPP is also relevant to the security governance literature, the literature on the responsibility to protect (R2P), and any other literature where there is a need to explain how, by whom and for whose benefit coercive force is deployed or withheld.

The security-governance literature has important elements of convergence with the plural-policing literature. It developed in recognition of the involvement of diverse actors, both public and private, in containing security threats no longer limited to inter-state conflicts, but including those commonly labelled as non-traditional security threats (pollution, infectious diseases, water shortage etc.). This is the equivalent of the switch from police to policing, although in settings beyond the nation-state. Also, similar to the plural-policing literature most of the early proponents of security governance drew heavily from existing governance theories and maintained a pre-theoretical approach that described security arrangements, but did not explain their political dimension (Sperling and Webber 2014). This early literature has also maintained a skewed focus on the European
Union and a strong bias towards analysing security governance within a winner-takes-all battle between international forms of authority and the national one (for reviews of this literature see Hameiri and Jones unpublished; Sperling and Webber 2014). A notable exception is the state-transformation approach (STA) developed by Hameiri and Jones (2015). This builds on Jessop’s state theory and, at its simplest, explains how calls to face non-traditional threats have led to rescaling of governance within the state (whether at local or national level) ignited by contestations among socio-political groups jostling to harness the benefit of the new security governance-arrangements (Hameiri and Jones 2013, 2015). The STA has thus contributed to the political turn in the security-governance literature in a manner that is similar to that noted in this chapter via the three political frameworks. Hameiri and Jones’s interest, however, is in the power relations and struggles that shape the governance structure at the meso level. They do not fully investigate who is physically involved in fronting the security threats on the ground; whether their role is contested; how they claim such a role; and how the contestation at this level reflects the broader struggles over the governance structure and, indeed, whether the micro-level contestations have an effect on the broader politics of how non-traditional security threats are governed. In other words, their analysis does not engage with policing actors and with the dialectical focus favoured by PEPP.

PEPP could also contribute to the growing literature on the responsibility-to-protect norm (R2P). Most of this literature engages with the normative aspect of R2P (Bellamy 2013; bin Talal and Schwarz 2013; Brockmeier et al. 2014; Doyle 2011); its legal standing in the international arena, its relation to the concept of sovereignty (Benjamin 2010; Mamdani 2010); and with the difficulties
in implementation (Bellamy 2009; Day and Freeman 2005; Tannam 2011). Some studies have delved more into the political dimension of the norm (Bellamy and Williams 2012; Bellamy and Williams 2011; Junk 2014), but important gaps remain. PEPP could add a critical lens to explain the multilayered political economy dimensions behind why and how coercive force is authorized or withheld in the name of the R2P, and for whose benefit; and how the authorization of coercive force affects the contestation over power and resources at local level, and for whose benefit.

8-5– Policymaking implications

PEPP places the emphasis on the politics that shape how policing is delivered, and more broadly how, by whom and for whose benefit coercive force is deployed or withheld. This emphasis questions the wisdom of technocratic reforms unsupported by the necessary political will, and it has potential policymaking implications.

In Indonesia, for example, the internal reform programs brought forward by the police mimic the Western-initiated mantra of democratic policing that, among others, requires a system of checks and balances to be in place to enforce accountability and transparency. These programs have been unsuccessful, and the police remain inefficient, corrupt and unaccountable. The adjectives, however, frame the police performance in regards to Western-framed best practices. PEPP, however, has explained that police’s inefficiencies, high level of corruption and unaccountability are intrinsic in how the institution, and its officers, procure money, and how this often illegal *modus operandi* feeds from, and into, the broad ‘system of exemptions’ that allows the conservative elites to maintain a dominant
position in the country’s political economy. Hence, a clearer assessment would be that the police are inefficient, but that this inefficiency is useful in maintaining the ‘system of exemptions’ from which both the police and the conservative elites benefit. This means that institutions such as the police should not be evaluated against technical considerations of best practice framed within a liberal understanding of how they should, or should not, operate. Instead they should be evaluated within the political economy in which they are embedded and in relation to whose interests they serve. This approach to explaining the limits of police reform in Indonesia is emblematic of PEPP’s potential usefulness in addressing broader issues related to security sector reform.

Beyond policing, PEPP could offer an analytical framework to better understand complex crisis in which politics is partly contested via coercive force. The case of post-Qadhafi Libya is indicative. As a Clingendael (El Kamouni-Janssen and Abdo 2015: 2) report recently summarized, Libya’s current crisis is rooted in the immediate post-revolutionary period, when the sudden opening up of political space led to a power game in which patronage and exclusion resurfaced. With no existing state structure in place, the unity of the Libyan state was challenged by a plethora of interest groups and their constituencies based on tribes, cities, regions and various Islamist tendencies. An intense power struggle emerged in which everyone wanted a piece of the post-Qadhafi cake and attempted to secure access to Libya’s resources at the expense of others. The unified effort that characterized the revolution (thawra) quickly turned into a zero-sum struggle over resources (tharwa) in which alliance-building became the key to political power (El Kamouni-Janssen and Abdo 2015: 2). The struggles over the broad political economy is reflected also on the ground with the contesting
sociopolitical groups developing relationships with armed groups as tools to acquire more influence and resources (El Kamouni-Janssen and Abdo 2015: 5). PEPP could place the attention on how the struggles among the armed actors reflects the struggle over the broad political economy, and it could explain the relationship between the strategic selectivity and the most relevant capital at the core of why some armed groups are embedded in the dominant sociopolitical groups. This could suggest possible actions to weaken such a link.

8-6– Conclusion

PEPP is an epistemological and theoretical contribution to the plural policing literature. It is the first framework that firmly views plural policing as a facet of state-society relations and that provides some analytical tools that explain how struggles over the broader political economy affect and are affected by policing. This has been demonstrated in this study by empirical case studies that have looked at various facets of the political economy-plural policing dialectical relations in Indonesia.

While focused on plural policing in this study, PEPP’s conceptual and analytical lines are likely to be equally useful in explaining the relationship between political economy and why, how and for whose benefit coercive force is deployed and withheld. From an academic standpoint, this means that PEPP could be applied to studies hailing from the literature on security governance, R2P, security sector reform and more. From a policymaking standpoint, it means that the framework could offer a possible analytical lens to better understand complex crisis in which politics is partly contested via coercive force.


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