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1 Chapter 12

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4 **Tourism and Media Studies 3.0**

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11 **ABSTRACT**

12 The term “social media” generally refers to the multi-point creation and  
13 distribution of electronic communication. It is understood in opposition to  
14 broadcasting. This chapter explains the history of media studies as a means  
15 of comprehending these newer media in the context of tourism. They need to  
16 be studied in the light of existing media, even as we seek a new form of truly  
17 interdisciplinary work that brings existing approaches together. Taking its  
18 agenda from social movements as well as intellectual ones, and its methods  
19 from social sciences and humanities, Media Studies 3.0 should focus on  
20 gender, race, class, sexuality, sustainability, and pleasure across national  
21 lines—an apt setting for those working on tourism.

22  
23 *Keywords:* Media studies 1.0; Media studies 2.0; Media studies 3.0

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27 **INTRODUCTION**

28  
29 The term “social media” generally refers to the multi-point creation and  
30 distribution of electronic communication. It is understood in opposition to  
31 broadcasting (though the notion that the most popular pastime worldwide  
32 now and in the last century should be other than “social” is bizarre). This  
33 chapter explains the history of media studies, which may be of value for

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1 comprehending these newer social media in the context of tourism. This  
 2 chapter discusses the social media in the light of their defunct, venerable,  
 3 and middle-aged counterparts.

4 Across history, media studies have been dominated by three topics:  
 5 ownership and control, content, and audiences. Approaches to ownership  
 6 and control vary between neoliberal endorsements of limited regulation by  
 7 the state to facilitate market entry by new competitors, and Marxist critiques  
 8 of the bourgeois media for controlling the sociopolitical agenda. Approaches  
 9 to content vary between hermeneutics, which unearths the meaning of  
 10 individual texts and links them to broader social formations and problems,  
 11 and content analysis, which establishes patterns across significant numbers  
 12 of similar texts, rather than close readings of individual ones. Approaches  
 13 to audiences vary between social psychological attempts to correlate  
 14 audiovisual consumption and social conduct, and critiques of imported  
 15 audiovisual material threatening national and regional autonomy. These  
 16 three components, fractured by politics, nation, discipline, theory, and  
 17 method, are embodied in what is called here Media Studies 1.0 and Media  
 18 Studies 2.0. These two formations cover a new Media Studies 3.0, and offer  
 19 some examples of how the media and tourism intersect in the contemporary  
 20 moment.

## 23 TOURISM AND MEDIA STUDIES

### 25 *Media Studies 1.0*

27 Media Studies 1.0 derived from the spread of new media technologies over  
 28 the past two centuries into the lives of urbanizing populations and the  
 29 policing questions that this posed to state and capital: What the effect on the  
 30 public of these developments would be and how they would vary between  
 31 those with a stake in the social order versus those seeking to transform it. By  
 32 the early 20th century, academic experts had decreed media audiences to be  
 33 passive consumers, thanks to the missions of literary criticism, distinguishing  
 34 the aesthetically cultivated from others, and psychology, distinguishing the  
 35 socially competent from others (Butsch, 2000, p. 3). The origins of social  
 36 psychology can be traced to anxieties about “the crowd” in a suddenly  
 37 urbanized and educated Western Europe that raised the prospect of a long-  
 38 feared “ochlocracy” of “the worthless mob” (Pufendorf, 2000, p. 144) able  
 39 to share popular texts. In the wake of the French Revolution, Edmund  
 40 Burke was animated by the need to limit collective exuberance via restraint

1 on popular passions (1994, p. 122). He was not alone, then or now. Consider  
 2 the opening line of Baroness Orczy's famous adventure tourism novel of the  
 3 Terror, *The Scarlet Pimpernel*: "A surging, seething, murmuring crowd of  
 4 beings that are human only in name, for to the eye and ear they seem naught  
 5 but savage creatures, animated by vile passions and by the lust of vengeance  
 6 and of hate" (2009, Kindle Locations, 10488–10489). Elite theorists from  
 7 both right and left emerged across the 19th century, notably Pareto (1976),  
 8 Mosca (1939), Le Bon (1899), and Michels (1915). They argued that newly  
 9 literate publics were vulnerable to manipulation by demagogues. Even Mill  
 10 spoke of "the meanest feelings and most ignorant prejudices of the vulgarest  
 11 part of the crowd" (1861, p. 144). The founder of the "American Dream,"  
 12 the Latino James Truslow Adams, regarded "[t]he mob mentality of the city  
 13 crowd" as "one of the menaces to modern civilization." He was particularly  
 14 disparaging about "the prostitution of the moving-picture industry" (1941,  
 15 pp. 404, 413). These critics were frightened of socialism, democracy, and  
 16 popular reason (Wallas, 1967, p. 137). With civil society growing restive, the  
 17 emergence of radical politics was explained away in sociopsychological  
 18 terms rather than political-economic ones. The psy-function warmed itself  
 19 by campus fires, far from the crowding mass. In the United States, Harvard  
 20 took charge of theorizing, Chicago observing, and Columbia enumerating  
 21 the great unwashed (Staiger, 2005, pp. 21–22). Tests of beauty and truth  
 22 found the popular classes wanting, and helped promulgate the idea of the  
 23 newly literate and suddenly enfranchised being bamboozled by the  
 24 artistically shameless and unscrupulously fluent.

25 The US Payne Fund studies of the 1930s investigated the impact of films  
 26 on what a gaggle of sociologists labeled "'superior' adults" (this expression  
 27 referred to "young college professors, graduate students and their wives")  
 28 versus children from juvenile centers. Researchers wanted to know, "what  
 29 effect do motion pictures have upon children of different ages?" especially  
 30 on people defined as "retarded." These pioneering scholars boldly set out to  
 31 discover whether "the onset of puberty is or is not affected by motion  
 32 pictures" and what they called "The Big Three" narrative themes: love,  
 33 crime, and sex (sound familiar?). They pondered "demonstrations of  
 34 satisfying love techniques" to see whether "sexual passions are aroused and  
 35 amateur prostitution... aggravated" by the screen, gauging reactions  
 36 through "autobiographical case studies," questionnaires asking whether  
 37 "All Most Many Some Few No Chinese are cunning and underhand," and  
 38 "skin response," as measured by psychogalvanometers attached to young  
 39 people in cinemas and hypnographs and polygraphs wired to them in their  
 40 beds (Charters, 1933).

1 The Payne Fund studies birthed seven decades of obsessive social-  
2 scientific attempts to correlate youthful consumption of popular culture with  
3 antisocial conduct, scrutinizing audiences in terms of where they came from,  
4 how many there were, and what they did as a consequence of participating  
5 (Miller, 2009). In 1951, Smythe wrote of this effects research, “[e]verybody  
6 seems to be doing it, especially those who are best qualified by virtue of  
7 the fact that ‘they wouldn’t have a television set in the house’” (2004, p. 318).  
8 Bob Dylan remembers the 1960s in Greenwich Village not only because  
9 he was singing in coffee shops but as a time marked by “Sociologists ...  
10 saying that TV had deadly intentions and was destroying the minds and  
11 imaginations of the young—that their attention span was being dragged  
12 down.” The other dominant site of knowledge Dylan encountered was the  
13 “psychology professor, a good performer, but originality not his long suit”  
14 (2004, pp. 55, 67).

15 Just such purveyors of normal science continue to cast a shadow across  
16 that village, and many others. The pattern is that when cultural technologies  
17 and genres emerge, young people are identified as both pioneers and victims,  
18 simultaneously endowed by marketers and critics with power and vulner-  
19 ability. They are held to be the first to know and the last to understand  
20 the media—the grand paradox of youth, latterly on display in the digital  
21 sublime of technological determinism, as always with the super-added  
22 valence of a future citizenship in peril (American Academy of Pediatrics,  
23 Council on Communications and Media, 2009). New genres and technol-  
24 ogies are accompanied by concerns about extreme distinctions among  
25 generations. The latest manifestation of this anxiety can be found in much  
26 pop-intellectual work that divines the existence of “digital natives”  
27 (Tapscott, 2009).

28 Concerns about supposedly unprecedented and unholy risks deriving  
29 from new media recur with each major technological and generic innovation.  
30 Damnation was sure to follow cheap novels during the 1900s, silent then  
31 sound film of the teens and 1920s, radio in the 1930s, comic books from the  
32 1940s and 1950s, pop music and television in the 1950s and 1960s, satanic  
33 rock and video cassette recorders of the 1970s and 1980s, and rap music,  
34 video games, the Internet, and sexting since the 1990s.

35 The satirical paper *The Onion* (2005) cleverly mocked these interdepend-  
36 ent phenomena of moral panic and commodification via a *faux* study of the  
37 impact on US youth of seeing Janet Jackson’s breast in a 2004 Super Bowl  
38 broadcast. Something similar in conventional tourism research can be seen  
39 into social media, which warns corporations about how to avoid negative  
40 responses and encourage positive ones, lest the herd-like public turn against

1 a particular company or resort (González, Gidumal, & López-Valcárcel,  
2 2010; Pan, Xiang, Law, & Fesenmaier, 2011; Xiang & Gretzel, 2010). The  
3 audience must be controlled as if it were an unruly mob of 19th-century  
4 socialists. This anxiety and desire for surveillance has particular force when  
5 the social media are identified as causal agents, or at least facilitators, of  
6 child sex tourism (George & Panko, 2011).

7 Effects studies suffer all the disadvantages of ideal-typical psychological  
8 reasoning. They rely on methodological individualism and fail to account  
9 for cultural norms, let alone the arcs of history that establish patterns of text  
10 and response inside politics, war, ideology, and discourse. Each laboratory  
11 test, based on, as the refrain goes, “a large university in the Midwest [of the  
12 United States],” is countered by a similar experiment, with conflicting  
13 results. As politicians, grant-givers, and pundits call for more and more  
14 research to prove that the media make you stupid, violent, and apathetic—  
15 or the opposite—academics line up at the trough to indulge their contempt  
16 for popular culture and their rent-seeking urge for public money. Media  
17 Studies 1.0 rarely interrogates its own conditions of existence—namely,  
18 governments, religious groups, business leeches, and the media themselves  
19 account for social problems by diverting blame onto popular culture. It  
20 takes each new medium and genre as an opportunity to affirm its omniscient  
21 agenda (Miller, 2009).

22 Whereas effects research focuses on the cognition and emotion of  
23 individual human subjects via observation and experimentation, another  
24 way of considering audiences looks to the customs and patriotic feeling  
25 exhibited by collective human subjects, the grout of national culture. In  
26 place of psychology, it is concerned with politics. The media do not make  
27 you a well- or ill-educated person, a wild or self-controlled one. Rather, they  
28 make you a knowledgeable and loyal national subject or a *naïf*, ignorant of  
29 local tradition and history. Cultural belonging, not psychic wholeness, is the  
30 touchstone of this model. Instead of measuring responses electronically or  
31 behaviorally, it interrogates the geopolitical origin of popular texts and the  
32 themes and styles they embody, with particular attention to the putatively  
33 nation-building genres of drama, news, sport, and current affairs. Adherents  
34 hold that local citizens should control television, for instance, because they  
35 can be counted on to be patriotic in the event of war. Many nations prohibit  
36 foreigners owning TV licenses. The United States is a prominent example.

37 In addition to audience research and cultural policy, Media Studies 1.0  
38 also includes political economy, which focuses on infrastructure rather  
39 than audiences, and critical theory, which is concerned that the audiovisual  
40 sector turns people away from artistic and social traces of authentic

1 intersubjectivity and toward control of individual consciousness. Both  
2 work from the *nostrum* that the media are all powerful. Political economy  
3 is more policy oriented and political in its focus on institutional power.  
4 Critical theory is more philosophical and aesthetic in its desire to develop  
5 modernism and the avant-garde. They began as one with lamentations  
6 for the triumph of industrialized cultural production and the loss of a self-  
7 critical philosophical address. The two approaches are also linked via a  
8 distaste for what they deride as mass culture. Because demand is dispersed  
9 and supply centralized, the media supposedly operate via an administrative  
10 logic. Far from reflecting already-established and -revealed preferences of  
11 consumers in reaction to tastes and desires, they manipulate audiences  
12 from the apex of production. Coercion is mistaken for free will, and culture  
13 is one more industrial process subordinated to the dominant economic  
14 forces within society. It seeks a maximum of standardization and a  
15 minimum of risk. The only element that might stand against this leveling  
16 sameness is said to be individual consciousness. But that consciousness has  
17 itself been customized to enable efficient media production (Adorno &  
18 Horkheimer, 1977).

19

20 *Media Studies 2.0*

21

22 For Media Studies 2.0, popular culture represents the apex of modernity. Far  
23 from being supremely alienating, it embodies the expansion of civil society,  
24 the first moment in history when political and commercial organs and  
25 agendas became receptive to, and part of, the popular classes; when the  
26 general population counted as part of the social, rather than being excluded  
27 from political-economic calculations. At the same time, there was a lessening  
28 of authority, the promulgation of individual rights and respect, and the  
29 development of intense but large-scale human interaction (Hartley, 2003;  
30 Shils, 1966). This perspective has offered a way in to media audiences  
31 that differs from Media Studies 1.0 and its faith in the all-powerful agency  
32 of the media. For in Media Studies 2.0, the all-powerful agent is the audience.  
33 It claims that the public is so clever and able that it makes its own  
34 meanings, outwitting institutions of the state, academia, and capitalism that  
35 seek to measure and control it. In the case of children and the media, for  
36 example, anxieties from 1.0 about turning Edenic innocents into rabid  
37 monsters, capitalist dupes, or mental Americans have been challenged by a  
38 new culturalist perspective. This formation has animated research into the  
39 generic features and intertexts of children's news, drama, action-adventure,  
40 education, cartooning, and play and how children distinguish between

1 fact and fiction and talk about the media as part of social interaction  
 2 (Buckingham, 2000).

3 Faith in the active audience can reach cosmic proportions. It has been a  
 4 *donnée* of 2.0 that the media are not responsible for anything. This position  
 5 is a virtual *nostrum* in some research into fans, who are thought to construct  
 6 connections with celebrities and actants in ways that mimic friendship, make  
 7 sense of human interaction, and ignite cultural politics. Media Studies 2.0  
 8 commonly attacks opponents of commercial culture for misrecognizing its  
 9 capacity to subvert patriarchy, capitalism, and other forms of oppression.  
 10 The popular is held to have progressive effects, because it is decoded by  
 11 people in keeping with their social situations. The active audience is said to  
 12 be weak at the level of cultural production, but strong as an interpretative  
 13 community. All this is supposedly evident to scholars from their perusal of  
 14 audience conventions, web pages, discussion groups, quizzes, and rankings,  
 15 or by staring at screens with their children. Consumption is the key to Media  
 16 Studies 2.0—with production discounted, labor forgotten, consumers  
 17 sovereign, and governments there to protect them.

18 Cybertarian technophiles, struck by the digital sublime, attribute magical  
 19 properties to contemporary communications, and cultural technologies that  
 20 obliterate geography, sovereignty, and hierarchy in an alchemy of truth and  
 21 beauty. Cybertarians see omniscient, omnipotent audiences outwitting the  
 22 efforts of capital, the state, and parents to understand and corral them.  
 23 The new-media *savants* who construct the latter model routinely invoke  
 24 precapitalist philosophers, dodging questions of state and capital by heading  
 25 for aesthetics (Cogburn & Silcox, 2008). A deregulated, individuated media  
 26 world supposedly makes consumers into producers, frees the disabled from  
 27 confinement, encourages new subjectivities, rewards intellect and competi-  
 28 tiveness, links people across cultures, and allows billions of flowers to bloom  
 29 in a post-political cornucopia. It is a kind of Marxist/Godardian wet dream,  
 30 where people fish, fornicate, film, and finance from morning to midnight. At  
 31 such moments, one can say that what Eagleton (1982) sardonically named  
 32 The Reader's Liberation Movement is in the house. In his survey of this  
 33 work, Mosco rightly argues that such "myths are important both for what  
 34 they reveal (including a genuine desire for community and democracy) and  
 35 for what they conceal (including the growing concentration of communica-  
 36 tion power in a handful of transnational media businesses)" (2004).

37 In tourism, the aggregated effect of collective knowledge via social media  
 38 that is associated with personal recommendations of destinations is a good  
 39 example of these claims (Popescu & Grefenstette, 2011). Such findings excite  
 40 2.0 advocates, as per the unseemly way that tourism experts egged on by



1 social media salivate over wealthy foreigners; a typical instance is the  
2 discourse of Chinese consumers liberated from the state (Arlt & Thraenhart,  
3 2011). Such sanctioned greed is some distance from research that illustrates  
4 how the social media function as surveillance-and-control devices in places  
5 as diverse as China and Australia (Qiu, 2007) or the World Privacy Forum  
6 proposing that people are in a “one-way mirror society,” where power  
7 accretes to corporations through the supposedly even-handed tool of  
8 interactivity (Dixon, 2010).

9 The fundamental dilemma for adherents of Media Studies 2.0 is this: Can  
10 fans or tourists be said to make rational evaluations of core questions of  
11 social justice such as labor exploitation, patriarchy, racism, climate change,  
12 and neo-imperialism—or in some specifiable way make a difference beyond  
13 their own selves—when they interpret TV unusually, each other about  
14 romantic frustrations, play pirated versions of Scrabble on Facebook, or  
15 take a cruise based on amateur recommendations?

16 Has the society gone too far in supplanting the panicky Woody Allen  
17 nebbishness of 1.0 (“I’m kind of bothered that ...”) with the Panglossian  
18 Pollyanna nerdiness of 2.0 (“Cool stuff”)? Keen, a lapsarian prophet of the  
19 Internet, argues that the new landscape is abuzz with noise and ignorance  
20 rather than subtlety and knowledge (2007, p. 12). He sees a dreary world of  
21 constant clatter and frenzied imagery denaturing aesthetics in favor of  
22 uninterrupted stimulus. This is no 2.0 utopia! Postrel, then editor of the  
23 libertarian *Reason* magazine and later a *New York Times* economics  
24 journalist, wrote a *Wall Street Journal* op-ed welcoming 2.0 as “deeply  
25 threatening to traditional leftist views of commerce ... lending support to the  
26 corporate enemy and even training graduate students who wind up doing  
27 market research” (1999).

### 28 29 *Media Studies 3.0*

30  
31 One needs more *frottage* between Media Studies 1.0 and 2.0, breaking down  
32 the binary between them. Media Studies 1.0 should register struggle, and 2.0  
33 should register structure. Currently, 1.0 draws one’s attention to audience  
34 inoculation and corporate control, but leaves out productive labor and  
35 environmental implications. Media Studies 2.0 uptakes and responses, but  
36 again marginalizes these key topics. Media Studies 1.0 misses moments of  
37 crisis and hope, presenting a subject-free picture of structure but no agency,  
38 other than psychological response, shareholder maximization, and manage-  
39 rial rationality. Its nationalistic cultural policies often deny the banality of  
40 protected cinema, the futility of quota-driven television, and the partiality

1 of who is chosen to create national images and appear in them. Media 2.0  
2 misses forms of domination and exploitation, presenting an institution-free  
3 picture with agency but no structure, other than fan creativity and reader  
4 imagination. Further, both 1.0 and 2.0 are doggedly tied to nativist  
5 epistemologies that must be transcended. The nativism is especially powerful  
6 in the United States, the United Kingdom, and their academic satellites such  
7 as Israel and Australia, where effortless extrapolations from very limited  
8 experience support totalizing theories and norms, due to the hegemony of  
9 English-language publishing and scholarly links to the warfare, welfare,  
10 and cultural bureaucracies. The following remark (paid for by Vodafone)  
11 encapsulates 2.0:

12  
13       Mobile phones have become affective technologies. That is,  
14       objects which mediate the expression, display, experience and  
15       communication of feelings and emotions. ... They are an  
16       extension of the human body ... building and maintaining ...  
17       groups and communities. (Lasén, 2004)

18  
19 This will not do. Thankfully it is challenged by a remark that could come  
20 from 3.0—funded by a nongovernment organization of Mexican electronics  
21 workers:

22  
23       The increasingly faster and more versatile computers, appeal-  
24       ing mobile phones, high-definition TVs, Internet, tiny music  
25       players, ingenious photo cameras, entertaining games consoles  
26       and even electronic pets give us the idea of a developed,  
27       pioneering and modern world. It is indeed a new era for many;  
28       but the dark side of this prosperous world reveals a very  
29       different reality, that far from taking us to the future, takes us  
30       back to a darker past. (Centro de Reflexión y Acción Laboral,  
31       2006)

32  
33 Media Studies 3.0 is as much about experiences as technologies or  
34 institutions. The media color the world. They give it meaning; and the  
35 process is reciprocal. The sounds, stories, and pictures that *are* the media—  
36 whether social or antisocial—actually come from people. Old stories from  
37 oral traditions become commercial narratives. Letters to the editor tell  
38 newspapers what interests their readers. Audience measurements and focus  
39 groups instruct producers on which TV shows are likely to succeed and why.  
40 Fans become creators as they write zines that in turn become story ideas.

1 Marketers trawl street fairs, clubs, and fan sites to uncover emergent trends.  
2 Coca-Cola hires African Americans to drive through the inner city selling  
3 soda and playing hip-hop. AT&T pays San Francisco buskers to mention  
4 the company in their songs. Street performance poets rhyme about Nissan  
5 cars for cash, simultaneously hawking, entertaining, and researching.  
6 Subway's sandwich commercials are marketed as made by teenagers.  
7 Cultural studies graduates become designers, and graduate students in  
8 New York and Los Angeles read scripts for producers and pronounce on  
9 whether they tap into audience interests.

10 Semiotics textbooks that critically deconstruct commercial culture adorn  
11 advertising executives' bookcases. Precariously employed part-timers prowl  
12 the streets with DVD players under their arms to ask target audiences what  
13 they think of trailers for upcoming movies, or while away their time in  
14 theaters spying on how their fellow spectators respond to coming attractions.  
15 Opportunities to vote in the Eurovision Song Contest or a reality program  
16 determine both the success of contestants and the profile of active viewers  
17 who can be monitored and wooed. In all these instances, audience creativity  
18 is important. It informs and frightens producers, simultaneously offering  
19 them leads on stories and trends and daunting them with its changeability  
20 and friskiness. End-user licensing agreements ensure that players of  
21 corporate games online and contributors to official discussion groups about  
22 film or television sign over their cultural moves and access. Such topics  
23 frequently elude 1.0 and 2.0. They do not fit those models.

24 Studying tourism through the media and vice versa must blend ethno-  
25 graphic, political-economic, and aesthetic analyses in a global and local  
26 way, establishing links among the key areas of cultural production around  
27 the world (Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East) and  
28 diasporic and dispossessed communities engaged in their own cultural  
29 production. Media 3.0 needs to be a media-centered version of area studies,  
30 with diasporas as important as regions. It must be animated by collective  
31 identity and power: how human subjects are formed and experience cultural  
32 and social space. Taking its agenda from social movements as well as  
33 intellectual ones, and its methods from economics, politics, communications,  
34 sociology, literature, law, science, medicine, environmental studies, anthro-  
35 pology, history, and art, Media Studies 3.0 should focus on gender, race,  
36 class, sexuality, sustainability, and pleasure, across national lines—an apt  
37 setting for those working on tourism.

38 One can gain some tips on doing this from the history of theorizing  
39 culture. It has usually been studied in two registers: via the social sciences  
40 and the humanities—truth versus beauty. Culture has been a marker of

1 differences and similarities in taste and status, as explored interpretatively or  
2 methodically. In the humanities, cultural texts have long been judged by  
3 criteria of quality, as practiced critically and historically. For their part, the  
4 social sciences have focused on religions, customs, times, and spaces, as  
5 explored ethnographically or statistically. Thus, whereas the humanities  
6 articulate differences through symbolic norms (e.g., which classes have the  
7 cultural capital to appreciate high culture and which do not), the social  
8 sciences articulate differences through social norms (such as, which peoples  
9 cultivate agriculture in keeping with spirituality and which do not)  
10 (Benhabib, 2002; Wallerstein, 1989). This distinction feeds into the Cartesian  
11 dualism separating thought from work. It assumes that humans have two  
12 distinct natures: the intelligent and the corporeal. One is focused on action,  
13 the other on reason. That binary has dominated media studies, posing  
14 oppositions of society versus economy and audience versus meaning. It  
15 haunts 1.0 and 2.0.

16 For all its sticky origins in Cartesianism, this bifurcation and silencing of  
17 labor and culture cannot and should not hold. Historically, the best critical  
18 political economy and the best cultural studies have worked through the  
19 imbrication of power and signification. Blending them can heal the fissure  
20 between fact and interpretation, the social sciences and the humanities, and  
21 truth and beauty, under the sign of a principled approach to cultural  
22 democracy. Grossberg recommends “politicizing theory and theorizing  
23 politics” by combining abstraction and grounded analysis (1997). That  
24 requires a focus on the contradictions of organizational structures, their  
25 articulations with everyday living and textuality and their intrication with  
26 the polity and economy, addressing production, consumption, and social  
27 stratification. Half a century ago, Smythe studied TV texts as “a group of  
28 symbols” that “serve as a medium of exchange between the mass media and  
29 the audience.” He recognized that analyses of infrastructure and content  
30 must be supplemented by accounting for the conditions under which culture  
31 is made, circulated, received, interpreted, and criticized: “The produced  
32 program is ... more than the sum of the program ingredients” because it is  
33 encrusted with “contextual and explicit layers of meaning” that emerge  
34 during its creation and consumption (1954, p. 143).

35 Relevant work toward 3.0 is already underway. Rajagopal notes that  
36 because the television, the telephone, the Internet, the neoliberal, and the  
37 outgoing tourist are relatively new to India, “markets and media generate  
38 new kinds of rights and new kinds of imagination ... novel ways of  
39 exercising citizenship rights and conceiving politics” (2001). For Winocur  
40 (2002), women’s talkback radio in Latin America since the fall of US-backed

1 dictatorships has offered a simultaneously individual and social forum for  
 2 new expressions of citizenship in the context of decentered politics, emergent  
 3 identities, minority rights, and gender issues—a public space that transcends  
 4 the subordination of difference and the privileging of elite experience. Mosco  
 5 (2004) starts from the power of mythology then “builds a bridge to political  
 6 economy” in his investigation of neoliberal *doxa* about empowerment,  
 7 insisting on “the mutually constitutive relationship between political  
 8 economy and cultural studies” as each mounts “a critique of the other.”  
 9 One can note similar intent animating such innovations as Sarai, the  
 10 Free Software Foundation, and the Alternative Law Forum—exemplary  
 11 instances of Media Studies 3.0 in formation. They blend internationalism,  
 12 political economy, ethnography, and textual analysis, and resist the binarism  
 13 of 1.0 and 2.0.

14 The art world can incarnate this approach in its critical views of tourism.  
 15 For instance, Amsterdam’s urbanscreens.org uses electronic billboards as  
 16 public space to encourage active citizenship, as do Ars Electronica of Linz  
 17 and Melbourne’s Federation Square. Artists draw attention to personal  
 18 multimedia messaging services and corporate occupancy of public space by  
 19 placing passersby on billboards, as per Zhang Ga’s Times Square *People’s*  
 20 *Portrait*, for all the world a throwback to Judy Holliday’s moment of  
 21 celebrity in the classic Hollywood film *It Should Happen to You* (George  
 22 Cukor, 1954), when she buys advertising space in Columbus Circle to **AU:!**  
 23 promote herself.

24 Anderson and Wolff (2010), lapsed sacerdotal zealots of the new media  
 25 from *Wired* magazine, say the web is dead because social networks and  
 26 software applications are supplanting the old fantasy of an open frontier  
 27 with a new hegemony of a few institutions. Schiller (2007) challenges social  
 28 media enthusiasts to query the way that economic inequalities fuel new  
 29 consumer needs, as people rush to purchase inferior services at high cost. In  
 30 the United States, for instance, the decline in governmental oversight of  
 31 the media since World War II has diminished the quality and regulation of  
 32 competition, allowing telecommunication companies to exploit the need  
 33 for connectedness in times of fragmentation.

34  
 35

## 36 CONCLUSION

37

38 To understand media infrastructure, it is necessary to address technological  
 39 innovation, regulation, labor, ownership, control, and environmental impact,  
 40 utilizing ethnographic, political-economic, scientific, and public-policy

1 research. To understand content, one must address production and under-  
 2 take content and textual analysis, combining statistical and hermeneutic  
 3 methods. To understand audiences, ratings, uses-and-gratifications, effects,  
 4 active-audience, ethnographic, and psychoanalytic traditions, combining  
 5 quantitative and qualitative measures should be standard.

6 Two examples that use 3.0 can be used to show the relationship between  
 7 the media and tourism. They concern major tourist spots thematized in  
 8 films. Each involves environmental destruction and popular responses to  
 9 corporate malevolence. They blend older and newer media in artful ways  
 10 appropriate to 3.0.

11 Much of Fox Studios' *Titanic* (Cameron, 1997) was shot in the Mexican  
 12 village of Popotla. During the making of the picture, the national film studio  
 13 Churubusco was renovated and a National Film Commission established,  
 14 with satellites across the country providing *gabacho* moguls trips in  
 15 governors' helicopters, among other services. Restoring Mexico to the  
 16 Hollywood map gained the film's director Cameron the Order of the Aztec  
 17 Eagle from a grateful government. *Titanic* was, in this context, a screen  
 18 testimony to the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement/Tratado de  
 19 Libre Comercio, which has seen offshore film and television production in  
 20 Mexico increase thanks to easy shipment of technology, especially for low-  
 21 budget shoots. Studio owner Rupert Murdoch approvingly cited the number  
 22 of workers invisibly employed in making the film:

23  
 24 this cross-border cultural co-operation is not the result of  
 25 regulation, but market forces. It's the freedom to move  
 26 capital, technology and talent around the world that adds  
 27 value, invigorates ailing markets, creates new ones.  
 28

29 Meanwhile, local Mexican film production spiraled downwards, from 747  
 30 titles in the decade prior to the agreement/tratado to 212 the following  
 31 decade (Maxwell & Miller, 2006; Miller, Govil, McMurria, Maxwell, &  
 32 Wang, 2005, pp. 164–65).

33 There is a cruel irony to this liquid globalization of cultural labor: the  
 34 cost of the film could have provided safe drinking water to 600,000 people  
 35 for a year. People submerged in the credits to *Titanic* (or not listed at all)  
 36 supposedly benefited from the textualization of a boat laden with wealthy  
 37 tourists and *lumpen* steerage that had been sunk by invisible ice and business  
 38 bombast 80 years earlier. During filming, Popotla was cut off from the sea  
 39 and local fisheries by a 6-foot-high and 500-foot long movie wall, built to  
 40 keep citizens away. Fox's chlorination of surrounding seawater decimated

1 sea urchins, which locals had long harvested, and reduced overall fish  
 2 levels by a third (Kushner, 1998; Miller et al., 2005, p. 165). Today, Popotla  
 3 is promoted as a destination for smiling foreigners eager to see where  
 4 their favorite drowning sequences were shot at the charmingly named  
 5 “Foxploration” ([http://www.bajatours.org/about\\_rosarito\\_beach](http://www.bajatours.org/about_rosarito_beach); [http://](http://www.rosaritoinn.com/foxtour.htm)  
 6 [www.rosaritoinn.com/foxtour.htm](http://www.rosaritoinn.com/foxtour.htm)).

7 Such arrogant despoliation has not gone unanswered. In collaboration  
 8 with artists like Jim Bliesner, the Popotlanos decorated the wall with rubbish  
 9 to ridicule the filmmakers, and adopted the rallying cry *mariscos libre* (free-  
 10 dom for shellfish). (Photographs are available at [rtmark.com/popotlaimages](http://rtmark.com/popotlaimages.html).  
 11 [html](http://rtmark.com/popotlaimages.html).) This nifty environmental critique has largely eluded journalistic  
 12 and scholarly analysis. Ars Electronica awarded the Popotlanos a prize for  
 13 “symbolic low-tech resistance to real high-tech destruction” that was in  
 14 keeping with the movie’s textual—if not industrial—class politics. But the  
 15 award was a fraction of the money Ars Electronica gave the film’s producers  
 16 for their innovative special effects. Resistance has come from groups  
 17 using social media to pose as officials from the World Trade Organization  
 18 to underscore the damage done to livelihoods and the environment. The  
 19 Popotlanos’ view of Cameron’s putatively green, pro-indigenous, anti-  
 20 imperialist *Avatar* (2009) is not on record, but their town is currently vilified  
 21 by the likes of *The Washington Times* as a site for “illegals” seeking to enter  
 22 the United States (Coombe & Herman, 2000; [gatt.org/popotla.html](http://gatt.org/popotla.html);  
 23 Kushner, 1998; *Popotla vs. Titanic*, n.d.; Sekula, 2001; Spagat, 2010).

24 Cameron acknowledges the need to change filmmaking in light of the  
 25 ecological crisis. He is quick to point out that “*Avatar* was an enormous  
 26 battle film that took place in a rainforest but was 100% C[omputer-]  
 27 G[enerated]” (Cheney, 2010; quoted in Miller, 2010). When he castigated the  
 28 Pacific Northwest for extracting oil from tar sands, the *Edmonton Sun*  
 29 editorialized in best un-Canadian fashion “James Cameron is a Hypocrite”  
 30 for working in California, where energy comes from power companies that  
 31 use coal from elsewhere (*Edmonton Sun*, 2010).

32 Three years after *Titanic*, Fox made *The Beach* (Boyle, 2000), where a  
 33 modern-day Asian Eden suddenly turns nasty for jaded tourists. Like the  
 34 earlier film, it starred the environmental moralist Leonardo DiCaprio  
 35 (Biggs, 2000). *The Beach* was shot in Maya Beach, part of Thailand’s Phi Phi  
 36 Islands National Park. Natural scenery was bulldozed because it did not fit  
 37 the company’s fantasy of a tropical idyll: sand dunes were relocated, flora  
 38 rearranged, and a new strip of coconut palms planted. The producers paid  
 39 off the government with a donation to the Royal Forestry Department, and  
 40 campaigned with the Tourism Authority to twin the picture as a promotion




1 for the country. The damaged sand dunes of the region collapsed in the next  
2 monsoon, their natural defenses against erosion destroyed by Hollywood  
3 bulldozers. Thai environmental and pro-democracy activists publicized this  
4 arrogant despoliation, while the director claimed the film was “raising  
5 environmental consciousness” among a local population whose appreciation  
6 of these things lagged “behind” US “awareness” (Law, Bunnell, & Ong,  
7 2007; Miller et al., 2005; Shoaib, 2001; Tzanelli, 2006). Director Boyle  
8 heroically announced his intention to “give something back to Thailand” by  
9 hiring Thai apprentices but then complained that “[w]e were hauling 300  
10 fucking people around wherever we went. And you know how hard it is to  
11 learn Thai names. Every lunchtime was like a prime minister’s reception”  
12 (quoted in Gilbey, 2002). Before the film was released—but no doubt after  
13 having had their consciousness raised—the Ao Nang Tambon Administra-  
14 tion Organization, the Krabi Provincial Administration Organization, and  
15 various environmental groups filed a suit against Fox and local officialdom  
16 for contravening the National Parks Act and the Environmental Protection  
17 Act. It took seven years, but the Thai Supreme Court found in their favor in  
18 2006 (*The Nation*, 2006). The reaction of the “300 fucking people” who were  
19 being “hailed around” during production is not on record.

20 The political-economic background to such ecologically destructive  
21 filmmaking implicates tourism. Structural adjustment as peddled by  
22 neoliberal high priests at the World Bank, the International Monetary  
23 Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the sovereign states that  
24 dominate them has encouraged the Global South to turn away from  
25 subsistence agriculture and toward tradable services, beyond manufacturing  
26 capacity and in the direction of human exchange. In much of Southeast  
27 Asia, these policies pushed people into littoral regions in search of work.  
28 Fish-farming corporations created a new aquaculture, displacing the natural  
29 environment of mangroves and coral reefs that protect people and land. The  
30 requirement to reconstitute themselves as entertaining heritage sites and  
31 decadent tourism playgrounds induced Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia  
32 to undertake massive construction projects. They built resorts at the point  
33 where high tides lap, attracting more and more workers and decimating  
34 more and more natural protection. Areas that had not been directed to  
35 remove natural barriers suffered dramatically fewer casualties in the 2004  
36 tsunami (Bidwai, 2005; Sharma, 2005; Shiva, 2005). That ugly side to  
37 tourism and the media is something 3.0 can specify, engage, and struggle  
38 against. Doing so might make for a truly social media.

39  
40



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