Catalog Home Page

Committees with leaks

Ghosh, S.P. and Roy, J. (2015) Committees with leaks. Games and Economic Behavior, 90 . pp. 207-214.

Link to Published Version:
*Subscription may be required
Free to read:
*No subscription required


We analyze the quality (informativeness and efficiency) of advice obtained from a committee of careerist experts where voting is secret but voting profiles are 'leaked' with an exogenously given probability. We show that fully informative voting is achievable only when the common prior is not too informative, the committee uses the unanimity rule and faces random leakage. It is then shown that informativeness and efficiency are mutually exclusive properties of committees with careerist experts.

Item Type: Journal Article
Murdoch Affiliation: School of Management and Governance
Publisher: Academic Press Inc.
Copyright: © 2015 Elsevier Inc.
Item Control Page Item Control Page