Is the human mind a Turing machine?
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King, D. (1996) Is the human mind a Turing machine? Synthese, 108 (3). pp. 379-389.
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Abstract
In this paper I discuss the topics of mechanism and algorithmicity. I emphasise that a characterisation of algorithmicity such as the Turing machine is iterative; and I argue that if the human mind can solve problems that no Turing machine can, the mind must depend on some non-iterative principle — in fact, Cantor's second principle of generation, a principle of the actual infinite rather than the potential infinite of Turing machines. But as there has been theorisation that all physical systems can be represented by Turing machines, I investigate claims that seem to contradict this: specifically, claims that there are noncomputable phenomena. One conclusion I reach is that if it is believed that the human mind is more than a Turing machine, a belief in a kind of Cartesian dualist gulf between the mental and the physical is concomitant.
| Item Type: | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Murdoch Affiliation(s): | School of Humanities |
| Publisher: | Kluwer Academic Publishers |
| URI: | http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/19156 |
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