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How to cook rice: A review of ingredients for teaching anti-prejudice

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ABSTRACT

There is a pressing need to address prejudice, racism and discrimination against marginalised groups in Australia. This involves change from the structural to the individual level. In this paper, we discuss the merits of individual anti-prejudice mechanisms within the Australian context. First, we expand on nine mechanisms described in a previous paper and then review five new mechanisms. We conclude that while some mechanisms are likely to be useful regardless of location, others need to be tailored to the local context. We also conclude that effective interventions need to utilise multiple mechanisms. It is hoped that the synthesis of the different mechanisms provided here will assist anti-prejudice researchers, practitioners and policymakers striving to improve relations between different groups in our society.
In a previous paper, Pedersen, Walker and Wise (2005) wrote of an old Chinese proverb “Talk does not cook rice”. By this, they suggested that instead of just talking or theorising about prejudice reduction, social action should be taken. Many practitioners, however, are not familiar with effective mechanisms to reduce prejudice. In the present paper, we review the primarily Australian literature on how to reduce prejudice successfully. In other words, we write of the ‘ingredients’ (mechanisms) of successful anti-prejudice interventions.

Pedersen et al. (2005) pointed to nine primary mechanisms that could be employed in anti-prejudice interventions. The present paper significantly updates that review, presenting more evidence of the effectiveness of these nine identified mechanisms. The present paper then discusses five new mechanisms, not outlined in the earlier paper, along with evidence of their effectiveness.

For the purposes of this paper, we use the term prejudice to refer to “a negative evaluation of a social group or a negative evaluation of an individual that is significantly based on the individual’s group membership” (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003, p. 414) and racism as race-related forms of such prejudice. Although beyond the scope of this paper, we note that the structural elements of oppression are considered elsewhere (see Donovan & Vlais, 2006; Paradies, Chandrakumar, Klocker, Frere, Webster, Burrell & McLean, 2009). The focus here is therefore mostly on education; that is, how to implement individual and interpersonal interventions to reduce prejudice. As much as possible, we concentrate on Australian research, since prejudice and racism are contextual and will not be experienced in precisely the same way in other nations (Dunn, Forrest, Burnley, & McDonald, 2004; Forrest & Dunn, 2007).
Fourteen Mechanisms to Reduce Prejudice

We now present 14 mechanisms for reducing prejudice and racism in individual and interpersonal contexts. We update what we now know about the first nine that were first presented in Pedersen et al. (2005) and provide a more detailed discussion of the remaining five.

The Provision of Information

While giving people correct information about marginalised groups usually seems the most sensible way of reducing prejudice (for instance, through some approaches to cultural awareness training), there are various limitations to consider with this approach. First, this mechanism rarely works when delivered in isolation; just giving information does not change behavior. Such a mechanism has also been criticised for homogenising and essentialising culture and minority groups, and can have an unintended effect of confirming negative stereotypes or inventing new ones (Fozdar, Wilding, & Hawkins, 2009). However, in conjunction other mechanisms, it has the potential to be effective.

Providing accurate information is also known as dispelling “false beliefs” (Pedersen, Contos, Griffiths, Bishop, & Walker, 2000) or as myth-busting (Wise & Ali, 2008). To update this mechanism, three examples will be given. First, anti-Indigenous prejudice includes a number of pervasive false beliefs such as “being Indigenous entitles a person to more social security benefits”. These beliefs correlated with prejudice (e.g., Pedersen et al., 2000), and research indicates that providing accurate information decreases acceptance of these beliefs (Batterham, 2001; Hill & Augoustinos, 2001; Issues
Second, prejudiced people are significantly more likely to accept inaccurate information such as “Muslims want Australia to be an Islamic country” and other simplistic negative media-related beliefs than non-prejudiced people (Pedersen & Hartley, 2009). These authors found an overall correlation of 0.88 between prejudice and these negative beliefs. Other research indicates that providing accurate information on this topic significantly decreases acceptance of those negative media-related beliefs and marginally decreases prejudice (Pedersen, Aly, Hartley & McGarty, 2009). Similarly, Issues Deliberation Australia (2001) found that providing information about Muslim issues decreased negativity about Muslim immigrants as well as the perception that Muslims have a negative impact on Australia’s security and harmony. Participants also reported an increase in knowledge about Muslim-related issues.

Third, evidence indicates that prejudice is linked with accepting false beliefs such as “asylum seekers are queue jumpers” (Pedersen, Watt, & Hansen, 2006). Although we are not aware of any studies that have done so, there is certainly a wide range of accurate information that could be given in an intervention to dispel false beliefs such as this. For example, asylum seekers are often unaware that there is a ‘queue’ that needs to be joined, and even if they were aware they may not have the capacity to join the ‘queue’.

While dispelling “myths” is a useful mechanism for change, is should not be used in isolation. Barlow, Louis and Pedersen (2008) found that giving accurate information about the Indigenous issues described above (e.g., about social security, etc.) significantly reduced false beliefs. However, they also found that prejudice remained constant.
Similarly, in another study, researchers found that simply presenting facts about older workers did not increase positive attitudes toward that group (Gringart, Helmes, & Speelman, 2008). Yet they found that presenting facts, coupled with a cognitive dissonance mechanism, resulted in more positive attitudes (see 6th mechanism, Dissonance).

Involving the Audience with Respect from Both Sides

Rather than simply “preaching” information at participants in anti-prejudice interventions, it is important to involve them in the process. For example, it may be that the triggers for prejudice may not be the same for all people. This suggests that it is advisable to listen and respond appropriately to participants (also see Hollinsworth, 2008, on being ready to ‘shift focus’, p. 50). Also, it is important that participants be given space to air their ideas, even when some of their views are perceived as “racist”. The chance of overt hostility or resistance within an anti-prejudice intervention can be diminished by encouraging participants to act respectfully towards one another. One successful anti-prejudice intervention involved an in-depth discussion on Indigenous people and the issue of “special treatment” (Pedersen & Barlow, 2008). It was stressed that with this particular issue, there were no “right” or “wrong” responses; that is, participants should make their own minds up based on an in-depth analysis of the issue.

At the end of the intervention when information was fed back to participants, one participant informed the workshop leader that one of the key factors which changed her mind about this controversial issue was being encouraged to think for herself.

Further, if there are a number of minority group members within the intervention, and if small-group work is being undertaken, it is important for minority members to
have the option to break into a group of their own where a “safer” environment is more likely (Malin, 1999).

A related issue is the open labelling of people who display prejudiced behaviours as being prejudiced or “racists” (Guerin, 2005a; Hollinsworth, 2006). First, people who report themselves as prejudiced are few and far between. Forrest and Dunn (2008) found that across Australian states/territories, 8-17% of approximately 12,000 respondents in phone surveys reported themselves as prejudiced compared with 83-93% who acknowledged that racial prejudice exists in Australia. Further, majority group members often distance themselves from overt prejudice, rationalise their outgroup negativity, and position themselves as being non-prejudiced (Augoustinos & Every, 2007).

In view of these points, it is therefore important to examine the social context of “racism” in terms of the issue at hand, the motivations behind the comment, and the likely social effects. Thus, accusing a participant of being prejudiced can be alienating and reduce the likelihood of a positive result from the interaction (see 3rd mechanism, ‘Emotions’). When implementing an anti-prejudice intervention, we argue that it is ill-advised to publicly label a participant in an anti-prejudice intervention as “racist” or “prejudiced” but it is instead preferable to identify the source of their behaviour and address this appropriately.

Choose Emotions to Tackle Wisely

Research indicates a significant inverse relationship between prejudice and collective guilt (Halloran, 2007). In other words, the more people report feelings of collective guilt in relation to a group, the less likely they are to feel prejudice against them (we note the relationship is likely to be bi-directional). However, as noted by
McGarty, Pedersen, Leach, Mansell, Waller and Bliuc (2005), few people report feelings of collective guilt at all, perhaps because guilt is an aversive emotion and people will attempt to avoid it at all costs (Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). This leads us to recommend that it may be more appropriate to tap into other emotions in anti-prejudice interventions. For example, moral outrage is also linked with prejudice (Barlow, Pedersen, & Louis, 2008) but given this is more of an other-focused emotion, it may be more useful within anti-prejudice interventions. Empathy may also be a more appropriate emotion to encourage. Prejudice and empathy have been found to be negatively related in a number of studies (e.g., Pedersen, Beven, Walker & Griffiths, 2004). Empathy can lead to increased liking for, and altruism towards others (also see Paradies et al. 2009), as well as a reconsideration of the appropriateness of prejudice (Crandall & Eshleman 2003). We differentiate between empathy and other related emotions such as pity or sympathy by defining empathy as per Thomas, McGarty and Mavor (in press) as the compassion involved in attempting to vicariously place oneself in somebody else’s shoes.

Returning to the distinction between collective guilt and empathy, Pedersen and Barlow (2008) note that there is a fine line between introducing guilt-related topics and avoiding them. Collective guilt and empathy are in fact strongly correlated (e.g., Pedersen et al., 2004). However, the extent to which an intervention should focus on any given emotion depends on the style adopted, the target group, and the context more generally. Also, if one’s goal is social action rather than prejudice reduction, research indicates that moral outrage may be more appropriate (Thomas, 2005, with regard to strategies to combat poverty). Finally, it is also worth noting that most anti-prejudice
interventions aim for their participants to “walk in somebody else’s shoes”; that is, invoke empathy (e.g., Malin, 1999) even if they do not explicitly state this.

Emphasize Commonality and Difference

Anti-prejudice interventions relevant to specific cultural groups often must address issues of difference or diversity between (as well as within) groups. While it is important for participants in an intervention to feel some similarity with members of the target group, there are risks involved in concentrating on either commonality or difference alone. Some researchers argue that there are problems assuming a causal relationship between perceiving strong inter-group differences and inter-group bias and that as it is unfeasible and undesirable to eliminate social categories, these distinctions should be valued (Park & Judd, 2005). Park and Judd (2005) make the further point that a multicultural society is a strength across a number of dimensions including creativity, productivity, problem-solving techniques and intellectual capabilities.

An Australian example comes from Tilbury (2007), who examined the way that asylum seeker advocates emphasised similarity in an attempt to turn around negative attitudes toward asylum seekers in Albany, Western Australia. Tilbury argued that by concentrating on their similarity to mainstream Australia this may have reinforced the notion of homogeneity – “be like us or you won’t fit in”. It is a difficult situation, however, because negative “difference” between asylum seekers and Australians generally had been strongly emphasised in the media at that time (Pedersen, Watt & Hansen, 2006).

Another notable issue is “special treatment” regarding Indigenous Australians – the need to see disadvantage as well as difference. This is particularly important given
that many Australians espouse the value of treating all Australians the same (Cowlishaw, 2006; Pedersen & Barlow, 2008). It is often necessary to discuss the lack of “a level playing field” between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people; in other words, disadvantage between groups. But it is also essential to stress the commonalities between groups. For example, given the relatively small proportion of Indigenous people in Australia (and other marginalised groups such as Muslim Australians and asylum seekers), much information originates from the media. However, as will be discussed later, the press often emphasises negative behaviour (e.g., terrorism; vandalism; anti-social behaviour).

In summary, it is important for anti-prejudice interventions to include a sophisticated approach to both the commonalities and the differences including, where possible, a decentering of mainstream Australia as the implicit norm to which all other groups should be compared (see mechanism 10, ‘Whiteness’).

Meet Local Needs

It is important to be aware of potential differences in participants’ attitudes, or strength of attitudes, across location and situation. Research across disciplines has found geographical differences in prejudiced attitudes (e.g., Forrest & Dunn, 2007; Markus & Dharmalingam, 2008; Pedersen et al., 2000). Some geographical differences can be quite subtle. For example, in one Western Australian study, the correlation between prejudice against asylum seekers and the fear of terrorism was stronger in a location where asylum seeker issues were more salient (Pedersen, Watt, & Griffiths, 2007). As argued by Guerin and Guerin (2007), we are likely to have much more of an effect if we are specific about the needs of a particular locality, and spend time with local communities to learn
about their situations. Some mechanisms such as consensus effects (see 6th mechanism) and white privilege (see 10th mechanism) will be more applicable in some locations than others.

Dissonance

Anti-prejudice researchers have often argued that pointing out incompatibility among beliefs can be influential in reducing prejudice (e.g., Gawronski, Peters, Brochu, & Strack, 2008). While this does not present new information, it does highlight incompatible information. Although a promising avenue of research, dissonance may not always be a useful tool as “people can readily hold apparently contradictory beliefs” (Donovan & Vlais, 2006, p. 116). It is argued that people are able to reduce dissonance by trivialisation (Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995) and ingroup support for one’s position (McKimmie, Terry, Hogg, Manstead, Spears & Doosje, 2003). Older people are more likely to seek cognitive consistency (Brown, Asher, & Cialdini, 2005) and dissonance is also affected by the salience of the issue to participants (McKimmie et al., 2003) – if the issue is not important to the perceiver, why bother reconciling inconsistencies (Guerin, 2001)? Finally, non-Western cultures may not be as concerned with consistency as Western cultures (Heine & Lehman, 1997).

It has been suggested that dissonance may be most effective with highly prejudiced individuals (Fozdar et al., 2009) or those who had not previously considered their own prejudices. Three factors enhance the effectiveness of this mechanism: recognition of inappropriate past behaviour, commitment to appropriate future behaviour and declarations of non-prejudice to others - especially in public (Gringart, Helmes & Speelman, 2008).
In short, while there are caveats to cognitive dissonance as a mechanism, in Western settings at least, it would appear that there is a tendency or social push (Guerin, 2001) for people to strive for attitudinal consistency (Draycott & Dabbs, 1998). Thus, it would be worthwhile using this mechanism within an anti-prejudice intervention. However, it is more effective in association with other mechanisms rather than in isolation (Gringart et al., 2008).

Evaluation

One of the problems for those wanting to facilitate prejudice reduction is that although informal feedback by participants in Australian studies is often extremely promising (e.g., Roberts & Fozdar, in press; Malin, 1999; Ranzijn, McConnachie, Day, Nolan, & Wharton, 2008), there are few studies which properly evaluate anti-prejudice interventions in Australia. We are aware of just eight Australian studies reporting pre-test and a post-test assessment of an anti-prejudice intervention, which in the absence of a control group is not in itself a strong form of evaluation (Hill & Augoustinos, 2001; Issues Deliberation Australia, 2001; 2007; Mooney, Bauman, Westwood, Kelaher, Tibben, & Jalaludin, 2005; Pedersen, Aly, Hartley & McGarty, 2009; Pedersen & Barlow, 2008; Pedersen, Paradies, Dunn & Hartley, 2010; Teague, 2010). Only Hill and Augoustinos (2001) and Pedersen et al. (2010) conducted a delayed post-test. It is likely that addressing prejudice is a long-term process involving critical awareness of the issue, and engagement over time.

Therefore, one of the mechanisms that practitioners can develop is to evaluate anti-prejudice interventions. If possible, this should be replicated in other contexts and over time.
Consensus: Building and Invoking Social Norms

Social norms are powerful and can legitimise attitudes (e.g., Terry, Hogg, & Blackwood, 2001). Research in the U.S. has found that giving feedback to students that their negative views were not consensually shared can reduce prejudice (Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001). In another U.S. study, simply hearing another person oppose racism publicly increased anti-racist views (Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham & Vaughn, 1994). Conversely, hostile group norms can increase prejudice even within prejudice-reduction interventions (Myers & Bishop, 1970). However, as found by Zitek and Hebl (2007), prejudice is more likely to be reduced when clear social norms exist (e.g., with respect to prejudice against Blacks as opposed to prejudice against ex-convicts).

Recent Australian research suggests that highly prejudiced individuals are significantly more likely to over-estimate their support in the community compared to low prejudice people. This was found regarding attitudes toward Indigenous Australians and asylum seekers (Pedersen, Griffiths & Watt, 2008), mandatory detention (Hartley & Pedersen, 2007), and Muslim Australians (Pedersen & Hartley, 2009). It may be best to use *injunctive* norms (involving approval/disapproval) rather than simply *descriptive* norms (involving common attitudes or behaviour) (Masser & Phillips, 2003). Masser and Moffat (2006) found that where there was no clear social norm regarding attitudes toward gays, prejudiced attitudes translated into subtle discriminatory behaviour. They concluded that “it may just be sufficient for those with prejudiced attitudes to be sure that it is not the ‘wrong thing to do’ for their attitudes to predict some form of discrimination” (p. 138). In a recent Brisbane study it was found that attitudes toward Muslim Australians were improved by hearing that others had positive attitudes (Randjelovic,
Believing oneself to be in the majority can lead to people being more forthright in their opinions, less willing to compromise, and less likely to modify their views (Miller, 1993). Thus, as argued by Pedersen, Griffiths and Watt (2008), as a result they have an influence that is disproportionate to their actual numbers. Anti-prejudice interventions therefore need to account for attitudes toward marginalised groups and in particular the fact that participants who are highly rejecting of “outgroups” are likely to over-estimate their support in the community. Being convinced this is not the case appears to be a useful anti-prejudice mechanism.

Arranging Appropriate Contact

The Contact Hypothesis

Allport (1954) argued that inter-group contact under the right circumstances is useful in combating prejudice. Four conditions were said to facilitate positive attitudes: conflicting groups must have equal status within the contact situation; there should be no competition along group lines within the contact situation; groups must seek superordinate goals within the contact situation; and relevant institutional authorities must sanction the intergroup contact and must endorse a reduction in intergroup tensions. Allport argued that unless these conditions are in place, negativity may increase.

Some evidence, however, suggests that most contact leads to less prejudice regardless of whether all four of these conditions are in place (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). These authors suggested that the conditions may facilitate the reduction of prejudice rather than being necessary to such reductions. However, other research finds that contact does not always lead to positive attitudes – at least in the Australian setting (Pedersen, 2009). Such negativity can also lead to what is known as 'contact valence
asymmetry'; in one study, White Australians attended to ethnic background more in the
future when prior intergroup contact was negative (Paolini, Harwood & Rubin, 2009).
Also, Vorauer (2007) found that participants who were relatively low in prejudice were
unresponsive to contact with an outgroup member; presumably due to a “switching off”
of generalisations (p. 916) and seeing contact more in terms of themselves rather than the
outgroup.

Despite the large body of evidence in support of the contact hypothesis, it has
been noted by Fozdar et al. (2009) that many of the studies in this area have been
conducted in ‘experimental’ rather than ‘real world’ contexts and, as already noted,
contact can at times lead to more prejudice. For example, at times severe disadvantage
can lead some people – regardless of cultural background – to engage in what some
would consider anti-social behaviour (see Pedersen et al., 2000). There are often
cultural/contextual reasons why contact may not reduce prejudice (Guerin & Guerin,
2007). Similarly, Putnam (2007) found in a large-scale American study that, in the short
term, immigration and ethnic diversity can reduce social solidarity and inter-racial trust.
As he put it, “people living in ethnically diverse settings appear to ‘hunker down’- that is,
to pull in like a turtle” (p. 149). Forrest and Dunn (2010) further indicated that there are
locations where inter-group friction has lasted a long time and a range of antecedents
(e.g., stereotyping of “outgroups” in popular culture) are likely to be responsible for
contact in isolation being unable to reduce prejudice.

Given that positive contact has the potential to change attitudes for the better,
including marginalised groups into the attitude change process should be beneficial.
However, prejudiced “mainstream” Australia should not expect marginalised groups to
reduce their prejudice for them. Although representatives of target groups should be invited to, and ideally involved, in anti-prejudice interventions, it may be more appropriate in some circumstances to include representations and voices of the target group by other means such as DVDs (e.g., Pedersen & Barlow, 2008). The primary responsibility lies with the perpetrators, not the groups which are negatively targeted, to rectify issues of prejudice.

**Experiential-Schemata Function**

Relatively, we now briefly describe some related research on the function of attitudes; more particularly, the experiential-schemata function (Herek, 1987). As touched on above, it is important to consider people’s own experience in addressing prejudice; these experiences can be both positive and negative. For example, personal experience (or the experiential-schemata function) is a major factor with regard to attitudes toward Indigenous Australians and Muslim Australians (Griffiths & Pedersen, 2009). As noted, it may be that because of serious disadvantage, some anti-social behaviour is witnessed (Pedersen et al., 2000). It is important to acknowledge that negative experience is a real ‘lived’ experience for some participants, and one that needs to be dealt with respectfully in anti-prejudice interventions. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this issue in detail, but possible solutions include highlighting the fallacy of stereotyping and essentialising whole groups of people based on individual experiences as well as presenting broader facts/figures without invalidating the participants lived experienced.

**Group Identities**

As noted by Hollinsworth (2006), when addressing issues such as prejudice and racism, we need to reflect on our own identity. We briefly describe below two identities
which have been linked with prejudice: a sense of national identity, and the hidden
identity of whiteness.

*Group Identity – Nationalism.* One group identity that is often linked with
prejudice is national identity. While there are many, and at times contradictory,
definitions of national identity, the relationship between such identity and prejudice have
been noted (e.g., Gale, 2004). The discourse of nationalism is frequently used to
undermine the legitimacy of minority group identifications with minority identities such
as Indigenous viewed as divisive and threatening to national unity (e.g., Augoustinos,
Tuffin & Rapley, 1999). As noted by Every and Augoustinos (2008), the discourse
regarding national identity can be used to *include* “outgroups” (in their case, Australian
asylum seekers) as well as *exclude* them. Hage (1998, p. 52) argues that racist strategies
of exclusion and inclusion should be represented as nationalist practices with some
people perceiving themselves as more or less national than others.

In the Australian context, people who score higher on nationalism are more
prejudiced against Indigenous Australians (Pedersen & Walker, 1997), asylum seekers
(Nickerson & Louis, 2008) and Muslim Australians (Pedersen & Hartley, 2009). Thus, it
would be useful for anti-prejudice interventions to examine what being Australian means,
and whether this national identity is in fact one that includes all Australians.

*Group Identity – Whiteness.* Whiteness studies examine the unearned and often
unconscious privileges afforded white people in many countries (see McIntosh, 1990).
Whiteness is often invisible to white people; unlike other marginalised ethnocultural
groups, it is not seen as a salient racial identity by white people and is thus uninterrogated
(Saxton, 2004). Although exploration of white privilege in pedagogy is increasingly
common in Australia and elsewhere (e.g., Green & Sonn, 2005), little research examines the effectiveness of this approach using a pre-test/post-test, with the exception of a couple of American college interventions showing inconsistent results (Boatright-Horowitz, 2005; Case, 2007; Johnson, Antle, & Barbee, 2009). Unfortunately, there is not enough research to analyse the effects of this type of intervention with any certainty. However, it is likely that a white privilege intervention will be more useful in some contexts than in others. As noted by Fozdar et al. (2009) among others, many intersecting factors are related to oppression, including age, class, disability, gender and sexuality.

We argue, therefore, that in an anti-prejudice intervention, using the concept of white privilege is likely to be more effective with a generally privileged group of participants than another group who may be white but disadvantaged in other respects. Also, whiteness interventions are more likely to be useful when the participants are primarily white. Although there is some debate on the utility of addressing non-white prejudice, it may be necessary to do so when strategists are working with a primarily non-white group. It is also important to note that the little research on this topic finds no difference in prejudice in ‘white’ vs. ‘non-white’ participants (e.g., Pedersen & Barlow, 2008; White & Abu-Rayya, 2009).

In short, it would appear that the jury is still out on the use of highlighting white privilege in anti-prejudice interventions. We also note that we have interpreted “whiteness” literally – to do with white skin and associated structural advantages. However, a number of researchers such as Colic-Peisker (2005) argue that “whiteness” is also about class, language, status and other individual characteristics that can be observed in social interactions. It is often not clear within individual studies which interpretation of
whiteness has been used; that is, whether whiteness incorporates other factors (e.g., class) under the general umbrella or whether such factors complicate whiteness. It has been noted elsewhere that anti-prejudice researchers can take a “whole-of-community approach” which takes into account prejudice across all peoples regardless of culture (Paradies et al. 2009). However, depending on the context, it is also be important to explore the privilege enjoyed by white Australians in particular.

Finding Alternative Talk

We need to appreciate how important social relationships are both generally and contextually with respect to prejudice - people wish to maintain status and reputation within their social groups (Guerin, 2003a, 2004). Thus, we need to examine the role of language in maintaining relationships as well as regulating them. People use talk about the weather, medical misadventure stories, rumours, jokes, and many other language strategies to keep other people in good relationships with them (Guerin, 2003b).

Of most relevance here, however, is that people often increase or maintain their relationship status by using prejudiced (often seen as prohibited or “politically incorrect”) conversations or jokes. Such racist discourses include strategies to resist anti-racist interventions including questioning the intervener’s sense of humour (Guerin, 2003 a, b) as well as disclaimers such as “I’m not prejudiced, but…” . There is a need for further research on conversational skills/strategies that are effective in dealing with prejudiced talk (see Every & Augoustinos, 2008; Fozdar, 2008; Guerin, 2003a, b; Teaching Tolerance, 2007). This also links to what is known as ‘bystander anti-prejudice’. This involves bystanders speaking up in the face of discrimination (see, for example, Dunn & Kamp, 2009). Some recent research found that after an anti-prejudice intervention,
participants were significantly more likely to engage in positive bystander action in three out of four hypothetical scenarios (Pedersen et al., 2010). Thus, it would be useful in an intervention to give participants such skills.

*The Source and Function of Attitudes*

As briefly touched on above, the source and function of attitudes is relevant to understanding why do people think the way they do (Herek, 1987). Research indicates that participants’ values are important functions of people’s attitudes while their experiences and what they learn indirectly are important sources (Griffiths & Pedersen, 2009). If one is attempting to change attitudes, it is a good idea to know both the source and the function of such attitudes. While people’s attitudes may stem from politician rhetoric; for example, “asylum seekers are queue jumpers”, the function may be a perceived value violation – “queue-jumpers take away Australian spots for ‘genuine refugees’”. Values, direct and indirect experience have been shown to be particularly relevant in Australian research. Direct experience was detailed above with regard to mechanism 9 above with a brief discussion of values and indirect experiences provided below.

*Addressing People’s Violated Personal Values.* The most common function of attitudes relates to participants’ values – this is the case whether participants are prejudiced or non-prejudiced in their views (Griffiths & Pedersen, 2009; Khan, 2009; Pedersen, Watt & Griffiths, 2008). Of course, values will not be the same across the target groups. For example, Australians who are anti-asylum seekers report that they are outraged by what they see as “queue-jumping” (Pedersen, Watt & Hansen, 2006).
Australians who are anti-Indigenous Australians report that they resent what they see as Indigenous people receiving preferential or “special” treatment (Pedersen, Dudgeon, Watt & Griffiths, 2006). Australians who are anti-Muslim report that they have concerns about what they see as gender and equity issues (Pedersen & Hartley, 2009).

*Indirect Experience.* The media is a primary source of indirect experience. This information can be either negative or positive. However, it is often negative with respect to asylum seekers (Gale, 2004), Muslim Australians (Aly, 2006) and Indigenous Australians (Meadows, 2001). Informal social networks are also a key source of indirect experience. What may start out as an unverified source may become part of mainstream discourse (Balvin, 2007).

In order to change prejudiced attitudes, it is useful to know the source and function of such attitudes (it is also useful to know the source and function of non-prejudiced attitudes). The sources which are most relevant are values, direct experience, and indirect experience.

*Length of Interventions*

Anti-prejudice interventions are best run over the medium to long-term to allow time for in-depth analysis and sustained behaviour change. As found by Malin (1999) in her anti-prejudice work with teachers, participants feel a degree of denial and resistance at first. Thus, having some time to reflect on the issues is ideal. In fact, seven out of eight of the successful anti-prejudice reduction interventions described above used a relatively lengthy format (Hill & Augoustinos, 2001; Issues Deliberation Australia, 2001, 2007; Pedersen et al., 2009; Pedersen et al., 2010; Pedersen & Barlow, 2008; Teague,
Mooney et al. (2005) (see mechanism 7 above) suggested that their intervention’s lack of effect may have been due to its half-day workshop format and a review of multicultural and racism awareness programmes for teachers found that a longer format was more effective (McGregor & Ungerleider, 1993).

Multiple Voices from Multiple Disciplines

It is preferable to have multiple voices giving information, leading discussions and repeating major points. With respect to receiving information from multiple sources, traditional psychology may be limited because of its individualistic focus. Yet its rigorous quantitative statistical methods can be useful in evaluations and experiments while non-traditional fields of psychology such as community psychology and discourse analysis can add a breath of understanding and meaning above and beyond quantitative methods. Moreover, other disciplines such as sociology and cultural geography provide a wider picture from an alternative view. Thus, more than one discipline allows for a more rounded and sophisticated approach. Prejudice and racism need to be tacked from a number of angles – individual, cultural and institutional (Jones, 1997) and as such any one discipline does not have all the answers.

Conclusions

We have outlined fourteen mechanisms which should be considered when conducting anti-prejudice interventions. It is important to bring the discussion back to the context of such interventions. Location or situation can affect the antecedents and extent of prejudice. Some of the mechanisms are likely to be useful regardless of location; in particular, the provision of information, the use of respect, careful choice of
emotion, emphasis on commonality and difference, dissonance, evaluation, national identity, alternative talk, the length of interventions and using multiple voices from multiple disciplines. However, some mechanisms are more context dependent; that is, local needs, consensus, contact, whiteness and privilege, and the function of attitudes.

At this time, it is not possible to separate out the different mechanisms to establish which were successful. Such a separation would certainly be a fruitful avenue for future research. However, we can say which mechanisms were used in successful interventions: the provision of accurate information, involving the audience with respect (including allowing participants to make their own mind up based on careful analysis), being careful of emotions used, emphasising both commonality and difference for ‘ingroups’ and ‘outgroups’, taking context into account, using cognitive dissonance, evaluating properly, allowing contact with ‘outgroup’ members, dealing with the three function of attitudes, having longer rather than shorter interventions, and using multiple voices from multiple disciplines. This does not mean the other mechanisms were unimportant; indeed, it may be that they were used but not reported on. For example, as we have touched on, the use of empathy (in particular, perspective taking) is likely to be implicit in many of the interventions.

Apart from the details of specific mechanisms, there are two main points to emerge from this review: multiple mechanisms should be utilised and these need to be adjusted to the local context (Guerin, 2005b; Guerin & Guerin, 2007). Racism and prejudice have nefarious effects on both individuals and the community, resulting in ill-health as well as reduced productivity, social inclusion and community cohesion (Paradies et al. 2009). As argued by Lawrence (2008), it is time for racism to be ‘named
up’ by policy makers as a contributor to health disparities and other social disadvantages. To combat the detrimental effects of prejudice and racism, solutions need to be multi-layered; furthermore, the mechanisms described above are not mutually exclusive. There are links between them such as violation of values and imparting of accurate information. As Fozdar et al. (2009) note, anti-prejudice interventions involve networks of influences. Structural and political strategies need to be implemented along with individual interventions (Donovan & Vlais, 2006; Paradies et al. 2009).

However, the mechanisms above may provide some sense guidance to anti-prejudice researchers, practitioners and policy-makers wishing to improve relations between different groups in our society. Multiculturalism is a great strength of Australia and, as Putnam (2007) puts it, to “create a novel ‘one’ out of a diverse ‘many’” can only be a good thing (p. 165).
References


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