
Manipulating the Data: Teaching and NAPLAN in the Control Society

High-stakes testing is changing what it means to be a ‘good teacher’ in the contemporary school. This paper uses Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas on the control society and dividuation in the context of NAPLAN testing in Australia to suggest that the database generates new understandings of the ‘good teacher’. Media reports are used to look at how teachers are responding to the high-stakes database through manipulating the data. This paper argues that manipulating the data is a regrettable, but logical, response to manifestations of teaching where only the data counts.

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Introduction

This paper addresses the ‘problem’ of teachers cheating in the contemporary version of high-stakes literacy and numeracy testing used in Australia, the National Assessment Program Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN'). This cheating is presented as the moral failure of individual teachers by various education stakeholders. We suggest another way to read these teachers’ behaviours: as a response to a change in the logic of teaching. Increasing media reports of teachers cheating attest to changes in the intensity and character of teachers’ work. The change in teachers work is in process, but it represents the breakdown of the production of the ‘good teacher’ and the overlaying of a new, more powerful ethic, the teacher who seeks to achieve the best results as recorded through NAPLAN by manipulating the data. In this theoretical paper, ‘the good teacher’ is a discursive construction for enacting the right forms and amounts of care in the classroom. The data manipulating teacher, who is in the process of overlaying this ‘good teacher’, responds to this new regime of assessment. Utilising Deleuzian theory we argue that the teacher seeking to achieve the best results through data manipulation, to whom we refer as the ‘dividuated teacher’, overlays the ‘good teacher’. This change exemplified in schools mirrors a wider change in the social from disciplinary to control mechanisms, from institutions to corporations (Deleuze, 1995a).

Every year, at the same time, students in Years 3, 5, 7 and 9 sit Australia-wide tests in literacy and numeracy. The majority of these tests consist of 40 multiple choice questions. Students’ answer booklets are sent to a central authority (ACARA) that analyses and records the results in a database. Approximately 5 months later, individual students get a report and their schools get the data analysis. Shortly after, these results ‘go live’ via an online reporting website called ‘My Schools’. This website uses a variety of criteria to compare and evaluate schools against each other and against normative standards and criteria, as measurements of teaching form “a system of varying geometry whose language is digital” (Deleuze, 1995a, p. 178). NAPLAN here, and the principal justification for its introduction, is to constitute a mechanism that measures, and therefore produces, ‘good teaching’. The multiple data sets generated (for example 30 sets of data in each class) is assumed to tell a story about that teacher, though the relation between the test results and preceding events in
the classroom is uncertain. Teachers, at least when it comes to this NAPLAN system, are publicly represented or produced from the synthesis of those data points.

**High-Stakes Testing**

International research on the impact of high-stakes testing on teachers’ work suggests that it brings about changes in curriculum, pedagogy and the well-being of students and teachers (Polesel, Dulfer, & Turnbull, 2012; Barret, 2009; Ryan & Wesinstein, 2009). Criticisms of the effects of high-stakes testing, often associated with neoliberal policy objectives, have focussed on performativity (Ball, 2003; Lumby, 2009; Troman, 2008), accountingisation, accountability and the emergence of an audit culture in schools (Apple, 2005; Biesta, 2010; Shore, 2008) and/or globalisation (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010). These criticisms share a concern with the rise of high-stakes testing practices changing teachers’ work and perceptions of their work. Crudely put, this research presents teachers as immersed within cultures, through the employment of “judgements, comparisons and displays as means of incentive, control, attrition and change”, that increase the disciplinary impact on the work that teachers do (Ball, 2003, p. 216). Closely associated with performativity is the examination of the impact of neoliberal education policies (emphasising markets and accountability) and its effects on teachers and teaching (Biesta, 2010, pp. 55-57).

In this context, cheating on contemporary high-stakes tests is seen to result from increasing disciplinary pressure placed on teachers. Ball explains an increase in “‘cheating’ as teachers and principals finding themselves under pressure to perform or ‘improve’ in a competitive environment” (Ball, 2003, p. 225). In their critique of education policy using ‘policy sociology’, Gale and Densmore, citing Lankshear, argue that we should trace the “tactical engagement” of teachers with policy because “tactics and uses ‘are things that have the capacity to resist and subvert’” (Gale & Densmore, 2003, p. 46). When 178 Atlanta teachers and principals in the US were implicated in a cheating scandal, one commentator wrote that: “As long as test scores are used in any field to make decisions on rewards or punishments, including for schools or educators, a small percentage of people will be willing to bend the rules or break them” (Samuels, 2011). Using Gale and Densmore’s analysis, the question that should be asked is whether this ‘cheating’ is coerced or tactical on the part of the teachers.

Whilst sympathetic to these perspectives (and recognising that many ring true), this paper applies a different theoretical perspective to the impact of current high-stakes testing on teaching. The above theorisations assume a fairly static organisation of power and power relations that are corporeal (aimed at the body) and enclosed within specific spatialised sites and enclosures as exemplifies by Foucault’s notions of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1991). Our argument, derived from Deleuze’s ‘Postscript on Control Societies’ is that these assemblages of power are being overlayed by more mobile, “ultrarapid forms of free floating control” (Deleuze, 1995a, p.178). Discipline is “associated with enclosure, partitioning and the control of activity” while control societies are places where surveillance “becomes electronic” (Watson, 2010, pp. 95-96). In terms of the school, this overlaying “provides a conceptual tool for theorizing the relationship between power and distribution in a society which increasingly depends on instantaneous and continuous communication” (Watson, 2010, p. 97).
For us, NAPLAN as the latest form of high-stakes testing requires a new conception of teaching, because teaching is not just assessed in disciplined and disciplinary exchanges between bodies and subjects but by statistics produced through a database. Teachers do not cheat, to paraphrase Deleuze, because cheating implies an interiority of thought; of teachers feeling forced to cheat, even when they know it’s wrong, because they can see nothing else to do. In this reactive strategy, the commonsense logics of the ‘good teacher’ force an internalised response: poor teacher, bad teacher, cheating teacher. If the teacher refuses this interior logic, however, and approaches the data as a morally indifferent set of data points that are not configured properly and need to be manipulated to tell a truer story, then they are affecting a new ‘sense’ of the teacher. Because the numbers acquire no interiority, manipulating the data remains an exterior affect, an active choice because different expectations surround the teacher and new possibilities imagined (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 377). Watson, citing Kresljer, argues that the control society in schools requires an agonic professional, one who:

becomes the instrument of his/her own control, using this potential to mobilise resources according to the lines of battle, developing inside knowledge, analysing the flows of power and the sources of capital (human, cultural, social) within the organization, moving ‘by means of strategies like dialogue, invasion, symbiosis, metamorphosis, argumentation, seduction and so forth’. (Watson, 2010, p. 102).

In suggesting a different understanding, we do not seek to justify the strategies named as cheating. Our intention is simply to discuss the new context in which teachers find themselves and to which, apparently, increasing numbers of teachers are responding by manipulating the data. Conceiving these responses to high-stakes testing as manipulation, and not cheating, reflects a changing understanding of teaching brought about by the NAPLAN tests themselves. Accusations of cheating misunderstand the effects of the increased used of databases as means for assessment. A database has no morality, only those who use its results can speak of morality. When teachers follow the logic of the database and manipulate the data to tell a favourable story, the imposition of morality is out of place.

**Discipline, Control and ‘Good Teaching’**

Data manipulation is understood as cheating because they break with the historicised moral expectations of ‘good teaching’. ‘Good teaching’ in this context reflects a genealogical trajectory of the “conflicted and merging” historical assemblage of various disciplinary technologies; care, efficiency, content knowledge and self-examination engaged in the ordering and examination of the urban space, or in this context, the contemporary school classroom (Jones, 1990, pp. 74-75). Jones maps historicised intensities of the disciplinary good teacher, as a movement through inspection (as categorised by surveillance) to bio-power (as categorised by manifestations of care), where each iteration “either conflicted or merged with the other available formations” (Jones, 1990, p. 74). These manifestations are all normalising discourses within which the ‘good teacher’ is constructed. This ‘good teacher’ is an example of Foucault’s “moral technologies” and relates to how the teacher is separated and categorised, at various times, as a particular expression of wider social expectations that is institutionally situated and corporeally aimed (Foucault, 1991, p. 74). We follow Deleuze’s
theorisation that suggests that this disciplinary teacher is breaking down; the latest form of high-
stakes testing, with its emphasis on data-points, data-sets and databases, disconnects the
disciplinary space of the classroom so that moralising judgement of teachers manipulating the data
cannot account for the space in which teaching is constructed.

In its historical construction, the ‘good teacher’ is situated within specific enclosed spaces (the
classroom, the staffroom) and specific discursive formations that are themselves historically and
socially contextualised. Jones’s genealogy “begins with the classroom as a site of inspection and
moves to the emergence of the classroom as a site of moral instruction (or instruction in morality)”
(Jones, 1990, p. 75). This expresses a particular mode of care both for the student and for oneself as
teacher. As a transmitter of morality and as the one who cares for the student in the classroom, the
teacher must be moral and dependable. Perceived immorality on a teacher’s part is, necessarily, of
great concern for those who oversee teaching. As Jones argues, the teacher has always been “a
suspicious figure that requires continual examination” (Jones, 1990, p. 75). Foucault argued that in a
disciplinary society these examinations were directed at the body and occurred within specific sites
and regulated spaces (Foucault, 1991).

Each new enclosure corresponds with forms of institutional surveillance that are bounded by the
temporal and spatial limits of the institution. Within each enclosure individuals can construct
themselves anew (or at least improve on their old selves). For example, at university student-
teachers are expected to leave behind irresponsible adolescence and become ‘professionals’. The
normalising surveillance of the disciplinary society operates through ‘apprenticeship’ – the teacher is
made governable and self-governing in a scaffolded way through a hierarchy of institutions and
inspections (Foucault, 1991). This theory of power relations has been utilised extensively in
contemporary critiques of schools and school practices (Gore, 1998; Besley & Peters, 2007; Biesta,
1998). For Deleuze, however, the disciplinary society is no longer the best way to explain how power
manifests itself in the contemporary world, as discipline has been giving way to control since the end
of the Second World War. As “new forces moved slowly into place... we were no longer in
disciplinary societies, we were leaving them behind” (Deleuze, 1995a, p. 178). Teaching, in this
disciplinary and moral sense is an interior “that’s breaking down like all other interiors” (Deleuze,
1995a, p. 178). While there remains a deceptive solidity to the rigid boundaries of sites of
confinement, such as “prisons, hospitals, factories, schools, the family”, the practices,
comportments, discourses and facialities internal to these institutions are being overthrown by
modulatory machines that exteriorise and disaggregate (Deleuze, 1995a, p. 178). Tellingly, Deleuze
nominated “assessment” as a technology of control becoming frightful, accelerating and amplifying
in the school system (Deleuze, 1995b, p. 175). This paper follows that logic through looking at a
particular form of high-stakes testing in Australia.

In Deleuze’s Society of Control, disciplinary codes and subjectivations such as the ‘good teacher’
become increasingly unable to explain the experiences of teachers when control takes over from
“the old disciplines at work within the time scales of closed systems” (Deleuze, 1995a, p. 178).
Characteristics of contemporary high-stakes testing that erode this (disciplinary) understanding of
the ‘good teacher’ are indicative of wider expressions of what Deleuze referred to as dividuation
within a control society. The individual is a coherent subject available for ethical judgement (the
‘good teacher’) in a disciplinary society. As we will explain later, the dividual is an effect of one of the
many databases at work in a control society.
Traditional assessments of teachers based on a series of inspections of their work within the classroom represent a disciplinary, corporeal manifestation of power, Foucault saw the school “as a machine composed of forces aimed at gaining the most efficient, disciplined group that would then work to maintain that machine” (Foucault, 1991, p. 164; Thompson, 2011, p. 39). In Deleuze’s control society, discipline is overlaid (or superposed according to Savat) by more powerful stories assembled from data that relate to their student’s performance in high-stakes tests (whose only relation to a specific classroom is that they were conducted there) (Savat, 2009). This means that while disciplinary power still functions (it does not disappear), it becomes decreasingly important. Schools will continue to surveil the following:

Time (latenesses, absences, interruptions of tasks), of activity (inattention, negligence, lack of zeal), of behaviour (impoliteness, disobedience), of speech (idle chatter, insolence), of the body (incorrect attitudes, irregular gestures, lack of cleanliness), of sexuality (impurity, indecency) (Foucault, 1991, p. 178).

Superposition, or the overlaying of control onto disciplinary machines, means that the activities above will become less important, or function with less intensity, as the digital and modulatory machine becomes more intense.

If we consider this in terms of high-stakes testing, the statistically derived product of students’ scores represents a new, more intense, virtual (and fragmented) logic of schooling and teaching. When tests are fed into a machine that converts them to data-points aggregated via a computer program before being organised, analysed and synthesised, a pattern of data-points emerges that tells a story that is more powerful than that concerning how well this teacher enforces the timetable and uniform policy. One teacher is rated more highly than another because of the patterns of data-points that are her/his students test scores. These teachers are rewarded or punished for the patterns they produce; not for anything they do in the classroom. The interior site of inspection and moral tutelage give way to an exteriority recorded in a database. In explaining the shift from discipline to control in the school, Ball makes reference to the “baffling array of figures, performance indicators, comparisons and competitions” within which teachers and schools now operate within (Ball, 2000, p. 3). He goes on to argue that this promotes feelings of “guilt, uncertainty, instability and the emergence of a new subjectivity – a new kind of teacher” (Ball, 2000, p. 4). Cheating or manipulating the data on tests like NAPLAN represents this new kind of teacher, in our theorisation, because this teacher refuses the guilt and uncertainty through becoming “the instrument of his/her own control” (Watson, 2010, p. 102).

The charge of ‘cheating’ fails to register the rise of the ‘dividuated teacher’. A concern with teachers’ morality makes little sense given the shift from discipline to control. Morality cannot be registered through the database as it cannot be measured. Teachers continue to teach in classrooms (they copy past behaviours), but it make more sense for them to direct their attention to their students’ scores, rather than to the discursive past. For us, manipulating the data need not be understood as cheating because the ‘dividuated teacher’ cannot be judged by the standards of the ‘good teacher’. ‘Cheating’ teachers are not attempting, and failing, to be ‘good teachers’. They are initiating a new practice, as dividuated teachers.

This requires going beyond the moral outrage directed at cheating teachers, who betray expectations of what ‘good teaching’ is and should be. An important effect of this moral outrage is
to individualise the ‘problem’, rather than recognising the changed conditions under which this cheating is occurring. If patterns of data-points and data-sets become the chief means through which teachers are assessed, and assess themselves, then strategies to achieve an optimum pattern of data points are compelling. This is a contradiction in which teachers are being criticised for acting in accordance with the requirements of a system that is not of their making (and which many may find deeply distressing).

Media Reports of ‘Cheating’

Reports of teachers cheating on high-stakes tests in Australia (NAPLAN was introduced in 2008) mirror the experiences across most jurisdictions in which such testing has been introduced (Verschoor, 2011). For example, in Chicago it has been estimated that this occurs in approximately 5% of all classrooms annually (Jacob & Levitt, 2003). The research findings are often used to pathologise the individual teacher/administrator as either being unable to cope (Verschoor, 2011) or lacking the morality expected of teachers (Jacob & Levitt, 2003). This pattern of blame is repeated in Australian media reporting. This list is incomplete, however it provides a useful starting point for this theorisation.

a) Manipulating answers

Media sources report a small, but growing, number of teachers investigated for seeking to influence students while they undertook tests. These strategies include: giving verbal prompts, erasing incorrect answers and inserting correct answers and bribing students with lollies to ensure they complete their tests (MacDougall & Dillon, 2011). Some teachers sat with students to review their papers before submission (Chilcott, 2012).

b) Preparing the curriculum

Despite repeated ‘expert’ statements that tests can’t be prepared for (because they assess basic aptitudes, rather than content), schools devote increasing amounts of time to preparing for NAPLAN. Schools attempt to manipulate the data through ‘teaching to the test’ or focusing on literacy and numeracy lessons at the expense of other curriculum areas and endeavours (Polesel, Dulfer, & Turnbull, 2012). While time spent on preparation for high-stakes testing makes minimal difference, schools still operate under the idea that being seen to do something is more important than doing the right thing (Hiatt & Tillett, 2012). International experience suggests that a key strategy to manipulate the data is to focus on the tests and squeeze subjects that are not tested out of the curriculum (Reid, 2009). In Australia it is not unusual for schools to prepare NAPLAN syllabi that teach for the test for up to an entire school term (10 weeks).

c) Preparing the Classroom

Another strategy is to prepare the classroom prior to a test. Teachers anticipate the content of the test and prepare their classroom such that useful information is available at various points around the classroom. Posters, charts and maps are often displayed and students may be directed to particular charts, posters or maps that contain information that would assist them to answer questions correctly (MacDougall & Dillon, 2011).
d) Preparing the Population

Another set of strategies point to collusion between teachers and principals. These strategies involve manipulating the data by controlling the population. The first step in controlling the population is to identify those students who will have a negative impact on NAPLAN results and those expected to have a positive impact (Chilcott, 2010; Chilcott, 2012). This is not a simple calculation. It is complicated by the fact that the students who are most likely to have a positive impact are not only the high achievers, but those students at about or just below the national average (Reid, 2009).

Students who were at or just below a threshold and who submit a test that puts them well beyond that threshold boost the score calculated for the teachers. Once students have been identified as likely to have a positive effect on a teacher’s score, the next move is to initiate steps to ensure that the students that will bring teachers’ results down do not sit the tests and those who will improve results do sit them. Figure 1 outlines attempts to manipulate the data through controlling the population reported in the Australian media.

Figure 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies to eliminate students who will likely have a negative impact</th>
<th>Strategies to ensure those students who will have a positive impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suspend ‘trouble-makers’ for relatively minor infractions for the duration of NAPLAN (Cobbold, 2010)</td>
<td>Organise free breakfasts during NAPLAN week for all students not previously eliminated (Branley, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage parents of students with learning difficulties to keep their children home to protect them from negative results (Barry, 2011)</td>
<td>Organise free transport to school for the high-achieving students (Anderson, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage parents of indigenous students to keep their children home to protect them from negative results (Anderson, 2010)</td>
<td>Provide parenting advice on how best to prepare students for tests (Branley, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage parents of students who have English as a second language and are recent migrants to keep their children home to protect them from negative results (Barrett &amp; Minus, 2010)</td>
<td>Encourage parents to enrol students in special (paid) NAPLAN classes to improve their results (Branley, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reject applications for enrolment from students for admittance based on low NAPLAN results (McDougall, 2011)</td>
<td>Encourage parents to buy preparation materials and spend holidays studying for NAPLAN (Branley, 2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The preceding account is not complete. However, it indicates the range of responses to NAPLAN that increase in intensity from those characterised as outright ‘cheating’, such as changing answers, to those more ambiguously framed as questionable and/or obvious strategies to maximise the creation of a desirable pattern of data points. To us, all of the activities reported above represent manipulating the data and result from teachers and administrators becoming aware of a ‘break’ with traditional visions of the teacher as a moralising agent. These actions represent a key ‘machine’ of control, the recognition of patterns and the use of these patterns to anticipate activities (Savat, 2009, p. 52). As Bogard argues, the technology of control is simulation, and in the context of NAPLAN requires teachers and schools to prepare profiles of learners that anticipate their tests results and act accordingly (Bogard, 1996). Arguably strategies enacted by teachers and schools to enhance their reputations are not unusual in the history of schooling. What is ‘new’ and represents a ‘break’, however, is that the intensification and amplification of the need to manipulate data is the result of a system that no longer rewards ‘good teaching’ as it has historically been conceived and practiced.
High-Stakes Testing, the Database and the Breakdown of the ‘Good Teacher’

The first problem, when it comes to treating manipulation as cheating is that it engages a moral register expected of the teacher that is exactly what the test is not about. NAPLAN is minimally, if at all, about the teacher in the classroom. The classroom continues to function as a space within the school, but the database increasingly drives determinations of good teaching, the teacher-student relationship becomes less important than the data generated when the student fills in the test sheets. These effects are not immediate, though, as the processes of discipline that affect a teacher’s reputation within the school are still forcefully present. If our theorisation holds, and discipline is overlaid by control, however, the historical measures of good teaching outlined above will become decreasingly important.

The database allows for ever-increasing data-capture (understood as both the capturing of data and capture through data). The relentless proliferation and the increased ‘power’ of digital technologies is not simply a matter of communication but of data assimilation so that “instead of enclosing you, your body, they enclose your information” (Bogard, 2009, p. 21). Our being in the context of digital technologies avails itself of increased and increasing capture, as data is recorded and added to like data to produce a variety of representations of ‘us’. An individual’s ability to ‘cohere’ or make a story of that information is extremely difficult, if not impossible, and is unnecessary. Each of us, from this perspective is a combination of data-base effects produced by separate databases (every body bears a variety of dividualities). The worldwide proliferation of high-stakes literacy and numeracy testing represents a shift in ‘knowing’ teaching from the proper ordering of students in a given classroom to the production of disembodied patterns of data-points that tell the right ‘story’. Teaching becomes of the data, rather than of those disciplined acts of teaching as outlined by Jones: care, efficiency, content knowledge and self-examination (Jones, 1990).

Names are still attached to those patterns created and captured in the database, but this is disciplinary. By accumulating data (tests) and analysing that data to produce patterns, the database produces information that has consequences for those whose names are associated with the captured data. So we find ourselves in a myriad of databases that register each of our movements and make some likeness from that captured data. We become through the records, or wakes, that we create as we move through spaces in which information is collected. In a still disciplinary society, however, these patterns are combined to form coherent ‘stories’ of individuals (Bogard, 2009). This is never final and the data-capture process is endless – the “continuous assessment” of which Deleuze wrote (Deleuze, 1995a, p. 182). This requires creating names for the entities produced by the database, such as the new names found in the Australian teaching standards (‘Highly Accomplished Teacher’ and ‘Lead Teacher’) that categorise teachers (AITSIL, 2011). But databases are indifferent to any attempt by a self to direct its story. Teachers, like everyone else, are caught in this data-space. While control overlays, and does not replace discipline, over time control becomes increasingly important. During this transition period, we cannot say that control dominates (we can only follow Deleuze and argue that it probably will). This is borne out by the fact that for teachers, NAPLAN data-capture still results in corporeal and spatialised (disciplinary) effects – bodies are at stake. What are teachers to do when as they increasingly lose control of their stories to the database and what they do in the classroom doesn’t count?
While some databases simply record patterns and may even be useful in preventing fraud (tracking stolen credit cards), the effects of high-stakes testing and the representation of teacher performance through plotting test scores achieved by their students are not benign and have never been presented as benign. Australian politicians have continually framed NAPLAN results as an opportunity to regulate teachers (Coorey, 2010). This regulation implies an attempted disciplinarity through attempts to use data-points to improve educational efficiency through publicising results and meting out rewards and punishments to schools and teachers. Rewarding teachers whose students produce good results on tests is represented as commonsense in providing children with the best education system possible. Our argument is that the database used to measure teaching simply provides a score, the disciplinary promise will eventually be subsumed (or made less relevant) within the amplification of dividuation. In Deleuzian terminology, the teacher becomes dividuated. The data points to which some human body is eventually connected is a single representation of that not-quite-yet-and-never body. Parents as consumers are being taught to read abstract data to interrogate ‘good teaching’. This change wrought by NAPLAN is important because dividuation requires the end of the individuated ‘teacher’:

An individual is an extended unit; it has a number ... A dividual, on the other hand, is a variation in an intensive parameter. Performance elements, large and small, are informed, tracked and stored in the database, and results fed back to make fine adjustments in the codes that govern them as they unfold (Bogard, 2009, p. 22).

The NAPLAN database is indifferent to what the teacher does. This is the key to understanding dividuality. A teacher who demonstrates commitment to teaching through demonstrating care for students and colleagues, building relationships, reflecting on practice and continually designing new and innovative pedagogies no longer evidences ‘good teaching’ as measured by the database. Even if account is taken of the care, efficiency, content knowledge and capacity for self-examination, to paraphrase Deleuze, this is part of who the teacher used to be, as the NAPLAN data becomes increasingly persuasive (Deleuze, 1995a). The ‘dividuated teacher’ is generated through a database that uses students’ test results to determine the presence of ‘good’ teaching’.

The ‘Dividuated Teacher’ in the Control Society

Representation through the database initiates or requires a new self-conception on the parts of teachers who recognise that this is how they are being understood. Once teachers accept that their representations, like many others, are effects of the database, teachers understand that their teaching will be rewarded to the extent to which they produce higher scores through high-stakes tests. Already assessments of teaching increasingly concern patterns of scores produced by the analysis and statistical representation of results from their students’ tests. As argued above, we think of this in terms of a pattern of data-points. Each data-point is an individual score and it is by plotting every score across each year of their teaching that teacher are recognised and, if their scores increase, validated. Teaching becomes decreasingly about instilling the right attitudes amongst students in the classroom and increasingly about producing the right patterns through the database. This is the change from the ‘good teacher’ to the ‘dividuated teacher’.

It is this concern for the database, we argue, that leads some teachers to manipulate the data. Our emphasis is on what possibilities the implementation of high-stakes testing offers teachers. We want to draw attention to the logics of ‘good teaching’ NAPLAN, the database and dividuation offer. In
part this is because we take seriously Deleuze’s advice: “It’s not a question of worrying for or hoping for the best, but of finding new weapons” (Deleuze, 1995a, p. 178).

One of the logics of dividuation is the end of care for individuals. In a disciplinary system that works to individuate, moments of care for an individual serve the needs of the disciplinary machine (Savat, 2009). Teachers are to care for the humanity of their students and/or they are to care for the virtue of knowledge with which they are apprenticing those students. The inspectory regime of discipline measures how well the teacher cares for students. Much of the sense of ‘good teaching’ was a measurement of the capacity for, and enactment of, care. Historical manifestations of inspection, as outlined by Jones as the “bio-teacher”, required that teachers attend to students as a key measure of what it means to be a ‘good teacher’ (Jones, 1990, pp. 72-74).

High-stakes testing overlays the bio-teacher with a new logic in which care is not registered. Or more precisely, the data points generated and entered into the database changes how ‘good teaching’ is understood. Care for the student is being replaced by the attention to the data because this is what is being used to judge teaching. Increasingly the teacher is being (de)valued by the data points students produce (that often have no bearing on events in their classroom) rather than the pastoral elements of teaching as involved in the production of ‘good citizens’. Metaphorically, the teacher is being asked to turn away from the student to gaze at the virtual representations of the data. Interestingly, the media reports already indicate a shift in manipulation, from those practices designed to directly change student data to the more subtle and collective action of manipulating the data through profiling, controlling and limiting the population undertaking the test. In a control society, the mode of panoptic surveillance is replaced by that of simulation as a “mode of observation that sees before the event... It can be seen in the profiling of individuals and populations” (Savat, 2009, p. 49). The strategies outline in Figure 1 as reported by the media represent attempts to manipulate the data through seeing before the event, or profiling those students who will be most likely to deliver the data-points wanted.

This process is neither final nor complete. Many, if not most, teachers will attempt to maintain their integrity in the face of a system that does not value integrity. They may ignore this change to the sense of teaching and hide in their classroom ‘doing what they have always done’; or they may attempt to ‘do more’ and ‘do it better’, to increase the frequency and intensity of those practices historically understood as good teaching – that is, to care more than ever before. These strategies are ultimately ineffective, however. Teachers can only hide from the data for so long. They can only amplify up to a certain point, at which collapse is likely. The other possibility, and that which we see as logically supported by NAPLAN, is teachers recognising their dividuation and embracing the logic of NAPLAN. In a modulatory system, which does not reward teachers for integrity, honesty, building relationships, being a mentor, nurturing, guiding, supporting students, practices intended to manipulate the data from NAPLAN testing will increase.

**Conclusion**

Manipulating the data is, for us and against those who decry cheating, a result of the introduction of a modulatory, or control mechanism: high-stakes testing that constructs digitised data-points and patterns that are used to assess teaching. While manipulating the data is merely one response to that mechanism, it is an important and interesting response because it denies the moralising processes of normalisation that are fundamental to the production of disciplined individuals, which
are reflected in allegations of cheating. Rather than taking them as true reflections, we see these allegations as uncovering the way that high-stakes testing is changing the character of teaching. Relying on the concept of dividuation means that we do not move beyond this discussion of cheating to theorise manipulation as the action of an agonic professional analysing the flows of power and acting as an agent of “his/her own control” (Watson, 2010, p. 102). We merely conclude that, within a control society, manipulation of the data makes sense, and in high-stakes tests like NAPLAN we should prepare for more subtle and strategic manipulations.

For Australian teachers, NAPLAN is becoming the most important vehicle for representing their teaching. The more they care about how their teaching is represented the more they attend to the scores used to measure their teaching and one potential consequence of this is a shift from caring about students to attention to the data. This may constitute a decreasing intensification of the importance of teachers caring for students, or the end of teachers’ capacity to represent themselves as ‘good teachers’ because they care for students (Savat, 2009). It may also represent a decreasing emphasis on building relationships with students, because powerful interpersonal relationships with students become superseded by the simulatory and profiling machines deployed as a result of high-stakes testing.

This may well be what Deleuze understood to be a simulacral event, as it may represent one end to traditions of teaching that go back millennia (Deleuze, 1990). The emergence of the data manipulating teacher is the point at which teaching as pedagogy becomes less important, already we are seeing a return to depersonalising, rote-learning methods of instruction (Polesel, Dulfer, & Turnbull, 2012). For in paying close attention only to the database and seeing their students test scores as the ‘be all and end all’, a new type of teacher is emerging. While teachers and teaching continue, their sense is no longer determined by disciplinarity (and morality) and begins to reflect modulation (and dividuality). No matter how it might look, no matter how much a teacher of today resembles or copies a teacher of the past, it would appear, given the strategies outlined by the media above, that there is a growing realisation that the disciplinary ‘good teacher’ is being replaced by attention to the digital information stored in the single database that is NAPLAN.

High-stakes testing is creating a new context for teachers in which dividuation dominates. Dividuals emerge through the operation of databases. In being forced to pay attention to the database and to see their students as producers of test scores, teachers are developing strategies that are both understandable and intellectually defensible. Other responses to high-stakes testing are available, but manipulating the data is likely to proliferate in the near future, as teachers come to understand ever more about the new ‘rules of the game’. Of course, this is challenging only so long as we refuse to recognise a new logic of teaching made compelling by NAPLAN, as Deleuze argued when we see “the approaching forms of ceaseless control... we may come to see the harshest confinement as part of a wonderful past” (Deleuze, 1995b, 175). Of course, there are other possibilities, or lines of flight, that we may see teachers beginning to manifest (if we are not already) such as the teacher who becomes indifferent to the database, who neither tries to ignore the changing expectations of the teacher or manipulate the data by saying; “So, you’ve created some data-points. So what!”.

This paper was written using funding from the Australian Research Council.
References


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1 The National Assessment Program Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) is a series of standardised tests given to all Australian school students in Years 3, 5, 7 and 9 every year since 2008. Students receive individual results, but the results of their schools by year level are published online via the My Schools website. This website enables comparison to be made between schools of similar contextual indicators.

2 In the Australian context this can be explained by the relationship between NAPLAN which tests students, to ACARA which analyses the data and then to the My Schools website that communicates the categorisation,
comparison and sorting of the data. This process has implications for teachers whose continuing employment is increasingly dependent upon ‘good’ data points.