TELEGRAMMATOLOGY PART II:  
LOT 49 AND THE POST-ETHICAL  
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"... are not the goddesses of Destiny also the 
goddesses of the human Lot, of allotment—the Moirai, 
the last of whom is the Silent One, Death?"

—Roland Barthes, A Lover's Discourse  

[This paper is part of a larger project called 
"Telegrammatology." That project is, in turn, embedded within a 
larger one: the production of a collection of papers by myself 
and David Wills on the work of Thomas Pynchon and its relations 
with the grammatical concerns of Derrida and others. In 
picular, Telegrammatology sets out to address some of the 
questions raised in David's paper called "PLS RECORD BOOK BID LOT 
49 STOP J DERRIDA." In that paper, he draws together some of the 
moral concerns of Lot 49 and Derrida's Envoule with respect to 
postal systems and the question of destination. Its title is an 
imagined construction of what Derrida's telegram would look like 
were he to be the Mysterious Bidder who arrives at the crying of 
The Lot. This first reply, Telegrammatology I, looks at the 
question of how to read Pynchon and takes an arbitrary slice 
through Lot 49. Prior to that, however, it considers some of the 
questions critics have raised in regard to Pynchon's contribution 
to the "morality" of the 20th century. A concept of the post-
ethical is generated to deal with this, drawing on Derrida's 
deconstruction of the origin/destination opposition. In Part II 
of the Telegrammatology, I turn to more obviously Derridean 
questions while remaining within the general question of how to 
read. If one can take an arbitrary slice through Lot 49, the 
same approach might work with, say, Of Grammatology. By 
deconstrucung the distinction between the correct and the 
erroneous, Part II shows how a collection of errors in the 
Derrida text can generate a positive reading, leading to a 
concept of the unhistorical (on the model of the "unconscious").]

Oedipus, the mass of America, is left with four 
possibilities: "Those symmetrical four. She didn't like any of 
them, but hoped she was mentally ill; that that's all it was" 
(130). Mentally ill, then: that's one. The other three: (1) 
a true network of Americans, really communicating, a real 
community; (2) she is hallucinating; (3) there is a plot, most 
likely set up by Inverarity, to place post-horns and Such like in 
her path. The four finally dudle, over the last few pages of 
the book, down to two: a real Other, a Word (137) behind the 
obvious; or else only that latter itself, the humdrum empirical 
bits and pieces of everyday life. The essential or the
contingent? The Platonic form or the inessence of its mere filling-in? And this real, if it exists, is a community, a real America behind its "crust and mantle" (135), behind its mere "name." Put bluntly: is the word behind the word? A hideous excluded middle, which Oedipa knew was "bad shit, to be avoided" (138).

To find anything behind the name, the inscription, is to be paranoid—in America all the more so because it could mean community, and we all know how the first six or seven letters of that word can be used. It fractures the American dream of independence, of atomisation, of self-security, of what the Germans called, in reference to both writing and the development of the independent self, bildung:

... they’d call her names, proclaim her through all Orange County as a redistributionist and pinko... (137)

Not much choice here: you crack up inside or else lose all possibility of a real outside. If the world is together, I'm mad; I am only sane if it is fragmented. And so we are (or it is) left, awaiting the crying.

This was how we diagramatised this in "Gravity's Rainbow and the Post-Rhetorical":

\[ a ( \text{look here} ) b \]

Accordingly: a and b might be a number of things or signs. For example, we could say that Oedipa has to exist uncertainly between signifier and signified, between, for example, the signifying post-horns and their meaning, the Tristere. If she veers too close to the signifier alone, she is left with a meaningless array of figures. On the other hand, to veer the other way—towards meaning—induces paranoia. She lives in a world where there is no longer any correspondence between Sr and Sd—and so she can’t take the option—it’s not there for the taking—of bringing the two together.

Again: a and b might be literal and metaphorical forms of signification. In this case, Oedipa cannot veer too close towards a literal reading of what she sees and hears—and neither can "the reader." Nor can she get lost in the mise-en-abyme of metaphor connections because that would lead nowhere but to her own insanity.

We could probably also plunder a number of other valencies for a and b, other dualisms in which Lot 49 abounds: the real and the fake postal systems, the odd politics, for example, of Mike Fallopian which cannot be situated as left or right (65-66), the animate and the inanimate, the humane and the mechanical, the "transcendent meaning" or "only the earth" behind the "hieroglyphic streets" (138):
For it was now like walking among matrices of a
great digital computer, the zeros and ones
blown away, hanging like balanced mobiles right
and left, ahead, thick, maybe endless. (139)

As a matter of fact, Lot 49 does not tell us if or how
Oedipa "resolves" all this—she is simply left to await the
"crying" of the lot, of the mass perhaps, the not-too-critical
mass. But plainly, the extremes are not recommended. The
excluded middle, somehow (but how?), has to be excluded,
cancelled, and a space opened (if you'll excuse the syntax)
parenthetically up. The novel says "look here"—but won't tell
us where "here" is and what can be found there.

At such a point of interpretation as this, it is difficult
to distinguish the supposedly pure, almost linguistic, problem of
signifying practice and a whole range of moral/ethical problems.
In the same way, a purely logical paradox becomes a practical
double-bind when it ceases to be a mere proposition in a textbook
and becomes instead an order or command. For example, the army
barber is ordered to shave all the men except those who shave
themselves and is on a charge whether or not he shaves himself.
The semiotic becomes ethical, however, at the point where we ask:
how to live in a world where the side of the signifier and the
side of the signified cannot be conjoined and where neither alone
is to be trusted: neither pure materiality (5r) nor absent or
continually deferred meaning/spirit (5d) neither substance nor
phantom?

So what is Oedipa's problem at the semio-ethical level?
Perhaps it could be formulated as follows: while the middle is,
in some sense, officially perhaps, excluded, Oedipa finds
herself in a middle of some sorts. At the very least, she is in
media res. She is caught between Origin (being), and Destination
(purpose), between "because" and "in order to." She is caught
like a dead letter, WASTEd communication, left in trash-can
rather than post-box. She is—or is manipulated into being—
exactly where the binary system will not let her be.

So she is in more than a double-bind in the classical sense
analysed by Bateson, Laing and others. For: in the double-bind
proper, neither term can operate. It is prevented by the other
term. One cannot, for example, be either loved or unloved by
one's mother, and one cannot be both. In excluding a and b, the
double-bind's logic excludes "both a and b" and "either a or b."
There is, after all, something definite, literal, logical, or
non-modal, about the double-bind as we know and love it. No
doubt that is why Bateson thought it could be resolved by
"metacommunications."

On the other hand, for Oedipa, both terms can, at least
potentially, at least in principle, be operative at once. The
trouble is that she can't tell if, and if so which, or if both.
If Origin points to Truth and if mere presence (experience) is
paranoid, then Oedipa is prevented from finding a further truth:
the truth of the relation between Truth and experience—or Origin
and presence. That truth would tell her "what-to-do." It would signal destination, somewhere and something to be.

Thereby: even the metaphysical conception of Truth (as Origin) is displaced for Dedipa. (While, for the one who is merely doubly-bound; two over-arcing, terribly obvious, and contradictory truths run amok.) Something has to be sought. But this truth lies in a relation between two terms, one of which is, itself, Truth and that is, by definition, unavailable. If our end is indeed our beginning (and Lot 49, it should be remembered, does end with "lot 49"), then there is no comfort when the beginning is just as obscure(d) as the end. If you like— and you probably won't—Dedipa is, if anything, doubly-unbound. She is in a state of end. There may be something comforting in that which is binding, in the legal sense, because one can know where one is with it. But this comfort is unavailable to Dedipa. Even the binding contract of the will seems indifferent to her.

Where I want to go from here, then, is to draw together two things: (a) the idea of beginning and end as ethical terms or termini and (b) the idea of beginnings and ends as textual points or puncta. Two ideas. The first involves us initially in the problem of Origin/Destination that Dedipa faces and the ways in which a deconstruction of that opposition might yield us a post-ethical ethics—a way of dealing with, though not necessarily "solving," Dedipa's dilemma. The second will be picked up once we have worked through the first section which could be considered on its own and called

Labyrinths

The paper PLY RECORD BOOK BID rightly refuses some of the possibilities which other readers of Lot 49 have taken to be positive ways for avoiding binaries: the psychic insights of the old sailor's dt's and the sensitivity of conspiring with Maxwell's Demon, to mention only two obvious ones. But somewhat in their place, there is a turn towards "the flip-flops of prosthesis," "perpetual switching," "perpetual motion between sensitivity and diabolism."5 Prosthesis, then, separates a space between a and b, an infinite series of delta-t discontinuities. It prizes apart signifier and signified so that neither one seems to be satisfied. And in the spectrum or rainbow which the two terms make, what we are and what we make of ourselves, now has infinite play rather than being fixed to the two terms (Sr/Sd) themselves. The solution is not, I think, unlike some readings of Gravity's Rainbow, readings in which the straight-laced lines of gravity (seriousness) are split through a prism into play (unseriousness) creating an infinitely expanding bandwidth. Gravity's Rainbow, then, would not be unlike "limited inc . . ." with its infinite ways of being spilled on the page.

In and through these labyrinths, I want to suggest another way—not necessarily incommensurate with BOOK BID/Pynchon/Derrida. It takes a new theme, however, in relation to g/b: that of refusal rather than splitting. I begin in the present tense but, as will shortly become evident, the past may be more appropriate . . .
What are we all looking for?—the religious, the theoretician, the person (like Gedipa so often) in the street? For want of yet another metaphor, what I think we're looking for is origins. In trying to find who we are, individually and collectively, there is a very strong will to origin. Perhaps especially for those of us in the New World(s) where, ultimately, past a certain point, history is always elsewhere. It is as if the finding of origins were the method we could all agree on as the correct means of self-knowledge. If, we think, we know from whence we derive, we will know ourselves. The two terms are now almost synonymous. So firm is the grip of the discourse on origins among us. The theorist of human nature, with all her stories of primeval humanity, and the man in the office of the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths, looking up family history, or else Gedipa on the trail of Pierce's will: all are on the same quest.

One problem with this dominant method—the search for and will to origin—is that we do not know where to stop. Because everything seems to us to derive from what we call origins, so too does our knowledge of where to stop. Only when we have found our origins, only, that is, when we have learned, among other things, how to stop, will we know how to stop searching. The process is obviously self-defeating and makes our "advanced," "technological" societies seem backward by comparison with those that have strong origin myths and non-linear conceptions of both historical and conceptual time.

In its potential for endlessness, the search for origins is like a labyrinth. Except that we are apt to use the wrong picture of a labyrinth when we think of it. Most of the mazes we are used to have definite starting and ending points. The starting point is "here," on the outside. The ending point is "there," usually in some as-yet-unknown-but-projected centre. And this indeed shows the strong connections between our notions of origin and centre. But anyone who has ever got to the centre of a large garden maze will know that the centre contains nothing special. It is an almost arbitrary point in the general landscape. Its hedges, seats, pathways and so forth are pretty much identical with hedges, seats and pathways to be found in any other byway of the labyrinth. Centres, then, are arbitrary and are simply places we imbue with special significance.

Another version of the labyrinth is Gedipa's view of the streets of Southern California, well laid-out, mainlining to the heart (17). And, in BOOK/BID, there's the idea that a joy or pleasure might be derived from the infinite moves to be made around this maze of circuits and lines.

Mythically, however, we have tended to populate our maze-centres. Usually with monsters or treasure. That is, we imagine our origins as being either hideously natural or corruptingly cultural. And, as we follow mazes, it is certainly a motivating force if we can clearly imagine things of this kind. Trepidation or fortune is certainly more attractive than aimlessness—yoyoing perhaps. The monsters to be killed and the gold to be won keep us on our track to the empty, arbitrary centre. We know, though
we rarely think of it, that the centre is no centre. The goods there are no good.

So, if we chance upon some possible centre, we feel always as if we have reached nothing. And then we want to return to our exploring because at least the exploring gave us a sense of purpose. So the search continues, even if we have discovered the centre to be empty. But now there is a continuous feeling of having been let down. It's the same feeling we get on the journey home. It always passes quicker than the outward journey. The freshness, the newness of the scene, the hope of an end in sight: all of these have been removed.

Even if the physical, common or garden labyrinth has some sort of central point, this is no more than any other psychological way-station. The regress still looms—the regress which is perhaps identical with the infinite flip-flop of prosthesis and, in itself, a source of pleasure. Whether we feel pleasure or anguish, our search for origins is still unsatisfiable. It is no more and no less than an addiction—much like the old sailor's addiction in Lot 49. Like all addictions, it has no purpose except for the satisfaction of the addiction itself. The way in and the way out are equally baffling. They provide the same kind of puzzle. And so every point along the way becomes a potential centre—and end.

Our problem is not "too few origins." It is not scarcity. Rather it is "too many origins." Over-abundance. War, love, god, self, man, wealth, nature, truth... We can't see "the" point because there are too many points, not too few. The will to origin and its pluralism constitute a central contradiction in our lives—and so we live in the eternal chasm between dogmas and aimlessness, uneasily, always tending to one side, carving a "middle way" between with the aid of various tools which often have the titles "religion," "ideology," "belief," and so on. We feel sometimes that we cannot reach the, or a, goal.

But what we get wrong is the idea of a goal. Goals, perhaps, are like goals scored in football: there can always be another quite different in character. There is no ultimate goal. If so, then it makes no sense to say we can't reach it than it does to say we can. And the myth of "the" goal is, for us and perversely, the origin. We have turned our ends into mythical beginnings. We will them to be so.

Here is the mistake: we want to stop—but we think that stopping means reaching for the origin/end. While, in fact, stopping means stopping either to search or to feel hopeless in the absence of anything to search for. I want a morality which refuses both. A post-ethical ethics. For: the two sides of the mistake are sides of the same coin—and the coinage as a whole is debased. We should continue (if I may be permitted to prolong this dogmatic fragment) to want to stop—but in another sense entirely. This different sense of stopping is: refraining from the hope for a definite origin and refraining equally from the hopelessness of the absent origin.
If the origin/end is—by some miracle—to return (and I doubt it), then it will do so without our going out and looking for it. Like some lost souls deserted by their mothers or their spouses, we go searching in the night through all the likely, and some of the unlikely, places. What we don't see is that our quest actually prevents any return. Refraining will not guarantee it either, but, unlike the search, it won't prevent it. That is the odd paradox: there is more hope in abstention from hope. But this is as far as hope can be allowed to go.

The positive search for an origin is associated with the concept of "same"—all things must have the same origin. A life lived on the concept of sameness (despite the empirical plurality of candidate origins) is a life which valorises "mystique" in Péguy's sense. To believe, on the contrary, that the origin cannot be attained is to live a life on the concept of difference—the bases of life, in the absence of an origin, one believes, must be plural, fragmented, differentiated, one-for-each-of-us or each-group-of-us. Here the origin is, too, deferred. It is continually put off. Such a life, again in Péguy's sense, valorises "politique." Here: the origin is absent and condemns us to this world, to politique. While, with the former course, the positive origin is never of this world—hence mystique.

But "same and different," "mystique and politique," in themselves, constitute another order of difference. The division between them is, therefore, on the side of politique. We need to see this difference as the difference which will give us a clue as to how to refrain (from the search for origins and also from fears of the goal being absent). The mystical dogmatist sees only a uniform world in which even the unbeliever has her origins in one central and primordial form. The unbeliever sees a multitude of worlds, including among them the mistaken beliefs of the mystic. But the "higher order" difference is that the world is both uniform and plural—or else it is neither, for its essential energy derives from relations between same and different, mystique and politique, uniformity and plurality, just as physical energy comes neither from a single indivisible subatomic particle, nor from the plurality of such particles but instead from the relations between them. (And what has been said up to this point is not very far from the prosthetic opening of the gap between a and b in BOOK/BID.)

The mistake is to go looking in the properties of objects (e.g., the will, the Tristero, etc.) instead of cancelling the object domain and focusing instead on the domain of relations. (And, once again, I may be pointing to the non-binarity of a/b, to its status as a triple term: a-slash-b—but need I say that my "look here" is more than simply that, for it points to a way of refraining from reading the slash in a definite way—e.g., as exclusion.) In physics, relations can be represented mathematically—as relatively pure writing. In the "human" domain we have no exact equivalent of mathematics. The relations can only be shown. That is, they can only be lived. Living becomes a form of writing—living. Life becomes identical with
its representation. (And that is why I want to get to a literary theory which looks, to invoke the symbolism of material typology, as follows: "The Novel //Writing"). Attempts at representation of the relations—which can be called psychology, sociology, anthropology, philosophy and so on—are doomed because they over-value the analogue with physics. They are all, whatever their protestations, positivistic, in this sense: in the sense that they hold life to be representable in some other form than life. The difference which gives human life meaning(s) is different from the difference which creates physical energy. And so the attempt which Oedipa makes at contact with the Demon, through the representation of Maxwell on the box cover, is always doomed; the two differences cannot be treated as the same. There is no equivalent of a mathematics to which we can turn (though many have mistaken logic for such a technique).

If I want to be happy with my life, or you with yours, or Oedipa with hers, then that will never eventuate as long as we demand an origin (the ultimately "same") or as long as we think of the origin as unattainable (the ultimately "different"). Yet, in these times, it is certainly probably easiest to take the latter option: "No Future," "God/Man is Dead," etc. In our present circumstances, it’s very easy to distrust the route of sameness and origin which served well for our pre-nuclear ancestors and to replace it with its antithesis, its inverted image. The point would then be to remove either image and not to mistake the removal of the first for the currently popular ideology of mere difference and hopelessness.

One beginning was the search for secular forms of "same" and "origin"—and some have made this move under the rubric of "humanism." That may be an important initial corrective—and it shows the historical importance of movements such as existentialism—but it is only on a par with adolescent impersonations of adulthood. Our age of humanism is effectively over now. But we have mistaken the new impersonality for hopelessness instead of seeing it as a possible freedom—albeit a freedom within the vestigial constraints of same and different.

So it may be true; one does not know the way ahead. But it is as important as ever to find out what its limits are. All of the beliefs we have relied on in the past are either beliefs which will get us into the labyrinth or beliefs which will get us out. What we need, then, are counterveliefs which will prevent us from entering at all. But this is like saying "Stop crying!" to one who is interminably disturbed. It is no good simply saying "Don’t enter!" We have to find not only reasons but also motivations for not entering. This is a burning project—in both senses.

I’m talking here like a child who has had enough of the maze game. But I have no idea how I can persuade you—some mythical you who wants to continue playing—that we should move on to another game. Maybe I simply have to complain loudly and long
enough. I'm not sure. But one thing is obvious: there's no
giving it alone. We have to give up together for it to make
sense, even if the raw game is not well formulated in my mind. I
cannot give anything like rational reasons for wanting to cease
and to begin in a new way. My only strategy is this: to tell
you stories—stories about what we might do when we cease.

Here, then, is a story. As it happens, it's a story about
stories. Once upon a time we used to tell stories of morality in
which there were quests. Chrétien de Troyes almost single-
handedly invented the Grail legends. The Bible tells us nothing
of it. In de Troyes' story and in many quest stories right up to
Tolkien and Pynchon and beyond, a young man is born, the last of
a noble line. He is kept sheltered from the world of chivalry,
often by his mother, in a country (or a country retreat) far from
civilisation. But one day, by accident, he wanders and meets a
knight on the road—or hears/read of rumours of knights. Torn
between his seemingly lowly origins and chivalry, he chooses the
latter and goes off on his quest—unsure of his, or its,
authenticity. Often the Grail, or its equivalent, eludes him at
a crucial moment. For example, he may fail to ask or answer a
simple question properly.

His lowly origins extend to common insecurities about
language in formal situations. We simply go wrong, against our
own better judgment and capacities—as the common phenomenon of
esprit d'escalier (knowing just what to say after the event)
shows. The young man does, however, despite this and other
failings, turn into a great king or leader in some new zone. But
he is always insecure about his "natural" ability. His success
seems more a matter of luck than of ability in any true or
ultimate sense. This is especially so in the light of his
failure in the face of the Question. But he makes wise laws,
keeps in touch with the people and often dies or disappears,
childless. But he does return from time to time—shadowy and not
quite material. Sometimes this is in the prefigurement of other
legends. Sometimes it is in later stories. And sometimes it is
in the works we call "scholarship," "criticism," or "mythology"
in the disciplinary sense. The scholar's quest for the hero is
often just like the hero's own quest. And of course the hero—or
the Grail—can turn out to be a monster or a treasure.

Today, the quest is unpopular. We see no point in
searching. Nothing seems to be worth it, to have any value to us
either in terms of destruction of evil nature (the monster)
or in terms of the value of goods (treasure). Essentially we
have lost what used to be called a "model of man," a conception
of human nature. But the denial of the quest, the refusal of a
theory of human nature, our very hopelessness, is an ethos in
itself. The absence of a "model of man" assumes a "model of man"
from whom the model is absent. We think we have gone without (in
the sense of "lack" and/or in the sense of "beyond")—but the
pull of the origin, one would like to say the form of the origin-
quest, for all its inversion, holds us still in our very anguish,
aimlessness and despair.
The one who goes on a quest—Oedipus, Quixote, Percival—is like the paranoid. The "model of man" for the quester is paranoid; for the paranoid can see pattern and purpose in absolutely everything. The hand of God is visible in the configuration of cigarette butts/ends around the library steps. The windmills are giants. Whatever John, Paul and George may say, the sect are after Ringo's ring (cf. the comparisons between The Paranoics and The Beatles and between Lot 49 and Help in particular). Old milk bottle tops are (real) gold and silver. Ring-pulls thrown away at random are rings which guarantee invisibility. But the anti-quester is simply the anti-paranoid. She is hebephrenic. The hebephrenic is one who can see no patterns in anything—can make no sense of the most significant events or objects (data, experiences, etc.). The quester is relation-ful and the anti-quester is relation-less.

Both of these extremes are a kind of illness. Some of us perhaps want to strike a balance—to manage the tightrope between the two. The world is full of agnostics of this kind. No one seems to have the fortitude to embrace cut-and-cut atheism—to prolong the metaphor. Atheism, here, would mean that both the quest for origins and its antithesis are pointless—both of them requiring an initial conception of origins. But that would not mean that life is pointless. Atheism would be like a kind of environmentalism. It would show us that there is a landscape outside the labyrinth and that we hardly know that landscape, let alone how to live in it, or at one with it.

We can learn from Western philosophers how to use balls of string to trace our way back to the entrance of the labyrinth. But they can no longer help us once we get out. Getting out, as I have said, is no different from the quest itself—even if it is an anti-quest. We need to turn somewhere to find out details of the counter-quest, of the cancelled #ast.

What I have been writing so far might be reduced—by someone who was not sympathetic to my ideas—to a simple distinction between the universal and the particular. After all, the idea of a quest for origins is rather like a kind of universalism, and the idea of purposelessness does make it look as if we're stuck with the particular minuiae of the moment, behind which no universal light ever shines. And then, if one accepted this reduction, it could be said: "Well, he's looking for a path between universalism and particularism, only in the area of the ethical—and particularly with regard to morality."

To some extent, that's a reasonable summary. But this is as far as I would want to go with these doctrines: universality and particularity I see as being bound up with the question, ultimately, of signification—which is where we started our investigation. They are a game with signification. Our times are surely ones in which people have come more and more to think about language and how it signifies, "the ways in which it means." (So much so that we can—as I just did—use "surely," or "certainly" to mark a kind of reservation.) For us is, if anything, the age of the signifier. Before we began to think
about the signifier, in its modern sense, before perhaps the work of de Saussure, words and other bits and pieces of language were thought to mean something by being attached to non-linguistic things: to cats and dogs, but also to love, happiness, anger and so forth. Rather in the way that a label is attached to a parcel, or a postage stamp to a letter. (Now, of course, we can collect just the labels or the stamps without that to which they were attached having much importance.) This “being attached” which was so important gave us the doctrine of unus nomen unus nominatum—which sounds quite particularistic but was in fact quite the opposite in its effects. Once you have an idea that signifiers, particular signifiers, never shift their meaning because they are attached in this way, you begin to believe that each has a universal, once-for-all meaning. So this was the age of the universal signifier—as if it were hard currency, fixed to some kind of gold standard, and when you cashed in your signifier, you always got the same thing (object, image) in exchange for it.

Now there has been something of an end to this. We have come to accept the sliding around of meaning—the fact that words and other linguistic paraphernalia are not fixed to a central meaning. We’ve come off the gold standard. The currency of signification is floating in a basket of related currencies. And here we can see perhaps why the word “meaning” itself is used in different ways: for example, sometimes it can be considered as “linguistic meaning,” sometimes as “significance” in the sense of “the meaning of life,” sometimes as “intending,” sometimes as “leading to” (‘x means y’) . . . and so on. It floats around in a way that we could consider as a metaphor for, or at least an instance of, the problem of meaning generally and its instability in our age. Just as we have the Old and the New Penny, we might talk about the old and the new signifier. The new one involves a lot more free play. Its value is by no means fixed. But we have not yet learned—like many people who introduce new currencies—to find our way with this new signifier. We keep trying to attach it to the value of the old. We keep making translations.

So our relativism has extended to or perhaps even derived from our conceptions of language—and the old, universal, signifier is now very much out of date (and, therefore, sought after? a relic? an antique?)—for all the new, playful, signifier keeps on being referred back to that shadow. (And the very act of referring, in this case, is a technique hanging over from our ways of utilising the old currency.)

Again we seem to be faced with a choice between fixed origins and the abyss of unreason. But here too it need not be so. The mistake, I think, is of the order of the other mistakes I’ve dealt with here. It involves actively looking for some quality called “the meaning” and then either finding that quality fixed or finding it hopelessly free. In place of this, we can think of meaning as other than “the meaning”—as an activity, like bathing and so forth. Then it would be as odd to ask “What is the meaning of a word?” as it is to ask “What is the bathing of a person?” This does not mean that we have to come down on
the side of universalism or particularism. It means that we can avoid asking that kind of question about our language. Perhaps this means refusing the whole problematic of Lot 49.

(I don't know how to put the mark of erasure under erasure, except by intensifying it.) This may be where we find our postern where once there were only post-horns—for look how the slashes make a /// an Un-Lot, perhaps, my final two letters.

The day of the fixity of language may be over; but equally the free play of language is by no means infinite—as the prosthetic reading might have it. There are indeed many sorts of activities we can undertake with, and as, language, and no one feature seems to bind these activities together. There is no "language in general," then. So ought we to despair? Perhaps not. Take the example of a greeting and a sermon. They are as unlike as lawn mowing and heraldry. Yet it is always quite clear that if one of these is to be done, then we can tell from the language and its accompanying activities whether or not it has been brought off. And we can "decide" these matters quite easily without worrying about fixed meanings or sliding signifiers. If the pathways, the shufflings from a to b (from "en?" to "be!?") are flip-floppy, then the ways in which we actually move, the language-games we undertake, are important.

Aimless wanderings through the streets or circuits are not the necessary upshot of the tangled variety we have available. Often it's very difficult to keep our hands out of this trap, though. But that is what we must do if we are to retain any kind of equilibrium; refuse! And what is WASTE if not refuse? Things must be fused again—re-fused—both in the bomber's and the welder's sense. Blown up. Brought together. The material is there. The point now is to use it rather than to sit contemplating its (present or absent) origin.

This marks the end of my labyrinths. They have left us with one important question for the reading of Lot 49: how to refuse the lot? How to make it an Un-Lot? This is how I would begin to answer that question, an answer which will take us into the text of Lot 49 and eventually into Teleogrammatology II. The first thing would be to face the problem of selecting analytic examples from the text. All literary analysis takes its examples. Usually, you get a critical theme and select passages which fit it. The "entropy" readings of Pynchon, for example, have done this with aplomb (a lead?). And so does BOOK/BID.

What this procedure (theme first, text second) achieves is a low degree of failure in literary studies. To increase this degree and thereby to add, in Popperian terms, an element of falsifiability to literary ideas: suppose we were to take our text-bits first. This would also mean that we were facing up to the materiality of the text. For example, we could take those parts of a text which held the same structural positions. This would constitute a new form of "identification" with the text. What then could we mean by "the same position?" Lot 49, for a
start, is made up of six chapters. Each chapter has to start and finish. It has to start and finish with particular units: words, sentences, paragraphs. So, in a purely structural way, we could take the first sentence of each chapter. Interestingly, when we do this, we get a not-too-bad summary of the plot:

One summer afternoon Mrs. Oedipa Maas came home from a Tupperware party whose hostess had put perhaps too much kirsch in the fondue to find that she, Oedipa, had been named executrix, of the estate of one Pierce Inerarity, a California real estate mogul who had once lost two million dollars in his spare time but still had assets numerous and tangled enough to make the job of sorting it all out more than honorary. She left Kinneret, then, with no idea she was moving toward anything new. Things then did not delay in turning curious. Though she saw Mike Fallopian again, and did trace the text of The Courier's Tragedy a certain distance, these follow-ups were no more disquieting than other revelations which now seemed to come crowding in exponentially, as if the more she collected the more would come to her, until everything she saw, smelled, dreamed, remembered, would somehow come to be woven into The Tristero. Though her next move should have been to contact Randolph Dribblette again, she decided instead to drive up to Berkeley. When she got back to Echo Courts, she found Miles, Dean, Serge and Leonard arranged around and on the diving board at the end of the swimming pool with all their instruments, so composed and motionless that some photographer, hidden from Oedipa, might have been shooting them for an album illustration.

Doubtless, a range of literary-critical remarks could be made here which would, I suspect, be as cogent as anything written on Lot 49—certainly as comprehensive. It would be tempting to analyse the patterns of contact Oedipa makes, to map her journey—as one may map Slothrop's arc-Journey through the Zone. It's all here, in the selected text—most of the major moves. So are many of the main characters, with some important exceptions—though, again, they could be brought in with a few skilful moves and connections. Thematically one could point to alcohol, wills, money, town-city moves, the build-up of clues, the pointlessness of them despite their temptation as jigsaw material, the textuality of The Courier's Tragedy and therefore the relations between Oedipa's and the critics' searches for interpretations, the mathematical nature of the enterprise, the 60's/Beatles connections, the hidden narratorial hand in the shape of the photographer, the inter-textual connections with cinema and so on. And so on. The point is not to do that but to
refuse and to show how plainly it could be done from these structurally culled and essentially random bits.

Now we could turn to the final lines of each chapter. Doing so, we get a very different text—one might even say the "other side" of the lot. And here I have arranged the sentences a little differently. The last lines:

- If the tower is everywhere and the knight of deliverance no proof against its magic, what else?
- After awhile she said, "I will." And she did.
- She got in and rode with him for two miles before realizing that the whimsies of nighttime reception were bringing them KDFC down from Kinneret, and that the disc jockey talking was her husband, Mucho.
- As if the dead really do persist, even in a bottle of wine.
- But by then it was too late to make any difference.
- Gedip settle back, to await the crying of lot 48.

This is a markedly different text from the first. If the first was—en of the lot. An/here I have for narrative such as Prince's—an astonishingly narrative text, this one is much less so. It uses fewer declarative, propositional utterances. It kicks off, for example, with an interrogative, moves on to reported speech, invokes a plot-tangential coincidence, makes a gnomic remark, becomes resigned, and finally, reports an event, but an ultimate one. The tone now is poetic—philosophical even. The themes do not have to be wrung by implication from the narrative events—they are there (for all their vagueness) as plain as day.

If the first text was from a nineteenth-century novel of the event-reportage, chase-game type, this is now from the postmodern philosophical novel, the novel of ellipsis and existential crisis, invoking Gedip's dilemma: she cannot escape like the romantic heroine from the tower. She, only by fiat, random and impulsive choice, is able to bring her words (I will) and her deeds (She did) together. Only the "whimsies" bring her into touch with those closest to her in any "official" capacity (her next of kin, her husband, Mucho). And the line about the dead may well refer back to Mucho upon she discovers changed, almost to the point of disintegration:

They are stripping from me ... one by one, my men. My shrink, pursued by Israelis, has gone mad; my husband on LSD, grooves like a child further and further into the rooms and endless rooms of the elaborate candy house of himself and
away, hopelessly away, from what has passed, I was
hoping forever, for love; my one extra-marital
fille has eloped with a depraved 15-year-old; my
best guide back to the Trystero has taken a Brody.
Where am I? (116)

The dead may persist, in a bottle of wine, too, given Oedipus's
glimpse of escape in the dr/DDs. And, of course, death will
always mean that it's too late to make a difference. Its
meaninglessness cuts across all difference. And so on, to the
point of waiting for the crying.

But it's always just too paranoid, or too aimless: either
to search for textual patterns or to recommend, as do the
Reader's Liberation Movement, the Free play of interpretation.
You can do it with, and between, these two fake passages. But
the point would be, after all of this, not to do it. Not to put
one's hand into the traps I have just put mine into.

If Derrida is indeed the Mysterious Bidder (though it may be
Genghis Cohen2 who does apologise to Oedipus for showing up,
after all—and I admit it could be an apology merely for showing
up and not for being "He"—I just wanted to sound a note of
cautions about reading the text such that it's definite we don't
know who "He" is)—if it is Jacques, I'll give you one guess who
I think Loren Passerine might be. Again, beginnings and ends
will give you a clue, as will syllables. --Murdoch University

Notes

references are to this edition.

2 Alec McHoul & David Wills, "Gravity's Rainbow
and the Post-Rhetorical," Southern Review 19.2

3 The distinction between "because" and "in order
to" motives originates in the work of Alfred Schutz.
See his Collected Papers, Vol. 1 (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1952) 69-72.

4 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind
Sanity, Madness and the Family, (Vol. 11 Families of

5 The quotations are from page 19 of the
manuscript of PLS RECORD BOOK/BID.

6 Jacques Derrida, "Limited inc: a b c
. . . . Glyph 2 (1978); 162-254. J. L. Austin,
"Three Ways of Spilling Ink," Philosophical Papers, 2nd

7 This argument is close to that of Wittgenstein
in Zettel (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967) 893. It also
owes much to the position taken by Mark Doitch in his unpublished paper "Wittgenstein and Derrida: No Contest."


9 Here I'm thinking of Barthes' argument that the unloved lover, for example, "identifies" with anyone of the same ilk regardless of other differences. See Roland Barthes, A Lover's Discourse: Fragments, (London: Cape, 1979) 129. The identification is no longer psychological or subjective but structural: "The subject painfully identifies himself with some person (or character) who occupies the same position as himself in the amorous structure."

10 See Gerald Prince, Narratology: The Form and Functioning of Narrative (Berlin: Mouton, 1982).

11 As often happens, more text has to be dragged into the fray once the process of critical interpretation is underway.

12 NB: The Penguin edition blurb says "the eminent philatelist Genghis Cohen, who likes her sex with the news on"—thereby confusing him with the telesexual Nefastis (80). The only other textual error I can find is on page 89 of the same edition where a non-speech passage begins with a quote-mark: "They’d never heard it that way . . . ." This and other errors (and their importance as structural points for text selection) are taken up in Telegrammatology Part II.