VICTOR TURNER
And the Theatre of War

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VICTOR TURNER AND THE THEATRE OF WAR

A reflection on the value of Psyops, culture and performance during conflict.

This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of a degree of a Bachelor of Arts with Joint Honours in English, and Securities and Counterterrorism, at Murdoch University, November 2011.

Ivana Trošelj
Declaration statement

This Honours thesis is presented in the year of 2011 for the Bachelor of Arts with joint Honours in English, and Securities and Counterterrorism at Murdoch University. I declare that this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my own work and an account of my own research.

- Ivana Trošelj.
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ABSTRACT

Conventional ‘force-on-force’ warfare is a thing of the past (Kilcullen 2009: 292). Much has changed in the conduct of war since Carl von Clausewitz’s opus On War (Clausewitz 1997) was first published in 1832; the ongoing digitisation of the contemporary battlefield promises swifter and more intense battles at a lower cost-to-combat ratio (Goldenstein and Jacobowitz 1996: 10); while a rise in low-intensity and insurgent war is anticipated to continue within the developing world (McLaughlin 1989: 1-2). The only thing one may say with any certainty about the future of warfare is the diverse nature of its conduct (Black 2001: 82); and the enduringly psychological nature of all kinds of human conflict (Paddock 1996: 33).

Despite this, contemporary Western militaries continually re-enact the principles of conventional war; even where unsuited, while the psychological dimension of war is often the least appreciated and engaged (Stillwell 1996: 319), even though it is ‘human’ forces that provide conflict with its many variables (Leonhard 2000: 209-2011). A misunderstanding of these forces has resulted in a shortfall of resourcing, continuity and training for Psychological Operations (Psyops) (Paddock 1996: 34); while appreciation for the soft power of Psyops and the human elements of war have been diminished by an empirical, neo-Clausewitzian strategic framework (Van Creveld 1991: 148-149) and a particularly Western and Postmodern notion of Technological Determinism (Black 2001: 97). I believe that importing Victor Turner’s performance theory into existing military doctrines will provide a useful heuristic model for working with these problems, because of its unique perspective on the dramatic power of symbol, performance and conflict; and I believe that this will further enhance the military’s understanding and appreciation of Psyops’ unique capabilities, along with the more human elements of warfare; while supplying a much-needed process-oriented understanding of human culture and conflict at strategic level.
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INTRODUCTION

Victor Turner once said that theories only become relevant if and when they illuminate some aspect of social reality (Turner 1974: 23). I am appealing to Turner’s theories on ‘performance’ here, in order to illuminate some aspects of armed conflict which I believe are persistently overlooked by those who plan wars; in particular those aspects which highlight the essentially ‘human nature’ of conflict. The focus of my research here is on the work of military Psychological Operations and the way in which Turner’s processual model of social drama, and the transforming potential of liminal states, can provide a better explanatory framework for their capabilities, as well as address the need for a process-oriented theory of culture in the military at present. I have chosen to focus on the work of Psyops, because they alone deal consistently with people and perception in conflict, and because they are a unique form of non-violent conflict management practiced by the military across a wide variety of conflict scenarios, only some of which involve combat. Because of their uses in both war and in peace, they are also uniquely situated to ensure that the continuity of human knowledge gained (and usually lost) from war to war is preserved.

Like so many other impotent observers, I followed astonished, at the developments that led up to Second Gulf War, augmenting what seemed like mere sabre-rattling into one of the lengthiest and costliest wars the U.S. has ever waged. Martin Van Creveld even called it the ‘most foolish war since Emperor Augustus in 9 B.C. sent his legions into Germany and lost them’ (Van Creveld 2005). And yet, I was surprised to learn, this war could have been avoided: had the U.S. better understood Saddam Hussein’s fears and the climate he operated in; had they only had a better understanding of Iraqi culture it was claimed; mere psychological coercion would have sufficed (Jervis 2010: 177). The U.S. campaign in Iraq was mired by a similarly deficient understanding of culture and the human dimensions of conflict, resulting in the waste of trillions of dollars and thousands of lives. I believe that Turner’s theories on culture and performance may remedy this faulty brand of ‘conflict management,’ and I present them here with the aim of improving the way in which cultural knowledge is handled by governments and militaries at present, while offering some novel insights into the nature of soft power.
In Section 1 of this dissertation I will discuss the challenges of Psychological Operations and reference Turner to argue the importance of understanding culture and human perception during conflict. Chapter I. on ‘The Value of Psyops;’ explains the function of Psychological Operations during conflict, and the reasons for their generally poor reception and resource allocation in the armed forces. As a general rule, the lower in intensity a conflict becomes, the more likely that military campaigns will depend upon Psyops, on account of the increased dependence upon local populations in occupied territories. Yet despite the vital support they render, their funding is seldom continued at the close of a war. Chapter II. on ‘Continuity’ discusses the ‘institutional amnesia’ that results as a lack of this continuity in Psyops, as evidenced in the curricula of service schools and subsequent military campaigns, where the mistakes of history are ever being repeated. In the contemporary era, these mistakes have been further augmented by a preference for ‘bodiless’ conflicts, and swift, high-tech, precision warfare, defined by the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA). The folly of Donald Rumsfeld’s ‘speed goals’ during the 2003 Iraq invasion is an example of this faulty thinking, and a costly reminder of the enduring importance of the ‘human terrain,’ which is explained and remedied by Turner’s arguments on human perception, as discussed in chapter III., ‘RMA vs. Human Terrain’.

The U.S. Military’s eventual promotion of a new counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine during the Second Gulf War, which included the use of embedded social scientists in the controversial Human Terrain Systems (HTS), was a response to the difficulties encountered with ‘human terrain’. Chapter IV. on ‘Culture vs. HUMINT’ focuses on this development to argue the military’s status as an evolving culture in its own right, while considering the nature of the HTS controversy, and drawing upon Turner’s theories to highlight the error of treating ‘cultural’ information as a form of static intelligence; especially at the Strategic level, where a more abstract theoretical framework of thinking is needed. This is where a qualitative form of judgement and research are especially required for a more nuanced understanding of human behaviour in conflict, as provided by Turner’s de-empiricalised version of Anthropology, and this will be argued in chapter V., on ‘Qualitative Judgement and the ‘Law of Humanity,’ where the military’s on-going preference for quantitative research and ‘hard’ sciences, will also be discussed.
In Section 2 I will elaborate on the psychological dimensions of conflict, in order to introduce Turner’s theories on conflict as a form of affective performance, capable of inducing altered states and generating social change, and as such, a worthy explanatory model for Psyops’ persuasive powers. Section 2 begins with chapter VI.; ‘War as a Performance,’ and introduces the importance of a defining doctrine for the military and the idea of conflict as a form of public performance, in order to highlight the value of Turner’s theories to Psyops’ understanding of perception and persuasion. Chapter VII., on ‘the Utility of Performance,’ discusses Turner’s theory of ‘social drama’ as a restorative response to a breach in the social order. His views on conflict mediation are supported here by insights from a number of other theorists writing on the psychological imperatives that compel people to enter war. These theorists all agree on the affective state that humans enter during conflict, and in chapter VII. on ‘Liminal Moments,’ this altered state of reality is further discussed within the scope of Turner’s work on ‘liminality’—ambiguous moments, induced via ritual and performance, during which symbols and meanings; social order, may be subverted and transformed. The nature of this transforming ‘soft power,’ inherent to all ‘performance,’ ‘ritual’ and ‘social drama’ will be summarised in chapter VIII., ‘Dramatic Possibilities’.

In Section 3, I will discuss Turner’s performance theory within the context of the Second Gulf War, beginning with a recapitulation of Turner’s ideas in chapter X., on the ‘Second Gulf War performance,’ where I present evidence of the performative, symbolic and ritualistic to support Turner’s theory on the universality of ‘performance,’ while Chapter XI, on The Importance of Strategy and Doctrine’ explains the importance of military doctrine; the way in which Turner’s theories can provide a much needed heuristic model at doctrinal level, and the ways in which doctrine, strategy and intelligence may also be misinterpreted, despite the sound intentions and intelligence of those who promote them. The final chapter, XII., ‘Turner’s Liminal Legacy – a final thought on ‘immersion,’ reconsiders the importance of properly engaging with human behavior and culture during conflict, and argues for more extensive engagement with the military on the part of the ‘soft’ sciences, while recalling Turner’s comments on the ineffable nature of the ‘liminal,’ an aspect of human behaviour which he claimed could only properly be studied by immersing oneself in the experience.
These claims will seem odd no doubt, for those who recall that Turner was a pacifist and a non-combatant during World War Two. But if Turner’s views on a ‘unified science’ of human behavior are to be respected as he requested, via the unification of numerous disciplines, and via the traversing of researchers into untraditional and uncomfortable territories, then an immersive study of conflict cannot be avoided, and there is still a case to be made in favour of academia’s engagement with the contemporary military; which itself is poised at a liminal, or transforming moment of sorts. It may be well to reflect here on the fact that one of the fundamental causes of intelligence errors for countries is that they see the world and each other differently (Jervis 2010: 177). As I previously mentioned, it has been claimed that the Second Gulf War might have been altogether avoided with a better grasp of culture and conflict process at strategic levels of decision making. In the absence of these, the U.S. failed to properly understand and communicate with its adversaries. I believe that the engagement of academics with both government and military will remedy this by exposing strategic decision making processes to the kind of cultural thinking which has clearly been lacking, not just in war, but in peacetime; while importing elements of Turner’s theories on culture and conflict into existing military doctrines will provide a more detailed heuristic model for conflict processes, and help to avoid such costly and tragic mistakes in the future.
Section 1 - I. THE VALUE of PSYOPS

The human race is governed by its imagination. – Napoleon
I. THE VALUE of PSYOPS

The ‘acme of generalship,’ according to Sun Tzu’s ancient text, The Art of War (c.210 BC), is to win without fighting (Sun Tzu (1994): c3). Psyops aspire to do just this, attempting to persuade via non-violent means; directing planned communications at target audiences in a bid to sway minds, emotions and actions towards a desired goal (Stillwell 1996: 320). An official definition from U.S. Army Doctrine states that it is the ‘planned use of subjective information to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behaviour of hostile, neutral or friendly groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives’ (Roberts 2005: 1). Psyops is also by needs, a complex, interdisciplinary field, encompassing psychology, sociology, communications and political and military sciences (Katz et al 1996: 122). This notwithstanding, for many within and without the military, Psyops still carry simplistic and negative connotations (Johnston 1996: 99), due to a misplaced suspicion of ‘propaganda’ and a basic lack of understanding as to how Psyops actually work (Paddock 1996: 33).

Psyops has actually been an asset to a commander’s ‘scheme of manoeuvre’ for far longer than the term has been in use, and has long operated without any of the technological support and research available to the military today (Goldenstein and Jacobowitz 1996: 11-12). But in the contemporary era, the capabilities of mass communications have augmented the force of conventional military persuasion in an unprecedented fashion, allowing direct communication with an audience to convey threats, conditions of surrender, or support for resistance, inter alia (Goldenstein and Jacobowitz 1996: 7-8). It was the NAZIs during WWII who actually provided the first glimpse of what Psyops could achieve with the aid of mass communication;¹ the results so compelling they revised much of the conduct of modern war (Katz 1996: 122-123). This was especially the case with the practice of ‘Total War’ (Totale Krieg), in which both civilians and combatants became targets of fire and propaganda across the full spectrum of operations.

¹ In chapter six of Mein Kampf, Adolf Hitler reflected bitterly on the success of British propaganda during World War I, vowing that he had learnt well from this experience, and that Germany would not fail in its propagandist efforts in future wars (Hitler 1943: ch6).
It was for this very reason during WWII, that psychological warfare became as institutionalised as it did; almost every warring country had some form of tactical or strategic Psyops in place, and many even formed special units for propaganda which was broadcast via radio, or distributed via leaflet drops. How far these activities may have influenced Kinetic Operations (KO / physical fighting) is not certain, but surrenders seemed to suggest a positive correlation to Psyops activities (Goldenstein and Jacobowitz 1996: 13). This shift in conduct due to enhanced communications marked the beginning of Psyops’ entry into an Information Age, where force would eventually become as important as the struggle for the ‘informational high ground’ (Leonhard 2000: 33).

Psyops is a unique, non-lethal weapon that acts as a form of persuasive ‘soft power’ in support of military objectives (Katz et al 1996: 44). As with other military operations, Psyops is planned across three areas: Strategic, Operational and Tactical (Roberts 2005: 30). On a Strategic level, Psyops targets a global audience with broad themes, such as the ‘War on Terror,’ although this may be reduced to a few a principal actors in the leadership of a foreign audience who may be steered towards certain objectives. One might also make intimations by deploying an aircraft carrier within sight of a country for instance, or by simply encouraging positive media coverage of certain ideas (Roberts 2005: 30). At Operations level however, Psyops supports the movements of large units for battle, often employing deceptions and ruses (Roberts 2005: 30-32). During the first Gulf War for example, there was an elaborate deception involving the creation of a ‘notional division’ to the south of Kuwait, to draw Iraqi troops into one position, while the U.S. VII Corps slipped into another (Roberts 2005: 32). Tactical Psyops on the other hand, works as a force multiplier for units on the ground, employing techniques such as loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops in order to support tactical deception, counterterrorism and counterpropaganda (Goldenstein and Jacobowitz 1996: 10). In this tactical setting, Psyops is used to either demoralise or confuse hostile groups, or to encourage the support of non-hostile and neutral groups (Paddock 1996: 25), perhaps eventuating in a quicker victory at a lower cost (Goldenstein and Jacobowitz 1996: 10), although swift results are never guaranteed in low intensity operations, whereas M.E. Roberts explains, winning popular support is a part of a slow, but necessary process (Roberts 2005: 28).
Notwithstanding the breadth of Psyops’ applications, they have never truly been accepted as a fixed element of security planning; only ever receiving any substantive support during, or immediately after wartime. This is perhaps because although Psyops have provided support in historic conflicts such as WWII, they were only ever considered secondary, and not crucial to the outcome, which was decided mostly by *Kinetic Operations* (KO); that is, force. Contemporary, low intensity wars however, are primarily fought on political and psychological grounds; requiring mostly only secondary support from military forces (Stillwell 1996: 321-322). This is a lesson that Western contemporary military have learnt at great cost in conflicts such as the Vietnam War, where psychological warfare was as valuable to counterinsurgency as any other weapon (Bjelajac 1966).

The idea that unconventional wars can still be fought with the same principles as conventional wars, and considered the same as all other conflicts, only lower in intensity, is inherited from the 18th Century military strategist Clausewitz, and is a point of disagreement for some writers, who argue that Clausewitz’s overarching philosophy offers little practical or predictive advice (Melton 2009: 153); especially in contemporary conflict, where it is assumed that a Clausewitzian classical strategy will eventually vanish, along with the conventional warfare that once informed it (Van Creveld 1991: 225). This is because the contemporary conduct of war has been markedly transformed by information technology and superior firepower. Military doctrine often struggles to keep up with advances in technology that radically revise the conduct of war, however. A failure to accommodate new technology in WWI for instance, cost General Douglas Haig a great many lives, for although the nature of war had changed markedly within Haig’s lifetime, he chose to perpetuate the examples of past conflicts in his command, even though improvements in artillery made tactics such as infantry charges inappropriate to his situation (Leonhard 2000: 4-6).
Conversely, a pre-emptive declaration of new military doctrine may be just as damaging as an out-dated doctrine: the success of digitised battle space and ‘production-line’ management of US forces during the 1991 Gulf War for instance, were confidently promoted as the beginning of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in which Information Warfare would dominate, bringing an end to protracted, costly wars (Lonsdale 2007: 232). But this approach proved to be inappropriate in the Second Gulf War of 2003, which was soon slowed by insurgent activity and asymmetric fighting tactics, which relied more on human cunning, than precision warfare. Certainly, the conduct of war has changed markedly over the years, in tandem with developments in science and politics; especially so with the Information Age (Leonhard 2000: 6). But as was the case with the Second Gulf War, any revision of warfare principles exaggerating the promise of technology may emphasise virtues such as accuracy in a way that denies the often unpredictable elements of human perception and behaviour in conflict. Indeed, Jose Fernandez-Vega believes that this absence of ‘human elements’ from current discussions of high-tech information-based warfare constitutes a serious ‘void’ in contemporary military culture (Fernandez-Vega 2007: 137).

All the same, George Allen believes that notwithstanding the increased need for Psyops in the Information Age, Kinetic Operations will never be wholly done away with, because military force still remains the strongest form of persuasion (Allen 1996: 214). Colonels Frank Goldstein and Daniel Jacobowitz agree, because the perceptions that Psyops create rely entirely on the credibility of armed forces to lend them any gravitas (Goldenstein and Jacobowitz 1996: 7-8). This is because even where Psyops methodology may improve ‘functional degradation of enemy capabilities,’ it is still the sound tactical performance of armed forces which creates the context for Psyops’ results (Goldenstein and Jacobowitz 1996: 10). Stillwell points out that this is not always the case, however. While high-intensity wars such as WWII may have relied primarily on a decisive use of force, with only secondary support from Psyops, in the asymmetric environment of counterinsurgency, the roles are often reversed, and the outcome determined on mostly political and psychological grounds (Stillwell 1996: 321-322). In this scenario, military force can only act as a short-term measure, to allow time for a political process to gain wider support. It can never be relied upon as a long-term solution (Masco 2010: 202).

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2 By the 2003 Iraq war, RMA had inspired confident new ‘speed goals’. A transformed military, Donald Rumsfeld announced, would be able to deploy in only 10 days, defeat an adversary in 20, and be ready for another battle in just 30 days (Lonsdale 2007: 233-236).

3 The C.I.A.’s FM 96-1A Guerrilla War Manual similarly states that ‘...In effect, the human being should be considered the priority in a political war. And conceived as the military target ... the human being has his most critical point in his mind. Once the mind has been reached, the ‘political animal’ has been defeated without necessarily receiving bullets’ (Central Intelligence Agency n.d.).
Psyops are not an infallible stop-gap for all manner of conflicts, either. Their application, while easily defined by the unique needs and environments of each level, must still at every level of planning, work in synergy with the others to ensure a *strategically consistent* theme and message (Roberts 2005: 30); so that at each level, there is adequate intelligence, coherent organisation, sound planning and a systematic evaluation of feedback (Katz et al 1996: 124). A lack of all of these was, according to a senior Foreign Service officer of the U.S. Information Agency in 1966, the cause of limited Psyops success in the Vietnam War, where small teams worked with little basic research data, few specialists, and only a vague sense of long-term strategic goals (Katz et al 1996: 129). The North Vietnamese in comparison, had a well-structured and comprehensive system of propaganda within all available media, and across the full spectrum of operations (Johnston 1996: 98); with which they sought to persuade those supporting the other side, while also making appeals to a global audience, and by bolstering the U.S. Peace Movement (Roberts 2005: 31). The U.S. discounted these efforts early on in the war however, losing much informational ground (Johnston 1996: 98). By the time it was apparent that Psychological Operations were indispensable in this protracted mode of war, and as important as any other weapon or technique (Bjelejac 1966), the U.S. had already lost the high ground in the conflict, resulting in a lack of faith in Psyops and withdrawal of many of its resources at the war’s conclusion (Katz et al 1996: 123-124). Psyops’ potential as a soft power has long been misunderstood and under-appreciated.
CONTINUITY

Hegel was right when he said that we learn from history that man can never learn anything from history. – George Bernard Shaw
II. CONTINUITY

Psyops has unfortunately, suffered the same fate of downsizing at the end of each war (Paddock 1996: 48). Although the highly ideological nature of the Cold War ensured a continuing interest in the psychological dimensions of conflict (Katz et al 1996: 123), the lessons learnt on the ground, especially with respect to unconventional warfare, were seldom formalised and soon forgotten. As David Paret observes, each war began ‘almost without an institutional memory of such experiences,’ necessitating a revision of ‘appropriate tactics at exorbitant costs,’ which were regrettably regarded as anomalous events and not lessons to be learnt; but simply ‘aberrations that need not be repeated’ (Paret 1986: 411). Given that counterinsurgency is hardly a new phenomenon, and that most contemporary wars have had counterinsurgent elements, it seems surprising that the military for the most part, seem to forget the lessons learnt from history, returning soon after each war's close to conventional warfare planning (Roberts 2005: 25).

This lack of continuity in Psyops research has also been reflected in the limited training and slow uptake of Psyops materials in the curricula of service schools over the years (Paddock 1996: 34), and the generally limited understanding of Psyops’ value and application within the military establishment (Paddock 1996: 33). Indeed, many members of the military have a simplistic notion of Psyops as being either a basic propaganda product; a mysterious means of brainwashing; or a public relations activity in post-war environments (Roberts 2005: 29). And in addition to the negative perceptions that Psyops attracts, it has also been disdained for its inability to produce swift, scientifically measurable results (Johnston 1996: 99). This lack of acceptance means that moments of ‘attitudinal readiness’ in Psyops have been rare (Stillwell 1996: 321) and that Psyops often earns the lowest ‘readiness rating’ of any operations group, both in terms of personnel and equipment (Paddock 1996: 48). Psyops has often lost out in a prioritisation of resources as a result (Paddock 1996: 33-34).
The habitual post-conflict downsizing of Psyops is also unfortunate given that Psyops is as uniquely suited for low-intensity conflicts as it is for ‘humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping missions, disaster relief, counter-narcotics operations, civic action, assessments of crisis zones and mobile training of friendly forces,’ *inter alia* (Paddock 1996: 47). This is why Psyops is sometimes included within a doctrine of *Operations Other than War* (OOTW) (Cimbala 2002: 175); which is important, since the way in which Psyops may be situated at any time within the military’s organisational structures and doctrines may define or diminish its capacities in very specific ways. Psyops was for instance, previously considered an aspect of *Special Ops*; which detracted from its manifold uses in times of peace, crisis *and* war (Paddock 1996: 37). But this very same breadth of application, form, and content, is perhaps part of the reason why Psyops has been so difficult to define or promote, and perhaps why debate continues on the appropriate place and name for Psyops within the taxonomy of military activities.

Most recently for instance, the U.S. Army decided to rename Psyops *Military Information Support Operations* (MISO), arguing that consolidating Psyops with *Information Operations* (IO) and *Public Affairs* (PA) would help to demystify and clarify Psyops’ activities (Paddock 2011: 1). This may also be a response to the U.S. Department of Defense 2003 *Informations Operations Roadmap* (DoD 2003), which identified the need to improve Psyops capabilities by better integrating it within their strategic national themes and objectives (Keuhl and Amistead 2007: 9). Colonel Alfred Paddock argues however, that the kind of integration that MISO attempts, fails to appreciate the very distinct functions that each of its incorporated operations has, notwithstanding the seemingly decent motive to rebrand Psyops with a more favourable image (Paddock 2011: 2). And although Psyops and IO are often mistakenly interchanged terms, the *Informations Operations Roadmap* clearly defines Psyops as just one aspect of IO, in which *Electronic Warfare* (EW), *Computer Network Operations* (CNO), *Military Deception* (MILDEC) and *Operations Security* (OPSEC) also form a part (DoD 2003). Psyops is however, the most ‘visible producer of products, actions and themes’ for IO, and an easy target for criticism, although IO is not Psyops, or any of these other specialisations alone. It merely coordinates and synchronises activities to meet an overall informational objective (Misoman 2011: 2).
As a result of the often flawed understanding of Psyops’ unique capabilities and missions, there is also a lack of appreciation for the value of Psyops in conflict and of Psyops as a unique, non-lethal weapon; a potent form of soft power that takes its strength from military readiness, without actually employing any force (Katz et al 1996: 144). Psyops’ importance in the field stems from the fact that all conflicts require more than force; indeed, as Maurice Tugwell explains, a conflict must be psychologically sustained by a belief in the worth of a cause, and the ability to ultimately prevail (Tugwell 1990: 70). Moreover, weapons, no matter how powerful, accurate or far their reach may be, are only as effective as their ability to influence the morale of the enemy. Robert Leonhard explains that this is because the influence and relevance of weaponry is related only to our ability to flee their effects, because the real power of weaponry lies in the ability to persuade via terror, not in complete destruction (Leonhard 2000: 222).

This is where it is perhaps useful to remember Clausewitz’s oft-cited observation, that war is simply politics by other means; force is but one means of political persuasion, and not always the best suited for every conflict scenario (Ayson 2006: 11-12). Combat is just one part of the entire ‘spectrum of conflict’ that States may be required to engage with via numerous ‘operations other than war’ (figure 1.). Moreover, even in the most high-tech projections of warfare, military hardware is only of use when employed in a combined approach; resulting in a ‘profitable combination of forces’ and in the service of a clear strategic objective (Black 2001: 82-83). A lack of these, and an over-reliance on technology, was apparently at the core of the U.S. military’s difficulties in the 2003 Iraq invasion, where an over-reliance on technology resulted in a shortfall of troops, poor strategic planning, and a basic inability to understand the very nature of the conflict (Melton 2009: 115). Such strategic failings help to underscore the fact that while technology may help the military to locate targets; it will never help to understand their behaviour.
Figure 1. Indicates the full range of conflict scenarios in which Psyops may provide a useful supporting element. Psyops’ capabilities are not restricted to Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) and can provide a useful means of engaging with populations in non-combat scenarios, too.
RMA vs. HUMAN TERRAIN

It has become appallingly obvious that our technology has exceeded our humanity.

– Albert Einstein
III. RMA vs. HUMAN TERRAIN

The significance of the human in conflict; of physical and psychological elements, is important to remember, given that a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) promises digitised war with superior information collection, remote sensing, and a lower body count than conventional war (Lonsdale 2007: 232). Because no matter what the hardware employed, even the most technologically enhanced military must engage with the actual terrain at some point, and the ‘real-world’ cannot unrealistically be expected to conform to the needs of weaponry (Black 2001: 83). Consider for instance, the way in which on March 24th 2003, the entire U.S. advance in Iraq was brought to a halt on account of a sandstorm (Terdoslavich 2006: 27). Similarly, the human element of command can also not be avoided; for no matter what the quality or quantity of information collected, we still require human interpretation to derive any meaning or value from it (Lovink 2008). Turner wrote of a similar conundrum that once faced Anthropology, where improvements in field techniques had resulted in more detailed data, for which there were yet no adequate explanatory theoretical frameworks (Turner 1974: 7).

More detailed data collection can be a burden for militaries too, for if the information produced via computing is greater than that which is processed by it, superior information collection may actually create more problems than it solves (Leonhard 2000: 112). One has only to recall the futility of former Eastern German mail opening operations during the Cold War, which immersed the State in a useless deluge of files, forever awaiting analysis, to appreciate that the challenge of developing intelligence is not always to gather more information (Heuer 1999: 51-52), but to make better use of that already acquired, through informed human analysis (NCWC 2008). This is painfully demonstrated by the fact that even with a surfeit of technical intelligence capabilities in the U.S., the September 11 attacks were still not pre-empted. Resources devoted to human intelligence (HUMINT) at the time, in comparison, were meagre (Cimbala 2002: 3).

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4 Russell Snyder also describes numerous occasions during his deployment in Iraq when failing machinery or ammunition would divert plans, for instance, trucks would break down and ammunition spontaneously explode on account of the heat, inter alia (Snyder 2011).

5 Could they have helped prevent 9/11? Colonel Ralph Peters says no-one has a crystal ball. “Despite the political grandstanding over a catalytic tragedy, any probability of preventing 9/11 through better intelligence was a myth. Our enemies out-maneuvered and out-imagined us so boldly that none of those who now insist that they warned us offered any useful specificity before the event” (Peters 2006: 112).
At every level of military command and combat, the importance of human dimensions stands out. Even so, *The Law of Humanity*; that fundamental military principle which recognises the enduring human dimension of conflict, is the one principle which Leonhard claims is the least appreciated by contemporary armed forces. The idea that long-range fire can solve all conflict uncertainties is wrong; the *Law of Humanity* reminds us that we are always contending *in primis*, with flesh and blood (Leonhard 2000: 209-211), and all the great variables of the ‘climate’ of war that Clausewitz once recognised as stemming from human perception and behaviour alone (Lonsdale 2007: 233). So no matter what RMA’s promises, the ‘fog of war’ will never truly be penetrated (Ayson 2006: 12).  

Jeremy Black also contends that RMA’s emphasis on dehumanising conflict with technology is actually symptomatic of numerous cultural and political assumptions that are particular to Western society and Postmodernism. These assumptions embody culturally specific developments and beliefs and sustain such varied concepts as anti-conscription, low-casualty thresholds, Western superiority and the ideology of Machinism (Black 2001: 97). They are also the source of myriad strategic blunders and misspent resources.

These assumptions have also increased, rather than diminished the number of conflicts, because as John McLaughlin writes, insurgent-style warfare will actually continue to rise *in response to* the technological advances of Western militaries, because asymmetric warfare will be the *only* fighting choice for a severely disadvantaged power (McGlaughlin 1989: 1-2). Given the importance of psychological dimensions in this climate of increasingly small or low intensity wars, which are all ‘won or lost in the minds of participants and observers’ (Cimbala 2002: 175), it seems unreasonable that Psyops would be so often subverted by the conventional notion that ‘violent techniques will work’ no matter what the circumstances (Jacobsen 2010: 182). The human dimension of conflict is also critical when one considers the varying motivations for war, which Lawrence LeShan has argued are seated in a deep psychological need for individuals and societies to transcend themselves in a defence of a greater cause, and to diffuse and displace tensions (LeShan 2002: 73). Martin Van Creveld agrees, stating that it is not important to wonder *what* future wars may be waged for, when we consider that wars are not fought to obtain concrete objectives alone. On the contrary he claims;

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6 Russian military scientist Colonel V.I. Orlyanskiy also reminds us that “misleading the enemy is one of the primary ways of achieving an element of surprise in operations under modern conditions” where the detection capabilities of the military no longer has much trouble identifying the position of an enemy (Orlyanskiy 2003: 76-84).
people will often join a cause in order to have a reason to fight (Van Creveld 1991: 226-227). Human behaviour is not always motivated by rational self-interest; There are yet other motivations at work (Miyoshi-Jager 2007: 13), which although not easy to rationalise from a strategic or tactical perspective, are well within the grasp of Psyops.

Even if we view conflict as a simple clash of objectives, for which actors willingly fight or die; a conflict which only subsides only when one party decides it is no longer profitable to carry on, (Stillwell 1996: 319) we are still left with the undeniable importance of psychological imperatives, especially if we consider Tugwell’s explanation that the will to fight can only be sustained by deeply held convictions; not material objectives alone. He goes on to explain that the decision to cease fighting is actually an ‘asset to liability shift' that occurs in the absence or erosion of such convictions, citing the demise of Europe’s colonial regimes as an example. The Nationalists prevailed he explains, because their motivation to fight was ideological and existential, while the Colonialists were fighting for practical and material reasons which proved too costly to sustain in the long term (Tugwell 1990: 71-72). It is precisely this perception of liability and the ‘will to carry on’ that Psyops engages with, attempting to persuade an adversary that they cannot or should not oppose (Leonhard 2000: 33) and why Psyops should have more prominent a place in military planning than it does.

Psyops can only achieve this engagement however, by working with an existing knowledge of their target audience; since perceptions, although stimulated by external media, are translated only via existing beliefs, symbols and experiences into meaningful ideas (Findley 1996: 59). Their success depends entirely on how they are perceived by target audiences, via the laws and customs attached to such acts, which grant them any measure of ‘social reality’ (Bourdieu 1991: 117). But Turner cautioned against any presumption that one could work with such cultural information as a static value. His contribution to Anthropology offered many important insights into conflict processes, including the way in which symbols function during conflict, where he claimed that not only were symbols often ‘multivocal’ in their meaning and potential, but that in this mutable, metaphoric quality, they were able to instigate social action (Turner 1974: 55). This understanding of culture as both an anti-structural and dynamic entity is especially useful for understanding Psyops’ various failures in the field. Psyops employed in the Vietnam War for

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7 This sentiment is reminiscent of: ‘Ye say it is the good cause which halloweth even war? I say unto you: it is the good war which halloweth every cause.’ – Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Nietzsche 1891).
example, were said to be ‘operationally ineffective,’ because the U.S. sought to do too much alone, without any real understanding of the cultural and political dimensions of the conflict, and the way in which these were transformed, over the course of the war (Stillwell 1996: 326). One veteran of the war, General Zinni, recalls the complexity of the conflict:

*I came back with a real understanding that this war was multifaceted; everything was all over the place. There was no clear and simple way to look at it. But most Americans who served in Vietnam had perhaps a year tour and saw only one geographical area. For them it was like the blind man and the elephant. The war they saw was real, but partial* (Clancy et al 2002: 36).

The *Human Terrain Systems* scheme (HTS) embodied in the U.S. Military’s most recent Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrines appears to be a response to such failings, and an attempt to recognise and better engage with this human dimension. HTS is officially defined as the ‘social, ethnographic, cultural, economic and political elements of the people among whom a force is working’ (Gonzalez 2010: 233). The U.S. Army institutionalised HTS as an ‘enduring capability’ in 2000 (U.S. Army 2011), on the initiative of Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters, who explained that the ‘human architecture’ of a city is its:

*... Human terrain ... people, armed and dangerous, watching for exploitable opportunities, or begging to be protected, determine the success or failure of the intervention ... the center of gravity in urban operators is never a presidential palace or a television studio or a bridge ... it is always human* (Peters 2000: 4).

As a part of this new COIN doctrine, soldiers are also lectured on the merits of protecting local culture and developing respectful relationships with people living in occupied territories, where they are cautioned to practice great restraint because ‘for every innocent person you kill, you create ten new enemies’ (Hastings 2010). This increased emphasis on culture and ‘human security’ in the U.S. military doctrines signifies such a departure from conventional warfare planning, that some writers have gone so far as to describe the 2006 U.S. Army *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (FM 3-24) as ‘revolutionary’ (Miyoshi-Jager 2007: 13). But Jonathan Gilmore claims that this development is really not so revolutionary, given that there has been a growing trend over the years to emphasise a minimum use of force together with long term military involvement in unconventional warfare doctrines; in-line perhaps with the increased shift towards matters of ‘human security’ in government policies (Gilmore 2011: 24). This shift has not been welcomed by all representatives of the military, either. Some claim the restraint that soldiers
are asked to practice in the field places them in unreasonable danger, while Douglas MacGregor, a retired U.S. Colonel, says of the most recent Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine:

*The entire COIN strategy is a fraud perpetrated on the American people ... the idea that we are going to spend a trillion dollars to reshape the culture of the Islamic world is utter nonsense* (Hastings 2010).

If MacGregor is correct, we may well wonder why one of the stated objectives of the 2003 Iraq invasion was the democratisation of the Middle East? Such comments are unsurprising, given that contests between the ‘doctrinal preferences’ of the military, and between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security approaches in general, have been going on for some time. Unfortunately, such tensions have resulted in a sometimes rather inconsistent application of COIN doctrine in the field. Kalev Sepp contrasts the defensive posture of the 187th Infantry in Iraq, with the more restrained and ‘public service oriented’ 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Afghanistan as an example of this (Sepp 2007: 220). These contests of doctrinal preference are also indicative of competing subcultures within the contemporary military itself, where science and technology still prevail as indicators of military supremacy, as evidenced by service schools’ continuing preference for ‘hard’ rather than ‘soft’ sciences; as well as for quantitative rather than qualitative research (Fujimura 2003: 136).

All the same, a changing demographic within the military and within conflict zones has in recent times necessitated a shift towards the more interpretive social sciences (Fujimura 2003: 135). Perhaps for his reason, as Keith Brown suggests, a better regard for the military as a diverse and responsive culture in its own right would be in keeping with the concern that social scientists have for the ‘ambiguous qualities of social and cultural process’ (Brown 2008: 444). Moreover, the intelligence methodology used in the lead up to the 2003 Iraq invasion, could have especially benefited from the rigours of social science according to Robert Jervis, not only to provide more accurate information, but to reform what he calls the ‘sociological weaknesses in the organisation’ (Jervis 2010: 189). Academics clearly have much to contribute to our understanding of the military as a culture and as an institution (Frese 2003: 148). But as Pamela Frese observes, this work:

*...is poised in a ‘liminal’ space itself – balanced between a sympathy for military objectives and for victims of war. Positions of liminality are potentially dangerous, slippery slopes – but they also engender power...* (Frese 2003: 148-149).
This is why Frese argues that the engagement of social scientists and the import of civilian paradigms into existing military doctrines may actually be able to provide important insights into armed conflict, while assisting peace efforts in their analysis of the military’s role (Frese 2003: 149). Additional academic engagement may even help to strengthen the voice of the ‘soft sciences’ within military institutions. That Frese employs the term ‘liminal’ in her consideration of a potentially transformed military and peace process is no accident, either. The term was used by Turner to describe the dramatic transforming potential that is present in all forms of conflict. As will soon become clear, the notion of a ‘liminal’ turning point is important to this discussion of ‘soft power’ and the symbolic value of culture. This is something I will expand on in chapter VIII. But for now however, I will return to the uses of cultural knowledge in conflict.
CULTURE vs. ‘HUMINT’

One of the things that annoys me is when people come up and say ‘tell me about your culture, what is your culture?’ … I can’t give you my culture on a piece of paper and say ‘Here, that’s my culture.’ Neither can you. Neither can anybody else. Your culture is not some commodity, some article that you give to someone – ‘Here’s my culture’ or ‘give me your culture.’ ‘Oh yes, thank you very much’ and walk away and take your culture.

- Senator Neville Bonner

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8 (Buchanan 1995).
HTS is often promoted as a ‘gentler’ form of counterinsurgency, which results in a significant reduction in the use of force. In the case of Afghanistan, it was claimed that this reduction of combat was up to 60% (Gonzalez 2010: 231), while in Iraq, following the 2007 troop surge and a shift to revised COIN practices, violence markedly declined, after hitting a peak in 2006 (Gilmore 2011: 22). But without additional supporting evidence for these claims, some anthropologists cynically conclude that HTS is just a means of marshaling support for an unpopular occupation, and another means of gathering intelligence (Gonzalez 2010: 231-232), which despite the invocation of ‘local sensitivities’ in U.S. Army’s Counterinsurgency Field Manual, seems to regard cultural and psychological knowledge as merely another source of intelligence to be used in support of force (Jacobsen 2010: 182). Moreover, claims Michael A. Cohen, ‘COIN advocates have confused correlation with causality in Iraq,’ because the diminished fighting was actually a result of other factors (Cohen 2010: 83) and as Jonathan Gilmore argues, the promotion of this blended form of ‘human security’ practice, continues to obscure the fact that all such efforts, however empathetic they may appear to be towards local populations, are in the service of a U.S. Imperialist project, and merely represent a ‘velvet glove’ on an ‘iron fist’ of traditional war (Gilmore 2011: 28).

The American Anthropologists’ Association has also decried the practice of embedding anthropologists in combat teams, citing practical, theoretical and ethical concerns (Gonzalez 2010: 231-232) and a concern for the safety, dignity and privacy of the subjects being studied. Gonzalez goes even further in his criticisms, stating that gathering information on local cultural and political realities is just a means of facilitating indirect rule through the co-option of local leaders, and that this follows in a tradition of Colonial rule. He cites the example of T.E. Lawrence (‘Lawrence of Arabia’) and Gertrude Bell, who established de facto British Colonial rule in Mesopotamia at the end of WWI, by applying ‘tools of cultural familiarity’ (Gonzalez 2010: 236-237). The 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual even employs extensive case studies of Colonial rule as exemplary models, he complains (Gonzalez 2010: 239). This approach he argues, provides little more than a ‘culturally informed occupation’ that employs locals in roles that support governance at a distance, at less cost and risk to Coalition forces (Gonzalez 2010: 239).

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9 Recent evidence suggests that a rampant ‘mission creep’ has also occurred during the collection of human intelligence in Iraq, and is yet another concern attached to the implementation of human security projects; no matter how well-intentioned. Mission creep is the expansion of a mission beyond its originally stated goals, and the use of human sources for purposes beyond those originally planned (Roach 2006).

10 Psyops teams often carry out surveys of the local population to ascertain the success of their communications. The results are then incorporated into the development of subsequent Psyops products. But the surveys usually only help to indicate the success of a single product, and are too specific to be of any use for a commander in a decision making process (DeWitt n.d.).
But what are the options, if insurgent-threatened countries are considered such a threat to international peace and stability that it must be a priority for Western governments to invest in Psyops for regions requiring Stability Operations? (Johnston 1996: 102). Any form of pacification (whether popularly accepted or not) requires sophisticated domestic propaganda approaches to help vulnerable States defend or define their power (Jacobsen 2010: 182), and to this end, our militaries have claimed the right to access the cultural knowledge they need to carry out the operations, or to wage the wars they have been appointed to fight by their elected leaders (Miyoshi-Jager 2007: 17). Also of relevance here, is the fact that armed conflict, or war, is but one possibility along an entire ‘spectrum of conflict’ that States and their militaries may in engage with, and it must be conceded that whatever the contentious history of ‘cultural intelligence,’ the U.S. military’s most recent attempts to introduce cultural understanding into its doctrines was sincerely motivated at least in part, by the need for civil affairs soldiers and peace keepers to respond to the rather dynamic environments of ‘operations other than war’ (Brown 2008: 444).

Keeping this in mind, academics need not limit their idea of military engagement to that of an embedded civilian stranded in an unpopular and/or illegal war. There are yet other opportunities for engagement along that ‘spectrum of conflict’. According to Frese, it is up to academics to recognise the need to engage an institution like the military in order to propose ways in which their work may be ethically applied to critical issues. One need not wait for a ‘popular’ or ‘necessary’ war to engage in such matters (Frese 2010: 149). And as Catherine Lutz points out, few anthropologists have been:

...confronted with the idea of U.S. Imperium, of global militarization and of cultural politics that make its wars seem either required of moral persons or simply to be waited out, like bad weather (Lutz 2002: 732).

Moreover, as Anna Simons writes, Anthropology and the military actually have much in common, for both spend long periods in the field, engaging with local populations and confronted by the challenges of cross-cultural communication. And although (unlike the military) anthropologists work without any political pressures, and with the motto ‘do no harm,’ they engage in an ‘exchange relationship,’ often exchanging money and gifts for information, just as the military does (Anna Simons 2003: 113).
Anthropology is not the only 'civilian paradigm' to have been imported into Psyops practices as a means of engaging with the 'human' dimensions of conflict, either. Colonel Benjamin Findlay has also argued for instance, for an adoption of the Business Marketing System (BMS), which in addition to offering insights on the way that culture affects people's choices, also manages perceptions and target group analysis, in order to better satisfy 'customers' (Findlay 1996: 55). Unfortunately all such approaches, no matter what the methodology claims Gonzalez, continue to be a part of the U.S. Imperial ambition, and still underpinned by the same traditional assumption that 'imperialism was correct and required to manage all native peoples;' never contemplating for a moment the actual aspirations of the people themselves (Gonzalez 2010: 237), or considering the impact of foreign presence or occupation upon these (Killcullen 2009: 118). They have essentially, forgotten that conflict is not just a strategy with a one-sided 'purpose-driven behavior,' but a complex dialectic of interactive behavior in an interdependent relationship (Ayson 2006: 13).

The criticism and sensitivity with which anthropologists in particular have reacted to the use of cultural information in managing conflict has perhaps, something to do with the prior history of such cultural schemes in the military that were utilised for wholly immoral purposes. During the Vietnam War for instance, cultural intelligence gathered as a part of the infamous 'Phoenix' programme was used to target around 26,000 Vietnamese in political assassinations, most of whom were civilians (Gonzalez 2010: 232). Their criticisms may also have something to do with Anthropology's own recent history — for while Gonzalez makes the point that extracting cultural information as a form of military intelligence is just 'vintage structural-functionalism' with no regard for culture as a 'historical process,' and that this practice treats culture as fixed and monolithic; encouraging the Orientalist dichotomy of 'colonial us' observing 'colonised them' (Gonzalez 2010: 239); it was not so very long ago that Anthropology reformed its own methods in response to similar charges; in fact it was for this very reason, once referred to as the 'hand-maiden' of colonialism (Miyoshi-Jager 2007: 14). Turner even made such complaints himself in the early 1970s, stating that Anthropology must be 'liberated' from an overly empirical regard for its subjects, which objectified them as little more than 'vessels' of cultural information, without showing any regard for social process or human agency. This is

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11 Findley’s BMS approach of addressing customer needs is also in keeping with Dr. Lung’s approach to ‘mind control’ when he instructs that we are best manipulated by our own desires (Lung 2006), because as Findley explains, they are simply giving the customer what they want. This practice of managing public perception is not exclusive to Psyops, either. It is already employed daily by mainstream advertisers (Findley 1996).
what led him to develop an anthropological ‘theory of performance,’ with which conflict and culture could be better understood as a more dynamic, interactive process (Turner 1988: 72-74). Given the varied criticisms of the military’s overly empirical treatment of cultural knowledge and the various intelligence failings that have resulted from this, Turner’s ideas seem vital to a consideration of culture’s function during conflict, and in Psyops’ employment of cultural information.

So, is the import of civilian paradigms Neo-colonial and empirical? Is Psyops useless to a high-tech military or simply ineffective at certain levels of military planning? At least part of the answer may lie in Sheila Miyoshi-Jager’s analysis of HTS in the contemporary military, which highlights the very different nature of ‘human’ information required at different levels of planning. In fact, she claims that the most evident confusion in the current literature for HTS and Psyops, is the conflation of the practical empirical knowledge required for operations and tactics, with that of the more abstract notions of cultural knowledge that are required to develop overarching strategies and policies (Miyoshi-Jager 2007: 4). But there is apparently a dearth of strategic leadership to provide any guidance on this matter, or to define sound objectives for the currently transitioning military. This may be an indication of the ‘diplomatic incoherence’ that Stephen Biddle of the Council of Foreign Relations speaks of when he says that even with a sound COIN doctrine, the military cannot on its own, be expected to create governance reform (Hastings 2010). It could also be related to the ‘lack of political will’ in the implementation of ‘soft security’ generally (Westendorf 2011: 24).12 Whatever the causes, a sound application of cultural intelligence at strategic level is lacking at present.

12 Soft Security approaches place less emphasis on military force and more on those which focus on the well-being of all actors involved, although the military may certainly be employed to secure such ends during ‘operations other than war’ that involve for example, development or relief projects (Westendorf 2011: 24).
Just as Turner once cautioned, Miyoshi-Jager writes that cultural knowledge is not a fixed set of values from which behavioural predictions can be drawn during strategic planning (Miyoshi-Jager 2007: 8). While a knowledge of the ‘grammar’ of local customs and beliefs may be easily applied at tactical and operational level, helping infantry to personally engage with the ‘human terrain;’ HTS components are still not able to inform strategy and policy (Miyoshi-Jager 2007: 10-11), where a more process-oriented and abstract, rather than fixed and empirical knowledge is needed (Miyoshi-Jager 2007: 4-5). And while much-needed updates of technology have allowed Psyops teams to better access the large stores of information gathered via HTS on the PAMIS database employed by the U.S. military,\(^{13}\) one which allegedly provides a full-spectrum of supporting information of both qualitative and quantitative content; the output and application of this information remains limited by an empirical methodology of data entry and by the framework of fixed cultural presumptions into which it is imported (Katz et al 1996: 139-142).

Psyops at strategic level then, clearly requires a stronger focus on historical process and how this informs interpretation, interaction and perception. This is why Miyoshi-Jager argues that a strategic application of culture requires an understanding of an on-going process of negotiation between the past and the present - and why a more abstract theoretical framework is required to engage with culture at the strategic planning level (Miyoshi-Jager 2007: 8). Turner spoke of cultural knowledge in the same manner, stating that ‘the social world is a world in becoming, not a world in being;’ adding that this made studies of static ‘social structure’ irrelevant, because there was no such thing as ‘static action’. The notion of static action; a fixed form of culture, he believed, violated the ‘actual flux and changefulness of the human social scene’ (Turner 1974: 14). This is the very reason why Turner’s processual model of culture in conflict is capable of informing the necessary theoretical framework at strategic level of planning in the military. But as will be discussed in the next chapter, the kind of nuanced qualitative judgments required to make sense of Turner’s theories, and to enable them any currency within military culture, are challenged by a variety of traditions and prejudices.

\(^{13}\) PAMIS: ‘Parallel Multimedia Index Server’ is a database that stores more than text or numbers. Media is indexed and retrieved via patterns of ‘similarity’ (Chiueh et al). The success of finding ‘something like this’ is built upon all manner of untested assumptions, however.
QUALITATIVE JUDGEMENT and the LAW OF HUMANITY

Man is a slow, sloppy and brilliant thinker; the machine is fast, accurate and stupid. – William M. Kelly.
The prevalence of low intensity conflict, coupled with technological and political expectations, redefines the conduct of warfare in the contemporary era (Van Creveld 1991: 225). Clausewitz may not have foreseen such changes, or the crisis of the State that bedevils international security with so many small-scale wars (Nagengast 1994), or even the impact that technology and global commerce would have upon military planning (Fernandez-Vega 2007: 123), but the universal elements of human conflict would certainly still be recognisable to Clausewitz, entrenched as they are within a ‘law of humanity’ - that very foundation of military thought most overlooked by military writers, due to the presumed difficulty in applying a scientific paradigm to accurately study or simulate ‘human factors’ (Leonhard 2000: 207-216).

Clausewitz expounded at length about the nature of ‘human factors’ in On War. But an omission of these factors in the current military science literature is evidence of his work being repeatedly misunderstood and misapplied, according to Fernandez-Vega. Clausewitz he claims, understood that the epistemological model developed by science could never satisfactorily describe human behaviour, because the quantitative data attached to the scientific evaluation of events and objects overlooks the nature of such things, generalising and subsuming all that is particular in human interaction into general, scientific laws (Fernandez-Vega 2007: 124). This is why Clausewitz repeatedly emphasised the importance of the human element in warfare which, being subject to uncertainty and violence, was determined by human participation, and human responses to such challenges; because human psychology and perception are still what most determine the climate of war (Lonsdale 2007: 233-234). Turner’s performance theory also reminds us of the importance of human psychology and perception in conflict when he writes that all social action ‘only acquires form via the metaphors and paradigms in actors’ minds’ (Turner 1974: 13).
War is for these reasons, justifiably viewed as a social event; one which demands a qualitative judgement to recognise any of the persisting patterns of human conflict throughout what appear to be radically different epochs of warfare. Fernandez-Vega also insists that Clausewitz was not only a man of his time when it came to tactics, but that his perspective was also influenced by a specifically Kantian philosophy of judgement (Fernandez-Vega 2007: 122-124). Immanuel Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement, while not directly referenced in Clausewitz’s writing, is invoked repeatedly he claims, by way of concepts such as kritik and the genius; the imagination and judgement of the military commander, through whom a flexible attitude allows a response to familiar patterns in a situation of war which will never be completely like any other before it (Fernandez-Vega 2007: 132). But these patterns inform ‘exemplary models of understanding,’ not scientific laws. This is why Fernandez-Vega also argues that war is just like art for Clausewitz, because Kant’s qualitative notion of kritik (judgement) is what actually brings together theory and practice in the field where, just as an artist works with a knowledge of the tradition of past masters, a commander must draw upon a knowledge of past conflicts in order to make decisions (Fernandez-Vega 2007: 126-130). This also reiterates the comments made by Miyoshi-Jager and Turner, about the necessity of viewing conflict as a part of an on-going historical process at strategic levels of planning.

Many of Clausewitz’s classical principles of war may be irrelevant to ‘industrialised total war,’ especially ideas such as ‘principle of mass’ which once guided the concentration of power into a decisive place or moment on the battlefield (Leonhard 2000: x), since a surge of bodies on the ground is meaningless in the RMA scenario of distantly guided, precision, digitised air-strikes, where a single actor is capable of killing numerous others at a blow (Leonhard 2000: 100). Yet despite the impact of the Information Age, the essentials of war that Clausewitz described have changed very little. The constants remain; of willing participants - as do the social, cultural and political scenarios that enable and sustain conflict (Black 2001: 114). Even in the scenario of a war completely transformed by technology, the human and psychological element of conflict will not diminish in importance, because it will still remain essential to assess threats in terms of both weapons capabilities and intentions. Only Psyops deals directly with the latter, via its engagements with civilian population, combatants and leaders (Leonhard 2000: 32-33), making it an indispensable capability in conflict. Even so, ‘human factors’ are still not a well-appreciated aspect of the ‘principles of war’ in our contemporary military culture; an oversight of a basic truth, claims Leonhard, who criticises many of the military’s doctrines for their ‘intellectual laziness’ in avoiding the ineffable nuances of the ‘human heart’ (Leonhard 2000: 210). In contrast,
Turner’s theories of performance deal directly with this issue of ‘dehumanisation’ by emphasising the aspects of ‘human agency’ throughout his methodologies (Turner 1980: 156); quite unlike the oversight of ‘the other’ in the planning of the 2003 Iraq invasion, that led to the U.S. military’s astonishment at the trenchant insurgent fighting that followed their initial tech-dominant ‘shock and awe’ strategy (Jervis 2010: 176).

A disjunctive culture of dehumanised, tech-dominant planning is clearly a liability. But ‘power’ has ever been about more than force; most simply defined, it is the ability to control the minds and actions of others. This is why armed conflict is best understood as a human interaction; a dialectic between two opposing wills (Freedman 2008: 24). This is what imbibes war with its particular qualities, and from whence we derive the notion of a ‘Human Law’. This is also why armed conflict is justifiably analysed as a cultural activity (LeShan 2009: 5). Even Clausewitz wrote, that the only way in which war differed from any other conflict, was in the bloodshed (Lonsdale 2007: 234). Culture is also the site, where a form of politics that truly symbolises human experience can be enacted to impart personal meaning (Giroux 2006: 14); and according to Turner, it is only within culture of all kinds, martial and otherwise, via the continuity of experience, that these varied enactments or social dramas form a kind of ‘empirical unit’ in the social process (Turner 1988: 92-93, Turner 1980: 156). This is why Clausewitz’s writing remains relevant today; the sometimes expressive, abstract and theoretical language of his work indicates a philosophical stance (Sumida 2007: 181) that supplies more than just a taxonomy or phenomenology of war (Fernandez-Vega 2007: 122); it grants us an insight into the nature of conflict.

The value of a qualitative judgement in war is underscored by the fact that Clausewitz’s primary concern was not actually knowing certain things, in the way that contemporary Information Warfare aspires to ‘know’ the battlefield in exactitude (Leonhard 2000: 19); but in knowing the character of perception that preceded knowing; something that would inform the ‘foundation of strategic choice,’ without actually prescribing it (Sumida 2007: 181). Clearly, no matter what the advocates of RMA suggest, the ‘fog of war,’ determined specifically by human interaction and perception, can never be entirely lifted. Armed force is not the only useful tool in conflict for that reason; other forms of Statecraft that encompass ‘soft power,’ also have the potential to secure objectives without the threat of force (Ayson 2006: 11-12), although Henry Giroux claims that ‘war has become the foundation for all social practices and relations of power’
But if we accept both these claims and understand war as ‘processual unit’ in the sense that Turner described it, when he wrote that the only thing that grants any affinity or linkage between such units and events is the ‘category of meaning’ (Turner 1980: 156), then we return once more to the ‘knowing’ of the commander in the field, drawing upon imagination to make sense of the patterns of human conflict, and we are left with the idea that while human ‘experience’ is the only thing that grants meaning and continuity to events and moments in time; it is also human ‘experience’ alone that grants them any power.

The conduct of war may have changed materially, but the fundamental psychological and cultural dimensions of human conflict remain unaltered. Psyops is uniquely suited to engage with this aspect of conflict, across a broad range of missions, at a variety of levels and intensities, because the essence of human conflict is the same, no matter what scale or from which era we view them. But the value of Psyops and an appreciation of its full potential remain restricted at present, because a misinterpreted Clausewitzian tradition has all-too often placed Psyops in the service of force first. According to Black, this primacy of force is also underscored by an attitude of Western supremacy that has denigrated and unnecessarily mystified human elements of psychology and culture in favour of Technological Determinism (Black 2001: 97), while tentatively re-enacting an Orientalist-Colonialist approach in its engagement with the ‘other’. It is not the import of Anthropology or any other civilian paradigm in Psyops that objectifies and places human information at the service of colonial attitudes however, but the practice of placing human information into older empirical frameworks of thinking which instruct us how to work with this information (Miyoshi-Jager 2007: v).

The military’s present-day challenges involving the uses and abuses of ‘human’ information are not unlike those that Anthropology once dealt with, so it may well be that Anthropology, however presently antipathic towards military aims, may offer some valuable insights here, especially given Turner’s revolutionary reforms of what he once considered an overly empirical, structuralist tradition (Weber 1995: 2007). Turner worked within an era of significant colonial and ethnographic change; his work served as something of a bridge between the past and future of Anthropology (Jules-Rosette 1994: 162). For some cultural theorists in the present day however, he may seem slightly out-dated, given the embarrassment of riches his work helped to generate in the subsequent years of cultural theory. But Turner remains relevant to the topic at hand, because he wrote for a ‘historic moment,’ which happened to be a moment of great transition for Anthropology; one which is not unlike the transition the U.S. military finds itself in at present.
Similarly, given that Strategy and Policy should precede any consideration of conflict, the present revision of military doctrines should consider the potential of civilian cultural paradigms that emphasise process and human agency, in a bid to find a more practical theory and application for culture which is presently missing at the strategic level; still seemingly stranded in a neo-Clausewitzian framework (Miyoshi-Jager 2007: 4). It is difficult to understand or appreciate the capabilities of Psyops, without understanding the forces acting upon human behavior in times of conflict, since Psyops alone directly engages with these tacit fields, offering a potent source of *soft power*, which draws its strength from military presence, political authority and the ‘universals of civilisation’ (Katz et al 1996: 144). But a grand strategy which fails to emphasise these is bound to encounter difficulties. Therefore a guiding framework which gathers up all three into a process-oriented view of human exchange and interaction; may help disentangle the issues considered here, and move decision making away from the kind of ‘deeply misguided’ grand strategies that have thus far bedeviled the U.S. in campaigns such as those seen in Iraq (Kilcullen 2009: 117).
Section 2 - WAR as a PERFORMANCE

*Drama is action, sir, action and not confounded philosophy.*

-Luigi Pirandello
Section 2 - VI. WAR as a PERFORMANCE

How war is perceived in any given era significantly influences military doctrine and practice. As has been discussed in the chapter on ‘RMA vs. The Human Terrain,’ current debates concerning a revision of military doctrine centre in particular on the cause and effect of technological improvements in warfare, and how these may necessitate an added emphasis on the ‘human’ elements of war in military planning. Some writers have even claimed that contemporary revisions of warfare are ‘conspicuously lacking any sociological, philosophical or theoretical component’ (Leonhard 2000: 13).

This is why and where I would like to revisit Turner’s ideas of ‘performance’ in my consideration of armed conflict. And not just any single mode of performance; I am not speaking strictly of actors on a stage, although we have actors and audiences and theatres in war; nor I am speaking only of the ritualistic or conventionalised performances of society; although these too are present in war. Rather, the idea that performances are all kinds of events which serve as basic units of culture that define ‘our actions, interactions and relationships’ (Schechner 2002: 24); and that these performances, as Turner believed, have a central part to play in society via their transforming or restorative potential (Bigger 2009: 212).

Turner had a unique insight into the workings of human conflict; his ideas are especially salient in terms of my argument for the military’s need for improved cultural competency, given that they appear unable to develop any at the strategic level where, as per Miyoshi-Jager’s criticisms in chapter IV. on ‘Culture vs. HUMINT,’ a more abstract, processual model of thinking is required. Turner’s theories of performance also explain Psyops’ potential as a ‘soft power,’ in ways not previously appreciated; specifically, with an understanding of armed conflict as an affective form of performance; one which clarifies the social and emotional needs that compel people to enter and sustain conflict, while also helping to explain those aspects of conflict that typically defy tactical or strategic logic.
Considering the more performance-like aspects of conflict will reveal something of the ‘dramatic’ nature of ‘soft power’ in conflict, and of Psyops’ potential as a ‘soft power,’ which will hopefully contribute to an increased appreciation of the psychological dimensions of conflict (Stillwell 1996: 319). A lack of appreciation for these is the reason why military planners often have little understanding as to how Psyops works in conflict, or from whence they actually derive their power; and as one observer noted in his criticism of the military’s out-dated grasp of Psyops:

...PYOPS has perhaps suffered most from identification with the hardware and missions of the tactical battlefield – that is, leaflet delivery, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasting. As a result of this, PSYOPS has had very low priority in terms of personnel, equipment, training, exercising, and doctrine. In addition, it has suffered from low visibility at senior command levels within the military... (Lord 1989: 28).

Psyops is clearly more than just a ‘product’. Turner’s theories allow us to see that they are also part of a ‘practice’ and a ‘process’. But at a time when the contemporary Western military is said to be ‘in transition’ and revising the very principles of warfare due to an increasingly high-tech and dehumanised culture of war, while facing a commensurate rise in low-intensity warfare (McLaughlin 1989); it becomes all the more necessary to do away with such misconceptions, and to revisit the enduringly human and psychological nature of war across all forms of conflict; but not just in a discussion on the continuing necessity of Psyops; but on the very nature of Psyops’ ‘soft power’.
THE UTILITY of PERFORMANCE

In the theatre of politics, as in dramatic theatre, breaking conventions tends to unleash an enormous amount of energy and power. - Branislav Jakovljevic14

14 (Jakovljevic 1999: 11)
VII. THE UTILITY of PERFORMANCE

Referring to conflict in theatrical terms is not a novel practice. Jakovljevic reminds us that the geographic section of terrain in which soldiers fight in is referred to as a ‘theatre of war;’ citing Brassey’s Encyclopaedia of Land Forces and Warfare (Margiotta 1996: 1064) to explain the slippage of the term ‘theatre’ into military science, and how the typical Renaissance-era collection of world maps, Theatrum Orbus Terrarum (1570), was eventually applied to describe the terrain of war as Theatrum Belli (war theatre) (Jakovljevic 1999: 6). We may also say, as Jakovljevic did of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, that contemporary wars (unlike those of ‘The Age of Reason’) are a form of unrestricted theatre enacted on both the terrain and in the public domain; a ‘total experience’ and ‘participatory theatre’ in which boundaries are blurred and civilians may become ‘participants and victims’ (Jakovljevic 1999: 6-7). Turner’s theories on conflict as a form of performance, or ‘social drama,’ took this notion even further however, and helped to elucidate the way in which we engage with such dramas. Turner’s work not only established a link between ritual and social structures, demonstrating how such ‘dramas’ not only provide conventionalised outlets for tensions, but how they also challenge and potentially change existing social structures (Alexander 1991: 1-2).

As discussed previously, Turner devised his theories in response to what he believed were the traditional failings of Anthropology in the early 1970s, by developing a processual, performance-based evaluation of social organisation (Bauman and Briggs 1990: 63). He hoped that this would ‘liberate’ Anthropology from a systemic dehumanisation of human subjects, who he claimed, were often regarded as mere bearers of ‘impersonal culture;’ their behaviours evidence of various pressures, and never the result of human agency (Kapchan 1995: 479). An understanding of social events as a form of ‘cultural performance,’ was Turner’s attempt to negotiate these concerns. By interpreting a wide variety of events and behaviours as a ‘performance,’ that is, an event with set of performers and audiences interacting in a finite quantity of time (Singer 1972), Turner discovered a ‘useful means of understanding communicative processes’ whether applied to ‘bounded events’ like war or theatre, or to everyday interactions (Bauman and Briggs 1990: 61).
Turner also identified a utility in ‘performance;’ a means of mediating all manner of tensions via social processes that arise specifically from conflict situations (Turner 1974: 37). He argued that all kinds of ‘social drama,’ are recognisable in the way they temporarily subvert the usually predictable patterns and conventions of daily life (Turner 1985: 196). This ‘social drama’ approach of Turner’s has four phases of public action: the process begins with a ‘Breach’ of normal social relations; when an actor attempts to move to a new place in the social order. This creates a state of ‘Crisis’, which may be blocked via ritual and conventions. ‘Redressive’ action follows, because the changes in status require a readjustment to a new scheme. This period of redress may also be a period of reflection on the cause of crisis, until the final ‘Re-integration’ or legitimisation of schism; when re-adjustment is formalised (Turner 1988: 74-75).

No matter what the ‘performance’ Turner argued, the process always fulfils the same function, albeit with different actors, spaces durations and props. To speak of all human interactions as ‘performances’ may seem an overly inclusive definition; but interpreting human behaviour in this way provides a ‘framework of cultural competence’ wherein the symbolic actually acquires meaning (Schechner 1977: 1). This however, can only be achieved by abstracting a pattern of behaviour in social events which is not immediately discernible, just as Clausewitz hoped his commanders might do in the field (Turner 1988: 76). These are Turner’s ‘universals of performance;’ present in all forms of social drama. All are an attempt to restore behaviour following a ‘breach’ of some kind (Blau 1990: 253). Even where attempts to resolve the breach may unsuccessfully cycle through the preliminary stages, the process will always eventually end with ‘reintegration’ (Turner 1988: 92).15

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15 Turner’s emphasis on restoration as an ultimate aim of ‘social drama’ is criticised by some as having an overly ‘redemptive’ attitude; some argued that this was a result of his piety (St John 2008: 19). In response to this, a later, more secular standpoint on this aspect of ‘performance’ emerged, where it was preferable to refer to a ‘border’ rather than a ‘limen’ (Weber 1995).
The Second World War offers an example of this process of ‘social drama’: in a macroscopic overview, Hitler’s bellicose ambitions, as disclosed at the 1937 Hossbach conference, and the resulting deployment of German forces, caused a ‘breach’ in social relations within Europe, where the actor (Germany, under Hitler), aspired for a new place in the social order. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s attempt to appease Hitler may be read as an attempt to ‘redress,’ or end the resulting crisis, via political conventions. Notwithstanding these efforts however, Germany invaded Poland in 1939, repeating the stages of ‘breach’ and ‘crisis;’ commencing what would eventually become a World War, finally ending in 1945 with the unconditional surrender of all German Forces, when the crisis was finally blocked (Roberts 2007: 592-594). And with the redressive action of the Nuremberg war crimes trials, and the final reintegration of a much changed state of social order, via the founding of the United Nations and the codification of wartime behaviour in the Geneva Convention; the performance was finally at an end (Roberts 2007: 610-611).

In this wartime example we are also reminded that social drama always alters, as previously stated, in some form, the existing social order: alliances and statuses are revised and new norms are generated (Turner 1988: 92). Performances are clearly not open-ended either; they have a diachronic structure consisting of a beginning, middle and an end (Turner 1988: 80). And in war, just as in other cultural performances, finiteness is guaranteed by conventions of behaviour and clear political goals which seek to restore order, after which the conflict ends. Politics, whenever transformed into war, will try to achieve its own ends through military means; but once these ends are achieved, another ‘temporal sequence’ begins (Fernandez-Vega 2007: 136). ‘Performance,’ understood in this way, is a dramatic attempt to bring some part of life under control (Juergensmeyer 2003: 121). But where the ‘ends’ are not clear however, and war is unable to be subordinated to political goals (Schell 2003: 15), we have what Fernandez-Vega refers to in the Clausewitzian fashion, as a war without politics, barren of imagination. Without imagination he reminds us, ‘violence becomes militarised and permanent’ (Fernandez-Vega 2007: 137).
Perhaps as a condition of the changed environment within which contemporary wars are mediated; both in the physical terrain and public domain, post-modern actors perform as much to themselves as they do to others, as an affirmation it seems, of who they are and what they are doing. Because as Turner once observed, a performance is reflexive – the performer reveals himself (sic), to himself, and not just to his audience (Turner 1988: 94); ‘Performance exists where any action is done in front of an audience – even only for oneself,’ Schechner reminds us (Schechner 1993: 20). And while a ‘performance,’ may be little more than an ordinary behaviour that has been transformed by means of reduction, exaggeration, repetition and rhythm (Schechner 1993: 228), these seemingly innocent features have much to do with the very power of performance, because the neurophysiological ‘affective state’ that one enters during a performance, is actually aroused by these qualities of ritual and superimposed onto a narrative framework that grants them meaning (Schechner 1993: 240). Turner suspected that it was the ‘rhythmic activity of ritual, aided by sonic, visual, photic, and other kinds of driving’ that lead to some sort of hyper-stimulation of both spheres of the brain during a performance that accounted for this effect (Turner 1987: 165).

We need not restrict our examples of affective performance to the hyperbolic state of wartime, either. All manner of ‘performance’ is apparently capable of affecting its participants in this way. One may for instance, enter an altered state of perception numerous times during day while engaging with the unique conventions of work, entertainment, or family (LeShan 2002: 73); but while each genre of performance has its own particular conventions, the formal characteristics of performance act as both stimuli and ‘do the work,’ acting as carrier for a message; remaining unaltered across all ‘performances’ (Turner 1988: 93). This process is enabled by the fact that public life is already shaped by symbols and institutions, where symbolic acts such as rites of initiation, weddings, or war, help define public space and meaning in our social interactions (Bourdieu 1991: 117). But performance is not just about specific gestures or techniques; it is about the relationship between form and ‘communicative function,’ interacting in ways that reconstruct our social realities (Bauman and Briggs 1990: 67). It is unfortunate however, that this ‘transformative’ potential has yet to be properly considered in any analysis of Psyops, or the military as a whole, during conflict.
LIMINAL MOMENTS

Earth, isn't this what you want: to arise within us, invisible? Isn't it your dream to be wholly invisible someday? O Earth: invisible! What, if not transformation, is your urgent command?

-Rainer Maria Rilke, ‘Turning Point’.
So what grants performance its persuasive power? What is it about performance that is so specifically affective? Jerzy Grotowski attempted to answer this question, as Turner did, by evaluating the traditional rites of various shamanic cultures, in order to discern some common elements that invoked the response they did from their participants. He hoped to isolate some basic techniques that could be relied upon to create a psycho-physiological effect on participants, irrespective of their cultural biases (Schechner 1986: 12-13). These ‘mechanics’ of performance are also of particular interest to those who employ performance as a form of psychotherapy; Susan Pendzik believes that the power of performance, which she draws upon in her work as a therapist, comes from its ability to transport participants into an alternate ‘dramatic reality’ where all things seem possible, hovering as it does between reality and fantasy, while incorporating the creative potential of both. More specifically she writes, the dramatic enactments allow what were previously virtual or internalised contents, to be made manifest through dramatic gestures, placing them in a realm where they may be transformed and given new meanings (Pendzik 2006: 273-274).

The idea that individuals and societies may be transformed via (sometimes even violent) performance is reiterated by numerous researchers. Turner explains that drama is a process of converting values and goals, distributed over a range of actors, into a system where they may be worked on, and changed (Turner 1988: 97); while Emile Durkheim referred to this transforming power of performance as ‘social effervescence,’ citing the French Revolution as an example of spontaneous public performances that are capable of generating new symbols and meanings (Turner 1988: 77). Turner also ascribed this alternate state of dramatic reality and potential to the ‘liminal’ mode; a shamanic-style condition in which seemingly magical transformations occur (Turner 1988: 102). In a detailed analysis, he suggested that one could even demonstrate how various verbal and non-verbal codes and styles accompanied and indicated the shift into an altered psychological state (Turner 1988: 91).

16 This is also the premise of the ‘Act Resilient’ drama therapy program for war veterans, where participants are asked to ‘act out’ and improvise their experiences of war, in a bid to externalise and transform them. Working through these performances, soldiers also learn to enter a performative state that can help to screen extra-sensory input, in order to be more focussed and ‘situationally aware’ when they return to duty in their hazardous work environments (Channon 2011).

17 Liminality is actually a term that was initially introduced by the anthropologist Arnold Van Gennep in his study of rites of passage (Lugones 1990: 506).
LeShan discusses this shift of perception at length in his *Psychology of War*, explaining that there are indeed signals that a society is moving from an everyday ‘sensory’ perception of reality, into a ‘mythic’ wartime mode. A ‘mythic state’ repeats the same narratives in every warring society apparently: there will be dramatic gestures, hyperbole and an un-nuanced evaluation of morality. There will also be shared notion of a single enemy that embodies evil, whose defeat will make the world a better place; making action against this foe morally right; while all who disagree are traitors (LeShan 2002: 30).

The idea of a warring state of reality, with its own requisite narratives, is reiterated once more in Tugwell’s theory of a ‘mobilising trinity’ for conflict, without which, Tugwell claims, a warring cause cannot be sustained, no matter how materially profitable the war. His trinity of convictions (into which all manner of beliefs and ideologies may be bundled) includes a belief in something good to be defended; something evil to be defeated; and the ultimate victory of the good cause (Tugwell 1990: 70). That both LeShan and Tugwell’s description of a special wartime narrative and perception of reality so closely corresponds to Turner’s restorative performance process and the liminal state it transports its participants into, is no accident.

Each theorist speaks of the necessity of a ‘performance’ to move its actors: Tugwell describes a narrative of beliefs required to sustain a warring state (Tugwell 1990: 70-72); LeShan explains the natural tendency and the psychological need for humans to enter the altered state of a performance on their own terms (LeShan 2002: 73); while Turner describes the deep emotional and social need that rituals address in their ability to transform damaged relationships in the special liminal space (Turner 1988: 72-74). They each also reference the social and emotional need for performance from their own distinct perspective however, and in comparing each perspective, an aspect of ‘soft power’ that emerges especially in the performative rituals and conventions of human behaviour, becomes evident. But again, this an aspect of ‘soft power’ that has yet to gain currency at any level of military planning, due to the generally poor esteem that qualitative research and psychological theories of warfare suffer from.
Leshan and Tugwell also point to the Vietnam War as an example of what happens in the absence of convincing dramatic narratives; how in the absence of any clear goals, the adversary gains the ‘psychological upper ground,’ and all other terrain (Tugwell 1990: 73). Visually, as the first-ever televised war (Hoskins 2005: 18-21), Vietnam also contradicted the ‘heroic’ speech of wartime with reports of events such as the My Lai Massacre, awakening shocked audiences from a ‘mythic mode,’ back into an everyday ‘sensory mode’ in which such conflicts are difficult to justify (LeShan 2002: 92). Turner described a similar ‘awakening’ in the shamanic rituals he observed, where participants were sometimes so deeply affected by the ‘magic’ of the rites, that it became necessary to shake them out of this state with a ‘ludic moment;’ an absurd interruption of this alternate reality (Turner 1988: 61). This also recalls in a fascinating way, the ‘power of ridicule’ sometimes employed in Psyops, to destroy the fighting narrative of an opponent (Waller 2006).18

Scientific evidence even suggests that regular ‘shifting’ between alternate perceptions of realities is essential to the health and well-being of people in general. Leshan offers one experiment as an example of this, in which subjects were prevented from dreaming, which caused such psychological harm to the participants that it had to be stopped (LeShan 2002: 46).19 And not only do humans habitually and effortlessly drift into altered states of consciousness to obtain this changing sensory state (LeShan 2002: 73), but this shift into an alternate perception of reality seems to address deep emotional and social needs (LeShan 2002: 22). This is exemplified by the psychological transition that societies make from peacetime into war (LeShan 2002: 63-64); with its special rhetoric, perception and behaviour (LeShan 2002: 47-48), which notwithstanding the markedly changed conduct of contemporary war, have remained constant throughout history and across a diverse range of cultures (LeShan 2002: 98). This is especially relevant to my consideration of Turner’s theories of performance, because he identified performance, or the ‘performative,’ as a means of attaining this state (Turner 1980: 156).

18 Martin Kaplan highlights the importance of dramatic narrative, when he claims that people are biologically ‘wired’ to pay attention to three things: Fear, Sex and even more so, storytelling (Throsby 2011). This is reminiscent of Turner’s claims that people’s responsiveness to ‘performance’ is biologically determined (Schechner 2002: 7-20). Gregory Currie also underscores the importance of the narrative in society by explaining how narratives actually guide opinion by creating frameworks for value systems (Currie 2010).

19 Psyops teams sometimes use humour to attack adversaries. The more totalitarian a regime, the more inflexible and vulnerable to criticism they generally are. This is also the case with humour, and few corrupt politicians can weather a successful campaign of satire (Waller 2006).

20 The need to ‘shift states’ is also demonstrated by extensive psychological studies drawn upon in the development of torture and interrogation methods, which reveal that sensory deprivation is the most efficient means of ‘breaking’ a person’s will. Sensory deprivation trials were said to induce the same effect on brain function as beatings, starvation or sleep deprivation; most subjects were compromised within a week. A changing sensory environment, it was revealed, was essential for human beings, otherwise the activity of the cortex becomes so impaired that the brain behaves abnormally (McCoy 2006: 32-40).
Our enthusiasm for war also seems to address universal ‘needs’ such as displacement of aggression; projection of self-doubt and loathing; meaning and purpose in life; as well as a sense of belonging. (LeShan 2002: 73). According to LeShan, this great ‘need’ is also demonstrated by the fact that not all acts of violence have tactical or strategic concerns. Although it has elsewhere been claimed that acts such as suicide bombing have decidedly political goals, with clear strategies (Pape 2005)\(^{21}\), Hamas leader Dr. A.A. Rantisi for example, has revealed in an interview that most terror attacks made against Israelis actually have little strategic value, serving instead to identify their enemy, while rallying others to the Hamas cause (Juergensmeyer 2003: 124-125). It is not true then, that war is just a means to an end, where people fight for specific goals (Van Creveld 1991: 226). Moreover, while the targets in a conventional war may have strategic and tactical value; in asymmetric warfare the targets are chosen for their ability to represent the power of the adversary; they are moments of radical public theatre (Juergensmeyer 2003: 129)\(^{22}\) which not only help us to identify an act of performance via their employ of the symbolic, but remind us yet again, of the importance of the ‘category of meaning’ that these symbols provide during a performance (Turner 1980: 156).

Giroux also draws attention to many kinds of public theatre as an ‘act of translation’ which work to fill an emotional and social void in society by enacting anxieties in a representative form (Giroux 2002: 2-6). Guy Debord suggests that this representative fixation is particular to the condition of a post-modern, media-driven society, and that the ‘whole of life’ has in fact become a giant series of spectacles, which are merely dramatic representations rather than directly experienced events (Debord 1983: 35). But Turner’s inclusivity of rites and customs that span centuries of cultural tradition would suggest this phenomenon is not new (Turner 1988: 21-32).\(^{23}\) Moreover, when the means of war, according to Jean Baudrillard, become the symbol of their own destruction, via dramatic presentation and with the help of the media, it augments the power of these violent means in the minds of spectators in a way which also makes the ‘represented’ another valid ‘lived experience’ of reality, and in a way that only begins to hint at the intrinsically soft power of performance (Baudrillard 2002: 410).

\(^{21}\) Pape explains the strategy of terrorism by not only offering terrorism as the preferred option for weak political actors, but by presenting quantitative data that demonstrates how, over time, terrorist’s political agendas have been advanced through the use of terror and that this has taught weak actors that terror is a powerful negotiating tool (Pape 2005).

\(^{22}\) Jacques Baumel, writing for the Council of Europe in 1993, described such deliberate symbolic wartime destruction of the cultural heritage of Croatians and Bosnians, urging his colleagues to move swiftly to document and preserve the heritage in which people lived, recognising that although the immediate safety of civilians trapped in conflict zones was important to act upon, so too was the preservation of the symbolic vestiges of their identity (Baumel 1993).

\(^{23}\) In his later career, Turner tried to differentiate between the ‘threshold’ moments of events staged by pre-and post-industrialised societies, reserving the term ‘liminal’ for tribal or religious experiences while using ‘liminoid’ for the altered state that modern audiences may experience at events where there is performance without a supernatural theme. But some have pointed out that there are still ‘liminal’ and ritualistic aspects to these contemporary secular performances that make such distinctions difficult to make (St John 2008: 9-10).
The oft-symbolic displacement of violence also explains the inclination to shift into ‘performance’ mode most often at times of stress and uncertainty (Juergensmeyer 2003: 121). Turner also argued that performance, as an organised event employing extra-ordinary symbols or actions to call attention to itself, promises to bring order by ensuring that elements of chaos exist only within prescribed times and places (Turner 1988: 93), much as the ‘rules of engagement’ prescribe the use of violence in armed conflict for only certain situations. Be that as it may, the ambiguity of the ‘liminal’ or ‘dramatic state’ challenges the credo of certainty and precision in contemporary high-tech armed forces. But what appears to military theorists to be a vulnerability is in fact, the locus of power in a performance, for while a performance is an attempt to impose structure on an ambiguous and unresolved situation, it is actually the potential embodied by this state that allows performance to be a place of creativity and transformation, whether we speak of theatre or social relations. Society’s creation of taboos is an acknowledgement of this threatening potential of the liminal state in fact, because when we break away from norms, uncertainty reigns (Alexander 1991: 14). But ‘Indeterminacy,’ according to Turner, was most important in historic wars and revolutions. Even so, we often interpret these historic events as things that happen to/in a ‘fixed social reality’ (Turner 1988: 79).

So, public performances of violence are social events with real and symbolic aspects (Juergensmeyer 2003: 146), and drama has the ability to augment, empower and transform. It would seem then, that a lack of concern for the psychological and dramatic dimensions of conflict, overlooks an aspect of soft-power that I believe has the potential to radically alter the outcome of low-intensity conflicts in particular – one that emerges specifically in the symbolic transformation of events via performance, because the relationship between social drama and theatre only commences when a crisis emerges during social interactions; when there is need for this process of transformation. All dramas follow the same process; via the ‘universals of

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24 Hitler’s invasion of Poland on September 1st 1939, is considered ‘irrational’ by strategists, because he did this fully knowing Britain’s commitment to the Anglo-Polish alliance. Attacking Poland would put him at war with both Britain and France, neither of which he planned to defeat; even after his later half-baked invasion of France, which hardly helped subdue Paris. But rather than accept the ‘continued uncertainty, opposition, and delay’ of late August, he acted – in a sense, to wage war against a state of ‘indeterminacy’ (Rosecrance 1986: 173).

25 General McChrystal also alludes to an indeterminate moment in war when he tells troops in Afghanistan that “We are knee-deep in the decisive year,” he tells them. The Taliban, he insists, no longer has the initiative – “but I don’t think we do, either” (Hastings 2010). Richard Holmes’ survey of decisive conflicts in history also reveals that those battles which have determined the outcome of wars are often indeterminate, difficult and confused conflicts to begin with (Holmes 2006).

26 The notion of a fixed historic or cultural reality was also contested by Michel Foucault, who used a particular methodology to focus on the problematisation of history. By regarding history as a perpetual narrative in flux, rather than one which might be neatly divided into fixed periods, Foucault argued that an objective, un-anthropocentric archaeological investigation could ‘flush out’ the details of history without assigning any value or moral judgement to them (Kendall and Wickham, 1999: 22-30).
performance,’ in order to address this need – because a situation actually becomes dramaturgical, because a performance is a kind of ‘fallen state’ emerging from a failure in ‘grammatical competence’ (Turner 1988: 75-76), just as war becomes ‘politics by other means’ in Clausewitz’s parlance. Recall here, that Clausewitz tells us war only differs from other conflicts in the bloodshed. So too, Mutatis mutandis, the only way in which the ‘social drama’ of war differs from any other kind of ‘social drama,’ is in the bloodshed, and it is reasonable to conclude that the ‘social drama’ embodied in even peaceful protest movements draws upon the very same power of performance that armed conflict does. This is why ‘public performance’ and ritual still has the ability to displace and transform conflict (Thompson et al 2009: 25-70). Not surprisingly, Jonathan Schell believes the success and rise of popular protest movements may even constitute something of a theatrical transformation of politics itself (Schell 2003: 68-79).
DRAMATIC POSSIBILITIES

The important thing is this: To be able at any moment to sacrifice what we are for what we could become. – Charles DuBois
Dramatic worlds are worlds of possibility then, because our worldview is constructed through not only ideas, but metaphors, and because (as Clausewitz and Kant and Turner each surmised), ‘what is unknown is guessed at in the analogy of the known’ (Elam 1980: 102). The power of performance as Turner reminds us; that is, its ability to transform the worldview of its spectators, lies in the amorphous possibilities of the symbolic, which is easily subverted and changed via the power of performance (Turner 1988: 85). This is why a performance is not only descriptive, but ‘emergent;’ creating social structure through the very act of performance (Bauman 1975: 304) that takes its participants into a ‘dramatic reality’. It is also a shared experience (Pendzik 2006: 275): for some, theatre is most simply defined as an encounter that ‘takes place between spectator and actor’ (Grotowski 1968: 32). So too, performed violence in the public space is like a ritual encounter that attempts to share or force an alternate view of reality upon its participants (Juergensmeyer 2003: 147). Dramatic displays of power such as those of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center make a symbolic statement; they are not tactical or strategic manoeuvres. They allude to a narrative beyond the immediate target; they are ‘dramatic events intended to impress with their symbolic importance’ and their function as such can be understood just as any other cultural performance is (Juergensmeyer 2003: 125-126).

There are numerous parallels in the literature for psychological operations, Anthropology and the dramatic arts, which indicate a shared perspective with respect to human conflict, human drama and human interactions. At their confluence is the suggestion that there is something innately human about the need to perform and create and to be transformed, and that this lies at the heart of every conception of soft power ever expressed. The ‘innately human’ is also a reminder that not every aspect of military planning will be covered by an empirical or quantitative approach, nor will it ever be able to rely upon technology alone. The usefulness of studying conflict as a form of ritual and performance in human interactions lies in its ability to reveal ‘clarifications, categories, and contradictions of social processes’ which may not be evident in any other analysis of conflict (Turner 1988: 75).
Importing a performance paradigm into existing military doctrines, specifically addressing the work of Psyops then, is not a fanciful exercise. Turner’s cultural performance theory provides the necessary theoretical framework still lacking at a Strategic level, where culture must be negotiated as a ‘dynamic entity’ in a historical process that informs interpretations, interactions and receptions of reality (Miyoshi-Jager 2007: 8). And because understanding the dramatic extra-dimension of performed reality clearly provides an understanding of those sometimes ineffable or counterintuitive moments of conflict that seem unconcerned with goals or strategies (Van Creveld 1991: 226), it provides not only an additional interpretative layer for what is already a complex and difficult to reduce field of human interactions, but another level of engagement, and a reminder perhaps, of the lasting value of Psyops, and the ‘human’ in military operations.
Section 3 – THE SECOND GULF WAR PERFORMANCE

War’s one of those things, don’t you think, where everyone always thinks they’re in the right, have you noticed that? Nobody ever says we’re the bad guys, we’re going to beat the shit out of the good guys. – Caryl Churchill, ‘A Number’. 27

27 (Caryl Churchill 2007: 28)
Section 3 – X. THE SECOND GULF WAR PERFORMANCE

In the previous chapters, I have drawn upon the work of Turner and numerous other theorists to explain that armed conflict is, like all other conflicts, a form of ‘social drama,’ or ‘cultural performance’ that societies enact to fulfill certain needs. Adopting Turner’s perspective helps to explain the dynamic function of culture during conflict, as well as the inherently persuasive power of performance which is carried by the ‘universals of performance’ across a wide range of ‘genres’. In the following chapter, I will survey details and stories of the Second Gulf War for evidence of these. Although the availability of media and the need for brevity will restrict this exercise to the critiques and observations of predominantly English-language media, there should still be ample material to reflect upon. For if Turner is correct in his analysis of conflict as a form of ‘social drama,’ then his ‘universals’ should also be present in every, or indeed any consideration of the war. There should be evidence of a process of social drama, as well as symbolic elements that allude to the metaphoric, the dramatic and the ritual. There will also be evidence of an altered state of reality, perhaps apparent in speech and gesture; indicating the ‘liminal’ states, and perhaps even the ‘ludic’ interruption of these. I will reflect on all these elements, and how they may be interpreted within Turner’s conflict process.

To begin with, Turner describes all of society, much like the culture it generates, as a series of interactive processes, paused by cycles of conflict (Turner 1985: 44). And not only are there interactions within these conflicts that move society and social structure forward on a course of constant ‘becoming,’ but the conflict scenarios themselves often overlap and interact, conspiring to create new moments, crises and possibilities. This is apparent in the lead up to the Second Gulf War, which was punctuated over many years, by dramas involving weapons inspections, aerial bombardments and economic sanctions (Terdoslavich 2006: 15). Each was a conflict in its own right, but overlapping as they did, mostly unresolved, they eventually burgeoned into an all-out state of war in 2003. The idea that performance is an expression of myriad cultural forces is common to many disciplines (McKenzie 2001: 8), and as I have stated previously, the use of theatrical terms to describe social phenomena is not a fanciful exercise, because when we treat any entity (i.e.: object, action, event) as a ‘performance,’ we open up an investigation into the function of that entity, and how it relates to others. To reflect on something as a ‘performance’ therefore, is about evaluating ‘actions, interactions and relationships,’ for this is what ‘performance’ is (Schechner 2002: 24).
‘Social drama’ arises from the ‘fallen state’ of communication as discussed in chapter VIII. on ‘Liminal Moments’ (Turner 1988: 75-76); just as Clausewitz once said that war was a continuation of politics by other means. Social drama is a response to a fallen or impaired social state which, attempting to remedy some breach in affairs, follows the four states of Breach, Crisis, Redressive action and Reintegration. But there are different fields of engagement during each of these stages that result in a slippage and flux of narratives, rhetoric and symbolism. In the script of the 2003 Iraq Invasion for instance, there is evidence not only of process generated by the drama of interaction, but process that is  imposed upon situations of uncertainty (the liminal).

On May 1st 2003, for instance, the U.S. President ‘closed’ the war in Iraq by announcing (amidst much bravura on the back of an aircraft carrier) that combat operations in Iraq had officially ended (Associated Press 2003a). But on August 31st 2010, it was announced yet again, that ‘combat operations had officially ceased’ (Chulov 2010). Still later (just in case anyone had missed it earlier), on October 21st 2011, it was announced yet again, that combat operations were at a close, and that all U.S. troops would be returned home by Christmas. The news was not met with much fanfare, however (Yusko 2011). Combat operations may have officially ceased, but conflict in Iraq is still a daily reality (Brasch 2011). So what could be the reason for such pre-emptive announcements, than to artificially command a narrative or a performance, which has unduly leapt from the mores of planned structures and durations into something less determinate?

In-between each of these artificially imposed endings; there were also great losses and numerous scandals. At the time of writing this, 4800 Coalition combatants have been killed (icasualities.org), while  Iraq Body Count estimates that around 112,824 civilians have also perished. And the budget for this war has exceeded all expectations; according to Joseph Stiglitz:

*Direct government spending on those wars so far amounts to roughly $US2 trillion - $US17,000 for every US household - with bills yet to be received increasing this amount by more than 50 per cent* (Stiglitz 2011).
Although this may all seem like profligate waste, it is still only the sparsest account of this long and taxing war. It is as Jakovljevic writes, as if powerful, pent-up forces had escaped during the dramatic break-down of conventions (Jakovljevic 1999: 11); Hans Blix tells us that this war is after all, ‘illegal’ (Penketh 2004), indicating perhaps that the ‘breach’ in this social drama has perhaps been initiated by the U.S. and not Iraq (Kilkullen 2009: 263). And this practice of announcing ‘false endings’ is clearly a clash and a contest of not just wills, but of narratives; for who gets to ‘own’ the performance and to ‘tell’ the story? Judith Butler explains:

_The power of discourse to produce what it names is linked with questions of performativity. The performative is thus one domain in which power acts as discourse_ (McKenzie 2001: 15).

This is why it was necessary for President G. W. Bush to repeatedly assume the moral high-ground in his invocation of _jus ad bellum_; in this way, _he_ is the one who gets to _name_ the evil in the world that must be defeated, and _he_ is the one who gets to explain to his audience that this is a righteous war that he was _forced_ to lead on behalf of _good_ people everywhere. It was his duty we learnt, to protect us from Saddam Hussein’s bellicose ambitions:

_These are historic times. The mission that you’re accomplishing here in Iraq will go down in the history books as an incredibly important moment in the history of freedom and peace ... We’re engaged in a global struggle against the follower of a murderous ideology that despises freedom and crushes all dissent, and has territorial ambitions and pursues totalitarian aims_ (Moreles 2006: 7).

Now for Turner, all such public crises are indeterminate; neither here nor there, and suggestive of what he called the ‘liminal,’ a potent source of new symbols and meanings, which are most important as Turner indicated, to the foment of wars and revolutions (Turner 1988: 79). But these altered ‘mythic’ states, as I have mentioned in chapter VIII on ‘Liminal Moments’ (LeShan 2002: 30), are also periods of high contrast when uncertainty forces people’s speech and judgements to become rather polarised and difficult to nuance with additional or contrasting facts. Supporters of peace movements within the U.S. for instance, suddenly found themselves accused of ‘unpatriotic’ behaviour; for there could be no middle ground in war time (you are either for or against us), and there could be _no_ critique of the war in Iraq (Boje 2003).
This polarisation of opinion is also apparent in President G. W. Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ rhetoric, which preceded the speeches of the 2003 Gulf War, and provided one of many clues of a ‘mythic mode’ that indicates a society is drifting towards a wartime sensibility. During his *State of the Union Address* on January 29th 2002, he presented the U.S. ‘War on Terror’ within a speech where he defined a new post-Cold War binary for the international system. Some States were supporting terrorism at the expense of others we learned; and the world was now divided into those who lived in an ‘evil world’ and threatened those living in the ‘civilised world’. There were, as was also evident in the previous example, no grey zones; we were either for the war, or against it. These statements knowingly demonised an adversary, while legitimising G. W. Bush as a spokesperson for the side of good (Yongtao 2010: 101-102).

The prominence of *Weapons of Mass Destruction* (WMD) in G. W. Bush’s rhetoric throughout the lead-up to the 2003 war, and afterwards, despite intelligence reports refuting their existence; also suggests that the WMD were in fact of more *symbolic* than material value to this conflict process. WMD (and Saddam Hussein) personified a disproportionately large evil in the world according to G. W. Bush’s mythic speech. And because they functioned as a prop of indeterminate value in these ‘historic times,’ the context around them was never static: first there were WMD; then there were not; after this there was simply the ambition to acquire them on the part of an oppressive regime. Yes, we may acknowledge here that Saddam Hussein’s regime crushed dissenting voices within Iraq, but this never proved much of a motivator for U.S. intervention in previous years. The conflation of Saddam Hussein and the threat made manifest by the 9/11 terrorist strikes, was also an interesting way in which to shift the symbolic value of Saddam Hussein and Iraq in the public imagination – revealing that these symbols; both 'WMD' and 'Saddam Hussein,' are clearly ‘multivocal’ as Turner explained, and hint in their waxing-waning function, at the unstable ‘dramatic state’ they are moving and being moved by.

Given the lack of evidence or clear military objectives supporting the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it seems likely that this conflict-cum-performance (like those others already mentioned) was a reaction against some state of indeterminacy in the international system. Indeed, the declaration of war may be viewed as an attempt to counter and close an ambiguous political climate that had been developing over many years, during which it was sufficiently proven that Saddam Hussein did not pose an international security threat. He had complied with weapons inspectors, after all, and Hans Blix of the U.N. inspection team had said so; the UN would not support an intervention (Terdoslavich 2006: 15-16). So these failed attempts on the part of G. W. Bush to rally the international community against Saddam Hussein, were all an effort in a sense, to rail against the
uncertainty of his reign. And not uncertainty in the sense that he might have WMD, but uncertainty about the social order; for although the U.S. had won a battle against Iraq in 1991, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, here was Saddam Hussein, still thriving some years on. The U.S. it seemed, had won a war, but not claimed a victory; and Saddam Hussein had yet to be ‘disciplined’. The ambiguity that this generated provoked an attempt to forcefully end this state of indeterminacy. With this condition of uncertainty in mind, the ‘forceful’ reincorporation of Iraq into G. W. Bush’s social order can be seen not only in the ‘pacification’ of Iraq, but in the repeated announcements over the years that the weapons had been found, even though there were none, and that the war (or some part of it) had ‘ended,’ although conflict continued, and still does today.

Indeterminacy threatens to un-seam all daily rituals and performances, no matter how well planned they are (Turner 1985: 185), and the indeterminate and liminal state of affairs represented in Iraq’s condition as a deposed State, would now have to be rebuilt according to democratic precepts. The new Iraqi elections constituted yet another performance that promised to end this state of indeterminacy for the country, but they were not supported by everyone, everywhere (Galbraith 2006: 244), and remind us that although Turner wrote about the way in which rituals serve to restore and reincorporate the fallen, in order to rebuild a sense of ‘communitas;’ that there are always those who refuse to participate; deliberately putting themselves outside of the process while still harnessing the liminal moment of drama for the sake of their own agency and resistance, as was evident in the numerous violent insurgencies the U.S. faced in Iraq (Kilcullen 2009: 118).

The violent sectarianism that followed the break-down of Iraqi civil society was not just a consequence of a ‘political power vacuum’ that certain actors vied to fill, however. If the U.S. campaign planners were astonished at the measure and complexity of the insurgent fighting that developed while they were occupying Iraq, it was because they failed to pre-empt this aspect of ‘social drama’ which Turner observed across all forms of conflict:

*Choices of means and ends and social affiliation are made, stresses dominantly laid upon loyalty and obligation, as much as interest, and the course of events may have a tragic quality ... conflict brings out fundamental aspects of society, normally overlaid by customs and habits of daily intercourse, into frightening prominence. People have to take sides in terms of deeply entrenched moral imperatives and constraints, often against their own personal preferences, choice is overborne by duty* (Turner 1974: 235).
Understanding the feelings of humiliation and frustration generated by the repeated strategic failings in the field that these uprisings must have caused, also helps to explain, from a performative and narrative perspective, why it would have been of such value to the U.S. government to repeatedly force a pre-emptive announcement of their victory, to bring some aspect of this performance under control. And after failing to subdue the country, it made ‘sense’ that the world then got to see Saddam Hussein not only being arrested and paraded before cameras, but also put on trial for crimes committed against Iraqi citizens, then publicly executed. But of what worth are public executions in this consideration of ‘performance’ and culture? Michel Foucault speaks of such ‘theatres’ in his *Spectacle of the Scaffolds* as being an exhibition of power, terror and emasculation, adding that ‘The public execution is to be understood not only as a judicial, but also a political ritual’ (Foucault 1977: 47), which again recalls the value of the symbolic and the dramatic process in Turner’s theories. The Iraqis quickly returned the gesture with the ritualistic execution of U.S. hostages (delivered with added force following the exposure of ritualised humiliation of Iraqis at Abu Ghraib prison), which were also filmed and distributed online (O’Rourke 2006: 5). This is an interesting example of the way in which subcultures often interact and mirror the dominant culture in a dynamic manner (Fujimara 2010: 136), and perhaps illustrates a performative element of what some writers like to refer to as the ‘terrorist learning curve’ (Harmon 2011).

In this war, the very presence of the U.S. Coalition in Iraq assumed a symbolic value altogether unexpected by the U.S., against which the people of Iraq began to rail and resist. Kilcullen presents a processual and interactive understanding of culture which is very attuned to Turner’s when he argues that it is the U.S. presence that has needlessly radicalised a previously peaceful people into such a defensive posture (the ‘breach’), inadvertently creating ‘accidental guerrillas’ (Kilcullen 2009: 263). But the presence of the symbolic also indicates that we are dealing with a social interaction that has begun to exhibit ritualised aspects. As Turner explained, symbols are a helpful key to understanding the performance as a whole because they are the ‘smallest unit of ritual’ to retain information of the whole act,’ and the ‘ultimate unit of specific structure in ritual context’ (Turner 1967: 19).

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28 In this way, his delegitimisation also follows the erosion of Tugwell’s trinity, which includes the ‘righteousness’ of a cause (Tugwell 1990: 70).

29 Despite the generally unpredictable nature of conflict, a recent quantitative evaluation of combat statistics incorporating successful terrorist strikes since the 1970s reveals a ‘general pattern for human conflict,’ that researchers claim reveals a consistent rate of escalation that has been likened to a ‘learning curve’ that might be of use in pre-empting the bloodiest periods of battle (Harmon 2011).
As unpredictable as war has ever been, the guerrilla warfare and insurgent uprisings in Iraq were still received with astonishment and denial by U.S. planners, Rumsfeld even dismissing them as ‘pockets of dead-enders’ at one point (Associated Press 2003b). There seemed to be complete surprise at the resistance that followed their initial campaign of ‘shock and awe,’ (Jervis 2010: 176) and the fact that they were viewed by the Iraqi people not as ‘liberators,’ but as occupiers (Helfers 2006: 15). Even after Saddam Hussein’s capture, and the elections in Iraq, the nation was daily beset by a burgeoning insurgency movement whose sole aim was to undermine the newly created Iraqi government, and to drive out the U.S. and its allies (Helfers 2006: 175). For a time, it seemed as if the U.S. might not learn from the experience, fixed as they were on the idea that they should be seen as liberators, but these initial failures were soon replaced by the new COIN doctrine and a different strategy of human-centred security emerged. The U.S. Military it seemed, had not only changed the landscape of Iraq, but were being slowly changed by it themselves – Turner’s processual theory of transformation made manifest.30

The limited nature of U.S. self-perception that preceded the more culturally-aware U.S. COIN doctrine, is sometimes referred to as the Rashomon Effect.31 This describes the highly subjective perspectives that different parties can have of the same event and of themselves. This tragic misreading of ‘self’ and ‘other’ does not begin in wartime, however. Robert Jervis reminds us that one of the biggest intelligence failures associated with the 2003 Iraq war was attached not to weapons capabilities analysis, but to cultural misreading. Saddam Hussein’s fears were apparently not well understood or negotiated by the U.S., and he himself did not pre-empt G. W. Bush’s actions, having taken counsel from French and Russian diplomats who suggested G. W. Bush’s threats were nothing more than a ruse (Jervis 2010: 205). But Jervis claims that it was ultimately the failure of the U.S. to properly communicate with its adversaries that led to the eventual use of force (Jervis 2010: 177). This cultural misreading is surely not as simple an oversight of culture as some custom or belief though; it has evidently to do with the character of perception in the relationship between the U.S. and Iraq, which once more leads into Turner’s territory of process, performance and ritual.

30 In fact, the U.S. military was so transformed by its experiences in Iraq that it went from being an inferior example of COIN ops in comparison to the British, to rapidly supereceding them (Griffin 2011: 318).

31 Akira Kurosawa’s 1950 film Rashomon presents four different versions of a contested event in order to consider whether or not an objective truth can really exist. It was inspired by a two short stories authored by Ryūnosuke Akutagawa (Roth and Mehta 2002) and once again underscores the importance role of narrative and the performative nature of language in defining events and/or granting power.
There are numerous examples of the symbolic in the 2003 Iraq war that hint at ritual in the way that Turner described that involve events, people, places and things whose meanings are suddenly shifted on account of the changed context of war. Take for example the gift of tea-towels with positive liberation messages prepared by the U.S. Psyops teams; some of these had verses of the Qur’an written on them, invoking Allah Almighty. They were designed as good-will offerings for the Iraqi civilians. But it had not occurred to anyone that not only would a devout Muslim refuse to wipe their hands and dishes over the name of God (Friedman), but that this clumsy gift might assume an altogether different meaning in the context of war, because of the way it functions within a relationship, as a gift. Similarly, while soldiers often enjoy passing sweets to young children as a means of befriending locals in the field; one wonders what message about the occupation is left with the smallest of the children, who so often after receiving treats earn themselves beatings from larger children intent on stealing their gifts (Friedman). Symbols are multivocal and metaphoric; a means of conjoining two different fields of experience into the one signifier (Turner 1974: 24). But as can be seen from these examples, the fusing of unintended messages, especially in a warzone, may not always produce favourable results.

Weaponry can also assume a symbolic value in wartime. We have already mentioned that the influence of weaponry in the field is related only to our ability to flee their effects, because their function is to persuade via terror (Leonhard 2000: 222). But if our fear of superior military technology is premised on the notion that precision fire can perfectly seek out its preferred target (a ‘finger of God’ effect, if you will) and we then see this same technology responsible for all manner of unguarded accidents and ‘collateral damage,’ the ‘meaning’ of the weaponry will begin to shift, and the behaviour of those in the field along with it. This is especially true in an asymmetric or unconventional war in which targets are often chosen to represent the power of the enemy (Juergensmeyer 2003: 129). The potential of a Psyops misreading of multivocal symbolism in weaponry is also evident in the failed ‘shock and awe’ tactic initially employed by the U.S. which (Bedway 2003) a New Sunday Times report from an Arab contributor in March 2003, titled ‘Shock and Awe’ tactics fail to cow defiant Iraqi fighters informs us that the Iraqis were antagonised, rather than being impressed into submission by this self-reflexive display of power:

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32 The claims of those who promote high-precision weaponry can actually place extra pressure on Psyops management of public perceptions in times of war where collateral damage is still expected. According to Michael N. Schmitt, ‘precision warfare’ is sometimes seen as a panacea for modern warfare, encouraging observers to assume that weaponry is so fail-proof, that civilian casualties can only ever be the result of incompetence (Schmitt 2005).
With all their might, the American and British Forces have not been able to force a regime change in Iraq ... because the Iraqi army, using comparatively crude weapons and with no real help from others, is able to withstand such an onslaught (Talib 2003).

Turner explains this variable value and function of symbols in even greater detail, offering three fields of meaning for the symbol which include: ‘indigenous interpretation,’ which is the daily and personal experience of the symbol; ‘operation meaning,’ which is about how the object is used by people; and then finally ‘positional meaning,’ which describes the value of the symbol in the overall structure of society. Their meanings can never be fixed over the course of time Turner explains, not just because they may exist in different fields simultaneously, but because the meanings of these symbols are contextualised by events, and involved in the social process itself (Turner 1967: 20). This is especially apparent with the indeterminate state of the ‘liminal,’ where/during which, symbols seem to act as an interface within the ritualistic, in order to facilitate creative engagement and transformation.

As I have mentioned briefly in chapter VIII., some of Turner’s critics took exception to his later delineation between the terms ‘liminal’ and ‘liminoid,’ (Turner 1967: 19), when he reserved the latter term for performances of a secular nature, because it was claimed, even in these secular ‘performances’ there was still evidence of ritualistic behaviour (St John 2008: 9-10). The basic elements of martial arts are an example of this, as they are infused with spiritual teachings, even though they are stylised performances that have their origins in war. This relationship between ritual, performance and combat is apparent in the fact that, just as in warfare, there is still evidence of ritual and performance that include the theatrical use of shock in combat; ritualistic behaviour which is politically or religiously motivated; traditions involving technique, repetition and drill; a hierarchical system of authority; and a desire to draw upon ‘internal power,’ often through religious invocations (Jones 2002: xi).

Examples of such ritualised martial culture may be found in much of the available media associated with the 2003 Iraq war too; and there are many examples of props with overtly religious themes, such as this U.S. Army Gun Sight, engraved with a citation from Biblical scripture:
By the same token, there are also secular examples that reference ‘internal power’ that seem to engage with more than the material. Tactical Psyops teams for instance, sometimes broadcast loud, aggressive music from their loudspeaker trucks as a kind of ‘harassment technique’ for their adversaries (Smyczek 2005). But what becomes apparent during Michael Moore’s interviews with Coalition troops in Iraq during his Fahrenheit 9/11 documentary, is that the soldiers appear to need to employ such techniques in order to be able to actually ‘do the work’ of war (i.e. killing), by entering into some kind of altered state (Moore 2004):

**Music Soldier 1:** It’s the ultimate rush, ‘cause you know, you’re going into the fight to begin with, and then you got a good song ‘playin’ in the background... and that gets you real fired up an’ ready to do the job (Moore 2004).

This comment about music hints not only at the altered state of reality that performance generates in its participants, and the fact that these soldiers need to be in an altered state of reality before they can ‘do the job,’ but it also suggests that humans need to perform for themselves as much as to others, as a condition of performance (Schechner 1993: 239); some Jihadist groups were also apparently collecting footage of their skirmishes with the Coalition for a similar reason; uploading their videos to the internet within minutes of the events, to an audience of their own, and that of their adversary’s (O’Rourke 2005: 5). As has already been mentioned, the reflexive nature of performance allows performers to reveal themselves, to themselves. But the self-reflexivity of performance is especially important to Turner’s ‘redressive’ phase of social drama, where there is an opportunity for a post-conflict reflection on events, since it becomes important at this stage of the ‘social drama,’ to reflect on the cause of the action which has damaged the social fabric (Turner 1985: 196).
As a further aid to this restorative process, after ‘Redress’ there may also perhaps be a ‘metacommentary’ on events, in which there may be reflections and interpretive re-enactments of the social drama (Turner 1974: 104). The concept of self-reflexive performance and the limits of self-perception can also be used to understand the Psyops ‘mirroring’ concept, in which familiar interpretive perceptions of self are projected onto unfamiliar environments. At the beginning of the 2003 Gulf War for instance, it was initially believed that Iraqis had simply abandoned the battle in fear; ‘shocked and awed’ by Coalition forces (Fairweather 2003). This is how the Coalition perceived its own performance. According to Stephen Melton however, the Iraqis had actually decided to engage with the Coalition on their own terms, at a later date, in a protracted, low-intensity war (Melton 2009: 111).

I have spoken so far of the special ‘mythic state’ of wartime in this example of the Second Gulf War, but there are also moments in which that thrall can be spent or broken. I have previously referred to Turner’s ‘ludic moment,’ a moment of absurd humour employed to awake the Shamans from their deep trances when it seemed they were threatened by the experience (Turner 1988: 61). But this effect is also observable in wartime when people may be suddenly diverted from lofty mythic speeches via humour and satire, or else with a hard shock of sensory reality. The latter may be invoked through the engagement of the mundane, the viscerally alarming, or the cognitive dissonance of the absurd. Compare the tone of the following writing (from the previously cited Arab source) with G. W. Bush’s prior comments on a ‘historic moment’ as an example of the two modes of speech, ‘mythic’ and ‘sensory’:

*When a small child in Basra, thin and malnourished was brought in with his left hand shattered to pieces and his abdomen ripped open with bowels hanging out; yet the child is fully conscious but very still and silent unable to shed even a single tear, I asked myself, ‘For whose crime has this child got to pay with his precious life?’* (Talib 2003: 3)
Consider also, how well-managed this ‘sensory reality’ was during the U.S. Government’s 18 year-long ban on the photography of soldiers being returned home in coffins. Some believe that the ban was an attempt to sanitise and sell unpopular wars to the public, although the government cited ‘privacy reasons’ at the time (Bumiller 2009). A concurrent policy of refusing to keep track, or speak publicly of the number of Iraqis who’d been killed would suggest otherwise, however (Kamiya 2005). The scandal of Abu Ghraib prison, in which dozens of Iraqi prisoners were photographed in sexually humiliating positions, with their captors gloating over them, caused a similar sensory shift for many Americans, awakening shocked audiences from a ‘mythic mode,’ back into the everyday ‘sensory mode’ where such conflicts are difficult to justify (LeShan 2002: 92).

Such conflicts are not only often difficult to justify, but to understand in a rational way, because much of what passes through a ‘performance’ is merely hinting at what is hidden from view, via the most mutable and multivocal of symbols, which act as an interface with some undetermined and occult state of potential. The ‘dramatic state’ is like some vast, seething societal unconscious, which we see but glimpses of during a ‘performance’. Taking Turner’s ideas into the narratives of conflicts as I have here, helps to evince some additional meaning from these tacit fields as well as helping to deduce something more about the complexities of human behaviour. Although I have only managed to briefly revisit some examples of the tactical, operational and strategic narratives of this complex wartime narrative here, and I well understand the reasons that such subtle elements may challenge decision making during conflict; I still maintain that the soft power inherent to the dramatic process explored here, reveals a great utility in understanding and managing the performative aspects of conflict. The experience of the Second Gulf War has proven for many in the military, the necessity of ‘perception management’ and the importance of developing an adequate way to exploit this aspect of soft power (Collins 2003). Given that the difficulties of the U.S. campaign in Iraq have all been ‘human’ (Helfer 2006: 165), this is an altogether decent ambition.
THE IMPORTANCE of DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY

Lateral thinking is both an attitude and a method of using information ... with lateral thinking one is always trying to generate alternatives, to restructure patterns. It is not a matter of declaring the current pattern wrong or inadequate. Lateral thinking is never a judgement. – Edward de Bono33

XI. THE IMPORTANCE of DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY

The U.S. military is reportedly, in a process of transformation. They even have a ‘Transformation Team’ guiding this process. I have argued consistently for the import of Turner’s ideas into the military’s doctrines as a part of such processes, in the belief that the same issues that Turner once dealt with in Anthropology might be dealt with in the military’s practices too. These issues centre upon an overly empirical treatment of cultural; that is, human information. I believe that Turner’s theories can solve these issues and build upon the focus on the human dimensions of war that have been promoted in the more recent counterinsurgency doctrines, while helping to offset some of the unsound judgements of the past that have relied too heavily upon technologically guided outcomes.

The reason that I have focussed on the idea of importing Turner’s ideas as some kind of heuristic model at doctrinal level, is that the military runs on doctrine. These doctrines codify the practices of the military, and operate somewhat like the ‘fighting instructions’ that an army goes to war with; a blueprint for battle which is passed down into the training of soldiers (Terdoslavich 2006: 12). Given the academic freedom enjoyed by U.S. military officers, one may wonder why, if there is ample literature from the military sciences to inform these processes, we should worry about the quality and content of doctrine? The reason is, that there are disagreements in the military sciences, just as there are in any other discipline, and although this diversity of opinion is a sound stimulus for the development of ideas, there must be a ‘uniformity of approaches’ to warfare for practical reasons; one that must be formalised within military doctrine (Gareev 2007: 2).

There are challenges involved in the reform of doctrine, though. While the change and uncertainty inherent to contemporary armed conflicts may necessitate new doctrine for the military, rapid doctrinal innovation is only ever likely following a strategic failure, because strategic innovation creates uncertainty. New technology for instance, is more likely to be assimilated into an older doctrine, rather than generate a new one (Rosecrance 1986: 169). This is a problem I have already highlighted with the incorporation of RMA into Clausewitzian conventional warfare perspectives, as well as of HTS into older empirical frameworks. It also helps to explain how swiftly the U.S. military sought to create a new COIN doctrine after their strategic failings in Iraq, where after finding themselves branded as ‘occupiers’ rather than ‘liberators,’ they were forced to accept a ‘holistic, politically focussed strategic approach to intervention’ (Griffin 2011: 317). In addition to reforming the curricula of service colleges
(Miyoshi-Jager 2007: 6), the COIN doctrine inspired by strategic failings in Iraq has also moved the U.S. Department of Defense to spend more of its money on the Army’s training for interventions abroad and COIN operations, amounting in a $55 billion cut to spending on high-tech weapons for the Air Force and Navy (Terdoslavich 2006: 56); a significant diversion of funds on account of the influence of doctrine alone.

Doctrine must have strong political will behind it, however. Many years before both the first and second Gulf Wars, Michael Howard had already noted that in contemporary war, it is impossible to ignore the non-operational dimensions of strategy; where a ‘multidimensional approach to the conduct of war in which operation, technological, logistical and societal dimensions’ are equally considered (Howard 1984: 101-115). This notion was amply demonstrated in Iraq in recent years, where ‘victory’ was simply not possible using military might alone; requiring the support of both political and economic will (Terdoslavich 2006: 59). But this is where Miyoshi-Jager says political guidance is still lacking; notwithstanding the new COIN doctrine (Jager 2007: 24), because among war planners there still persists an inclination towards the technical capabilities of war, which in addition to requiring less abstract thought, also tend to distract planners from the moral dimensions of war in their preoccupation with the material (Handel 2001: 82).

There have also been earlier, and sometimes rather controversial attempts at dealing with counterinsurgency that have not ended well, as discussed in chapter IV. on ‘Culture vs. HUMINT,’ where I touched upon the use of HUMINT and cultural knowledge to target Vietnamese civilians for political assassination. Whatever we may say of the political motivations for the invasion of Iraq, the COIN-inspired changes to military doctrine do represent a break with this dark past however, and are a genuine turning point in the history of the U.S. military, because they redefine not only the role of the military, but a new form of civil-military relations, one in which traditional distinctions between the work of soldier and civilian are blurred in the name of human-security projects, encompassing more than just traditional warfare (Rosen 2009: 597-598). A new doctrine is also required to define these emergent roles, where the import of cultural theory into military doctrine and training encourages ‘a view of military and civilians as potential partners, rather than adversaries,’ casting cultural knowledge in a constructive and potentially life-saving role (Brown 2008: 444).
The longevity of such a doctrine is questionable though, given that although the U.S. Army is sometimes referred to as one of the ‘great learning institutions,’ they are often re-learning the lessons of past strategic failures (Jackson 2008: 1). Examples of such COIN revisitations in the recent history of the U.S. warfare are numerous. In the post-cold war era alone, conflicts which have included unconventional elements include: Panama (1989), Somalia (1992-93) Haiti (1994) Bosnia (1995) Kosovo (1999) Afghanistan (2001-) and Iraq (2003-) (Terdoslavich 2006: 58); and as there was in each also an element of revision to address strategic failures, there was and is clearly an issue of continuity that should be dealt with before any further doctrinal innovation can take place.

One way of addressing this problem is to keep a permanent level of troops enlisted and ready for any situation, rather than waiting for a war to rebuild troop levels and reconstitute any lessons of the past. Thus far we have only seen a ‘feast of famine’ cycle in the development and support of armed forces, from one conflict to the next (Helfers 2006: 170); a pattern which is especially obvious in the neglect of Psyops between wars, even though as I have discussed, there are many peacetime missions that Psyops may profitably engage with under the banner of ‘Operations Other Than War’. A lack of continuity in military planning is also apparent where HUMINT is concerned when Peters claims that:

*There has been no consistent lobby for human intelligence, language skills, or deep analysis. Despite occasional bursts of supportive rhetoric on Capitol Hill, the money was still going, for quite a time, to machinery, and not flesh and blood. Even though we live in an era when our security problems are overwhelmingly human problems* (Peters 2006: 113).

This bias apparently comes from the very top levels of planning, where technology is preferred to human elements as the more reliable choice, presumably because it is immune to ‘personnel problems,’ although it may not always be the most salient choice (Peters 2006: 113). There will also be resistance to doctrinal development from those who believe that contemporary militaries have no requirement for theory or philosophy, and should only ‘inculcate in their members a relentless empiricism, a disdain for *a priori* theorising’ (Cohen and Gooch 1990: 236-237). But I have already discussed the limits of empiricism where culture and human behaviour are concerned, and the usefulness of applying a theory of conflict such as Turner’s as a heuristic model capable of addressing these issues.
Doctrine should be an aid to understanding what we see in conflict. In the case of Iraq, for example, where ‘we couldn’t see what we wanted to see, so we refused to see what we didn’t want to see’ (Peters 2006: 113), applying Turner’s theories in the development of doctrine can inspire a more sophisticated theoretical framework for understanding the complexities of culture in conflict and in the military, just has it once did for Anthropology.

There are problems occasionally, with the application of new doctrine though, that may make such reforms difficult to promote. The gap between theory and practice is especially evident at the level of strategy, where Fernandez-Vega complains that there is not enough imagination or qualitative thinking on the part of leaders (Fernandez-Vega 2007: 128); and the new rules of engagement, as specified by the latest COIN doctrine, have also sometimes been distorted as they were handed down in the military’s chain of command; sometimes from irresponsibility, and other times simply through a lack of understanding of the basic concepts the doctrine embodies (Hastings 2010). The problem is that doctrine requires imagination from commanders, but it is ‘easier to think in terms of technological force multipliers, such as smart weapons, than to create multipliers based on smart doctrines’ (Kober 2003: 145), even though it has been noted that a sound knowledge of language and culture can be ‘more effective to our military than entire squadrons of FA/22s’ (Peters 2005: 35).

For want of sound doctrine, there has also often been a dearth of strategy too, and the 2003 war in Iraq has been amply discussed as a war bereft of strategy. Rather than being driven by clear objectives, it was initiated by ‘imperialist arrogance’ according to Fernandez-Vega who explains, that although the West has the material means to conquer its adversaries, it has no clear policies to inform a victory, and for this reason its campaigns will be doomed to travel an endless cycle of violence, with no guiding narrative or end in sight (Fernandez-Vega 2007: 137). Bad planning in the Second Gulf War, which resulted in a lack of basic resources for soldiers, and the inclusion of an ill-prepared National Guard, can also be traced back to decisions made by civilian planners with no practical experience of war (Helfers 2006: 180). This disregard for human experience was also apparent in the fact that the U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, tried in vain for two and a half hours to use his own judgement and experience of war to dissuade President G. W. Bush from initiating a war with Iraq (Feith 2008: 248). Mandatory retirement in the military also excludes those with the greatest wisdom and experience from contributing to such planning. General Zinni’s 1999 war-game projections of a hypothetical Iraq war for instance, accurately predicted all the issues the U.S. Coalition were to eventually face in Iraq, but received no interest from Washington, and was promptly forgotten after he left his post in 2000 (Helfers 2006: 150).
Governments are frequently prone to ignoring the advice of their military and intelligence agencies it seems, especially where that advice does not support policy ambitions (Jervis 2010: 157). The titles of various investigative news pieces concurring with serious strategic failings in Iraq attest to this being the case: *Bush Ignored the Experts* (Schmitt and Brinkly 2003); *CIA Officers warn of Civil War* (Strobel and Landay 2004); *Report Says White House Ignored CIA On Iraq Chaos* (Jehl 2005); and *Blair-Bush Deal Before Iraq War Revealed in Secret Memo* (Norton-Taylor 2006). Intelligence has also frequently been distorted under political pressure, as was the case when intelligence agencies denied both the presence of WMD in Iraq and anything linking Saddam Hussein with Al Qaeda (Jervis 2010: 158-161). But the vast executive powers of U.S. Presidents mean that they are unhindered in their ambitions to make war; they may decide to do so against the advice of intelligence people, and have at their command a willing and professional military with a global reach (Munson 2011). This means that wars such as the Second Gulf War can be undertaken with little or no planning. Peter Munson argues that for this reason, it is not a question of the loss of past-knowledge gained in places like Vietnam or Iraq that compromise sound military operations, but misguided *politics* at both the national and bureaucratic levels (Munson 2011).

The U.S. Army already has a comprehensive fighting doctrine; but the challenge for the human-security issues of the new millennium will require equally comprehensive doctrines for peaceful missions. Moreover, these doctrines should so unambiguously inform the purpose and practice of the military, that there should be no trouble transitioning a military from a fighting to a peacekeeping mission when required to (Terdoslavich 2006: 59). Adopting a cultural point of view in conflict is also important, because the more detailed perception of the nature of war it grants will directly impact on future strategic performance (Lonsdale 2007: 239). This is where I would like to recall Psyops’ breadth of application across every type of conflict scenario, whether it be peace-keeping or disaster relief; Psyops alone is continually engaged with the human and the cultural dimensions of conflict, in every kind of mission and at every level of planning. This is why I believe that Psyops has a unique potential to embody and put into practice Turner’s theories on culture and conflict. It is not unreasonable to expect military commanders to at least be *inspired* by theory, and to make use of a new set of theoretical tools for dealing with the novel practical challenges that contemporary conflict scenarios offer (Kober 2003: 143), although now that President Barack Obama has announced the imminent withdrawal of the U.S. from combat operations in Iraq, and cut-backs to military funding that will also affect COIN research and operations (Ackerman 2011), it is not unreasonable to wonder whether the lessons learnt from this war will be shelved and forgotten as others have been, and perhaps repeated at some later stage.
TURNER’S LIMINAL LEGACY – A FINAL THOUGHT ON ‘IMMERSION’

All fish cannot be reached from the shore. For a fisherman to be complete, he must go upon the water. – Ricky Noel Mitchell
In the previous chapters, I have established the need to retain a more comprehensive vision of the human dimension of armed conflict and the way in which Psyops are uniquely suited to engage with these across a wide variety of missions, only some of which may involve combat. I revisited the importance of cultural understanding in Psyops’ work, and the way in which the failings of the military often hinge on a poor understanding of culture and the way it may function during conflict. I have also presented Turner’s theories of ‘cultural performance’ as an explanatory theory of this function, and the way that conflict produces unique psychological conditions which are akin to the conditions of the ‘dramatic state,’ and concluded that this performance-like quality is what grants conflict its most persuasive and transformative power, although the violence itself, or the threat of violence, often supports this function via the power of symbol and mutable metaphors.

The notion that war is irresistible to people because it is somehow enmeshed in our nature, is a myth that many anthropologists have tried to refute. R. Brian Ferguson reiterates this argument when he states that neither history nor science can substantiate the claim that we are drawn towards violent measures (Furguson 2009: 33-34). If I agree with Ferguson, it may seem contrary to draw upon the arguments of Van Creveld and LeShan in my support of Turner’s theories, because they both suggest the opposite; that people seem irremissibly drawn to war. But this is because I believe that it is not the violence itself that creates the allure of war, but the mass, spectacled, all-out performance of society engaged in yet another permutation of ritualised conflict; the very process of ‘social drama,’ and the promise of the ‘liminal,’ that attracts participants and spectators alike. Turner understood this aspect of conflict. His theories provide a useful heuristic model when studying the mechanics of conflict. In Turner’s vision, war is but one of many genres of conflict; and only one of many genres of ‘performance’. And while we may not be ‘biologically determined’ for war, there is every indication that we are ‘made’ for the high symbolism of performance:
Man (sic) has, as it were, discovered a new method of adapting himself to his environment. Between the receptor system and the effector system, which are to be found in all animal species, we find in man a third link which we may describe as the symbolic system. This new acquisition transforms the whole of human life. As compared with the other animals man lives not merely in a broader reality; he lives, so to speak, in a new dimension of reality ... Reason is a very inadequate term with which to comprehend the forms of man’s cultural life in all their richness and variety. But all these forms are symbolic forms. Hence, instead of defining man as an animal rationale, we should define him as an animal symbolicum. By so doing we can designate his specific difference, and we can understand the new way open to man – the way to civilization (Cassirer 1972: 24-26).

Reason alone is indeed a very inadequate term with which to comprehend not only the richness of ‘man’s cultural life,’ but the manifold motivations and interactions that can occur in that life, not just in our quotidian experience, but in the exaggerated passages of war; for as explained throughout this dissertation, wars are not always fought for entirely rational reasons. As discussed in the chapter IX. on ‘Dramatic Possibilities,’ Kant and Clausewitz both surmised the same of ‘reason’ and ‘human nature,’ as did Turner, whose theories helped to move Anthropology from a practice long-stranded in such unhelpfully empirical thought. As I have already mentioned in the introduction to this work, It may seem curious to draw upon the work of Turner to explain the most human aspects of war, given that during World War II, he was both a pacifist and objector to military service (Deflem 1991: 1); just as it may also seem odd to seize upon Turner’s ideas, almost forty years after they were first published, although his work was revolutionary for its time. These facts notwithstanding, I do believe that Turner’s theories remain eminently suitable as a theoretical framework for understanding the value of culture during conflict not only because they address culture as a dynamic entity, but because they help to describe its function in a process of social drama where participants find themselves moved into an altered state of perception by the very nature of performance; and where existing social structures may be challenged and transformed by that same potential.
Turner’s most fascinating and original research was on ‘liminality,’ where those being moved within a social process, according to a ‘cultural script,’ would suddenly find a moment in which they are liberated from the usual social constraints, in a gap between ordered worlds where anything may happen (Turner 1974: 13). This dynamic cultural perspective is also perfectly attuned for the work of the military, where:

*There are few, if any, static answers in intelligence. The problems we face from foreign enemies are throbbing, morphing, living, often-irrational manifestations of human problems that are themselves in the process of constant change. Intelligence moves. Even the best strategic intelligence provides only not-quite-focused snapshots and rough-compass bearings, not detailed maps to a predetermined future* (Peters 2006: 114).

Truly, Turner’s work helps to explain something novel about conflict, and in particular, with his insights into the ‘liminal,’ they shed light on an aspect of ‘soft power’ that our militaries have not yet considered, let alone begun to appreciate. This is most evident in the under-appreciated capabilities of Psyops, which are apparently, hardly visible at the strategic level of planning (Collins 2003), and often suffer for want of resources and continuity (Paddock 1996: 34). It is hardly surprising that more has not been written about the ‘liminal’ though, given that for some researchers, a study of subjective experiences and psychological states are a ‘traditional weakness of Anthropology,’ where they are regarded as either altogether ‘ineffable,’ or inaccessibly ‘esoteric,’ according to Barbara Myerhoff (Myerhoff 1990: 254). Edith Turner once said the study of performance and experience was so challenging as to be ‘like catching the electron in motion’ (Turner 1985: 11). But we must aspire to study ‘performance’ more closely, especially in the case of war, where Carolyn Nordstrom says that most theorists are still ‘writing form the safety of a nonviolent situation,’ despite the long-held practice of anthropologists learning from practical experience, out in the field, where they can absorb the ‘raw and the tangible’ before creating the ‘abstract’ (Waterston 2009: 15).
Turner also pleaded with his colleagues to try and ‘live’ more comfortably in other territories of study – for the sake of a ‘unified science of man,’ and an ‘authentic Anthropology’. War, conflict, the military sciences; cannot be excluded from the breadth of this study; one must immerse oneself and *live* these things, to be able to properly write about them, he said (Alexander 1991: 17). I am aware that the idea of ‘living comfortably’ when presented in this context, may invoke a host of unresolved controversies, not least of which involves exposure to great danger, or the idea of supporting the so-called American Imperialist ambitions, and providing those who may pursue them with additional means of conquest. But there are yet other means to engage directly with the military, and if we consider how much the social sciences and humanities have to contribute to the on-going transformation of a contemporary military, with their unique perspectives on culture, and the adaptive or resistant nature of social networks, then there is more to be gained than lost from the collaboration (Fujimura 2010: 136). In such a collaboration, Turner’s processual and interactive view of conflict and transformation also has implications for the military as a culture too; for while fixed cultural stereotypes have often misinformed the U.S. military’s engagement with Iraqis, a commensurate bias exists among the critics of the military who have just as stereotypical a view of the so-called ‘military mind’ (Brown 2008, 443).

Turner’s belief that we *must* immerse ourselves inside processes, to obtain proper knowledge of them, also holds true when it comes to military planning (Turner 1975: 32), and is perhaps most painfully demonstrated by the fact that so many of the planning errors of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq were made by *civilian planners*. Those who have been engaged most intimately with war should logically be in the most important decision-making roles concerning wars of the future. There is now a younger generation of intelligence and Psyops officers who have weathered all the brutalities of wars like Iraq, and know well not to rely upon any promises of technology (Peters 2006: 112). Even so, the ‘Transformation Team’ tasked with the reform of the military is comprised of mostly academics and officers without any direct combat experience; an oversight, since the nature of future wars promises to be unconventional, and most likely fought on the ground than from a distance (Helfers 2006: 171).

As I have already discussed in chapter V. on ‘Qualitative Judgement and the Law of Humanity,’ ‘knowing’ the battlefield is about a good deal more than knowing empirical facts, figures and physical terrain; it is about knowing the *character of perception* that precedes ‘knowing’ in the way that Clausewitz once hoped his commanders might (Sumida 2007: 181), and this is an element of the battlefield that Psyops is uniquely positioned to understand and engage with; one that can only be enhanced by the import of Turner’s theories, especially to address the lack of oversight demanded at strategic levels of planning (Miyoshi-Jager 2007: 4), since Turner
describes this ‘character of perception’ in his evaluation of meaning and symbol in an altogether novel way however, proving how ‘performance,’ as a kind of transmuted form of modern ritual, still has a very serious purpose, and is capable of changing hearts and minds, as well as being part of a social reconciliation (Bigger 2009: 212). Psyops already aspires to do the former – but perhaps with more considered engagement and wisdom from the Social Sciences and Humanities it could be supported to do the latter, as well.

As has hopefully become evident by now, the usefulness of studying conflict as a form of ritual and performance rests in its ability to provide ‘actors’ and ‘audiences’ with an additional interpretive layer and means for engagement, by revealing ‘clarifications, categories, and contradictions of social processes’ which may not be evident in any other analysis of conflict (Turner 1988: 75). It is unlikely that war will ever be abolished. There will always be some actor willing to employ obdurate violence to pursue their ends. Nor will all wars be ‘popular’ or ‘necessary’. But if our governments are able to develop a better cultural competency, they can perhaps at least attempt to avoid resorting to violence in the first instance to deal with such threats (Helfer 2006: 187), as was presented in the example of the Second Gulf War (Jervis 2010: 177).

I have not tried to present a definitive analysis of any conflict or war here; simply to use Turner’s theories to augment a specific feature or facet of war that is common to all forms of conflict. I am guilty, like all those other theorists and planners, of having little practical experience of war to draw upon. My sole experience of war is as a nineteen year old volunteer with a group of combat medics in Balkans in 1991, where I was sheltered from much of the drama. But I see in Turner’s work a unique vantage point and explanation for human behaviour and the ‘soft power’ that has been under-appreciated in the military texts thus far, and is most evident in the poor regard for Psyops work. The other reason I have focussed on the work of Psyops, is because they are uniquely suited to deal with all kinds of operations including war, and because of this full-spectrum of engagement, imbuing Psyops with Turner’s continual vision of historic process and all the difficult counterinsurgency lessons of the past, presents the most likelihood that this wisdom will be granted any continuity at the close of a war. Turner once wrote that it is often ‘…not a theorist’s whole system which so illuminates, but his scattered ideas, his flashes of insight taken out of systemic context and applied to scattered data,’ and that ‘such ideas have a virtue of their own and may generate new hypotheses’ (Turner 1974: 23). I have written as I have, because I believe that the import of Turner’s theories into existing military doctrines can have just that effect.
These principles, though the result of long thought and continuous study of the history of war, have none the less been drawn up hastily, and thus will not stand severe criticism in regard to form. In addition, only the most important subjects have been picked from a great number, since a certain brevity was necessary. These principles, therefore, will not so much give complete instruction to Your Royal Highness, as they will stimulate and serve as a guide for your own reflections.

– Carl von Clausewitz, ‘On War’.
Glossary of Terms

The following glossary includes terminology specific to both Performance Theory and Military Science. It should be noted that at the time of writing, the U.S. Army has announced the appointment of a team of ‘terminologists’ to revise the Army’s use of specialised terminology and acronyms, which are allegedly a source of some confusion in the armed forces. The most recent edition of the Army Field Manual (FM 1-02) for instance, contained some 1,100 acronyms and 2000 operational terms (Brinkerhoff and Wallechinsky: 2011). The list that follows includes a brief definition for those military terms used in this thesis, and still extant in the cited literature.

Anti-Structural / Antistructure – Turner’s methodology and approach to understanding culture. In contrast to the methods of structural functionalism, where one could categorise, count participants, and describe social place and behavior, antistructuralism aspires to understand motives, meaning and the flux of relationships.

Asset-to-Liability Shift – Belief in the value of one’s cause is one of three essential factors in maintaining conflict, according to Tugwell. Without this belief, the cost of one’s goals are difficult to justify. When this occurs, an ‘asset to liability shift’ has occurred.

Asymmetric warfare/fighting - a conflict where there is an imbalance of forces and capabilities between adversaries, and the disadvantaged power resorts to unconventional tactics in order to make up for this disparity in power.


Clausewitzian – referring to the classical-era mode of conventional force-on-force warfare between evenly-matched States.


COIN – Counterinsurgency (may refer to techniques or doctrine).

Cost-to-combat ratio – the quantifiable material sacrifice require to secure a goal in conflict.

Culturalism – The notion that the character of people and their behavior, is determined by their culture alone.

Diachronic Structure – (especially when referring to ‘narrative’) a sequential or chronological structure.
Dramatic State / dramatic reality – an altered state of reality induced by participating in drama. Also alludes to the ‘liminal state’ of potential.


Hard Power – the (sometimes political) influence of physical force.

Hard Security – Security planning that involves the use of hard power.

High Intensity War – High intensity conflict - full scale conventional warfar/ combat between evenly matched armed forces.

HTS – ‘Human Terrain Systems’ – a scheme of embedded social scientists working with the military to produce cultural intelligence.

Human Security – a security paradigm that has as its focus the needs of the individual rather than the State.

Human Terrain – The cultural landscape during wartime.

HUMINT – human intelligence. One source of potential intelligence, in addition to SIGINT (Signals Intelligence), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), and open source intelligence (OSINT).

Industrialised Total War – (or ‘Totaler Krieger’) a conflict with no restriction on conduct, the type and number of weapons used, or on the terrain and combatants (e.g. civilian).

Information Age – an era beginning in the latter part of the 20th century, defined by the access, dominance and manipulation of information information across a wide spectrum of media, predominantly electronic.


Insurgency – and organised resistance whose aim is to overthrow a government through violent means and often asymmetric warfare techniques.

IO – Information operations – sometimes mistakenly interchanged with the term Psyops, or Information Warfare. IO coordinates and synchronises activities to meet an overall informational objective.

IW - Information Warfare (sometimes mistakenly exchanged for the terms Psyops and Information Operations), is the use of electronic communications and the Internet, specifically during periods of conflict, to secure a certain objective over an adversary or adversaries.
**KO – Kinetic Operations, i.e.: combat (soon to be replaced with ‘Lethal operations’).**

**Law of Humanity, The –** the first ‘law’ of war: That warfare is an outgrowth of the human soul and that all conflicts (and difficulties encountered during conflict) are founded upon human nature.

**Levels of Planning:**
- **Tactical** – involves units in direct combat.
- **Operational** – involves the movement of large segments of military on the terrain.
- **Strategic** – concerns the overarching objectives of the war / State.

**Liminality / Liminal / Liminoid** – A transient and altered state of reality researched by Turner, and first described by Van Gennep, which emerges during performance and seems ‘in-between’ possible outcomes.

**Low Intensity War** – (or low intensity conflict) defined by the U.S. Army as ‘involving protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of the armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments.’

**Ludic moment** – The comedic interruption employed in some shamanic traditions in order to suddenly bring a ritual participant back from a trance which may seem threatening.

**Machinism, Ideology of** – an economic and/or political preoccupation with machinery/technology.

**MILDEC - Military Deception** – the deliberate deception of rival military decision makers, specifically with respect to the home militaries capabilities and intentions, in order to induce actions that support the goals of the home government.

**Military Doctrine** – the codified attitudes and fighting instructions of the military.

**MISO – Military Information Support Operations** (until recently formally referred to as Psyops).

**Mission Creep** – The expansion of a project or mission beyond its originally stated goals.

**Mobilising Trinity** – Tugwell’s theory that conflict can only be sustained with the presence of three influencing beliefs: The belief in the goodness of one’s struggle; the belief in the wrongness of one’s enemy’s motives; and the belief that one will ultimately prevail if one continues to struggle.

**Multivocality / Multivocal** – (of symbols); having many simultaneous or possible meanings, according to context.
Mythic mode – an altered state of perception described by LeShan, in which individuals and groups may enter prior to, or during wartime. Characterised inter alia, by a generally un-nuanced judgement. hyperbolic speech and demonization of an enemy.

OOTW – Operations Other Than War: according to the U.S. Department of Defence, ‘Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war’.

OPSEC - Operational Security: The process of identifying critical information about home capabilities, which may be gathered in the open by hostile intelligence.

PA - Public Affairs - public information, command information, and community relations activities aimed at foreign and domestic audiences, which support the missions of Defence and government.

Pacification – the act of subduing hostile (or potentially hostile) opinions or forces.

PAMIS – ‘Parallel Multimedia Index Server’ is a database that stores more than text or numbers. Media is indexed and retrieved via patterns of ‘similarity’.

Postmodernism – an ideological rejection of the notion of objective truth and universal values, characterised by political and cultural fragmentation/decentralisation.

Precision Warfare – technologically enhanced warfare which may seek out preferred targets with great accuracy, and from a distance.

Principle of Mass, the - the traditional practice in warfare of massing effects of overwhelming power at the right place and time; according to Leonhard, not a valid principle of war for the Information Age.

Processual – pertaining to process, in the case of Turner’s work, it refers to the methodology attached to the study of culture, which placed greater value on interaction than structure.

PSYOPS – Psychological Operations – defined by U.S. Army Doctrine as: ‘the planned use of subjective information to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behaviour of hostile, neutral or friendly groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives’.

Rashomon Effect – the subjectivity of memory and self-perception; many observers may have alternate and credible recollections of the same event. Inspired by the Kurosawa film of the same name.

RMA – Revolution in Military Affairs – the notion that the future of military thinking and practice will be defined and guided by technology.
**Sensory Shift** – LeShan’s description of the shift into an altered state of perception, triggered by differing sensory queues.

**Social drama (and stages of)** – The ‘lived’ process of community, and the universal ‘performance’ process of any conflict in the public realm, defined by the following four phases of public action:
- **Breach**: a ‘Breach’ of normal social relations; when an actor attempts to move to a new place in the social order.
- **Crisis**: This creates a state of ‘Crisis’, which may be blocked via ritual and conventions.
- **Redress**: ‘Redressive’ action follows, because the changes in status require a readjustment to a new scheme. This period of redress may also be a period of reflection on the cause of crisis, until the final **re-integration and Restoration**: when re-adjustment is formalised and the schism legitimised.

**Social Effervescence** – an altered state of perception in the community, triggered by rites and rituals, which are highly charged collective experiences which serve to unite groups and propel moments of historic change and transformation.

**Soft Power** - Political influence wielded via diplomacy, aid, cultural allure, rather than by such "hard" means as military intervention or punitive economic measures.

**Soft Security** - security which protects something from harm in a discreet and indirect fashion, rather than with direct, or obvious, physical measures.

**Special Ops** – (SO) - Operations carried out in hostile, inaccessible, or politically sensitive environments where there are no conventional military options, usually covertly organised, for the same reasons.

**Spectrum of Conflict** – (after Bowdish) a range of conflict scenarios with which States may engage, and possibly employ the capabilities of the military to address – everything and anything from economic issues, to humanitarian and disaster relief. Only a small element of this spectrum includes combat.

**Stability Operations** – broad missions conducted in collaboration without other entities to maintain or reclaim a stable social environment, in which essential services and governance are guaranteed.

**Structural Functionalism** - the idea that the central function of the various aspects of a society is embedded in its social structure.

**Technological Determinism** – a reductionist theory that claims technological development alone is responsible for the development and structure of society.
Theatre of War (Theatrum Belli) - the geographic section of terrain in which soldiers fight. Adapted from the term used for renaissance map rooms, ‘Theatrum Orbus Terrarum’ to describe the terrain of war as ‘Theatrum Belli’.

Transformation Team – the special group tasked with the reform of the U.S. military. Critics complain that it is mainly comprised of academics and officers without any direct combat experience.

Unconventional Warfare – The opposite of conventional warfare, defined by the U.S. Military as: ‘activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.’

Universals of Performance – perennial elements of the process of ‘Social Drama’.

WMD – ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’: weaponry that may swiftly afflict people, structures and the environment on a large scale.
SIGILS – a legend

(Vintage engravings from royalty-free sources)

‘A symbol, then, is a blaze or landmark, something that connects the unknown with the known’ (Turner 1967: 48).

Title page - A Death’s head hawk moth.  Pg 1

Section 1 - I - A Werewolf devouring a maiden.  Pg 15

THE VALUE of PSYOPS: ‘The human race is governed by its imagination’. – Napoleon

II - A Dodo.  Pg 21

CONTINUITY: ‘Hegel was right when he said that we learn from history that man can never learn anything from history’. – George Bernard Shaw

III - A worker on an antique cycle.  Pg 27

RMA vs. HUMAN TERRAIN: It has become appallingly obvious that our technology has exceeded our humanity.

– Albert Einstein

IV - Indigenous Australian Warriors.  Pg 35

CULTURE vs. ‘HUMINT’: ‘One of the things that annoys me is when people come up and say ‘tell me about your culture, what is your culture?’ ... I can’t give you my culture on a piece of paper and say ‘Here, that’s my culture.’ Neither can you. Neither can anybody else. Your culture is not some commodity, some article that you give to someone – ‘Here’s my culture’ or ‘give me your culture.’ ‘Oh yes, thank you very much’ and walk away and take your culture’.– Senator Neville Bonner

34 (Buchanan 1995).
### V - A Map of the Human Heart.

**QUALITATIVE JUDGEMENT and the LAW OF HUMANITY:** ‘Man is a slow, sloppy and brilliant thinker; the machine is fast, accurate and stupid’.
– William M. Kelly

### Section 2. VI - A Hornet’s Nest.

**WAR as a PERFORMANCE:** ‘Drama is action, sir, action and not confounded philosophy’. -Luigi Pirandello

### VII - A Human Flea. From little things, big things come.

**THE UTILITY of PERFORMANCE** – ‘In the theatre of politics, as in dramatic theatre, breaking conventions tends to unleash an enormous amount of energy and power’. - Branislav Jakovljevic

### VIII - A Flying Fish, between sea and sky.

**LIMINAL MOMENTS:** ‘Earth, isn’t this what you want: to arise within us, invisible? Isn’t it your dream to be wholly invisible someday? O Earth: invisible! What, if not transformation, is your urgent command?’
– Rainer Maria Rilke, ‘Turning Point’

### IX - A Dolmen. A tombstone, or a doorway?

**DRAMATIC POSSIBILITIES:** ‘The important thing is this: To be able at any moment to sacrifice what we are for what we could become’.
– Charles DuBois

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35 (Jakovljevic 1999: 11).
### Section 3. X - A Norman Soldier.  

THE SECOND GULF WAR PERFORMANCE: ‘War’s one of those things, don’t you think, where everyone always thinks they’re in the right, have you noticed that? Nobody ever says we’re the bad guys, we’re going to beat the shit out of the good guys’. – Caryl Churchill, ‘A Number’.  

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### XI - The Owl of Minerva, not yet spread its wings before the dusk.  

THE IMPORTANCE of DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY: ‘Lateral thinking is both an attitude and a method of using information ... with lateral thinking one is always trying to generate alternatives, to restructure patterns. It is not a matter of declaring the current pattern wrong or inadequate. Lateral thinking is never a judgement’. – Edward de Bono  

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### XII - Is it a Coelacanth skeleton?  

TURNER’S LIMINAL LEGACY – A FINAL THOUGHT ON ‘IMMERSION’: ‘All fish cannot be reached from the shore. For a fisherman to be complete, he must go upon the water’.  

– Ricky Noel Mitchell  

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### End page - An antique soldier’s helmet.  

‘Consider the little mouse, how sagacious an animal it is which never entrusts its life to one hole only’. – Titus Maccius Plautus  

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36 (Caryl Churchill 2007: 28).  
37 After Hegel.  


Heuer, R. J. (1999). The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. , CIA.


Consider the little mouse, how sagacious an animal it is which never entrusts its life to one hole only. –Titus Maccius Plautus