FAITH, RACE AND STRATEGY:

JAPANESE-MONGOLIAN RELATIONS, 1873-1945

This thesis is presented for the degree of
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(BA (Hons) Adelaide)
I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains as its main content work which has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary education institution.
ABSTRACT

Between 1873 and 1945 Japan and Mongolia had a complex and important relationship that has been largely overlooked in post-war studies of Japan’s imperial era. In fact, Japanese-Mongolian relations in the modern period provide a rich field of enquiry into the nature of Japanese imperialism as well as further evidence of the complexity of Japan’s relationships with other Asian countries in the decades before 1945. This thesis examines the relationship from the Japanese perspective, drawing on a diverse range of contemporary materials, both official and unofficial, including military documents, government reports, travel guides and academic works, many of which have been neglected in earlier studies. In previous analyses, the strategic dimension has been seen as overwhelming and Mongolia has often been regarded as merely a minor addendum to Japan’s relationship with Manchuria. In fact, however, Japan’s connection with Mongolia itself was a crucial part of its interaction with the Chinese continent from the 1870s to 1945. Though undeniably coveted for strategic reasons, Mongolia also offered unparalleled opportunities for the elaboration of all the major aspects of the discourses that made up Japan’s evolving claim to solidarity with and leadership of Asia. It also functioned as a showcase for Japan’s supposedly benevolent intentions towards Asia. In some ways, moreover, the relationship with Mongolia was presented as distinctive, particularly because of the common faith in Buddhism and a supposedly shared ancestry in ethnic terms. In turn, the military, political, ideological and cultural opportunities apparently provided by Mongolia account for the wide range of groups and individuals in Japan that developed Mongolian connections and for the often close relations between these groups and individuals on the one hand, and the most powerful institutions of the Japanese state on the other.
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CONVENTIONS

Chinese and Mongolian personal and place names are given in the main text in the Wade-Giles transliteration that was common in English-language sources produced during the period covered by this thesis. The Pinyin readings, with the appropriate characters, are found in the appendices. Transliteration of Mongol names follows Gaikō shiryōkan, Tokyo, ‘Mōko yōran’, November 1912, in Foreign Ministry papers, 1·6·1·57-1, ‘Mōko jōhō chōsa shoichi’. The appendix of personal names lists Chinese, Japanese and Russian individuals referred to in the thesis. Chinese characters are given for Chinese and Japanese names, and dates of birth and death are included whenever possible.

Macrons have been omitted over the long vowels in the text, and in English-language works in the footnotes and bibliography, in the commonly-encountered Japanese place names: Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto and Kobe.

Between 1928 and 1949, when the Nationalist Chinese government moved its capital to Nanking, Peking was known as ‘Peiping’. To avoid confusion, however, I have used ‘Peking’ throughout the thesis.
# ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>IMTFE</td>
<td>International Military Tribunal for the Far East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCWE</td>
<td><em>Japan Chronicle Weekly Edition</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>(Kwantung Army) Special Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMIRC</td>
<td>United States Military Intelligence Reports, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YS</td>
<td><em>Yomiuri shinbun</em></td>
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TIMELINE

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<tr>
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<th>Event</th>
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<td>Meiji Restoration</td>
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<td>1873</td>
<td>Buddhist monks from Nishi Honganji visit Inner and Outer Mongolia</td>
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<td>1879</td>
<td>Fukushima Yasumasa dispatched covertly to Inner Mongolia by Yamagata Aritomo</td>
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<td>1912</td>
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<td>1928</td>
<td>Japanese-Mongolian party rides on horseback from Manchuli to Tokyo to promote friendly relations between the two peoples</td>
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<td>Sept. 1931</td>
<td>Manchurian Incident</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar. 1932</td>
<td>Establishment of ‘Manchukuo’</td>
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<td>Jan. 1933</td>
<td>Kwantung Army occupies Jehol province, Inner Mongolia, and incorporates it into Manchukuo</td>
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<td>Nov. 1933</td>
<td>Zenrin kyōkai established in Tokyo</td>
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INTRODUCTION

In the years immediately following the Meiji Restoration, Japanese leaders struggled not only to modernise their country, but also to engage in new ways both with the dominant European powers and with the countries of their own region. In the case of the Western powers, the priority was to parry the threat they posed to Japan. At the same time, some members of the Japanese elites regarded East Asia as an area where Japan could perhaps carry out some imperialist projects of its own, or at least as a region in which Japan had important strategic and other objectives. One target area of Japanese ambition was ‘Mongolia’, an ambiguous geopolitical label that covered a vast swathe of sparsely populated territory strategically positioned between Russia and China. The term potentially included both Inner and Outer Mongolia, together with a number of other adjacent regions, stretching from the Hsingan Ranges in western Manchuria to the Altai Mountains in the west (bordering Kazakhstan), south as far as the Great Wall of China, only a few hundred kilometres from Peking, and north to the boundary between Russia and China.

Mongolia has usually been regarded by historians of modern Japan as, at best, a minor arena of Japanese activity on the Chinese continent in the years before 1945. Yet the history of Japanese activity there is just as rich a field of enquiry as corresponding activity in Manchuria has proved to be. Japanese soldiers, businessmen, religious leaders, scholars and others engaged in a wide array of projects in Mongolia in the modern period. Japanese activity in Mongolia before the 1930s, however, has attracted little notice among researchers, apart from Robert Valliant, who in 1972 examined the independence movements of the 1910s.\footnote{Robert B. Valliant, ‘Japanese Involvement in Mongolian Independence Movements, 1912-1919’, \textit{Mongolia Society Bulletin}, vol. 11, no. 2, 1972, pp. 1-32.} Subsequent scholarship
on the 1930s has at least recognised that when the Kwantung Army created the ‘new nation’ of ‘Manchukuo’ in 1932, it in fact aimed to construct a ‘Manchurian-Mongolian’ kingdom;\(^2\) but nevertheless, researchers have not seriously considered the attention paid by both military and civilian elites to the parts of Mongolia that lay outside the borders of Manchukuo. Contemporary sources show, on the other hand, that Japanese who were active in the region at the time usually intended considerable new portions of Mongolia to be added to Manchukuo,\(^3\) even if that goal was not realised. From at least the early twentieth century onwards, the conviction that Japan’s area of interest encompassed large parts of Mongolia as well as Manchuria was reflected in the frequent use in Japanese sources of the term ‘Man-Mō’, or ‘Manchuria-Mongolia’, to refer to a supposed single geographical entity whose exact boundaries underwent continual adjustment. To ignore Mongolia as a potential or actual part of ‘Man-Mō’ is thus to overlook the separate significance of Mongolia to Japanese military and civilian ideologues of the decades before 1945, and the distinctive nature of the Japanese experience there.

This thesis investigates the perceived significance of Mongolia for Japan in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. I demonstrate that between the 1870s and 1945, a variety of groups and individuals in Japan focused considerable attention on Mongolia. I seek to answer the question of how and why they did so, and how their activities impacted on the larger framework of Japanese policy in the region.


Mongolia in Historical Context

What today is known as the sovereign state of ‘Mongolia’, and was formerly termed the Mongolian People’s Republic or Outer Mongolia, is only one part of the far larger region that once covered more than three and a half million square kilometres of sparsely inhabited territory, roughly the same area as that of France and Germany combined (Figure 1). From 1644 until 1912 this territory was nominally ruled by the Ch’ing dynasty, and included both ‘Outer’ and ‘Inner’ Mongolia. ‘Outer Mongolia’ was the term applied (until the 1990s) to the more or less unified area occupied by the Khalkha Mongols in the north. Because of its geographical position, far enough from Peking to retain a semblance of independence, and its single tribal group, who could be relatively easily unified, this region was not completely dominated by the Manchu rulers of China and even achieved a degree of formal independence from the Ch’ing
empire in November 1911, shortly before the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty. Soviet Russia, however, was a powerful neighbour and from 1921 until 1990 Outer Mongolia was under its political sway.5

‘Inner Mongolia’ in the south, by contrast, had been ruled by a disparate group of Mongol princes since before the rise of the Ch’ing dynasty. Partly because of their proximity to Peking, these princes came more directly under Manchu control between 1644 and 1912. As for the composition of the population, Inner Mongolia was very varied in ethnic terms. Within its vast expanse there roamed a multitude of tribes: among them Kharachin, Khorchin, Chahar, Tumed and Ordos. Many of these peoples appended the word ‘Mongol’ to their name, as in ‘Chahar Mongol’, yet had a very weak sense of alliance with each other and of their relation to ‘Mongolia’ as an entity.6

Following the collapse of the Ch’ing empire in 1912, Inner Mongolia was first controlled by Han Chinese warlords and then by governors appointed by the Chinese Republican government. After seizing Manchuria in 1931-2, however, Japanese forces penetrated Inner Mongolia as part of an attempt to gain control of the region. This aim was largely achieved following the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, with the subsequent Japanese occupation of North China and the establishment of the Japanese-backed Inner Mongolian regime of ‘Mengchiang’. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Inner Mongolia was re-incorporated into China and now forms part of the People’s Republic of China.7 Throughout this thesis, I use

4 Tennyson Tan, Political Status of Mongolia, Shanghai: Mercury Press, 1932, p. 11.
the term ‘Mongolia’ to refer to the larger area known by this term during the Ch’ing dynasty (see Figure 1), using the terms ‘Outer Mongolia’ and ‘Inner Mongolia’ to distinguish between the northern and southern regions where necessary.

Long before the modern period, Mongolia had been a significant power in the region, and at the time of the great khans, from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries, it had been at the centre of the world stage. By the late seventeenth century, however, it was essentially a vassal state of Imperial China, with the Manchus pursuing a policy of ‘divide and rule’ over it. In the late nineteenth century, when Japanese elites were turning their attention to the region, Mongolia was a shadow of its former self, with its empire long gone. Nevertheless, nineteenth-century Mongolia was still perceived to occupy an important geo-political position, lying as it did between the advancing Tsarist Russian Empire of the Romanovs in the north and the decaying Ch’ing dynasty in the south. In practice, it was subject by that time to considerable influence from Russia as well as China. Meanwhile, the important border between Russia and the territory ostensibly controlled by the Ch’ing dynasty, including Mongolia, had been delineated by a series of treaties, notably the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, which fixed the boundary between the two, and the 1728 Treaty of Kyakhta, by which Tsarist Russia signalled its acceptance of the Ch’ing dynasty’s control over both Inner and Outer Mongolia.

Thus by the mid-nineteenth century, Mongolia had been largely reduced from a major power to a hotly contested buffer zone between Russia and China. It was into this equation that Japan advanced, tentatively during the latter part of the nineteenth century, but with more vigour from the beginning of the twentieth, as Japanese leaders pursued their own continental policies and goals. In short, the arrival of Japan turned the bilateral Romanov-Ch’ing tussle over borders into a trilateral contest, in which

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Japanese leaders sought to carve out their own sphere of influence, in the process challenging the perceived domains within Mongolia of their larger neighbours.\(^{10}\)

Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Japanese leaders negotiated a series of diplomatic agreements with Russia and China within which their objectives in Mongolia were first outlined and then confirmed. Elements within the Japanese military and political elites were, at times, united in the pursuit of their shared objective in Mongolia, namely either direct or indirect control of the region; when diplomatic means failed to achieve the desired ends, they resorted to military force. Japanese leaders, however, never considered their relations with Mongolia except as part of a complex web of objectives in the region as a whole. The attitude of the Japanese elites towards Mongolia is shown by the way in which they referred to the region: the conviction among certain groups that Japan should gain strategic control over Mongolia, in addition to Manchuria, was expressed from the 1910s onwards in Japanese sources, frequently through reference to the supposed region of ‘Man-Mô’.

The threat that Tsarist Russia and later the Soviet Union might pose to Japan’s perceived strategic goals was crucial in military thinking, particularly from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, as Russia expanded eastwards. Tsarist Russia had established a presence in Mongolia by the turn of the century, and used the excuse of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 to seize much of Manchuria as well. While official Japan’s attention, both military and diplomatic, was largely focused on Korea, the ‘dagger poised at the heart of Japan’,\(^{11}\) part of the problem for the Japanese government

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\(^{9}\) See Sanders, *Historical Dictionary of Mongolia*, pp. 177-8, 246-7, for further details.


was that Korea might be especially vulnerable in light of Russia’s expansion into Northeast Asia. Accordingly, from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 through to the catastrophic encounter in 1939 between Japanese and Soviet forces at Nomonhan on the Manchukuo-Outer Mongolian border, Japanese military leaders sought to gain control of the northwestern region of the Chinese continent to block their northern nemesis. The steps that the Japanese military took to ensure control first of Korea, and then later of Manchuria, have been well documented. The role that Mongolia played in this equation, however, particularly following the annexation of Korea in 1910, has usually been neglected.

Japan and Mongolia in the Modern Period

Between at least 1873 and 1945, a period of almost seventy-five years, a variety of Japanese groups was connected to Mongolia. After 1905, the most important of them was the Kwantung Army. Key figures within this force regarded Mongolia as a region of crucial strategic importance, especially in a period when neighbouring Manchuria was increasingly controlled by Japanese troops as a result of the Russo-Japanese War. From the 1870s onwards, however, other groups and individuals also worked actively to further relations between Japan and Mongolia, and to raise the profile of Mongolia within Japan, employing official, semi-official and non-official channels and engaging in a range of discourses and activities that could be classed as ‘cultural diplomacy’. They included business groups, certain academics, right-wing political activists and Buddhist leaders. After 1905, their activities functioned to strengthen Japanese control

12 For example, Conroy, Japanese Seizure of Korea; Duus, Abacus and the Sword; Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria; Takehiko Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963; James B.
in Mongolia, and to reinforce its legitimacy by providing a non-military face to the Japanese presence there. These groups often sympathized with the military’s expansionist aims. Yet, they had their own separate agendas as well.

Japanese groups connected to Mongolia produced a variety of documents and records. The range of such writings provides strong evidence that Mongolia was more than just a region of minor importance to be absorbed, if possible, into the growing Japanese empire. Some in Japan believed that ties of race, culture, history, religion and custom bound the Mongols and Japanese closely together. The evidence extends from the romantic musings of Meiji politician Suematsu Kenchō, with his theories that Genghis Khan had actually been Japanese, through to the extensive research done by academics such as the anthropologist Torii Ryūzō and the Sinologist Shiratori Kurakichi into the nature of the relationship between the two peoples. The eventual outcome of this emphasis on the ties between Japan and Mongolia was an assertion from some quarters that it was the ‘sacred duty’ of the Japanese to rescue their ‘brothers’ from their current state of oppression by the Han Chinese or Russians, either Tsarist or Soviet. Major-General Doihara Kenji of the Kwantung Army, at the time Mukden Special Intelligence Agency chief, dramatically articulated this view in late 1935, when he stated that it was Japan’s mission to save the Mongols. Such a view certainly justified Japanese intervention in Mongolia, but even during the 1930s and


1940s, the Japanese presence there was not solely military in character; it also sought to provide the Mongols and others with medical assistance and educational support, for example.

Japanese military and non-military activities in Mongolia, in fact, were closely intertwined and, by the 1930s, even interdependent. Such interdependence is shown most clearly in the establishment in 1933 of the Zenrin kyōkai (Good Neighbour Association), an ostensibly humanitarian organisation that was the chief means through which Japan’s semi-official cultural diplomacy was implemented in Mongolia in the 1930s and 1940s. Given Mongolia’s position, sandwiched between Russia and China, and the long-term tensions between Japan and both of those countries, such cultural diplomacy was arguably necessary or at least desirable. Any overt move by Japanese forces to seize Mongolia might well have destabilised the region and worked against Japanese ambitions for it. The Japanese military did in fact make a number of covert attempts to seize Mongolia, especially in the decade after the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty in 1912 and again in the 1930s, but these attempts were always handled in such a way that ‘official’ Japanese involvement could be denied.

The Zenrin kyōkai represents a synthesis of the various groups — military, religious, academic and other — that sought to increase Japanese control over Mongolia. It undertook a range of activities in Inner Mongolia, including the provision of medical services and educational opportunities to the Inner Mongol population of Chahar and Suiyuan provinces, beginning at a point when these areas were still technically under Han Chinese Republican rule. Like the South Manchurian Railway Company Research Department, it appears to have attracted a number of idealistic young Japanese to live and work in the region,\(^6\) and it also engaged in a concerted campaign to educate the Japanese reading public about the importance of Mongolia to Japan. Yet the
Zenrin kyōkai has largely eluded attention in scholarly comment on Japan’s forays into Inner Mongolia, and when it has been mentioned, it is in passing and with the suggestion that it was merely a front for the intelligence-gathering activities of the Kwantung Army.\textsuperscript{17} While there is no doubt that the Zenrin kyōkai was used to gather information, to dismiss it as simply a front ignores its other, less military, activities. As this thesis will show, the Zenrin kyōkai represented the fusion of at least two broad groupings that wished to further the Japanese claim to Mongolia, the military and the religious. It also attracted the attention of academics, business groups and politicians. As such, it is crucial to our understanding of how Japanese groups and individuals with ambitions in Mongolia coalesced and, at times, acted together.

As we have seen, Mongolia attracted Japanese leaders and various kinds of activists for a number of reasons. Mongolia’s military significance has been well recognised. Both in retrospect and in contemporary Japanese perceptions, however, the military dimension is broader than has usually been acknowledged. Most scholarly analyses concentrate on fairly narrow issues of strategy,\textsuperscript{18} whereas in fact, Japanese Army operations in Mongolia are also of considerable importance for historians seeking to understand the actual conduct of the military in the pre-war period. Japanese military actions in Mongolia appear, for example, to have provided a model in some respects for later actions elsewhere. A notable case in point is instances of ‘gekokujō’.

\textsuperscript{16} See Young, \textit{Japan’s Total Empire}, pp. 241-303.
or ‘overthrow of the senior by the junior’, which plagued Japan’s military and political hierarchies in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Well-known examples included the assassination of the Manchurian warlord Chang Tso-lin in 1928 and the Manchurian Incident of September 1931, both engineered by elements of the Kwantung Army, as well as the various attempted military coups at home that continued through to the 26 February Incident in 1936. There has been extensive research into the phenomenon of gekokujō and its impact on developments within Japan.¹⁹ Its origins are usually held to lie in the factional politics of the military, in which the Tōsei-ha (Control faction) and Kōdō-ha (Imperial Way faction) competed to gain control of the military decision-making process; most historians would thus emphasise the importance of the 1930s. I do not dispute this explanation. I do, however, highlight the earlier instances of gekokujō found during the Japanese-sponsored Manchurian-Mongolian independence movements of 1912 and 1916 and the Siberian Intervention of 1918-22. I argue that these actions established the pattern of ‘patriotic’ insubordination by officers in the field, as well as a willingness by senior officers to ignore such instances of insubordination when it suited them, well before the assassination of Chang Tso-lin in 1928.

In terms of contemporary perceptions, Mongolia was an integral part of Japanese military thinking in another way that is often overlooked: as a source of horses, which were then a basic military requirement. Until the Second World War, and even after, armies relied heavily on horsepower to move men and supplies across large distances in order to maintain empires. Cavalry also served as ‘shock’ troops used to break up

resistance within empires, as well as to carry out long-range reconnaissance of enemy movements. Mongolia had been famous for its horses since the time of Genghis Khan, with the smaller Mongolian horses being sturdier than their European counterparts, as well as seemingly untiring. In addition, the Mongolian horse was not only able to survive in far colder climates than other breeds, it was also able to feed itself even in deep winter, using its hooves to uncover grass up to fifty centimetres under the snow.

This ability to forage for itself would make the Mongolian horse an ideal mount for the Japanese military in the event of an assault on the inhospitable Russian Far East, as an attacking force would have been less troubled by the need to supply forage for its horses. As this thesis will illustrate, there is ample evidence that in the decade prior to the Manchurian Incident of September 1931, as well as earlier, the capacity of Mongolia to meet the Japanese Army’s need for mounts was thoroughly examined by the Army General Staff.

Mongolia’s significance for Japanese leaders, however, went well beyond military and strategic considerations. I will show that Japanese ambitions in Mongolia began far earlier than the creation of the Kwantung Army, and were not limited to any particular group in Japan. In fact, almost immediately following the Meiji Restoration, and the lifting of the ban on travel abroad, Japanese visitors to the Chinese continent penetrated deep into Mongolia. On their return to Japan, a number of these travellers came to hold important positions in the Japanese military, political, academic and religious worlds, and were therefore able to influence Japanese thinking in a range of areas. By the 1930s, the cultural ramifications of a close relationship between Japan


and Mongolia were at the heart of the project to present Japan as the natural leader of Asia: Mongolia was by then integral to broad Japanese claims of cultural, political and religious solidarity with the peoples of the region.

Throughout the period covered by this thesis, both military and non-military groups and individuals attempted to portray Japan’s relationship with Mongolia as a special one. In truth, the claim was not entirely without foundation. Mongolia did indeed have a distinctive connection with Japan, and thus it offered significant opportunities for Japanese propaganda to exploit. Moreover, there were also particular conditions in Mongolia that made it easier for Japanese forces to exert control, and these, too, were thoroughly exploited. The chief features favouring the success of Japanese efforts to control Mongolia were the existence of politically active individuals and groups seeking independence from Han Chinese authority; the practice of Buddhism, as in Japan; and a supposedly shared racial heritage with Japan.

Taken together, these and other circumstances differentiated Mongolia from Japan’s other colonies and spheres of influence, allowing the construction of a distinctive discourse about the past, present and future of Japanese-Mongolian relations. Accordingly, Japanese ideologues of all kinds presented the connection as fundamentally different from the relationship Japan had with other countries in the region. Their claims rested in part on a pseudo-scientific basis that was strongly influenced by Social Darwinism: thus, leading Japanese academics claimed that the Mongols and Japanese were genetically related, and that the two peoples shared a number of distinctive traits that made them superior to other Asians. Other groups subsequently hijacked this theory and used it to champion the idea that the historic ‘decline’ of the Mongols, which was supposedly both caused and demonstrated by Han

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22 See, for example, Shiratori, *Tō-A bunka ronshū*. 
Chinese discrimination against them, could only be halted through Japanese intervention and support.\textsuperscript{23}

To an extent, then, discourses about Japan’s relationship with Mongolia resembled those elaborated to justify Japanese domination of Korea. In his analysis of this topic, Peter Duus highlights a marked emphasis on the shared history and shared cultural heritage of the Japanese and Korean peoples.\textsuperscript{24} In the case of Mongolia, however, there were extra elements. One was an apparent religious affinity that prompted leading religious figures to seek to forge closer ties between Japanese and Mongolian Buddhism at a number of points.\textsuperscript{25} Although Korea was also Buddhist, this fact does not appear to have been emphasised, for whatever reason, by those Japanese who called for greater control of Korea, judging from Duus’ analysis. Other aspects of discourses on Mongolia that differed from those on Korea included the need to assist indigenous activists to break away from Chinese control and a distinct tendency to romanticise the region, which contrasts starkly with the pessimistic views of Korea described by Duus. Moreover, while Japanese writers regarded the Koreans, as well as the Chinese, as ‘dirty’ and ‘uncivilised’,\textsuperscript{26} the Mongols were never portrayed in this fashion. Instead, the Mongols were usually presented as a people exhibiting a kind of faded nobility, a nobility that could be restored with Japanese help. While the Chinese, too, were sometimes presented as representatives of a great civilisation that had now declined, such images were often paired with highly contemptuous descriptions:

\textsuperscript{23} See, for example, Major-General Doihara Kenji’s pronouncement, quoted in Stein, \textit{Far East in Ferment}, pp. 162-3.
\textsuperscript{24} See Duus, \textit{Abacus and the Sword}, pp. 397-423.
various epithets linking the Chinese with pigs, for example, had circulated since the late nineteenth century.27 It is striking that Japanese writers did not describe the Mongols in this insulting manner. Perhaps the urge to distinguish them from the Han Chinese, and ultimately to separate the two peoples politically, provided an impetus to treat the Mongols with more respect on a rhetorical level.

The overall point is that favourable concrete conditions combined with powerful rhetorical arguments to raise the profile of Mongolia in Japan, and diversify Japanese activities in Mongolia. The relationship, however, was not just a matter of top-down Japanese exploitation of a passive Mongolian populace. At least some level of cooperation from the Mongols was always needed to legitimise the Japanese presence, given the sensitivity of Mongolia’s location and the realities of power politics in the region. Moreover, on occasions, Mongol leaders actively sought Japanese aid, either tangible, in the form of arms, munitions and money, or intangible, as in the provision of education, or diplomatic recognition of Mongolia. The case of Mongolia thus confirms the recent trend in studies of Japanese imperialism and colonialism towards recognition of the complexity of Japan’s relationships with other Asian countries in the decades before 1945.28 While Japan’s engagement with Mongolia was unequally balanced in terms of power, it was also one in which certain Mongols played an active part, pursuing their own agendas with varying degrees of success.

Moreover, a closer examination of the networks that supported Japanese actions in Mongolia serves to illustrate the mechanisms through which Japanese expansionism operated more generally. This was not necessarily evident at the time in question. As noted above, official Japanese ambitions relating to Mongolia were furthered not

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just by the military, but also by a variety of civilian agents, both as individuals and in
groups. Such agents, however, operated away from the spotlight and received
comparatively little international attention, at least prior to the 1930s. In this respect,
Japanese actions in Mongolia are distinct from those in Taiwan, Korea or Manchuria,
which attracted notice almost from the very beginning. Furthermore, the groups and
individuals active in Mongolia were often ‘lone wolves’, operating with less supervision
than was the norm in other parts of Japan’s expanding imperial domain. Nevertheless,
they were often highly integrated with establishment institutions and figures at home,
who sponsored and encouraged their activities. Japan’s relationship with Mongolia,
then, provides a good case study in that it lays bare the mechanisms through which
Japanese imperialism was supported and furthered from the early Meiji period to the
end of the Second World War.

While the specific goals of those members of the Japanese elites who were
attracted to Mongolia varied, certain elements remained constant. One was
undoubtedly an appreciation of the strategic value of the region. Another factor was a
more or less romantic notion of the physical nature of Mongolia, of its history, and its
supposed past and future connections with Japan through shared ethnicity, religion and
perhaps a common political destiny. From the early twentieth century through until
the end of the Second World War, Japanese visitors to Mongolia, whether travelling for
military, business or academic purposes, were keen to pass on what they had
experienced, and thus wrote of their travels for an audience back home. While most of
the visitors were men, a few women, as we will see, also played prominent roles in the
construction, promotion and dissemination in Japan of the romantic myth about
Mongolia, suggesting, through their endeavours, that Japanese women could play an

28 See Sandra Wilson, ‘Bridging the Gaps: New Views of Japanese Colonialism,
active part within the mythologised terrain that apparently constituted Mongolia. Mark Elliot has noted that Japanese authors in the 1930s and 1940s tended to produce romanticised accounts of ‘Man-Mô’, portraying it as a land of abundance and opportunity, but this trend was already evident at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Moreover, Mongolia seemed to many Japanese observers to be a virtually unclaimed land. Throughout the period examined in this thesis, Japanese sources refer often to the vast expanse of sparsely inhabited territory that was Mongolia, suggesting that size and relative emptiness formed part of the attraction of the region to Japanese eyes. At a time when Japan was perceived to be overpopulated, Mongolia was widely imagined, in much the same way that Manchuria was, as a vast, lush, uninhabited paradise into which the overflow of the Japanese populace could spill. While in the case of Manchuria such a perception was partly false, given the Han Chinese population of around thirty million as well as the presence of many Koreans by the 1930s, it was more accurate in relation to Mongolia. Population estimates for Mongolia in the early twentieth century are sketchy, but one source puts the 1912 Mongol population of Inner Mongolia at less than one million, and it is unlikely that the population of Outer Mongolia was significantly larger than this at the time.

Apart from the lure of wide, open spaces, the structure of the Mongol administrative system, with its ‘leagues’ and ‘banners’, that is, the administrative

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regions through which Mongolia was ruled, may have attracted Japanese observers as a nostalgic echo of their own pre-Meiji Restoration political system, with its fiefs and liege lords. In addition, the sense of romance surrounding Mongolia is often connected with horses: there is a common image of a lone horseman riding across the endless plains, and horses also feature strongly in references to Genghis Khan and his horde. Some Meiji leaders in particular may even have seen the Mongol people themselves as romantic, ‘noble horsemen’. Certainly, the idea that the Mongols and the Mongolian horse were in some way important to Japan has found voice in the writings of the well-known historian and archeologist Egami Namio. Having done his fieldwork in Mongolia in the 1930s and 1940s, Egami produced a controversial book in 1967 entitled *Kiba minzoku kokka: Nihon kodaishi e no apurochi* (The People of the Horseriding Nation: An Approach to Ancient Japanese History), in which he argued that the Mongols and their horses had played a vital role in the development of prehistoric Japan.\(^\text{32}\) Whichever elements of the discourse were uppermost for any individual observer, it is clear from the evidence that the romantic lure of Mongolia drifted through the corridors of power and elsewhere in Japan from the 1870s to the end of the Second World War, if not beyond.\(^\text{33}\) It can still be felt today: Egami’s book remains in print and is in its sixth paperback edition.

In order to examine Japan’s relationship with Mongolia from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, it is necessary first to clarify exactly what ‘Mongolia’ was considered to be. By the second decade of the twentieth century the compound ‘Man-Mō’ appeared frequently in Japanese-language materials, whether official or

otherwise, but its exact meaning was by no means fixed. The geographical area perceived to be encompassed by the term was constantly in a state of flux and could change within the space of a single paragraph in any one source, allowing both writers and readers to make their own interpretations of what it meant. The fluidity of this term provides a useful indication that Japanese objectives in Mongolia were unstable and constantly evolving. By the same token, the periodic attempts by contemporary Japanese writers to determine what was meant by ‘Man-Mō’ often seem to reflect official or other Japanese claims as to what constituted Japan’s rightful sphere of influence in the region. Accordingly, any discussion of this point of terminology relates in significant ways to a larger geopolitical context.

The Region of ‘Man-Mō’

At the beginning of the twentieth century a number of different labels were applied simultaneously to the region of the Ch’ing empire north of the Great Wall. As we have seen, the geopolitical construct often termed ‘Mongolia’ was further divided into ‘Inner Mongolia’ (also known as ‘Southern Mongolia’) and ‘Outer Mongolia’ (also known as ‘Northern Mongolia’), the latter being the region that achieved nominal independence from the Ch’ing empire in November 1911. Moreover, the Ch’ing, and later Republican, geographical construct of ‘Mongolia’ was further complicated by the simultaneous use of the term ‘Eastern Mongolia’ to refer to the eastern regions of both Inner and Outer Mongolia, and by the fact that ‘Eastern Mongolia’ contained some provinces that had been established in the late Ch’ing dynasty and others created by Republican China. In both cases the authorities had established these provinces in an attempt to bring the region more directly under central control, first of the Ch’ing and

then of the Han Chinese regime. At the same time, the older, Mongolian governing structures also remained in place.

In 1907, the Ch’ing administration created the three provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin and Fengtien, in the area that was the homeland of the Manchus and was known by both Westerners and Han Chinese as ‘Manchuria’. The aim was not only to bring the northeastern region of the empire under more direct control, but also to counter Tsarist Russian expansion. Despite the establishment of these provinces, the existing Mongolian administrative structure of leagues and banners remained in place in Heilungkiang and Fengtien (see Figure 2). Then, in 1914, the government of Republican China divided ‘Inner Mongolia’ into the four ‘special administrative districts’ of Ninghsia, Suiyuan, Chahar and Jehol (see Figure 3). Fourteen years later, in 1928, these districts were formally recognised by the Republican Chinese government as fully-fledged provinces. While the four new provinces were now technically under central control, once again, alongside the Republican administration there continued to exist the older, Mongolian governing structures through which the Mongol princes maintained some control, even after the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty in 1912. The overlap of either Ch’ing control or Republican administration at the national level with the Mongol leagues and banners at the local level resulted in confusion in the geographical terms used for parts of the region, a confusion that was subsequently both reflected and exploited by the Japanese elites as they sought to implement Japanese control there.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, Japanese occupation in the region covered only a comparatively small part of Southern Manchuria, an area of some 3,500 square kilometres located on the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula, known as the Kwantung

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34 See Elliot, ‘Limits of Tartary’, pp. 603-46, for further discussion of this point.
Leased Territory.  From this perch, gained by Japan following its victory over Tsarist Russia in the war of 1904-5, Japanese observers looked north towards the area of Manchuria that Russia had occupied during the Boxer Rebellion, which remained under Russian control even after 1905.

Even before the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese observers had already coined the term ‘Man-Mô’.  The term was applied to a geographically vague area including both Manchuria and Mongolia, although how much of either was unclear.  Over the course of the two decades following Japan’s victory over Russia, the area encompassed by the term changed, so that for some observers it came to include the Mongol leagues and banners within Jehol province, lying to the west of Manchuria.  The area covered by the term grew even larger to include, by the 1920s, sections of Suiyuan and Chahar, even further to the west. By 1915, as W. G. Beasley has noted, Manchuria and Inner Mongolia were ‘customarily elided in Japanese drafting’, with the compound ‘Man-Mô’ commonly used by Japanese officials.  It is significant that the term ‘Man-Mô’ or ‘Manchuria-Mongolia’ is found only in Japanese sources, unlike ‘Manchuria’, a label found also in Chinese and Western sources.  This suggests that, consciously or otherwise, the term ‘Man-Mô’ was associated with Japanese interests and, ultimately, Japanese imperialism.

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37 For an early use, see ‘Irohabin’, *Yomiuri shinbun*, 6 December 1903, p. 2.
Figure 2: Map of Manchuria and adjacent regions showing Chinese provinces in the late Ch’ing/Republican era, with Mongol leagues and banners shaded, adapted from Owen Lattimore, The Mongols of Manchuria: Their Tribal Divisions, Geographical Distribution, Historical Relations with Manchus and Chinese, and Present Political Problems, New York: John Day, 1934, reprinted New York: Howard Fertig, 1969, p. 14.
Figure 3: Map of North China, showing the provinces established in 1928, with areas of significant Mongol population shaded. The names of the four new provinces are underlined, and the position of the Great Wall is marked.

It is possible to encounter widely different interpretations of what ‘Man-Mô’ encompassed in contemporary sources written even over the short space of twenty years or so. Furthermore, the label appears sometimes to overlap with other terms, such as ‘Inner Mongolia’ and ‘Eastern Mongolia’. In other words, the fluid nature of the term ‘Man-Mô’ allowed it to be applied to an area of territory that always included ‘Manchuria’, but also covered a varying portion of ‘Mongolia’. All three terms — ‘Man-Mô’, ‘Inner Mongolia’ and ‘Eastern Mongolia’ — included parts of Mongolia that certain representatives of the Japanese government and military, and some outside the state, presumably sought to claim as Japan’s sphere of influence, although often with no clear definition of what precise area was encompassed. Widely differing

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39 For examples of the different labels used to describe the region, see A. M. Pooley, Japan’s Foreign Policies, p. 77, quoted in C. Walter Young, Japan’s Special Position in Manchuria, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1931, reprinted New York:
perceptions of what the region covered can be seen in Figures 4 to 8 inclusive, which I have drawn to represent the various opinions in the sources discussed in this section. The approximate position of the Great Wall is shown on each map, because both Chinese and Westerners regarded the wall as the boundary between ‘China proper’ and the region outside, a point to which Japanese writers would repeatedly draw attention as well.

In scholarly works as well as contemporary materials, the label ‘Man-Mō’ is used differently, largely reflecting the different time periods studied. For example, Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka notes that during the early years of the South Manchurian Railway Company (founded in 1906), when Japanese commentators used either the technically narrower term ‘Manshū’ (Manchuria), or the more expansive ‘Man-Mō’, they included, to all intents and purposes, certain sections of ‘Eastern Mongolia’, that is, those parts lying in North Manchuria. What this meant, according to Matsusaka, was that the terms ‘Manshū’ and ‘Man-Mō’ both referred to the region encompassing the three provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin and Fengtien, within which lay part of ‘Eastern Mongolia’. Thus there was no real difference between the area covered by the two terms, so that ‘Man-Mō’ equalled ‘Manchuria’ at this time. As there were Mongol leagues and banners within the borders of Heilungkiang and Fengtien provinces in ‘Manchuria’, this position is technically correct: the area in question was simultaneously both ‘Manchuria’ and ‘Mongolia’.

According to Gavan McCormack, however, by the autumn of 1921 Japanese politicians and military leaders considered the term ‘Man-Mō’ to comprise not only the

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three provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin and Fengtien, but also the ‘special administrative districts’ of Jehol, Chahar and Suiyuan, created in 1914, within which were also found Mongol leagues and banners. This amounts to a far larger region. Adding even more confusion to the term ‘Man-Mö’, Onon Urgunge and Derrick Pritchatt, when writing about the period after the end of the Ch’ing dynasty in 1912, imply that Eastern Mongolia and Northern Manchuria were one and the same region, an accurate observation, to the extent that within this region there existed concurrently both Manchurian provinces and Mongolian leagues and banners, particularly within Heilungkiang province.

Thus, the term ‘Man-Mö’ encompasses different regions according to the writer and the period. The ambiguity of the geopolitical labels given to the region can be seen in the writings of the famous Japanese poet Yosano Akiko about her 1912 journey along the Trans-Siberian Railway, in which she referred to the town of ‘Manchuli’ as being in Outer Mongolia. Manchuli, however, clearly lay within the northern part of Manchuria on most maps, at least in 1930, when her book was published. The failure of the Japanese authorities to properly define what they meant by ‘Man-Mö’ was specifically noted by Owen Lattimore in the early 1930s.

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44 Yosano Satoru and Yosano Akiko, *Man-Mö yüki*, Tökyö: Osaka yagō shoten, 1930, p. 133. The map at the front of Tō-A shinzen kijōkai (ed.), *Nichi-Man-Mōkan chōto kijō tettei sanzen ri*, Tökyö: Tō-A shinzen kijōkai, 1929, also places Manchuli in Mongolia, indicating that Yosano was not alone in making this assertion.
In short, unless a contemporary source gives a clear definition of the term, modern readers must be cautious about what is designated by ‘Man-Mō’, and acknowledge that the fluid nature of the label allowed different groups to work on the basis of different understandings. More importantly, as noted above, the discussion of what constituted ‘Man-Mō’ was not simply a matter of geographical labels. Throughout much of the pre-1945 period, the instability in meaning of this term was determined in part by the political and imperialist nature of Japan’s relationship with the region, as state authorities and others sought, under shifting circumstances, to delineate what they saw as Japan’s proper sphere of influence.

That there was always a fair degree of confusion as to what the different terms meant is apparent, for example, from reports of Diet deliberations relating to Japanese railway construction in ‘Eastern Mongolia’ in May 1915, with a Diet member asking what was ‘the line of demarcation in Eastern Mongolia?’46 In context, the focus at this time by some Diet members on ‘Eastern Mongolia’ and their desire to clarify the meaning of the term suggests they considered the region to be important to Japan’s continental ambitions, especially in connection with railway construction, at this point one of the principal means of imperial expansion.47 The same sense of uncertainty about the geographical labels was echoed shortly after, in press reports concerning a planned visit in the summer of 1915 by a group of Tokyo high school students to the region. One report commented that ‘Perhaps the students will succeed in locating

Eastern Inner Mongolia, about the position of which there was recently so much uncertainty expressed in the Diet’. 48

Figure 4: Torii Ryûzô’s perception of ‘Eastern Mongolia’, 1915.

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48 ‘Students’ Educational Tour – Visit to China’, *Japan Chronicle Weekly Edition*, 15 July 1915, p. 120.
Figure 5: Torii Ryūzō’s perception of Japan’s sphere of influence in ‘Inner Mongolia’, 1928.

Figure 6: Kawase Tatsuo’s perception of ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’, 1926.
Neither was there a fixed view among academics as to how to define ‘Inner Mongolia’ and ‘Eastern Mongolia’. In July 1915, the year of the question in the Diet
mentioned above, Torii Ryūzō, the pioneer Japanese anthropologist and a Mongolist on par with the American Owen Lattimore, attempted to elucidate the term ‘Man-Mō’. In so doing, he explained that what Japan called ‘Eastern Mongolia’ was actually the same as ‘Inner Mongolia’. Torii’s assertion that ‘Eastern Mongolia’ and ‘Inner Mongolia’ were interchangeable is problematic, as ‘Inner Mongolia’ traditionally includes Suiyuan and Ninghsia provinces, which are not in the east of Mongolia by any stretch of the imagination. Torii claimed, as part of his explanation, that Japan had a ‘relation’ or ‘connection’ (kankei) with four of the six leagues within Inner Mongolia, namely the Cherim, Chosotu, Chao-Uda and Silingol leagues, located in Jehol and the northern half of Chahar provinces (see Figure 4). His omission here of Suiyuan and Ninghsia was most likely because, with Diet deliberations and news reports discussing the apparent confusion surrounding the meaning of ‘Eastern Mongolia’ and ‘Inner Mongolia’, Torii’s focus was only on the area adjacent to Manchuria. Possibly, in asserting that Japan had ‘ties’ with parts of Inner Mongolia, Torii was implying that Japan had a potential economic or political claim that stretched, or should stretch, deep into the then ‘special administrative region’ of Chahar. Torii was an important individual in Japanese academia, whose career extended from the 1890s to 1953. He eventually became Professor of Anthropology at Tokyo Imperial University, the apex of Japan’s academic world; and he had an ongoing relationship with both the Japanese Army and the Foreign Ministry. Thus his pronouncements as to what ‘Man-Mō’ encompassed may have carried particular weight.

Nevertheless, even Torii’s own definition of ‘Eastern’ or ‘Inner’ Mongolia did not remain unchanged. In 1928 he stated that of the six leagues that comprised Inner

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Mongolia, only three, Cherim, Chosotu and Chao-Uda, all located in Jehol province, were part of ‘Japan’s so-called sphere of influence’ (Nihon no iwayuru seiryoku han-i) in the region\(^5\) (see Figure 5). Compared with the area that Torii had earlier claimed as having a ‘relation’ or ‘connection’ with Japan, the Silingol league in Chahar province was removed. It seems probable that the change in Torii’s position was influenced by views circulating among military and political elites as to the extent of Japan’s proper sphere of influence, as discussed below, a factor that may also have shaped his position in 1915.

On the other hand, Kawase Tatsuo, in his 1926 *Shina oyobi Shina mondai jiten* (A Dictionary of China and the China Problem), defined ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ as ‘the eastern region of Inner Mongolia’, and included within his definition much of Chahar province, including the part below the Great Wall\(^5\) (see Figure 6). While Kawase’s background and position at the time of publication are not known, in the Foreword he acknowledged the help given him by Okano Masujirö\(^5\), an advisor to the Chinese warlord Wu P’ei-fu. Okano had ties to the Japanese military,\(^5\) and although not conclusive, his links to Kawase suggest that Kawase himself may have either been a former military man or have had other links to the military.

Kawase claimed that, ‘Generally speaking, what Japanese mean when they talk about Inner Mongolia, in the context of “Man-Mō”, is this “Eastern Inner Mongolia”.’\(^5\) Kawase’s perception of what ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ comprised was significantly

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54 Kawase, *Shina oyobi Shina mondai jiten*, Foreword, p. 2; on Wu, see Wou, *Militarism in Modern China*, pp. 240-2.
larger than the region that Torii had delineated in either 1915 or 1928. Moreover, while there is no direct evidence that Kawase regarded the area covered by his definition as a potential Japanese ‘sphere of influence’, it seems probable that he did. Books of this nature, that is, those dealing with areas that were ‘problematic’ for Japan, seem usually to have been produced with a specific agenda in mind, often in order to lay claim to a region that the author considered should be brought under Japanese control. Kawase’s probable connection with the military makes it even more likely that he wrote with some such purpose in mind.

Nor was Kawase alone in his assertion that Chahar province fell within ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’. A year later, in a book discussing the railway system of Manchuria and Mongolia, Ōshima Yokichi made a similar claim. Ōshima had carried out intelligence-gathering missions in Mongolia for the Japanese Army prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, served as a member of one of the special operations teams (tokubetsu ninmuha) dispatched during the war for espionage and sabotage, and subsequently published a book about these operations.

This, however, was not the final word on the matter. Even the Japanese Army itself offered different interpretations of the area considered to be Japan’s ‘sphere of influence’ in this region, as shown by two examples from the early 1930s. In March 1931, six months prior to the Manchurian Incident, the Army General Staff produced a lengthy secret report outlining the strategic importance of Suiyuan and Chahar and openly asserting the need to seize control of both provinces to facilitate a possible strike either north into Outer Mongolia, or west, deeper into the Han Chinese Republic.
The report stated on the very first page that ‘Chahar and Suiyuan provinces, together with Jehol province, are the so-called Inner Mongolia’59 (see Figure 7), a view that would not have been particularly unusual, except for the omission of Ninghsia. Why the army omitted Ninghsia from its definition of ‘Inner Mongolia’ is not known. What is notable, however, is that the Army General Staff identified the need for Japanese control of this large area. Rather than focusing its military ambitions on ‘Man-Mō’ as usually defined, which generally would not extend west of Chahar, the Army General Staff had apparently begun to consider the strategic importance of a far more extensive region, namely ‘Inner Mongolia’, which in this case included Suiyuan and Chahar provinces if not Ninghsia.

An alternative and much more restricted definition, however, was offered just two months later, in May 1931, when former Major-General Satō Yasunosuke, writing for a general audience on ‘Sino-Japanese Relations with a Focus on the Manchuria-Mongolia Problem’, asserted that although most Japanese took the term ‘Man-Mō’ to mean Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, in actuality the term applied only to Manchuria60 (see Figure 8). It will be recalled that this was a tenable position, insofar as ‘Manchuria’ included some Mongol leagues and banners. Satō had served as the representative of the Japanese Army General Staff at the Peking Consulate-General just prior to the overthrow of the Ch‘ing dynasty in 1912, and a few years later had acted as the go-between in negotiating Japanese government loans to a number of Mongolian princes, before moving into journalism.61 It is highly unlikely that a former officer of Satō’s background and senior position would have produced such a statement about the

59 Ibid., p. 1.
60 Satō Yasunosuke, Nisshi kankei: Man-Mō mondai o chūshin to suru, Tōkyō: Nihon hyōronsha, 1931, p. 23.
limits of ‘Man-Mō’ without solid reason. The inference is that one aim of his book was to ‘define’ the army’s goal at that particular stage, only four months before the Manchurian Incident, perhaps restricting the area claimed to one that could reasonably be seized at one time.

Scholarly Context

Most scholars who have considered Japan’s relationship with Mongolia before 1945 have focused on how the region was positioned strategically vis-à-vis Manchuria, and hence how it affected Japanese strategic aims there.62 This is an important but limited factor. For one thing, as I will illustrate, Japanese ambitions in Mongolia were much broader than such a view suggests. Even before the region began to attract military attention at the end of the nineteenth century, religious, cultural, academic and economic considerations had already spurred certain groups and individuals in Japan actively to seek ties with Mongolia.

Moreover, many scholars of Japan’s relationship with Manchuria do not in fact pay much attention at all to the impact of Mongolia on Japanese ambitions there. Sadako Ogata, Gavan McCormack, Louise Young and Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, for example, have all examined aspects of Japan’s relations with Manchuria before 1945 without making substantive reference to Mongolia.63 As noted in some detail above, however, Japanese observers during the period under examination did not actually view Manchuria and Mongolia as distinct geographical regions, but usually grouped them together instead into the geographically amorphous entity known as ‘Man-Mō’.

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62 See, for example, Sow-Theng Leong, Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917-1926, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1976, pp. 75-86; Coox, Nomonhan, pp. 3-11, 22-3.
Accordingly, examining Japanese ambitions in Manchuria without considering Mongolia is inadequate as an approach.

Some research has specifically considered the role of Mongolia in Japan’s continental policy, but invariably the focus has been limited to a particular aspect or period. For example, S. T. Leong discussed the official Japanese stance on Mongolia in his examination of Sino-Soviet relations, but only for the period between 1917 and 1926 and, of course, with a principal focus on the relationship between China and Russia. Nakami Tatsuo has written extensively on Japanese-Mongolian relations, but has concentrated on the period around the fall of the Ch’ing dynasty in 1911-12, and in particular on the role played by the Mongol prince, Güngsangnorbu. Narangoa Li’s study of the links between Japanese imperialism and Mongolian Buddhism has dealt chiefly with attempts by the Japanese military during the 1930s and 1940s to subvert Mongolian Buddhism for its own ends. As all of these works treat quite specific topics, they have limited capacity to consider developments over time, and the interplay among the different organisations and individuals involved in Japan’s relationship with Mongolia. The full complexity of that relationship therefore remains obscured.

From the Mongolian point of view, Uradyn E. Bulag has charted Japan’s contribution to the development of nationalism in both Inner and Outer Mongolia.

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64 Leong, *Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations*.
during the 1911 Chinese Revolution and again during the 1930s.67 Mongolian historian Baabar (Bat-Erdene Batbayar) has discussed the contribution of Japan’s ties with Outer Mongolia to the development of Mongolia as a nation, both prior to the declaration of independence from the Ch’ing dynasty in 1911 and in the decade following. He focuses especially on the various Russo-Japanese agreements signed between 1907 and 1916, with particular reference to the establishment of Russian and Japanese spheres of influence in Mongolia, and on Japanese military support between 1918 and 1922 for the Pan-Mongol movement, which called for the union of all the various Mongol peoples into one ‘Greater Mongolia’.68 Baabar, however, pays little attention to the wider ramifications of Japanese religious, business and academic activities in the region.

One of the most important commentators on the broader Japanese involvement in Mongolia between the 1870s and 1945 is the American scholar Owen Lattimore, the pioneer of Mongolian studies in the West. Lattimore’s work spans the Second World War, but tends to concentrate on Japan’s relationship with Russia and China during the 1930s and 1940s.69 Historians David Sneath and Christopher Atwood have also

written from the Mongolian perspective, both focusing narrowly on the relationship between Inner Mongolia and China proper during the twentieth century, and in the case of Atwood, restricting himself to a period of just twenty years, from 1911 to 1931. The main focus of Sneath’s and Atwood’s works, as in the cases of Bulag and Baabar, is naturally on Mongolia itself; when the Japanese-Mongol relationship is considered, it is from the perspective of the Mongols, and not the Japanese. While such scholarship is crucial in adding to our understanding of how the Mongols viewed their relationship with Japan, it cannot explain what it was that drew the Japanese to Mongolia.

The majority of works that consider the importance of Mongolia to Japan within the larger question of Sino-Japanese relations, whether by Western, Chinese or Japanese academics, focus principally on the 1930s. Such studies therefore cannot highlight the long and complex nature of the Japanese-Mongolian relationship from the 1870s to 1945. Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, Parks M. Coble and Sun Youli, for instance, writing from a Chinese perspective, have concentrated particularly on the impact of Japanese expansion into Inner Mongolia on Sino-Japanese relations prior to and during the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45. Coble also considers the

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effect of Japanese attempts to woo the Inner Mongols before 1937, concluding that on the whole, the Inner Mongols were compelled as a result of various Kwantung Army schemes to side with the Japanese.\footnote{Coble, \textit{Facing Japan}, pp. 197-9, 207-9, 327-9.} In general, however, works written from the Chinese perspective contain little analysis of why some Mongols were willing to side with the Japanese.

The issue of Mongol collaboration with the Japanese in the 1930s has received some scholarly attention from other writers, and recent analysis of Sino-Japanese collaboration in other parts of China is also suggestive. John Boyle concluded in 1972 that those Inner Mongols who sided with the Japanese did so more because of frustration with Han Chinese rule than from a positive desire to support Japan.\footnote{John H. Boyle, \textit{China and Japan at War 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration}, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972, pp. 123-33.} Rana Mitter’s much more recent examination of Sino-Japanese collaboration in Manchuria during the existence of the puppet state of Manchukuo provides comparative examples through which the actions of the Inner Mongols can also be evaluated, as does Timothy Brook’s study of collaboration in central China.\footnote{Rana Mitter, \textit{The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China}, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000; Timothy Brook, \textit{Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China}, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005.} Both Mitter and Brook conclude that whether an individual chose to collaborate or not depended on a variety of factors. According to Mitter, some in Manchuria were encouraged to collaborate by the Confucian world view that gave high priority to the efficient management of society — in other words, they collaborated because the Japanese were perceived as better managers than the Chinese. Furthermore, Mitter states that ‘traditional Chinese thought contributed to [the] sanctioning [of] elite collaboration’ in particular.\footnote{Mitter, \textit{Manchurian Myth}, p. 18.} Brook notes that people often collaborated simply to survive, as it was easier and safer than...
resistance. This thesis is chiefly concerned with Japanese rather than Mongolian perspectives. In general, however, I concur with Boyle: I suggest that those Mongols in positions of authority who chose to side with the Japanese did so because they sought independence from Han Chinese domination, even though what they eventually got was simply a change of overlord.

The military dimension is fundamental to any examination of Japan’s relationship with Mongolia between the 1870s and 1945, as we have seen, and accordingly, this thesis deals in detail with military themes. My research confirms some key recent findings and approaches in studies of the Japanese military. In particular, the thesis reinforces an emphasis to be found in several recent studies, namely, the complex interplay between the military and political worlds in Japan before the Second World War, both in policy terms and in the careers of particular individuals. In a sense this is a very old theme, but new approaches have revitalized and refined it. Earlier works, as noted below, often concentrated on fairly narrow histories of single institutions, while the first analyses of the connections between the military and politics tended, understandably perhaps, to emphasise expansionist military dominance over ‘normal’ civilian politics. The more recent works have provided much more subtle analysis of this topic. The interplay among institutions that they describe was clearly evident in Japanese activities in Mongolia as it was elsewhere.

The common perception of the Japanese Army among foreign observers, both prior to and after the Second World War, was that it either acted alone, or conspired with sinister intent with other arms of the state from the early 1930s onwards to dominate the political system. Early corrections to this view were provided by

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76 Brook, *Collaboration*, p. 246.
Malcolm Kennedy, the military attaché at the British Embassy in Tokyo in the early 1920s, and Hillis Lory, who both noted the army’s long-standing and fairly orthodox connections with other elite institutions and the wider Japanese society. Later works, including those of Saburo Hayashi, Alvin D. Coox, Meirion and Susie Harries, and Leonard Humphreys, support the earlier conclusions of Kennedy and Lory, recognising that the army played an important part in the political process of determining Japan’s continental policy, and not just by ‘standover’ tactics. Humphreys further notes that the Japanese military itself was a complex organisation riven by an array of different factions, all seeking their own direction with respect to policy. The eventual consequence of these internal struggles was inconsistent military policy. Coox deals specifically with the ambitions of the Kwantung Army in Mongolia, showing that the pursuit of Japan’s supposed claims to the region had far-reaching consequences, among them ‘enhanced Chinese nationalism and confidence’.

A number of recent studies have examined the relationship between the Japanese military and the bureaucracy, especially the Foreign Ministry, as well as the various political parties that existed in Japan from the latter part of the nineteenth century onwards. They include the works of Barbara Brooks, Stewart Lone, Ryoichi Tobe and J. Charles Schencking. Again, while none of these studies deals specifically with Japan’s relationship with Mongolia, each confirms the multiple connections between

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80 Humphreys, Way of the Heavenly Sword, pp. 172-81.
the Japanese military and the civilian elites. Such a perspective is reinforced and extended by my research on Mongolia.

Brooks, for example, analyses the relationship between Japanese Foreign Ministry personnel stationed throughout China and their army counterparts, concluding that the consular officials on the spot were often fully aware of what the military was up to and kept the civilian authorities in Tokyo informed; the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, on the other hand, was often unwilling to challenge the military. The same was also true in the case of Mongolia, especially prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 and at the time of the first Mongolian ‘independence’ movement in 1912. Lone illustrates the manner in which prominent individuals, specifically General Katsura Tarō, were able to move between the military and political spheres, playing an influential and complementary role in both. Mongolia, too, provides instances of military officers who subsequently held political office and played an important role in both spheres. Tanaka Giichi and Araki Sadao are just two examples of army officers who were connected with military operations in Mongolia in the 1910s and 1920s, and who then moved into the political sphere where, no doubt, they continued to influence Japanese policy on Mongolia.

Tobe focuses on the interplay between the military and political spheres that developed during the First Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, and on the importance of this connection not only for the military-political nexus, but also for the relationship between the Army Ministry and Army General Staff. Relations between

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81 Coox, Nomonhan, pp. 69-73.
the Japanese military and political elites were just as significant in connection with Mongolia as in other ways. In particular, the closeness between the military and political realms is displayed in the willingness of some members of both elites to overlook ‘patriotic’ insubordination by officers in the field in Mongolia during the 1910s and 1920s.

Schencking demonstrates the often complex nature of the relationship between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the political system in the late Meiji and Taishō periods, showing that the navy exploited this connection to its own benefit, particularly in attempts to expand naval budgets.85 The same complexity is also found in the relationship between the Imperial Japanese Army and the political system with respect to Mongolia. When the two were in accord, the military was willing to co-operate with the political elite to enhance Japanese control of Mongolia. It was also prepared to ignore the civilian government, however, when there was disagreement between the two and when the political elites sought to rein in the military.

Taken as a whole, the works identified above provide a far better understanding of the way in which the military, political and bureaucratic elites in pre-war Japan interacted, especially with regard to Japan’s relations with China and Russia. Thus they are particularly useful to a study of the relationship between Japan and Mongolia, in which so many individuals and agencies were active, often in concert with each other. At the same time, analysis of Japanese projects in Mongolia complements and refines the insights of such earlier works.

A major aim of this thesis is to explore the range of Japanese individuals and groups that were active in Mongolia and that often played a mediating role in Japanese imperialism there. In particular, the thesis expands the range of conscious or

unconscious ‘partners’ of the Japanese military, well beyond the usual focus on politicians and bureaucrats, to include religious, academic and business figures among others. In doing so, it builds on a theme evident in a number of recent studies that have recognised and explored the contributions of non-state actors, including writers, folklore specialists and doctors, to Japanese imperialism. They include the works of Faye Yuan Kleeman, Timothy Tsu Yun Hui, Ming-Cheng M. Lo and Joshua Fogel. While studies of Japanese imperialism and colonialism are thus beginning to take account of a much wider range of actors than older works did, the insights they provide are still very partial ones, and have hardly ever been applied to Mongolia. Nevertheless, though the majority of these works specifically consider Japan’s relationship with Taiwan, they do provide important examples through which to evaluate the actions of the people involved in the various Japanese schemes in Mongolia.

Kleeman, for instance, analyses the Japanese colonial literature on Taiwan, providing a context through which writings on Mongolia can be assessed, particularly from the point of view of images of the local population. For Kleeman, Japanese writing on Taiwan presented images that were far more complex than simply ‘subjugated colonized populace and … dominating colonizer’. This observation also applies to Mongolia, but in addition, the works of Japanese writers on Mongolia were often imbued with a sense of romance, something apparently less evident in the Japanese colonial literature on Taiwan. Tsu demonstrates that pre-war Japanese academic research on folklore in China, particularly Taiwan, was a function of the emergent Japanese empire’s expansionist aspirations and colonising enterprises.

86 Wilson, ‘Bridging the Gaps’, pp. 294-5.
88 Kleeman, Under an Imperial Sun, p. 233.
Moreover, he illustrates how the political elites used the work of Japanese academics to legitimise colonialism. Such a finding is certainly relevant to Mongolia as well, as will be shown in my discussion of the anthropologist Torii Ryūzō especially. Torii’s works, along with those of other Japanese academics, had considerable influence on pre-war Japanese images of Mongolia, yet have attracted little attention from scholars so far. Though definitely scholarly in intent, Torii’s work also reflected the positions of the Japanese military and political elites, who also sponsored and supported his work in various ways.

Lo examines the prominent role of doctors in Taiwanese politics and society, arguing that the activities of these doctors demonstrate the ‘unintended and unpredictable interactions’ that occurred between the processes of what she terms ‘professionalization’ and ‘colonization’. What Lo means is that by creating an ‘elite native class’, the Japanese encouraged the rise of a group who were then able to ‘articulate and promote anti-colonial policies’. A similar process occurred in Mongolia, where, for example, the Zenrin kyōkai’s provision of education to the local population led to an increase in dissatisfaction among Mongol nationalists, partly because the Japanese sought to make the Mongols feel they were part of the larger Japanese empire, contrary to the wishes of the great majority of Mongols.

Finally, Fogel analyses the extensive range of Japanese travel writings about China from the Meiji Restoration through to 1945, also drawing attention to a number

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of specific instances in which Japanese authors wrote about Mongolia. He notes that the travel narratives of Japanese visitors to China are an ‘almost entirely unused source’, even though they contain a wealth of firsthand information about a wide range of topics, something that also holds true for Japanese travel writings on Mongolia specifically. This thesis demonstrates that such writings constitute a valuable source as to which groups and individuals across the Japanese elites exhibited an interest in Mongolia, pointing to a series of networks that has received little attention in previous scholarly examination of Japanese-Mongolian relations. Moreover, such works reflect as well as help to construct dominant Japanese discourses on Mongolia in the period from the late nineteenth century onwards.

**Thesis Argument, Sources, Approach and Structure**

Overall, I argue in this thesis that Japan’s relationship with Mongolia was a crucial part of its interaction with the Chinese continent from the 1870s to 1945, and hence its foreign relations more broadly. Though Mongolia was primarily coveted by Japanese leaders and ideologues for strategic reasons, the Japanese Army did not operate there as an isolated entity, but rather, cultivated ties with a variety of Japanese civilian actors, all of whom, with greater or lesser degrees of self-consciousness, helped to further the strategic goals of Japanese leaders while pursuing their own agendas as well. Mongolia, however, was more than just an arena of Japanese military activity. It also offered unparalleled opportunities for the elaboration of all the major aspects of the discourses that made up Japan’s evolving claim to solidarity with and leadership of Asia. In addition, it functioned as a showcase for Japan’s supposedly benevolent

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92 Ibid., p. 5.
intentions towards Asia. In turn, the opportunities provided by Mongolia account for the wide range of groups and individuals in Japan that developed connections with Mongolia and for the often close relations between these groups and individuals on the one hand, and the most powerful institutions of the Japanese state on the other.

The primary sources used in this thesis consist of a diverse range of contemporary materials. In addition to these primary sources, I have drawn on a range of secondary texts, including some that use contemporary primary sources from languages other than Japanese and English, such as Mongolian, Chinese or Russian. One important group of primary sources, held at Japan’s Bōeichō shiryōkan (Self-Defence Force Archives), relates to Japanese military activities in Mongolia between the 1870s and 1945. These materials include the Mitsu ōnikki (Secret Great Diaries), an unpublished collection of more than one hundred volumes containing the highest-level reports prepared by departments within the Army Ministry for the Army Minister, the Chief of the Army General Staff and the various departments that were directly subordinate to these positions, as well as the diaries of specific campaigns, including the Nishi ju mitsu ōnikki (Western Secret Great Diaries), which pertain specifically to the Siberian Intervention of 1918-22.95 The Self-Defence Force Archives also contain opinion pieces by staff officers, intelligence reports from military officers in the field, and detailed reports regarding the strategic and economic potential of particular parts of Mongolia.

Certain limitations of these sources must be borne in mind. Aside from the fact that many of the early materials in the Secret Great Diaries are hand-written in an extremely cursive style that makes them difficult to read, there are also gaps in the records. Such gaps may result from deliberate destruction, as in the disposal of

95 Bōeichō shiryōkan, Tokyo, Mitsu ōnikki, multiple volumes, held at the Bōeichō kenkyūjo senshi shitsu. See note at beginning of Bibliography about this source.
records that occurred shortly after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, or from losses incurred in other ways, including during the fire-bombing of Tokyo in the last months of the war. Other lacunae also occur. For example, the reports that mention Mongolia in the *Secret Great Diaries* between 1933 and 1935 are vague as to what the Kwantung Army was up to in the region, although other, more specific reports on Mongolia were certainly filed with the Kwantung Army General Staff by the Kwantung Army Special Intelligence Agency (Kantōgun tokumu kikan) during this period; a number of them have been located from other sources, and will be examined in Chapters Four and Five. Thus it seems that the Kwantung Army, for some reason, may have been keeping the Army General Staff in the dark about its activities in Inner Mongolia. Moreover, the earliest reference to Japanese military goals in Mongolia in the *Secret Great Diaries* appears to occur in 1907, but other sources indicate a clear focus on Mongolia on the part of the army high command almost thirty years previously. Despite such gaps, there are certainly more than enough entries in the *Secret Great Diaries* to demonstrate a high level of Japanese military attention to Mongolia from the late Meiji period through until the end of the Second World War.

Materials held at Japan’s Gaikō shiryōkan (Diplomatic Records Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), including consular reports and opinion pieces, provide strong evidence that Japanese diplomats pursued specific objectives in Mongolia. Such records also demonstrate the degree to which the Foreign Ministry and the Army Ministry co-operated with each other on matters relating to Mongolia as on other issues, as shown by the regular exchange of documents between the two. The two ministries often agreed on policy for Mongolia, and the Foreign Ministry was, in all probability, generally aware of what the military intended.

Three sets of published collections provide further valuable material. The *Senshi sōshō* (Military History Series), published by the Bōeichō kenkyūjo senshi shitsu (Self-
Defence Force Research Institute’s War History Section), is the official military history of the period between 1937 and 1945, and is based on records held in the Self-Defence Force Archives. The series Gendaishi shiryō (Source Materials on Contemporary History) reproduces a wide range of original documents. Material in these volumes relevant to Mongolia is drawn not only from the Self-Defence Force Archives, but also, for example, from the South Manchurian Railway Company. The Foreign Ministry’s official publication, Nihon gaikō bunsho (Japanese Diplomatic Records), reproduces in one hundred volumes the telegraphic traffic between the Foreign Ministry and its embassies, consulates and legations from 1865 to 1935.

Documents produced by the Japanese Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs give Japan’s official position with regard to Mongolia. They are complemented by other contemporary sources, allowing us to build up a fuller picture of Japanese-Mongolian relations and their importance at the time. Such materials indicate that consciousness of Mongolia could be found throughout a much broader section of society than an examination relying solely on official records would suggest. My research has uncovered at least seventeen books dealing exclusively or substantially with Mongolia that were published in Japan between 1878 and 1921, and more than forty published between 1922 and 1945, including travel accounts, guidebooks, government publications for the general public and works by highly respected academics. Many of these sources have been overlooked in earlier examinations of Japan’s continental exploits.

98 Gaimushō (ed.), Nihon gaikō bunsho, 100 vols, Tōkyō: Nihon kokusai rengō kyōkai, 1961-76. Unfortunately, the documents contained in Nihon gaikō bunsho only go up to 1935, so the Foreign Ministry’s official position on Mongolia after this date is not as fully documented.
Such works also provide an insight into how Mongolia was presented to the wider Japanese reading audience. They often describe the region that Mongolia was perceived to encompass, emphasising its size, as well as the customs and religions of the Mongols, giving the impression that Mongolia was in some respects different from Japan, particularly in its vast area, but in other respects similar, including in religion. Of particular interest in the case of these less formal sources is the question of who wrote the Forewords, as this is often an indication of the network of shared interest that existed at a specific time in relation to Mongolia. For example, in three books on Mongolia published in Japan between 1909 and 1913, the Forewords were written by Ōkuma Shigenobu, one of the most important Meiji political figures, while two of the three also had Forewords by Fukushima Yasumasa, a prominent military figure with close ties to Mongolia. While it is easy to explain the choice of Fukushima, given his connections with Mongolia, that of Ōkuma is less obvious, as there appears to be nothing else in his career to suggest a strong involvement with Mongolia. In one of the three examples, it may simply be that the author was Ōkuma’s protégé, but in the other two instances, this does not seem to be the case. It may be that Ōkuma had a connection to Mongolia that has escaped the attention of previous researchers.

One caveat must be borne in mind when examining Japanese-language materials on Mongolia produced from the 1870s to 1945. The intended audience and timing of publication are often important factors, as is acknowledged by the historian Nakami Tatsuo. Some authors in the 1930s, for example, because of their association with right-wing organisations, glorified the role played by the tairiku rōnin, the so-called ‘continental adventurers’, more often than not right-wing, in Japan’s activities in

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99 Ichinomiya Misako, Mōko mīyage, Tōkyō: Jitsugyō kono Nihonsha, 1909; Torii, Mōko ryokō; Matsumoto, Tō-Mōko no shinsō.
100 Matsumoto, Tō-Mōko no shinsō, pp. 1-4.
Mongolia. In reality, their role was almost certainly less significant than that of the military. On the other hand, the histories of right-wing associations are an important source of information on Japanese operations in Mongolia. The three-volume history of the Kokuryūkai (Amur River/Black Dragon Society), for example, running to some eighteen hundred pages in total, constitutes one of the most important contemporary sources available on topics such as Japanese involvement in the Manchurian-Mongolian independence movements of 1912 and 1916. To discount the information it provides would be extremely shortsighted. A number of post-war works are also very useful, including the history of the semi-official Zenrin kyōkai.

Several sets of official English-language primary sources are of particular value for this study. The intelligence reports of the United States military attachés based in Peking between 1911 and 1941, for instance, give another perspective on the activities of the Japanese military in Outer Mongolia from the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty in 1912 through to Japanese military operations in Inner Mongolia during the 1930s. The reports from the various United States consulates in China between 1930 and 1939 show how United States consular officials on the spot viewed Japanese activities in Mongolia. A third major English-language source is the official record of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, more often referred to as the Tokyo War Crimes Trials. The object of the Trials was, in part, to determine legally if

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101 Nakami, ‘Mongol Nationalism and Japan’, in Narangoa and Cribb (eds), Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, p. 94.
Japan had pursued a concerted policy to gain control of the Chinese continent, beginning in 1928 with the assassination of the Manchurian warlord Chang Tso-lin, and continuing until 1945. Accordingly, the materials presented to the tribunal by the prosecutors, at least, had been selected with a specific purpose in mind, that being to prove Japanese leaders guilty of waging a war of aggression, among other things. Naturally, therefore, such materials must be approached with caution. Nevertheless, various documents presented to the tribunal do provide information on Japan’s activities in Mongolia, and thus supplement what is otherwise known from the various official and unofficial Japanese-language sources.

Taken together, these three sets of official English-language sources contribute to an understanding of how Japanese ambitions in Mongolia impacted on Japan’s relationships with other countries, as well as providing both additional information and a different perspective on events as they unfolded. The reports were written by experienced observers, who sought to provide their own governments with accurate information as to what was occurring in the region. The use of such documents has allowed the construction of a far more detailed, and, in some ways, a more reliable picture of Japanese ambitions towards and activities in Mongolia than would have been possible by relying solely on Japanese-language sources.

Less formal English-language materials also provide considerable insight into Japan’s relationship with Mongolia before 1945. The researcher into events in Asia prior to the Second World War is blessed by the fact that so many Western visitors to the ‘Far East’ seem to have felt compelled to write about their journeys, either focusing on the weird and wonderful sights and smells that they encountered while touring the ‘exotic Orient’ so that those back home could also appreciate them, or, particularly in the 1930s, pontificating on the events unfolding in China and Japan during this
tumultuous decade.  There was also a steady flow of works by long-term Western residents in Asia, including China, Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia, in which they sought to explain to those back home how things really were in the ‘exotic East’.

Journalists, academics and other professionals who passed through the region produced other relevant works, including Thomas A. Bisson, Peter Fleming and Guenther Stein, all of whom wrote in the 1930s and at least touched upon Japan’s relationship with Mongolia. Many of their books were constructed largely from the opinions of ‘leading Japanese’, voiced for Western consumption. Such publications, especially those dating from the 1930s and 1940s, thus give an insight into how prominent Japanese at the time wanted the rest of the world to view the Japanese relationship with the Mongols, even if the Western writers recording their opinions did not always convey the view that their Japanese informants intended them to. All of


these works must be approached with caution, as such writers were often also in the employ of one or other of the countries whose causes they championed, and many were partisan in their views. Nevertheless, they are a valuable source of information.

Western writers on the region also produced some serious academic works during the 1930s, one example being the three volumes by C. Walter Young that examined Japan’s position in Manchuria in terms of international law.110

The thesis proceeds chronologically, moving from the earliest contacts between modern Japan and Mongolia that I have identified, that is, from shortly after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, to the end of the Second World War in 1945. Within the specific chapters, the various dimensions of Japanese-Mongolian relations are analysed both thematically and chronologically. Chapter One deals with the period from 1873, when Meiji Japan’s first encounter with Mongolia appears to have occurred, through to the abdication of the young Manchu emperor Pu-yi in February 1912 and the end of the Ch’ing dynasty, examining the diverse range of groups and individuals in Japan who worked to further specific objectives in Mongolia during this first phase. Chapter Two then examines the three Japanese-sponsored Manchurian-Mongolian movements that sought independence from China after the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty. The chapter covers the period from March 1912 until the death of the Japanese-backed White Russian military leader Baron Roman Nicolaus Feodorovich von Ungern-Sternberg in September 1921, and focuses almost exclusively on a re-examination of Japanese military ambitions in the region at that time. In particular, this chapter discusses the role that covert military operations in Mongolia played in the development of ge kokujō as a means of implementing policy on the continent, together with the apparent

110 Young, Japan’s Special Position in Manchuria; C. Walter Young, The International Legal Status of the Kwantung Leased Territory. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1931, reprinted New York: Arno Press, 1979; C. Walter Young, Japanese
willingness of the army high command to turn a blind eye to such behaviour when it fitted with its own objectives.

Chapter Three analyses the period from the Japanese withdrawal from Siberia in November 1922, following the failure of the Siberian Intervention to halt the Bolshevik advance, until just prior to the creation of Manchukuo by the Kwantung Army in March 1932. The chapter considers first the re-emergence of connections with Mongolia among Japanese business and religious groups, then the re-appearance of overt Japanese military attention to the region, particularly in relation to its potential to supply horses to the Japanese Army.

Chapter Four deals with the period from the Manchurian Incident in September 1931 to the Suiyuan Incident in November 1936, examining the various military and intelligence-gathering operations undertaken by the Kwantung Army in an attempt to gain control of Inner Mongolia, as well as the activities of the Japanese-sponsored Mengchiang government between its foundation in September 1937 and the defeat of the Japanese Army in August 1945. In addition, it discusses the cultural promotion of Japan’s claim to a special position in Mongolia through an examination of Japanese- and English-language books published between 1932 and 1945. Finally, Chapter Five discusses the operations of the Zenrin kyōkai from its inception in 1933 until August 1945, investigating the humanitarian activities that it undertook in Inner Mongolia through the provision of medical facilities and educational opportunities, as well as its increasing interest in the Muslims of Mongolia and its promotion of Mongolia in Japan.

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CHAPTER ONE

SOLDIERS, ADVENTURERS AND EDUCATORS:
MEIJI ENCOUNTERS WITH MONGOLIA, 1873-1912

‘When Lieutenant-Colonel Fukushima crossed Siberia … the Japanese nation went wild with enthusiasm and feted him everywhere as a hero’.¹

Information about the early stages of Japan’s relationship with Mongolia in the modern period is sketchy. The evidence that exists, however, indicates that representatives of a number of different groups, including military, diplomatic, political and religious elites, sought to cultivate ties with Mongolia from an early stage, and that first contact between the two countries in the modern period probably occurred in 1873, only five years after the start of the Meiji era.

This chapter analyses relations between Japan and Mongolia in the Meiji period from Japan’s point of view. Sources are patchy, as noted above, but one way to investigate Mongolia’s significance for Japanese leaders in this period is to examine the activities of specific individuals who had both a strong connection to Mongolia and close contacts with the Japanese elites. The first part of the chapter focuses on the careers of three very different people connected with the Meiji military, political and academic worlds who sought to develop links with Mongolia in this period, namely Fukushima Yasumasa, Kawashima Naniwa and Kawahara Misako. All three were deeply connected with events in Mongolia after 1879 but are now largely forgotten figures. The chapter next examines the cultural connection between Japan and Mongolia, as seen through the romantic musings of political and academic figures, and

the promotion of ties with Mongolia by Buddhist leaders. Lastly, the chapter details
Japanese activities in Mongolia in the first part of the twentieth century, up to 1912 and
the overthrow of the Ch’ing dynasty, an event that precipitated a distinct change in
dominant Japanese perceptions of Mongolia, especially in its relation to China.

Certain common themes are evident throughout this formative period in relations
between Japan and Mongolia, themes that embedded themselves in Japanese discourse
about the region and remained persistent for decades afterwards. Some Meiji-period
observers believed that Japan and Mongolia shared a common racial heritage; along
with this the idea developed that there was something inherently romantic about
Mongolia. Such an attitude is markedly different from the Japanese view of Korea; as
Peter Duus notes, Japanese writers may have exoticised Koreans, but they never
romanticised them.2 The intertwined themes of a common heritage and of Mongolia as
a place of romance were continually revisited throughout the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, until they became more or less fixed aspects of the dominant image
of Mongolia in Japan. Moreover, as the notion of a supposedly shared racial heritage
developed, it was in turn woven into the emerging discourse that proclaimed Japan’s
solidarity with and leadership of Asia. Underlying the romantic perception, however,
was the far more important fact that Mongolia occupied a vital geo-strategic position,
lying as it did between Russia and China. This was the overriding concern for those in
the Japanese elites who cast their eyes towards Mongolia, though they couched their
views partly in culturally romantic terms. Alongside geo-strategic considerations,
another significant feature of the Japanese-Mongolian relationship that was established
in this early period was the interdependence of military and civilian elements in the

1 ‘Forty Years Ago’, Japan Chronicle Weekly Edition (hereafter JCWE), 16 December
1937, p. 806.
2 Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-
quest for greater Japanese control over Mongolia, an interdependence that continued until 1945.

Fukushima Yasumasa was one of the outstanding Japanese military men of his time. Though no longer much remembered, he was once a household name throughout Japan because of a dramatic and well-publicised lone horseback ride he undertook from Berlin to Vladivostok in 1892-3. He subsequently had a distinguished military career, which included serving as the commander of the Japanese expeditionary force to Peking during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and as governor of the Kwantung Leased Territories. If Kawashima Naniwa is now remembered, it is as the adoptive father of Japan’s infamous female spy, the Manchurian-born Kawashima Yoshiko, the ‘Far Eastern Mata Hari’. Kawashima Naniwa himself, however, was one of the principal political activists in Japanese attempts to establish an ‘independent’ Mongolia from 1912 onwards. To understand the role he played after 1912, it is important to examine his career during this earlier period. Thus in this chapter, the discussion of Kawashima centres on his initial activities in China and the links he forged in Peking with two Manchu princes. These connections were crucial to his later activities in Mongolia, which will be discussed in Chapter Two. Kawahara Misako is in some ways the most fascinating of the three, for her career illuminates the interplay of different Japanese ambitions in Mongolia in the late Meiji period and beyond, as well as contributing to the entrenchment of some important attitudes that influenced ongoing Japanese activities in the region. She was primarily a teacher who worked in

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Mongolia for several years, but she also engaged in undercover work for the Japanese military during the Russo-Japanese War.

All three of these people were born in the town of Matsumoto in Nagano Prefecture, in central Japan, and in some way they were connected with one another. Post-war studies in English that consider Japan’s continental expansion during the Meiji period have paid little attention to their careers. Yet, as I will show in this chapter, the lives and careers of the soldier, Fukushima, the adventurer, Kawashima, and the teacher, Kawahara, foreshadowed much about the tone and pattern of Japan’s later forays into Mongolia, and also contributed to the forging of an influential and popular Japanese image of Mongolia as a wild and romantic region. This image, in turn, arguably provided an important underpinning for Japanese activities in Mongolia in later decades.

The chapter then examines the other cultural connections that existed between Japan and Mongolia during this period, before finally analysing Mongolia’s position in military, diplomatic and political thinking following Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905.

**Fukushima Yasumasa and the Military Dimension of Japanese-Mongolian Relations**

Fukushima Yasumasa was born in Matsumoto in 1852, and joined the military at an early age. Clearly his superiors saw something in him, as he was transferred to the Army General Staff in 1875, at the age of just twenty-three. Fukushima was destined for a colourful career, during which he would visit places as diverse as India, the United States and the countries of the Balkans, as well as serving as military attaché in China,

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Bloomsbury, 2008. The latter is an especially romanticised version of Kawashima’s life, focusing largely on its erotic aspects.
His first contact with Mongolia came in 1879 when Lieutenant-General Yamagata Aritomo, then chief of the Japanese Army General Staff, dispatched him to Inner Mongolia to spend three months undercover, gathering intelligence on the region. Exactly why Yamagata chose to send Fukushima to Inner Mongolia is unknown. Fukushima, however, was not the only officer Yamagata sent around this time to study conditions in the countries that were Japan’s near neighbours. In December 1878 Yamagata had already dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel, later General and Prime Minister, Katsura Tarō, in this case to study and report on conditions in North China and Korea, and in the same year that Fukushima was dispatched to Inner Mongolia, Yamagata also sent ten officer-students to survey various other parts of China. It should be noted, though, that while Katsura and the officer-students sent to China appear to have travelled in uniform, Fukushima, as mentioned above, was ordered to travel incognito. The reason remains unclear, but the dispatch of officers in disguise, especially to the borderlands between China and Russia, continued after this point as well.

Yamagata’s specific orders to Fukushima provide some indication of the nature of the Japanese Army General Staff’s goals in Mongolia at this time. Principally, the army’s focus on Mongolia stemmed from a general desire on the part of Japanese military leaders to establish control of North China, and an appreciation that the greatest threat to such ambitions was Russia. The Russians already had an established military

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presence in Outer Mongolia by the late nineteenth century, and it was always likely that they would continue their advance until they reached the Pacific coast of the Chinese continent, placing them within striking distance of the Japanese archipelago. There were two possible routes for the Russians to take. The first was south from Outer Mongolia into North China, followed by a turn east, directly into Manchuria. The alternative was for the Russians to enter Manchuria over its northern border, the one abutting Siberia, then move south down through Manchuria, and then turn west to head directly into North China. With either of these manoeuvres, the Russians might gain control of a large area of the northern region of the Ch’ing empire.

If Japanese forces, on the other hand, were to be active in the region, they would be most likely to operate from North China, and they therefore needed to evaluate which route the Russians might take if they chose to advance into the region. Amongst other things, Fukushima was required to assess the likelihood of the Russians moving south from Outer Mongolia, as well as the likelihood that they might either use the western route from Kupeikou, lying to the north of Peking or, as an alternative, advance from Manchuria into North China via Shankaiwan; to assess the political situation in Inner Mongolia and determine whether the Mongols were pro-Japanese; and to locate Han Chinese in Inner Mongolia who were willing to work with the Japanese. On his return to Japan, in December 1879, Fukushima prepared a report for Yamagata detailing his five-month mission to North China and Mongolia, entitled Rinbō heibi ryaku (The Military Preparedness of Our Neighbour), and the following year this report was presented to Emperor Meiji. Two years later, Fukushima was given an official

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posting to China, on this occasion serving as military attaché in Peking from 1882 to 1884. While there is no record of him visiting Inner Mongolia during this period, given that the Great Wall, which was regarded as the boundary between China proper and Mongolia, lay only one hundred kilometres north of the Chinese capital, the possibility that Fukushima made additional intelligence-gathering sorties into the region cannot be discounted.\textsuperscript{11}

Between 1880 and 1885 the Japanese Army General Staff sent a number of other officers to carry out operations similar to Fukushima’s, with two in particular focusing on Mongolia. In 1881, when Major Yamamoto Kiyokatsu was returning to Japan after a period of service as military attaché in St Petersburg, he travelled via Irkutsk, Urga (Ulan Bator, the capital of Mongolia), Kalgan and Peking. He thus became the first Japanese Army officer to have visited Outer Mongolia, as far as I can ascertain.\textsuperscript{12} Four years later, in 1885, Lieutenant Hagino Suekichi was dispatched on an intelligence-gathering operation to Vladivostok, Siberia and Mongolia.\textsuperscript{13} Unfortunately, there is no record of how long either Yamamoto or Hagino spent in Mongolia, nor what their specific instructions were while there. Overall, however, the dispatch of several military officers to gather intelligence about Mongolia suggests that the Japanese Army General Staff regarded the area as at least potentially important in strategic terms.

In 1887, the Army General Staff’s intelligence-gathering in relation to China as a whole resulted in the production of a six-volume work entitled \textit{Shina chishi sōtaibu} (A Complete Topography of China).\textsuperscript{14} Volume Six covered Manchuria, Mongolia and Tsinghai, the last being the province adjacent to Tibet, as well as the peoples on the

\textsuperscript{12} Shimanuki, \textit{Fukushima}, vol. 1, p. 74.
peripheries of these regions, who were termed ‘outlying nomads’ (naizoku yūbokubu).
Fukushima was directly involved in the production of this series, being listed on the title page as one of those responsible for proofreading and corrections. A second work, again part of a multi-volume series, was published six years later, in 1893. *Shina chishi kan jūgo ge: Mōko bu* (A Topography of China, volume 15, part 2: Mongolia) ran to 215 pages, beginning with the location of Mongolia in terms of longitude and latitude, as well as geographical features such as rivers, before moving to cover, in some detail, such topics as manners (fūzoku), Buddhism, education, trade, roads and population. The production of such substantial and detailed works indicates the degree of attention that the military paid to Mongolia, among other parts of China, in the 1880s and 1890s.

Fukushima Yasumasa, in the meantime, had returned to Mongolia in the most dramatic way, in the process bringing both himself and Mongolia to the attention of the broader public in Japan. In 1887, he had been dispatched to Berlin as military attaché, a post that he held for over five years. During his time in Berlin, someone supposedly offered him a wager that it was impossible for a man to ride solo on horseback from Berlin to Vladivostok. Fukushima accepted the wager. As unlikely as it may sound, this was not the first instance of a lone ride by a military officer through territory controlled by another power. In 1875, a British officer, Captain Frederick Gustavus Burnaby, had embarked on a ride through Russia into Afghanistan, a journey that allowed him to gather information for Britain on Russia’s military strength along the

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way. Presumably, the Japanese Army General Staff was thinking along the same lines when it agreed to Fukushima’s ride, although Fukushima both sought and received permission from the Russian and Chinese governments for his trip, indicating, perhaps, that those governments were not overly worried about what he might learn.

Having taken the bet, and having received approval to undertake the attempt from the Japanese Army General Staff and from the Russian and Chinese governments, Fukushima departed from Berlin on his epic journey on 20 January 1892. While the ostensible objective of his journey was to prove that the lone ride to Vladivostok was possible, and to win the wager, there can be little doubt, given the approval of the Army General Staff, that it was also an intelligence-gathering exercise of the first order. Fukushima travelled from Berlin through the Russian empire, spending almost a month

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and a half in Mongolia, before finally reaching Vladivostok on 9 June 1893, some seventeen months after setting out.\textsuperscript{19} His lone ride, as Jason Karlin has noted, coincided with an upsurge of romanticism towards Asia among certain groups of Japanese youth. This romanticism centred on tales of the horseback bandits of the late Ch‘ing period who had apparently ‘protected’ the peasants who lived along the great plains of Northeast China, the region that encompasses Mongolia and Manchuria,\textsuperscript{20} though it is unclear exactly what the bandits were protecting the peasants from.

The Japanese press covered Fukushima’s journey extensively; there was obviously no secrecy surrounding his ride.\textsuperscript{21} When Fukushima arrived in Vladivostok there was even a Japanese journalist on hand to interview him, and according to James Huffman, this one interview provided copy to the \textit{Tôkyô asahi} newspaper for an incredible 120 successive stories that ran through until November 1893, nearly six months after the completion of the journey.\textsuperscript{22} The extensive reporting of Fukushima’s adventure made him, as Karlin has noted, ‘an overnight hero and a symbol of the new adventurous Japanese male’.\textsuperscript{23} The \textit{Ôsaka asahi} newspaper proclaimed in June 1893: ‘in one fell swoop, this stalwart fellow of five lands and two seas has astonished us all and elevated the good name of Japanese men. What’s more, he has made our nation’s pride shine among the Great Powers’.\textsuperscript{24} In fact, Fukushima’s exploits were still being written

\textsuperscript{18} Deacon, \textit{Kempeitai}, p. 69.
\textsuperscript{21} For example, Fukushima’s departure from Berlin was reported by the \textit{Yomiuri shinbun}, albeit some months late. See ‘Beruin yori bajō nite kichō sentoso’, \textit{Yomiuri shinbun} (hereafter YS), 7 April 1892, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{23} Karlin, ‘Gender of Nationalism’, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Ôsaka asahi shinbun}, quoted in Karlin, ‘Gender of Nationalism’, p. 71.
about more than twenty years after his death, as will be discussed in Chapter Four, and recently his lone ride has been presented to a new audience through manga.\textsuperscript{25}

According to Karlin, one contemporary outcome of Fukushima’s ride was that, encouraged by the stories about Fukushima, ‘would-be Japanese adventurers, many former sōshi [the so-called “patriotic adventurers”], journeyed to the continent, apparently aiming to define their manhood through imperialistic labours and idealistic dreams’.\textsuperscript{26} One of those ‘patriotic adventurers’ was Kawashima Naniwa, who was subsequently closely connected with Japanese schemes to bring Mongolia and Manchuria under Japanese control.

**Kawashima Naniwa: Man of Action**

Kawashima was born in Matsumoto in 1865. He was apparently fascinated with China from an early age, and in 1882, at the age of seventeen, entered a foreign language school in order to learn the Chinese language. In 1886 he made his first visit to the Asian mainland, travelling to Shanghai. With him, Kawashima carried a letter of introduction to Fukushima Yasumasa, who was at this time stationed in Tientsin.\textsuperscript{27} Exactly why Kawashima needed an introduction is a little unclear, as according to a number of sources, it was Fukushima who had provided the funds for Kawashima to make the journey in the first place.\textsuperscript{28}

Kawashima remained in China for a number of years, and according to more than one source, it was during this first period of residence there that he began to think about

\textsuperscript{26} Karlin, ‘Gender of Nationalism’, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{27} Kamisaka, *Dansō no reijin*, pp. 42-3.
the desirability of establishing a new country in the region of ‘Eastern Mongolia’ to protect Japan against invasion by Russia. 29 His stay in China, however, was cut short in 1889 by illness, and he was forced to return to Japan. Undaunted, Kawashima travelled back to China to serve as an interpreter for the Japanese Army during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, and then again during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, this time at the specific request of Fukushima Yasumasa, then the commanding officer of the Japanese Expeditionary Force. 30 In the course of his second term of duty as an interpreter, Kawashima came into contact with Prince Ch’ing, one of the two Manchu princes with whom he was to be closely connected during the first two decades of the twentieth century, the other being Prince Su (see Figure 10). 31

Exactly when or where Kawashima first met Prince Ch’ing is a matter of conjecture, but it is likely that it was following the 1900 Boxer siege of the Peking legations. In any case, the relationship between the two was such that in October 1900, only two months after the lifting of the siege, Kawashima was asked by Prince Ch’ing to coordinate an intensive training program in police work for the then fledgling Chinese police force in Peking. There is no obvious reason for the selection of a Japanese for this position, except perhaps for a general recognition throughout Asia of Japan’s success in modernisation, and how and why Kawashima came to be chosen is not clear. There is nothing in his background to suggest why he was suitable. It may have been partly that, given his acquaintance with the commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Force, that is, Fukushima, Kawashima was deemed a politically suitable

30 Kamisaka, Dansō no reijin, p. 45; Reynolds, Xinzheng Revolution and Japan, p. 165.
31 The photo in Figure 10 appears in Reynolds, Xinzheng Revolution and Japan, p. 166, where it supposedly shows Kawashima and Prince Ch’ing. It also appears in Aida, Kuzū and Kamisaka. All of these authors, however, state that it shows Kawashima with Prince Su.
appointee by Ch’ing, one who could act as an intermediary between the Ch’ing court and one of the nine powers occupying Peking following the end of the Boxer Rebellion. Kawashima’s appointment was to lead to even greater things, when in August 1901 Prince Ch’ing awarded him a five-year contract to head the new Peking Police Academy. The award of a contract of this length was unusual, as agreements were normally for three years, but in fact Kawashima single-handedly oversaw the academy for the next twelve years.32

![Figure 10: Kawashima Naniwa (left) and Prince Su (right), c. 1905, reproduced from Aida Tsutomu, Kawashima Naniwa-ō, Tōkyō: Bunsuikaku, 1936, reprinted Tōkyō: Ōzorasha, 1997, opp. p. 88.](image)

Kawashima’s time in Peking allowed him great opportunity for intrigue, especially in the field of intelligence-gathering. His exact relationship with the Japanese military

32 Reynolds, Xinzheng Revolution and Japan, pp. 165-71; Kamisaka, Dansō no reijin, p. 48. David Strand, in Rickshaw Beijing: City People and Politics in the 1920s,
at this point is not known, but there is evidence that he was involved in covert operations. According to Reynolds, it was later reported that during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 Kawashima had begun to use the academy as a base for political propaganda against the Russians on behalf of the Japanese. Reynolds adds that the academy was also reported to have become a gathering-place for Japanese adventurers with their eye on Mongolia.\(^{33}\) This was not the only instance of Kawashima’s apparent connection with intelligence-gathering. According to Kamisaka Fuyuko, Kawashima planted a Japanese teacher at a school in Peking run by the Manchu Prince Su, with the teacher reporting to Kawashima regularly on events within the Su household.\(^{34}\) Kawashima’s connection with Prince Su grew even closer, when, in 1913, he adopted one of the prince’s daughters, Chin Pi-hui, renaming her Kawashima Yoshiko.\(^{35}\)

In many respects, Kawashima Naniwa represents the archetypal ‘tairiku rōnin’, or continental adventurer. His early career is certainly a good example of the way in which individual Japanese who were drawn to the Chinese continent subsequently became involved in various schemes to further Japanese influence in the region. Through his association with Fukushima Yasumasa, Kawashima met and developed close ties with the Manchu Prince Su. Together the two men went on to play an important part in the Japanese-sponsored attempts to detach portions of Mongolia and Manchuria from Han Chinese Republican control after 1912, as we will see later.

Meanwhile, by the early 1900s, important changes had begun to occur in the ethnic composition of Inner Mongolia. Until the start of the twentieth century, the regions of Mongolia and Manchuria had been officially off-limits to Han Chinese. This is not to

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34 Kamisaka, *Dansō no reijin*, p. 51.
say that there had been no immigration by Han Chinese into these regions, but rather that numbers were limited. The situation changed in 1902, when, to raise money to pay the Boxer Indemnity required by the foreign powers as compensation for the losses they had suffered during the rebellion, the Ch’ing court abolished the earlier policy of immigration restraint and opened these lands to cultivation. The land was thus sold to Han Chinese who wished to migrate to the region. Then, around 1903, with the extension of the Trans-Siberian Railway as far as Dairen, there was an influx of Russian settlers into the northern Mongolian hinterlands, a region that had long been isolated from the rest of the world.

The increased contacts between Mongols and outsiders led some Mongol nobles to reassess how they viewed their existing relationship with the Manchu and the Han Chinese. Indeed, some nobles gradually became pro-Japanese, in part because they believed that with Japanese help they could achieve greater independence from the Han Chinese, who now controlled them more closely. While the desire to achieve independence was muted prior to the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the seeds that grew into greater Japanese-Mongol co-operation in later years were planted at this time. This was the situation in Mongolia when Kawahara Misako first travelled there.

Kawahara Misako: A Forgotten ‘Hero’

Kawahara is a significant figure in Japanese-Mongol relations, not least because she was a woman and she went to Mongolia as a teacher in 1903. In previous academic commentary on Meiji expansion, where the role of Japanese women has been considered, the focus has most often been upon prostitutes. It is clear, however, from the careers of Kawahara and a number of others like her, that there is a second group of women, namely teachers, who have been largely overlooked in the context of Meiji Japan’s continental expansion. For this reason alone, Kawahara is an important figure, as she provides a different perspective on women’s role in the imperialist project. In addition, Kawahara’s career points to the function of education itself as a means of strengthening the ties between Japan and Mongolia, an aspect of cultural exchange that has received comparatively little scholarly attention. Teaching was in fact originally a male profession in Japan, and the influx of women into the profession did not begin until around 1916, making Kawahara one of the pioneers among women teachers.

It was not only in the cultural realm that she was active, however, and a further dimension of Kawahara’s importance is the part she played in intelligence-gathering operations prior to and during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, using her position as a teacher in Mongolia to serve the Japanese Army General Staff in its desire for accurate information on the region. Finally, through her later activity as a writer, Kawashima contributed strongly to the introduction and consolidation of a romantic

view of Mongolia among the Japanese reading public in the early part of the twentieth century. Such a view persisted in Japanese discourses for decades to come.

Kawahara attracted a good deal of attention in Japan throughout her adult life, especially in the early twentieth century, and again in the 1930s. The publicity that surrounded her raises the question of why her exploits have not received greater attention from historians. The most probable explanation is that Kawahara, while both a woman and a teacher, was also blatantly an agent of Japan’s expansionist policies, and as such may have seemed an embarrassing figure after the Second World War. This is unfortunate, as an examination of Kawahara’s career provides a good understanding of the relationship between official organisations and ‘unofficial’ individuals during Japan’s imperial phase, and of the role that at least one woman played in this relationship.

Kawahara was born in Matsumoto in 1875, the eldest daughter of Kawahara Chû, a respected kagakusha or Chinese literature scholar, and his wife Shinako, who died while Kawahara was still a child. Her family was acquainted with the family of Fukushima Yasumasa. Kawahara graduated from high school, and then went on to attend the Women’s Higher Normal School in Tokyo, later known as Ochanomizu Women’s University, although ill-health forced her to return home without graduating. Despite this, Kawahara continued her studies, presumably at home, and began teaching at Nagano Girls’ High School. It was while she was there that she met the noted Meiji educator Shimoda Utako, whose influence on her was considerable. The extent to

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which Kawahara modelled herself on Shimoda apparently led to Kawahara being nicknamed ‘little Shimoda’ (koShimoda).\footnote{Fukushima, Kawahara Misako, p. 16. Judge, in ‘Talent, Virtue, and the Nation’, p. 778, refers to Kawahara as ‘Shimoda’s disciple’.


Shimoda herself is an important figure not only in the history of education in Japan, but also in her promotion of Pan-Asian ideals. She was very influential in both official and non-official circles concerned with educational reform for girls in China and Japan from the late nineteenth century onwards. She worked closely with both Japanese and Chinese politicians during this period to create educational institutions that instilled in women what she regarded as East Asian values, including the practice of ‘feminine virtues’ and the desire to serve the nation by reorienting these virtues from a simple focus on local issues towards patriotism of a national kind. Her objective was to ‘strengthen Asia’ by extending education to all women while at the same time preserving the Confucian concept of female virtue. Prasenjit Duara has called Shimoda the single most significant figure of the early twentieth century in East Asia in the development of orthodox role models for women, particularly in her insistence that women should be self-sacrificing and frugal.\footnote{Fukushima, Kawahara Misako, p. 16. Judge, in ‘Talent, Virtue, and the Nation’, p. 778, refers to Kawahara as ‘Shimoda’s disciple’.

Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern, Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, pp. 134-5.} In many ways, Shimoda’s views on education for women were actually not that different from those of other leading educational figures in Japan, but what is distinctive is her combination of these views with Pan-Asianism.

It was apparently on Shimoda’s recommendation that Kawahara was employed from 1902 onwards by the famed Wupen Women’s College in Shanghai, as the lone female among the school’s nine teachers. Shimoda probably recommended Kawahara because the two women shared not only broadly similar ideas about education in general, but also more specific ideas about education for women. Kawahara remained
in contact with Shimoda, in all likelihood for the rest of Shimoda’s life. At one point Kawahara asked Shimoda to pen a Foreword for the book she wrote about her time in China proper and Mongolia, as well as entrusting to Shimoda the education of three young Mongol women who had been placed in her care, as we will see below.

Kawahara’s appointment to the Shanghai college may also have been the result of efforts by another person who was in favour of women’s education, namely Güngsangnorbu (Gung), prince of the Kharachin Right Banner, an administrative district in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, who was related by marriage to Prince Su, the Peking sponsor of Kawashima Naniwa. Prince Gung founded one of Mongolia’s earliest modern schools in 1902, and has been referred to by Almaz Khan as the pioneer of modern Mongol education. In 1903 Prince Gung was invited by Major-General Fukushima Yasumasa, who knew the prince as one of the progressive leaders of Inner Mongolia, to visit the Fifth Domestic Industrial Exposition (Daigokai naikoku kanyō hakurankai) in Osaka, which was formally opened by the Emperor Meiji on 20 April 1903. In her own writings, Kawahara suggested that in going to Osaka the prince was not only responding to Fukushima’s invitation, but was also motivated by concern about the growing Russian sphere of influence near the Kharachin Right Banner. He apparently wanted to learn more at the Osaka Exposition about Japan’s industrial progress, ultimately with a view, perhaps, to strengthening Mongolia by imitating Japan’s success. It was while he was there, according to Kawahara, that the prince realised that education, for women as well as for men, had been an important factor in

Japan’s rise to become an industrial and military power. Nakami Tatsuo also stresses that Gung’s visit to Osaka was his first experience of another country, and that Gung was struck by the way in which Japan had modernized, especially in respect of the military and education.

While he was in Osaka, it was reported that Prince Gung discussed with Fukushima the changes that had occurred in Japan as a result of the Meiji Restoration. As one way of facilitating similar changes in Mongolia, the prince apparently requested Japanese aid in regard to education for women. In any event, on his return to his banner, Prince Gung set about establishing a number of schools, including a school for women and a military school, then inviting teaching staff from Japan in an attempt to implement reforms within his banner. The prince also organized for selected Mongolian students to study in either Japan or Peking. Among the students dispatched were a future leader of the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party and a future cabinet member in the influential Mongol leader Prince Teh’s Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government of the 1930s. It must be stressed, however, that the number of Mongols sent to Japan in this period was very small.

In September 1902, Kawahara arrived in Shanghai to begin work as a teacher at Wupen Women’s College. While she was employed there, a series of meetings on the subject of Mongolia took place at the Japanese Legation in Peking, attended by Colonel

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Aoki Nobuzumi, the military attaché; Uchida Yasuya (Kōsai), the Japanese consul-general; and Kawashima Naniwa, then superintendent of the Peking Police Academy. These meetings had been arranged by the Japanese Army General Staff, which had become increasingly concerned about Russia’s economic and strategic ambitions in Mongolia, especially in view of the ever-increasing likelihood of war between Japan and Russia.\(^{51}\) Kuzū Yoshihisa states that Shimagawa Takezaburō, presumably another ‘patriotic adventurer’, also joined Aoki and Uchida.\(^{52}\) The outcome of the meetings was a decision to gather intelligence throughout Manchuria and Mongolia, making use of those ‘tairiku rōnin’ who were then in Peking. The ‘tairiku rōnin’ subsequently dispatched included Ōshima Yokichi, who was sent to Urga, and Yokogawa Shōzō, who, over a period of eighteen months, was ordered to traverse Manchuria a total of three times. On his final journey he travelled throughout Inner Mongolia as well. In addition to these missions, Colonel Aoki also undertook to appoint an army captain, Itō Ryūtarō, as a military instructor at the Kharachin Right Banner administration of Prince Gung.\(^{53}\)

Other developments relating to the region were also occurring in Japan at this time. In late May 1903 a group of seven university professors, six of whom were from Tokyo Imperial University’s prestigious Faculty of Law, began to lobby the government to adopt a strong foreign policy in regard to Russia. These scholars, whose ideas were published in June 1903, had long been working to get the Japanese government to accept not only the necessity of pushing Russia out of Manchuria, as far back as Lake Baikal as some of them urged, but also the inevitability of war as a means of doing

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\(^{51}\) Kawahara, *Karachin ōhi to watashi*, pp. 301-4.


Despite being censured by Tokyo Imperial University authorities for their outspokenness, the seven professors continued to call for war, and there is little doubt, in view of their high positions, that their views were influential. While the professors made no specific reference to Mongolia, a glance at a map would have made clear that much of Mongolia would most likely have fallen under Japanese control if the professors’ demands had been met, as it lay just to the south of the region in question, and thus would be traversed by Japanese troops.

In November 1903, Kawahara Misako left Wupen Women’s College to take up an appointment as governess in Prince Gung’s household. According to the official history of the Kokuryūkai, the person who arranged her appointment was the politician Sasaki Yasugorō, known, because of a visit he had made to Mongolia in the summer of 1903, as the ‘king of Mongolia’. During his 1903 visit, Sasaki met with Prince Gung at the Kharachin Right Banner administration, where the prince’s wife, according to this version of the story, asked him to find a Japanese governess for her children. Sasaki, no doubt eager to oblige, consulted the Japanese consul-general and military attaché in Peking, who both agreed that this was a golden opportunity to place an observer in a banner administration at the centre of a region in which the Russians were active. The woman they selected was Kawahara. Sasaki himself continued to be involved in Japanese-Mongol relations in the years following the 1911 Chinese Revolution, while also serving as an independent member in the Diet.

Kawahara Misako first travelled, in November 1903, from Shanghai to Peking, where she met with the Japanese Consul-General, Uchida Yasuya. Presumably, she

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had already accepted the position of teacher at the banner of Prince Gung, because she was briefed in Peking as to what her new position would involve. It was clear, however, that Kawahara was to be more than a teacher. According to one source, for example, it had been Fukushima Yasumasa, rather than Sasaki Yasugorō, who had engineered her appointment, as Fukushima wanted someone to gather intelligence in Kharachin, given its strategic position in Inner Mongolia.58

![Figure 11: Kawahara Misako, Prince Gung and consort, c. 1904, reproduced from Kawahara Misako, Karachin ôhi to watashi: Mongoru minzoku no kokoro ni ikita josei kyōshi, Tōkyō: Fuyō shobō, 1969, frontispiece.](image)

In this version, Kawahara’s mission was to cultivate Prince Gung, who had earlier visited Japan and shown himself to be sympathetic to the Japanese, and also to ascertain what Russia’s military and political intentions were. Both the Japanese and the Russian military recognised the importance of the Kharachin Right Banner, which lay

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57 For a brief biographical sketch, see ‘Sasaki Yasugorō’, in Nihonshi kōjiten henshū iinkai, Nihonshi kōjiten, Tōkyō: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1997, p. 914.

58 Aida, Kawashima Naniwa-ō, p. 97.
on the road to Hailar and Tsitsihar in Northern Manchuria. Control of the banner could prove vital in the event of war between the two countries. Indeed, because of the geographic position of the Kharachin Right Banner, the Russians were also wooing Prince Gung.59 Thus, part of Kawahara’s purpose in cultivating the prince was presumably to discern what Russia’s intentions were.

After three weeks of preparation in Peking, Kawahara left for her new assignment, arriving at the Kharachin Right Banner administration on 21 December 1903. On 28 December, together with the prince’s consort, she presided over the opening of the Ikusei Women’s College, a school for approximately sixty young women aged between fourteen and seventeen60 (see Figure 11). Having taken up her teaching position, Kawahara was now well placed to begin gathering intelligence. She appears to have fully recognised the danger in which she was placing herself by providing the Japanese military with intelligence regarding Russian troop movements. In the diary that she kept while at the Kharachin Right Banner she wrote, ‘In case of capture by the Russians, I am resolved to commit suicide with the pistol that I received from my father for self-protection when I left my country, and always have near me’.61 Her diary entry suggests that Kawahara’s father, too, might have been aware of the dangers that his daughter could face on the continent, although one wonders if he knew in advance that she might be called upon by her country to be more than a teacher.

Kawahara was not the only intelligence operative dispatched around this time by Major-General Fukushima. At some point in 1904, on orders from Fukushima, Narita Yasuteru, a ‘patriotic adventurer’, was ordered to undertake a reconnaissance trip into

59 Kawahara, Karachin ōhi to watashi, pp. 304-5; Tamaru, Gekitō Ryōjun, Hōten, pp. 193, 199; Ōhama Tetsuya, Shomin no mita Nisshin · Nichiro sensō: teikoku e no ayumi, Tōkyō: Tōsui shōbō, 2003, pp. 115-16.
60 Kawahara, Karachin ōhi to watashi, pp. 304-5; Watanabe Ryūsaku, Bazoku: Nitchū sensō shi no sokumen, Tōkyō: Chūō kōron, 1964, pp. 35-6.
Mongolia from Peking, crossing the Gobi Desert, and then entering Urga to ascertain Russian troop strengths there. This trip may have taken place either prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in February of that year, or after hostilities were underway, as the Japanese Army General Staff still needed to know Russian troop strengths even after the war had begun.

On 10 February 1904, Japanese forces launched a naval attack against the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, and military operations on land were soon underway as well. The Japanese Army General Staff was keenly aware of the need to maintain its strategic advantage in relation to the battlefront, and to deprive Russia of the opportunity to diminish this advantage. Accordingly, special operations teams (tokubetsu ninmuha) were dispatched to carry out a series of attacks against Russia’s principal line of reinforcement, the Trans-Siberian Railway. Forty-six operatives in total were dispatched by the Army General Staff to gather intelligence, as well as to carry out acts of sabotage on railway and telegraph lines. To enable the special operations teams to penetrate Russian-occupied areas, the members were disguised as Mongols. At the end of February 1904, a five-man team arrived at the Kharachin Right Banner administration. Included in the team were Captain Itō Ryūtarō, who had previously served as a military instructor at the banner administration, and Yokogawa Shōzō, one of the tairiku rōnin who had undertaken several intelligence-gathering missions in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia prior to the outbreak of the war. The team remained at

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the banner administration for three days to receive information about the region from Kawahara.65

Overall, the special operations failed to destroy any of the designated targets, with one two-man team being caught and executed by the Russians as it attempted to plant explosive charges in the railway tunnel at Hailar. Nevertheless, the operation should not be judged a complete failure from the Japanese point of view. The hunt by the Russians for the remaining teams no doubt tied down troops who could have been better utilised, so, in all probability, the Japanese Army General Staff would have considered the operation a partial success. It should be noted, to support this conjecture, that following the Russo-Japanese War, Kawahara was decorated with the sixth grade of the Order of the Sacred Crown, an award bestowed only on women and considered to rank as equal to the Order of the Rising Sun, presumably for her role in these operations.66 Moreover, by the late 1920s, the two members of the special operations team who had been executed by the Russians, Yokogawa Shōzō and Oki Teisuke, were being lauded as heroes along with other much more famous figures, including General Nogi Maresuke.67

Kawahara remained at the Kharachin Right Banner administration for the remainder of 1904 and then, at the end of the year, accompanied Prince Gung and his retinue to Peking to deliver the traditional New Year’s greeting to the Manchu emperor.

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It is unclear whether she returned to the banner administration afterwards, but it seems likely that she did, as it is known that at some point she arranged for three daughters of the chief retainer of the Kharachin Right Banner to study in Japan. The three young women, Ho Hsün-cheng, Yü Pao-cheng and Chin Shu-sheng, accompanied Kawahara when she eventually returned to Japan in January 1906. She entrusted them to the care of Shimoda Utako, who had by that time also returned to Japan. The three young women subsequently returned to the Kharachin Right Banner where they worked as teachers.

Kawahara’s activities on the continent, even prior to her move to Inner Mongolia in November 1903, were not unknown in Japan, and her work as a teacher received special attention in the progressive weekly women’s magazine *Fujo shinbun* (Women’s and Girls’ Newspaper), a periodical with a particular focus on women’s education. The magazine ran a series of articles between January 1903 and February 1904 entitled ‘Mōko kikō’ (An Account of My Travels in Mongolia), detailing Kawahara’s adventures while travelling, as well as her experiences as a teacher at the Kharachin Right Banner. In May 1904 another article appeared entitled ‘Zaigai no futari joshi’ (Two Teachers Overseas), concerning the careers of Kawahara in Mongolia and Yasui Tetsu in Siam. Shortly after this, one of Kawahara’s own articles appeared, in which

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70 See Sandra Wilson, ‘Women, the State and the Media in Japan in the Early 1930s: *Fujo shinbun* and the Manchurian Crisis’, *Japan Forum*, vol. 7, no. 1, April 1995, pp. 89-91, for additional information regarding *Fujo shinbun*.

she wrote specifically about teaching in Mongolia, giving details of the curriculum, the number of students, and other matters.\textsuperscript{72} The coverage of Kawahara’s activities in \textit{Fujo shinbun}, a magazine with impeccably respectable credentials, including a connection to the imperial household,\textsuperscript{73} indicates that she was considered to be a very suitable subject for the educated female reading public in Meiji Japan. The recent assertion by Faye Yuan Kleeman that the Japanese press focused primarily on Kawahara’s espionage work, and that the press paid attention to her only after her return to Japan, ignores the stories that appeared in \textit{Fujo shinbun} about Kawahara’s work as a teacher, both prior to and after the war.\textsuperscript{74}

Following her return to Japan, \textit{Fujo shinbun} did publish a number of pieces either about Kawahara or written by her. The first of these, appearing in February 1906, was entitled ‘Kawahara joshi o mukau’ (Welcome to Miss Kawahara), while the second was entitled ‘Möko miyage’ (Mongolian Souvenir).\textsuperscript{75} They were followed in April 1906 by an article by Kawahara entitled ‘Möko kyōiku no gaikyō’ (The General Condition of Education in Mongolia). Finally, in July 1906, \textit{Fujo shinbun} published two articles, one entitled ‘In’ (Retirement), and a second, far longer piece which ran for three consecutive issues, entitled ‘Setchū ume’ (Plums Amid the Snow), an extract from the diary that Kawahara had kept while she was in Mongolia, which told of her intelligence-gathering work for the military espionage team.\textsuperscript{76} Publication of such an article in \textit{Fujo shinbun} again suggests that Kawahara’s military activities in Mongolia were not regarded as something to be hidden, and probably were not even considered a failure in broad terms. Clearly, Kawahara was a role model to be admired, or at least

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{72} Cited in Nagahara Kazuko, ‘\textit{Fujo shinbun} ni miru Ajia kan’, in \textit{Fujo shinbun} o yomukai (ed.), \textit{Fujo shinbun to josei no kindai}, Tōkyō: Fuji shuppan, 1997, pp. 105-6.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Wilson, ‘Women, the State and the Media in Japan in the Early 1930s’, p. 89.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Kleeman, ‘Russo-Japanese War and Literary Expression’, p. 253.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Cited in Chino Reiko, ‘Kaisetsu’, in Fukushima, \textit{Kawahara Misako}, p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Cited in Nagahara, ‘\textit{Fujo shinbun} ni miru Ajia kan’, pp. 105-6, 108.
\end{itemize}
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someone whose activities were judged to be significant. At the same time, the focus on Kawahara inevitably brought an additional focus on Mongolia itself, and on Japan’s relationship with the region.

Kawahara’s memoir, Mōko miyage (Mongolian Souvenir), covering her time in both China proper and Mongolia, was published in 1909 under her married name, Ichinomiya Misako. The book provides considerable insight into how Mongolia was portrayed in Meiji Japan, and also constitutes a significant work in the promotion of closer ties between Japan and Mongolia. Further, it confirms Kawahara’s own high profile: Fukushima Yasumasa contributed some calligraphy to the book, as did the retired statesman Ōkuma Shigenobu, while Shimoda Utako and Shinoda Toshihide, another important figure in Meiji education, each wrote one of the Forewords.

One point to note is the use of the word ‘miyage’, or ‘souvenir’, in the title of the book. The word has a romantic or nostalgic flavour, conjuring up the idea of something special brought home to give to others or as a memory to treasure. The theme of romance was in fact a major aspect of the book as a whole, not just the title. Within its pages, Mongolia is portrayed as an alluring and mysterious place. Kawahara’s introduction begins:

The heart beats as the wind blows across the foreign sands, and the Mongolian moon looks down upon more than two thousand li of sorrow exhausted.

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77 Ichinomiya Misako, Mōko miyage, Tōkyō: Jitsugyō kono Nihonsha, 1909.
78 Shinoda, together with Nakajima Rikizō, Professor of Ethics and Philosophy at Tokyo Imperial University, wrote extensively on education, including women’s education. See, for example, Nakajima Rikizō and Shinoda Toshihide, Fujo shūshikun, Tōkyō: Bungakusha, 1902. For details of Shinoda’s career, see Taishō jinmei jiten gekan, Tōkyō: Tōyō shinpōsha, 1918, reprinted Tōkyō: Nihon tosho sentā, 1987, vol. 2, p. 2,189.
79 Ichinomiya, Mōko miyage, p. 1.
The romantic image is heightened by chapter titles such as ‘Yume?’ (A Dream?) and ‘Setchū ume’ (Plums Amid the Snow). One passage presaged the image of friendship and harmony between Japan and Mongolia that was more consciously propagated during the 1930s. Kawahara’s students are described gathered at a garden party, attended by Prince Gung, his consort and several hundred others, at which the students entertained the assembled guests by singing Japanese and Mongol songs.80

The first part of Kawahara’s book dealt with China proper. Interestingly, this book followed others in distinguishing between the northern region and the rest of China, using terms like ‘Shina honto’ and ‘Shina honbu’ to refer to China proper. For example, when talking about roads in Mongolia, Kawahara began, ‘To reach Mongolia from China proper, …’ (Mōko yori Shina honbu ni itaru ni wa …).81 In making such a distinction, Kawahara followed the convention, found in military and political works of the period, that separated Manchuria, or ‘Manchuria-Mongolia’, from the rest of China.82 This was an important step in the development in Japan of the idea that China and ‘Manchuria-Mongolia’, or China, Manchuria and Mongolia, were actually separate countries, a notion that came to have greater importance as time went on. It was a view articulated with increasing frequency by those in Japan who championed the concept of an ‘independent’ Manchuria-Mongolia in the years following the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1912. Two subsequent chapters of Kawahara’s book were then devoted to her time at the Kharachin Right Banner, with another specifically about the Ikusei Women’s College where she had taught. Another chapter covered a wide range

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80 Ibid., pp. 162-4.
81 Ibid., pp. 228-9.
of topics related to Mongolia, including the weather, animal life, customs, education, and Buddhism.

Despite the deft romantic touches accompanying the description of her experiences in Mongolia, Kawahara the analytical intelligence operative is also very much in evidence in this book. The author provides much information as to Mongolia’s geographical location, as well as a detailed list of the leagues and banners of both Inner and Outer Mongolia. With respect to boundaries, for example, Kawahara was very precise, noting that:

Excluding Tsinghai, Mongolia’s northern boundary is the Altai Mountains and adjoins Russian Siberia, while the Great Wall, which marks the limits of China proper, marks the southern boundary. The basin of the Nunkiang River in Manchuria marks the eastern boundary, while the western boundary adjoins Kansu and Ili provinces. In area, Mongolia covers 248,040 square li [approximately 3,830,952 square kilometres], but has a population equivalent to that of the combined population of Tokyo and Osaka.

In this short passage, Kawahara captures for her readers both the vast size of Mongolia and its sparse population, a combination that became a stock theme to be echoed by later Japanese visitors to Mongolia. The information regarding the leagues and banners of Inner and Outer Mongolia then runs to three pages, including a complete list of the names of the banners within each of the leagues. The inclusion of this highly specialised information is puzzling, given that it is unlikely to have had much practical value for a general readership. It may have reflected a kind of pseudo-scientific

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83 This is presumably Japanese li (1 li = 3.93kms) rather than Chinese li (1 li = 500m).
84 Ichinomiya, Mōko miyage, pp. 211-12.
85 See, for example, Yosano Satoru and Yosano Akiko, Man-Mō yūki, Tōkyō: Ōsaka yagō shoten, 1930, pp. 119-20.
approach, echoing the work of anthropologists including Torii Ryūzō, who, as noted earlier, travelled to the region on a number of occasions, the first time shortly after the Russo-Japanese War, and wrote extensively about his journeys.87

Shortly after her return to Japan in 1906, Kawahara had married Ichinomiya Reitarō,88 the assistant manager of the Yokohama Specie Bank’s New York Branch. She then accompanied her husband to New York, remaining there until 1921. She stayed in the public eye in Japan, however, writing two articles about life in the United States for *Fujo shinbun* not long after arriving in New York, and following these with several others.89 We know little about her life after her return to Japan, but what we do know indicates that, once again, she did not disappear entirely from public view. In the 1930s, especially, Kawahara’s earlier activities received renewed attention. In 1935, as part of the commemoration of the magazine’s thirty-fifth anniversary, *Fujo shinbun* published a book about Kawahara’s exploits during the Russo-Japanese War, written by Fukushima Sadako, the wife of Fukushima Shirō, editor of *Fujo shinbun*.90 This book will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. Then, the following year, Torii Ryūzō, in his memoir of his early visits to Mongolia, wrote of Kawahara and her role as a teacher at the Kharachin Right Banner.91 Kawahara’s own book, *Mōko miyage*, was reprinted in 1943, two years before her death in 1945.92 More recently, Kawahara’s activities at the Kharachin Right Banner have attracted the attention of Japanese historical revisionists, who laud Kawahara as an example of Japan’s

90 Fukushima Shirō is not known to be related to Fukushima Yasumasa.
supposedly benign pre-Second World War relationship with Asia.\textsuperscript{93} Kawahara’s book has also been introduced to a new Japanese reading audience in a paperback edition, part of a series devoted to literary works from Japan’s ‘school of modern romantic writing’,\textsuperscript{94} suggesting that the romantic appeal of Mongolia continues for some Japanese.

While Kawahara Misako was not one of the prime movers of Japanese policy on Mongolia, she did play an important personal part in forging the links between Japan and Mongolia in the first part of the twentieth century, on both the military and the cultural level. The military operations for which she provided intelligence as a spy in 1904-5 were ultimately unsuccessful, but her information must have been considered valuable, given that the government later decorated her. Her more enduring legacy, however, was probably cultural rather than military. Kawahara helped to strengthen ties between Japan and Mongolia through education, presumably also doing her part to spread Shimoda Utako’s Pan-Asian ideals. In the longer run, she contributed to the development of enduring themes in Japanese attitudes to Mongolia: firstly the idea that Mongolia should be regarded as separate from China proper; and secondly, the view of Mongolia as a romantic region worthy of the best endeavours of Japanese adventurers and pioneers. Both these ideas provided important groundwork for later Japanese activities and ambitions in Mongolia.

Kawahara’s career also has wider implications for our understanding of the overall relationship between Japan and Mongolia in the late Meiji period. While the accepted view is probably of a predatory Japan taking every opportunity to expand its military control of the region, Kawahara’s case provides much more nuance. The relationship

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\item \textsuperscript{93} See Irikawa, ‘Mongoru minzoku no kokoro o hikitsuketa Kawahara Misako’, pp. 230-2.
\item \textsuperscript{94} Higuchi Ichiyō and Ichinomiya Misako, \textit{Higuchi Ichiyō / Ichinomiya Misako} (Kindai rōmanha bunko 10), Kyōto: Shingakusha, 2004.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
between Japan and Mongolia was evidently not solely military, but also had a significant cultural dimension, as shown by the teaching activities of Kawahara and others. At the same time, however, there was no clear division between the cultural and the military: after all, Kawahara was both teacher and spy. The Japanese Army had its hand in everything, so that again, the cultural and the military were not separate realms, and the distinction should not be exaggerated. Moreover, Kawahara’s career also provides evidence that the connection between Japan and Mongolia was by no means one-way. The relationship was not equal — it was Japan that was the source of knowledge and aid, and members of the Mongol elite went to Japan to learn and to acquire financial support. Nor, however, was it a case of Japanese action versus Mongol passivity, as we can see from Prince Gung’s approaches to Japan to further his own agenda.

Rather than a picture of Japanese imperialism acting upon a passive and powerless Mongolia, the cases of Kawahara and others point to a shifting, dynamic relationship very much influenced by larger historical events, and seeking to take advantage of new opportunities as well as meet new challenges. This pattern was repeated in the events of the next decade or so. By the early twentieth century, Japanese schemes for Mongolia had extended beyond a few pioneering figures — partly, presumably, thanks to the efforts of those pioneers. Mongolia may not have been of primary concern in Japan’s foreign policy objectives in this period, but nevertheless, military, diplomatic, political and religious considerations combined to produce a significant focus on the region and its potential from Japan’s point of view.

**Other Cultural Connections between Japan and Mongolia**

In addition to Fukushima, Kawashima and Kawahara, there were a number of other groups and individuals who promoted the perceived cultural connections between Japan
and Mongolia. Among them were prominent Meiji political figures, leading academics and important religious leaders. In some instances, the work they undertook was based on a rational premise. This is evident, for example, in the research done by leading academics to show that the Japanese and Mongols were racially alike, or in the attempts by Japanese Buddhist leaders to forge a Japanese-Mongol Buddhist alliance. In other instances, the claims were much more fanciful. The common thread is a clear determination among all of these groups and individuals to draw attention to apparent cultural connections between Japan and Mongolia.

The most fanciful example of this effort to find cultural connections must have been the promotion of the supposed Japanese origins of the great Mongol leader Genghis Khan. As farfetched as it might sound, the legend that Genghis Khan was actually Japanese dates back at least to the early Edo period (1600-1868). The legend holds that Genghis Khan was actually Minamoto no Yoshitsune, one of the greatest of Japan’s medieval heroes. According to the story, Yoshitsune was not in fact killed in 1189 at the Battle of Koromogawa, but rather escaped via Hokkaidō and Sakhalin to Mongolia, where he became Genghis Khan. Yoshitsune, as Genghis, then unified the Mongol tribes and went on to forge the largest empire the world has ever known, while his grandson, Kublai Khan, subsequently sought revenge on his former enemies by staging the attempted Mongol invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281. An early example of the propagation of this myth is the Chinese-language work *Chin-shih pieh-pen* (A Separate History of the Jin), by Sawada Gennai, dating from the mid-seventeenth century. The tale re-emerged periodically throughout the Edo period,

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95 Nakami, ‘Mongol Nationalism and Japan’, in Narangoa and Cribb (eds), *Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia*, p. 91.
suggesting that it retained a certain appeal. It was in the early Meiji period, however, that it was presented to a far larger audience, both inside and outside Japan.  

In July 1885 a Japanese translation appeared of a book by the journalist and writer Suematsu Kenchō, originally entitled *Identity of Great Conqueror Genghis Khan with the Japanese Hero Yoshitsune: An Historical Thesis* and first published in English in 1879. The Japanese version fast became a best-seller. Indeed, by November 1886, only seventeen months after the translation had been published in Japan, it was in its sixth printing, suggesting it had struck a chord with Japanese readers. It is not clear why Suematsu first wrote in English, but the book was completed while he was resident in England. According to Miyawaki Junko, it was while studying at Cambridge that Suematsu noticed that the *on* reading (*onyomi*) of Minamoto’s name, or ‘Gengikei’, was similar in sound to that of Genghis Khan, ‘Jingiskan’, and concluded that the founder of the Mongol empire had in fact been Japanese, although as noted above, the myth pre-dated Suematsu by at least two centuries.

What is important here is Suematsu’s high profile, and hence the prominence of this theory in the 1880s and beyond. He was well connected, well educated and well placed. Ten years before his book appeared in Japanese, Suematsu, then a journalist working for the newspaper *Tōkyō nichinichi* (Tokyo Daily), had been taken under the wing of Itō Hirobumi, one of the most important figures of the Meiji political world. With Itō’s assistance, Suematsu had gone to England, serving from 1878 on the staff of

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100 Uchida Yahachi (trans. and ed.), *Yoshitsune saikō-ki*, Tōkyō: Uedaya, 1886.
the Japanese Legation in London, before moving to Cambridge University to study law. Suematsu remained at Cambridge until 1886. By the 1880s, Suematsu was an influential member of Japanese ruling circles, becoming not only Itō’s son-in-law in 1889 but also a prominent politician who sat in the Diet for many years and who also served in different capacities in several of Itō’s cabinets. He became a member of the Privy Council in 1906. Suematsu’s case, while idiosyncratic, shows that at least one member of Japan’s ruling elite in the late Meiji period had a distinct perception of Mongolia, and indeed harboured very particular ideas as to the historical relationship between Japan and Mongolia.

Nor was Suematsu the only person to popularise the long-standing ‘Yoshitsune is Genghis Khan’ myth in the modern period. The tale reappeared in 1924, with the publication of a study by Oyabe Zen’ichirō, a Yale-educated Christian minister and teacher, and again just prior to the Manchurian Incident of September 1931, in a short story by noted author Sakaguchi Ango, who went on to become a well-known writer after World War Two. The myth was even propagated in the early 1940s to a Western audience in English-language works by Japanese authors. These examples suggest that the myth of Yoshitsune and Genghis Khan had a certain appeal for the

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101 Miyawaki, Mongoru no rekishi, p. 218.
104 See Doi Zenjiro, Yoshitsune densetsu o tsukutta otoko: Yoshitsune Jingisu Kan setsu o toaeta kikotsu no hito, Oyabe Zen’ichirō den, Tōkyō: Köjinsha, 2005, for the most recent examination of Oyabe’s book. Doi covers Oyabe’s entire life, but focuses particular attention on how Oyabe researched his theory that Yoshitsune and Genghis Khan were one and the same person during his time in Hokkaidō, living among the Ainu, and then in Siberia during the 1918-22 Japanese intervention.
106 See Jaya Deva, Japan’s Kampf, London: Victor Gollancz, 1942, pp. 129-30, where reference is made to a book, Japan’s Next Step, in which the myth was explained.
Japanese reading public and that certain Japanese were happy to propagate the myth to a larger audience.

There was also, of course, more serious academic research undertaken by Japanese scholars into the relationship between Japan and Mongolia. While much of the early Meiji focus on Mongolia had been military and strategic, in the period following the Russo-Japanese War, academics began to develop and disseminate the idea that the Japanese and the Mongols were in some way directly related. Moreover, several prominent Japanese academics, among them Shiratori Kurakichi and Torii Ryūzō, began to focus specifically on Mongolia.

By the late nineteenth century, Social Darwinism, and the notion that the maxim ‘survival of the fittest’ could also be applied to race, were prominent in academic circles throughout the world, prompting considerable activity in the measuring, photographing, and even collecting of indigenous peoples. At the same time, while the proto-anthropologists were measuring and comparing the races of the world, the proto-linguists were endeavouring to unravel the links among the various tongues, hoping to show which groups were related. In 1857 the Austrian scholar Anton Boller published a work aimed at proving that Japanese was a language within the Ural-Altaic category of languages — that is, the Uralic group, comprising Samoyed and Finno-Urgic, and the

Altaic group, comprising Turkic, Mongolian and Manchu-Tungus.\(^{108}\) By the late nineteenth century, this idea had reached Japan, where it was developed primarily by the eminent Sinologist Shiratori Kurakichi, who used Boller’s thesis to argue that Japan’s roots were in Northeast Asia, even while emphasising Japan’s supposed superiority over other members of this ‘family’ of nations.\(^{109}\) Using methods from linguistics and ethnology, Shiratori did groundbreaking research on the various peoples of Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia and Inner Asia, giving the Mongols great prominence in his writings as a driving force of history.\(^{110}\)

Nor was Shiratori alone in thinking that Mongolia had played a special role in history from Japan’s point of view, and indeed the world’s. From the spring of 1906 through until December 1908, Torii Ryūzō, the so-called ‘father of modern Japanese anthropology’, served as both advisor and teacher to Prince Gung in Inner Mongolia, while Torii’s wife replaced Kawahara Misako as a teacher at Ikusei Women’s College.\(^{111}\) After his return to Japan, Torii produced the first Japanese anthropological study of ‘Eastern Mongolia’. The book had two Forewords, one by Fukushima Yasumasa and the other by Ōkuma Shigenobu. Of the two, Ōkuma’s is the more significant, beginning: ‘Except for Korea, Japan’s deepest relationship is with Eastern Mongolia …’.\(^{112}\) Ōkuma’s comment provides further evidence that politicians as well

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\(^{109}\) Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, p. 182.


as academics were conscious of Japan’s supposed special historical relationship with Mongolia.

Ultimately, Torii himself hoped to develop an integrated conception of Asia with Japan at the centre. He subscribed to the view that Northeast Asia was the ancient meeting-ground of all the ‘Far Eastern’ races, and he also believed that the indigenous inhabitants of the Siberian-Manchurian region had remained basically unchanged since ‘prehistoric times’. Torii suggested that shamanism had provided a common feature of and source for all the indigenous religions of Northeast Asia, including those of Korea and Japan. Kuwabara Jitsuzō, the legendary late-Meiji Sinologist, followed Torii’s lead in studying Mongolia, spending one and a half months in ‘Eastern Mongolia’ from July 1908. Kuwabara was obviously enthralled by his trip to Mongolia, and in his later writings he took pains to distinguish Han Chinese from Mongol culture.

The belief in the importance of the Mongolian plateau in the development of civilization was not confined to Japanese scholars. In October 1909, an expedition by the Russian Academy of Science and Geological Research in the Amur District returned from Mongolia. M. Wittenburg, the expedition leader, apparently believed that he had collected evidence to support the theory first advanced by the explorer Pyotr Alexeyevich Kropotkin some forty years earlier, that the first humans had lived on the banks of the lakes of the Gobi plains, and thus, Mongolia was the cradle of the human race.

In turn, Shiratori Kurakichi, having already employed the Ural-Altaic theory to construct a new paradigm of history, further developed Torii’s proposition that the

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113 Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity, p. 183.
Mongolian plateau had been a meeting-place for various different peoples. According to Duara, Shiratori believed the Altaic peoples of Asia, especially the Mongols, were the ‘key to the unfolding of world history’. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Shiratori, now a professor at Tokyo Imperial University, had produced a body of work that covered mythology, ethnology, and comparative linguistics among Koreans, the Hsiung-nu (a people on China’s northern border during the Han dynasty, 206 B.C.-220 A.D.), the Manchus, and the Mongols. The culmination of all of his scholarship was the idea that the Mongols had been a major force affecting the history of both the Orient and Europe. To sustain this point of view he had to reclassify a number of peoples as members of a Mongol subgroup, thereby creating a genealogy that considerably elevated the Mongol influence in Eurasian history. The idea that the Japanese and the Mongols were related, in terms of both race and language, was one that Japanese academics also advanced to foreign audiences in the early part of the twentieth century. In the years that followed, Mongolia continued to receive more than its fair share of attention from Japanese academics.

Religion provided further links between Japan and Mongolia from an early point. Japanese religious groups cultivated ties with Mongolia, largely because Buddhism was the dominant religion in both Japan and Mongolia. In fact, in 1873, six years prior to Fukushima’s first visit to the region and three years before Japanese Buddhist missions to China proper started, a group from the Kyoto Ōtani school’s Honganji temple, home of a famous and powerful Japanese Buddhist sect, journeyed to Mongolia.

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116 Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity, p. 183.
117 Tanaka, Japan’s Orient, pp. 63, 78-9, 88-9.
This is the earliest modern contact between Japan and Mongolia that I have discovered in the course of my research. After overcoming various hardships, the travellers first entered Inner Mongolia, to conduct research on Buddhist practices there, and then proceeded on to Outer Mongolia. The ultimate aim of the mission was apparently to establish an East Asian Buddhist Federation. According to Brian Victoria, the Japanese government lent its support to Buddhist activities in China as a whole because, as a Pan-Asian religion, Buddhism was seen as a useful tool in promoting the unity of East Asian people under Japanese hegemony. Certainly, Honganji’s activities in Mongolia were part of a broader interest in the region, including North China. This is shown by the temple’s dispatch of a party to help wounded Japanese soldiers during the Boxer Rebellion, and to ascertain how the welfare of the troops could be improved. One prominent member of the party was Okumura Ioko, who returned to Japan to found the Aikoku fujinkai (Patriotic Women’s Association) in 1901.

Buddhism was also useful as a cover for other activities. For example, prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, an agreement was reached between Japanese Army vice-chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Kawakami Sōroku, and Ōtani Közui of Kyoto’s Honganji sect, that all Honganji missions dispatched to China proper, Siberia and Mongolia would assist the military in intelligence-gathering activities. Co-operation between the Japanese Army and the Honganji sect continued after the victory over China in 1895. Two years later, Shimizu Shōgetsu, supposedly a priest from Nishi Honganji temple in Kyoto, arrived in Vladivostok to serve as a priest at the sect’s temple there. In the winter of 1899 he travelled throughout Eastern Siberia,

121 Ibid.
122 Victoria, Zen War Stories, p. 92.
going as far west as Irkutsk before passing through Mongolia to Kirin, Changchun, Manchouli and Maimaicheng in Manchuria. In actuality, however, ‘Shimizu’ was the pseudonym of Captain Hanada Nakanosuke, who had been sent secretly to Siberia on the orders of Lieutenant-General Kawakami, Vice-Chief of the Japanese Army General Staff. The use of the role of Buddhist monk as cover for military intelligence-gathering operations continued until almost the end of World War Two.

There were also more concrete ties between the Japanese Army and the Honganji sect, in relation to activities in China proper and Mongolia. One link was a language school established in Kobe by Ōtani around the turn of the century, which included army officers among its students. Little is known about the school, but it was definitely operating prior to the Chinese Revolution of 1911. The school employed a Mongol lama as the teacher of Mongolian, and it is reported that at least nine army officers studied the language there for a period of three years. Unfortunately, direct evidence is scanty: the only officer actually on record as having studied at the Ōtani school is Hayashi Daihachi, who later served in Harbin and Taonan in Manchuria in 1914, and the Russian Far East during the 1918-22 Siberian Intervention.

Ōtani and Japanese military intelligence were linked in other ways as well. In the first decade of the twentieth century, Ōtani dispatched a number of young acolytes to Mongolia, the most famous being Tachibana Zuichō. Tachibana travelled first through Mongolia and then throughout much of Central Asia, crisscrossing the region, supposedly in search of Buddhist relics, but more likely gathering intelligence for the

125 Ōhama, Shomin no mita Nisshin · Nichiro sensō, pp. 102-3.
Japanese military.\textsuperscript{128} His travels were reported in both the English-language press in Japan and the Western press.\textsuperscript{129} According to Peter Hopkirk, Tachibana’s travels also attracted the attention of British military intelligence, which suspected him of being a Japanese naval officer and lodged an official complaint with the Japanese government when Tachibana approached the border between Kashgar and British India.\textsuperscript{130}

An important event in Japanese-Mongolian relations occurred in the summer of 1901, and once again there was a connection with the Honganji temple. Teramoto Enga, a Zen Buddhist monk and one of the first Japanese to go to Tibet in the modern period, led a delegation of thirteen prominent Tibetan and Mongol holy men or ‘living Buddhas’\textsuperscript{131} and Lamaist dignitaries to Japan, where they met representatives of Higashi Honganji temple in Kyoto, as well as leading political figures in Tokyo. The group was also granted an audience with Emperor Meiji. Teramoto, who had studied at the Yung-hogung temple in Peking in 1898, had emerged as a hero to Tibetan and Mongol lamas of that temple in the period after the Boxer Rebellion, for his efforts in getting Russian troops evicted from the temple grounds where they had been quartered.\textsuperscript{132} In the aftermath of the siege of the legations, food had been scarce in Peking, but Teramoto had also succeeded in obtaining some tons of rice to sustain the starving lamas, a move that apparently led Buddhists from Mongolia to Tibet to regard

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\textsuperscript{131} For an explanation of what a ‘living Buddha’ was, see Sechin Jagchid and Paul Hyer, \textit{Mongolia’s Culture and Society}, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979, pp. 184-7. In 1906-7, Teramoto also endeavoured, ultimately unsuccessfully, to arrange for the Dalai Lama to visit Japan.
\textsuperscript{132} Berry, \textit{Monks, Spies and a Soldier of Fortune}, pp. 60-2.
\end{flushleft}
Japan as the defender of the faith. The idea that Japan was the protector of the Buddhist faith in Mongolia was exploited again and again from the Japanese side in subsequent years, and the religious ties between Japan and Mongolia continued through the next half-century.

Mongolia in Japanese Military, Diplomatic and Political Thinking after 1905

The Japanese Army General Staff continued to regard Mongolia as a region of geo-strategic importance for Japan after the Russo-Japanese War. Several pieces of evidence support this conclusion. In 1906, for example, two officers, Majors Uehara Taichi and Hino Tsuyoshi, were ordered to undertake a journey through China and Central Asia, including Mongolia. Uehara spent as long as four years investigating Mongolia and Sinkiang, living for part of this time in Ili in Sinkiang while learning Mongolian and Russian. In March 1908, moreover, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Government-General, Major-General Hoshino Kingō, forwarded a copy of a report by a Colonel Morita to Foreign Ministry undersecretary Chinda Sutemi, following a visit to Mongolia by Morita. This report, which ran to more than three hundred pages, constituted a very thorough examination of Inner Mongolia. It clearly detailed the borders between Inner and Outer Mongolia, in particular the borders of the six leagues of Inner Mongolia, as well as those within Heilungkiang and Kirin provinces in Manchuria. Evidently, the army was still intent on collecting information about Mongolia.

134 Gaikō shiryōkan, Tokyo, ‘Uchimōko ryokō nikki tame osankō sōfu sōrō nari’, 12 March 1908, in Foreign Ministry papers, 5-1-10-26, ‘Morita rikugun chūsa no Uchimōko ryokō nikki’.
In addition to intelligence-gathering, the Japanese Army General Staff also undertook to win hearts and minds in Mongolia. In 1907, Major Moriyama Toshitō was assigned as military attaché at Changchun, in Manchuria, but was charged specifically with improving Japanese-Mongol relations. To do this, Moriyama brought together a number of the Mongol leaders in the region and implemented a program under which the Japanese language was taught to Mongols, while Mongolian was taught to Japanese, presumably to army officers assigned to the region. His long-term objective was apparently to combat Russian designs on Mongolia and to foster Japanese-Mongol friendship among the ten banners of ‘Eastern Mongolia’, as well as the forty-nine banners of Outer Mongolia.135

From this point onwards, the relationship between officers within the Japanese military and members of the right wing who wanted to bring Mongolia more directly under Japanese control became closer. Adachi Takanari, for example, a member of the Japanese Army General Staff’s survey department, undertook a trip to Manchuria and Mongolia in 1909.136 In the years to follow, Adachi was part of a group that included Tōyama Mitsuru, founder of the right-wing Genyōsha (Dark Ocean Society); Kawashima Naniwa; Uchida Ryōhei, one of the co-founders of the Kokuryūkai; and others who were concerned with issues relating to Manchuria-Mongolia.137 Together with Kawashima, Adachi subsequently took part in the second Manchurian-Mongolian independence movement of 1916.138

Japanese diplomats also focused on Japan’s relationship with Mongolia in the late Meiji period. Mongolia was an important consideration in all four of the ententes by which Russia and Japan sought to resolve their differences in the aftermath of the war

137 Ibid.
of 1904-5. Under the first of these, signed in 1907, the two countries divided the region of Mongolia and Manchuria into separate spheres of influence. Although Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria was nominally affirmed, Russia recognized Japan’s pre-eminent position in the south, and in Inner Mongolia to the east. In return, Japan recognized Russian influence as paramount in Northern Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang.\textsuperscript{139} According to the Mongolian historian Baabar, however, several years later, Japan coerced an admission from Russia that Outer Mongolia actually lay within Japan’s sphere of interest.\textsuperscript{140}

Those in the political world who paid attention to Mongolia were not limited merely to members of the government or to the bureaucracy, but were also found on the fringes. One organisation that focused on Mongolia was the Rôninkai (literally, masterless samurai society), a small society established in 1908 by Tôyama Mitsuru, who, as previously noted, was the founder of the Genyôsha and was also godfather to the Kokuryûkai, established seven years earlier in February 1901. The new group seems to have been a subsidiary of the Kokuryûkai. Its exact purpose is not clear, but it appears to have concentrated initially on strengthening Japanese influence over Mongolia, by seeking intelligence there, as well as creating a cell of activists, presumably made up of suitable Japanese individuals in Mongolia.\textsuperscript{141} Members of the society included Nakano Seigô, an important political figure who served in the Diet.


from 1920, and Kazami Akira, a longtime associate of Nakano’s. The Kokuryūkai itself had already incorporated a focus on Mongolia and its neighbours in its manifesto, where it declared that Japan must fight Russia and expel it from the East, then ‘lay the foundation for a grand continental enterprise taking Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia as one region’.

Conclusion
The first period of modern Japanese-Mongolian relations established many of the characteristics that remained constant in the following decades. The most significant of these was a perception of the geo-strategic importance of Mongolia to Japan, with Mongolia lying as it did between Tsarist Russia and Imperial China, both potential rivals of Japan’s. Accompanying the emphasis on Mongolia’s geo-strategic position was a sense of romance about the region and a belief that Japan and Mongolia had a shared ancestry in ethnic terms. These themes could be found in the exploits of Fukushima, the writings of Kawahara and Suematsu, and the academic theories of Torii and Shiratori. Moreover, it was during this early period that the networks of groups and individuals that sought to establish Japanese control of Mongolia first emerged — some within the most powerful institutions of the Japanese state and others on the fringes of Japanese society — networks that remained active until 1945.

The next chapter will examine the two unsuccessful attempts, in 1912 and 1916, by factions within the Japanese military, aided by members of the right wing and business groups, to support the establishment of an ‘independent’ Manchuria-Mongolia. It will also consider the shift in strategic thinking within the Japanese military

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CHAPTER TWO

CARPE DIEM?: THE MANCHURIAN-MONGOLIAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS, 1912-22

It is Manchuria and ... Mongolia that offer her [Japan] the easiest field [for expansion]; and therefore he who wishes to understand the essence of Japanese policy must carefully watch every development in this zone.¹

With the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty in February 1912 and the subsequent power vacuum in Northeast Asia, Japan seemed poised to take a much greater role in Asia. Manchuria and Mongolia were prime areas for increased Japanese activity, and between 1912 and 1922, members of the various Japanese elites made numerous attempts to delineate a sphere of influence there for Japan, and to increase Japanese control. These disparate efforts were by no means coordinated, but together they do reveal a marked overlapping of goals among several powerful institutions and groups, even while opinions differed on how Japanese control could be increased.

The resolve of the Japanese military to increase its power in Mongolia is particularly evident, and circumstances were conducive to this project in the fluid conditions surrounding the end of both the Ch’ing and Tsarist empires, as well as the events of the First World War. One major result of the opportunities presented by these developments was Japanese military involvement in three separate movements to wrest Mongolia from Han Chinese control, in 1912, 1916 and 1918-22. Though these movements were abortive, Japanese participation in them indicates the lengths to which some military officers were prepared to go in an attempt to facilitate Japanese

domination of the region. The Japanese Army officers involved were for the most part field officers and not especially senior, but considerable evidence suggests that their attempts were supported from above. Moreover, Robert Valliant noted in 1972 that in all three movements between 1912 and 1922 there was a consistency of purpose on the part of elements of the Japanese military and the right wing, as well as continuity in Japanese personnel, both military and civilian.² Valliant, however, overlooks several points of conflict over Mongolia among the Japanese elites, which will be discussed below.

An important feature of Japanese military activity in this period was the apparent willingness of the Army’s high command to turn a blind eye to the incidences of insubordination that occurred in connection with all three military operations in Mongolia. In each operation, as noted earlier, there appears to have been high-level tolerance, approval or support of military action in the field that was designed to increase Japanese control of Mongolia, even when these field actions constituted clear instances of insubordination. Arguably, this high-level approval or tolerance of independent action set a pattern that was later exploited by the Kwantung Army in the assassination of Chang Tso-lin in 1928 and the Manchurian Incident of 1931.

From the numerous attempts to delineate Japan’s sphere of military influence or to increase direct Japanese control of the region in this period, it is clear that the supposed strategic importance of Mongolia to Japan was uppermost in the relationship, and had a distinct impact on Japanese-Mongolians ties. Not surprisingly, therefore, elements of the Japanese military and the right wing were in the ascendancy in the relationship between 1912 and 1922. Religious, academic and business groups did continue to

seek closer ties with Mongolia, but their activities were largely overshadowed by the operations of the military and of right-wing activists.

Nevertheless, as in earlier periods, the relationship between Japan and Mongolia was a two-way affair in these years. Especially in the diplomatic arena, several overtures to Japan were made from the Mongolian side, suggesting, once more, that circumstances were fairly favourable to an increase in Japanese influence in the region. The various approaches during the period made by Mongolian individuals and groups seeking either diplomatic recognition or concrete aid from Japan no doubt further reinforced the perception among the Japanese elites of the validity of Japan’s claims to leadership within the region.

This chapter will first consider the geopolitical context of the three Japanese-backed ‘independence’ movements between 1912 and 1922. Then it will examine the ongoing promotion within Japan of Japanese ambitions in Mongolia between the 1912 and 1916 movements. In particular, I will consider the efforts of members of the press, political figures and academics to draw attention to these ambitions. Next I will re-examine the role of the Japanese Army high command in all three operations, paying particular attention to the willingness of high-ranking army officers to overlook insubordination when it suited their purposes. Finally, I will consider the various overtures made by Mongolian leaders to their counterparts in Japan in their quest for either diplomatic recognition or concrete aid.

**The Geopolitical Context of the ‘Independence’ Movements**

Throughout this period, Japanese-Mongolian relations were again strongly coloured by changes in Japan’s relations with both China and Russia. Sino-Japanese relations were profoundly affected by the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty in February 1912 and the establishment of the Han Chinese republic, a development that cannot have been
completely unexpected by the Japanese authorities. Prior to the downfall of the Ch’ing dynasty, some in the Japanese government and military had supported its overthrow by providing arms and financial assistance to anti-Ch’ing groups, as well as political asylum for their members in Japan.\(^3\) The general aim of this assistance seems to have been to ensure a weakened China, one that could be more easily influenced by Japan.

With the outbreak of the Wuchang uprising in October 1911, the Ch’ing dynasty, in decline ever since its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, was wracked by fresh upheaval, which eventually culminated in the abdication of the emperor in February 1912. The demise of the Ch’ing dynasty and the arrival of its replacement, a comparatively weak Republican government, have been described by Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka as ‘a once-in-a-century chance to strengthen Japan’s influence both north and south of the Wall dramatically’.\(^4\) Even the creation of the Republican government, however, was met with opposition from some of those who had supported the overthrow of the Ch’ing dynasty, presumably because they were opposed in principle to a republican form of government. Japanese aid, therefore, was subsequently funneled to Mongol and Manchu leaders who favoured an imperial restoration,\(^5\) albeit one controlled by the Japanese.

The fluidity of the situation on the Chinese continent affected both the Japanese and the Mongols. In December 1911, eighty Mongol princes had gathered in Peking for consultations about the possible future of the Manchu dynasty. Some of the princes went so far as to suggest that China should be divided in two, with the southern part becoming a republic and the northern part remaining a Manchu monarchy, though


it is not clear why they suggested such a move. Others opted to join the so-called ‘royalist party’, headed by a Manchu prince who was supported to a limited extent by the Japanese military and Japanese right-wing groups. As a part the plan it was proposed that an independent country called ‘Manchuria-Mongolia’ be established under Japanese and Russian protection.6

Prince Gung of the Inner Mongolian Kharachin Right Banner, who was probably a member of the ‘royalist party’, then requested Japanese support for a Mongolian independence movement. Japanese leaders were quick to exploit this opportunity, and in the same month as the princes met in Peking, the Japanese Foreign Ministry approved a loan of 200,000 taels (approximately US$148,000) to Prince Gung through the Yokohama Specie Bank. Other princes followed suit and applied to Japan for loans. The Japanese Army General Staff negotiated with the Mongols through Major Taga Muneyuki and Ôkura Kihachirô, head of Ôkura-gumi, one of the largest Japanese industrial-financial combines. A total of ¥110,000 (approximately US$55,840) was loaned, with the security being mining rights in the five banners of the Chao-uda League. Nor was Japanese aid restricted to loans. In an effort to ensure the success of the independence movement, Prince Gung also requested arms and ammunition. Accordingly, in December 1911, the Army General Staff dispatched three army officers, Major Taga, Captain Matsui Shinsuke and Captain Kimura Naoto, to liaise with Prince Gung. All three subsequently figured prominently in operations in Mongolia. Japan’s dealings with the Mongol princes in the region did not go unnoticed. Chao Erh-sun, the Han Chinese Governor-General of the three Northeastern Provinces, that is,

Manchuria, complained to Peking about the subsequent smuggling of arms by Japanese to the Mongols.\(^7\)

Events, however, were moving faster than the Ch’ing dynasty could control. While the princes in Southern Mongolia were approaching the Japanese for assistance, the princes in Northern Mongolia had already taken the initiative. In November 1911, Outer Mongolians opposed to Chinese rule rose against the Han Chinese officials stationed in Urga, the capital of Outer Mongolia, and imprisoned the Chinese Resident, that is, the most senior official representing the Ch’ing government. They then declared the Bogd Khan, the supreme Buddhist leader of Outer Mongolia, to be the head of a ‘Mongolian Confederacy’.\(^8\) On 3 November 1911 the Outer Mongolian princes formally declared their independence from China, claiming that all along their allegiance had been to the Manchu throne, and not to the political entity known as ‘China’. A message proclaiming the independence of Northern Mongolia was sent to France, Britain, Germany, the United States, Belgium, Japan, Denmark, the Netherlands and Austro-Hungary.\(^9\) As Matsusaka has noted, however, while China’s relationship

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with Outer Mongolia may have been under challenge and poorly defined, by 1912 the Han Chinese Republic’s formal sovereignty over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was recognised by international treaties, making Japan’s subsequent attempts to assert its control over this region tentative at best.

Japan’s relations with Tsarist Russia were also changing rapidly. In the years following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the Japanese government made a concerted effort to resolve territorial differences with its former enemy through a series of diplomatic agreements. As discussed in the previous chapter, the first of these agreements, signed in May 1907, divided the contested region of Manchuria and Mongolia between Russia and Japan: Russia recognised Japan’s pre-eminent position in South Manchuria and in Inner Mongolia to the east, while Japan recognised Russian influence as paramount in Northern Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang. This first Russo-Japanese agreement was followed, in July 1910, by a second that more precisely delineated the respective Japanese and Russian spheres of influence in Northeast Asia. Russo-Japanese relations, however, were complicated by Outer Mongolia’s declaration of independence, a development that neither Tsarist Russia nor imperial Japan could ignore. When the Outer Mongolian forces ousted the Chinese officials in Urga in November 1911, the Russians reacted swiftly to replace the Chinese, sending troops to Urga ‘for the protection of Russian residents and also for maintenance of peace in Mongolia’.

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Following these Russian troop movements, the Japanese press raised the question of how Japan’s own position on the continent might change.\textsuperscript{14} For its part, the Japanese government clearly viewed Russia’s actions with alarm, and political negotiations between Russia and Japan recommenced, culminating in the third Russo-Japanese agreement, signed in July 1912. This agreement not only reconfirmed Russia’s pre-eminence in Outer Mongolia, but also fixed the line of demarcation between the respective spheres of influence of Russia and Japan at the meridian of Peking, meaning that Outer Mongolia, the Barga region of northwestern Manchuria, and the portion of Inner Mongolia found in Chahar and Suiyuan provinces were placed under Russian influence, while Jehol and the three Manchurian provinces were placed under Japanese influence.\textsuperscript{15}

Tsarist Russia and Japan signed a fourth and final agreement in 1916, in which the two countries agreed to work together to prevent China falling under the control of a third power,\textsuperscript{16} the most likely contender being the United States. All four agreements, however, were overturned in November 1917, in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution. Russo-Japanese relations were further affected by the Russian civil war from 1918 to 1922, and by Japanese involvement in this war through the provision of support for the White Russian forces. In the Russian Far East, a series of actions ensued that became known in Japan as the Siberian Intervention, during which elements of the Japanese military once again sought to seize control of Outer Mongolia, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{14} ‘Mōko dokuritsu to Rokoku’, YS, 7 January 1912, p. 2; ‘Rokoku no yōkyū’, YS, 11 January 1912, p. 2.
The 1912 ‘Independence’ Movement

At the beginning of 1912, the most senior military figures among Japan’s top leaders, Yamagata Aritomo, Katsura Tarō and Terauchi Masatake, had all come to the conclusion that Japan should send reinforcements to the Kwantung Province, in the southern part of Manchuria, where Japanese troops had been stationed since 1905, to defend Japan’s territorial interests from the consequences of the Chinese revolution. Desiring to avoid arousing international suspicion, however, the cabinet in fact decided on 12 January 1912 not to move troops, but rather to initiate talks with Russia about Japanese and Russian spheres of interest. This rejection of the military advice resulted in dissatisfaction among certain Japanese Army officers, who saw the ongoing Chinese revolution as an opportunity for action. In this context, a plan was formulated by Major-General Utsunomiya Tarō, a section head in the Japanese Army General Staff, and Kawashima Naniwa, then attached to the Peking Legation, to encourage the separation of both Manchuria and Mongolia from the rest of China.17 Accordingly, throughout January and February of 1912, Japanese Army officers were assigned to different parts of Mongolia, and ordered to gather intelligence, especially on the attitude to Japan of the Mongol nobles, as well as to conduct topographical surveys.18

The decision to assign these officers was probably taken as a way of circumventing the cabinet’s decision not to move troops to Kwantung Province, and in order to allow for a degree of ‘independent’ action by officers on the scene. This supposition is supported by what followed. As we have seen, several Mongolian princes were applying to Japan for financial aid around this time. On 22 January 1912 Kawashima

Naniwa dispatched a telegram to the Army General Staff that read, ‘the Mongol princes have asked for Japanese aid as they long to escape from the tiger’s mouth’. A second telegram followed, announcing that on 2 February, Prince Su, under the alias of Chin An-tai, had left Peking, where, with the collapse of the Manchu dynasty, there was growing unrest, for the safety of Dairen. A third telegram read, ‘It is estimated that we require approximately ¥50,000 (approximately US$25,400) to get Prince Su to join us’. At the same time that he was organising for the Japanese to support Prince Su financially, Kawashima was also concluding an agreement with Prince Gung to provide Japanese aid in other ways as well, with the aim of bringing about the independence of Mongolia. This agreement comprised ten points and aimed to establish a region in Inner Mongolia from which, presumably, Japan would oppose Russia. According to Kawashima, only weeks before the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty, Prince Gung had said:

Mongolia is not a part of China. More than ever, at the present time, with the collapse of the Manchus, it is only right that Mongolia should be independent of China. Further, Mongolia should not be unhappy. On this occasion, with Japanese aid, we should strive for independence.

Nor was he alone in this belief. As the noted Mongolist Owen Lattimore wrote in 1935:

Mongolia having been artificially linked with China under the Manchu dynasty, the fall of the dynasty ought to have broken the connection. The idea that a Chinese republic could claim

20 Ibid., pp. 55-6.
21 Ibid., p. 55.
to inherit the Manchu overlordship in Mongolia was historically a non-sequitur. Mongol independence of China was something that had always existed.\textsuperscript{22}

As mentioned above, one part of the plan to detach Mongolia from Chinese control involved the placement of Japanese Army officers at a number of the leagues and banners throughout Inner Mongolia. This, however, was not a new development. The large numbers of surveys that the Japanese military had ordered conducted by military officers and right-wing adventurers in the decade before the revolution had already furnished intelligence to facilitate both the detachment of Mongolia and Manchuria from China, and the control of the region by Japanese forces.\textsuperscript{23} Kawashima Naniwa’s ongoing relationship with Prince Su, who was to be one of the principal leaders of the first independence movement, also suggests that the 1912 movement did not occur spontaneously. For the better part of a decade, both the Japanese military and the right wing had cultivated Su and others like him in China who had been strongly opposed to a republican government and to Han Chinese control of the region north of the Great Wall.

The immediate foundations of the 1912 movement were certainly laid in the wake of the Wuchang uprising of October, with the placement of Japanese Army liaison officers in a number of the Eastern Inner Mongolian leagues and banners. While these officers had presumably been placed there in an attempt to counteract Russian influence in the region, in the aftermath of the overthrow of the Ch’ing dynasty in February 1912, they now worked closely with those Mongol and Manchu princes who sought

\textsuperscript{22} Owen Lattimore, ‘Prince, Priest and Herdsman in Mongolia’, \textit{Pacific Affairs}, vol. 8, no. 1, March 1935, p. 44.

independence from the new Han Chinese Republic. As we have seen, the princes called amongst other things for the establishment of an independent country called ‘Manchuria-Mongolia’ which would be protected by Japan and Russia.24 Among the princes concerned was Prince Su, who argued that the Emperor and the court should withdraw north of the Great Wall, preferably to Jehol, and from there, if the worst came to the worst, consolidate what remained of the Manchu dominions after the secession from China.25

While it was the Japanese military that figured prominently in the scheme to separate Mongolia from China, Japanese Foreign Ministry documents show that diplomats were certainly aware of what was occurring. As noted above, the Foreign Ministry had been the conduit through which funds, under the guise of loans, were transferred to the Mongol princes who sought independence from China.26 Moreover, numerous references in the diary of Ijūin Hikokichi, Japan’s principal diplomatic representative in Peking in 1912, indicate that he was well informed as to the plans of the Mongolian-Japanese coalition working for the ‘independence’ of Inner Mongolia. Both before the independence movement got underway and during its initial stages, Ijūin was kept informed about the activities in Inner Mongolia of Kawashima Naniwa and the Japanese Army officers involved.27 Presumably Ijūin then kept Tokyo abreast

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24 Onon and Pritchatt, Asia’s First Modern Revolution, pp. 31-2; Underdown, ‘Chinese Revolution and Inner Mongolia’, p. 209.
26 See telegram #515, ‘Mōko shakkan no shinkō o shakin gō e kankoku aritaki ken’, 6 December 1911, in Gaimushō (ed.), Nihon gaikō bunsho, seikoku jihen (Shingai kakumei), Tōkyō: Nihon kokusai rengō kyōkai, 1961, p. 365, the first of a series of telegrams relating to loans to Inner Mongolian princes.
of what the Japanese Army officers were up to on the continent, as both the Foreign Ministry and the Army General Staff are reported to have opposed the assistance being provided to the Inner Mongolian princes.28

In February 1912, Japanese Army officers and members of the right wing on the Chinese continent set about assembling arms and ammunition to transport to Mongolia. In early March 1912, however, the authorities in Tokyo acted to rein in all of the Japanese, both military personnel and civilian activists, connected with the scheme. Furthermore, to ensure that right-wing civilian participants toed the line, the Japanese Army high command summoned Kawashima Naniwa to Tokyo, where both Vice-Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Fukushima Yasumasa and Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya bluntly informed him that all material assistance to the Inner Mongolians must cease.29

This apparent official opposition to the first ‘independence’ movement seems to be at odds with the impression that leading figures in Japan desired to bring as much of the Ch’ing empire north of the Great Wall as possible under Japanese sway. No doubt the larger context of the fall of the Ch’ing dynasty in February 1912 had impacted on the political decision-making process in Japan, with the need to avoid antagonising Japan’s former adversary, Russia. There is evidence, however, that the Japanese military itself had proposed the dispatch of two divisions to South Manchuria following the October 1911 Wuchang uprising, in part to give protection to the Manchu court, and also to ensure equality with Russia which was moving to secure its position in Outer Mongolia.30 As noted earlier, however, in January 1912 the Japanese cabinet decided that any troop movement into Manchuria might arouse international suspicion,

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29 Ibid.
30 Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, p. 105.
especially among the Russians. Accordingly, while some in Japan may have desired control of Inner Mongolia, this ambition had to be tempered by caution, and a distancing of the army high command from what was unfolding. On the other hand, some in the high command wanted to extend Japanese control over Inner Mongolia, by force if necessary, and were presumably willing to turn a ‘blind eye’ to the support provided by officers in the field to Inner Mongols seeking independence from China.

At any rate, despite the recall of Kawashima and the clear directive that the scheme to supply the Inner Mongols with arms and ammunition should cease, Japanese Army officers stationed in South Manchuria proceeded to ship the arms and munitions to the Inner Mongolian princes. It was no small operation, with records showing that at least thirty Japanese were involved, a number them serving army officers. In addition to the Japanese participants, there were also around one hundred Han Chinese, who probably supported the idea of an independent Manchuria-Mongolia, as we will see below. The party of Japanese and Han Chinese transported fifty wagonloads of arms and ammunition from Japanese-controlled Southern Manchuria to the Inner Mongolian princes in Jehol province. While the arms shipments began secretly, the Han Chinese general at Mukden, Chao Erh-sun, soon exposed the clandestine arrangement to the Peking government. In response, units from the Han Chinese Republican Army were dispatched to intercept and destroy the shipments. This resulted in a clash between the Japanese-led smugglers and the Chinese military in early June 1912 in which the arms shipment was destroyed and more than fifty people were killed.

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31 Ibid.
killed, including thirteen of the Japanese involved, with one of the Japanese Army officers, Matsui, being seriously injured.34

The high death toll among the Japanese-led smugglers suggests a number of things. First, it indicates that both the Japanese and the Han Chinese involved were fairly strongly committed to the operation to supply the Inner Mongols with arms and ammunition. If the Han Chinese participants had simply been mercenaries they would surely have fled at the first sign of danger. Second, the fact that one of the Japanese Army officers, Matsui, was seriously injured tends to confirm a high degree of Japanese commitment to the operation. Third, army authorities do not usually look kindly on military personnel getting themselves killed or wounded in operations that are not officially sanctioned; accordingly, Matsui’s evident commitment to the venture suggests that either the army officers involved expected the high command to turn a blind eye to what they were doing, or that they had a ‘devil-may-care’ attitude with regard to authority and simply did not care about the official consequences of their actions. In any event, the first independence movement had effectively come to an end.

The Japanese press reported what had occurred on the continent, suggesting that the reading public in Japan was expected to have an interest in Mongolia and the question of Japan’s sphere of influence there, and that the operation was by no means secret. Press reports clearly portrayed the events of 1912 as an attempt by a ‘Manchu-Mongol coalition’ to achieve independence, with significant Japanese assistance, from the new Chinese Republic. Reports also noted some degree of official Japanese approval of the idea of Mongolian independence. In January 1913, six months after the collapse of the independence movement, a relatively long article appeared in the Japanese press that dealt extensively with the relationship between Kawashima Naniwa

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and Prince Su, and their plan to bring about the independence of Manchuria and Mongolia from China.\textsuperscript{35} Three days later, the \textit{Japan Chronicle}, a Kobe English-language newspaper, also ran the story, with substantially more information. The paper claimed that approval for Japanese support of the attempt to achieve independence had been given by Chief of the Army General Staff General Hasegawa Yoshimichi, Governor-General of Korea Terauchi Masatake, Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo, and the Tō-A Dōbunkai (East Asia Common Culture Society).\textsuperscript{36}

The assertion of such high-level approval deserves comment. If the \textit{Japan Chronicle} had not been sure of the accuracy of its information, it is hardly likely to have listed such prominent individuals as being connected with the scheme. The willingness of the paper to devote two pages to the story implies that the editors were prepared to stand by the assertions, and there is no evidence of any later retraction with respect to those named as either involved in or supporting the operation. The comparative length of the story in a highly-regarded newspaper aimed at an overseas audience\textsuperscript{37} also suggests that the story was fairly widely known in Japan, and that the paper wanted to make its overseas audience aware of this Japanese attempt to achieve control of parts of the Chinese continent.

\textsuperscript{35} ‘Man-Mō to kokumin no kesshin’, \textit{Tōkyō asahi shinbun}, 13 January 1913, p. 4.
Ongoing Japanese Ambitions in Mongolia, 1912-16

Despite the failure of the first ‘independence’ movement, some within the Japanese press, the military, the political world and academia continued to draw attention to Mongolia and Japanese activities there after 1912. Japanese observers and writers covered a broad range of topics on Mongolia. Meanwhile, definitions of what constituted ‘Mongolia’ continued to be fluid.

Newspapers and periodicals produced a steady trickle of articles on Mongolia, often with the implication that the region was or should be part of Japan’s sphere of influence. In November 1912, for instance, the press speculated on what impact the newly-signed Russo-Mongolian agreement might have on Japan’s relations with Mongolia.\(^{38}\) The following November, a Russo-Chinese agreement was concluded, under which Russia recognised, among other things, Republican China’s suzerainty over Outer Mongolia and agreed to limit Russian troops there to those needed for guard duties, while China agreed not to interfere in Outer Mongolia’s internal affairs and to refrain from colonising the region.\(^{39}\) Again the Japanese press examined the impact of the agreement on both Mongolia’s relationships with Russia and China, and Japan’s relations with Mongolia.\(^{40}\) There was even an interview with Fukushima Yasumasa, still famed for his lone horseback ride from Berlin to Vladivostok some twenty years earlier, in which he voiced his opinions on Japan’s relationship with Mongolia, remarking that ‘in Inner Mongolia the climate was mild, and any crops grown in Japan

\(^{38}\) ‘Mōko mondai’, Seiyō, 20 January 1913, no. 149, pp. 56-60.
could be raised there’, an observation perhaps designed to promote Inner Mongolia to potential Japanese settlers. Reports on military and trade matters relating to Mongolia also appeared.

While the press could only speculate as to the impact of the November 1913 Russo-Chinese agreement on Japan’s position in the region, some in the Japanese Foreign Ministry were certainly alarmed. The Japanese consul in Harbin, Honda Kumatarō, for example, dispatched a long telegram in December 1913 to the Foreign Minister, Makino Nobuaki, addressing the probable impact of the agreement on Japan’s position. Honda analysed such matters as the effect of the agreement on political developments in Outer Mongolia and how Russia’s new position might affect ‘our sphere of influence’ (waga seiryoku han-i) in Inner Mongolia (Uchimōko). Honda was vague, however, about what this sphere of influence encompassed and what it should be called, referring to it as either ‘southeast Mongolia’ (tōnan-Mōko) or ‘Inner Mongolia’s southeastern region’ (Uchimōko tōnanbu). What is highly significant, though, is that the consul here referred plainly to the region as Japan’s sphere of influence, and that he considered it to be more than just ‘eastern Inner Mongolia’ (tōbu Uchimōko), a comparatively smaller area geographically.

The next significant development came in January 1915, with the presentation by the Japanese Minister to Peking, Hioki Eki, to the president of the Chinese Republic,

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Yuan Shih-k’ai, of the ‘Twenty-One Demands’ for greater Japanese powers in China.  

Through these demands, the Japanese government attempted, amongst other goals, to achieve the same concessions in Southern Manchuria and ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ that China had granted Tsarist Russia in relation to Outer Mongolia. In effect, ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ in this case encompassed Jehol province. After considerable Chinese protest and some revisions, the Chinese side finally accepted the demands in late April 1915, thus granting Japan the concessions it had sought in Southern Manchuria and ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’. The Japanese press trumpeted the advance in ‘Japan’s historic political and economic relations with Mongolia’. Press articles also discussed how the economic development of the region could benefit Japan. As Daniel Weissich has noted, Chinese acceptance of the demands relating to Mongolia meant the Japanese were now in a position to ‘infiltrate the region’: that is, Inner Mongolia. Actually, following the signing of the treaty that was based on the Twenty-One Demands, various figures in Japan publicly denied that Japan did in fact have any plans to annex Manchuria and Mongolia. A member of the House of Representatives and a representative of the Oriental Development Company, for example, both publicly denied that Japan was considering annexation. Both added,


Article translated from the Jiji shinpō and reported as ‘Japan & Mongolia’, JCWE, 29 April 1915, p. 637.


however, that if China were serious about developing the region then Japan was the best placed to help it to do so.\textsuperscript{49}

Questions raised in the Imperial Diet shortly after this confirm, firstly, that a range of public figures perceived in Mongolia some potential benefit for Japan, and secondly, that Japanese ambitions in Inner Mongolia nevertheless remained very vague. In late May and early June 1915, the subject of ‘Eastern Mongolia’ was raised in the Diet on several occasions, with opposition spokesman Ogawa Heikichi calling on the government to clarify exactly what constituted Japan’s sphere of influence in China, and especially the position of Mongolia within this sphere.\textsuperscript{50} The following week, leading opposition politician Inukai Tsuyoshi commented on the geopolitical terms applied to the region, in the course of complaining that the gains from the recently signed Sino-Japanese Treaty were not as great as the government claimed. Inukai asserted:

\begin{quote}
the Japanese Minister in Peking, in setting forth Japan’s demands on China regarding Mongolia [in the May 1915 Sino-Japanese Treaty], carefully refrained from clearly specifying the limits of the districts concerned, all that he stated in this respect being ‘part of South Manchuria’ and ‘parts of Jehol district’, which the Minister of Foreign Affairs described as Eastern Inner Mongolia .... Jehol lies in Chili Province; so what the authorities give out as rights obtained in Mongolia are not really in Mongolia, but in Manchuria, masquerading under the new name Eastern Inner Mongolia .... the public must ascertain the
\end{quote}


delimitation of the so-called Eastern Inner Mongolia before congratulating themselves upon the acquirement of rights.⁵¹

Thus, according to Inukai, ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ was merely being used as another term for part of Manchuria. His statement underlines yet again the flexibility of the terms used for the region at this point.

The Diet discussions show that the confusion as to what ‘Mongolia’ constituted were openly acknowledged in this period, at least by those politicians who concerned themselves with the region. Debate as to the meaning of ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’, as well as ‘Man-Mō’ and other terms, continued over the next decade, both inside and outside of the Diet. As we have seen, at the very time that questions were being raised in the Diet in June 1915 about the extent of Japan’s sphere of influence in Inner Mongolia, Torii Ryūzō was separately promoting a different version of the same sphere of influence, one that included significant portions of Chahar province, the province adjoining Jehol⁵² (see Figure 4).

Diet members did more than pontificate about Mongolia. For instance, two months after Inukai had proclaimed that ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ was merely another name for Manchuria, a party of twenty Diet members undertook a tour through North China, visiting, among other places, Changchiakow, the capital city of Chahar province,⁵³ one of the four provinces that comprised Inner Mongolia. It is not clear why a party of Diet members chose to visit that area at this point. Japanese military ambitions in the region, however, were then on the increase and it is likely that some politicians shared the military’s strategic and probably predatory objectives there.

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⁵² Torii Ryūzō, Mōko oyobi Manshū, Tōkyō: Tomiyama bō, 1915, pp. 45-6.
While politicians debated, the Japanese Army continued to investigate one part of the region in question, which it called ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’, in this instance meaning all of Jehol and a substantial part of Chahar province. At the beginning of August 1915, the Japanese Army General Staff’s *Secret Great Diary* carried a report delineating the boundaries of ‘Southern Manchuria’ and ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’.\(^{54}\) This report, from the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Government-General, Major-General Nishikawa Torajirō, to Vice-Minister of the Army, Lieutenant-General Ōshima Ken’ichi, concluded that ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ comprised the four eastern leagues (tōyonmei) and the four banners of the left wing of Chahar (Chaharubu no sayoku yon hata).\(^{55}\) This was approximately the same region that was held by Torii Ryūzō in 1915 to be Japan’s sphere of influence\(^{56}\) (see Figure 4).

In the same month that Nishikawa submitted his report, the Army General Staff also dispatched a seven-man survey team, commanded by Major Koiso Kuniaki, to gather data on ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’. The team, divided into three sub-teams, surveyed the northern, central and southern areas of ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’, which for the purposes of the survey included the Uchumuchin banners of Northern Chahar and the area around Dolonnor, a town located near the border of Chahar and Jehol. For the Japanese Army, then, ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ evidently encompassed a far larger area than Inukai Tsuyoshi had suggested in the Diet a few months earlier. The table of contents of the subsequent report ran to forty-one pages, while the actual report exceeded 1,000 pages. The report included information about a wide range of topics, including the agriculture, climate, and nature of the soil of each sub-region. More

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\(^{55}\) Ibid., p. 356.

\(^{56}\) Torii, *Mōko oyobi Manshū*, p. 44.
general information about the Mongol population — for example, about physical characteristics and health — was also included.\textsuperscript{57} The broad range of topics covered suggests that the army’s goal was more than merely strategic.

The Army General Staff also prepared three additional reports, each entitled \textit{Tō-Mō jijō} (The Situation in Eastern Mongolia), between December 1915 and March 1916. These reports were comparatively short, around 150 pages each, and covered topics relating to politics, education, geography, diplomacy and other matters. Amongst other things, they show that for the Japanese military, Suiyuan province, lying northwest of Peking, was considered to be within the boundaries of ‘Eastern Mongolia’ as early as 1915.\textsuperscript{58} The army’s inclusion of Suiyuan in ‘Eastern Mongolia’, a region that cannot conceivably be included in definitions of ‘Manchuria’, appears to contradict Matsusaka’s assertion that the terms ‘Manshû’ and ‘Man-Mō’ were interchangeable at this point.\textsuperscript{59}

In less than one year, then, the Japanese Army produced four reports on Mongolia. The sheer number of reports in such a short time is evidence of an extremely high level of military attention to the region. Furthermore, the army’s attention to Mongolia in itself attracted the notice of the press in Japan. A speech by a Major Tomomori at the Osaka Military Officers’ Club regarding his recent tour of Inner Mongolia, for example, was deemed newsworthy enough to be reported.\textsuperscript{60} While much of the army’s information on the region remained confidential, the reporting of

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\textsuperscript{57} Sanbō honbu, \textit{Tōbu Uchimōko chōsa hōkoku keiei shiryō}, Tōkyō: n. publ., 1916.
\textsuperscript{60} ‘Conditions in Inner Mongolia – Japanese Officer’s Tour’, \textit{JCWE}, 23 September 1915, p. 526.
Tomomori’s speech suggests that the army was not averse to its activities in the region being reported to a wider audience within Japan and abroad.

Nor was examination of the military importance of Mongolia to Japan confined to the army. In September 1913, the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff (Kaigun gunreibu) produced a translation of a Russian report on a trade mission dispatched from Moscow to Outer Mongolia in the summer of 1910. The Japanese version, entitled *Seihoku Mōko jijō* (Conditions in Northwest Mongolia), contained a map clearly showing that ‘Northwest Mongolia’ was essentially what both Russia and Japan termed ‘Outer Mongolia’, although the map extended as far south as the Great Wall, suggesting that the location of the border dividing Outer Mongolia from Inner Mongolia was still as vague for the Japanese Navy as it was for the army. Given that Mongolia is landlocked, its appeal to the Navy General Staff is difficult to explain. One could speculate, however, that the navy’s interest stemmed either from inter-service rivalry — the need for the navy to be fully cognisant of what the army was up to — or from the fact that the report had originated in Russia, still a potential foe, and one whose priorities the navy needed to appreciate. The most significant point, however, is that several powerful institutions in the Japanese establishment were paying careful attention to the region.

The civilian bureaucracy was also conducting its own investigations into Mongolia during this period. Once again, however, it was not always clear what actually constituted the region, in the eyes of the bureaucrats. In March 1914, for instance, the Ministry of Trade and Agriculture’s Commerce and Industry Bureau (Nōshōmushō shōkōkyoku) published *Gendai Mōko* (Present-Day Mongolia), again a

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translation of a book by a Russian who had spent two years in Mongolia. While the title implied that the book dealt exclusively with Mongolia, it actually covered three areas: Outer Mongolia and two adjoining regions, Sinkiang and Kansu. Two years later, in March 1916, the Ministry of Trade and Agriculture collated and published a report entitled Tōbu Uchimōko sangyō chōsa (A Survey of Eastern Inner Mongolian Industry), which comprised a series of smaller reports. This publication identified ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ as the Cherim, Chao-Uda, Chosotu, and Silingol leagues, as well as the region of Eastern Chahar, a definition very similar to that offered by anthropologist Torii Ryūzō some nine months before, in July 1915, as discussed earlier. In all likelihood the Ministry of Trade and Agriculture was following Torii’s lead.

Russian-authored books on Mongolia attracted attention outside official circles as well. For example, March 1914 saw the publication of the Japanese translation of a book by Aleksiei M. Kuropatkin, the commander of the Russian Army during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, entitled Man-Mō shobunron (Concerning the Disposition of Manchuria and Mongolia). The publisher was Minyūsha, a publishing house closely associated with the nationalist journalist Tokutomi Sohō. The book, which discussed such topics as the Yellow Peril, Russia’s eastern expansion, and the European encroachment on China, was very successful, being reprinted three times before the end of April the same year. While the actual number of copies sold is unknown, at one yen, the book was not particularly expensive for the time, so the number sold may have been considerable. In his conclusion, Kuropatkin listed the

64 Aleksiei N. Kuropatkin, translated by Ōi Kanenori, Man-Mō shobunron, Tōkyō: Minyūsha, 1914.
65 For example, Nōshōmushō shōkōkyoku’s Gendai Mōko, published in 1914, cost 65 sen; Ichinomiya Misako’s Mōko miyage, published in 1909, cost 80 sen; while Torii Ryūzō’s Mōko ryōkō, published in 1911, cost 1 yen 80 sen.
areas of the Far East to which Russia apparently laid claim, including Northern Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang, arguing that Russia must be prepared to use all necessary force to achieve its aims in those regions.66 The burgeoning strategic importance of Mongolia, coupled with the spectre of further conflict with Russia over respective spheres of influence on the continent, probably struck a chord with Japanese readers.

Meanwhile, press coverage of Mongolia continued, and in the wake of the Sino-Japanese treaty of May 1915 included some discussion of the potential for Japanese emigration. An article in Chūō kōron (Central Review) speculated that ‘East Mongolia would prove to Japan what Canada or Australia is to England’, going on to suggest that ‘the best means of exploiting the province would be to undertake stock-breeding or mining and suchlike projects that would utilize the labour of the native people’.67 In fact, however, Japanese emigration to Mongolia during this period was minimal and appears to have been largely limited to prostitutes for Chinese and Mongolian men.68

**The 1916 ‘Independence’ Movement**

At the beginning of 1916, plans to implement direct Japanese control over Mongolia re-emerged among factions of the Japanese military and the right wing, setting the stage for the second Manchurian-Mongolian ‘independence’ movement. The lead-up to and

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subsequent collapse of the movement have been well documented elsewhere; here I will briefly review the events, with particular focus on how the military chain of command operated.

At the start of 1916 several different military and right-wing groups within Japan actively supported two different coalitions on the continent that apparently had the same aim — separating Manchuria-Mongolia from Republican China. In late March 1916 the Japanese Army General Staff dispatched three officers, including Major Koiso Kuniaki, to the continent to oversee the merging of these two existing indigenous political groups, one of which was led by the Manchu Prince Su, the other by the Inner


69 See Kuzū, *Tō-A senkaku*, vol. 2, pp. 625-82; Valliant, ‘Mongolian Independence
Mongolian leader Babujab (see Figure 12), whose ties to the Japanese military dated back to the Russo-Japanese War. Presumably, a merged organisation was considered likely to be more effective than two separate ones. The army’s promotion of such a merger seemingly indicates that the General Staff favoured the idea of Manchurian-Mongolian independence from China at this point. Koiso was undoubtedly chosen for the 1916 mission because he had commanded the seven-man army survey team dispatched to ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ the previous year.

Around the time that Major Koiso and the others were dispatched, however, the Japanese Foreign Ministry raised objections to the army’s evident support of plans to separate Manchuria and Mongolia from Han Chinese control. These objections had little to do with actual opposition to detaching the region from China. Rather, the complaint centred on how the separation was to be achieved. Japan’s consul-general at Mukden, Yada Shichitarō, for example, favoured the promotion of an ‘independent’ Manchuria and Mongolia, but felt that Japanese ambitions would be better served by backing Chang Tso-lin, the former Han Chinese bandit who now controlled much of Manchuria, rather than Prince Su or Babujab. In response to this objection, Lieutenant-General Tanaka Giichi, Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, telegraphed Major-General Nishikawa Torajirō, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Government-General, and advised that no further action should be taken in connection with the planned army support for either Prince Su or Babujab, or with the idea of an

Movements’, pp. 7-14; Hatano, Man-Mō dokuritsu undō, pp. 165-77.
71 For a summary of Yada’s career, see Hata Ikuhiko (ed.), Senzenki Nihon kanryōsei no seido · soshiki · jinji, Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1981, p. 238.
independent Manchuria-Mongolia. What this meant, presumably, was that Tanaka agreed with Yada, preferring that support should instead be given to Chang Tso-lin.

Then, in late April 1916, Tanaka went further, ordering Koiso’s immediate superior, Colonel Doi Ichinoshin, to stop all preparations for the launch of the Manchurian-Mongolian independence movement. Finally, in early May 1916, Major Koiso was recalled to Tokyo, where he met with Tanaka and Lieutenant-General Fukuda Masatarō, also of the Army General Staff. Despite being effectively ordered to end any support for a second Japanese-sponsored attempt to wrest Manchuria and Mongolia from China, Major Koiso, according to Valliant, chose to ignore orders, and following his meeting with Lieutenants-General Tanaka and Fukuda, informed both Colonel Doi and Major-General Nishikawa that it was necessary to continue preparations.

If the first Manchuria-Mongolia independence movement can be dismissed as a gun-running operation that went wrong, the second was a far more grandiose affair, involving a conglomeration of Mongolian irregulars; Japanese Army officers, both regular and reserve; and the ubiquitous tairiku rōnin, drawn from the right-wing patriotic societies. One of those involved was the political activist Maekawa Tsuneyoshi, who was later closely associated with the Zenrin kyōkai and whose career will be examined in more detail in Chapter Five. In addition to this volatile mix, elements of the Japanese business world were drawn into the scheme, with the Ōkura Trading Company providing funds for the operation while Mitsui undertook to

74 Doi’s connection to Mongolia dated back to the Russo-Japanese War, when he had been assigned by the Army General Staff to work with the ‘special operations teams’ that were dispatched during the war, as discussed in Chapter One. See Ōshima Yokichi, Bakuhanuki hishi, Dairen, Manchuria: Manshū bunka kyōkai, 1933, pp. 15-16.
smuggle the ammunition. As noted above, planning for the independence movement got underway in March 1916. The actual operation ran from late June until early October. In mid-August there was a series of clashes between the Japanese-backed Inner Mongols and the Han Chinese forces, in which the Mongols required the assistance of the Japanese military to survive. At its height the independence movement involved a force of almost 3,000 men that exerted a degree of control over more than 5,000 kilometres of territory.

The movement, however, was doomed from the outset. Following the death of Chinese President Yuan Shih-k’ai in June 1916, the Japanese cabinet opted to back Yuan’s successor, Li Yüan-hung, and ordered that all support for the Manchuria-Mongolia independence movement be withdrawn. The decision to support Yuan’s successor was presumably based on a belief that backing Li as the appointed president of the Han Chinese Republic would be more likely to benefit Japan than would support of Babujab and Su. With planning for the ‘independence’ movement in the final stages at the time of Yuan’s death, however, it was impossible to simply bring the operation to a stop. Officers in the field continued to direct operations, and it was not until the death of Babujab, the Inner Mongolian leader, following a clash between the Japanese-backed Mongols and the Han Chinese Republican Army in early October 1916, that hostilities finally ended and the Mongolian irregulars and Japanese personnel

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77 Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, pp. 116-17.
dispersed. As will be discussed later in the chapter, this train of events was very important in consolidating the pattern of high-level tolerance that grew up around independent army actions in Mongolia.

With the cessation of Japanese support for the independence movement, the death of Babujab and the subsequent collapse of the second Manchuria-Mongolia independence movement, plans for an ‘independent’ Manchuria-Mongolia again came to an abrupt end. The third and final attempt in 1918-22, however, would be a far larger affair.

The 1918-22 Siberian Intervention and the Pan-Mongol Movement

In 1918, following the collapse of Tsarist Russia and the success of the Bolsheviks, Japan joined the Allied expedition to the Russian Far East, more commonly known in Japan as the Siberian Intervention. While the principal objective of Japanese involvement in the Siberian Intervention was to block the spread of Communism, some army personnel also viewed support for the anti-Bolshevik White Russians as a way to revive the failed Manchuria-Mongolia independence plan. Moreover, some officers who had seen action in the second independence movement actively participated in the Siberian Intervention. The third Mongolian ‘independence’ movement, also known as the Pan-Mongol movement, was connected with the Siberian Intervention. It began in late 1918, and built on an earlier idea that had been promoted by two of the White

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Russian figures supported by the Japanese army in the Russian Far East, namely Grigori Mikhailovich Semenov (Figure 13) and Baron Roman Nicolaus Feodorovich von Ungern-Sternberg\(^3\) (Figure 14).


The Cossack leader Ataman (‘headman’ or ‘leader’) Semenov was born in Siberia in 1890 of Buriyat-Mongol parentage. Semenov first encountered the Japanese in early 1918, after being dispatched to the Russian Far East by Aleksandar Fedorovich Kerenskii, leader of the Russian Provisional Government that was formed following the abdication of Tsar Nicolas II in 1917, to raise a regiment of Mongol cavalry for use against the Germans on the Eastern front during World War One. Shortly after arriving in the Russian Far East, Semenov is reported to have met with Lieutenant-Colonel Araki Sadao, then Harbin Special Intelligence Agency (SIA) chief, and subsequently agreed to work with the Japanese in the fight against the Bolsheviks.

The details of the meeting are sketchy, but Semenov appears to have first outlined the idea of an independent Transbaikal, presumably an area from which the Bolsheviks could be fought, and later expanded this to include Mongolia.84

The nucleus of the Mongol cavalry unit that Semenov raised on Kerenskii’s orders85 happened to come from a unit of Japanese-sponsored Mongolian irregulars that had been involved in the failed 1916 Manchurian-Mongolian independence movement.86 How the Mongolian irregulars came to be part of the cavalry unit raised by Semenov is not known, but the likelihood that Japanese Army officers previously involved in the 1916 movement may have arranged it cannot be discounted. An assessment by the Japanese Army, prepared in April 1918, not long after Semenov had begun to work with the Japanese, indicated that Semenov commanded a comparatively powerful force. In addition to some 1,800 men, divided into infantry and cavalry units, he also possessed twenty artillery pieces and almost fifty machine guns as support weapons.87 Almost a third of the cavalry unit that Semenov eventually raised were Mongols, most likely those who had earlier served under Babujab,88 the remainder being made up, presumably, of White Russians.

Faber & Faber, 2008. The former is a fictionalised account of Ungern-Sternberg’s life. Takahashi, Hahei, pp. 61-3.
87 Ibid.
Semenov’s compatriot, Ungern-Sternberg, was a Russian-Hungarian nobleman, rumoured to have been married to a Manchurian princess, who is reported to have encountered Semenov, evidently a kindred spirit, while serving in the Russian Far East either just prior to or during World War One. Both Semenov and Ungern-Sternberg believed themselves to be ‘Buddhists’ and supported the idea of a ‘Buddhist-Mongol’ empire that included Mongolia and Tibet. This proposal expanded to become the

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Pan-Mongol movement, which in late 1918 aspired to a unified greater Mongolia. Semenov acted as the driving force of the movement, while other figures involved included an Inner Mongolian religious leader, appointed to lead the provisional government formed in 1919; a Buriyat nationalist from the Transbaikal; and a former associate of Babujab, the Mongolian leader connected with the 1916 Japanese-sponsored Manchurian-Mongolian ‘independence’ movement.

From the outset, Japanese military intelligence personnel were actively involved in this movement, as they saw in it a chance to encourage Mongolian separatism from China, and eventually, Japanese dominance of the region. A number of the personnel who served in the Japanese Army’s SIA in the Russian Far East were directly linked to Semenov. Japanese Army officers were present at meetings attended by regional representatives of the Pan-Mongol movement from early 1919, then reporting on developments to Tokyo, and arranging financial and military assistance. In addition, archival sources show that the Japanese Army provided Semenov and Ungern-Sternberg with instructors and headquarters staff, who sent written reports to both the Army and Foreign Ministers on the development of the movement.

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94 Bōeichō shiryōkan, Tokyo, ‘Semiyonofu haika Mōkogun kon’nyū no hōjin no kōdō ni kansuru ken’, 10 October 1918, in *Taishō hachinen jūgatsu nishi mitsu ju ŏnikki*; Bōeichō shiryōkan, ‘Semiyonofu haika Mōkogun kon’nyū no hōjin no kōdō ni kansuru
physically survey the region also continued unabated. In April 1919, for example, Lieutenant-General Yui Mitsue, Chief of Staff of the Vladivostok Expeditionary Army, requested funds, and presumably permission, to enable Major-General Takayanagi Yasutarō to undertake a special survey of Outer Mongolia.95

While the Japanese military backed Semenov, the principal organizer of the Pan-Mongol movement, it does not appear to have believed that he could be successful on his own. There is evidence to suggest that the military may have planned for Semenov to co-operate with Chang Tso-lin, the Japanese-sponsored Manchurian warlord. The plan was apparently that Semenov and Chang would eventually divide Mongolia in two, presumably with both regions then coming under Japanese guidance. The Japanese consul in Harbin apprised Foreign Minister Uchida of this plan in mid-September 1919.96

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A White Russian present in Chita in 1919, who later wrote of his experiences, quoted a colleague involved in the Pan-Mongol movement as follows about the movement’s plans for the region:

We intend to organize a new empire; a new civilization. It will be called the Middle Asiatic Buddhist Empire, carved out of Mongolia, Manchuria and Eastern Siberia. Communication has already been established for that purpose with Djan-Zo-Lin [Chang Tso-lin], the warlord of Manchuria, and with Hutukhta, the Living Buddha of Mongolia [the religious ruler of Outer Mongolia]. Here in these historic plains we will organize an army as powerful as that of Genghis Khan. Then we will move, as that great man did, and smash the whole of Europe. The world must die so that a new and better world may come forth, reincarnated on a higher plane.97

Whether Semenov and Ungern-Sternberg, let alone their Japanese supporters, actually believed in such a plan is unknown, but as we have seen, parts of the Japanese military were certainly willing to provide substantial assistance to the Pan-Mongol movement, in terms of both finance and equipment.

The Pan-Mongol movement proved to be far less successful than had been hoped. Although it had the grandiose aim of uniting all Mongols under the one banner, the movement was viewed by the Outer Mongolian government with a high degree of suspicion and as nothing more than a ‘Japanese-Semenov plot’.98 Even without Outer Mongolia’s participation, however, the plan proceeded and a Provisional Mongolian Government was formed in March 1919, comprising representatives from Inner Mongolia, Barga and Buriatia.99 An attempt was then made in April 1919 to send delegates to the Paris Peace Conference to argue for Mongolian self-determination.

97 Quoted in Alioshin, Asian Odyssey, p. 15.
98 Leong, Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, pp. 80-1.
This move, however, was unexpectedly blocked by Tokyo, leading to an increase in distrust among the various parties involved, most of whom blamed Semenov.  

Things finally got completely out of hand in the autumn of 1919, when one of the Inner Mongols involved organised an armed revolt against Semenov, a revolt that Semenov ruthlessly put down.

While Japanese military support for Semenov and Ungern-Sternberg increased, other alternatives were also considered in the military’s quest to gain control of Mongolia. This is evident in the provision of a military advisor to two of the Han Chinese warlords who had ambitions in Mongolia. The advisor to both was Banzai Rihachirō, an army officer who had had a long and varied career, including several terms of service in North China. Banzai, as will be discussed in Chapter Three, was also connected with Morishima Kadofusa, an individual who figured prominently in Japan’s relationship with Mongolia from the 1920s onwards. In early May 1920, Banzai was reported to be advising the Chinese General Hsü Shu-cheng, after Hsü returned to Urga from Peking and attempted to re-establish Han Chinese control over Outer Mongolia, Chinese rule having formally ended there some nine years earlier, in 1911, when the Outer Mongolians had declared independence. Banzai’s duties as advisor appear to have been more than simply military. The Japanese press reported that his role, in part, was to see ‘the farms and ranches in Eastern Mongolia [developed]

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99 Baabar, Twentieth Century Mongolia, pp. 185-6.
102 For a summary of Banzai’s career see Hata (ed.), Nihon riku-kaigun sōgō jiten, p. 120.
as a training ground for Japanese experts’. Evidently the military was considering the economic potential of the region. It was also reported that Banzai had been assigned by Marshal Tuan Ch’i-jui to oversee the training of several Chinese Army divisions, including one to be headquartered at Urga. Banzai’s appointment as an advisor to Hsü and Tuan was, presumably, part of ongoing Japanese military schemes to increase Japanese control of Mongolia.

By 1920, the existence of a Japanese-backed government in the Maritime Province, that is, the region of the Russian Far East adjacent to the Sea of Japan, had stimulated the creation by the USSR of a new entity, the so-called Far Eastern Republic, which was to act as a buffer state between Soviet Russia and the Japanese and their allies in the Maritime Province. The new state was thus designed to combat the threat posed by forces hostile to the Bolsheviks following the withdrawal of the Japanese from the Transbaikal in July 1920 and the establishment of *de facto* Bolshevik control of the region. Such a threat became real in June 1921, when Semenov, Ungern-Sternberg and other White Russian leaders launched a three-pronged assault on the Far Eastern Republic. The assault evidently had significant Japanese support. Nishihara Yukio states that in addition to half a million yen in financial support, the Japanese military also provided the White forces in Vladivostok with 12,000 rifles, six heavy field guns, fifty machine guns and more than 350,000 cartridges.

The assault on the Far Eastern Republic was ultimately a failure, with the forces of Semenov and the other White Russian leaders failing to make any real progress against

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103 Translated and reported in ‘Notes and Comments’, *JCWE*, 6 May 1920, p. 513.
the Red Army. Ungern-Sternberg’s force was initially more successful, but his reportedly brutal and sadistic behaviour,\textsuperscript{108} which earned him the soubriquet of the ‘bloody baron’, undermined the support of the Outer Mongolians, leading to the betrayal of Ungern-Sternberg and his subsequent capture and execution by the Red Army in September 1921.\textsuperscript{109} Though it was more than a year before Japanese troops in the Russian Far East withdrew, active Japanese support for the White Russians effectively ended at this point.\textsuperscript{110} The suspension of Japanese support for the various White Russian forces in the Russian Far East also meant the end of any concrete support for the Pan-Mongol movement, as support for the movement had been channelled through these forces.

**The Japanese High Command and Mongolian Operations**

Japanese military operations in Mongolia in this period were punctuated by seemingly renegade actions. The pattern of official complicity in them is of key importance, because it suggests that what appears to be independent military action in the field was not in fact isolated from a larger pattern of willingness on the part of the Japanese establishment to interfere in Mongolia for the purpose of extending Japanese control there. ‘Renegade’ actions were probably not planned or approved of in advance by senior officers, but nevertheless, those officers were more than willing to grasp at any


favourable outcomes that might ensue, and to turn independent field actions to their own advantage. Presumably, they would also have repudiated such actions if they had proved sufficiently embarrassing. On another note, as will be discussed later in this chapter, these events in the field did not radically clash with what some leading Mongols appear to have wanted from Japan.

Several instances of senior Japanese military officers turning a blind eye to the independent actions of officers in the field in Mongolia are to be found in the ‘independence’ movements from 1912 onwards, and the number of such instances increased each time. The willingness of elements of the high command to ignore and thus tacitly to encourage what was happening in the field, presumably because it served the aims of some of them, has, however, attracted little attention in earlier studies of the three independence movements.

As we have seen, Kawashima Naniwa, one of the important figures in the first independence movement, was summoned to Tokyo in March or April 1912 and informed by both Vice-Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Fukushima and Foreign Minister Uchida that the operation must cease. According to Valliant, however, Fukushima was in fact intimately involved in the operation and at times ‘almost seemed to be Kawashima’s right-hand man’. So, the Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff officially forbade a plan of action, while actually being one of the participants in it. If Fukushima’s actions in supporting the first independence movement were known and had contravened army policy, some kind of censure should have followed, but there is no evidence of any censure. Indeed, Fukushima was subsequently promoted to a higher rank. Then, in April 1912, he was appointed governor of the Kwantung Leased

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Territories, a position that brought him closer to the action, and one he held until September 1914, when he was promoted to full general, the second highest general officer rank. Fukushima also became vice-chairman of the Imperial Military Reserve Association. Similarly, Taga Muneyuki, a major at the time of the first Manchuria-Mongolia independence movement and an active participant in supposedly unauthorised operations, later reached the rank of lieutenant-general, only one rank below that attained by Fukushima. The only conclusion to draw is that the actions of these two officers were not considered insubordinate; otherwise they would not have been promoted.

There is, of course, the theoretical possibility that the army authorities were unaware either of Fukushima’s association with Kawashima or of Taga’s activities. This, however, is unlikely. Fukushima and Kawashima had been closely associated with one another for the better part of twenty-five years. It had probably been Fukushima who had provided the funds for Kawashima to travel to China in 1886, and it was Fukushima who had engaged Kawashima as an army interpreter at the time of the 1900 Boxer Expedition. Presumably, the army must have been aware of the relationship between the two men. As for Taga, it had been the army that had

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114 For a summary of Taga’s career see Hata, *Nihon riku-kaigun sōgō jiten*, p. 86.
116 Kamisaka, *Dansō no reijin*, p. 45; Reynolds, *Xinzheng Revolution and Japan*, p. 165.
dispatched him to Inner Mongolia for the purpose of aiding Prince Gung, one of the leaders of the ‘independence’ movement of 1912.117

The high command again appears to have turned a blind eye to renegade operations in Mongolia in the next independence movement. The actions of the senior officers involved in 1916, Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff Lieutenant-General Tanaka, and Lieutenant-General Fukuda, discussed earlier, support this conclusion.118

As for Major Koiso Kuniaki, he had been ordered to suspend operations in Inner Mongolia, but when the operation in fact proceeded, he was not held culpable. At the time Koiso was a comparatively junior officer, and had only been attached to the Army General Staff since June 1915. Yet, apparently, he deliberately disobeyed orders. Junior staff officers were not expected to think for themselves, and if Koiso’s actions had been deemed irregular it is highly probable that he would have been sidelined.119

If Koiso ignored a direct order from a superior, in this instance the Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, and then directed a number of officers senior in rank to him to proceed with the planning of the second independence movement, it implies that he believed he had at least the tacit approval of Tanaka, Fukuda and other officers senior to him.

Thus the evidence strongly suggests that high-level tacit approval, at least, was given to Japanese involvement in the second Manchurian-Mongolian independence movement. Koiso went on to hold a number of important posts, both military and

political, including that of Prime Minister between July 1944 and April 1945, indicating that his apparent disobedience in 1916 was by no means a black mark against his career. The conclusion must be that Koiso received verbal approval for his actions in 1916, thereby allowing him to act independently, but avoiding the paper trail that a written order would have left. Neither does there seem to have been any other censure by the Army General Staff of the independent action by other officers in the field following the cabinet’s decision to terminate support for the Inner Mongols.

More importantly, even following the death of Yuan Shih-k’ai in June 1916 and the Japanese cabinet’s decision to terminate any further operations against the new Chinese Republic, there were still officers who continued to support the second independence movement, providing further evidence that some within the military disagreed with the political decision and were prepared and allowed to act independently. As we have seen, the result of this independent action, in which Japanese officers actually directed operations, was a series of armed clashes between the Mongol and Han Chinese forces in 1916. These encounters received extensive press coverage in both the Japanese- and English-language press in Japan, and in the English-language press in China, with particular attention being given to the fact that Japanese officers commanded the Mongols. American military intelligence also

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120 For a summary of Koiso’s career see Hata, Nihon riku-kaigun sōgō jiten, p. 58.
reported on Japanese involvement in the clashes between the Mongols and Han Chinese.\textsuperscript{122} Thus the Japanese military’s involvement in the 1916 ‘independence’ movement was widely known, to the general public and at the highest levels of government, both within Japan and abroad.

The propensity of the Japanese high command in this period to ignore independent action in the field, as well as to ignore the wishes of the elected government, is borne out by archival evidence of the army’s actions during the Siberian Intervention, and especially of its support for Semenov and Ungern-Sternberg. As we will see, the government officially decided to cease supporting Semenov and probably Ungern-Sternberg in May 1919. Local Japanese military assistance to Semenov, Ungern-Sternberg and others continued after May 1919, however, and it is safe to conclude from the archives that such assistance had the tacit approval of elements of both the Japanese military at home and the government.\textsuperscript{123} The Army General Staff knew that Semenov was receiving Japanese support in the field, and as the aims of Semenov and at least one part of the Japanese Army were in concert, a blind eye was turned. Several of the Japanese Army officers involved in the Siberian Intervention later played prominent roles in the political world in Tokyo; and more importantly for

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our purposes, some of those in Tokyo who favoured support for unofficial action during the Siberian Intervention also went on to hold positions of significant responsibility, suggesting that their superiors had not greatly disapproved of their actions.

Until the end of the Siberian Intervention, Semenov and Ungern-Sternberg themselves clearly had at least the tacit approval of senior levels of the Japanese Army for their activities in the Transbaikal and Mongolia. The question of whether they also had high-level Japanese government approval is more difficult to answer. It is known that in November 1917, a full ten months prior to the government’s decision to dispatch Japanese personnel to the Russian Far East, the cabinet of Terauchi Masatake adopted a policy of assisting ‘moderate elements’ in Siberia that were to include Semenov.124 Later, in January 1919, during the early phase of the Pan-Mongol movement, the cabinet of Hara Kei decided that it was necessary to remove Russian influence in Outer Mongolia, as well as to ensure that no other power, such as the United States, gained a foothold in the region.125 While it is unclear if this decision implied further aid to Semenov, Japanese Army officers in Urga did make clear to the Mongols Japan’s desire to exclude Western influence from Outer Mongolia and also pressed repeatedly for diplomatic representation between Japan and Outer Mongolia, as well as a variety of economic concessions.126

As a result of his often bloody and brutal reign over the Transbaikal, however, the attitude of the other Allies in the Siberian Intervention, especially the USA, turned against support for Semenov, and shortly after the beginning of the Pan-Mongol movement, the Hara Cabinet decided to restrain him. In May 1919, the cabinet persuaded the Japanese Army to unite behind a decision to channel all arms and

125 Ibid., pp. 85-6.
economic assistance to Semenov through the overall White Russian leader in the Russian Far East, Admiral Aleksander Vasilevich Kolchak, thus officially ending the separate support given to Semenov by Japanese secret agents and field officers, with or without the knowledge of the Army General Staff.\textsuperscript{127} There was another twist when, in early January 1920, the United States government decided to end its involvement in the Siberian Intervention, realising that support for the White Russians was unlikely to lead to the defeat of the Bolsheviks. The Hara Cabinet, after learning of the intended American withdrawal from Siberia, agreed that Japan would follow suit, but ‘at an appropriate moment’.\textsuperscript{128} What this meant in practice was that Japan continued to occupy Vladivostok and the former Tsarist Russian railway zone in Northern Manchuria, supposedly to protect Eastern Mongolia, Manchuria and Korea from Bolshevik subversion.

In May 1919, when the Hara Cabinet convinced the Army General Staff to suspend aid to Semenov, and presumably also to Ungern-Sternberg, the suggestion was that the support given prior to 1919 had been from field officers and was accordingly unofficial.\textsuperscript{129} Reports from 1918 and 1919 in the Army General Staff’s \textit{Nishi mitsu ju ōnikki} (Western Secret Great Diary), however, clearly show that the ministers for both the Army and Foreign Affairs were kept fully appraised of the steps being taken to support Semenov, and were still being kept informed in September 1920, when a report was submitted to the Army Ministry regarding Japanese volunteers fighting with

\begin{itemize}
\item Ewing, \textit{Between the Hammer and the Anvil?}, pp. 119-30; Leong, \textit{Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations}, pp. 80-6.
\item Leong, \textit{Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations}, p. 84.
\item Leong, \textit{Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations}, p. 84.
\end{itemize}
Finally, in May 1921, two years after the decision had been made officially to end assistance, a report championing military support for the White Russians was prepared by Major-General Isomura Toshi, Chief of Staff of the Vladivostok Expeditionary Army, and submitted to the Army Vice Minister, Lieutenant-General Yamanashi Hanzō. The report urged that substantial assistance be given to Ungern-Sternberg, in order to facilitate the collapse of the Far Eastern Republic, even though such an outcome would have left Ungern-Sternberg’s force in control of Mongolia. Evidently such Japanese aid was in fact provided; the failed June 1921 assault on the Far Eastern Republic, discussed earlier in the chapter, was one part of a broader Japanese-backed White Russian campaign by Semenov, Ungern-Sternberg and other White Russian leaders to overthrow the new state. Thus the evidence is that the Japanese military continued aid both to Semenov and to Ungern-Sternberg well after the May 1919 cabinet decision to end such aid. It is also apparent that the high command was well aware of what was occurring.

More than two years after the official decision to end support for Semenov and those associated with him, presumably also including Ungern-Sternberg, the Japanese government was still finding it necessary to give public assurances on the international stage that it really was no longer supporting White Russian forces in the Russian Far East. In September 1921, at the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments in Washington DC, Japan’s representative, Shidehara Kijûrô, read out a statement explaining that Japan had been reluctant to abandon Semenov, given that the government had originally encouraged him, but that it had been found that assistance to

131 Bōeichō shiryōkan, Tokyo, ‘Baron Ungerun gun sentôryoku narabini jikyû nôryoku no handan ni kansuru shiryô’, 1 May 1921, in Taishô jûnen gogatsu nishi mitsu ju ônikki.
Semenov had complicated the international situation in Siberia, and Japan had therefore severed all relations with Semenov and had not renewed them. While Shidehara was denying Japanese support for Semenov, other sources confirm, as noted earlier, not only continuing Japanese support for Ungern-Sternberg in his assault on Outer Mongolia, but also the subsequent assault on the Far Eastern Republic, an operation in which Semenov himself was also involved.

Nor was the Japanese Foreign Ministry unaware of the support Ungern-Sternberg was receiving from the Japanese Army. A November 1921 report, prepared for Ijūin Hikokichi, then head of the Foreign Ministry’s Information Bureau, entitled “‘Ungerun’ gun ni yō haretaru Nihonjin no kōdō shimatsu’ (After-Action Report Concerning the Proud Japanese Participation in Ungern’s Army), went into some detail regarding Japanese support for Ungern-Sternberg. It is possible to infer from the report that one unit of Ungern-Sternberg’s army was commanded by a Japanese Army colonel.133 Two reports by the United States military attaché in Peking, submitted to the United States government in March 1921, further detailed Japanese involvement in Ungern-Sternberg’s operations.134

High-level complicity in supposedly renegade military operations in Mongolia progressively increased between 1912 and 1922. In 1912, it appears to have been limited to a small number of senior officers, among them Fukushima Yasumasa, according to Valliant.135 By 1916, however, the evidence suggests that a significant

132 Friters, Outer Mongolia, p. 226.
133 Gaikō shiryōkan, Tokyo, “‘Ungerun’ gun ni yō haretaru Nihonjin no kōdō shimatsu’, 5 November 1921, in Foreign Ministry papers 1-6-3-24-13-28-1, ‘Rokoku kakumei ikken: (bessatsu) Kyokutō oyobi kagekiha katsudō, (bessatsu) “Ungerun” no Kūron kōgeki’.
proportion of the Army General Staff was willing to ignore political decisions in pursuit of its own aims, and that in doing so it had the support of at least some elements of the Kwantung Army. The situation was even more complex by the time of the Siberian Intervention. Again the evidence suggests that elements of the military were more than willing to ignore cabinet decisions that they did not like. Judging from the title of the Foreign Ministry’s November 1921 after-action report, which talked of ‘proud Japanese participation’ in Ungern-Sternberg’s operations, some in the Foreign Ministry may also have opted by this time to ignore cabinet decisions that did not suit their aims.

Mongolian Overtures to Japan
Japan’s relationship with Mongolia at this time undoubtedly was largely moulded by the Japanese elites. As in the earlier period, however, it was not a one-way relationship, and there were ongoing, albeit sporadic, attempts throughout these years by leading Mongols to establish closer links with Japan. As Narangoa and Cribb and others have noted, Japan’s early success in industrialising, together with its spectacular and unexpected victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, inspired many Asians, who saw in Japan both a model and a possible source of assistance for their own plans for modernisation and independence.\footnote{Narangoa Li and Robert Cribb, ‘Introduction: Japan and the Transformation of National Identities in Asia in the Imperial Era’, in Narangoa and Cribb (eds), Imperial Japan and National Identities, p. 2.} The Mongols were no exception. Indeed, in some instances, it could be argued that the Mongols welcomed the opportunity to forge closer ties with Japan equally as much as the Japanese sought to cultivate the Mongols.

The first recorded diplomatic overture from the new Outer Mongolian government, established in 1911, to another country was in early 1913, when a delegation visited St Petersburg in an attempt to establish a closer relationship with
Outer Mongolia’s larger northern neighbour, through a guarantee of Russian support against any possible Chinese Republican incursion. The same delegation, however, also sought to limit the influence that Russia exerted in Outer Mongolia through the establishment of diplomatic relations with other nations, in particular, Japan. As a part of this attempt to open diplomatic relations with Japan, the Outer Mongolian delegation in St Petersburg forwarded a letter to the Japanese emperor from the Bogd Khan, the supreme religious ruler of Outer Mongolia and head of the Mongolian government. The letter, however, was returned to the Mongols unopened. The Japanese presumably rebuffed the Outer Mongolian overtures because, under the Russo-Japanese Agreement signed in July 1912, Outer Mongolia was deemed to fall within Russia’s sphere of influence.

Despite the rebuff, in February 1913, the Outer Mongolian government made a second attempt to open diplomatic relations with Japan. On this occasion, the Home Minister of the Bogd Khan’s government, Tserenchimed, sought to have Japan establish a protectorate over Inner Mongolia while simultaneously recognising the independence of Outer Mongolia and also the notional sovereignty of Outer Mongolia over Inner Mongolia. One major object was to enable the Outer Mongolian government to achieve its aim of nominally uniting Inner and Outer Mongolia, in order to create the Greater Mongolia that some in Outer Mongolia dreamed of. To achieve this aim a delegation was dispatched to Harbin to meet with the Japanese consul there, as the first step in a planned trip to Japan to petition the Japanese government. Unfortunately for the Outer Mongolian delegation, the Japanese consul informed them that because Russia opposed the trip to Japan, he could only advise the Outer Mongolians to avoid

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unpleasantness and return to Urga. The Japanese go-between for this second attempt was Miyazato Yoshimaro, a ‘Mongolian adventurer’ (Mōko rōnin), later connected with Babujab, the Mongolian leader of the 1916 independence movement. Miyazato supposedly succeeded in persuading both the Harbin consul-general, and the Japanese military staff in Changchun, to accept the Mongolian mission, but because of pressure from Russia, the Japanese government declined to allow the mission passage to Japan.

In early 1914, the Outer Mongolian government may have made a third attempt to open diplomatic relations with Japan. On this occasion, the Mongolian Special Envoy in St Petersburg granted an interview to the Japanese press in which he called on the Japanese government to promote closer ties with Inner Mongolia. The envoy’s reason for doing this is unclear, but it may have constituted another attempt by Outer Mongolia to gain Japanese recognition of Outer Mongolia’s notional sovereignty over Inner Mongolia. Moreover, from the tone of the interview, it appeared that the Outer Mongols were becoming frustrated with Russia. The envoy made the following statement:

The Koolon [Urga] Government is now tired of the cunning diplomacy of the Russian Government. In view of the self-government of Outer Mongolia established through Russian help, Inner Mongolia desires to secure similar rights by Japanese help. It was in furtherance of this desire that the Living Buddha [Bogd Khan, or religious leader of Outer Mongolia] asked the Russian Foreign Department to convey his letter to the

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Emperor of Japan. If, therefore, Japan should give help to the present political movement of Inner Mongolia, she would secure privileges there equal to those secured by Russia in Outer Mongolia.\[^{141}\]

Evidently, parts of the Outer Mongolian government were seeking to strengthen Japan’s position in Inner Mongolia, perhaps hoping in the future that Japan might counter Russia’s dominant position in Outer Mongolia as well. The fact that this interview was published in Japan also suggests that elements of the Japanese media regarded the Outer Mongolian overture as an opportunity to secure for Japan a stronger position in Inner Mongolia, and were not shy of conveying this opinion, albeit indirectly.

Despite the earlier rebuffs, in the middle of 1915 Miyazato Yoshimaro was again approached to act as a go-between in Mongolian attempts to secure Japanese military assistance. On this occasion, Miyazato assisted two Mongols, one of them Babujab’s brother-in-law, to travel to Japan, where the pair came to the attention of Kawashima Naniwa, who had been involved in the first Manchurian-Mongolian independence movement, and others of like mind. Following a meeting of the Mongols, Kawashima and others, the Japanese military decided to dispatch two reserve army officers to Mongolia to assess what aid Babujab’s army required.\[^{142}\] The eventual outcome of this approach was the Japanese assistance given to the second independence movement, discussed earlier in the chapter.

\[^{141}\] Interview by the *Mainichi* newspaper correspondent in St Petersburg, translated as ‘Russia, Mongolia, and Japan – Mongolia’s Longings’, *JCWE*, 8 January 1914, p. 49.
Conclusion

The attempts by members of various interest groups to increase Japanese control of Mongolia during the Manchurian-Mongolian independence movements of 1912 and 1916 and the Siberian Intervention of 1918-22 should not be examined in isolation. Rather, the three operations, and the ongoing diplomatic overtures by Japan to China and Russia, must be seen as part of a larger pattern. The independence movement of 1912 was not the first attempt by Japanese military officers to enlarge Japan’s sphere of influence into Mongolia, though earlier efforts had been less ambitious. As outlined in Chapter One, the Japanese military had made several attempts prior to the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty to strengthen Japan’s position in Inner Mongolia, including by such means as encouraging the activities of Kawahara Misako as teacher and intelligence officer in the months preceding the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, and placing Japanese Army officers in parts of Inner Mongolia prior to the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty.

One thing that is distinctive about this period, however, and yet has been neglected in other works, is the high-level tolerance of apparently renegade army actions in Mongolia. From the first independence movement of 1912 through to the end of the Siberian Intervention in 1922 the pattern of apparent insubordination, and tolerance of it, grows steadily larger. In 1912 it was probably only a handful of officers out in the field who disobeyed official orders, although it is possible, as Valliant has suggested, that Fukushima Yasumasa, a senior officer in the high command, was quite deeply involved. In 1916, apparent insubordination again seems to have been accepted in connection with operations in Mongolia, as seen by the evident lack of censure of Koiso by the Army General Staff, although the General Staff did appear to

143 Valliant, ‘Mongolian Independence Movements’, p. 5.
follow the wishes of the civilian government in officially suspending assistance to the forces led by Babujab. By the time of the Siberian Intervention even the semblance of willingness by the Army General Staff to kowtow to the civilian authorities had ceased, as can be seen in the call by high-ranking army officers for aid to White Russian leaders in May 1921, some two years after the civilian government had decided to suspend such aid. Clearly, some in the high command were prepared to ignore the civilian authorities when it came to operations in Mongolia, especially if the decisions made by the civilian authorities interfered with attempts by the military to extend Japan’s control over the region. Operations were conducted, however, in such a way that the high command could plead ignorance of what had occurred if the attempt failed.

Despite the failure of the various Japanese-backed attempts to gain control of Mongolia during this period, the degree of attention shown by the Japanese military and other groups to Mongolia indicates the perceived strategic significance of the region to Japan. Moreover, the overtures made by some in the Outer Mongolian government to Japan, in an attempt to gain diplomatic recognition for their independence from Han Chinese domination, to counter Russian interference, and to enhance their own claim to influence over Inner Mongolia, indicate that some Outer Mongolians favoured the idea of Japan playing an active role in their future. These overtures no doubt also served to strengthen Japanese leaders’ belief that Japan was or could be the leader of Asia. The next chapter will show that the withdrawal of the Japanese Army from the continent following the collapse of the Siberian Intervention brought a further shift in Japanese-Mongolian ties, as business and religious figures re-emerged and again assumed a significant role in the relationship.
CHAPTER THREE

MONGOLIA’S RICHES:
JAPANESE EXPLORERS, ENTREPRENEURS AND
MILITARY OPPORTUNISTS, 1922-31

Even if my body lies in Mongolian fields
As a Japanese man I will feel no shame.
At this moment I ascend to heaven.
I will protect Japan and the world.
Far away from Japan,
I am now about to become a god in the skies of
Mongolia.¹

Between 1922 and 1931, the dominant Japanese attitudes to Mongolia were woven from a number of disparate strands. Direct military ambitions remained a crucial factor, but certain Japanese political, business and, more surprisingly, religious figures also apparently came to feel that Mongolia was a valuable, exploitable resource, and one that should accordingly be brought under Japanese control. Of all of them, economic considerations were particularly prominent in this period.

The shift in imperialist emphasis — from a reliance in the 1910s on military means to achieve Japanese hegemony, to greater emphasis on economic control — was not exclusive to Mongolia and in this sense, orthodox attitudes to Mongolia reflected the broader trend in Japanese policy towards China at this time. As a number of writers have noted, from the 1922 Washington Conference to the 1931 Manchurian

Incident, Japanese leaders favoured a policy of economic expansionism in China as a whole, rather than relying on force in the first instance. By and large they sought to preserve existing rights and interests, expand export trade and cultivate new investments, though there were occasions, as in the May 1928 Tsinan Incident, where force was considered necessary. Economic expansionism dominated Japanese activity in Mongolia as well throughout the 1920s, as Japanese business and religious figures explored the potential of the region, while back in Japan, certain bureaucrats and politicians promoted Mongolia’s supposed wealth and importance to Japan. At the same time, Japanese press reports on civilian visits to Mongolia and on various bureaucratic and political pronouncements about Mongolia ensured that the region continued to be brought to the attention of the reading public.

Despite the apparent new emphasis on economics, the lines between military and civilian activities remained blurred. Many of those in Japan who promoted Mongolia’s wealth in fact had ties to the military. The extent to which the Japanese military actually supported their ventures is unclear, but the apparent geo-strategic importance of Mongolia to Japan was often an important underlying element in schemes to exploit Mongolia economically, and thus the military is quite likely to have encouraged such schemes in one way or another.

This chapter illustrates the ways in which a range of the Japanese elites, chief among them the military, sought in the wake of the withdrawal from Siberia to further Japanese control of Mongolia. I first review the geopolitical context of Japanese-Mongolian relations between the end of the Siberian Intervention in 1922, when military operations directed at achieving Japan’s strategic ends on the continent were temporarily halted, and the Manchurian Incident of 1931, in which the use of military

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force was again pre-eminent. I then discuss the notion that Japan had ‘special interests’ in Mongolia, showing how such claims were promoted to the general public by individuals and groups from the military, political, academic and religious elites. Next I examine some major Japanese business ventures promoted in Mongolia during this period, noting their connections to the military and the manner in which these ventures were publicised within Japan, before considering attempts by Japanese religious figures, both mainstream and fringe, to forge closer ties between Japan and Mongolia, again noting their links to the military. Finally, I discuss one particular aspect of Japanese military ambitions, the desire to use Mongolia as a source of horses for the army.

I argue overall that while the various schemes, both military and civilian, pursued by Japanese groups and individuals in Mongolia during this period may appear unconnected, they in fact form part of the larger, ongoing picture of Japanese ambitions for the region. Those in the elites who regarded Mongolia as part of Japan’s sphere of influence maintained and strengthened their ties with Mongolia during this period, and Mongolia also remained in the public eye in Japan. Moreover, there was a high degree of continuity in the participants involved in these schemes, many of whom had connections with the earlier attempts to extend Japanese control in Mongolia discussed in the previous chapters. The web of personal connections that had first appeared during the late nineteenth century among those Japanese with ambitions in Mongolia expanded during the 1920s, leading to the emergence of a broad synthesis of political, economic and cultural interests in the region.

The Geopolitical Context

The Red Army’s defeat of Ungern-Sternberg in July 1921, and the subsequent Soviet occupation of Outer Mongolia, effectively ended Japanese plans to install a puppet
regime there during the 1918-22 Siberian Intervention. How the Japanese Army General Staff reacted to this setback is unknown. Given, however, that sections of the Japanese military had been contemplating an increase in support to Ungern-Sternberg shortly prior to his defeat, as discussed in the previous chapter, the General Staff cannot have been happy with the turn of events. As for the Siberian Intervention itself, the last Japanese troops were finally withdrawn in November 1922, but the army’s dogged pursuit of its strategic aims on the continent had ramifications that lasted beyond the period in which it had been active in Siberia. As Leonard Humphreys notes, the Siberian expedition had been hugely expensive, and partly for that reason, it alienated the Japanese public from the military and increased calls for a reduction in the size of the army.

On the diplomatic front there were several important developments in Japan’s relations with its principal rivals for influence in Mongolia, that is, Russia and China. At Soviet instigation, the Mongolian People’s Republic was proclaimed in Outer Mongolia in November 1924, five months after the death of the Bogd Khan, the Outer Mongolian religious leader and head of the government. The area remained under Soviet sway until 1990. The Japanese military certainly remained alert to political developments in Outer Mongolia after 1924. Given the fact of Soviet power there, however, from the early 1920s onwards, most Japanese military attention switched to the geo-strategic position of Inner Mongolia instead.

For Inner Mongolia, the 1920s were turbulent years. Technically, the region was part of the extremely unstable Han Chinese Republic. Between 1916 and 1928 the

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Chinese head of state changed nine times, there were twenty-four cabinet reshuffles with twenty-six different Prime Ministers, and corruption was endemic, with much of the country under the control of warlords. The political instability on the national level in China was reflected in the three provinces that comprised most of Inner Mongolia: Suiyuan, Chahar and Jehol. Shifting alliances among the warlords who vied for control of this region resulted in a never-ending series of skirmishes in which this month’s ally became next month’s enemy, and control of the three provinces changed with each round of combat.

In May 1922, for example, the Chihli faction defeated Chang Tso-lin’s Fengtien faction, which had controlled much of Inner Mongolia since 1920, and control of the provinces of Suiyuan, Chahar and Jehol passed to the Chihli faction. While Chang lost military power in the provinces, however, this did not stop him from declaring the Three Northeastern Provinces (Manchuria), plus Jehol and Chahar provinces and Inner and Outer Mongolia, independent from the Peking government on 12 May 1922. This was a confusing array of territory, given that Jehol and Chahar were part of Inner Mongolia and under the control of the Chihli faction, while Outer Mongolia was under Soviet sway. For their part, the Soviets allegedly regarded the declaration of ‘independence’ as Japanese-inspired, a ‘revival of the idea of a Japanese-Manchurian buffer’ and the ‘spearhead of Japanese imperialism’.

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7 Ibid., p. 219.
8 Ibid., pp. 212-13.
In late 1924, the Fengtien and Chihli armies again clashed, with the Japanese military backing Chang, while the Russians backed his rival, Feng Yü-hsiang. As a result of the clash, Suiyuan, Chahar and Jehol provinces fell to Feng’s Kuominchun (People’s Army). Not surprisingly, the Japanese military was unhappy with this outcome. Major-General Hayashi Yasakichi, the Japanese military attaché at the Peking Legation, for example, noted that Feng’s defeat of Chang would have a negative impact on Japan’s relations with Manchuria, and with ‘Man-Mō’. The Japanese government was sufficiently worried to deliver a note to the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Peking expressing its concern about Japan’s position in Manchuria and Mongolia. The response from the Chinese Foreign Ministry indicated that Japanese claims there were to be treated the same as other foreign claims, presumably meaning that Japan could no longer demand preferential treatment from the Chinese government.

In the wake of the warlord clashes in North China came a further threat to Japan’s position north of the Great Wall. In June 1926, Chiang Kai-shek launched his Northern Expedition, aiming to unify China under the control of the Kuomintang (Nationalists). By the middle of 1927, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi considered the threat to Japanese ambitions sufficiently serious to send Yamanashi Hanzō, a retired army officer who later served as Governor-General of Korea, to Peking, in an attempt to persuade Japan’s protégé Chang Tso-lin to retreat north of the Great Wall, thereby avoiding a clash with Chiang. The Japanese hoped to convince Chiang

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12 Ch’i, *Warlord Politics*, p. 216.
Kai-shek to accept the partition of China, leaving Manchuria and Mongolia in Chang Tso-lin’s hands. Given the Japanese support of Chang, the area would then be under *de facto* Japanese control. Chiang Kai-shek was initially unresponsive.\(^\text{16}\) In October 1927, however, Tanaka and Chiang met face-to-face in Tokyo, and attempted to reach an agreement under which Japan recognised Chinese Nationalist control of China proper, and Chiang recognised Japan’s special position in Manchuria and Mongolia. The eventual outcome of the talks, however, was obscure and apparently ambiguous. According to Takehiko Yoshihashi, there was an agreement; William Morton, on the other hand, states that Tanaka did not respond to Chiang’s overtures.\(^\text{17}\)

Although Japan’s overall China policy was generally geared towards economic expansionism during the 1920s, there were, nevertheless, instances in which the government dispatched troops to the continent to defend Japan’s perceived ‘special interests’. Nor were the troops used purely for defensive purposes. In May 1928, for example, Japanese and Chinese troops clashed at Tsinan in Shantung province, when Nationalist troops entered the city as part of Chiang Kai-shek’s offensive against the northern warlords and encountered the Japanese troops stationed there, supposedly to protect Japanese businesses.\(^\text{18}\) The Tsinan Incident was just one instance of the opportunism that continued to colour the Japanese government’s dealings with Republican China.

\(^{16}\) McCormack, *Chang Tso-Lin*, pp. 244-6.


\(^{18}\) See Humphreys, *Way of the Heavenly Sword*, pp. 149-52, for an examination of the Tsinan Incident and its aftermath.
Mongolia in Japanese Bureaucratic, Political and Cultural Discourse

Throughout the 1920s, a discourse continued in Japanese bureaucratic, political and cultural circles about ties with Mongolia. Much of the discussion revolved around claims to a special relationship with the northeast region of the Chinese continent, the region commonly referred to as ‘Man-Mō’, and the nature of Japan’s strategic, economic and political rights in what Japanese leaders regarded as their country’s ‘sphere of influence’. Public pronouncements by various prominent figures, as well as certain administrative moves, bolstered Japan’s claims to the region.

Bureaucratic developments and academic arguments reinforced discourses about special rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia. At the 1922 Tokyo Peace Exposition, for example, as at the 1903 Osaka Domestic Industrial Exposition, a number of pavilions were devoted to regions that were already Japanese colonies or were apparently regarded as potential colonies. Among the pavilions in the colonial section in 1922 was the ‘Manchuria and Mongolia Hall’. The inclusion of this hall in the colonial section resulted in a formal complaint from the Chinese government, which objected to the suggestion that the region was or would be a Japanese colony. This was not the only claim that Mongolia fell under Japan’s colonial preserve. In 1922, the same year as the Tokyo Exposition, there was agitation in bureaucratic circles for the establishment of a Colonial Department at ministerial level, presumably to administer those external areas not already directly governed, that is, Taiwan and Korea. The proposed department would oversee the South Sea Islands, over which Japan held a League of Nations’ mandate; but there were also calls for it to take into account the

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21 ‘Notes of the Week’, JCWE, 4 May 1922, p. 622.
‘changed conditions in North Manchuria, Mongolia, Siberia and Saghalien’. Evidently, some bureaucrats viewed Japan’s colonial ambitions as stretching across a large swathe of territory, including Mongolia. Despite these calls for the establishment of a Colonial Department, nothing eventuated at this stage.

The question of whether or not a formal bureaucratic organ was needed to further Japan’s colonial aspirations and to oversee its colonial dependencies, other than Taiwan and Korea, was still under discussion in 1926. In June of that year, a Mr Kurogane, the Director of the Japanese Government’s Colonisation Bureau (Takushokukyoku) of the Home Ministry, called for the establishment of a ‘Colonisation Department’, presumably another name for the department that had been proposed in 1922. The specific aim was now to put Japan’s policy vis-à-vis Manchuria and Mongolia on a firmer basis. Kurogane had toured the region and had concluded that Japan’s ambitions there were endangered by the fact that the South Manchurian Railway Company, the Foreign Ministry and the army each pursued independent policies. Hence there was a need for a new co-ordinating body. Among the places Kurogane had apparently visited were Harbin, Tsitsihar, Kirin and Chita. While the first three towns lie in Northern Manchuria, Chita lies west of Lake Baikal, deep inside Russian territory. Kurogane’s visit thus poses the question of how far Japan’s ‘special interests’ were perceived to extend on the continent. Calls for the creation of a bureaucratic colonial department eventually resulted in the establishment of the Takumushō (Colonisation Ministry) in 1929.

22 ‘Shokuminshō ansaizen’, Tōkyō asahi shinbun, 22 April 1922.
23 ‘Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia – Statement by Director of Colonization Bureau’, JCWE, 10 June 1926, p. 681.
24 Ibid.
25 For further information about the Takumushō and its forerunner, the Takushokukyoku, see Hata Ikuhiko (ed.), Senzenki Nihon kanryōsei no seido · soshiki · jinji, Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1981, pp. 709-10.
Academic arguments were frequently used to bolster Japan’s claims to the region. In late December 1921, for example, Dr Yano Jin’ichi of the Faculty of Literature of the prestigious Kyoto Imperial University held forth in a newspaper article as to what constituted ‘China’ and how this definition affected Japan’s perceived ‘special interests’ north of the Great Wall. Yano concluded that ‘history’ showed that Manchuria, Mongolia and Tibet were not part of China, and that China therefore had no claim on these regions. Presumably, the point of Yano’s article was that if China had no legitimate claim to them, one or more of these regions could then be appropriated by Japan. A version of Yano’s article was also published by the influential foreign policy journal Gaikō jihō (Revue Diplomatique) and from there was swiftly translated into English. Yano’s thesis was hardly original. Some people in Japanese government and academic circles had long regarded China’s territorial claims to Mongolia, as well as to Manchuria and Tibet, as spurious. This position predated the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, and had been advanced in 1905, for example, by Suematsu Kenchō in a paper offered to the Central Asian Society in London. Indeed, Suematsu’s presentation of this view to a distinguished foreign audience suggests that even at that early point, the Japanese government believed it could legitimately and openly challenge Chinese territorial claims to Manchuria and Mongolia. Such opinions continued to be published, as part of an ongoing flow of writings that legitimised

26 ‘Shina mukoku kyōron – Shina to wa nan zo ya’, Tōkyō asahi shinbun, 26 December 1921, p. 3.
27 Article in Gaikō jihō, translated as ‘What is China?’, JCWE, 26 January 1922, pp. 124-5.
Japan’s claims to areas of the Chinese continent. Moreover, it was not only Japanese authors who advanced this thesis; some Western writers said similar things.

The question of whether Mongolia was the place of origin of the Japanese as a people was also hotly debated among Japanese academics in the 1920s. One of those involved in the debate was Japan’s premier Mongolist, Torii Ryūzō. In 1925, Torii published *Yōshi izen no Nihon* (Prehistoric Japan), in which he presented a theory of Japan’s ethnic origins which emphasised Japan’s racial diversity, and painted a picture of a prehistoric population drawn from all corners of Japan’s imperial territory and beyond, including Mongolia. The effect of Torii’s argument was to highlight the racial links between the ‘Japanese’ and their neighbours, presumably providing those who sought to expand Japan’s empire overseas with further justification for their actions. To collect further evidence for his theory, Torii conducted extensive fieldwork in Mongolia and adjacent regions. It was on a visit to Mongolia in the autumn of 1927 that he revised his own former opinion, as discussed in the Introduction, as to which of the leagues of Inner Mongolia fell, or ought to fall, within Japan’s sphere of interest. The following year, Torii again spent several months in Manchuria and Mongolia, publishing his findings for a wider audience on his return to Japan.

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31 ‘Notes of the Week’, *JCWE*, 4 May 1922, p. 625.
Torii’s 1928 visit was undertaken partially at the request of the Foreign Ministry’s Chinese Cultural Section (Gaimushō tai-Shi bunkabu), showing once again that Torii had close ties to the Japanese establishment. Indeed, Torii had consistently received material support for his research from the Japanese authorities. For example, when he conducted fieldwork in Manchuria and Mongolia in 1905, shortly after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese Army stationed there provided him with both guards and transportation. Then, during the Siberian Intervention of 1918-22, Torii enlisted the help of the Japanese expeditionary forces to travel to Northern Sakhalin and Eastern Siberia. The support Torii received from both the Japanese Army and the Foreign Ministry not only provides evidence of the longstanding links between the academic and bureaucratic realms in Japan, but also implies that Torii’s research, in particular, was regarded as important to Japan’s official position in the region.

Emphasis by the government on Mongolia and its importance to Japan was particularly evident in the second half of the decade. For example, in January 1926, Prime Minister Katō Takaaki included a reference to Japan’s rights, ‘both corporeal and non-corporeal’, in Manchuria and Mongolia in his speech at the opening of the fifty-first session of the Diet. In light of the ceremony that surrounded the opening of the Diet, with the emperor overseeing proceedings, the specific mention of Japan’s supposed rights in Manchuria and Mongolia can be seen as a measure of how important these rights were considered to be in political circles. Moreover, the very next month, Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō reiterated to the Diet that Mongolia, specifically, ranked highly in government thinking. Responding to a question from the opposition,

36 Ibid., p. 3 of Foreword, p. 2 of main text.
Shidehara stated that the government was ‘ready to afford help to such Japanese capitalists as might make investments in that region’. The willingness of the Katō government to formally pledge assistance to any Japanese business concern considering investing in Mongolia suggests the perceived economic importance of the region to Japanese leaders. Mongolia’s economic significance for Japan, as part of ‘Man-Mō’, was still under discussion in political circles some two years later, when Seiyū, the monthly journal of the Seiyūkai political party, published two articles on the need to develop the region, the second of which was a comparatively lengthy piece.

Outside of academic, bureaucratic and political circles, various other individual civilians also subscribed to the notion that Mongolia lay within Japan’s purview and made a number of endeavours to promote closer ties between the two regions. Of the private individuals who are known to have journeyed to Mongolia in the 1920s, nearly all went with some degree of assistance from one or more of the Japanese elites that had specific goals in the region. These people may not have been directly associated with the political, bureaucratic or academic groups discussed above, but they often had connections to individuals within those circles. The ‘casual’ travellers, language students and nationalist thinkers who ventured to Mongolia on unofficial visits, then returned to Japan and wrote or lectured about their experiences, further propagated the idea that Mongolia had a special significance for Japan and fell, accordingly, under Japan’s purview.

Among these private individuals, one of the more intriguing is Morishima Kadofusa, whose links to Mongolia date back to 1913. In that year Morishima, then aged twenty-seven and having decided for some reason that Mongolia was where he

40 Ibid., p. 768.
should live out his life, entered a lamasery in Inner Mongolia to hone his Mongolian language skills.\textsuperscript{42} After three years in the lamasery, Morishima had seemingly tired of the monastic life; from 1917 until 1921 he was attached to the Japanese Army Special Intelligence Agency (SIA) office in Urga.\textsuperscript{43} Then, in 1926, he appears to have become the first Japanese visitor to Outer Mongolia since the Soviet occupation of 1921. His visit was made possible through the mediation of the \textit{Mainichi shinbun} (Daily Newspaper) special correspondent in Peking, Fuse Tatsuji,\textsuperscript{44} who arranged for Morishima to obtain a visa from the Russian Consul in Peking, Lev Mihailovich Karakhan.\textsuperscript{45} Given that diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union had only been normalised the previous year, the granting of a visa to allow Morishima — a private individual with no apparent connection to official circles in Japan — to visit Outer Mongolia, a region that had previously been a point of potential conflict between Japan and the USSR, suggests that Karakhan saw some benefit in the move. Exactly how Morishima was able to gain this privilege, and the nature of his connection with Fuse or the \textit{Mainichi shinbun}, remain unknown. In any event, Morishima travelled via Manchuli, Ulan Ude and Kiakhta, before arriving in Ulan Bator, as Urga had been re-named.\textsuperscript{46}

On Morishima’s return to Japan, Lieutenant-General Banzai Rihachirō, a long-time friend, arranged for him to present a report on his visit to Outer Mongolia to the president of the House of Peers, Tokugawa Iesato, and other members of the House.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{42} Nakajima Manzō, \textit{Toku-ō to tomo ni}, Ōsaka: privately published, 2000, p. 123.
\textsuperscript{44} For a summary of Fuse’s career, see Matsuo Takamichi, ‘Fuse Tatsuji’, in Usui Katsumi, Takamura Naosuke, Torinoumi Kiyoshi, Yui Masaomi (eds), \textit{Nihon kingendai jinmei jiten}, Tōkyō: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2001, pp. 915-16.
\textsuperscript{45} Uchida, \textit{Uchimōko}, p. 72.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.; Nakajima, \textit{Toku-ō}, p. 123.
Following his appearance before this august body, Morishima went on to give a series of public lectures on two topics, namely ‘Outer Mongolia’s Current Situation and Future’ and ‘The Relationship of Japan, Russia and China with Reference to Outer Mongolia’. The lectures were apparently successful, as Morishima seems to have later published two books based on them. It is clear that Morishima had links to the Japanese military, not least through his friendship with Banzai, whose own connection to Mongolia was examined in the previous chapter. The fact that Morishima was also invited to present a report to the House of Peers further suggests that his visit to Outer Mongolia was regarded as significant by important establishment figures. Moreover, Morishima’s connection to Mongolia continued subsequently, as will be seen in Chapter Five.

Other Japanese visitors to Mongolia during the late 1920s included a group of students from the Chinese and Mongolian language departments of the Tokyo Foreign Language School, who spent almost a month in Inner Mongolia in mid-1927. They later compiled a series of reports, including ‘Commercial Transactions in Mongolia’. The title of this report suggests the students were encouraged to consider the eventual practical application of their language studies and also highlights the focus on the economic potential of Mongolia that was promoted from various quarters during the 1920s.

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48 Uchida, Uchimōko, p. 72.
Overshadowing the public impact of all other visits by private individuals to the region, however, was the 1928 visit by Yosano Akiko,51 the famed feminist poet. For six weeks, in May and June 1928, Akiko and her husband, Yosano Tekkan, accompanied by officials of the South Manchurian Railway Company, travelled throughout Manchuria and Mongolia. The two later published an account of the journey, divided into three distinct sections comprising Akiko’s travel diary, a selection of the poems Tekkan and Akiko had been inspired to write during their travels, and Tekkan’s commentary on the journey, written in Chinese. A selection of photographs was also included.52 Of the three sections, it is Akiko’s travel diary that has been most highly praised. American historian Joshua Fogel has even described it as ‘one of the great events in the writing of literary travel narratives’.53 The tour by the Yosanos was highly publicized.54 The impact of the subsequent book, however, was probably even more significant. In some respects the book resembled Kawahara Misako’s of twenty years before, for example in its careful definition of ‘Mongolia’, its emphasis on the huge size of Inner Mongolia compared to Japan, and its detailed breakdown of the leagues and banners of Inner Mongolia.55 This last feature further echoed the work of Torii Ryūzō, to whom Akiko also made reference.56 Clearly, a modest but more or less coherent body of Japanese literary and academic writing on Mongolia had emerged by this stage.

52 Yosano Satoru and Yosano Akiko, Man-Mō yūki, Tōkyō: Osaka yagō shoten, 1930.
53 Fogel, Literature of Travel, p. 266.
55 Yosano, Man-Mō yūki, pp. 120-21.
Japanese Business and Mongolia

By the 1920s, the Japanese press was focusing increasing attention on economic activities in Mongolia. Particular attention was paid to prominent figures such as the financier Ōkura Kihachirō and Grigorii Semenov, the former White Russian leader and Japanese military protégé, who also had significant commercial interests in the region. In press reports of both Ōkura and Semenov’s activities during the mid-1920s, the emphasis was on Mongolia as a land of great expanse and even greater natural wealth. Some stories, moreover, blurred the boundaries as to the area that ‘Mongolia’ actually encompassed. The dominant aim of all reports appears to have been to highlight for the Japanese public the lush, resource-rich prize that was supposedly there for the taking in Mongolia.

From late 1924, for example, the Japanese press reported on Semenov’s plan to establish a forest-cutting concession in Mongolia and then to trade camel hair, horsetails, wool, hides and skins among Mongolia, Manchuria and Japan.57 The latter project appears to have involved valuable quantities of materials, with some reports estimating the worth of the trade at around one hundred thousand yen per shipment, while others suggested ten times this amount.58 Either way, the size of the sums must have suggested to the Japanese reading public that Mongolia had enormous economic potential. Moreover, the underlying implication of these stories was that it was to Japan’s advantage to promote such ventures.

The emphasis on great natural wealth was repeated in the stories concerning a visit by Ōkura to Mongolia in 1925, although in this instance it was the agricultural potential of the region that was highlighted. The press first reported on the planned trip in

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56 Ibid., p. 120.
February 1925, noting that the baron had decided to visit the extensive paddy fields he owned in Mongolia and that he would then sojourn in the Mongolian desert. 59 Later reports went into far greater detail as to the size of Ōkura’s holdings. One story claimed that his fields covered an area of some 200,000 chōbu (around 200,000 hectares or nearly half a million acres), 60 while another declared that his holdings extended to ‘millions of acres … converted into rice paddy fields’. 61 Exactly how large Ōkura’s holdings were in 1925 is hard to determine. According to Sunagawa Yukio, however, when Ōkura established his agricultural concern in Inner Mongolia in 1923, the planned development had covered only some 6,000 chōbu (around 6000 hectares or 15,000 acres). 62 Clearly, if the newspaper report is correct, Ōkura’s operation in Mongolia had grown considerably in a short time to more than thirty times its original size, at the least.

On his departure from Japan in May 1925, much was made by the press of the fact that Ōkura planned to spend nearly two months in Mongolia, and that, while he had visited China ten times, this was to be his first visit to Mongolia. 63 Moreover, while Ōkura spent some three months in total travelling throughout North China and Inner Mongolia, including the Gobi Desert, he apparently spent more time in Inner Mongolia than anywhere else. 64 Why this was so was not explained in the press, but it suggested that even a powerful figure such as Ōkura placed great importance on Mongolia.

58 Article from the Ōsaka asahi shinbun, translated as ‘Semenoff as Trader’, JCWE, 25 December 1924, p. 874; ‘Semenoff – His Trading Venture’, JCWE, 8 January 1925, p. 35.
Reports further noted that the baron planned to ‘produce rice in great quantity in Mongolia’, presumably for the Japanese consumer back home. Ōkura was apparently to be assisted in this project by a number of Japanese agricultural experts who accompanied him on his trip to Mongolia. Later reports claim that the baron’s Mongolian agricultural endeavours were proving successful.

Press reports of Ōkura’s journey continued the prevailing tendency to blur the region’s geographical boundaries. Newspaper articles confused what was in Mongolia with what was in Manchuria, thus reconfirming other contemporary evidence, discussed earlier, that political and geographical boundaries on the Chinese continent were quite fluid in Japanese perceptions. Such fluidity, as we have seen, reflected the ongoing ambiguity in Japanese political, military and academic writings as to what exactly constituted ‘Man-Mō’, or Manchuria-Mongolia, and in turn, different views about an actual or desired Japanese sphere of interest on the continent.

Ōkura was not merely a businessman seeking to promote commerce in the region; he also had ties to the Japanese government and to the military. He had been closely involved in financing the 1912 and 1916 ‘independence’ movements discussed in the previous chapter, and the possibility that Ōkura was again acting as an intermediary for either the Japanese government or the military to promote Japan’s ambitions in the region cannot be discounted. Indeed, from certain newspaper articles it is clear that his visit to the region had a political dimension. For example, there were reports that he had arranged to meet Chang Tso-lin, with the express purpose of organising ‘a Sino-Japan joint company for the exploitation of Mongolia on an elaborate scale’.

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64 Sunagawa, Ōkura, p. 262. His visit to the Gobi was specifically mentioned in reports of Ōkura’s return to Japan: see Ōkura dan kaeru, YS, 6 August 1925, p. 3.
65 ‘Ōkura’s Rice Plan Proving Successful’.
66 ‘In Mongolia – Peaceful Penetration’.
67 ‘Ōkura’s Rice Plan Proving Successful’.
68 Translated in ‘Notes of the Week’, JCWE, 11 June 1925, p. 725.
newspaper placed its account of this meeting prominently on its front page, accompanied by a photograph of the two men.\(^6^9\) Nor was Ōkura’s appointment with Chang his only meeting with an important Chinese political figure in the region. Shortly after he arrived in Inner Mongolia, Ōkura met with Feng Yü-hsiang, Chang’s political rival. According to James Sheridan, Ōkura and Feng discussed the need for Sino-Japanese co-operation in ‘resisting the white race’.\(^7^0\) The meeting with Feng had been arranged by one Matsumuro Takayoshi, a Japanese Army cavalry officer, who was attached to Feng’s army at the time as an advisor, and who subsequently served as the SIA chief at a number of locations in North China and Inner Mongolia.\(^7^1\) In this latter capacity, Matsumuro submitted several reports to the Kwantung Army General Staff concerning Japan and Inner Mongolia, which will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five. Matsumuro’s part in arranging Ōkura and Feng’s meeting suggests that there was an ‘official’ purpose behind Ōkura’s visit to Mongolia.

Ōkura’s connection with Mongolia was again in the news in early 1927, when he announced his formal retirement from business. The press reported that while much of his commercial empire was to be passed to his son, Ōkura senior planned to retain control of his holdings in Inner Mongolia.\(^7^2\) Perhaps, then, Ōkura saw these as more important than all his other holdings, including those in Japan. Great emphasis was again placed in press reports on the size of Ōkura’s holdings in Inner Mongolia. The effect of this emphasis was twofold. First, it advertised the size of one individual’s financial investment in a region in which Japanese leaders claimed a ‘special interest’, and so helped to legitimise that claim. Second, given that the average farm-holding in


\(^7^0\) Sheridan, _Chinese Warlord_, p. 154.

\(^7^1\) Ibid., pp. 154-5. For a summary of Matsumuro’s career, see Hata Ikuhiko (ed.), _Nihon riku-kaigun sōgō jiten_, Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppansha, 1991, p. 137.

\(^7^2\) ‘Baron Okura – Formal Retirement’, _JCWE_, 13 January 1927, p. 36.
Japan was no more than a few chōbu, the enormous size of Ōkura’s holdings, some 200,000 chōbu, underlined the opportunity that Inner Mongolia, at least, appeared to offer to Japanese settlers in terms of land.

Apart from the ventures promoted by Semenov and Ōkura, Japanese interests supported a number of other economic undertakings targeting Mongolia during the 1920s. In late 1924, for example, an expedition by the Japanese Asiatic Exploration Association (Ajia tanken kyōkai) to Inner and Outer Mongolia was announced.73 This expedition was no small affair, consisting of a party of some sixty explorers, with the object of assessing the natural resources of the region. The party even included a camera crew, which was to document the journey.74 The expedition was led by a son of Kiyoura Keigo, a former prime minister, which may indicate a degree of official connection with the venture. Moreover, the party’s guide was Hatakeyama Kōtarō, who had assisted Ungern-Sternberg during the Siberian Intervention, as discussed in the previous chapter.75 The involvement of persons with ties to the Japanese political world, and others with ties to the military, raises the possibility that this was not just an expedition to assess the natural resources of the region for general purposes. Later analyses have certainly suggested other aims. In Gerard Friters’ view, for example,

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74 For discussion of the part that documentary film played in the promotion of Japanese imperialism in the early twentieth century, see Michael Baskett, The Attractive Empire: Transnational Film Culture in Imperial Japan, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2008, pp. 6-9.
75 Gaikō shiryōkan, Tokyo, ‘‘Ungerun” gun ni yō haretaru Nihonjin no kōdō shimatsu’, 5 November 1921, in Foreign Ministry papers 1·6·3-24-13-28-1, ‘Rokoku kakumei ikken: (bessatsu) Kyokutō oyobi kagekiha katsudō, (bessatsu) “Ungerun” no Kūron kōgeki’. Hatakeyama’s service with Ungern-Sternberg during the Siberian Intervention was also specifically mentioned in ‘Unknown Mongolia – More Peaceful Penetration’.
while the expedition had gone to Mongolia ostensibly to conduct geological research, in reality its object was to ‘reconnoiter’ the political situation.76

A more direct attempt by the Japanese government to establish ties with Outer Mongolia, for economic purposes, was made in October 1927. On this occasion, the Japanese government dispatched Kuhara Fusanosuke, president of the Seiyūkai political party, to the Soviet Union as its ‘Special Economic Survey Delegate’.77 The objective of Kuhara’s journey was to discuss the possibility of creating a demilitarized buffer zone between Russia and Japan, consisting of Manchuria, Korea, the Maritime Province of Siberia and, presumably, Outer Mongolia. The ultimate purpose of this buffer zone from Japan’s point of view, according to Sadako Ogata, was to hinder Soviet economic penetration of the parts of Manchuria and Mongolia that Japanese leaders regarded as properly falling within Japan’s sphere of influence.78 Although Stalin expressed interest in the idea, however, this grandiose scheme never came to fruition, probably due to opposition both from within Japan and from Chang Tso-lin.79

Two years later, in the spring of 1929, an even more direct attempt was apparently made to open trade between Outer Mongolia and Japan. On this occasion, according to Joseph Geleta, a Hungarian who spent more than a decade in Outer Mongolia, the Japanese government sent a mission to Mongolia to ‘study the possibilities of the country’, with a view to granting Mongolia a ‘large measure of support’,80 though details of the kind of support envisaged are not known. The Japanese mission was permitted to travel through the Soviet Union, but was turned back at the Soviet-Outer

78 Ibid.
Mongolian frontier by the Outer Mongolians. The Russians, Geleta claims, engineered the Mongolian rejection of Japan’s overture, rather than openly opposing the Japanese plans. Presumably, Russia wished to maintain the monopoly it held with respect to trade with Outer Mongolia.

**Japanese Religious Aims in Mongolia: The Mainstream and the Fringe**

Throughout the 1920s, Japanese religious organisations, both mainstream and fringe, were active in Mongolia. It is also distinctly likely that religious missions were again used as cover for intelligence-gathering operations in the region, as they had been in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In late 1923, for example, the Kyoto-based Honganji sect of Buddhism announced that it planned to build a branch temple at Mukden in Manchuria, in part to support the sect’s operations in Mongolia. This was a major undertaking, with the proposed cost of construction alone being 300,000 yen (approximately US$145,770), a very sizeable sum at the time. The land for the temple was to be provided free of charge by the South Manchurian Railway Company. Given that the company was a quasi-government organisation, this can be taken to mean that the sect’s activities in Manchuria had a degree of official approval. Ōtani Kōzui, the former head of the Honganji sect, was reportedly involved in the enterprise. As discussed in Chapter

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81 Ibid.
83 Translated and reported in ‘Notes of the Week’, *JCWE*, 20 December 1923, p. 842.
85 Ōtani had fallen from grace because of his involvement in a land swindle involving the Imperial family, and was removed as chief abbot of Nishi Honganji in 1914. Nevertheless, he remained active in Japanese schemes on the continent. See Ronald S.
One, Ōtani had close ties to the Japanese military dating back to the late Meiji period, while the Honganji sect had been active in intelligence-gathering operations from the time of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5. One press article described Ōtani as an ‘ardent missionary and wireless amateur’. Why were these two attributes linked together in connection with Mongolia? The most likely answer, given Ōtani’s earlier connection to the military, was that the proposed temple was considered to be a cover for intelligence-gathering on the continent.

Ōtani was not the only prominent Japanese religious figure active in Mongolia. In the spring of 1924, Deguchi Onisaburō, leader of Ōmotokyō, one of the ‘new religions’ that had emerged in Japan following the Meiji Restoration, travelled to Inner Mongolia. Deguchi’s activities on the continent, which attracted a great deal of coverage in the Japanese press, ensured that Mongolia remained firmly in the public eye, and further added to the romantic aura that seemed to surround the region. In the account of his travels written by Ueno Kōen, no doubt with help from Deguchi, and published the following year, Ueno stated that Deguchi’s journey was a ‘pilgrimage’, the object of which was ‘to win the hearts of the Mongolian people and forge a spiritual union between the Japanese and Mongols’. Ueno further claimed that Deguchi’s purpose was to ‘unify Sinkiang, Tibet, India and all of China under one religion, resulting in an East Asian Federation’, presumably under Japanese guidance. In this endeavour, Deguchi appeared to be following in the footsteps of the Japanese monks who visited Mongolia in 1873, who had also sought to establish an ‘East Asian

86 Translated and reported in ‘Notes of the Week’, JCWE, 20 December 1923, p. 842.
88 Ibid., p. 34.
Buddhist Federation’. On the other hand, Deguchi’s goal of uniting Inner and Outer Mongolia, which was laid out at a later point in the book, echoed the Japanese-backed Pan-Mongol movement of 1918-22.

Despite its seemingly peaceful objective, there was a distinctly martial side to Deguchi’s Mongolian mission. Deguchi gave several names to the force he led, among them ‘divine army’ (shingun). Moreover, according to Ueno, Deguchi claimed this army had ‘attempted a world-shaking undertaking in Mongolia’ (Mōko no chi ni kyōten-dōchi no ichidai sōkyō o kokoromita). Deguchi also referred to the force on one occasion as the ‘Army for the Rescue of an Independent Inner and Outer Mongolia’ (naigai-Mōko dokuritsu kyōngun), with himself assuming the position of a Dalai Lama. Moreover, towards the end of his account of Deguchi’s journey, Ueno declared that Deguchi’s overall objective was to advance on Urga and drive the Red Army from the city, thus providing confirmation of the martial nature of his endeavour. Clearly, Deguchi’s ‘pilgrimage’ sought to do more than just ‘win the hearts of the Mongolian people’.

Finally, according to Ueno, Deguchi gave his force yet another name, the ‘Army for Northwestern Autonomy’ (Seihoku jichigun). Ueno’s book even included an illustration of the flag under which the force had marched. While the colours on the flag — red, white, yellow and green — were supposedly chosen to represent Mongolia, the centre of the flag incorporates a star and crescent, traditional Islamic symbols (Figure 15). While not conclusive, this suggests that Deguchi may have been seeking

90 Ueno, Oni Mōko nyūki, pp. 88-9.
91 Ibid., p. 197.
92 Ibid., p. 10.
93 Ibid., p. 72.
94 Ibid., pp. 247-8.
95 Ibid., pp. 237-8.
to appeal to others apart from the Mongol population of the region. The term ‘seihoku’, as discussed in the previous chapter, was applied at the time to an undefined geographical area that included all of Outer Mongolia and significant portions of Inner Mongolia,\(^96\) which suggests that it may have been chosen to reinforce the point that Deguchi’s objective encompassed both regions.


Given the various names appended to the force that he led, there seems little doubt that Deguchi saw himself in a martial role during his time in Mongolia. The photo at the front of the 1925 account of his journey showed Deguchi dressed in priestly robes; however, the photo taken while he was actually in Mongolia told a different story. Astride a Mongol pony, accompanied by a number of heavily armed soldiers, and apparently with a rifle over his shoulder, Deguchi looks more like a military than a religious leader (see Figure 16).

\(^{96}\) See map in Kaigun gunreibu, *Seihoku Mōko jijō*, Tōkyō: n. publ., 1913.
Deguchi’s antics on the continent attracted an enormous amount of attention from the press in Japan, which openly speculated as to what exactly he was up to. An early report seemed to suggest that Deguchi’s journey to Mongolia was purely for religious purposes.\textsuperscript{97} Later press reports, however, alluded to the political dimension of his journey, suggesting in a general way that ‘leading politicians of Japan, bandit leaders of Manchuria, and distinguished people of China\textsuperscript{98} had supported Deguchi. No doubt, part of the reason for press speculation was the fact that at the time, Deguchi was out on bail and pending trial for \textit{lèse majesté}. In 1921 he had been arrested and charged with this crime and with violating the Newspaper Law’s prohibition against printing material disrespectful of the emperor and the imperial house. The charges resulted from his prophecy while preaching that, following war with America, the Emperor would move

\textsuperscript{97} Translated and reported in ‘Notes of the Week’, \textit{JCWE}, 27 March 1924, pp. 418-19.
to Ayabe in Kyoto and rule from there. Deguchi was under house arrest at the time of his escape to Mongolia.99

For all his plans, Deguchi’s attempt to carve out a religious kingdom in Mongolia came undone. In an attempt to further Japanese control of Outer Mongolia, he and his followers joined forces with Lu Chan-k’uei,100 a former bandit who now had links to Chang Tso-lin. According to McCormack, in aligning himself with Lu, Deguchi gained an armed force and a ‘means of promoting his own teachings in Mongolia’.101 Moreover, according to Tanin and Yohan, Deguchi also sought an alliance with both the native Mongolian Lamaism and the Chinese Fyflot Association, a humanitarian group in North China with ties to the Japanese right wing.102 Presumably, in joining with Lu and seeking an alliance with such groups in the region, Deguchi hoped to gain the means to promulgate his beliefs, and allies to support the attempt. Unfortunately for Deguchi, his apparent plan to march on Urga was stillborn, when, in early June 1924, Lu decided that returning to banditry was more profitable. Chang Tso-lin was not amused by what he regarded as treachery, and Lu and a number of his followers were seized and executed on Chang’s explicit orders.103 Deguchi and his Japanese followers were also arrested by Chang Tso-lin’s troops, and almost executed. In the event they were handed over to the Japanese authorities in Manchuria, and Deguchi was then

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98 Article from the Ōsaka asahi shinbun, translated as ‘Much Haircutting – Omoto-kyo Devotees Sacrifice Their Locks’, JCWE, 8 May 1924, p. 631.
100 Kuzū states that Lu and Babujab, the Mongol leader involved in the Japanese-sponsored 1916 Manchurian-Mongolian independence movement, were blood brothers. See Kuzū, Tō-A senkaku, vol. 3, p. 29.
101 McCormack, Chang Tso-Lin, p. 119.
102 Tanin and Yohan, Militarism and Fascism, pp. 251-2; McCormack, Chang Tso-Lin, p. 119.
returned to Japan to stand trial for the crimes with which he had originally been charged.104

Before the trial commenced, the Japanese press pondered at length on Deguchi’s exploits. The middle-class monthly magazine Taiyō, for example, serialised the story of Deguchi’s Mongolian escapades in a four-part piece entitled ‘Dreams of a Mongolian Kingdom’.105 Some writers opined that Deguchi had not acted alone, one headline specifically noting his connection to certain Shina rōnin (China adventurers), usually a term for the Japanese right-wing bravados associated with unofficial Japanese schemes on the continent.106 If the Japanese press and public, however, had hoped for revelations at his trial about official involvement in Deguchi’s escapades, they were disappointed. Deguchi was vague as to why he had travelled to Mongolia, simply stating that he had ‘originally intended to proceed to Manchuria and Mongolia for the propagation of his own tenets’, but that he had not intended to ‘make a religious community or body in Mongolia by his propaganda’.107 The press continued to ask questions about Deguchi’s motives, specifically and repeatedly asking why he had gone to Mongolia, and noting the failure of the trial to answer these questions.108

There was a further twist to the story of Deguchi’s Mongolian adventures, when newspapers suggested that he had not gone to proselytise, but was in fact fleeing to

103 McCormack, Chang Tso-Lin, p. 119.
105 See Stalker, Prophet Motive, p. 152.
108 See ‘Notes of the Week’, JCWE, 4 September 1924, p. 314.
Mongolia in the company of Chinese bandits, presumably to avoid the aforementioned trial for *lèse majesté*. The story subsequently changed again with the claim that Deguchi was actually in search of buried treasure allegedly left behind in Mongolia by Ungern-Sternberg. The idea of Deguchi searching for buried treasure, accompanied by bandits, must have added to Mongolia’s aura of romance: as Narangoa Li notes, reports of Deguchi’s Mongolian foray ‘inspired many people who had romantic ideas about Manchuria and Mongolia’. Stalker concurs that Deguchi’s adventure ‘built upon the common notion of the romantic Mongolian frontier’, adding that reports of Deguchi’s activities also implied that Mongolia was ‘ripe for Japanese civilizational guidance’.

The story of Ungern-Sternberg’s supposed buried treasure had appeared some years earlier in Ferdinand Ossendowski’s hugely successful 1922 book, *Beasts, Men and Gods*. In this autobiographical narrative, Ossendowski recounted his travels through Siberia and Mongolia, which included an encounter with Ungern-Sternberg, and made a passing mention of the baron’s reported treasure. According to recent accounts by Baabar and Jamie Bisher, the treasure does exist. Presumably, it

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110 ‘Omoto-kyo – Deguchi and his Bail’, *JCWE*, 22 May 1924, p. 721.
114 Baabar (Bat-Erdene Batbayar), *Twentieth Century Mongolia*, translated by D. Sühjargalmaa, S. Burenbayar, H. Hulan and N. Tuya; edited by C. Kaplonski,
consists of the proceeds of looting by the baron during his rampage across the region. Prior to his assault on the Far Eastern Republic in 1921, Ungern-Sternberg, according to Baabar and Bisher, had decided to send the treasure to Hailar, in Northern Manchuria, for safekeeping. Both authors claim that the treasure-trove was substantial, consisting of many valuable artifacts, as well as 1,800 kilograms of gold, silver and precious stones. For reasons unknown, the soldiers carrying the treasure were reportedly unable to cross the Mongolian border and buried it in the steppes of Eastern Mongolia.\(^{115}\) According to Baabar, nobody has yet found the cache and, therefore, of course, rumours surrounding the treasure have grown into legends.\(^{116}\) Bisher suggests that an attempt was made by the Japanese in the early 1930s to recover the treasure, but that the attempt failed when the recovery team was arrested and expelled from Outer Mongolia by Soviet forces stationed there.\(^{117}\) Presumably, the treasure is still there. Given the reputed size of the hoard, it is not surprising that it caught the attention of the Japanese press at the time.

In Ueno’s account of Deguchi’s Mongolian adventures there is no mention of any search for buried treasure, but there is confirmation of the connection between Deguchi and the Japanese military. Specifically, Ueno noted that an SIA major-general had been ordered to Mongolia by the General Staff to liaise between Deguchi and the Chinese, although the officer’s name was censored in Ueno’s book.\(^{118}\) The fact that Ueno was allowed to publish an account of Deguchi’s exploits in Mongolia at all, with such an acknowledgement of military support, suggests that the Japanese military was not averse to its part in Deguchi’s escapade receiving public attention in Japan.

\(^{115}\) Bisher, White Terror, p. 280.
\(^{116}\) Baabar, Twentieth Century Mongolia, p. 214.
\(^{117}\) Bisher, White Terror, p. 301.
\(^{118}\) Ueno, Oni Môko nyûki, p. 219.
Presumably, if the military had not wanted its part in the operation revealed, it would have taken steps to see that the book was censored accordingly, just as the officer’s name had been. Moreover, in his account, Ueno detailed the part played in Deguchi’s activities by Inoue Kanekichi, one of Deguchi’s senior followers, who, in 1924, acted as Deguchi’s liaison with Chang Tso-lin. While a reserve officer, Inoue had been involved in the 1916 Manchurian-Mongolian independence movement.\textsuperscript{119} Though not conclusive, this connection confirms the evident complicity of the Japanese military in Deguchi’s activities. Ueno’s account was reprinted four times in a matter of weeks in 1925,\textsuperscript{120} which further suggests that whatever Deguchi’s aims on and for the continent had been, leading Japanese figures were not opposed to the publicity he attracted.

Subsequent analyses of his Mongolian adventures all agree that Deguchi favoured Japanese control of both Inner and Outer Mongolia, though there are differing views of the extent of Japanese control that he sought. The Kokuryūkai account of Deguchi’s trip, published in the 1930s, asserted that, prior to his departure, he had proclaimed that Japan ‘should see the plains of Mongolia as a gift from heaven to our nation’, and that it was Japan’s responsibility ‘to develop greater Mongolia, heaven’s gift’.\textsuperscript{121} Presumably, this meant that the region should be controlled by Japan. The Kokuryūkai also documented Deguchi’s links to the Japanese military,\textsuperscript{122} substantiating Ueno’s claims that Deguchi had been acting with the assistance of the military. In post-war scholarship, Gavan McCormack concludes that Deguchi was involved in a plan to seize Urga, an undertaking in which he was aided by an Inner Mongolian prince and by an associate of the Japanese-backed Manchurian warlord Chang Tso-lin.\textsuperscript{123} The objective of this plan was, presumably, to increase the size of the region over which Chang held

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., pp. 228-9; Kuzū, \textit{Tō-A senkaku}, vol. 2, pp. 635-6.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., printing details opp. p. 386.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., pp. 29-31.
sway. Nancy Stalker agrees that the object of Deguchi’s mission was to gain control of Outer Mongolia, but posits the view that Chang offered his support in an attempt to exploit the spiritual vacuum in Outer Mongolia following the death of the Bogd Khan, the Outer Mongolian religious leader: Chang now hoped to rally the population behind another charismatic leader, that is, Deguchi.\(^{124}\) If he had been successful, Outer Mongolia would then have fallen under indirect Japanese control.

From the available evidence there seem to be two possible explanations for Deguchi’s Mongolian foray. The first is that he was on an intelligence-gathering mission for the Japanese military, but because of the unreliability of the Chinese who accompanied him, events moved beyond his control, necessitating the intervention of Chang Tso-lin, who had long been associated with the Japanese. As we have seen, the Japanese military had made use of religious figures before for intelligence-gathering, and, as noted above, both Ueno’s and the Kokuryūkai’s versions of Deguchi’s activities openly mentioned his links to the military.\(^{125}\)

The second possibility is that the Japanese military had more concrete aims than intelligence-gathering in using Deguchi. The military may have seen in Deguchi a means to revive the earlier Pan-Mongol movement and to achieve Japanese control of Mongolia. The evidence for this is, admittedly, tenuous, and I am here engaging in conjecture. What evidence there is relates to the activities around this time of Grigorii Semenov, the former White Russian leader whose fortunes were closely tied to the Japanese military from 1918 onwards. In late May 1924, Semenov was reported to be ‘seeking his fortune in Mongolia again’, having apparently been ‘visited by a Mongolian envoy’.\(^{126}\) Given Semenov’s involvement with the earlier Pan-Mongol

\(^{124}\) Stalker, *Prophet Motive*, pp. 149-50.
\(^{126}\) Translated in ‘Notes of the Week’, *JCWE*, 29 May 1924, p. 734.
movement and his relationship with the Japanese military, it is possible that his decision
to return to Mongolia may have been prompted by inside information as to what
Deguchi had planned. The two apparently worked together a few years later:
Deguchi and Semenov are said to have been involved together in a 1929 plan, backed
by the Japanese Army and the Kokuryūkai, to declare Siberia independent of the Soviet
Union. Overall, Semenov was closely associated with Japanese military schemes
involving both Manchuria and Mongolia, remaining in Japanese employ for the
better part of twenty-five years, until his capture by the Soviets in August 1945. It is
unlikely, given this close association with the Japanese military, that he would have
decided to return to the continent in 1924 without the approval of his military patrons.
Again, the probable reason for the failure of this Pan-Mongol revival, if it was
attempted, was the unreliability of the Chinese involved in the scheme. Which
explanation of Deguchi’s Mongolian adventure is correct will probably never be known,
but his activities certainly highlight the ongoing propensity of the Japanese military to
work through surrogates in their efforts to gain control of Mongolia.

The Japanese Military and the Mongolian Horse

For much of the 1920s, the army’s ambitions in Mongolia were less evident than were
economic activities, and also less evident than they had been earlier. Towards the end
of the 1920s, however, one particular military concern was prominently displayed, in a
specific media campaign, probably prompted by the military itself, to promote the
importance of Mongolia to Japan as a potential source of horses for the army.

See, for example, Gaikō shiryōkan, Tokyo, “Semiyonofu” rai-Hō ni kansuru ken’, 6
August 1930, in Foreign Ministry papers, A-22-2-C-R2, ‘‘Semiyonofu” no Mōko
shinshutsu kaikaku kankei iken’.
Richard Luckett, *The White Generals: An Account of the White Movement and the
Arguably, the emphasis on horses in this period was an indirect way of continuing to highlight the apparent need for Japanese military control of the region and its resources.

The Japanese military’s need for horses in the 1920s was not new. From the early 1870s, as the military sought to reconfigure itself along Western lines, a sufficient number of horses, to serve either as cavalry mounts or as draft animals, was essential. For example, at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, one Japanese Army division required 4,700 horses.¹³⁰ Moreover, the perceived need to improve the quality of the Japanese horse was of such importance around this time that in 1906 Emperor Meiji himself raised the topic in conversation with a British Mission then visiting Japan.¹³¹ By the late 1920s, a Japanese Army division required almost 5,000 horses, meaning that the army as a whole, then numbering some twenty-one divisions, needed in excess of 100,000 horses.¹³² Even with the shift to mechanisation that occurred at the end of the 1930s, a standard Japanese infantry division still required more than 2,000 horses for its three infantry regiments alone, with more needed for the attached headquarters and ancillary components.¹³³ By 1941, the Japanese Army required more than 382,000 horses for its fifty-one divisions.¹³⁴

From the beginning of the twentieth century, Mongolia, with its long history of breeding horses, was an important potential source of the mounts required. It was not until the late 1920s, however, that a concerted campaign appears to have been

undertaken by the Japanese military to bring this fact to the attention of a wider audience within Japan. One method was to publish books dealing with the subject. As we will see below, a more unusual method was tried in early 1928, when a well-publicised horse ride was staged from Manchuli to Dairen, and then from Fukuoka to Tokyo.

As noted in the Introduction, Mongolia was especially attractive as a source of horses because of the type of horse bred in the region. Of great stamina and endurance, the Mongol horse required watering only once a day, and for the most part fed on grass. This offered the Japanese military a mount with distinct advantages. With a Mongol horse there was no need to carry extra fodder. This, coupled with the animal’s stamina and endurance, would allow the army to carry more supplies for the men and larger quantities of ammunition. This factor was of particular importance when the Japanese Army considered the likelihood of conflict with the Soviet Union in the Russian Far East, an immense, sparsely populated region.

The potential of Mongolia as a possible source of horses for the Japanese military had been officially noted as early as 1907. The need for a reliable supply of mounts was also brought to the attention of the Japanese public in a newspaper article in that year, although no mention was made of Mongolia as a potential source. In the 1910s and 1920s, however, other official reports again noted Mongolia’s potential to supply horses. These reports, though, were all classified as secret and, apart from

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136 Böeichō shiryōkan, Tokyo, ‘Mōko bashitsu batō’, 3 September 1907, in *Meiji yonjūnen ji hachigatsu shi kugatsu mitsu onikki*.
137 ‘Horses for the Army – This Year’s Requirement’, *JCWE*, 16 May 1907, p. 665.
the 1907 newspaper story, the public had little or no reason to know of the army’s ongoing attention to the issue.

This situation changed in the late 1920s, with the publication of two books. In 1927, Yoshida Heitarō produced Mōko tōha ki (An Account of a Walk through Mongolia), concerning surveys undertaken by the Japanese Army General Staff in Inner Mongolia in connection with the supply of horses.139 Then, in 1929, the Tō-A shinzen kijōkai (East Asian Goodwill Horse-Riding Association) produced Nichi-Man-Mōkan chōto kijō tettei sanzen ri (Three Thousand Li Horseshoes: A Great Distance on Horseback across Japan-Manchuria-Mongolia), which documented a horse-ride undertaken at the beginning of 1928 by members of the Association.140

The author of the first book, Yoshida Heitarō, was a former army officer, who had undertaken his journey through Inner Mongolia eight years earlier on orders from the chief of the Army Ministry’s Cavalry Bureau (Rikugunshō kieki kachō) and the chief of the army’s Horse Supply Section (Bahojū honbuchō).141 Although Yoshida had left the army by the time the work was published, in advertisements for the book, his former rank of lieutenant-general and service with the army’s Horse Supply Section were both stressed.142 Yoshida’s work is important for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that it was published by a Japanese association devoted to research on Manchuria and Mongolia.

The book detailed Yoshida’s journey through Inner Mongolia from late March to early October 1919. No explanation was given for the delay between the journey and

139 Yoshida Heitarō, Mōko tōha ki, Tōkyō: Man-Mō kenkyūkai, 1927.
141 Yoshida, Mōko tōha ki, frontispiece.
the publication, but it was probably because of a perceived need for military secrecy. As noted in the Introduction, Inner Mongolia was technically Chinese territory, and in practice was controlled by a number of Han Chinese warlords. Some in the Japanese military may well have wanted to bring the area under Japanese control, but if so, they needed to act with great caution. This raises the question of why the book was published at all. Presumably, in 1927, it was intended to assist the army’s campaign to justify Japanese control of Inner Mongolia by promoting the importance of the region, partly because of the significance of its horses.

In the course of his six-month journey in 1919, Yoshida had travelled extensively throughout Inner Mongolia, traversing Jehol, Chahar and Suiyuan provinces, and eventually ending his outward journey at the capital of Suiyuan province, Kwei-hwa. The book based on his travels contained an introduction, covering Yoshida’s journey from Tokyo to the continent, then thirteen sections, each of which dealt with one stage of the journey, in the form of a travel diary. Much of Yoshida’s account was devoted to the historical places he visited, though he often made specific mention of horses in connection with those places. There was a certain air of mystery to Yoshida’s writing, which came from his habit of referring to many of the people he encountered only by the initial of their last name. In doing this, Yoshida transformed what is essentially a travel diary into something like a thriller, where readers must have wondered at the need for secrecy. For example, Yoshida recounted his unexpected meeting with a party of four or five Japanese near Uchumuchin, in the eastern part of Silingol League, naming only a ‘Mr S’.143 The omission of full names in this case tantalizes, especially as there were hints of Japanese military activity in the region some pages earlier, where Yoshida had explained that the Japanese Army’s Horse Supply Section and Equestrian Affairs

Office (Nihongun bahojūbu oyobi baseikyoku) maintained breeding pastures near Uchumuchin.\textsuperscript{144} The presence of Japanese people at Uchumuchin was probably a result of the 1915 Sino-Japanese Treaty that allowed Japanese the legal rights of travel and residence in Inner Mongolia.\textsuperscript{145} Such legal rights make the need for secrecy puzzling, but it may be that the persons mentioned only by initial were serving army officers covertly engaging in some sort of activity not sanctioned by the 1915 Treaty.

In the section of his book that recounted his journey across the Hsingan Ranges to West Uchumuchin, Yoshida specifically discussed the army’s breeding pastures in the region, noting, for example, that the herds numbered in the hundreds and that the pastures covered a considerable area. He then detailed the steps being undertaken to improve the quality of the Mongolian horse, explaining how bloodlines were selected to produce a mount that had superior pulling power, as well as speed and endurance. The object of this breeding program was to produce a horse that rivalled the Arab, widely recognized as having the greatest endurance among horses.\textsuperscript{146}

Mongolia’s horses were next promoted by a highly publicised horse-ride from Manchuli to Dairen, and then from Fukuoka to Tokyo, by a party of five members — two Japanese and three Mongolians — from the Tō-A shinzen kijōkai, an association whose objective appears to have been to forge stronger ties among Japan, Manchuria and Mongolia. The horse-ride began in January 1928 and ended two months later. In the association’s book about the ride, Lieutenant-Colonel Ōshima Matahiko,\textsuperscript{147} chairman of the executive committee of the Tō-A shinzen kijōkai, explained in the Foreword that the idea of undertaking the ride had first been raised at a meeting of the

\textsuperscript{143} Yoshida, \textit{Mōko tōha ki}, p. 103.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., p. 101.
Nichi-Mō shinzen kyōkai (Japan-Mongolia Goodwill Association), another group in Japan that presumably sought to improve relations between Japan and Mongolia. This meeting, held at Ōshima’s house in Tokyo in early October 1927, outlined a plan that was subsequently approved by Nishikubo Hiromichi, who was then both the chairman of the Tō-A shinzen kijōkai and the mayor of Tokyo, having held a succession of other important posts in earlier years.¹⁴⁸

Ōshima noted that in line with Japanese Army and Foreign Ministry policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia (Man-Mō), Sino-Japanese relations were an important consideration in the planning of the ride. Presumably, given that the riding party’s leader was an army lieutenant-colonel, this meant that the Chinese authorities needed to be assured that the ride was not for the purpose of intelligence-gathering. Ōshima observed that the approval of the Han Chinese military governor of Heilungkiang province, Wu Chūn-sheng, had been vital to the success of the planned ride, presumably because Wu’s approval lessened suspicion on the Chinese side. While the possibility that illicit intelligence-gathering did take place cannot be dismissed, the fact that the Japanese sought Wu’s prior approval suggests that it was not the primary purpose of the ride, or that they were at least trying to avoid the appearance of such activities.

The book about the horse-ride had all the makings of an adventure story, telling of the long distances travelled by the party in conditions that were often quite harsh. The temperature on the day of departure from Manchuli was minus twenty-two degrees Celsius at one o’clock in the afternoon, dropping to minus thirty-seven degrees.

¹⁴⁸ Tō-A shinzen kijōkai, Nichi-Man-Mōkan, Foreword, pp. 3-4. For details of Nishikubo’s career, see Hata (ed.), Senzenki Nihon kanryōsei no seido · soshiki · jinji, p. 176.
overnight.\textsuperscript{149} In temperatures this extreme, a good mount was vital, and the account of
the journey included ten pages on the different types of Mongolian horse, describing
their height and weight, stamina, and other characteristics.\textsuperscript{150} The book listed those
regions of Mongolia that were believed to produce the best horses, noting that in Inner
Mongolia it was around Uchumuchin,\textsuperscript{151} an assertion that explains why, as recorded by
Yoshida in the earlier book, the Japanese Army’s Horse Supply Section and Equestrian
Affairs Office maintained breeding pastures there. The 1929 book also discussed, as
had Yoshida, the steps being taken to improve the bloodlines of Mongolian horses to
make them more suitable for military use, in particular either as cavalry mounts or for
hauling artillery pieces, observing that the army hoped to use Mongolian horses in these
roles as they could operate at extremely cold temperatures, unlike Japanese horses.\textsuperscript{152}

Even before it began, the planned ride had attracted the attention of the press.
Two important points emerge from early newspaper reports.\textsuperscript{153} The first is an
emphasis on the fact that the ride was not to be exclusively a Japanese undertaking. In
having riders from both Japan and Mongolia in the party, the object was presumably to
foster closer ties between the two through a shared undertaking and through the
publicity the ride generated. The second point relates to the political and geographical
definition of the region. The town of Manchuli, where the ride began, was usually
understood to be part of Manchuria, but at least one newspaper report placed it in
Mongolia.\textsuperscript{154} The map that appeared in the front of the book about the ride, showing
the course that the party took, also placed Manchuli in Mongolia.\textsuperscript{155} The ambiguity as

\textsuperscript{149} Tō-A shinzen kijōkai, \textit{Nichi-Man-Mōkan}, p. 235.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., pp. 204-14.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., p. 204.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., p. 209.
\textsuperscript{153} ‘Japanese-Mongolian Horseback Party to Journey to Tokyo’, \textit{Japan Times}, 2
\textsuperscript{154} ‘Riding from Mongolia’.
\textsuperscript{155} Tō-A shinzen kijōkai, \textit{Nichi-Man-Mōkan}, map at front of book.
to Manchuli’s location again confirms that political and geographical boundaries on the Chinese continent were quite fluid in Japanese perceptions at the time.

Figure 17: 1928 Poster advertising events connected with the erection of memorial tower commemorating the defeat of the Mongol invasion of Japan in 1281, reproduced in Nagoshi Futaransuken, Shōwa no sensō kinenkan dai-ikkans: Dōran no hatten: Manshū jihen to Shina jihen, Tōkyō: Tentensha, 2001, p. iv.

On the arrival of the party in Japan in early March 1928, the riders attended a ceremony in Hakata in Kyushu marking the erection of a memorial tower commemorating the anniversary of the defeat of the Mongol invasion of Japan in 1281. While it appears odd that commemorating the defeat of the Mongols might be considered a way to bring the two peoples closer together, that was apparently the purpose. The tower, known as the ‘Mōkogun dai-kuyōto’ (Mongol Army Great Memorial Tower), was intended to stand as a symbol of reconciliation between the
Japanese and Mongols. From the poster promoting the ceremony, it is clear that the arrival of the ‘Japan-Mongolia Friendship Riding Party’ (Nichi-Mō shinzen hō-Nichi daikiba ryokōtai) was just one of a number of events connected with the ceremony that aimed to promote Japanese-Mongolian friendship (Figure 17). Other events included a series of lectures designed to promote Japanese friendship with East Asia generally, as well as Mongolia specifically, and an exhibition of photographs showing life in ‘Manchuria-Mongolia’.

On 7 March 1928, a ceremony was held at the memorial tower to commemorate the fallen soldiers of 1281 from both Japan and Mongolia. The role of Buddhism was highlighted in this ceremony, presumably in order to emphasise that through a shared religion the two regions, once enemies, were reconciled and co-operating. A Japanese Nichiren Buddhist prelate was on hand to conduct the memorial ceremony, while the Royal Great Lama (Mōko-o dairama), obviously an important Mongolian religious leader, was also due to attend. The connections and goals apparently shared by Mongolia and Japan were also indicated by the list of Mongol and Japanese notables who were to attend the ceremony. Among the Mongol dignitaries present was to be Han Shao-hong, characterised as the son of ‘the famous general, the late Babujab’, that is, the Mongol leader involved in the 1916 Japanese-sponsored Manchuria-Mongolia ‘independence’ movement. While it was his Chinese name that was given, this presumably was Kanjurchap, Babujab’s second son, who in 1927 had married Kawashima Naniwa’s adopted daughter, Yoshiko, at a ceremony in Port Arthur attended by an array of Japanese notables, among them high-ranking Kwantung

\[\text{156} \text{ Nagoshi Futaranosuke, } Shōwa no sensō kinenkan dai-ikkan: Dōran no hattan: Manshū jihen to Shina jihen, Tōkyō: Tentensha, 2001, p. iv.\]

\[\text{157} \text{ Poster reproduced in ibid., p. iv.}\]

\[\text{158} \text{ Tō-A shinzen kijōkai, Nichi-Man-Mōkan, pp. 100-4.}\]

\[\text{159} \text{ Ibid., p. 101.}\]

\[\text{160} \text{ Poster reproduced in Nagoshi, Shōwa no sensō kinenkan, p. iv.}\]
Army officers.\textsuperscript{162} Also in attendance at the March 1928 ceremony in Hakata were an unnamed ‘special Mongolian missionary’ (Mōko tokumei senkyōshi), and Lientzu, the fourth daughter of Prince Su, the Manchu prince who had worked with Japanese forces in attempting to separate Manchuria and Mongolia from the rest of China in 1912. ‘Lientzu’ was most probably none other than Kawashima Yoshiko herself, now Kanjurchap’s wife.\textsuperscript{163} Japanese dignitaries present included Kawashima Naniwa, who, as we have seen, had also been involved in the 1912 and 1916 ‘independence’ movements.\textsuperscript{164} The presence of such people implied that, in the same manner in which Japan and Mongolia had co-operated on the ride, they had earlier co-operated, albeit unsuccessfu Completing, to achieve Mongolian independence.

Yoshida’s 1927 book on the army surveys of horses in Inner Mongolia, together with the 1928 ride by the Tō-A shinzen kijōkai, and the subsequent book detailing the ride, suggest that towards the end of the 1920s there was a considerable effort on the part of the military, and groups with ties to the military, to highlight the importance of Mongolia for Japan. There was certainly a specific emphasis on Mongolia as a source of mounts for the Japanese Army. The promotion of Mongolia as a source of horses continued into the 1930s and 1940s, in a context in which the Army Ministry was seeking to reinforce the importance of the horse to the military in general.

One way in which it did this was by gathering and publicising songs that told of the bond between soldiers and their steeds, such as ‘Aiba yuki’ (Travelling with My Beloved Horse) or ‘Aiba shingunka’ (Song of My Beloved Horse and the Advancing

\textsuperscript{161} Tō-A shinzen kijōkai, Nichi-Man-Mōkan, pp. 101-2.
\textsuperscript{162} Kamisaka Fuyuko, Dansō no reijin: Kawashima Yoshiko den, Tōkyō: Bungei shunjū, 1985, pp. 101-2.
\textsuperscript{163} A chart showing all of Prince Su’s children, borne by his principal and four other wives, in Kamisaka, Dansō no reijin, p. 19, lists no daughter by the name of Lientzu. Kawashima Yoshiko was a daughter of Prince Su’s by his fourth wife.
\textsuperscript{164} Tō-A shinzen kijōkai, Nichi-Man-Mōkan, pp. 101-2.
Army). The army’s campaign to publicise horses, both in general and with specific reference to Mongolia, later expanded to include films in which horses featured. The military also held ceremonies at which horses killed in battle were commemorated (see Figure 18); one such ceremony was held in Hibiya Park in October 1938 for the ‘spirits of horses which have fallen on China battlefronts’. The military specifically emphasised Mongolia as a source of horses to an English-speaking audience, as well as to the Japanese public. Mongolia and its horses in the Japanese military featured prominently in English-language Japanese photo magazines about the military, for example.

Figure 18: Army ceremony commemorating fallen army horses, late 1930s, reproduced in Gordon L. Rottman, Japanese Infantryman 1937-45: Sword of the Empire, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005, p. 43.


167 ‘War Horses Honored’, Trans-Pacific, 27 October 1938, p. 15. Ceremonies commemorating horses killed in battle dated back to the Russo-Japanese War, if not earlier. See ‘Local and General’, JCWE, 6 September 1906, p. 294, for a report of Buddhist and Shinto religious services for the horses killed during operations in Manchuria.

168 See, for example, The Manchoukuo Army and Navy, n. publ., n.d. (c. mid-1930s).
The Japanese press continued to play its part in publicising the importance of army horses.\textsuperscript{169} It also highlighted the efforts of the Zenrin kyōkai, an organisation whose activities will be discussed in Chapter Five, in connection with the breeding of horses. In September 1938, for example, it was reported that the Zenrin kyōkai planned to breed horses as well as cattle and sheep in Mongolia and Sinkiang.\textsuperscript{170} Given the importance that the Japanese Army placed on the supply of horses it is likely that the army had a hand in the development of the Zenrin kyōkai’s stock-breeding facilities in the region.

**Conclusion**

Between 1922 and 1931, the focus of Japanese-Mongolian relations shifted, when compared with the previous period, with the civilian elites in the ascendancy and the chief public focus on Mongolia centering on its natural resources rather than its strategic value. This shift may have been due, in part, to the fall in favour that the Japanese Army experienced in the aftermath of the 1918-22 Siberian Intervention, and in the comparatively liberal atmosphere of the 1920s in Japan. As shown in this chapter, however, there is abundant evidence that the army, for much of the decade, continued its attempts to increase its control over Mongolia, sometimes operating through surrogates, albeit with little or no success. When the political climate changed towards the end of the 1920s, the army’s ambitions in Mongolia were once again more publicly evident, primarily through the publicity given to the importance of Mongolian horses. The academic and literary promotion of Mongolia, through the writings of Torii Ryūzō, Yosano Akiko and others, were also more in evidence towards the end of the decade. Such intellectual contributions to the strengthening of the Japanese-

\textsuperscript{169} See, for example, ‘Notes of the Week’, *JCWE*, 13 May 1937, p. 573; ‘Horse-breeding Plan – 100,000 Animals to be Sent to Manchoukuo in Five Years’, *JCWE*, 21 July 1938, p. 56.

\textsuperscript{170} ‘Cattle-farming in Mongolia’, *JCWE*, 22 September 1938, p. 325.
Mongolian relationship had been overshadowed before the 1920s, when military and political concerns had been more prominent.

The next chapter will analyse the steps taken by the Kwantung Army in the wake of the Manchurian Incident of September 1931 to achieve greater control of Inner Mongolia. It will also examine the various works produced between 1932 and 1945, both in Japanese and in English, that promoted or discussed Japan’s claims to the region.
CHAPTER FOUR

INNER MONGOLIA: JAPANESE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ITS CULTURAL SUPPORT, 1932-45

To the ends of the Great Wall,
To the ends of Mongolia,
In search of light
Did I travel afar.
But what do I find
Now that I’ve come …
Only cold winds of greed,
Oh! cold winds of greed.¹

With Japanese domination of Manchuria after the Manchurian Incident of September 1931, the number of ethnic Mongols who fell under direct Japanese control steadily grew, because, as discussed in the Introduction, parts of the three north-eastern provinces of China were predominantly populated by Mongols. One consequence was that the question of the significance of Mongolia itself within the broader framework of Japanese imperialistic ambitions moved into the mainstream of government discourse. The Japanese Army, elements of which had sought to gain control of Mongolia for strategic reasons for the better part of two decades, now saw its ambitions in the region supported to a much greater extent by the government and the bureaucracy. In tandem with these changes within official circles, there was also a significant increase in the

¹ Poem composed by Shinohara Ichinosuke, quoted in Kodama Yoshio, I Was Defeated, Tokyo: Robert Booth and Taro Fukuda Publishers, 1951, pp. 63-4. Shinohara, jailed for involvement in the attempted right-wing coup d’état of May 1932, travelled to Inner Mongolia after release and served with the Paotou SIA. For a brief biographical sketch, see Nakagawa Tetsuo, ‘Sōshi: Shinohara Ichinosuke’, in
publication of cultural works justifying Japan’s claims to a special relationship with the Mongols. Such works often incorporated themes familiar from previous decades. For example, the romantic image of sweeping plains, lone horsemen and noble inhabitants was a strong element. The role that Japanese women could play in ongoing Japanese schemes in Mongolia was promoted too, again echoing themes from the early part of the twentieth century. Attempts by Japanese authors to mobilise Japanese public opinion behind the various official policies on Mongolia also attracted attention from Western writers, and in some cases were reinforced by those writers.

While a number of studies have examined the actions of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and North China between the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937,2 the military’s promotion of Japan’s claim to Mongolia in this period has received significantly less attention. This chapter examines Japan’s relationship with Mongolia between 1932 and 1945. Specifically, it focuses on those parts of Mongolia in which it was still possible to extend Japanese power in this period, that is, Inner Mongolia. As we have seen, Outer Mongolia had fallen under Soviet control following the defeat of Ungern-Sternberg in 1921; thus, for some time, Japan’s territorial ambitions had been largely directed at the part of Mongolia still under nominal Chinese control, namely Inner Mongolia.

One theme that has been particularly neglected in scholarly analyses is the crucial connection between the Manchurian Incident and Inner Mongolia, a connection based

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principally on the importance of Jehol province, situated to the west of the three provinces of Manchuria. Jehol, which had a predominantly Mongol population, was absorbed into the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo in January 1933. The Japanese architects of Manchukuo subsequently combined Jehol province with the largely Mongol region of Holunbuir, which stretched across Heilungkiang and Fengtien provinces in Manchukuo, to create the supposedly autonomous Mongol-governed Hsingan province. The establishment of Hsingan was then promoted by the Japanese authorities to those Mongols living outside the borders of Manchukuo as evidence of Japan’s willingness to recognise the Mongols’ desire for ‘independence’ from Han Chinese domination.3

In this chapter I argue that from the early 1930s onwards, both military strategists and civilian writers worked to construct an image of Japan as the champion of the Mongols, building on a particular interpretation of past history and the opportunity to appeal directly to Mongols in Jehol and Hsingan, as a precursor to further incursions into the predominantly Mongol provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan in the years prior to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. After 1937, however, as Inner Mongolia’s significance for the Japanese military declined with the shift in strategic focus, first to southern China and then to Southeast Asia, the purpose of promoting closer Japanese-Mongolian relations changed: now the goal was to strengthen the Japanese military’s grip on the region, presumably because of its strategic importance as a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and Republican China, and because of Inner Mongolia’s economic potential.

Japanese authors continued to write about Mongolia in this period, and a number of Western writers also examined Japan’s relationship with the region. I argue that Japanese perceptions of a special relationship with the Mongols were widely known outside of Japan and were, to a certain degree, appreciated and promoted by Western writers. Moreover, a number of those Western writers clearly believed that Japanese stewardship of the Mongols would serve to counter Soviet Russia’s threat to the region, given that the USSR had already subsumed Outer Mongolia and seemed poised to make inroads into the relatively weak Chinese Republic to the south.

The chapter first reviews the various military operations, both covert and overt, that the Kwantung Army undertook between 1932 and 1937 with the aim of imposing Japanese control over Inner Mongolia, and the subsequent establishment of the Japanese-backed government of Mengchiang once control had been achieved, following the outbreak of full-scale war in July 1937. Next, I examine the continued promotion of Japan’s claim to a special position in Mongolia in Japanese-language books published during the period, considering the various ways in which Japan’s supposedly unique relationship with Mongolia was presented to the Japanese reading public. Finally, I discuss those works aimed at an English-speaking audience that served to promote this ‘special’ relationship to a far larger audience and, no doubt, also helped to bolster and perhaps legitimise Japan’s claims in the eyes of the Japanese elites.

The Japanese Military in Inner Mongolia, 1932-6

In the Manchurian Incident of September 1931, direct military action was successful as a means of furthering the Kwantung Army’s continental aims, unlike in 1928, when the assassination of Chang Tso-lin by army hotheads had failed to garner widespread support from the high command. In 1931, the situation was quite different compared to 1928: because sections of the army high command did support the actions in the field this time, the authorities in Tokyo, both military and civilian, were unable to rein in the Kwantung Army as it sought to gain control of Manchuria. From September 1931, the Kwantung Army advanced steadily northward, bringing the three provinces of Manchuria under Japanese control. Among those supposedly involved in the army’s seizure of Manchuria was Kawashima Yoshiko, the adopted daughter of Kawashima Naniwa, who included a romantic account in her 1940 memoir of her participation,
alongside the soldiers of the Kwantung Army, in the advance north from Mukden. In March 1932, the Kwantung Army engineered the creation of the ‘new state’ of Manchukuo, and, in January 1933, it expanded the borders of the new ‘nation’ with the seizure of Jehol province.

The inclusion of Jehol in Manchukuo is a crucial landmark in Japanese-Mongolian relations because it brought a far larger Mongol population under direct Japanese control than had previously been the case. While the Japanese military already held sway over the Mongol-populated Holunbuir region in the northern part of Manchukuo, the decision by the architects of Manchukuo to meld Jehol and Holunbuir into the supposedly autonomous Mongol-governed Hsingan province gave them a significant opportunity for propaganda aimed at Mongols living outside the borders of Manchukuo. Some Mongols, inside and outside of Jehol, undoubtedly supported the new regime in Manchukuo. One decision that helped to bolster such support was the installation by the Japanese military, in March 1932, of Pu-yi, the last Ch’ing Emperor, as nominal head of the ‘state’ of Manchukuo. This was crucial to Mongol sentiment towards the new arrangement, as it harkened back to the days when the Ch’ing had ruled over China and the Mongols had been a dominant part of the ruling elite.

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subsequent installation of Pu-yi in 1934 as the ‘emperor’ of Manchukuo also had important ramifications, because, as noted by both Japanese and Western writers, it increased his capacity to serve as a rallying-point for those Mongols living outside of Manchukuo who desired independence from Republican China.⁹

The Japanese authorities adopted a relatively benevolent attitude towards the Mongol inhabitants of Manchukuo. For example, in the nominally independent province of Hsingan in the northwest, the Japanese trumpeted a ‘policy of rule of the Mongols by the Mongols’ (Mōjin Mō-ji seisaku), installing a Mongolian prince as head of the Hsingan regional administration.¹⁰ The willingness of the architects of Manchukuo to grant a degree of autonomy to its Mongol inhabitants was a powerful drawcard to the Mongols in Chahar and Suiyuan provinces, outside Manchukuo, who sought greater autonomy from the Han Chinese Republic. At the same time, the Japanese policy constituted a challenge to the Chinese authorities. Owen Lattimore, writing shortly after the creation of Manchukuo, declared that:

in Manchuria they [the Chinese] are confronted with an autonomous Mongol province [Hsingan] in which Chinese are forbidden to settle and in which the development and improvement of the pastoral economy is to the interest of Japan. It is not too much to say that the Mongols are once more an ascendant people, so far as the Chinese are concerned.¹¹

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Though Lattimore does here acknowledge the dominance of the Japanese, he also clearly points to a changed balance between the Mongols and the Chinese.

The Japanese decision to grant the Mongols of Manchukuo some autonomy was not made for idealistic reasons; there were clear political and strategic motives. Principally, it allowed the Japanese authorities to present themselves to the populations of Soviet-controlled Outer Mongolia and Han Chinese-controlled Inner Mongolia as potential liberators. This image was further exploited by the Japanese military in the following years, as we will see.

From 1933 to 1935, in tandem with its push into North China, the Japanese military sought to remove any potential Han Chinese opposition to Japanese control of Inner Mongolia. First, in May 1933, the Tangku Truce was signed, officially ending hostilities in Manchuria and providing for the ‘demilitarisation’ of an area of some 13,000 square kilometres lying between the Great Wall and a line running just north of Peking and Tientsin. The term ‘demilitarised’, however, is misleading: while the Chinese Republican military was largely excluded from the zone, the Kwantung Army had complete freedom. The Tangku Truce was important for Japanese-Mongolian relations because, as Lincoln Li has observed, the removal of the Han Chinese authorities from the region gave the Kwantung Army more opportunities to encourage an ‘ongoing Mongol revival’, which worked against the Nanking regime. Such a revival could then be exploited to further strengthen the military’s hold over the region through the infiltration of Japanese military officers serving as ‘advisors’.

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Two years later, in June 1935, two additional instruments, the Ho-Umezu and the Chin-Doihara Agreements, enlarged the ‘demilitarised’ area in North China, setting the stage for the Kwantung Army-backed North China Autonomy Movement.\textsuperscript{15} With the Chinese Republican forces thus banished from most of North China, the Kwantung Army now attempted, using the threat of military intervention, to separate the five provinces of North China — Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi and Shantung — from Chinese control entirely and to make them a ‘compact autonomous bloc, independent of Nanking, and deriving its inspiration, its politics – and its goods – from Tokyo’.\textsuperscript{16} The army high command in Tokyo, however, had reservations about further incursions into North China at this time, in part because of the heavy-handed manner in which the attempt was made, and scotched the attempt to detach the five provinces.\textsuperscript{17}

Along with reducing Han Chinese control in North China, the Kwantung Army also sought to strengthen its position by insinuating itself into the predominantly Mongol provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan. First, the Kwantung Army formed a number of Japanese-backed Manchurian and Mongolian irregular forces, using them in March 1933 to seize control of Dolonnor, a town near the Chahar-Jehol border, which gave the Japanese military control of the eastern strip of Chahar province from this date onwards.\textsuperscript{18} The Kwantung Army then established a number of Special Intelligence Agency (SIA) offices close to Dolonnor, to prepare for further encroachments into

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Li, \textit{Japanese Army in North China}, p. 27.
\item \textsuperscript{16} H. Hessell Tiltman, \textit{The Far East Comes Nearer}, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1937, p. 194.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Kahn, ‘Doihara Kenji and the North China Autonomy Movement’, pp. 198-9.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Nakajima, \textit{Toku-ō}, pp. 149-50.
\end{itemize}
Chahar province and to gather intelligence on Outer Mongolia.\textsuperscript{19} Despite the fact that this region had declared itself, with Soviet backing, as the Mongolian People’s Republic in November 1924, the Japanese military continued to gather intelligence on the region, alert to any change that might signal an opportunity to increase Japanese influence there.

With a presence established in Northeastern Chahar, the Japanese military now moved to sponsor meetings of Mongol representatives from the various leagues and banners throughout Chahar and Suiyuan at Pailingmiao, a Mongol settlement in the centre of Suiyuan province, between July and October 1933.\textsuperscript{20} The policies to be implemented at these meetings were laid out in two documents. The first, ‘Zankō Mōkojin shidō hōshin yōryōan’ (An Outline of Policy to Guide the Mongols), produced in July 1933, called for the reduction of Han Chinese domination of Mongol lands, the improvement of stock and breeding programs, the improvement of medical facilities and the provision of educational opportunities for the Mongols.\textsuperscript{21} The second, ‘Mōkokoku kensetsu ni kansuru iken’ (Opinion Regarding the Construction of Mengkukuo), written by Matsumuro Takayoshi in October 1933, went further. Matsumuro, an army officer and Mongolian specialist who, as mentioned in the previous chapter, had served in the region on and off since the early 1920s, called for the establishment of a ‘Mongol’ nation — that is, ‘Mengkukuo’ — to include the leagues of Silingol, Ulanchap and Ikh-Chao in Suiyuan province, as well as the ‘Eight Chahar Banners’ and the region lying between the inner and outer sections of the Great Wall. In this plan, ‘Mengkukuo’ was to have its own army and serve as part of

Japan’s defence against both Russia and China. The new army was to be formed around the Mongol irregulars who had seized Dolonnor and was to be bolstered by additional Japanese and Mongolian personnel who would oversee the various offices administering ‘Mengkukuo’. It seems likely that these two plans served as the blueprint for Japanese operations in Inner Mongolia from this point on, and while not all of their provisions were fulfilled, much of what was proposed was later implemented, as will be discussed in Chapter Five.

In August 1935, as part of the Kwantung Army’s plan to improve the infrastructure of Inner Mongolia, the army, in co-operation with the Ėkura trading company, whose connection to Mongolia, as we have seen, dated back to the 1910s, established the Dai-Mō kōshi (Great Mongolia Trading Company). This company, according to Mori Hisao, was formed to facilitate the Kwantung Army’s cultural and economic penetration of Inner Mongolia and thereby to promote greater Japanese political and military advances. The company’s chief objective in concrete terms was to change the operation of Sino-Mongol trade so that the trade route would run not from Kalgan, via Peking, to Tientsin, but rather from Dolonnor to Manchukuo, thereby directing trade away from Han Chinese merchants and bringing it under Japanese control.

By late 1935, as one consequence of the Ho-Umezu and Chin-Doihara Agreements, the Kwantung Army indirectly controlled a significant portion of Chahar province. Then in December 1935, Japanese forces directly occupied Chahar to the north of Kalgan, putting them in a better position to also exercise influence over the

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provinces of Shansi, in North China, and Suiyuan, in Inner Mongolia. The Kwantung Army now prepared for operations designed to remove Suiyuan from Han Chinese control. Among the plans drafted for operations in Suiyuan, the January 1936 ‘Tai-Mō (seihoku) shisaku yōryō’ (Outline of Policy towards (Northwest) Mongolia) is the most significant.

The plan was based on a careful amalgamation of military, political, economic and cultural measures designed to further the army’s stated objective — control of Inner Mongolia — which, it was noted, was in turn part of the Japanese Army’s larger strategy for operations against Soviet Russia. As a part of the plan, it was deemed necessary to facilitate the creation of an ‘independent’ Inner Mongolia under Prince Teh, the leader of a group of progressives known as the ‘Young Mongols’ who sought greater autonomy from the Nanking government. The plan outlined the steps to be taken to achieve Japanese control of Inner Mongolia. These steps included the fusion of Japanese political, military, economic and cultural influences within Inner Mongolia, to be accomplished, in part, through non-military organisations such as the South Manchurian Railway Company, the Zenrin kyonkai, whose activities will be examined at greater length in the next chapter, and the Ōkura dai-Mō kōshi, mentioned above. Promotion of the ideal of the ‘harmony of the five races’ (gozoku kyōwa), which had been publicised in Manchuria as one means of legitimising the formation of Manchukuo,

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26 Ibid., p. 1a. Note that this report is handwritten, with the pages having been subsequently folded and bound. As a result the same page number appears on both sides of the page. Accordingly, I use ‘a’ to refer to the obverse of the page, and ‘b’ to refer to the reverse. For an examination of Prince Teh’s life, see Jagchid, Last Mongol Prince.
was also recommended for Mongolia. In this instance the five ‘races’ in question were the Japanese, Mongolians, Han Chinese, Muslims and Tibetans, whereas in Manchuria, they were the Han Chinese, Manchu, Mongol, Japanese and Korean. The perceived importance of the cultural aspect of Japanese-Mongolian relations was also evident in the plan’s declaration that the promotion of Lamaism and Islam would counter the anti-religious policies of Soviet-controlled Outer Mongolia. The educational and medical facilities to be provided by the Zenrin kyōkai were also outlined. Lastly, the plan detailed the proposed structure of an Inner Mongolian army, to consist of cavalry, supported by a range of light and heavy weapons, including machine guns, mortars and horse artillery.

By the end of January 1936, the Kwantung Army General Staff had adopted ‘Tai-Mō (seihoku) shisaku yōryō’ and moved to implement it. The first step was to amalgamate the four western banners of Chahar that had come under Japanese control into a new administrative league under Japanese sponsorship. At the ceremony to launch the new league, Lieutenant-Colonel Tanaka Hisashi, a Kwantung Army SIA officer, delivered a speech emphasizing the importance of Japanese-Mongolian friendship and co-operation. To better achieve such co-operation, Japanese advisors would assist the head of the new league. Chahar province was still technically Chinese territory, and thus the Han Chinese Republican government moved to check the Japanese initiative in February 1936, sponsoring the foundation of the Suiyuan

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27 ‘Tai-Mō (seihoku) shisaku yōryō’, pp. 1b, 9a.
28 Ibid., p. 1b.
30 ‘Tai-Mō (seihoku) shisaku yōryō’, pp. 3a-4a.
31 Ibid., pp. 4a-4b, 9a.
32 Ibid., pp. 6b-7b.
34 Jagchid, Last Mongol Prince, pp. 122, 134-5; Nakajima, Toku-ō, p. 154.
Mongolian Political Council, which was made up of Mongol princes opposed to Prince Teh.\textsuperscript{35} The Japanese press noted these developments, commenting that Mongolia was likely to become a flashpoint.\textsuperscript{36} The expected clash came nine months later, in November 1936, with the so-called Suiyuan Incident.

As the Suiyuan Incident has been examined in a number of existing works,\textsuperscript{37} I will provide only a brief summary here of what occurred. In early February 1936, a Japanese-sponsored Mongolian Military Government (Mō-gun seifu) was established at West Sunid; Prince Teh assumed a senior position in the new government.\textsuperscript{38} American officials in Peking noted that it was ‘only a matter of time’ before Teh ‘declared “independence” with Japanese assistance’.\textsuperscript{39} Then, in April, the Kwantung Army sponsored the Mongolian State-Founding Conference (Mōko kenkoku kaigi). The conference was attended by representatives, most probably either selected or vetted by the Kwantung Army, from Chahar and Suiyuan provinces, as well as from Outer Mongolia and the western leagues of Alashan, Ejine, Ikh-Chao and Tsinghai. Among the policies adopted were support for the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia together with Tsinghai, a province in North China located to the west of Kansu province.

\textsuperscript{35} Zenrin kyōkai chōsabu (ed.), Mōko taikan: Shōwa jūsannen han, Tōkyō: Kaizōsha, 1938, p. 284.
\textsuperscript{36} For example, Gotō Tomio, ‘Uchimōko no kögen yori’, Kokusai hyōron, February 1936, pp. 135-44; Matsui Hitoshi, ‘Mōko o michibiku mono wa dare zo’, Kokusai hyōron, March 1936, pp. 54-61; ‘Hokushi no akka to saikin no soshi kankei’, Tō-A, 1 March 1936, pp. 17-29.
\textsuperscript{38} Nakajima, Toku-ō, pp. 154-5.
\textsuperscript{39} Telegram from Peking to the Secretary of State, Washington, 11 February 1936, in Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files: China Internal Affairs 1930-1939, Frederick, Md: University Publications of America, 1984, microfilm reel 46, frame 77-8.
and bordering Tibet, with a substantial Mongol population. The conference also expressed support for a mutual aid treaty between Inner Mongolia and Manchukuo.40

By mid-July 1936, Kwantung Army plans for the military occupation of Suiyuan had advanced to the stage where Lieutenant-Colonel Tanaka Ryūkichi41 was made fully responsible for coordinating the projected Japanese invasion and occupation.42 Tanaka’s ties to Mongolia dated back to the late 1920s, when he had first met Prince Teh, and were part of the reason he was chosen to oversee the Kwantung Army plan.43 Tanaka was also associated with right-wing figures favouring Japanese control of Mongolia. In early 1917, for instance, he had attended a memorial service in Kyoto for those Japanese killed during the 1916 Manchurian-Mongolian independence movement,44 suggesting a more than passing acquaintance with those involved. Tanaka later denied that the Japanese had been the driving force behind the Mongols’ attempt to seize Suiyuan, claiming that Japan had merely acceded to Prince Teh’s own wishes.45 His denials, however, were made to the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, and thus must be treated with circumspection; furthermore, they are contradicted by other sources, including contemporary reports filed by the United States military attaché in Peking that detail the steps undertaken by the Japanese military to gain control of Suiyuan.46

41 For a summary of Tanaka’s career see Hata, Nihon riku-kaigun sōgō jiten, p. 85.
42 Matsui, Naimō, p. 165; Hata Ikuhiko, Nitchi sensō shi, Tōkyō: Kawade shobō shinsha, 1961, p. 115.
45 IMTFE, vol. 1, p. 2042.
46 See ‘Comments on Current Events: June 6-19, 1936’, USMIRC, microfilm reel 2, frames 0464-7; ‘Comments on Current Events: June 20-July 3, 1936’, USMIRC,
For the planned invasion, Tanaka assembled a Mongolian-Manchukuoan force to which was attached a further unit of Han Chinese irregulars. To ensure that the Mongolian-Manchukuoan force achieved its objective, the Kwantung Army provided additional support in the form of a Japanese air unit, equipped with a small number of fighters, light bombers and transport aircraft. There was also a generous provision of army funds, with Tanaka receiving in excess of one million yen for the operation.

Despite all the preparations, however, the November 1936 Suiyuan operation was a complete debacle, with the Japanese-backed Mongols being soundly defeated by the Han Chinese Republican forces of Fu Tso-yi. The unexpected Chinese victory had important ramifications, inflaming nationalist fervour throughout China and triggering a rapprochement between the Kuomintang (Nationalists) and the Chinese Communists that eventually united them against the common enemy, Japan.

The change in relations between the Nationalists and Communists did not happen smoothly. In early December 1936, as Fu Tso-yi’s troops drove the Mongols back from Pailingmiao in Suiyuan province, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek flew to the city of Sian in nearby Shensi province to meet with Chang Hsueh-liang, the former ruler of

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47 Matsui, Naimō, pp. 182-3.
49 Matsui, Naimō, p. 181.
Manchuria. Chiang’s purpose was to convince Chang that the Chinese Communists posed a greater threat to the republic than the Japanese did, despite calls from diverse groups in Chinese society — students, business figures, military leaders and others — to resist Japan’s encroachments on Chinese territory, instead of accommodating the Japanese as in the past. Shortly after Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Sian, however, he was kidnapped and held for almost two weeks by Chang Hsueh-liang, who convinced the Generalissimo of the need for a unified front against the Japanese. Writing later of his decision to seize Chiang, in what was subsequently known as the Sian Incident, Chang specifically mentioned the Suiyuan invasion as one of the reasons for his action. Kwantung Army Vice Chief of Staff Kawabe Torashirō concluded for his own part that the Suiyuan invasion had prompted the kidnapping. In seeking to gain control of Inner Mongolia, the Kwantung Army had awakened the sleeping Chinese dragon.

**Japanese-Inner Mongolian Political and Diplomatic Relations, 1937-45**

After the December 1936 Sian Incident and the release of Chiang Kai-shek, calm appeared to return to the region, with no indication that Sino-Japanese relations were about to change so dramatically. Indeed, according to one contemporary source, it was the quietest spring in more than a decade. The sense of calm was shattered, however, on the night of 7 July 1937 when Chinese and Japanese troops clashed at the Marco

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89 for the recollections of Imai Takeo, a Japanese staff officer serving in Peking at the time of the incident.
Polo Bridge, not far from Peking. What sparked the clash remains a subject of dispute, but the consequences for Mongolia were clear.

With the outbreak of full-scale war between Japan and China in July 1937, the Kwantung Army moved to seize Suiyuan and Chahar, the two provinces that comprised the majority of Inner Mongolia. In a lightning-fast campaign, the army swept along the Peking-Suiyuan railway, and by mid-October had reached Paotou, the terminus of the line, supported by Inner Mongolian cavalry units. The Japanese military now controlled the majority of ‘Inner Mongolia’, with only Ninghsia province remaining in Chinese hands.

In Japanese press reports of the Kwantung Army’s advance, much was made of the assistance rendered by the Inner Mongolian Army, the force that had been set up by the Kwantung Army in February 1936, and cavalry was particularly emphasised. In early September, for example, Dōmei, the official Japanese news agency, issued a press release highlighting the role of the Inner Mongolian cavalry in the campaign (see Figure 20). Two months later, the Yomiuri shinbun ran a series by Tokyo Imperial University professor Yokoo Yasuo, entitled ‘Mōko no kihei wa naze tsuyoi ka’ (Why is the Mongolian Cavalry Strong?). In December, the magazine Pictorial World also carried a number of stories about Japan and Inner Mongolia, two of which specifically highlighted the part played by the Inner Mongolian cavalry in assisting Japanese

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56 See Coble, Facing Japan, pp. 370-4 for a summary of Chinese, Japanese and Western assessments of the cause.
57 ‘Comments on General Events: October 1–18, 1937’, USMIRC, microfilm reel 10, frames 0599-0600.
58 ‘Mongol Cavalrymen of the Type who are Co-operating with the Japanese Forces. Domei Took This Picture Last Week’, Japan Chronicle Weekly Edition (hereafter JCWE), 9 September 1937, p. 361.
military operations in the region. The effect of the media reports was, presumably, to emphasise Inner Mongolia’s importance to Japan, both as a potential ally and because of the horses that the region could provide, as well as the supposed friendship and co-operation between Japan and Mongolia. This coverage thus echoed the Japanese promotion of Mongolia in the late 1920s, especially the type of publicity surrounding the Tō-A shinzen kijokai’s ride from Mongolia to Japan, examined in the previous chapter.

After the failure of the Suiyuan Incident in December 1936, the Japanese victories following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident must have seemed like a godsend to Prince Teh and his supporters. By late October 1937, the region north of the Great Wall was

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60 Two examples are ‘Suien sensen: Tenken koete sekka no tazu’ and ‘Sekai fūzoku meguri sono nijūkyū: Kōya ni kagayaku – dai-Mōko dokuritsu – Ajia no
free of Han Chinese Republican forces and the time looked ripe for Inner Mongolia to gain its independence from China. In November, the prince and his supporters gathered in anticipation at Hohhot, as Suiyuan city had been renamed, for a conference to announce the foundation of the Mongolian Federated Autonomous Government (Mōko renmei jichi seifu). The attendance of Lieutenant-General Tōjō Hideki, commander of the Kwantung Army, greatly enhanced the prestige and authority of the congress. Moreover, many Mongol delegates viewed his presence as evidence of tacit Japanese support for the basic principles of Mongol nationhood.

The sense of joy, however, was short-lived. Less than a month later, in December 1937, the Japanese military amalgamated the new Inner Mongolian government with two smaller North Chinese puppet regimes, naming the new entity ‘Mengchiang’. Exactly why the name ‘Mengchiang’ was adopted is unclear, but the term dates back to at least 1921, when Chang Tso-lin used it to draw together parts of Inner Mongolia that were supposedly under his control. The new government was created, according to Jagchid, to ensure the provision of natural resources to feed Japanese industry back home. The capital was established in Kalgan, rather than at Hohhot, bringing it firmly under Japanese control, as all of the Japanese military and civilian administration of Mengchiang was based there. Prince Teh, his objections

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62 Jagchid, Last Mongol Prince, p. 177.
65 Jagchid, Last Mongol Prince, p. 189.
overruled by his Japanese ‘advisors’, found himself appointed as nominal head of the new administration.  

In spite of his lack of real power, Teh remained important to the Japanese authorities for symbolic reasons. He twice travelled to Japan, first in 1938 and again in 1941, and on both occasions was treated as a head of state, with full diplomatic protocol observed (Figure 21). On his first visit to Japan, Prince Teh was granted an audience with the Japanese emperor, ‘the highest honour they [the Japanese] could bestow upon a visitor’.  

He was also decorated with the ‘Grand Cordon of the Rising

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66 Ibid., pp. 189-90.
67 Ibid., pp. 205, 245-6.
Sun of the First Grade of Merit’, another very high honour for a foreign leader.\textsuperscript{70} The meeting with the emperor and the awarding of honours clearly indicates that the Japanese authorities wished to keep up the public pretence that Teh was the head of an independent government.

Despite the trappings of state, the pomp and ceremony and the honours that Teh received, the situation in Inner Mongolia gradually deteriorated, from the point of view of Mongolian autonomy, as the Japanese extracted the maximum they could from the region. Japanese civilian visitors to ‘Mengchian’ noted the extent to which the Japanese administration exploited the region. One visitor, the ultranationalist Kodama Yoshio, lamented that Mengchian was ruled by ‘bayonet politics’,\textsuperscript{71} quoting the Shinohara poem that appears at the beginning of this chapter. Nor was this appraisal limited to Japanese observers. An Australian who visited the region quipped that Inner Mongolia was ‘where the income tax was collected with machine guns’.\textsuperscript{72}

In the wake of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the Japanese military’s seizure of large portions of North China, the Japanese government moved to have the Chinese Nationalists formally recognise the ‘independence’ of Inner Mongolia, even before the creation of ‘Mengchian’. In October 1937, as part of a Japanese peace initiative, it was proposed to the Chinese government that a settlement could be reached if ‘China would concede Japan’s “righteous” demands in Inner Mongolia and … also recognize the present status of Prince Teh’.\textsuperscript{73} Nothing came of this initiative and meanwhile, the perceived importance of Mengchian to Japan declined. From 1938 Mengchian was

\textsuperscript{71} Kodama, \textit{I Was Defeated}, p. 68.
\textsuperscript{72} Frank Clune, \textit{Sky High to Shanghai}, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1939, map on book endpapers.
\textsuperscript{73} IMTFE, vol. 12, pp. 29,771-81.
little more than a backwater as the Japanese military’s strategic focus moved south, first in the campaigns on the Chinese continent and then into the Pacific and Southeast Asia, following the December 1941 attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor.

During the same period, the Kwantung Army, which had been the driving force behind the seizure of Suiyuan and Chahar provinces following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, and the creation of Mengchiang in November of the same year, suffered a similar decline in importance. First, in September 1939, it was catastrophically defeated by the Soviet military, following a clash at Nomonhan on the Outer Mongolia-Manchukuo border. Then, in April 1941, with the signing of the Russo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact, the primary reason for the Kwantung Army’s existence, that is, the likelihood of a future military offensive against the Soviet Union, disappeared at least for the time being, and from this point onwards its personnel and equipment were used to re-supply other battlefronts. By 1945, the supposedly formidable Kwantung Army was a shadow of its former self.

The economic significance of Mongolia, however, continued to be promoted in some quarters. In 1942, for example, at a time when there was considerable official emphasis on the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, anthropologist Nishimura Shinji highlighted the part that Mongolia could play within the sphere, in his book Dai Tō-A kyōeiken (The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere). After covering the geographical position of Mongolia and the makeup of its population, Nishimura devoted

several pages of his book to the various natural resources that Mongolia could supply to the Co-Prosperity Sphere. The list was divided into eight different categories, including livestock, mineral resources and vegetable produce. Moreover, like earlier writers, Nishimura also stressed the role that parts of Mongolia, in particular Uchumuchin, played in the breeding of strong, healthy horses. In an unlikely twist, the final part of Nishimura’s assessment of Mongolia’s potential dealt with the role that women such as Kawahara Misako had played in Japanese-Mongolian relations. This section was given the romantic sub-heading ‘Nichi-Mō o musunda kinkaku no te’ (the women’s hands that connected Japan and Mongolia). ‘Kinkaku no te’ (women’s hands) is a quite poetic term, ‘kinkaku’ being a woman’s hair ornament. Evidently, even a work of serious scholarship was not immune to romantic, poetic allusions. Japanese officials, too, continued to declare that the Mengchiang regime was both important to Japan and an integral part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Mengchiang’s fortunes, however, were undoubtedly declining. In November 1943, the Greater East Asian Conference, held in Tokyo under the auspices of the Japanese government, brought together the leaders of six of the newly ‘independent’ nations in the region, including Manchukuo and the Nanking regime of North China headed by Wang Ching-wei. Mengchiang, however, was not represented at the conference. While the Japanese administrative apparatus remained in place at Kalgan and the region remained under the control of the military, the idea of Mengchiang as an

77 Nishimura, Dai Tō-A kyōeiken, pp. 128-9.
78 Ibid., p. 130.
79 Ibid., pp. 130-1.
81 IMTFE, vol. 16, p. 39,723.
‘independent’ state had vanished. After all of the Kwantung Army’s plotting and subterfuge to gain control of Inner Mongolia, once the strategic focus changed, the significance of the region for Japanese military planners evaporated and Mengchiang was largely forgotten.

Regardless of the shift in the Japanese military’s strategic focus and the decline of the Kwantung Army’s own prestige, for those Japanese lucky enough to be stationed in Mengchiang between 1937 and 1945, life was not that bad. True, there was always the danger of ambush by the Han Chinese guerilla bands that roamed the countryside. Despite this danger, however, the Japanese in Mengchiang were spared the bombings and food shortages experienced by their compatriots at home in 1944-5, as the conflict in the Pacific became a war of attrition. The relative safety of Mengchiang, on the other hand, came to a crashing end in August 1945, when the Soviet military juggernaut raced across the border from Outer Mongolia.82 While the memoirs of Japanese residents of Mengchiang who lived through the Soviet invasion are generally less grim than those produced by Japanese in Manchukuo, some in Mengchiang were certainly carried off to Outer Mongolia as prisoners-of-war.83

Well before it was evident that Mengchiang had declined in importance in Japanese eyes, Prince Teh’s dissatisfaction with the Japanese had led him to make contact with both Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists. By late 1939, the prince had contacted the Kuomintang and offered to defect. Chiang, however, believed that it would be better for Prince Teh to remain in Mengchiang and ‘deceive the enemy’.84 Exactly when Teh contacted the Chinese Communists is not known, but

84 Jagchid, Last Mongol Prince, pp. 224-5.
most likely it was after he had communicated with the Kuomintang. In August 1945, with the defeat of Japan, Prince Teh was free to escape from the Japanese. He fled first to Peking, where the Chinese Nationalists welcomed him. In 1948 he made another attempt to found an independent, non-Communist Mongolian regime. The victory of Mao’s People’s Army in 1949, however, put an end to any chance of the Inner Mongolians achieving independence from China, and Teh fled once again, this time north into Outer Mongolia. Unfortunately for him, the Outer Mongolian government returned Teh to China in 1950. The Chinese Communists put the prince on trial, and sentenced him to a lengthy prison term. Teh was later paroled, and died at Hohhot in 1966.

Japanese Writers and Mongolia, 1932-45

Following the Manchurian Incident of September 1931 and the creation of the ‘independent’ state of Manchukuo in 1932, a number of Japanese authors wrote books that not only justified those actions, but also drew favourable attention to Japanese activities in Mongolia. Indeed, Unno Hiroshi has recently noted that from 1938 onwards there was something of a ‘Mongolia boom’ in Japan. Published in both Japanese and English, works on Mongolia included memoirs, biographies, travel accounts, and economic analyses of the region. Films and songs were also produced; their main characteristic is that they cast Mongolia and its inhabitants in a distinctly romantic light.

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One category of writing specifically recapitulated the exploits of Japanese individuals who had played prominent roles in Mongolia decades earlier. Thus, Kawahara Misako, Kawashima Naniwa and Fukushima Yasumasa were presented once again to the Japanese public, clearly as brave, patriotic and self-sacrificing figures to be admired. By now, their activities had been woven into a narrative of longstanding Japanese connection with and investment in Mongolia, a narrative that justified new actions and more sacrifice, and in particular helped to legitimise further Japanese encroachment on the region. Kawashima Yoshiko, too, the adopted daughter of Kawashima Naniwa, published her own memoir in 1940.89

One of the first books to appear after the momentous changes of 1931-2 was Mōko o atarashiku miru (A New Look at Mongolia), published in 1932.90 In essence, the book was an introduction to the region, in the context of the new conditions there. The author, Ishizuka Tadashi, chairman of the Nichi-Mō bōeki kyōkai (Japan-Mongolia Trade Association), declared that thanks to the creation of Manchukuo, Mongolia was now ripe for trade with Japan,91 presumably because there was now a shared border between Mongolia and a region in which Japanese people were very active. While little is known about the Nichi-Mō bōeki kyōkai, it is clear that its objective was the economic exploitation of Mongolia, and it was evidently large enough to fund its own publications.92 Ishizuka’s book briefly summarised research on Mongolia by Japanese and foreign academics, then detailed the customs of the Mongols, as well as conditions in Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia (within both Manchukuo and the Chinese Republic), Western Mongolia, Holunbuir and Manchukuo.93 Ishizuka’s view of ‘Mongolia’ thus resembled the broad nineteenth-century definition discussed in the Introduction. Some

89 Kawashima, Dōran no kage ni.
90 Ishizuka Tadashi, Mōko o atarashiku miru, Tōkyō: Sanseidō, 1932, p. 17.
91 Ibid., Foreword, p. 1.
92 Ibid., pp. 18-21, 90-5.
years later, in 1939, Ishizuka also published *Nazo no Mōko* (Mysterious Mongolia), its title echoing the tone of the 1920s newspaper reports discussed in Chapter Three.

While Ishizuka drew attention to the economic potential of the region, other writers in this period trumpeted Japan’s long-running mission to ‘liberate’ Northeast Asia. Among their works was the three-volume official history of the Kokuryūkai, the right-wing organisation founded by Uchida Ryōhei in 1901. This massive work, published between 1933 and 1936, was produced by Kuzū Yoshihisa, whose ‘patriotic’ credentials were so impeccable that when Uchida died in 1937, Kuzū succeeded him as head of the Kokuryūkai. Part collective biography of those who had sallied forth to further Japan’s control of the continent, part adventure story, the three volumes of the association’s history described the activities of the covert military intelligence-gathering missions of the 1880s onwards, detailed the first and second Manchurian-Mongolian independence movements, documented the support rendered by Japanese institutions to Semenov and Ungern-Sternberg at the time of the Siberian Intervention, and recorded the attempt by Deguchi Onisaburō to establish a Mongolian kingdom. In short, anything that the right wing had done to further Japanese control of Manchuria and Mongolia seems to have been documented. The activities of Kawahara Misako

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93 Ibid., pp. 1-6.
95 For example, ‘Kiyoura-shi no Mōko tankentai ni – sanka rokuji yomei’, *YS*, 11 August 1924, p. 3; article from the *Mainichi shinbun*, translated as ‘Unknown Mongolia – More Peaceful Penetration’, *JCWE*, 14 August 1924, p. 231.
101 Ibid., pp. 734-60.
and Kawashima Naniwa were included, but in the period 1932-45 both these individuals also warranted whole books devoted solely to their activities.

In the case of Kawahara, it was *Fujo shinbun*, the women’s magazine that had reported her activities at the beginning of the twentieth century, that now promoted her exploits further. As discussed in Chapter One, throughout its existence, *Fujo shinbun* had a particular focus on women’s education and often presented prominent women to its readers as role models. The magazine was also very conscious of its own standing, and had a connection to the imperial household, as the editor liked to remind his readers. Thus, despite the magazine’s ostensibly pacifist objectives, it was not shy about lauding Kawahara. Given that *Fujo shinbun* was still devoting space to Kawahara and her earlier life in the 1930s, we can assume that her past activities, including espionage on behalf of the Japanese military, were considered highly creditable. In 1935, as part of the commemoration of the magazine’s thirty-fifth anniversary, *Fujo shinbun* published a book about Kawahara’s exploits during the Russo-Japanese War. One effect was to keep the topic of Japanese ties to Mongolia before the reading public.

The book, written by Fukushima Sadako, the wife of Fukushima Shirō, editor of *Fujo shinbun*, linked Kawahara directly to Fukushima Yasumasa, the officer famed for his lone horseback-ride across Siberia in 1892-3. The first chapter, for example, was entitled ‘Shiberiya tanki ōdan no Fukushima taishō to shin’yū Kawahara Chū’ (General Fukushima, who crossed Siberia alone on horseback, and his intimate friend Kawahara

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104 Sandra Wilson, ‘Women, the State and the Media in Japan in the Early 1930s: *Fujo shinbun* and the Manchurian Crisis’, *Japan Forum*, vol. 7, no. 1, April 1995, pp. 89, 95.
105 Ibid., p. 88.
Chū [Misako’s father]). By drawing the reader’s attention to the links between Kawahara’s father and Fukushima Yasumasa, a national hero, Fukushima Sadako clearly intended to present Kawahara Misako’s exploits in Mongolia as equally heroic. She also included the dramatic extract from Kawahara’s diary, quoted in Chapter One, where Kawahara vowed to take her own life if captured, to reinforce the idea that Kawahara had performed a heroic and dangerous mission in providing Japan with intelligence regarding Russian troop movements.

Fukushima’s book sought to influence not only Japanese readers’ view of Kawahara, but also their image of Mongolia. She mentioned the garden party, discussed earlier, at which Kawahara’s students sang Japanese and Mongolian songs for the assembled guests, adding that Prince Gung, his consort and Kawahara took this opportunity to discuss the necessity of women’s education with those present. In this way, Fukushima presumably sought to imply that it was through the agency of Japan that the topic of education for Mongol women came to prominence. Fukushima’s use of photographs may also have been intended to illustrate how alike the two ethnic groups actually were.

One photograph shows the aforementioned garden party, an idyllic scene in which Mongolian men and women are gathered. The protagonists, however, are obviously alien from a Japanese point of view, given both the style of dress worn and the background. In contrast to this, a second photograph (Figure 22) shows Kawahara, Prince Gung and his consort, together with some of Kawahara’s students, on the day of Kawahara’s departure from the banner. In this photograph all are in Mongolian dress, with only Kawahara’s hairstyle distinguishing her from the others. This second

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107 Fukushima, *Kawahara Misako*, p. 3.
109 Ibid., pp. 72-3.
photograph is striking, in that although the clothes of the Mongols would still have seemed alien to Japanese readers, the people themselves are physically very similar to Japanese people. It is tempting to speculate that the average Japanese on seeing the photograph most likely thought that the two ethnic groups were not all that different. Perhaps, then, they were destined to tread the same path.


Nor was Fukushima’s book the only work on Kawahara published around this time. Fukushima’s final chapter lists a number of other books and magazine articles focusing on Kawahara’s exploits. These included Komai Tokuzō’s *Dai-Manshūkoku kensetsu roku* (A Record of the Building of Greater Manchukuo); an article by Ōshīma Yokichi, a member of one of the 1904-5 ‘special operations teams’, who also published a book in 1933 entitled *Bakuhayuki hishi* (The Secret History of a Bombing Mission); and an eighteen-page pamphlet with the title *Hokuman no ochibana* (Fallen Flowers of North

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110 The photo is not reproduced here because of the poor quality of the original. See Fukushima, *Kawahara Misako*, opp. p. 72.
Manchuria), which was also the title of a film. Even Torii Ryūzō mentioned Kawahara’s time as a teacher in Inner Mongolia in his 1936 memoir of his early visits to Mongolia.

While the general public in Japan largely forgot Kawahara after the Second World War, the sheer number of works about her that appeared during the 1930s suggests that she was a figure of some importance at that time. *Fujo shinbun*, at any rate, evidently continued to hold her in high regard, as shown by the magazine’s recapitulation of her exploits during the Russo-Japanese War when commemorating its thirty-fifth anniversary in 1935. Through the magazine’s pages, the reading public was reminded not only of a tale of individual ‘heroism’, but also of Japanese activity in Mongolia more generally. The connection with *Fujo shinbun* was clearly close and one that Kawahara maintained. Her name figured prominently, for example, in the list of those who sent New Year greetings to the paper in 1932. The prominence of Kawahara in the eyes of the magazine’s editors is reinforced in Nagahara Kazuko’s 1997 analysis of *Fujo shinbun*’s view of Asia. Nagahara devotes six pages to Kawahara, as well as including a photograph of her at the beginning of the chapter.

Kawashima Naniwa’s activities on the Chinese continent, in particular in relation to the two Manchurian-Mongolian independence movements, were similarly lauded in a 1936 book about his life, entitled *Kawashima Naniwa-ō*. Even the title of the book struck a hagiographical note. The use of the term ‘ō’ or ‘okina’, meaning ‘sage’ or

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111 Ibid., pp. 191-5, 205-16. Unfortunately, Fukushima gives little or no information on dates or places of publication.
112 Ibid., pp. 196-204. Fukushima gives no indication of whether the film and the pamphlet were connected in any way, nor any date of the release of the film.
114 ‘Kinga shinnen’, *Fujo shinbun*, 1 January 1932, p. 5.
'venerable old man', suggests that the author, Aida Tsutomu, wanted the reader to see Kawashima as a figure worthy of great respect. Aida’s book detailed Kawashima’s relationship with Prince Su, as well as Kawashima’s part in Sino-Japanese, Japanese-Manchurian and Manchurian-Mongolian relations from the 1890s onwards, including his involvement in the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Two lengthy chapters were devoted to his association with the Manchurian-Mongolian independence movements of 1912 and 1916. Aida further linked these two movements to the activities of Semenov and Ungern-Sternberg during the 1918-22 Siberian Intervention. In doing so, his object was presumably to fix in the minds of his readers a connection among Semenov, Ungern-Sternberg and Kawashima, and to convey the sense that all were individuals who, with official Japanese assistance, had struggled for the ‘independence’ of Manchuria and Mongolia.

Aida implied that Kawashima’s evident fascination with Mongolia was long-standing. As far back as the early 1880s Kawashima had allegedly dreamt of Genghis Khan, and then of himself ‘leading an army of one hundred thousand across the great desert of Mongolia’. Later in the same decade, according to Aida, when the Russians moved into the Ili region of Northeast Sinkiang, Kawashima first began to think about the possibility of an independent Manchurian-Mongolian entity (Man-Mō kenkoku risō no shohokki), to comprise Manchuria and the eastern part of Mongolia (Mōko no tōbu). Presumably, Aida wanted his readers to conclude that Kawashima was already a visionary, even before he became involved in the various concrete schemes to create an ‘independent’ Manchurian-Mongolian kingdom, because Kawashima had foreseen the need to create ‘Manchukuo’ almost five decades before it became a reality.

117 Ibid., pp. 290-2.
118 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
A few years later, in 1940, Kawashima Yoshiko, Kawashima Naniwa’s adopted daughter and the thirteenth child of his former associate, the Manchu Prince Su, published her own memoir, evocatively entitled *Dōran no kage ni – watakushi no hanseiki* (In the Shadow of Chaos – A Record of My Life Till Now). The book was filled with romantic images, not the least of which was the description of Kawashima as a ‘Far Eastern Joan of Arc’, both in the Foreword by Igaue Shigeru and by Kawashima herself. Kawashima recalled that in childhood, she had dreamt of herself leading an army in China, much as her father had done, presumably in this case to free China from the Republicans, just as Joan of Arc had freed France from the English. The sense of romance in her book was extended to her activities in Manchuria and Mongolia. When discussing her supposed exploits with the Kwantung Army, following the Manchurian Incident of September 1931, Kawashima detailed the Japanese advance north from Mukden, towards the Chinese Eastern Railway, in which she had apparently participated, in a section entitled ‘Rakuda no chūtai’ (Camel company). One feature of this section is her romantic blending of the image of the camel corps and the Mongolian *ger* (the traditional Mongolian tent, also known as a ‘yurt’).

In 1927, as noted earlier, Kawashima had married Kanjurchap, the second son of Babujab, ‘hero’ of the 1916 Manchuria-Mongolia independence movement, at a ceremony attended by a range of Japanese notables, including high-ranking Kwantung Army officers. In her memoir Kawashima implied that this was a dynastic marriage

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119 Ibid., pp. 45-7.
120 Kawashima, *Dōran no kage ni*, Foreword, pp. 1, 5; main text, pp. 31-5. Igaue appears to have been a poet, author and social commentator. Why he was asked to write a Foreword is unknown. The only major work the National Diet Library holds of his is *Tsubasa*, published by Nantendō shōbō in 1930. Haga Noboru (ed.), *Nihon jinbutsu jōhō taikei* 5, Tōkyō: Köseisha, 1997, also includes a piece by Igaue entitled ‘Nihon josei no chikara’.
121 Kawashima, *Dōran no kage ni*, pp. 31-5.
joining the Ch’ing and Mongol noble lines. Her account of the wedding was entitled ‘Mōko no yoru’ (Mongolian nights), a romantic image evoking Scheherazade and the tales of the Arabian nights. Kawashima Yoshiko’s public emphasis on the romantic associations of Mongolia was also evident in August 1933, when she recorded the song ‘Kyaraban no rin’ (Caravan Bell) for Columbia Records Japan. The title alone conjured up the image of caravans of camels along the Silk Road. At around the same time, Kawashima also recorded two Mongolian folksongs, although it is unclear whether these were released.

The exploits of Fukushima Yasumasa, the army officer famous for his lone horseback-ride from Berlin to Vladivostok in the early 1890s, were also lauded in two books published in the early 1940s. Both were edited by Ōta Ayama and were substantial works. The first reprinted Fukushima’s own account of his epic ride, originally published in 1894, together with a small selection of other pieces about his achievement. The second reprinted Fukushima’s account of a journey he made in 1895-6 through Northern Persia, Turkish-controlled Arabia, India and Burma. The publication of these two works shows that Fukushima remained in the Japanese public memory long after his death, at least partly because of his activities in Mongolia. Indeed, the prominent army general, Matsui Iwane, at his last meeting with the Buddhist chaplain of Sugamo prison on the eve of Matsui’s execution as a war criminal in

124 Kawashima, Dōran no kage ni, pp. 79-80.
125 Ibid., pp. 78-86.
126 ‘Kyōshū no omoifukashi “Mōko no uta” – Kawashima Yoshiko jō ga rekōdo fukikomi’, YS, 6 August 1933, p. 2.
127 Kamisaka, Dansō no reijin, p. 143.
December 1948, specifically recalled Fukushima, naming him as one of the four ‘fathers of the Japanese Army’.\textsuperscript{129}

In the wake of the July 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the onset of full-scale war between Japan and China, together with the extension of Japanese control into Chahar and Suiyuan provinces, Japanese authors shifted their attention from the potential offered by control of Inner Mongolia, presumably because the region was now under Japanese control, to discussion of the actual relationship between the Japanese and the Mongols, and the assistance already being provided by Japan in Inner Mongolia. In 1941, for example, journalist Iiyama Tatsuo and photographer Hazama Otohiko produced an illustrated record of their July 1938 travels through Mengchiang.\textsuperscript{130} Iiyama contributed a sixty-four-page essay, discussing the changes that had occurred in the region since the outbreak of war in July 1937. He drew particular attention to the work being undertaken by the Zenrin kyōkai, pointing to the idealism of the young Japanese who had opted to work in the region.\textsuperscript{131} The majority of the book, however, was given over to Hazama’s photographs. What is noteworthy about these is that there are no images of soldiers, even though the book’s title refers to the North China Army. Rather, there are idyllic scenes of happy Mongols inhabiting seemingly endless plains. The only Japanese apparently present are serious young men, presumably members of the ‘noble’ Zenrin kyōkai, evidently eager to lift up their less fortunate Mongolian brothers.


\textsuperscript{130} Iiyama Tatsuo and Hazama Otohiko, \textit{Mōkyō no tabi: Hokushi hakengun hōdōbu ken‘etsusai}, Tōkyō: Sanseidō, 1941.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., pp. 36-7.
Other visitors, too, wrote about the region in this period. For four months, from late 1937 to early 1938, Hasegawa Haruko, an artist trained in both Japanese and Western styles of portraiture, travelled through North China and Mengchian, subsequently publishing an illustrated diary of her journey. Hasegawa, who travelled as special correspondent for the Ōsaka mainichi shinbun (Osaka Daily News) and the magazine Kaizō (Reconstruction), wrote a number of articles that dealt specifically with the new regime in Mengchian. Several of her reports were published not only in the Ōsaka mainichi shinbun, but also in other newspapers, including the Yomiuri shinbun, prior to being gathered together and included in the book. Thus, quite a wide audience presumably read Hasegawa’s work.

In the first section of her published book, Hasegawa expressed her opinion that it was not Russia or America that ensured Mongolia’s future prosperity, but rather the Zenrin kyōkai, the Japanese organisation most active in the region at the time. In a similar vein, she described Prince Teh, and his supporters whom she met, as ‘the new men for a new Mongolia’, and as ‘passionate’ and ‘ambitious’. She also recorded her encounter with a young Mongol boy who had spent two years at elementary school in Japan and who spoke to her in Japanese, which clearly impressed Hasegawa. Throughout this section, whether praising Teh or mentioning the young boy who had studied in Japan, Hasegawa’s objective seems to have been to make her reader aware of the ways in which Japan was helping the Mongols to fulfill their destiny. In many

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135 Ibid., pp. 55, 59.
respects, Hasegawa echoed the sentiments expressed in Kawahara Misako’s book, *Mōko miyage*, published some thirty years before.137 Both works, that is, conveyed the idea that it was with the help of Japan, at all levels of Mongolian society, that the Mongols could build a ‘new Mongolia’.

As an artist, Hasegawa sought to capture not only what she heard, but also what she saw, through a series of ink sketches. The illustration that accompanies her recollection of the meeting with the young boy who spoke to her in Japanese, for example, shows someone, in all probability the boy in question, swaddled in furs and smiling (Figure 23). There is a sense of peace and contentment to the drawing. The boy gazes upwards at the sky, while behind can be seen a man with a rifle slung on his back and a child standing together with a horse. The only other indications of life are

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136 Ibid., p. 21.
a dog walking away and the smoke rising from the chimney of the *ger*. Hasegawa’s portrayal of Mongolia has an idyllic quality, no doubt influenced by the romantic perception of the region common among Japanese at the time.

Hasegawa’s book also includes a section entitled ‘Sensen no josei tachi’ (women of the front-line). Three of the five parts in this section dealt specifically with Mengchian, each one accompanied by an ink portrait. The first, ‘Mōko hō no shōjo’ (Maiden of the Mongolian *ger*), not only mentioned the importance of the Zenrin Kyōkai’s work in Mengchian, but also included an illustration of an older woman, perhaps Hasegawa herself in Mongolian attire, walking with her arm around the shoulders of a young Mongolian girl (Figure 24). Here the image suggests maternal protectiveness, with the older woman shielding the innocent Mongolian maiden. Undoubtedly, what Hasegawa conveyed through the sketch was an idealized version of Japan’s relationship with the Mongols.

![Figure 24: ‘Maiden of the Mongolian *ger*’, reproduced from Hasegawa, *Hokushi Mōkyō sensen*, p. 151.](image)

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The part entitled ‘Chōkakō no taipisuto’ (Kalgan typist) was about the women attached to the SIA, serving with the Japanese military alongside the men. The accompanying illustration of an elegant, overall-clad young woman, stylishly posed warming herself beside a stove, exudes sophistication (Figure 25). The young woman portrayed would not have looked out of place in a Tokyo setting. Through the illustration, Hasegawa implies that Kalgan is in some way similar to a Japanese metropolis, in that women there can be just as elegant and worldly as in Tokyo. Moreover, although the figure is, in all probability, that of a young Japanese woman, it could equally be a Mongol. In this respect, while the previous drawing (see Figure 25) brings to mind the Mongols before the benefits of Japanese enlightenment have been fully absorbed, this one suggests that with Japanese assistance, the Mongols are fulfilling their potential. In many ways, these two illustrations also echo the photographs that appeared in Fukushima Sadako’s book on Kawahara Misako (see Figures 22), which implied how physically similar the two peoples were.

The part of Hasegawa’s book entitled ‘Hōtō no jojō gunkisha’ (Woman military journalist at Paotou) concerned a German journalist attached to the Japanese Army. The illustration shows a woman swaddled in furs, with a plane in the background (Figure 26). The image here is of the warrior woman, ready to join the ‘fellows’ in combat. The illustration, however, could just as easily be meant to represent a Japanese woman, maybe even Hasegawa herself. Indeed, earlier in the book, Hasegawa included a photo of herself, smiling and cheerful, dressed in much the same way (see Figure 27). It is tempting to speculate that in the German woman journalist she encountered at Paotou, Hasegawa saw a reflection of herself.

Figure 26: ‘Woman military journalist at Paotou’, reproduced from Hasegawa, *Hokushi Mōkyō sensen*, p. 157.
The three different illustrations of women drawn by Hasegawa present Mengchiang as a place where a Japanese or even a Western woman could fill a number of different roles, among them the mother, the urban sophisticate and the warrior; indeed, almost whatever role she wished. In this manner Hasegawa drew attention to the supposedly important contribution of women to Japan’s relationship with Mongolia, as Kawahara Misako had done some thirty years earlier.

In contrast, when Hasegawa dealt with the role of Chinese women in the areas under Japanese military control, the illustration she included was of three young Han Chinese women holding white flags (see Figure 28). While the three figures are certainly elegant, there is also a sense of fragility, giving an impression of inherent weakness to the picture. The white flag, moreover, as a universal symbol of defeat and submission, reinforces the impression. There is clearly a Japanese soldier in the background, illustrating the protection that the Japanese military offered to the Chinese population, but the women themselves appear to be mere watchers on the sidelines. Whether deliberately or not, this picture stands in stark contrast to others in the book. None of the three women in this image shows any of the vitality found in the three
pictures portraying other women in Mengchiang. Unlike the woman braving the cold with the child, the typist warming herself beside the stove, or the journalist ready to take to the skies, the Han Chinese women here appear beautiful but useless. In the earlier images, by contrast, Hasegawa implies that it is through the agency of Japan (and possibly its German ally) that Mongolia can achieve a better future, as well as suggesting that there is a place in this future for Japanese women.

Figure 28: ‘Shihchiachwang’s golden princesses’, reproduced from Hasegawa, *Hokushi Mōkyō sensen*, p. 155.

In addition to this kind of popular publication, more scholarly works on Mongolia also appeared in this period. For example, in 1941, under the auspices of the Tō-A kōko gakkai Mōko chōsahan (East Asian Archeological Association’s Mongolian Survey Section), the archeologists Egami Namio and Yonebayashi Kiyoshi produced a volume detailing two fieldtrips undertaken in Inner Mongolia by researchers from the
association in 1931 and 1935. Why it had taken so long to write up the fieldwork was not explained, but the book presented a thorough study of the Silingol and Ulanchap regions of Inner Mongolia. An account of the experiences of another survey team, from Kyoto Imperial University, that spent a month in the region in September 1938, also appeared in book form in 1943. The team’s survey of Inner Mongolia had been carried out with assistance from Japanese Army units stationed in the region. The introduction to the book included a comment to the effect that it was because of the Kwantung Army’s operations that the Inner Mongols had been able to found a new state, Mengchiang.

Other visitors to Inner Mongolia in this period included the geographer Suda Kanji, who undertook an eight-month journey through the region, an account of which was later published as Yōsha (Rickshaw). Suda travelled extensively through Mengchiang, describing the Mongols’ way of life and touching on such topics as the kinds of fuel used, foodstuffs, Inner Mongolia’s rivers and lakes, roads, clothing and religion. In one passage, Suda waxed lyrical about the taste of sheep cooked in miso, which he had eaten at Abagar in Inner Mongolia, at a building run by the Zenrin kyōkai. There is possibly nothing more archetypically Japanese than miso, and the whole purpose of the passage seems to have been to illustrate the connection between the Japanese and the Mongols, by highlighting their enjoyment of the same product. Just as Fukushima Sadako, in her book about Kawahara Misako, had perhaps intended the juxtaposition of photographs to illustrate the similarities between the two peoples,

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139 Miyazaki Takeo, Mōko ōdan: Kyōto teikoku daigaku Uchimōko gakujutsu chōsatai shuki, Tōkyō: Hōbundō, 1943.
141 Miyazaki, Mōko ōdan, pp. 1-3.
142 Suda Kanji, Yōsha, Tōkyō: Kokin shoin, 1939.
Suda used the most basic shared element, food. Moreover, the mention of the Zenrin kyōkai no doubt served to remind the reader of the sterling work being done by that organisation in the ‘wilds of Mongolia’.

A number of other Japanese writers and artists also visited Mengchiang after 1937 and wrote about what they had seen and experienced. A notable example is Mōkyō (Mengchiang), by novelist Yasuda Yojūrō, the acknowledged leader of the Japan Romantic School (Nihon rōmanha). The book is quite dense in places, but it is clear that Yasuda, like other writers, perceived in Mengchiang a kind of romantic reflection of Japan and of Japanese power. At one point he writes, ‘my romanticism is extremely gratified by the sight of our troops under the north wind in the Mongolian landscape’ (sakufū no shita no waga guntai ya Mōko no fūdo wa, watakushi no romanchishizumu o hijō ni manzoku saseru). The linking of Japan and Mongolia in such a romantic fashion was by now well established as a literary convention. The addition of the reference to the military emphasised the role that the Japanese Army had played in bringing the region under Japanese control, and functioned to cast even the military in a romantic light.

The attention paid to Mongolia by Japanese writers at this time is perhaps best demonstrated through the works of Yonaiyama Tsuneo, a former Foreign Ministry official who spent almost three years, from October 1933 until August 1936, stationed in Hsingan, a province of Manchukuo predominantly inhabited by Mongols. During his time in Hsingan province, Yonaiyama wrote a number of articles about different

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143 Ibid., pp. 103-5.


145 Yasuda, Mōkyō, p. 127.

146 Yonaiyama Tsuneo, Mōko fūdoki, Tōkyō: Kaizōsha, 1938, author’s preface, p. 1.
aspects of neighbouring Mongolia, on such topics as the people of the Holunburir region, and Mongolia’s climate, flora and folk music. On his return to Japan, he published extensively about Mongolia, and about both Japan’s and China’s relationship with the region. Yonaiyama’s 1938 book, *Mōko fūdoki* (An Account of Mongolian Topography), was followed by two more, both published in 1942: *Mōko sōgen* (The Mongolian Grasslands) and *Mōko risō* (The Mongolian Ideal). Not content with publishing three books on Mongolia in the space of five years, Yonaiyama published two more in 1943: *Shina to Mōko* (China and Mongolia) and *Mōko oyobi Mōkojin* (Mongolia and the Mongols). Both these works centred on the position of Mongolia in relation to China and Japan.

In *Shina to Mōko*, Yonaiyama focused his attention on Mongolia’s future, asserting that it was the dream of the Mongolians to found a Greater Mongolia (*dai-Mōko kenkoku*) and that for this to eventuate three things needed to occur: the population must increase, Mongolia must be completely separated from China, and traffic between Manchuria and Mongolia must be developed. For the last to happen traffic between the Mongolian city of Kalgan and China must be stopped and a direct rail link between Manchuria and Mongolia, that is, between Mongolia and a Japanese-controlled region, must be built. While Yonaiyama did not openly state it, it is clear that his plans for the modernisation of Mongolia were geared to Japanese interest: everything was designed to facilitate Japanese control of the region. With his call for the development

of trade between Kalgan and Manchukuo, for example, Yonaiyama was echoing one of the Kwantung Army’s proposals discussed earlier in this chapter. Yonaiyama further argued that for East Asia as a whole to prosper, a new Mongolia must take shape, comprising all four regions — Inner, Outer, Eastern and Western Mongolia — each ruled by its own princes, with this confederation then to form a Greater Mongolian empire, to join with Manchukuo under the rule of the Manchukuo emperor, Pu-yi.151

In reality, given that Pu-yi was a Japanese puppet, the Greater Mongolian empire would also then be part of a Japanese puppet state. In his second book published in 1943, Mōko oyobi Mōkojin, Yonaiyama covered a wide range of topics relating to the Mongols, beginning with their racial origins and the specific regions that they inhabited,152 and continuing with a very thorough examination of all aspects of Mongolian society, including the Mongols’ nomadic lifestyle, their daily life and their religious customs.153

It is easy to dismiss many of the sentiments expressed by Yonaiyama, such as the desirability of a Greater Mongolian empire under the rule of the Manchukuo emperor, as well as the need for a cross-continental railway joining ‘Japan to Manchuria, Manchuria to Mongolia, and Mongolia to Central Asia, spreading the light [of Japanese benevolence] from the east to the west’.154 Yet there was presumably a market for his writings. The publication of five books on Mongolia in the space of six years by a single author certainly suggests that there was; and the fact that three of them were published by the same company, Kaizōsha, further suggests that at least one publisher recognised the demand. It seems likely that Yonaiyama’s audience included the seemingly idealistic young men and women who flocked to Mengchiang under the

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151 Ibid., p. 344.
152 Yonaiyama, Mōko oyobi Mōkojin, pp. 8-18.
153 Ibid., pp. 177-213.
154 Yonaiyama, Shina to Mōko, p. 355.
banner of the Zenrin kyōkai, an organisation that will be examined in the following chapter.

Western Writers and Mongolia, 1932-45

Western assessments of Inner Mongolia’s strategic and economic potential no doubt served, in the eyes of the Japanese elites, to bolster Japanese claims to the region. They are also important in that they demonstrate that Japanese perceptions of Mongolia in this period were widely known and appreciated outside of Japan. Indeed, some form of alliance between Mongolia and Japan appeared natural to certain Western writers at this time, if only because the Mongolians and the Japanese were ethnically similar, and the Japanese were both technologically advanced and territorially ambitious. For example, in 1933, the Danish journalist A. R. Lindt quoted a Buriat Mongol who said:

To the south there is Japan. We would accept the help of anyone, Japan, America, or England. Perhaps, however, Japan is the power that could help us most. She could serve as an example to us. Like ourselves, the Japanese are a yellow race. Alone amongst the people of Asia they have managed to stand firm with no aid but their own. They assimilated all the inventions of the West, but in spirit they remained unchanged. They are Asiatics still. They have remained faithful to the religion of Buddha. They have kept their emperor. Like them we must learn to become a great nation without the sacrifices of our old institutions.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{155} Lindt, \textit{Special Correspondent}, pp. 268-9.
Here Lindt captured all of the points that the Japanese authorities trumpeted about Japan’s relationship with the Mongols — the racial, religious, and social aspects — if not the military dimension that was the most important in reality.

The following year, Owen Lattimore agreed that Japan was wooing the Mongols, and that the Mongols were responding enthusiastically.¹⁵⁶ From his tone, Lattimore obviously viewed developments in Manchuria in 1931-2 as positive for the Mongols, although he was cautious about their future, in view of the fact that they were not ‘fully independent’ of either China or Japan. Lattimore noted the strategic nature of Japan’s ambitions in Mongolia, stating that if the Mongols of Manchuria were won over by Japanese policies they could be ‘both an effective possible screen between the Japanese and Russian spheres of influence, as well as a way to extend the prestige of Japan and Manchukuo far out on the frontier between China and Inner Mongolia, thus cutting off the Chinese to terra irredenta’.¹⁵⁷ The idea that Japan actively sought to extend its sphere of influence so that it could create a strategic buffer was by now a relatively common theme in writings on the region.

Other Western visitors to Inner Mongolia made similar comments. English journalist Peter Fleming, who travelled through the region in late 1934, commented on the complex nature of the Japanese-Mongolian relationship at around this time, noting:

The Mongols of Manchuria, whose territory lies along the northeastern frontier of Outer Mongolia, were regarded by the Japanese (in, I think, a rather woolly way) as a potential focus of Pan-Mongolian unity. A successful movement of this kind might, theoretically, have detached Outer Mongolia from Russia, or anyhow disaffected the inhabitants; it might also have paid

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 138-9.
dividends in Inner Mongolia, which was still an integral part of China.  

In making this comment, Fleming appeared to be harking back to the Japanese-backed Pan-Mongol movement of the time of the Siberian Intervention, and speculating as to whether the Japanese would now back a revived movement.

The Soviet historians who wrote in 1934 as O. Tanin and E. Yohan commented on Japanese ambitions in Mongolia from the Soviet perspective. They drew particular attention to the number of Japanese religious sects active in ‘furthering the penetration of Japanese influence in Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, China, and the Pacific Islands’. In relation to Inner Mongolia, they specifically named Ōtani Kōzui of Honganji, who, they reported, had been given the ‘special task’ by the Japanese General Staff of ‘directing the work among the Lama priesthood of the region’. They also pointed to the use of Tenrikyō, a Shintō sect founded in the early nineteenth century, to woo the non-Buddhist population of Inner Mongolia.  

Tanin and Yohan’s work is important as a contemporary source that clearly notes the links between the Japanese military and religious groups in operations in Inner Mongolia, and also because it specifically names Ōtani. The inference is that the connection between Japanese military and religious activities in Mongolia was widely known at the time.

Contemporary foreign commentators on the Japan-Mongolia connection tended to focus especially on Russo-Japanese relations. It was widely believed that a conflict between the two nations was likely as they grappled for control of Northeast Asia, with Western writers often siding with Japan and against the Communist regime.

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Collier and Lt-Col. L’E. Malone noted in 1936 that Russian control of Outer Mongolia and Japanese control of Manchukuo and the subsequent arms build-up by the two countries meant a situation in which:

incidents of no small significance are occurring almost every week in this district [Manchuria and Mongolia], and when we remember that both Russia and Japan are armed to the teeth, it is impossible not to visualize how easily any of these incidents might be claimed by the Power which desires war, as an insult to her prestige.\textsuperscript{161}

P. T. Etherton, formerly the British Consul-General to Chinese Turkestan, and H. Hessell Tiltman, gave credit to the Japanese for their efforts to counteract the apparent Bolshevik campaign to sway the Mongols.\textsuperscript{162} Harry Wildes went further and declared that Japan should occupy Mongolia to counteract the ‘Soviet menaces [sic] to the far interior of Asia’.\textsuperscript{163} In 1936, Guenther Stein wrote at length on the position of Inner Mongolia in Russo-Japanese relations, noting that the ‘Mongolian problem may even become of crucial importance in the near future’ in relations between the two.\textsuperscript{164} Tiltman echoed Stein’s view the following year. Now that full-scale war between Japan and China had broken out, Tiltman concluded that Japan’s fears of Soviet expansion into China and of Soviet military power in general had ‘assumed the dimensions of phobias in the minds of the Japanese militarists’, and that Japan had:

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{164} Guenther Stein, \textit{Far East in Ferment}, London: Methuen, 1936, p. 156.
decided to get her blow in first, and by creating a *cordon sanitaire* of Japanese-controlled territories from Dairen to Ulan Bator, to checkmate Soviet Russia in Asia, while at the same time providing the Japanese forces with a strategic base from which she could, in necessity, effectively demonstrate to Russia her determination to remain the Overlord of Asia.\footnote{Tiltman, *The Far East Comes Nearer*, p. 135.}

Some five years later, in 1942, Simon Harcourt-Smith, who had previously served at one of the British legations in China and then in the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, agreed with Tiltman, adding that the idea of Russia as a menace ‘continues to obsess them [the Japanese] even to this day’.\footnote{Simon Harcourt-Smith, *Japanese Frenzy*, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1942, pp. 18-19.}

While much of the attention of Western writers was focused on the geo-strategic nature of Japanese ambitions in Mongolia and the perceived Soviet threat to Japan’s growing continental empire, a number of them were aware of the economic potential of Inner Mongolia from Japan’s point of view. Tiltman, for example, appears to have shared Ishizuka’s assessment that Inner Mongolia had vast economic potential for Japan, noting that ‘the plains of Inner Mongolia, including Suiyuan, offer magnificent grazing land for sheep at a time when Japan is striving to diminish her dependence upon Australia for her supply of raw wool’, and that ‘there is gold in abundance in both Chahar and Suiyuan’.\footnote{Tiltman, *The Far East Comes Nearer*, p. 210.} Henry May made a similar point, listing the wide array of resources that would benefit Japan if it gained control of the region.\footnote{Henry May, *The Far East Comes Nearer*, p. 210.}

**Conclusion**

For the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, the implementation of direct Japanese rule following the heady days of ‘liberation’ from the Chinese in September 1937, and the
foundation of the Mongolian Federated Autonomous Government two months later, meant that in reality, the expulsion of Han Chinese authority from the region brought little political change other than a new overlord. On the cultural front, however, the story of Japanese-Mongolian relations was more complex. Japanese writers continued to recognise the racial, cultural and religious ties that existed between the Japanese and Mongols, but also drew attention to other aspects of Japanese-Mongolian relations. Recent history provided a rich vein to be exploited anew for a fresh audience. The role played in the past by Kawahara Misako, Kawashima Naniwa and others, for example, was recounted once again, in part, no doubt, in order to justify Japan’s current actions on the continent. Such works suggested longstanding Japanese effort on behalf of Mongolia, and the heroism and sacrifice of a number of individuals in the cause of Mongolian independence from China. Western writers, for their part, made much of the geo-strategic position that Mongolia occupied and speculated on whether the region would prove to be the flashpoint in Russo-Japanese relations, or on what would eventuate as Japan occupied the region. The strategic importance of Mongolia was clearly more significant for Western writers than were the racial, cultural or religious ties that Japanese writers often focused on. Other writers, both Japanese and Western, trumpeted the economic potential of Mongolia, at a time when the Japanese military sought to extract the maximum benefit from Inner Mongolia.

While Inner Mongolia may not have been granted independence by the Japanese military, it did benefit from Japanese humanitarian endeavours, which were chiefly channelled through the Zenrin kyōkai. The next chapter will examine the activities of the Zenrin kyōkai in Inner Mongolia from the early 1930s until the end of the Second World War, as the organisation brought together an array of Japanese groups and

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individuals who sought closer ties with the Mongols and waged a campaign to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Mongol population of Chahar and Suiyuan provinces.
CHAPTER FIVE

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN ACTION:  
THE ZENRIN KYŌKAI IN INNER MONGOLIA, 1933-45

This chapter examines the Zenrin kyōkai, a semi-official Japanese organisation that provided medical assistance and educational opportunities to the Mongols of Chahar and Suiyuan provinces, that is, to an Inner Mongolian population living on the fringes of the Han Chinese Republic. From the outset, the Zenrin kyōkai fulfilled two distinct purposes. While it was on one level a humanitarian organisation, it was also an agent of Japanese expansionism. It had a close association with the Kwantung Army, and in practice the humanitarian operations of the Zenrin kyōkai allowed for far greater Japanese penetration of the region adjoining Manchukuo than would have been possible, without arousing overt Han Chinese hostility, if the Kwantung Army had relied solely on military force as a means to gain a foothold in the region. The Japanese military thus used the Zenrin kyōkai to facilitate its strategic aims in Mongolia. As this chapter will show, the association’s humanitarian activities in Inner Mongolia, in conjunction with its campaign in Japan to promote better ties between the two peoples, suggest that Japanese policy-makers, both military and civilian, saw distinct benefits in the use of cultural diplomacy or ‘soft power’.

Despite the important role that it played, the Zenrin kyōkai has been largely overlooked in post-Second World War studies of Japanese-Mongolian relations. Furthermore, when its activities in Inner Mongolia have been mentioned, the association has generally been dismissed as no more than a front for Japanese Army
That there were close links between the Zenrin kyōkai and the Kwantung Army Special Intelligence Agency (SIA) is undeniable, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter, but the Zenrin kyōkai should not be dismissed simply as a cover for intelligence-gathering. Moreover, although the civilian groups and individuals associated with the organisation undoubtedly sympathised with the Kwantung Army’s expansionist aims, such groups and individuals also had their own separate agendas to pursue in Mongolia. Thus, the Zenrin kyōkai was not merely a tool of Japanese imperialism.

This chapter will do four things. First, it will examine the background to and formation of the Zenrin kyōkai, showing that the association brought together representatives from across the Japanese elites who sought control of, or closer ties with, Mongolia. Second, it will discuss the association’s activities, both in Inner Mongolia and in Japan, showing how the Zenrin kyōkai sought to improve the lot of the Mongols and to act as an advocate in Japan of the empire’s ‘civilising mission’ in this part of Asia. Third, I analyse the relationship between the Zenrin kyōkai and the Kwantung Army, especially the SIA, and the army’s use of cultural diplomacy in Inner Mongolia. Finally, I demonstrate that, after 1937, the Japanese authorities were willing to modify and expand the role of the Zenrin kyōkai to woo the minority Muslim population of Inner Mongolia, much as they had previously wooed the Mongols, presumably as a precursor to further expansion into the predominantly Muslim areas under Han Chinese or Soviet Russian control bordering Inner Mongolia.

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Much of the information in this chapter is taken from Zenrin kyōkai shi: Uchimōko ni okeru bunka katsudō (A History of the Zenrin Kyōkai: Its Cultural Activities in Inner Mongolia), which was produced in 1981 by former members of the association. Of particular importance for this thesis is its account of the background to the formation of the Zenrin kyōkai, and the chronology of the association’s activities, which provides a comparatively thorough picture of the Zenrin kyōkai’s work in both Inner Mongolia and Japan.

Force versus Persuasion

Undoubtedly, following the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and the Japanese Army’s advance on to the Chinese continent after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, the military relied primarily on brute force to control the local population. In Manchuria, despite Japanese claims that the region was the ‘country of the Manchu’, the Japanese military and civilian authorities were faced with a population that was predominantly Han Chinese, a proportion of whom were opposed to Japanese rule. Thus the Japanese military experienced major problems in Manchukuo with ‘bandits’, a term that was liberally applied to any overt opposition. Beginning in 1932, the Kwantung Army launched a series of costly and time-consuming military campaigns

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4 While reliable population figures are hard to determine, in 1933 the population of Manchukuo numbered about 33 million, of which more than ninety percent was Han Chinese. See Sobei Mogi and H. Vere Redman, The Problem of the Far East, London: Victor Gollancz, 1935, p. 14.
designed to eliminate the ‘bandit problem’ and make the country safe for Japanese settlement. In 1937, almost six years after the imposition of Japanese rule, the Japanese administration still devoted more than half the Manchukuoan defence budget, or some 175 million yuan (US$52,500,000), to the ‘bandit-suppression’ campaigns. The need to suppress Han Chinese opposition continued as the Japanese military advanced into Northern and Central China after July 1937. The Japanese military’s behaviour in the occupied areas of China was brutal, leaving a legacy that haunts Sino-Japanese relations to this day.

In contrast, Japanese-Mongolian relations do not appear to be burdened with the same level of residual bad memories. The reason is probably that from the beginning of Japanese control of Inner Mongolia, starting in Jehol from the early 1930s, the Japanese authorities were met with a lower level of overt opposition, and consequently adopted a less hostile attitude towards the local population. Among immediate Japanese policies in Manchukuo were the decision to restrict Han Chinese immigration into Mongol lands, and the establishment of a supposedly autonomous Mongol region.

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in Northwest Manchukuo, that is, Hsingan province. Both these actions were presumably popular with the Mongols. In general, the Japanese authorities chose to ‘woo’ the Mongols through policies amounting to ‘cultural diplomacy’ rather than to cower them through brute force, as they had done to the Han Chinese. This was only possible because the Mongols responded relatively well to the Japanese overtures, perhaps seeing the decision to restrict Han Chinese immigration onto their lands, for example, as a step towards Mongol independence.

There were good reasons for the Japanese authorities to adopt a comparatively conciliatory approach in Mongolia after 1937. First, the Mongols occupied a strategically important region that, if brought under Japanese control, could serve as a buffer zone between Soviet Russia and Japanese-occupied Republican China, as indeed it did. A hostile local population would have reduced the significance of this important territorial gain to the Japanese military. Second, given the sheer size of Inner Mongolia, co-option of the Mongols eliminated or lessened the need either to station a large garrison force there, or to raise and equip a compliant puppet force, as was done in Manchukuo. There were also reasons to expect that overtures towards the Mongols might be successful. In particular, the Mongols were a distinct ethnic group who had already shown themselves to be both anti-Han Chinese and anti-Communist, and whose sympathies could be played upon to Japan’s advantage. The major agent of this Japanese cultural diplomacy in Mongolia was the Zenrin kyōkai.

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Agents of Japanese Cultural Diplomacy

The Zenrin kyōkai in Inner Mongolia resembles two Japanese organisations active in Manchukuo: the Kyōwakai (Concordia Association) and the Research Section of the semi-official South Manchurian Railway Company. All three were agents of Japanese cultural diplomacy, and, while established for different purposes, were used in practice to extend Japanese influence into areas not always under direct military control. On the other hand, as this section will illustrate, there are distinct differences in the manner in which the Zenrin kyōkai operated, in comparison to the other two.

The Japanese authorities established the Kyōwakai in July 1932, in order to mobilise the population of Manchukuo in support of Japanese rule through the ideal of the ‘harmony of the five races’ (gozoku kyōwa). To this end, according to Gavan McCormack, the Kyōwakai pursued an ideology that was ‘vague and nebulous, anti-capitalist, and anti-communist’, although, as Louise Young notes, the anti-capitalist stance was soon dropped, as it proved inconsistent with the Kyōwakai’s purpose of supporting Japanese rule. McCormack adds that the Kyōwakai gradually assumed an extra security role as an adjunct to the Kwantung Army, though he does not explain what this involved; at the same time, the association also sought to incorporate the whole population of Manchukuo into one or other Kyōwakai-dominated structure.

While the Zenrin kyōkai similarly sought to mobilise the Mongols and played on the Mongols’ anti-Communist feelings, it does not appear to have had any specific ideology, nor to have been anti-capitalist at any point. In fact, the Zenrin kyōkai played a part in the development of capitalism in Inner Mongolia by promoting various business schemes in the region, both on its own and in co-operation with the Dai-Mô

kōshi (Great Mongolia Trading Company), an Ōkura-affiliated company, the establishment of which was noted in the previous chapter.

The South Manchurian Railway Company Research Department, established in April 1907, underwent considerable restructuring in the years that followed. Its purpose, however, remained unchanged: it was directed towards building a modern nation in Manchuria. It focused on introducing technology that would facilitate urban planning and renewal, and, according to Young, on the eventual construction of a ‘utopia’ in Manchukuo. Numerous young, educated and idealistic Japanese appear to have gravitated to the Research Department. As for the Zenrin kyōkai, while it did try to improve the living conditions of the population of Inner Mongolia, its aims seem to have been more limited than those of the Research Department of the South Manchurian Railway Company. It does not appear to have aimed specifically at building a modern nation in Inner Mongolia, nor to have been guided by the type of ‘utopian’ ideals that Young believes motivated the staff of the Research Department. On the other hand, the Zenrin kyōkai did have its share of romantics. One such individual was Morishima Kadofusa, whose connection with Japan’s activities in Mongolia in the 1920s was discussed in Chapter Three. Morishima, who was clearly idealistic and somewhat romantic, was closely connected with the Zenrin kyōkai’s operations from the 1930s onwards.

Yet the Zenrin kyōkai perhaps attracted a broader cross-section of Japanese society than did the South Manchurian Railway Company. Members included

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14 For a brief history of the Research Department, see Young, Japan’s Total Empire, pp. 270-1, n. 65; for a chart showing the evolution of the Research Department, see Kobayashi Hideo, ‘Mantetsu chōsabu’, in Imawaki Ryōji (ed.) Manshū teikoku (Rekishi gunzō shiriizu, no. 84), Tōkyō: Gakkan, 2006, p. 141.
15 Young, Japan’s Total Empire, pp. 242-4, 246-7.
16 Ibid., p. 302.
individuals with a long association with Mongolia, who had connections either with the Japanese military or with the right wing, and who were subsequently employed by the Zenrin kyōkai or closely associated with its operations. The political activist Maekawa Tsuneyoshi is one case in point. Maekawa was a member of the Zenrin kyōkai from shortly after its establishment until his death in 1946. His connection with Mongolia, however, was much longer: as described in Chapter Two, it dated back to 1916 and his involvement in the Japanese-sponsored second independence movement.

If the South Manchurian Railway Company Research Department was filled with idealistic, educated Japanese dreaming of a ‘utopian future’ in Manchukuo, and the Kyōwakai evolved into a mere extension of the Kwantung Army, the object and activities of the Zenrin kyōkai were different. The overt aim of the association was simply to provide the Mongols of Inner Mongolia with a better standard of medical care and more educational opportunities than had previously been offered to them by the Han Chinese authorities. There was, of course, an ulterior motive to this apparently benevolent objective. Zenrin kyōkai activities were also designed to make the Mongols regard the Japanese more favourably and to encourage them to be more amenable to the imposition of Japanese control. The Zenrin kyōkai, then, in no way worked against the Kwantung Army; yet its activities went beyond a desire to extend military control.

20 Young, Japan’s Total Empire, p. 302.
The Genesis of the Zenrin Kyōkai

Although it was not founded until November 1933, the origins of the Zenrin kyōkai, at least in terms of its main concerns and of the people involved in it, can be traced back to Taiten College (Taiten gijuku), a school established by Sasame Tsuneo in Tokyo in 1928. Sasame’s aim was to provide educational opportunities for young Mongols from the Mongol-inhabited Holunbuir region in Northern Manchuria, the region that was amalgamated in 1933 with Jehol province to form the Manchukuoan province of Hsingan. This concern with providing Japanese-style education for Mongols was more fully exemplified a few years later in the Zenrin kyōkai, with which Sasame was also closely connected. Following the 1931 Manchurian Incident, Sasame closed Taiten College, so some of its pupils could return to Inner Mongolia to work with Prince Teh, presumably to aid the prince in his quest for Inner Mongolian autonomy. Some years later, Sasame also participated in another unofficial program that brought Mongol children to schools in Japan. Sasame, however, was not merely an education-minded idealist. He was also connected to various right-wing groups in Japan. Mori Hisao labels him a ‘Mōko rōnin’ (Mongolian adventurer), presumably meaning that just as the ‘tairiku rōnin’ (continental adventurers) sought the imposition of Japanese control in China, so Sasame sought the same in Mongolia. Sasame was subsequently connected with both the Nichi-Mō kyōkai (Japan-Mongolia Association), discussed below, and the Zenrin kyōkai. Taiten College, meanwhile, was linked not only to the right wing through

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21 Mori, Toku-ō no kenkyū, p. 91, n. 3.
22 Ibid.
23 Narangoa Li, ‘Educating Mongols and Making “Citizens” of Manchukuo’, Inner Asia, issue 3, 2001, p. 120.
24 Mori, Toku-ō no kenkyū, p. 91, n. 3.
Sasame, but also to Ōmotokyō, through Taiten’s principal, Ōshima Yutaka.\(^{26}\) Ōshima, who later served as Zenrin kyōkai chairman, was an acquaintance of Deguchi Onisaburō,\(^{27}\) and thus provided a connection to a religious group that had demonstrated a strong desire to bring part, if not all, of Mongolia under more direct Japanese control.

In March 1933, Sasame and Ōshima, together with a number of other important military and civilian figures, among them Hayashi Senjūrō, briefly to become Prime Minister in 1937, Matsui Iwane, later to become famous as commander of the Japanese force responsible for the Nanking massacre, and Yamamoto Jōtarō, a prominent politician and former president of the South Manchurian Railway Company, established the Nichi-Mō kyōkai,\(^{28}\) an organisation which sought to foster closer ties between Japan and Mongolia. To achieve this goal, the association, almost immediately after its foundation, dispatched an emissary to Inner Mongolia to court Prince Teh. Thus in the summer of 1933, Sasame Tsuneo arrived at the prince’s Sunid Banner disguised as a lama and carrying a letter from two Japanese Army generals, Hayashi and Matsui, offering Japanese aid to Teh.\(^{29}\) Exactly what assistance was offered is unclear, but according to Sechin Jagchid, it was designed to foster Mongol ‘independence’, presumably under Japanese guidance. No doubt Sasame was selected by the Japanese military to act as its intermediary with Prince Teh because of his connection to the Nichi-Mō kyōkai and his earlier involvement with Mongolia through Taiten College.

In November 1933, the Nichi-Mō kyōkai changed its name to the ‘Zenrin kyōkai’. The reason for the change is not explained in the association’s history, but according to Jagchid, the establishment of the Zenrin kyōkai was Sasame’s idea, so it was probably

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\(^{27}\) ‘Zenrin kyōkai no enkaku’, in ZKS, p. ii.

\(^{28}\) Ibid.

\(^{29}\) Jagchid, *Last Mongol Prince*, p. 58.
he who was responsible for the new name. The association’s president was Prince Ichijō Sanetaka, a member of the House of Peers who was related to the imperial family through marriage. The prince’s presidency indicates the standing of the new association. Jagchid claims, however, that the real administrators were Sasame, the political activist Maekawa Tsurumasa, who was later closely connected with the Zenrin kyōkai’s activities in Inner Mongolia itself, and Ōshima, the former principal of Taiten College. While the name changed in November 1933, all those connected with the Nichi-Mō kyōkai apparently became members of the new association. Hayashi Senjūrō, for one, remained associated with the Zenrin kyōkai until his death in 1943.

From its establishment, the Zenrin kyōkai thus had links to a number of groups in Japan, including the military, the organised right wing and Ōmotokyo, which favoured greater Japanese control of Mongolia. The name of the association itself is significant, in that it provides evidence of the link with Ōmotokyo: the word ‘zenrin’, meaning ‘good neighbourly relations’, came directly from the texts of Ōmotokyo. There are also other indications of the connection. For instance, according to Jan van Bremen, Ōmotokyo had sympathizers in the Kwantung Army who encouraged the religious organisation to establish contacts with Mongol leaders. The Japanese government and major Japanese business concerns were also connected with the association’s founding. The Foreign Ministry apparently had a hand in its creation, although the

30 Ibid., p. 127.
32 Jagchid, Last Mongol Prince, p. 127. Jagchid’s translation of Japanese names is often quite idiosyncratic. He refers to Maekawa Tsurumasa as ‘Maikawa Hirokichi’.
33 ‘Zenrin kyōkai no enkaku’, in ZKS, p. ii.
36 Ibid.
exact role it played is unclear. The involvement of such a prestigious ministry suggests that the establishment of the Zenrin kyōkai had official support, and that the government might also have sanctioned the association’s later operations. The Zenrin kyōkai received generous financial support from Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo, amounting to 130,000 yen in total (approximately US$33,400). Exactly why the new association attracted such financial largesse is unclear. Presumably, however, these businesses perceived a potential economic benefit in supporting it.

The Zenrin Kyōkai’s Activities in Inner Mongolia, 1933-7

In December 1933, the Zenrin kyōkai established an office at Hsinking, the capital of Manchukuo. The association’s activities in Inner Mongolia itself began in early 1934, after several months of planning, and were initially restricted to the Mongol population of the northern region of Chahar, the province bordering Manchukuo. The movement of Japanese civilians from the Zenrin kyōkai across the border between Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia, then under Republican Chinese control, for humanitarian purposes was something to which the Han Chinese authorities were presumably unlikely to raise strong objections.

First, the Zenrin kyōkai provided the Mongol population of Chahar with an extensive series of medical examinations, conducted at a number of locations throughout the Silingol League, in Northern Chahar. In a seven-month period,

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37 Ibid.
39 This office was abolished in March 1938, by which time the Zenrin kyōkai was firmly established throughout Mengchiang and presumably no longer had any need of a base in Manchukuo. See ‘Zenrin kyōkai nenpō’, in ZKS, pp. 412, 414.
between August 1934 and March 1935, Japanese doctors from the association examined and treated more than 2,500 patients. The association also built clinics at a number of the places where examinations were conducted, to provide ongoing medical assistance, as well as launching campaigns aimed at eradicating diseases in livestock, such as anthrax. The local population no doubt welcomed the improved health care for humans, but the eradication of anthrax, a disease that affects sheep, was probably even more useful, given that sheep were the primary source of the Mongols’ wealth.

Contemporary observers make it clear that the Mongol population of the region was in dire need of even the most basic medical assistance. A Japanese who observed a Zenrin kyōkai medical team in operation at West Sunid in Northern Chahar in July 1938 noted that the team examined a total of 173 patients on this occasion, of whom sixty-one had venereal disease, twenty-eight had eye disease, twenty had skin diseases, seven had respiratory problems, and five had rheumatism. Two Western observers in Inner Mongolia in late 1935 similarly commented that ‘many of the babies, particularly among the Mongols, are born with severe eye trouble and skin affections [sic] due to the enormous amount of venereal disease prevailing among the parents’.

It must be stressed that Chahar province, which abutted Jehol, the province the Kwantung Army had incorporated into Manchukuo in 1933, was at the time still Han Chinese-controlled territory. There appears, however, to have been no official Han Chinese response to the medical examinations, or to the construction of clinics by the Japanese, raising the question of why the Zenrin kyōkai was allowed to operate as it did. Part of the answer doubtless lies in the fact that the Han Chinese authorities paid little

41 Iiyama Tatsu and Hazama Otōhiko, Mōkyō no tabi: Hokushi hakengun hōdōbu ken’etsusai, Tōkyō: Sanseidō, 1941, p. 49.
attention to the Mongols. Evidently they had little respect for them and treated them as second-class citizens or worse. In his post-war memoirs, Owen Lattimore recounted a meeting with Fu Tso-yi, the Han Chinese governor of Suiyuan from 1931 to 1947, at which Fu flatly stated that the Mongols were ‘sheng-k’uo’ (domestic animals), indicating a considerable disdain for them. As will be discussed later in the chapter, during the especially severe winter storms that swept Inner Mongolia in 1935-6, the Republican government ignored an opportunity to court the Mongols by providing humanitarian aid, despite calls from at least one English-language newspaper in China for it to do so, while the Zenrin kyōkai was actively involved in fund-raising back in Japan to provide relief supplies. The shortsightedness of the Han Chinese authorities probably helps to explain why, following the Japanese victories of late 1937, the Mongols of Chahar and Suiyuan provinces were, at least initially, quite welcoming of the Japanese military. In a region where medical facilities were primitive and disease widespread, the provision of even the most basic medical care must have gone a long way to improving the lives of ordinary people. The fact that this aid was provided by a Japanese organisation no doubt influenced the inhabitants of Inner Mongolia when it came to deciding where their loyalties lay.

In addition to providing medical aid and constructing clinics, the Zenrin kyōkai also established and staffed schools for Inner Mongolian children. In providing such facilities, the association was more or less following the example of Kawahara Misako and others like her. The provision of schools also accorded with Kwantung Army

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43 See, for example, M. Sanjdorj, Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia, translated by Urgunge Onon, with a preface by Owen Lattimore, London: C. Hurst & Company, 1980, for an examination of the discriminatory Han Chinese policies towards the Mongols during the late Ch’ing period, policies that presumably continued into the Republican era.


45 ‘Mongol Distress’, North China Herald, 8 April 1936, p. 45.
priorities, which will be discussed in more detail below. Between November 1935 and September 1936, the Zenrin kyōkai opened schools throughout the Silingol League, although the number of pupils was admittedly small. For example, at the Abaga No. 1 Primary School in Northern Chahar, which opened in November 1935, the initial intake was only thirty-five students.46

The Zenrin kyōkai continued the specific commitment that had been displayed by earlier activists to the provision of education for girls. One photograph from a collection of Japanese reminiscences published in the 1970s captures something of the nature of the association’s educational work among girls in Inner Mongolia (Figure 29). While the photo shows only one classroom, each of the girls present has a desk and a book of her own, and the classroom, while spartan, is clearly fitted out with the necessary teaching-aids. This classroom could easily have been situated in a pre-


Second World War school in Japan itself. It is not known if the photograph was published before the war, but if it was, its purpose was probably twofold. First, it showed the Zenrin kyōkai in action as an agent of Japan’s civilising mission, and how similar the two peoples were in appearance. In this latter respect it was much like the photos that had appeared in Fukushima’s book, discussed in the previous chapter. Second, as the classroom shown was a girls’ classroom, it focused on the supposedly progressive and egalitarian nature of the Zenrin kyōkai, which apparently provided an education to all who warranted it.

A few Mongolian students who excelled in particular fields were given opportunities through Zenrin kyōkai programs to pursue further studies elsewhere. For example, those students deemed to have an aptitude for medicine were sent to the Manchurian Medical University (Manshū i dai) in Mukden. The Zenrin kyōkai probably intended to train future staff in this way for the clinics it had established in Inner Mongolia. The association also contributed to the education of several Mongols who later played a prominent role in the development of Mongolian studies in the West, following the Second World War. Both Onon Urgunge and Hangin Gombojab, for instance, benefited from Japanese-sponsored educational opportunities. Onon, a Mongol Daur from Northern Manchuria, attended a Japanese-controlled school in Tsitsihar, before studying at Tokyo Imperial University. Onon’s Japanese sponsors must surely have seen his admission to the university, the pinnacle of Japan’s highly competitive education system, as a great honour. Hangin, from Chahar province, attended the Zenrin kyōkai’s school at Dolonnor, before going to Hokkaidō Imperial

University. Following their studies in Japan both men returned to Inner Mongolia and worked closely with Prince Teh in the Mengchiang administration.48

The Zenrin Kyōkai’s Activities in Japan, 1933-7

Throughout its existence the Zenrin kyōkai fulfilled two roles. In Inner Mongolia it worked to improve the lot of the Mongol population, while in Japan it sought to publicise the good work it was doing on the continent and to educate the Japanese public about the importance of Mongolia to Japan. To some degree, members of the Zenrin kyōkai could be compared to nineteenth-century Christian missionaries seeking to civilise the ‘natives’, in that many Zenrin kyōkai activities were designed to improve the lot of the Mongols. Moreover, like the missionaries, members of the Zenrin kyōkai took great care to make the association’s activities known back home, presumably in order to attract greater support, both moral and financial, from the Japanese public at large.

Within a matter of months of its establishment, the Zenrin kyōkai began publishing books in Japan about Mongolia. In the eighteen months between January 1934 and June 1935, it published at least eight books on Mongolian society. They included works on the current situation in both Inner and Outer Mongolia, a translation of Owen Lattimore’s Mongols of Manchuria, completed within months of the original English-language publication, and works on Lamaism and Buriat Mongolia,49 a predominantly Mongol region lying east of Lake Baikal, deep in Soviet territory. The

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49 ‘Zenrin kyōkai nenpō’, in ZKS, pp. 412-13. The titles were: Mōko to wa donna tokoro ka, January 1934; Mōko wa naze sukuvanebanaranuka and Shinsei no ayumu Uchimōko, June 1934; Shinpi Ramakyō, August 1934; Manshū ni okeru Mōko minzoku, the translation of Lattimore’s Mongols of Manchuria, December 1934; Gaimōko no
speed with which Lattimore’s book was obtained and translated suggests that the Zenrin Kyōkai either had members or sympathisers living in the United States, or maintained contact with overseas Japanese organisations, either official or private. Although the number of copies of each title sold is unknown, the Zenrin Kyōkai evidently believed there was a market for eight books dealing with Mongolia in the space of a year and a half.

While some of the books published by the Zenrin Kyōkai were general introductions to the region, others had a more direct agenda. The provocatively titled 1934 publication Mōko wa naze sukuwanabanaranuka (Why Must Mongolia Be Saved?), for example, was most likely intended to strengthen the impression that ‘saving’ the Mongols was Japan’s responsibility. In addition to the book titles, from March 1935, the association also published the Zenrin Kyōkai chōsa geppō (Zenrin Kyōkai Monthly Research Report). Originally monthly, from issue thirty-four it appeared every ten days, that is, three times a month, or thirty-six times a year. Among the articles in this periodical were translations of works on Mongolia published overseas, further evidence that the association had members, sympathisers or contacts abroad. Publication of the ‘Zenrin Kyōkai Monthly Research Report’ ceased in April 1939 when the association began publishing the journal Mōko (Mongolia), which was produced until August 1944.

One example of the more general type of book the association published was Yoshimura Chūzō’s 1935 Gaimōko no gensei (The Current Situation in Outer

gensei and Buriyāto Mōko no zenbō, January 1935; and Uchimōko – chiri, sangyō, bunka, June 1935.
51 For example, in March 1936 a translation appeared of Edward Dunn’s pamphlet, The Truth About Outer Mongolia, originally published in Shanghai, while in September 1937 selections were translated from J. Lévine’s La Mongolie, Historique, géographique, politique, originally published in Paris. See Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, pp. 29, 65 of bibliography.
Little is known about Yoshimura’s background, except that he was head of the Zenrin kyōkai’s research section from its inception. In the course of eleven chapters, his book covered Outer Mongolia’s diplomatic relations, education system, religious beliefs, trade and economy, agriculture, industry, communications and major cities. It also described in detail the various peoples termed as ‘Mongol’, probably to convey the impression that Japan could claim ties with a large range of people under the banner of Japanese-Mongolian relations, even if some of those people lived in territory controlled by the Soviet Union.

The book constituted both a primer to Outer Mongolia, and a call for greater vigilance on the part of Japan to the danger apparently arising from Soviet domination of that region. Chapter Three, for example, examined Outer Mongolia’s relationships with the Soviet Union, China, Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia in some detail. The focus here was on the threat posed by Soviet control of Outer Mongolia to the other regions that could be designated ‘Mongol’, such as parts of Manchukuo, as well as Inner Mongolia. Indeed, Yoshimura’s objective seems to have been to stress the separate Japanese and Soviet ‘spheres of interest’ in the northern parts of the Chinese continent, and the need to defend Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, that is, the territory that he believed fell under Japan’s purview, from the Soviets.

The potential threat posed by the Soviet Union to an area perceived to fall within Japan’s specific ‘sphere of interest’ was even more closely examined in Chapter Four of the book. Yoshimura claimed that, as a part of its military preparedness in the Russian Far East, the Soviet Union was bolstering its military forces in Outer Mongolia.

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54 ‘Zenrin kyōkai no enkaku’, in ZKS, p. ii.
56 Ibid., pp. 53-76.
57 Ibid., pp. 61-3.
Moreover, Yoshimura also declared that the Soviet Union was pursuing an ‘anti-Japanese-Manchukuoan policy’ (tai-Nichi-Man seisaku). While relations between the Soviet Union and Japan were strained during the early 1930s, with ongoing negotiations over the sale of the Soviet-controlled Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria and skirmishes along the Manchukuo border, Yoshimura’s assertion that the Soviet Union was pursuing an ‘anti-Japanese-Manchukuoan policy’ is baseless. Indeed, for much of the 1930s, as several studies have noted, Soviet Russia was on the defensive in the region. The perception of the Soviet threat, however, was almost an obsession for the Japanese Army throughout this period, and it was evidently an obsession shared by Yoshimura. Yoshimura went on to give details of the various Red Army units stationed in Outer Mongolia, and of the composition of the smaller Outer Mongolian Army.

In 1936, the Zenrin kyōkai also published Mōko nenkan, its Mongolian yearbook, for the first time. While Yoshimura’s book was a fairly slim volume of around two hundred pages, Mōko nenkan was a substantially larger work of more than seven hundred pages, although it covered much the same topics as the other work, including the threat posed by a Soviet-dominated Outer Mongolia. More important was the manner in which the yearbook and its topic, Mongolia, were publicised: one advertisement proudly proclaimed that ‘tomorrow’s Asia comes from Mongolia’ (ashita

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58 Ibid., p. 77.
61 For example, see H. Hessell Tiltman, The Far East Comes Nearer, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1937, p. 135.
62 Yoshimura, Gaimōko, pp. 77-82.
63 ‘Zenrin kyōkai nenpō’, in ZKS, p. 413.
64 1936 Mōko nenkan, pp. 202, 206-23.
The suggestion that Mongolia would in some way produce the future of Asia seems surprising, given the conditions in Mongolia at the time. Most likely, the book’s authors intended to suggest that it was through the civilising agency of Japan and the Zenrin kyōkai that the lot of the Mongols would improve, and that Mongolia would go on to serve as a template for the rest of Asia.

Alongside its publishing activities, the Zenrin kyōkai was also active in educating people in Japan about Mongolia in other ways. In February 1935, for example, the association established its own school in Tokyo, the Zenrin Kyōkai Technical College (Zenrin kyōkai senmon gakkō). The avowed purpose of this new institution was to provide a cadre of young Japanese who would graduate into the ranks of the Zenrin kyōkai. The college had places for fifty students, although the initial intake was only thirty. The association also established a facility in Inner Mongolia for young Japanese who wished to study the Mongolian language. One person who attended the facility, Kimura Hisao, later wrote about his subsequent experiences in Mongolia. Only eighteen when he joined the Zenrin kyōkai, Kimura noted that he, like many of the other students, had been ‘young, a bit romantic, and — at least in [sic] the outset — incredibly innocent and brimming with idealistic fervour’.

In addition to the chance that the Zenrin kyōkai provided for young Japanese to travel to and experience life in Inner Mongolia, the association also made opportunities available for young Mongols to travel to and experience life in Japan, in accordance with its objective of promoting bilateral exchange. Part of the reason for sponsoring such exchanges was undoubtedly that they were conspicuous, providing obvious

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65 See advertisement for Mōko nenkan in Yomiuri shinbun (hereafter YS), 27 May 1936, p. 5.
67 Ibid.
examples to the association’s Japanese supporters of the ‘good work’ that the organisation was doing in Inner Mongolia. The Zenrin kyōkai’s annual summer exchange, for example, a program that allowed young Mongols to travel to Japan, began in 1934 and continued until at least 1943.69 Those chosen to participate in the program spent around one month visiting a variety of places in Japan.70 The visitors were encouraged to record their impressions, which were then published in the Zenrin kyōkai’s research report.71 The ‘most trusted intellectual followers’ of Prince Teh who, with the help of the Zenrin kyōkai, were sent to Japan in the summer of 1934,72 probably represent the first group to take advantage of this program.

Other educational activities in Japan were facilitated by the Zenrin kyōkai’s links with the Japanese Army General Staff. In May 1934, for example, the association was entrusted with the care of ten Mongol students, brought to Japan by the General Staff.73 How long the students were in Japan and the precise purpose of their visit are not known, but it seems likely that they went on to form the cadre of Japanese-trained Mongol personnel who led the Japanese-backed Inner Mongolian army that was established in early 1936.74

Lastly, the Zenrin kyōkai was involved in charitable work in Japan, raising funds to aid Inner Mongolia in times of natural disaster. As mentioned earlier, in 1935-6, there was a particularly severe winter in Inner Mongolia. Though the scale of the humanitarian crisis facing the Mongols was immense, with the loss of approximately

72 Jagchid, Last Mongol Prince, p. 127.
ninety percent of all livestock in addition to human casualties, the Han Chinese Republican government apparently provided very little in the way of relief.\textsuperscript{75} In Japan, the Zenrin kyōkai coordinated a fundraising drive in co-operation with two major Tokyo newspapers, the \textit{Asahi} (Rising Sun) and \textit{Tōkyō nichinichi} (Tokyo Daily). Those in Japan who wished to strengthen ties with Inner Mongolia must have seen the terrible natural disaster and the subsequent fundraising drive as a golden opportunity. The substantial sum of 40,000 yen (US\$12,000) was raised for the Inner Mongolian Snow Damage Relief Fund (\textit{Uchimōko setsugai gienkin boshū}).\textsuperscript{76} The press in Japan noted that following an urgent appeal from Prince Teh, the Manchukuo government, ‘in co-operation with the Japanese authorities’, had also agreed to provide daily necessities and foodstuffs worth a further 14,000 yuan (US\$4,200) to the inhabitants of the afflicted region.\textsuperscript{77}

Having appealed to the sympathy of the Japanese public as to the plight of the Inner Mongolians, the Zenrin kyōkai staged another event a few months later, presumably designed to keep Mongolia in the Japanese public eye. In September 1936, in conjunction with Mitsukoshi Department Store in Tokyo, one of the most prestigious stores in the Japanese capital, the Zenrin kyōkai sponsored an exhibition to promote


\textsuperscript{77} ‘Hsinking to Aid Famine Victims in Inner Mongolia – Majority of People in Country Near Starvation; Prince Teh Makes Appeal’, \textit{Japan Times}, 3 April 1936, p. 2;
Mongolia,\textsuperscript{78} probably in part to show how Japan’s humanitarian assistance was being used. Another similar event was held in Tokyo in early 1938, again with Zenrin kyōkai involvement.\textsuperscript{79}

**The Kwantung Army and the Zenrin Kyōkai**

In early 1934, when the Zenrin kyōkai started operations in Northern Chahar, the Kwantung Army had control of the three northeastern provinces that comprised Manchuria, and of Jehol, one of the four Inner Mongolian provinces, and had begun to mould them into the ‘independent’ nation of Manchukuo. Nevertheless, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the Kwantung Army sought control of still more Chinese territory. To this end, it brokered a number of agreements, both before and after the Zenrin kyōkai commenced operations — the 1933 Tangku Truce and the 1935 Ho-Umezu and Chin-Doihara Agreements — that removed the majority of Han Chinese Republican military forces from a vast swathe of the region north of the Great Wall and adjoining Manchukuo. It was into this region that the Zenrin kyōkai moved, together with the Kwantung Army’s SIA, with which it worked closely. A variety of evidence suggests that the Kwantung Army and the Zenrin kyōkai shared broadly similar aims in Inner Mongolia, and supported each other’s activities in the region.

Kwantung Army reports filed from 1933 onwards, as Japanese control of Manchukuo solidified, make it clear that cultural diplomacy was considered an important accompaniment to the projected military penetration of Inner Mongolia as well. In October 1933, for example, shortly before the establishment of the Zenrin kyōkai, the Kwantung Army General Staff produced a report entitled ‘Nekkashō yori ‘Manchukuo to Send Food to Stricken in Inner Mongolia’, *Japan Times*, 9 April 1936, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{78} ‘Zenrin kyōkai nenpō’, in ZKS, p. 413.
mitaru Mōko minzoku ni tsuite’ (The Mongol Race as Seen from Jehol Province). After noting the low level of education among the Mongols and the small number of schools in the province, the writer or writers advocated Japanese efforts to improve the standard of education in Jehol as one way of raising general prosperity. Presumably, this would facilitate Japanese economic penetration of the region, which would no doubt be accompanied by an increase in Japanese military personnel there. It seems likely, given the links between the military and the Zenrin kyōkai, that Kwantung Army leaders were aware of the forthcoming establishment of the association, and were making plans to use it as one means of strengthening Japanese control of Jehol.

While the author of the October 1933 report is unknown, a second Kwantung Army report on Mongolia, dated January 1934, was clearly attributed to Colonel Matsumuro Takayoshi. It seems probable that Matsumuro’s reports on Inner Mongolia received close attention within the Kwantung Army. From his service record Matsumuro was closely connected with Inner Mongolia, where he had held a number of important posts. It was he who had brokered the June 1925 meeting between Japanese business magnate Ōkura Kihachirō and the Han Chinese warlord Feng Yü-hsiang, discussed in Chapter Three. Matsumuro’s assignment to this task indicates that he was seen as a capable officer who could be entrusted with politically and diplomatically sensitive projects. Matsumuro remained on the continent until his return to Japan in 1927 and then served in a number of positions, including a one-year

81 Bōeichō shiryōkan, Tokyo, Matsumuro Takayoshi to Koiso Kuniaki, report, 24 January 1934, contained in ‘Mōko ni kansuru shorui te moto rikugenshō shōshō Matsumuro Takayoshi’, card no. 568, in Rikugun file box no. 56: ‘Sensō shidō’.
attachment to the Army General Staff. From January 1933, he was the chief of two
Kwantung Army SIA offices in succession: first at Tsitsihar, in Northern Manchuria,
and later at Jehol city, in Jehol province.83

Matsumuro’s January 1934 report, which was addressed to Koiso Kuniaki,
Kwantung Army Chief of Staff, dealt, in part, with the potential benefit to Japanese
military ambitions in Inner Mongolia if the infrastructure of the region were improved.
In addition to the establishment of such basic facilities as roads, Matsumuro noted a
particular need for schools and hospitals throughout the region.84 That both
Matsumuro’s report and the earlier report of October 1933 called for the establishment
of schools and the promotion of education suggests that the Kwantung Army perceived
in cultural diplomacy certain long-term benefits to its ambitions in Inner Mongolia.
Presumably, Matsumuro also urged the Kwantung Army to fund the building of schools
and hospitals because it was a way in which individual Japanese people, as well as
organisations, could be infiltrated into the region. In many respects, Matsumuro’s
report foreshadowed what the Zenrin kyōkai sought to accomplish in Inner Mongolia in
later years.

Some eighteen months later, in late July 1935, the provision of education was
again recommended by Major Katakura Tadashi and other officers of the Kwantung
Army’s General Staff, in ‘Tai-Naimō shisaku yōryō’ (Essentials of Policy on Inner
Mongolia).85 The potential role of the Zenrin kyōkai in connection with education,
health care and the economic development of Inner Mongolia was specifically outlined
here, as part of a recommendation that the army facilitate co-operation between Japan

83 Hata Ikuhiko (ed.), Nihon riku-kaigun sōgō jiten, Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku
shuppansha, 1991, p. 137. According to Uchida Yūjirō, Matsumuro had first been
stationed at Kalgan in 1923 as a member of an Imperial Japanese Army research team
in Mongolia. See Uchida, Uchimōko, p. 21.
84 Matsumuro Takayoshi to Koiso Kuniaki, report, 24 January 1934.
and Prince Teh. The long-term objective of this proposed co-operation was, presumably, greater Japanese control of the region adjoining Manchukuo, and it appears from the prominence given to the Zenrin kyōkai in this plan that the Kwantung Army regarded that organisation as one means to achieve such control.

This inference is borne out by the January 1936 Kwantung Army plan, ‘Tai-Mō (seihoku) shisaku yōryō’ (Essentials of Policy on (Northwest) Mongolia),\textsuperscript{86} which was written by officers of the Kwantung Army General Staff, and has been examined at length in the previous chapter. The Zenrin kyōkai was mentioned three times in this document. The first time was in a list of the non-military organisations\textsuperscript{87} that could be expected to contribute to what Mori terms the ‘cultural and economic aspects of the Kwantung Army’s Inner Mongolian plan’\textsuperscript{88}. Next the Zenrin kyōkai was specifically linked to the promotion of an independent Mongolia with the five ‘races’ (Japanese, Mongol, Han Chinese, Muslim and Tibetan) living in harmony,\textsuperscript{89} an ideal similar to the ‘racial harmony’ (minzoku kyōwa) earlier proclaimed in Manchukuo.\textsuperscript{90} Incidentally, it is noteworthy that the authors of this document, as well as other pronouncements, treated the Muslim population as members of a ‘race’ rather than as adherents of a religion. Finally, the Zenrin kyōkai was mentioned in connection with the actual educational and medical assistance that it was providing by this stage.\textsuperscript{91} Evidently, the

\textsuperscript{87} ‘Tai-Mō (seihoku) shisaku yōryō’, p. 1b. ‘a’ refers to the obverse and ‘b’ to the reverse of the page.
\textsuperscript{88} Mori, Toku-ō no kenkyū, p. 136.
\textsuperscript{89} ‘Tai-Mō (seihoku) shisaku yōryō’, p. 1b.
\textsuperscript{91} ‘Tai-Mō (seihoku) shisaku yōryō’, pp. 4a-4b, 9a.
Kwantung Army regarded the Zenrin kyōkai as an important component of its plans to gain control of Inner Mongolia.

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the view that the Zenrin kyōkai was merely a front for Kwantung Army intelligence-gathering has been favoured by a number of writers, and there is evidence to demonstrate that the association did perform this function. In June 1934, for example, when the Zenrin kyōkai established its first offices in Inner Mongolia to support humanitarian work in Northern Chahar at the West Sunid and West Uchumuchin banner administrations, the Kwantung Army seconded two members of its Mongolian Research Team to assist the Zenrin kyōkai.92 The Mongolian Research Team was a Kwantung Army think-tank, established in September 1932, and was evidently a component of the army’s SIA. It comprised five Mongolian- and two Russian-language specialists, who gathered intelligence and carried out strategic surveys of that part of the Russian Far East that bordered Manchukuo.93 The two Kwantung Army personnel remained attached to the Zenrin kyōkai until June 1935, when both were re-assigned to the SIA.

For the officer already stationed at West Sunid this simply meant that his job designation changed, as re-assignment came when an SIA office was established at that banner administration. For the other officer it involved a transfer and a new assignment, again to West Sunid: he was appointed to liaise with the religious leader known as the Outer Mongolian Living Buddha, Dilowa Khutughtu, who had fled to West Sunid. The emphasis on West Sunid on the part of both the Zenrin kyōkai and the Kwantung Army is probably attributable to the fact that it was the seat of Prince Teh’s administration. Opening an office there would thus place a number of Japanese

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92 Nakajima, *Toku-ō*, pp. 151-2; Jagchid, *Last Mongol Prince*, pp. 125, 127. One of the officers dispatched, Nakajima Manzō, was also a member of the Zenrin kyōkai, having joined in 1934. See ‘Zenrin kyōkai kankeisha meibo’, in ZKS, p. 11.
93 Nakajima, *Toku-ō*, p. 149.
personnel in close proximity to the prince. In addition to liaising with the Living Buddha, the second Kwantung Army officer was also given the task of gathering intelligence on Outer Mongolia from the large number of refugees who had settled at that banner after the purges carried out by the Moscow-backed Outer Mongolian government in the early 1930s, in which monasteries were disbanded and numerous monks executed or imprisoned.94

From the manner in which personnel moved between the Kwantung Army SIA and the Zenrin kyōkai, as illustrated in this case, it is evident that the relationship between the two was close. In general, where there was an SIA office there was also some kind of Zenrin kyōkai facility; on the other hand, where there was only an office of the Zenrin kyōkai, one of its staff was probably an army officer serving with the SIA.95 The manner in which the groundwork was laid for the new SIA office in West Sunid further illustrates the close links between the two. According to Mori, when the Kwantung Army dispatched an officer in early 1935 to seek permission from Prince Teh to establish the new office, that officer travelled under an assumed name and in the capacity of a director of the Zenrin kyōkai.96 Mori does not explain why it was necessary for the officer to travel incognito, and it seems odd, given that there were already a number of Japanese personnel stationed at West Sunid. Here, however, we have a clear example of the Kwantung Army using the Zenrin kyōkai as a cover for its operations, in much the same manner as Japanese military officers had used the guise of Buddhist monk in the late nineteenth century.

In addition to obtaining permission to set up an SIA office at West Sunid, the officer who had travelled incognito also sought permission to establish a radio station at

95 Nakajima, Toku-ō, p. 151.
the prince’s banner. Even allowing for Japanese personnel being assigned more than one duty, the establishment of an SIA office, plus a radio station, which usually required a crew of eight (Figure 30), and a Zenrin kyōkai facility at an Inner Mongolian league or banner meant that upwards of a dozen Japanese military and civilian personnel might have been stationed in the one place. With the rotation of personnel and the need to replenish supplies, this implies a steady stream of Japanese crossing back and forward across what was ostensibly Han Chinese territory. Through the establishment of such facilities, the Kwantung Army was thus able to insinuate a steadily increasing number of personnel deeper and deeper into Inner Mongolia.


The evident movement of personnel between the Zenrin kyōkai and the SIA raises a number of questions. It is unclear, firstly, what the chain of command for the SIA offices in Inner Mongolia was, and, secondly, how this command hierarchy operated in

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96 Mori, *Toku-ō no kenkyū*, p. 84.
relation to the Zenrin kyōkai. For example, when Kwantung Army personnel were seconded to the Zenrin kyōkai, to whom were they answerable for their actions? Despite such ambiguities, it is too limiting to see the Zenrin kyōkai as merely a ‘front’ for the Kwantung Army. While the association was undoubtedly used as a cover for intelligence-gathering, this was not the fundamental reason for its establishment. Nor was the Kwantung Army short of other means by which to gather intelligence. As mentioned above, for example, the army had formed the Mongolian Research Team in September 1932, more than a year prior to the establishment of the Zenrin kyōkai, apparently for just such a purpose. There were also a number of SIA offices dotted throughout Manchukuo, some of which were situated close to the Manchukuo-Soviet or Manchukuo-Outer Mongolian borders. The Zenrin kyōkai, then, was a convenient means by which the Kwantung Army could gather intelligence, given that it was often on the spot, but it was not the only means. Moreover, the Zenrin kyōkai’s humanitarian work was also important in its own right. Following the failure of the 1936 Suiyuan Incident, in fact, the links between the Kwantung Army and the Zenrin kyōkai appear to have weakened. Even as late as 1943, however, Zenrin kyōkai personnel were still being used for intelligence-gathering.

The Zenrin Kyōkai’s Activities after 1937

The Zenrin kyōkai followed in the wake of the Kwantung Army’s North China blitzkrieg from July 1937 onwards, remaining active in the Japanese-sponsored regime.

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100 For a partial list of the SIA offices located throughout Manchukuo and Mengchiang, see Hata, *Nihon riku-kaigun sōgō jiten*, pp. 377-80.
of Mengchiang until Japan’s defeat in August 1945. The association also continued to
play an active part in the promotion of Japanese-Mongolian ties in Japan. The range
of activities the Zenrin kyōkai was involved in after 1937 was essentially the same as in
the earlier period: the provision of health and education services throughout
Mengchiang and the promotion of Mongolia and the Mongolian language in Japan.
The earlier Japanese romanticism about Mongolia also continued to live on in the
Zenrin kyōkai in this period. At least some of the young Japanese, both men and
women, who went off to the newly-created Mengchiang to teach or heal were inspired
by high ideals: to work alongside their Mongolian brothers and sisters to build a better
Asia.\textsuperscript{102}

In Japan, the association continued to publish books about Mongolia, although not
as prolifically as it had during the earlier period. In 1937 and 1938, for example, the
Zenrin kyōkai produced \textit{Mōko kokushi} (A History of Mongolia); a three-part work,
\textit{Mōko gaku} (Mongolian Studies); and an edition of \textit{Mōko taikan} (A General Survey of
Mongolia).\textsuperscript{103} The last ran to around six hundred pages and covered all parts of
Mongolia, including those regions controlled by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{104} It was extremely
detailed. The section discussing Mongolia’s international position over the previous
two decades, for example, amounted to more than forty pages,\textsuperscript{105} while the section on
Mengchiang alone filled almost sixty pages, covering the political structure, industry
and agriculture of the region, together with its military.\textsuperscript{106} The \textit{Mōko taikan} was not a

\textsuperscript{102} For examples of romantic attitudes to the region among Japanese residents of
Mengchiang see the two volumes of recollections published by the Rakudakai:
Rakudakai honbu (ed.), \textit{Kōgen senri (Mōko kaikoroku)}, Tōkyō: Rakudakai honbu,
1973; Rakudakai honbu (ed.), \textit{Omoide no Uchimōko: Uchimōko kaikoroku}, Tōkyō:
Kōdansha sābisu sentā, 1975.
\textsuperscript{103} See ‘Zenrin kyōkai nenpō’, in ZKS, pp. 413-14.
\textsuperscript{104} Zenrin kyōkai chōsabu (ed.), \textit{Mōko taikan: Shōwa jūsannen han}, Tōkyō:
Kaizōsha, 1938.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., pp. 199-240.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., pp. 293-349.
one-off publication, but appears to have been an ongoing work that was revised every few years. Production continued until late into the war, with the 1945 edition being cancelled only in late 1944.\textsuperscript{107} At seven yen, the 1938 \textit{Mōko taikan} was more than three times as expensive as the 1936 \textit{Mōko nenkan}. Nevertheless, the revision of \textit{Mōko taikan} every few years suggests that the Zenrin kyōkai considered it an important piece of work for which there was a market.

The association’s commitment to educational opportunities for young Mongols remained consistent. The summer exchange program to Japan, for example, continued until at least 1943, with around 130 Mongol students participating in the program between 1937 and 1940.\textsuperscript{108} The Zenrin kyōkai’s schools in Inner Mongolia also continued to operate. One contemporary observer noted that by 1940 there were more than 1,000 Japanese-sponsored elementary schools and sixteen high schools in the eastern area of Hsingan province alone, where more than 50,000 boys and girls were taught by both Japanese and Mongol teachers. Mongolian nationalists, however, became disillusioned with the educational opportunities offered by the Japanese authorities,\textsuperscript{109} presumably because the goal of Japanese education was to make the Mongols feel they were part of the larger Japanese empire, something the vast majority of Mongols undoubtedly did not desire to be. In this sense, this particular form of cultural diplomacy was probably less successful than those implementing it might have hoped.

The Zenrin kyōkai continued to provide medical care for the civilian population at clinics throughout Mengchiang, along with facilities to train a local cadre of medical personnel.\textsuperscript{110} In September 1938, the association also established a large-scale

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{107} ‘Zenrin kyōkai nenpō’, in ZKS, p. 418.
\item \textsuperscript{108} Ibid., pp. 413-17.
\item \textsuperscript{109} Heissig, \textit{Lost Civilization}, pp. 190-1.
\item \textsuperscript{110} ‘Zenrin kyōkai nenpō’, in ZKS, pp. 413-14.
\end{itemize}
Mongolian Army medical facility at Paotou Hospital, in Western Suiyuan, a move that promoted closer links between the association and the Japanese-sponsored Inner Mongolian Army. A year and a half later, in March 1940, the Japanese military established an additional Mongolian Army medical facility, probably at Kalgan, where the headquarters of the Japanese Army in Mongolia (chū-Mōgun) was located. One of its tasks was to dispatch three Mongol and two Japanese youths each year to study at the Manchukuo Army Medical School (Manshūkoku rikugun guni-i gakkō) in Harbin. While it is not known if the Zenrin kyōkai was connected with this second medical facility, it seems probable that it was.

Clearly, the Zenrin kyōkai was still willing to invest in long-term projects designed to improve the overall quality of Inner Mongolian society. While there was obviously an ulterior motive for doing so, the humanitarian aspect of such work should not be overlooked, especially when one considers, as discussed earlier, the generally poor treatment of the Mongols by the Han Chinese authorities.

The Zenrin Kyōkai and the Muslims of Mengchiang

The most significant change in the Zenrin kyōkai’s activities from 1937 onwards was that it began directing attention to the Muslim population of Mengchiang, who in ethnic terms comprised Uighurs and Hui (Han-Chinese Muslims). This change in the Zenrin kyōkai’s scope is hardly surprising, given the eagerness of the Japanese authorities, both military and civilian, to co-opt local sub-populations within their colonies and spheres of influence wherever possible, and given that politically, the Muslim population shared similar characteristics with the Mongols of Mengchiang. Like the Mongols, the Muslim population represented a distinct group, exhibiting anti-Han and anti-

111 Ibid., pp. 413-15.
112 Nakajima, Toku-ō, p. 163.
Communist sentiments that made them attractive to Japanese policy-makers. The Japanese military could once again present itself as a ‘liberator’ rather than as an ‘invader’, potentially reducing resistance among the local population. Moreover, with the implementation of various forms of cultural diplomacy aimed at the local Muslim population, Japanese rule could subsequently be presented in a positive light to other Muslims, especially those living in the regions abutting Mengchiang.

The Muslim population of Mengchiang was not large, perhaps no more than a few hundred thousand. The efforts of the Zenrin kyōkai to court it, therefore, indicate that the Japanese authorities were prepared to go to considerable lengths to co-opt the local population. Such efforts also suggest that the Japanese authorities were actively looking for distinct groups to separate from the rest.

In late 1937, the Japanese military was still considering further expansion, either westward into Han Chinese-controlled Sinkiang or northwards into the Soviet Union. Both regions had significant Muslim populations, and efforts to co-opt them could be expected to bring advantages to the Japanese military. American military intelligence took note of Japanese overtures to the Muslim population in areas under Japanese control during the 1940s; and these activities have also received some attention in recent scholarship. In both wartime intelligence reports and postwar scholarship, 113 Office of Strategic Services, ‘Japanese Infiltration Among the Muslims Throughout the World’, May 1943, quoted in ‘Japan Courted Muslims: ‘43 OSS Paper’, Japan Times, 20 August 2004, http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20040820a8.htm, accessed 20 August 2004.  

however, the humanitarian activities of the Zenrin kyōkai among the Muslim population of Mengchiang and the association’s promotion within Japan of better ties between Japan and the Muslim world have been overlooked.

Exchange between Japan and the Muslim world in the modern period dates back to the late nineteenth century. Contact went both ways. Beginning in the late 1890s, Japanese individuals, often connected with one or more of the Pan-Asianist groups that flourished in Japan, or with the right-wing Kokuryūkai, travelled to the Middle East seeking to foster closer ties between that region and Japan. On the other hand, a number of important Pan-Islamic figures in the Muslim world saw in Japan a source of inspiration and assistance in throwing off Western colonialism, and were prepared to travel to Japan to seek support to achieve this aim. Ofﬁcial overtures were also made: in addition to the efforts of individuals and particular interest groups, the Japanese authorities sought to learn more about the Middle East from the late nineteenth century onwards. In the 1890s, for example, the Japanese Army General Staff dispatched Colonel Fukushima Yasumasa to Northern Persia and Turkish-controlled Arabia, as well as India and Burma, to gather information on these countries. Intelligence-gathering by the Japanese military as well as other links between Japan and the Muslim world continued into the twentieth century.


117 See, for example, Michael Penn, ‘East meets East: An Ottoman Mission in Meiji Japan’, in Worringer (ed.), Islamic Middle East and Japan, pp. 33-62.
By September 1931, the Japanese military had already taken steps not only to woo important Muslim leaders in North China, but also to provide them with concrete aid. For example, around the time of the Manchurian Incident, the military dispatched a number of ‘advisors’ to serve with Ma Chung-yi, the leader of a group of Muslim separatists in Sinkiang, the Chinese province to the west of Inner Mongolia.  

Exactly what the ‘advisors’ were to do is not recorded, but in late 1937, during Ma’s subsequent rebellion against Sheng Shih-t’ai, the Han Chinese governor of Sinkiang, some among the rebels apparently believed that ‘Japan would support Tungan [Han Chinese Muslim converts] and Turkish Moslems by sending Inner Mongolian troops’ to the region.  

While direct Japanese military involvement in the rebellion in Sinkiang actually appears to have been minimal, the fact that the Muslim rebels reportedly expected material support from Japan suggests that the Japanese authorities’ intention to better their ties with the Muslim world had been moderately successful.

Friedrich Otte, a German academic and longtime foreign resident of Peking, suggested in an article published in 1936 in the prestigious journal *Die Welt des Islams* (The World of Islam) that the Japanese military’s ultimate objective in cultivating the Muslims of Mongolia was to separate the majority of Western and Central Asia from the control of both the Han Chinese Republic and the Soviet Union. This was apparently to be achieved through the creation of a huge ‘Central Asian Muslim Empire’, a nominally independent state under Japanese control, which was to include Russian Central Asia up to the Urals, the Chinese provinces of Kansu and Sinkiang, and

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119 Whiting and Sheng, *Sinkiang*, p. 52.

120 Ibid., p. 23.
Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{121} The benefit to the Japanese military of such an ‘empire’, especially one established under Japanese sponsorship, would be twofold. First, the new ‘empire’ could act as a buffer zone against Soviet Communist infiltration of China and Korea. Second, a buffer zone in the region could also serve as a jumping-off point for a Japanese military assault on the Soviet Union, something that remained a serious possibility until at least July 1941.\textsuperscript{122}

Whether or not the Japanese military really did expect to be able to create a ‘Central Asian Muslim Empire’, there was a definite preoccupation with the apparent threat from the Soviet Union, as discussed earlier. A number of contemporary Western observers during the 1930s noted that the Japanese military perceived Soviet infiltration into China and Korea as a distinct danger. H. Hessell Tiltman claimed that to Japanese leaders, the threat had ‘assumed the dimensions of [a] phobia’ and that Japan sought to create a ‘cordon sanitaire of Japanese-controlled territories … to checkmate Soviet Russia in Asia’.\textsuperscript{123} Harry Wildes accepted that the threat was real, declaring that to ‘guarantee the safety of Korea’ from Communism, ‘Japan must push back the Chinese and the Soviet menaces to the far interior of Asia’.\textsuperscript{124}

As part of their attempt to counter the apparent Soviet threat, the Japanese authorities sponsored conferences in the early 1930s at which representatives from Western and Central Asia pledged joint opposition to the Soviet Union. An initial conference was held in Kobe in May 1934, and was attended by a small number of

\textsuperscript{121} Friedrich Otte, ‘Die Mohammedanerbewegung in China’, \textit{Die Welt des Islams}, February 1936, pp. 94-5.
\textsuperscript{123} Tiltman, \textit{Far East Comes Nearer}, p. 135.
delegates from China proper, Korea, Manchuria and Japan. A far larger conference was then held in February 1935 at Mukden, in Manchuria, with forty delegates, representing some 15,000-20,000 Turkis nationals, the blanket term applied to the various peoples of Western and Central Asia. Among the delegates were followers of Ma Chung-yin, the Muslim separatist leader supported by the Japanese military at the time of the Manchurian Incident. Ma’s followers are reported to have played a prominent role at this conference.

With the apparent success of the military offensive against China in late 1937 and the imposition of Japanese military control throughout much of North China, the Japanese authorities began to take concrete steps, by using organisations such as the Zenrin kyōkai, to co-opt the Muslim population there. Presumably, the intent was to divide the local population, thereby limiting the size of any organised anti-Japanese opposition, and, with luck, generating some positive support for the Japanese as well. In addition to the Zenrin kyōkai, the Japanese authorities established other organisations, such as the Chinese National Muslim League in Peking. The purpose of this league, according to Peter de Mendelssohn, a German-born British national working as a British civil servant and writing in 1944, was to foster closer co-operation among China, Japan and Manchukuo, as well as to combat Communism and ‘promote faith in Islam’. Presumably, ‘faith in Islam’ would encourage opposition to the Han Chinese and the Soviets. No doubt, the Japanese authorities saw the league as a way to bring a significant proportion of the population under indirect Japanese control and to use its

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anti-Communist sentiment to Japan’s advantage. The league was generously funded by the Japanese authorities in Peking, apparently with an annual budget of half a million Chinese dollars (approximately US$148,000).\textsuperscript{129} There were reported to be almost 400 branches of the league throughout China by 1940.\textsuperscript{130} It had a comparatively complex organisational structure, under which China was divided into six distinct administrative areas, including Outer Mongolia and the southwestern region of China, both of which were outside of Japanese control at the time. While on paper the Chinese National Muslim League appears to have been a sizable organisation, the fact that it thus included areas that lay outside of Japanese control suggests that its ambitions may have been more fanciful than de Mendelssohn implied. Moreover, the inclusion of Outer Mongolia, a region that could in no way be classed as ‘Muslim’ — only around five percent of the population were Muslim\textsuperscript{131} — suggests that the purpose for which the Japanese authorities established the league may have been hazy.

Japanese military agents were reportedly active in providing funds to separatists in some of the outlying areas for which the Chinese National Muslim League was supposedly responsible, including the Muslim strongholds of Ninghsia, Tsinghai and Sinkiang, the Chinese provinces adjoining Inner Mongolia and Tibet. For example, in late 1937, monthly Japanese remittances to Muslim leaders in Sinkiang alone were said

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{129} In 1937 1 US dollar was equal to 3.38 Chinese yuan. 1937 US$/Chinese Yuan exchange rate, Economic History Services, \url{http://eh.net/hmit/exchangerates/answer?yBegin=1930&yEnd=1940&nation%5B%5D=China}, accessed 19 February 2007.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{130} de Mendelssohn, \textit{Japan’s Political Warfare}, p. 160.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{131} Reliable data for the Muslim population of Inner and Outer Mongolia for this period, as well as the regions adjacent, are hard to find. According to Narangoa Li, however, the Muslim population of the town of Hohhot in Suiyuan province in 1949 was only five percent, and it is unlikely that the proportion of Muslims in the region as a whole was significantly larger. See Narangoa Li, ‘Nationalism and Globalization on the Inner Mongolia Frontier: The Commercialization of a Tamed Ethnicity’, \textit{Japan Focus}, \url{http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2575}, accessed 13 December 2007.}
to have amounted to more than three million yen in some months.\textsuperscript{132} The amount paid to Muslim leaders in Ninghsia and Tsinghai is unknown. Japanese support, though, appears to have been more than just financial, at least potentially: one Muslim leader in the region was promised assistance by Japanese agents in May 1935, presumably military assistance, for an attempt to create a Sinkiang that was independent of China, after the pattern of Manchukuo.\textsuperscript{133}

After 1937, official Japanese rhetoric reflected the new emphasis on courting Muslims in areas under Japanese control. For example, the Japanese authorities made much of the harmony in which Mongols and Muslims were said to live together in Inner Mongolia. When the Zenrin kyōkai reported the establishment of the new Mengchiang administration in November 1937, for instance, the association’s yearbook declared that ‘for more than three hundred years the Manchu, Mongol, Han Chinese, and Muslim peoples have lived in harmony …’ \textit{(sanbyaku amari nenrai, Man · Mō · Kan · Kai · kanjō yūgō shi, buji aianzeri)}.\textsuperscript{134} In keeping with the ideal of the ‘harmony of the five races’, the proclamation called for co-operation among the ‘five yellow races – Japanese, Manchu, Mongol, Han Chinese and Muslim’, in particular against the ‘spectre of Communism’.\textsuperscript{135}

To foster such co-operation among the different groups in Mengchiang, the Zenrin kyōkai undertook much the same range of activities for Muslims that it had previously undertaken for Mongols both in the region and in Japan. In June 1938, for example, the association established the Institute of Islamic Studies (Kaikyōken kenkyūjo) in Tokyo to research all aspects of the Muslim peoples and their faith.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{132} Lattimore, \textit{Pivot of Asia}, p. 72.
\textsuperscript{134} 1938 \textit{Mōko taikan}, p. 286.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., pp. 286-7.
\textsuperscript{136} ‘Zenrin kyōkai nenpō’, in ZKS, p. 414.
According to Cemil Aydin, this institute was ‘Japan’s primary academic centre for research on Islam’, and was responsible for the production of academic works, public conferences, documentary films and radio talks.\textsuperscript{137} Among the books published by the institute were a number of works on Islam and the Muslim world intended for the general reading public, including the 1939 \textit{Kaikyōken} (Muslim World).\textsuperscript{138} Individuals connected with the facility also contributed articles to the Japanese press discussing Japan’s relations with the Muslims of Mengchiang. For example, in November 1939, the well-known journalist Itō Kinjirō\textsuperscript{139} published an article in \textit{Chūō kōron} about Prince Teh and the ‘new Mongolia’, that is, the Japanese-sponsored Mengchiang regime. In part, the article focused on the apparent co-operation among the Mongols, Muslims and Han Chinese, claiming that, with Japanese assistance, the three peoples had indeed formed a united front to combat the spread of Communism.\textsuperscript{140} By 1942, the Zenrin kyōkai was promoting the study of the Arabic, Turkish and Persian languages. The head of the Institute of Islamic Studies, Ōkubo Kōji, a Turkish-language expert specializing on Central Asian studies,\textsuperscript{141} was closely involved with the language program.\textsuperscript{142}

The Zenrin kyōkai also acted as a welcoming committee for Muslim visitors to Japan.\textsuperscript{143} The association greeted a number of groups that were either partly or entirely

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\textsuperscript{137} Aydin, ‘Beyond Eurocentrism?’, pp. 141-2.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., p. 417. Other titles dealing with Islam included the 1942 \textit{Gaikan Kaikyōken} and the 1943 \textit{Gaikan· Kaikyōken}. Although the two titles are almost identical, the manner in which they are listed in the association’s post-war history suggests they were two different books.
\textsuperscript{139} Itō wrote on a wide range of topics. See \textit{Shōwa jinmei jiten dai-ikkan}, Tōkyō: Teikoku himitsu tanteisha, 1943, reprinted Tōkyō: Nihon tosho sentā, 1987, vol. 1, p. 65 for additional information regarding Itō’s career.
\textsuperscript{140} Itō Kinjirō, ‘Toku-Ô no kinjō to shinsei Mōko’, \textit{Chūō kōron}, no. 627, November 1939, p. 199.
\textsuperscript{141} Esenbel, ‘Japan’s Global Claim to Asia and the World of Islam’, p. 1163; Aydin, ‘Beyond Eurocentrism?’, p. 142.
\textsuperscript{142} ‘Zenrin kyōkai nenpō’, in ZKS, p. 417.
\textsuperscript{143} See ‘Zenrin kyōkai nenpō’, in ZKS, pp. 414-17.
made up of Muslims between September 1938 and May 1942. In April 1938, for example, the association’s office in Tokyo hosted a welcome party for a group of ten Mengchiiang Muslims, among whom were schoolteachers, government officials, doctors and religious leaders.\textsuperscript{144} The visitors spent almost a month travelling throughout Japan. In a speech at a mosque in Kobe, the leader of the group declared that ‘ever since we arrived in Japan we have been under the impression of being not in a foreign country but in a land inhabited by a people whom we feel to be our brothers’.\textsuperscript{145} Indeed, some press commentators openly speculated that the group was offered ‘exceptional courtesies’ in light of the ‘ongoing revolt in Mohammedan Sinkiang’,\textsuperscript{146} discussed earlier in the chapter.

The visit to Japan by a party of ten Muslim women from Mengchiiang in October 1943,\textsuperscript{147} and the fact that it was associated with the Zenrin kyōkai, attracted particular coverage even before the group arrived in Tokyo. Press reports implied that the purpose of the visit was to allow the women to study Japan’s wartime mobilisation.\textsuperscript{148} The women were to visit the Greater East Asia Ministry, the Mongolian government offices in Japan, and Yasukuni Shrine, amongst other places.\textsuperscript{149} Press coverage suggests that this visit was considered very important by the Japanese authorities,\textsuperscript{150} most likely because of the need to mobilise the regions under Japanese control to better support the war effort.

\textsuperscript{145} ‘Mongolian Mission in Kobe’, p. 594.
\textsuperscript{146} Translated and reported in ‘Notes of the Week’, \textit{JCWE}, 28 April 1938, p. 501.
\textsuperscript{147} ‘Zenrin kyōkai nenpō’, in ZKS, p. 417.
\textsuperscript{148} ‘Tatakau Nihon migaku Kaikyōtō joshi hō-Nichi dan asu nyūkyō’, \textit{Yomiuri-Hōchi shinbun}, 5 October 1943, p. 3. In August 1942, as part of wartime austerity measures, the \textit{Yomiuri shinbun} merged with the \textit{Hōchi shinbun}, and the paper’s name changed to the \textit{Yomiuri-Hōchi shinbun}.
\textsuperscript{149} ‘Kaikyō hō-Nichi joshidan raisha’, \textit{Yomiuri-Hōchi shinbun}, 7 October 1943, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{150} See, for example ‘Kaikyō hō-Nichi joshidan raisha’. 
In Inner Mongolia, the Zenrin kyōkai’s activities aimed at the Muslim population followed much the same pattern as those aimed at the Mongols. Beginning in 1939, for example, the association built medical clinics specifically for Muslims at a number of locations throughout Mengchiang. Moreover, in June 1939, it established a training facility for Muslim medical students, presumably to provide a cadre of Japanese-trained Muslim personnel to staff the clinics. While the number of students admitted for training was quite small, with only twenty-one in total receiving training, the course appears to have been a lengthy one, lasting between twenty and twenty-four months.

Other educational opportunities were also provided. In June 1939, for example, when the Zenrin kyōkai opened the Mengchiang Academy (Mōkyō gakuin) at Kalgan, there were fourteen Muslims among its initial intake of sixty-six male students, representing almost twenty percent of the student intake, evidence of the preferential treatment that the Japanese authorities accorded the Muslim minority. Some six months later, in January 1940, the Zenrin kyōkai also established a school specifically for young Muslim women, the Zenrin Muslim Girls’ School (Zenrin Kaimin jojoku). The first intake was tiny, a mere four students, and numbers remained small, with only twenty-four students admitted up until April 1943. The proportion of Muslims admitted to the Mengchiang Academy and the subsequent establishment of a school specifically for Muslim girls, however, further points to the Japanese policy of targeting distinct groups within the region.

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152 Ibid., pp. 415-17.
The Zenrin Muslim Girls’ School probably also had considerable symbolic importance. Its style may have been intended to emphasise similarities with Japanese schools, and hence, the success of ‘Japanisation’. While early photos showed the girls attired in the traditional Chinese style of dress, a June 1941 photo is strikingly different. This photo of the students and the Japanese staff at the Zenrin kyōkai’s Kalgan headquarters showed the students dressed in a standard Japanese summer school uniform (Figure 31). The change of uniform may have been intended to further demonstrate the ‘civilising’ nature of the Zenrin kyōkai’s activities. There is nothing to mark the girls as Mengchiang Muslims, and they could just as easily be a group of Japanese girls on a school excursion. The photo is also similar to the earlier image of the classroom of Mongol girls studying (see Figure 29), in that it highlights the physical similarities of the students and the Japanese teachers. It is not known if the photo was
published at the time, but if it was, it was no doubt also intended to further promote the ‘good work’ that the Zenrin kyōkai was carrying out on the continent.

It is noteworthy that the Zenrin kyōkai considered education for Muslim girls important, or at least wished to be seen to be providing it. The type of education offered echoed prevailing ideals in Japan: according to one of the teachers, the express purpose of the school was to educate Muslim women to be ‘good wives and wise mothers’, thereby initiating a ‘new era’ in the region, presumably under Japanese guidance. A small number of these girls was also given the chance to study in Japan.

As well as providing a school aimed solely at Muslim girls, the Zenrin kyōkai also sought to reach Muslim women in Mengchiang through a series of conferences. Between November 1941 and May 1942, the association staged conferences for Islamic women at Hohhot, Tatung and Kalgan, three of the major centres in Mengchiang. The association’s published history gives no details of these meetings, but the sponsorship of three conferences in the space of six months suggests that the mobilisation of Muslim women in Inner Mongolia was considered important.

In addition to the Zenrin kyōkai’s Institute of Islamic Studies in Tokyo, the association was also connected with the establishment of the Northwest Research Institute (Seihoku kenkyūjo) at Kalgan, the capital of Mengchiang, in March 1944. The Northwest Research Institute was a scientific facility headed by the noted anthropologist Imanishi Kinji, and counted among its staff a number of anthropologists who went on to post-war prominence. While its primary focus was academic

158 Nakajima, Toku-ō, pp. 165-6; Fujieda Akira, Haruyama Aki and Morita Kenji (eds), ‘Seihoku kenkyūjo no omoide: Fujieda Akira hakushi danwa kiroku’, Narashigaku,
research, especially in anthropology and partly focused on the Muslim population of Mengchiang, the institute may also have been connected to Japanese military intelligence.\(^{159}\) At the least, given the earlier instances of links between academia and the military discussed in Chapter Three, such ties cannot be discounted, but the evidence is vague and, at best, inconclusive.

Along with the research facilities that the Zenrin kyōkai directly funded in Japan and Inner Mongolia, the association also maintained a connection with the Ethnological Research Institute (Minzoku kenkyūjo), established in Tokyo in January 1943, under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, to carry out research that would contribute to the wartime policies of the Japanese government in its handling of the various ethnic groups living in its overseas territories.\(^{160}\) Researchers from the Tokyo institute worked extensively in and around Inner Mongolia in co-operation with the Zenrin kyōkai-backed Northwest Research Institute. In June 1944, for example, the Ethnological Research Institute dispatched a survey group to Kalgan, expressly to study the Muslim population in Mengchiang. The team remained in Kalgan until August 1945.\(^{161}\) The institute dispatched another research group to Mengchiang in the summer of 1945, shortly before the end of the war, again with the aim of surveying the Muslim community.\(^{162}\) While such a purpose was not overtly stated, it seems likely that these surveys were part of the effort by the Japanese authorities to win the ‘hearts and minds’

\(^{159}\) Nakao, ‘Japanese Colonial Policy and Anthropology in Manchuria’, p. 249.
of the local Muslim population. The surveys most likely assessed what the local population needed, as well as conditions in the region in general, with the aim of then using the Zenrin kyōkai to improve standards of living.

While real efforts were made by the Japanese authorities to better the daily lives of the Muslims in Mengchiang through the provision of medical facilities and educational opportunities, success was not guaranteed. One factor was undoubtedly that some of the Japanese personnel connected with these programs lacked religious sensitivity. Fujieda Akira, a member of the Northwest Research Institute, notes that while graduates of the Zenrin Muslim Girls’ School were often employed as trainee clerks by the Zenrin kyōkai, the Japanese general manager of the institute had the unfortunate habit of holding parties, to which these women were invited, where alcohol and ham were served.\textsuperscript{163} Given the Koran’s prohibition on the consumption of both, this manager appears to have been singularly lacking in cultural sensitivity. Whether such behaviour was widespread among the Japanese staff is not known, but if his subordinates echoed such behaviour it most likely undid some of the positive feeling towards Japan that the Zenrin kyōkai’s activities might otherwise have generated among the Muslims of Mengchiang.

\textbf{Conclusion}

In the thirteen years that it existed, the Zenrin kyōkai was an important component of the Japanese authorities’ attempts to woo both the Mongol and Muslim populations of Inner Mongolia through ‘cultural diplomacy’. While the work of the association doubtless did improve the daily lives of at least some Mongols and Muslims, the Zenrin kyōkai was not entirely successful in its endeavours. As we have seen, Mongol

\textsuperscript{162} Fujieda, ‘Seihoku kenkyūjo no omoide’, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., pp. 65-6.
nationalists, for example, became disillusioned as to the purpose of the education that was provided by the Japanese authorities, and Japanese personnel may not always have behaved appropriately when dealing with the Muslims of Mengchiang. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that relations between the Japanese and the inhabitants of Inner Mongolia were more harmonious than those between the Japanese and the Koreans or Han Chinese. While the medical and educational services provided by the Zenrin kyōkai were never entirely based on altruism, the humanitarian work that the association undertook does set it apart from the other main agents of Japanese cultural diplomacy, the Kyōwakai and the Research Department of the South Manchurian Railway Company. The Zenrin kyōkai, in short, deserves to be seen both as a crucial instrument of the Japanese imperialist project in the region, and as a reflection of the complexity of that project.
CONCLUSION

This thesis has demonstrated that between 1873 and 1945 Mongolia was far more important to Japan than previous studies have recognised. Furthermore, the connection began quite early, five years or so at most after Japan’s reemergence on the international stage, and continued throughout the entire period. One significant piece of evidence confirming the importance of Mongolia to Japan is the longstanding use of the term ‘Man-Mô’, a label adopted only by Japanese writers and in use even before the Russo-Japanese War. The ambiguity of the term, moreover, is also important, as it reflects the unstable nature of Japanese understandings of and ambitions in the region, in a context in which the Japanese elites were seeking to co-exist with their continental rivals, Russia and China, and at the same time to carve out Japan’s own sphere of influence on the continent.

There were a great many agents involved in the relationship from the Japanese side, and a variety of interests were intertwined. Military considerations were the dominant single element, but they were always combined with other factors, in ways that make the relationship with Mongolia unique among Japan’s imperial relationships. These factors included perceptions of a shared ancestry in ethnic terms, a shared religion in Buddhism, the supposed need to assist indigenous activists to break away from Chinese control, and a somewhat romantic view of the Mongols as a people. Admittedly, some of these arguments were also used elsewhere. The promotion of the concept of shared ethnicity, for example, was not unique to Japanese-Mongolian relations: as Peter Duus has noted, the same claim was also made about Japan’s
relationship with Korea in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The additional emphasis on a shared religion, the perceived need to support indigenous activists, and the sense of romance that surrounded Mongolia in Japanese discourses, however, set Japanese-Mongolian relations apart.

As noted earlier, Koreans and Chinese were typically described in Japanese writings as ‘uncivilised’ and ‘dirty’, even if the Chinese were also portrayed as heirs to a great civilisation. The Mongols, on the other hand, were presented in a quite different light. Where Japanese writers made much of the squalor they encountered in Korea and China, in writings about Mongolia they tended to emphasise instead the similarities between the two peoples. Fukushima Sadako’s choice of photographs in her work about Kawahara Misako may well have had this effect; certainly, Suda Kanji’s lyrical passage about the taste of sheep cooked in miso must have done. In such writings there is often the sense that with Japanese assistance, the Mongols might reclaim their former glory, and even in the present, they were shown to have a kind of dignity, albeit a relatively powerless one. In the 1930s the Zenrin kyōkai could even trumpet that ‘tomorrow’s Asia comes from Mongolia’, suggesting that there was something inherently special about the region. Such a comment implies a definite respect for Mongolia, even if such feelings were balanced by a conviction of Japanese superiority.

4 See advertisement for *Mōko nenkan* in *Yomiuri shinbun*, 27 May 1936, p. 5.
Moreover, as Duus notes, while Japanese writers might have ‘lampooned or exoticized’ the Koreans, they never romanticised them. The sense of romance that many Japanese projected onto Mongolia is one thing that makes this relationship distinctive. Romantic associations with Mongolia can be found across a broad swathe of Japanese writings, including Kawahara Misako’s account of her time at the Kharachin Banner in the early part of the twentieth century, the press reports of businessman Ōkura Kihachirō’s sojourn in the Gobi desert in the 1920s, and even Nishimura Shinji’s 1942 examination of Mongolia’s economic potential for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It may be true that Japanese colonialism produced ‘no Japanese Kiplings’; yet, Mongolia clearly touched the consciousness and the imagination of a certain group of Japanese writers in a very particular way.

Shared religion was also a powerful drawcard for some Japanese. While Korea was Buddhist too, this fact does not appear to have impressed itself upon Japanese writers at any point during the period under examination in discussions of the shared characteristics of the two peoples. In Japanese-Mongolian relations, however, much was made of the common religion. As shown in Chapter One, it was Buddhist monks from Kyoto’s Honganji Temple who probably made the first Japanese contact with Mongolia in the modern period, and contacts between Buddhists continued until 1945.

While the activities of the various agents involved in Japan’s relationship with Mongolia differed, they also form a pattern in which there were some more or less

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constant elements. The first, and undoubtedly most important, was the strategic significance of Mongolia for the Japanese military and political elites, a factor that previous studies have recognised, although generally only as an adjunct to Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. These studies, moreover, usually date Japanese ambitions in Mongolia only from around the time of the Russo-Japanese War, but, as I showed in Chapter One, there is ample evidence that the military and political elites recognised the strategic importance of Mongolia at least thirty years prior to this. A second element, as I have illustrated throughout this thesis, was the high degree of continuity among the groups and individuals in Japan that developed connections with Mongolia. Alongside the military and political elites can be found religious groups, academics and business figures, some of whom constantly reappear in Japan’s Mongolian ventures. Thus we find important individuals, among them Fukushima Yasumasa, Kawashima Naniwa, Torii Ryūzō and Ōkura Kihachirō, as well as lesser-known figures, such as Morishima Kadofusa and Maekawa Tsuneyoshi, whose association with Japanese schemes for Mongolia spanned, in many cases, three or more decades.

This thesis has also demonstrated that Japan’s relationship with Mongolia, whether driven by strategic considerations or by other factors, changed over time according to the shifting priorities of the Japanese government, the impact of events in China and other external factors. In the late nineteenth century, as Japan first tentatively advanced onto the continent, contact between Japan and Mongolia was sporadic and often undertaken in a clandestine fashion, as shown in Chapter One. This changed as the Japanese government became more confident in itself and in its own position in the region, especially after its victory over China in 1895 and over Russia a decade later. Then, following the collapse of the Ch’ing Dynasty in 1912, the Russian

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 76; see also Duus, Abacus and the
Revolution in 1917, and the various upheavals that plagued Northeast Asia in the early 1920s, as examined in Chapter Two, the Japanese military launched a number of attempts to gain control of significant portions of Mongolia. Although none of these attempts was ultimately successful, they illustrate the lengths to which some in the military and political elites were prepared to go to achieve Japanese domination of the region. Importantly, they also demonstrate the development in the tactic of ‘gekokujo’ (overthrow of the senior by the junior) that occurred in connection with Mongolia, and that, perhaps, set the pattern for the better-known instances of ‘gekokujo’ of the late 1920s and early 1930s.

Following the Japanese withdrawal from the Russian Far East in 1922, a change in modus operandi occurred in relations with Mongolia, with greater prominence being given to non-military activities, especially economic ones, in accordance with the general trend of the 1920s in other areas of Japanese activity, a development examined in Chapter Three. As the international and domestic climate worsened at the end of the 1920s, there was renewed military effort to gain control of Mongolia, which was combined with a cultural push, both within and outside of Japan, as illustrated in Chapter Four. All of these factors — the military’s desire to gain control of Mongolia, along with academic justification for such control, and economic and religious ambitions in the region — came together in the early 1930s with the formation of the Zenrin kyōkai, an organisation discussed at length in Chapter Five, and a means by which the various groups and individuals in Japan connected with Mongolia could extend their influence in the region. The overwhelming demands of war elsewhere, however, spelled the decline of Japanese activity in Mongolia, and while the Zenrin

Sword, p. 400.
kyōkai continued to operate until Japan’s defeat in 1945, military activity in Mongolia came to an end altogether.

While Japanese military operations in Mongolia thus ceased in August 1945, this was not the end of the relationship. In the postwar period, Japanese academics continued to write about the region; the best-known example is Egami Namio’s 1967 work in which he argued that the Mongols and their horses had played an important part in Japan’s prehistory. Moreover, as Junko Miyawaki-Okada has noted, Mongolia’s romantic image survived Japan’s military defeat and can still be found in writings about the region to this day. The ties between the two countries have continued. Perhaps the most surprising development has been in the field of sport, with the dominance of Mongolian wrestlers in sumo, that most Japanese of contests.

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APPENDIX ONE

LIST OF KEY FIGURES

Adachi Takanari (安達隆成) (?-?)
Aida Tsutomu (会田勉) (?-?)
Aoki Nobuzumi (青木宣純) (1859-1924)
Aoyagi Katsutoshi (青柳勝敏) (1879-1934)
Araki Sadao (荒木貞夫) (1877-1966)
Banzai Rihachirō (坂西利八郎) (1871-1950)
Babujab (巴布礼布) (1875-1916)
Chang Hsueh-liang (张学良) (1898-2001)
Chang Tso-lin (张作霖) (1873/1875-1928)
Deguchi Onisaburō (出口王仁三郎) (1871-1949)
Doi Ichinoshi (土井市之進) (1866-1949)
Doihara Kenji (土肥原贤二) (1883-1948)
Egami Namio (江塚南) (1906-2002)
Feng Yü-hsiang (冯玉祥) (1882-1948)
Fu Tso-yi (傅作義) (1895-1974)
Fujieda Akira (藤枝晃) (1911-98)
Fukuda Masatarō (福田雅太郎) (1866-1932)
Fukushima Sadako (福島貞子) (1882-1975)
Fukushima Shirō (福島四郎) (1874-1945)
Genghis Khan (成吉思汗) (1162-1227)
Güngsangnorbu (Gung) (1871-1931), also known as
Prince Ch’ing (慶親王) (1838-1917)
Hagino Suekichi (萩野信吉) (1860-1940)
Han Shao-hong (韓紹宏), also known as Kanjurchap (甘珠爾礼布)
Hara Kei (原敬) (1856-1921)
Hanada Nakanosuke (花田仲之助) (1860-1945), alias Shimizu Shōgetsu (清水松月)
Hasegawa Haruko (長谷川春子) (1895-1967)
Hasegawa Yoshimichi (長谷川好道) (1850-1924)
Hatakeyama Kōtarō (畠山孝太郎) (?-?)
Hayashi Daihachi (林大八) (1884-1932)
Hayashi Senjūrō (林铣十郎) (1876-1943)
Hayashi Yasakichi (林弥三吉) (1876-1948)
Hazama Otohiko (羽間乙彦) (1915-?)
Hino Tsuyoshi (日野強) (1865-1920)
Hioki Eki (日置益) (1861-1926)
Ho Hsün-cheng (He Xunzheng) (何薰貞) (?-?)
Honda Kumatarō (本多熊太郎) (1874-1948)
Hoshino Kingó (星野金吾) (?-?)
Hsü Shu-cheng (Xu Shuzeng) (徐樹錡) (1880-1925)
Ichijō Sanetaka (一条実孝) (1880-1959)
Ichinomiya Misako (一宮操子) (Kawahara Misako) (1875-1945)
Ichinomiya Reitarō (一宮鈴太郎) (1870-?)
Iiyama Tatsuo (伊山達雄) (1904-93)
Ijūn Hikokichi (伊集院彦吉) (1864-1924)
Igaue Shigeru (伊賀上茂) (?-?)
Imai Takeo (今井武夫) (1900-1982)
Imanishi Kinji (今西錦司) (1902-92)
Inoue Kanekichi (井上兼吉) (?-?)
Inukai Tsuyoshi (井上寛治郎) (1855-92)
Ishizuka Tadashi (石塚忠) (?-?)
Isomura Toshi (磯村年) (1876-1961)
Itō Hirobumi (伊藤博文) (1841-1909)
Itō Kinjirō (伊藤金次郎) (1892-1964)
Itō Ryūitarō (伊藤柳太郎) (?-?)
Kanjurchap (甘珠爾札布) (Han Shao-hong) (?-?)
Karakhan, Lev Mikhailovich (1889-1937)
Katakurita Tadashi (片倉喜) (1898-1991)
Katō Takaaki (加藤高明) (1860-1926)
Katsura Tarō (桂太郎) (1848-1913)
Kawabe Torashirō (河邊虎四郎) (1890-1960)
Kawahara Chū (河原忠) (1852-?)
Kawahara Misako (河原操子) (Ichinomiya Misako) (1875-1945)
Kawakami Sōoku (川上操六) (1848-99)
Kawase Tatsuo (河瀬龍雄) (?-?)
Kawashima Naniwa (川島浪速) (1865-1949)
Kawashima Yoshiko (川島義子) (1906-48) (formerly Chin Pi-hui (Jin Bihui) (金壁輝))
Kazami Akira (風見章) (1886-1961)
Keren斯基, Aleksandar Fedorovich (1881-1971)
Kimura Hisao (木村肥佐生) (1922-89)
Kimura Naoto (木村直人) (?-?)
Kiyoura Keigo (清浦奎吾) (1850-1942)
Kodama Yoshio (兒玉義夫) (1911-84)
Koiso Kuniaki (小磯国昭) (1880-1950)
Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasilevich (1873-1920)
Kuhara Fusanosuke (久原房之助) (1869-1965)
Kuropatkin, Aleksiei M. (1848-1925)
Kuwabara Jitsuzō (桑原幾蔵) (1870-1931)
Kuzū Yoshihisa (葛生能久) (1874-1958)
Li Yüan-hung (Li Yuanhong) (黎元洪) (1864-1928)
Lu Chan-k’uei (Lu Zhankui) (盧占魁) (?-1924)
Ma Chung-ying (Ma Zhongying) (馬仲英) (1911-?)
Maekawa Tsuneyoshi (前川恒吉) (1886-1946)
Makino Nobuaki (牧野伸顕) (1861-1949)
Matsui Iwane (松井石根) (1878-1948)
Matsui Shinsuke (松井清助) (?-?)
Matsumuro Takayoshi (松室孝良) (1886-1969)
Minamoto no Yoshitsune (源義経) (1159-89)
Miyazato Yoshimaro (宮里好嵒) (?-?)
Morishima Kadofusa (盛島角房) (1886-1946)
Moriyama Tositō (守山利遠) (?-?)
Nakajima Manzō (中島萬蔵) (1907-99)
Nakano Seigō (中野正剛) (1886-1943)
Narita Yasuteru (成田雅次) (?-?)
Nishikawa Torajirō (西川虎次郎) (1865-1944)
Nishikubo Hiromichi (西久保弘道) (1863-1930)
Nishimura Shinji (西村真次) (1879-1943)
Ogawa Heikichi (小川平吉) (1869-1942)
Okano Masujirō (岡野増次郎) (?-1946)
Oki Teisuke (沖禎介) (1874-1904)
Ökubo Kōji (大久保幸次) (1888-1950)
Okuma Shigenobu (大隈重信) (1838-1922)
Okumura Ioko (岡村五百子) (1845-1907)
Ökura Kihachirō (大倉喜八郎) (1837-1928)
Öshima Ken’ichi (大島健一) (1858-1947)
Öshima Matahiko (大島又彦) (1872-?)
Öshima Yokichi (大島與吉) (?-?)
Öshima Yutaka (大嶋豊) (1900-78)
Ötani Kōzui (大谷光瑞) (1876-1948)
Oyabe Zen’ichirō (小谷部全一郎) (1867-1941)
Pu-yi (Puyi) (溥儀) (1906-67)
Sakaguchi Ango (坂口安吾) (1906-55)
Sasaki Yasugorō (佐々木安五郎) (1872-1934)
Sasame Tsuneo (笹目恒雄) (1902-97)
Satō Yasunosuke (佐藤安之助) (1871-1944)
Sawada Gennai (沢田源内) (?-?)
Semenov, Grigorii Mikhailovich (1890-1946)
Sheng Shih-ts’ai (Sheng Shicai) (盛世才) (1895-1970)
Shidehara Kijirō (幣原喜重郎) (1872-1951)
Shimagawa Takezaburō (島川毅三郎) (1867-?)
Shimizu Shōgetsu (清水松月), alias of Hanada Nakanosuke (花田仲之助) (1860-1945)
Shimoda Utako (下田歌子) (1854-1936)
Shinoda Toshhide (篠田利英) (1858-?)
Shinohara Ichinosuke (篠原市之助) (1909-40)
Shiratori Kurakichi (白鳥庫吉) (1865-1942)
Soloviev, Vladimir Sergeevich (1853-1900)
Prince Su (Shan-ch’i) (Shanqi) (肃親王) (1863-1922)
Suda Kanji (須田侃次) (1892-1976)
Suematsu Kenchō (末松謙澄) (1855-1920)
Tachibana Zuichō (橘瑞超) (1890-1968)
Taga Muneyuki (多賀宗之) (1872-1935)
Takeyanaagi Yasutarō (高柳保太郎) (1869-1951)
Tanaka Giichi (田中義一) (1863-1929)
Tanaka Hisashi (田中久) (1892-1969)
Tanaka Ryūkichi (田中隆吉) (1893-1972)
Prince Teh (Demchugdorj) (德王) (1902-66)
Teramoto Enga (寺本婉雅) (1872-1940)
Terauchi Masatake (寺內正毅) (1852-1919)
Tōjō Hideki (東條英機) (1884-1948)
Tokugawa Iesato (徳川家達) (1863-1940)
Tokutomi Sohō (Iichirō) (德富猪一郎) (1863-1957)
Torii Ryūzō (鳥居龍藏) (1870-1953)
Tōyama Mitsuru (頭山満) (1855-1944)
Tserenchimed (1869-1914)
Uchida Yasuya (内田良平) (1874-1937)
Uchida Yahachi (内田彌八) (1855-1920)
Uehara Taichi (上原多市) (?)?
Ungern-Sternberg, Roman Nicolaus Feodorovich von (1886-1921)
Utsunomiya Tarō (宇都宮太郎) (1861-1922)
Wang Ching-wei (王精衛) (1883-1944)
Wu Chün-sheng (Wu Junsheng) (吳俊陞) (?-?)
Yada Shichitarō (矢田七太郎) (1879-1957)
Yamagata Aritomo (山縣有朋) (1838-1922)
Yamamoto Jōtarō (山本条太郎) (1867-1936)
Yamamoto Kiyokatsu (山本清堅) (1848-91)
Yamanashi Hanzō (山梨半造) (1864-1944)
Yano Jin’ichi (矢野仁一) (1872-1970)
Yasuda Yojiro (保田與重郎) (1910-81)
Yasui Tetsu (安井哲) (1880-1945)
Yokogawa Shōzō (横川省三) (1865-1904)
Yokoo Yasuo (横尾安夫) (1899-1985)
Yonaiyama Tsuneo (米内山庸夫) (1888-1969)
Yonebayashi Kiyoshio (米内鉅夫) (?)?
Yosano Akiko (与謝野晶子) (1878-1942)
Yosano Tekkan (Satoru) (与謝野鐵幹) (1873-1935)
Yoshida Heitarō (吉田平太郎) (1867-1934)
Yoshimura Chūzō (吉村忠三) (1889-1972)
Yü Pao-cheng (Yu Baozheng) (于保貞) (?)?
Yuan Shih-k’ai (Yuan Shikai) (袁世凱) (1859-1916)
Yui Mitsue (由比光衡) (1860-1925)
APPENDIX TWO

LIST OF MONGOLIAN AND CHINESE PLACE-NAMES

The Wades-Giles system is used, with Pinyin in brackets where appropriate.

Abagar (阿巴嘎)
Alashan (阿拉善)
Altai (亞爾泰)
Barga (巴爾喀)
Buriat (ブリヤート)
Chahar (察哈爾)
Changchiakow (Zhangjiakou) (張家口)
Changchun (長春), later known as Hsinking (新京)
Chao-Uda (Juu uda) (昭烏達)
Cherim (Jerim) (哲里木)
Chili (Zhili) (直隸), renamed Hopei in 1928
Chosotu (Josoto) (卓索圖)
Dairen (Dalian) (大連)
Daur (デゥアル)
Dolonnor (多倫諾爾)
Eastern Inner Mongolia (東內蒙古/東部內蒙古)
Eastern Mongolia (東蒙古/東部蒙古)
Ejine (額濟納)
Fengtien (Liaoning) (奉天)
Gobi Desert (戈壁沙漠)
Hailar (海拉爾)
Harbin (哈爾濱)
Heilungkiang (Heilongjiang) (黑龍江)
Hohhot (厚和) (Suichuan, Kweihua)
Holunbuir (呼倫貝爾)
Hopei (Hebei) (河北)
Hsingan (Khingan) (興安)
Ikh-Chao (Ikuchao) (伊克昭)
Ili (Kuldja) (伊犁)
Inner Mongolia (內蒙古)
Jehol (Rehe) (熱河) [province]
Jehol (Chengde) (承德) [town]
Kalgan (Zhangjiakou) (张家口)
Kansu (Gansu) (甘肅)
Khalkha Mongolia (喀爾喀蒙古)
Kharachin (喀喇沁)
Khorchin (科爾沁)  
Kirin (Jilin) (吉林)  
Kulong (庫倫), also known as Urga  
Kupeikou (Gubeikou) (古北口)  
Kwantung (Guandong) (関東)  
Kweihwa (帰化)  
Kiakhta (恰克圖)  
Liaotung (Liaodong) (遼東)  
Manchukuo (Manzhouguo) (滿州国)  
Manchuli (Manzhouli)(滿州里)  
Manchuria (滿州)  
Mengchiang (Mengjiang) (蒙疆)  
Mengkukuo (蒙州国)  
Mongolia (蒙古)  
Mukden (奉天)  
Nanking (Nanjing) (南京)  
Ningshsia (Ningxia) (寧夏)  
Nomonhan (Khalkin Gol) (ノモンハン)  
North China (北支)  
North/Northern Manchuria (北滿州/北部滿州)  
North/Northern Mongolia (北蒙古/北部蒙古)  
Ordos (鄂爾多斯)  
Outer Mongolia (外蒙古)  
Pailingmiao (Bailingmiao) (百靈廟)  
Paotou (Baotou) (包頭)  
Peking (Beijing) (北京), known as Peiping (Beiping) (北平) between 1928 and 1949  
Port Arthur (Lushun) (旅順)  
Shanghai (上海)  
Shankaikwan (Shanhaiguan) (上海関)  
Shansi (Shanxi) (山西)  
Shantung (Shandong) (山東)  
Shensi (Shaanxi) (陝西)  
Silingol (Silinghol) (錫林郭勒)  
Sian (Xian) (西安)  
Sinkiang (Xinjiang) (新彊), also known as Chinese Turkestan  
South/Southern Manchuria (南滿州/南部滿州)  
South/Southern Mongolia (南蒙古/南部蒙古)  
Suiyuan (綏遠) [province]  
Suiyuan (綏遠), also known as Kweihwa (帰化) [town] and renamed Hohhot (厚和) in November 1937  
Sunid (Sunit) (蘇尼特)  
Tangku (Tanggu) (塘沽)  
Taonan (洮南)  
Tatung (Datong) (大同)  
Tientsin (Tianjin) (天津)  
Tsinan (Jinan) (濟南)
Tsinghai (Qinghai) (青海)
Tsinghai Mongolia (青海蒙古)
Tsitsihar (Qiqihar) (齊爾哈爾)
Tumed (土默特)
Uchumuchin (Ujumuchin) (烏珠穆沁)
Ulan Ude (Verkhneudinsk) (ウエルフネージンスク)
Ulanchap (Ulaanchab) (烏蘭察布)
Urga (庫倫), renamed Ulan Bator in 1924
Western Buriat (西ブリヤート)
West/Western Mongolia (西蒙古/西部蒙古)
Wuchang (武昌)
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