The Governmentality of School Autonomy and Self-Management:
A Foucauldian Analysis

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School of Education
Declaration by the author

“I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any institution of higher education, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by any other person except where due reference is made in the text.”

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Abstract

Over the past four decades in Australia, many politicians, policy-makers, experts and social commentators have sought to increase the organisational autonomy of public schools and their principals. This trend of shifting the locus of educational decision-making and management away from bureaucratic centres to individual schools and parents continues, with the Western Australian state government recently introducing the Independent Public Schools policy. This policy devolves an increased range of organisational and curriculum responsibilities from the state education bureaucracy to selected public schools. This thesis examines what appears to be the enduring trend towards school autonomy and self-management.

The perspective of this thesis is informed by the theoretical, analytical and historical insights of Foucauldian studies of government, or governmentality. Foucault’s studies have increasingly influenced sociological and historical studies in education. His notions of power and discipline have been elaborated and applied in the study of the micro power relations of schooling. Unfortunately, while the study of schooling as a technology for disciplining the individual’s mind and body has received most attention, Foucault’s studies in government have been less widely understood, elaborated and used. This thesis explores Foucault’s genealogy of the formation of the modern liberal state (and governmentality) and the
rich and subtle insights it provides into the complex relationship between the state, politics, society and the government of education.

I explore Foucauldian studies in government with the aim of teasing out their implication for our understanding of the relationship between self-managing school reforms and the state, politics and government. In particular, I argue that the trend in public schools towards school autonomy and self-management cannot be adequately understood without understanding the inherent dilemma embedded within the discourses of politics and government of modern liberal democracies. This problem can be described as an agonistic tension in liberal governmentality between political and governmental authorities enabling individual and economic freedom, whilst needing to secure the state and the welfare of its constituent elements under the condition of freedom.

This tension fuelled a ‘crisis of liberalism’ or a ‘crisis of liberal governmentality’ in the late twentieth century. This crisis involved vociferous critiques of the welfare state in conjunction with a cultural renewal of the discourses of individual freedom, emancipation, liberation and empowerment. According to Foucault, central to this crisis was concern about the costs of the perceived growth of excessive government of the post World War Two era, measured both economically and in terms of personal and political freedom. This thesis puts the case that the emergence of ‘self-managing school reforms’ is linked to this ‘crisis of liberalism’. The self-managing school constitutes both an instrument and object of
government, re-regulating the domain of education according to an ethos of individual empowerment, activity, enterprise, autonomy and responsibility.

To illustrate some of the consequences of these reforms, two case studies are examined. The first explores the emergence at a national level of the devolution of responsibilities and authority to schools, particularly canvassed in the *Schools In Australia* report (1973) and by the Commonwealth Schools Commission (1973-1988). The second case study examines the use of self-management techniques and practices in schools. These reforms have sought to strengthen the capacity of those within schools to manage themselves and their schools as competitive enterprises with diminished reliance on central education bureaucracies. I argue that this development, like the case of devolution, is linked to the new ways of rationalising and enacting the care and government of the population and the state emerging from the crisis of liberalism. I conclude with a discussion of the implication of this trend towards self-management, specifically in terms of what is at stake for the liberal state from a mode of government that seeks to govern for its citizens’ freedom and also, often antagonistically, for the state’s security.
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements........................................................................................................ xii

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1
  A Foucauldian approach to studying self-management................................................. 4
  Governmentality ............................................................................................................. 8
  Thesis overview ............................................................................................................. 10
  Thesis structure .............................................................................................................. 13

**PART I: SELF-MANAGING REFORMS** ...................................................................... 15

Chapter 1: The Self-Managing School ........................................................................... 17
  Introduction .................................................................................................................. 17
  The self-managing school .............................................................................................. 18
    The ‘self’ in self-management ..................................................................................... 20
    The ‘management’ in self-management ....................................................................... 22
    Caveat ......................................................................................................................... 23
  The self-managing school as a technical assemblage ................................................ 24
  The self-managing school as a political-technical assemblage .................................. 28
    The politics of school self-management ................................................................... 34
  Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 39

Chapter 2: The Political Dimension of Self-Management ............................................. 42
  Introduction .................................................................................................................. 42
  Freedom from the state ................................................................................................. 43
    Freedom and self-managing reform .......................................................................... 47
    Freeing the liberal subject? ......................................................................................... 50
  Is empowerment ‘de-governmentalisation’? ................................................................. 55
  The crisis of legitimacy ................................................................................................. 60
    A welcomed or regrettable reform? ........................................................................... 63
    Distinguishing between sovereign power and governmental power ....................... 66
  Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 71

Chapter 3: History, Theory and Method ..................................................................... 73
  Introduction .................................................................................................................. 73
  Rethinking the state and government ......................................................................... 74
  A transformation in the modalities of rule .................................................................... 77
    The state and techniques and practices of government ............................................. 77
    Rationalities of government ....................................................................................... 80
    Political discourse ..................................................................................................... 83
  Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 87

**PART II: THE FORMATION OF THE LIBERAL STATE AND ITS CRISIS** .................. 90

Chapter 4: The Roots of the Pastoral State ................................................................. 99
  Introduction .................................................................................................................. 99
The shepherd-flock and city-citizen games ............................................. 100
Reason of state ......................................................................................... 104
Police ........................................................................................................ 111
Political rationality .................................................................................. 118
  The state as pastoral power ................................................................. 120
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 122

Chapter 5: Liberal Governmental Rationality and its Dilemma ...... 123
Introduction ............................................................................................ 123
Liberalism ............................................................................................... 124
  The economy ......................................................................................... 125
  The population ..................................................................................... 131
  Civil society .......................................................................................... 135
The governmental rationality of liberalism .......................................... 137
An internal dilemma for liberalism ....................................................... 143
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 148

Chapter 6: The Crisis of Liberalism: From Welfare to Advanced Liberalism ................................................................. 150
Introduction ............................................................................................ 150
Liberalism and the welfare state ............................................................ 151
  The emergence of social government ................................................. 154
  The governmental rationality of social liberalism ................................ 159
  Troubling trends of the social state ..................................................... 163
Reactions to the welfare state and social government ................. 166
  German neo-liberalism and the market ............................................. 167
  German neo-liberalism and competition .......................................... 171
  American neo-liberalism and entrepreneurship ................................ 174
The dilemma of freedom and security ............................................... 177
Advanced Liberalism ............................................................................. 182
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 186

PART III: PROGRAMS OF FREEDOM: EMPOWERMENT & ENTREPRENEURIAL MANAGEMENT ........................................ 188
Introduction ............................................................................................ 190
Analysing the link between government and self-managing reforms ..... 193
  Problematisations and government ..................................................... 194

Chapter 7: Governing the Family-Education Nexus Through Empowerment ................................................................. 199
Introduction ............................................................................................ 199
Sketching the persistent problem of the family and parenting .............. 200
  Schooling and the family .................................................................. 202
  Strengthening the home-school link: ................................................. 206
  disadvantage, compensation and socialisation ................................ 206
Governing through empowerment ....................................................... 210
  An advanced liberal orientation to governing .................................. 215
Liberating parents from bureaucracy ................................................... 219
  Government or freedom? ................................................................. 223
Liberating teachers from bureaucracy ............................................... 225
Capitalising the self .............................................................................. 230
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 236
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Introduction

In Western Australia, where this thesis was written, the state government recently invited state schools to apply for what it terms Independent Public School status (Department of Education 2010c). Independent public school status accords school leaders and teachers greater decision-making autonomy and flexibility than those schools managed by the ‘one size fits all’ approach of the central bureaucracy (Department of Education 2010a). The Department’s information material lists twenty-five ‘flexibilities’ that Independent Public Schools are accorded, including the recruitment of staff, the use of resources, the design and use of curriculum, and responsiveness to their communities and other demands and opportunities (Department of Education 2010bb). Principals and school communities have eagerly taken up this invitation to ‘unlock their school’s future’ (Strauss 2010).

While the Director-General of Education touts the Independent Public School (IPS) policy as a new initiative, the IPS policy’s discourse of school autonomy and independence is located within a policy trajectory of devolution, school autonomy and self-management that has marked the
discourses of education management since at least the 1970s. In Australia, a policy of devolving decision-making responsibilities from bureaucratic centres to the school level was first canvassed in the early 1970s (Karmel 1973) and since this time a plethora of official government reports has sought to shift the locus of educational decision-making away from bureaucratic centres to individual schools (Beazley et al. 1984; Black 1993; Directorate of School Education 1994; Hoffman 1994; McCarrey 1993; Ministry of Education 1987).

Former Western Australian Minister for Education, Bob Pearce, described the nature of this shift in an interesting way. He described it as an inversion in how education systems were being thought about and governed (Pearce 1987). He observed that for most of the twentieth century public education was organised around centralised education bureaucracies. Individual schools belonged to an educational system and it was the educational system and decisions related to it that determined a school’s activities. The quality of individual schools was perceived to be a product of fostering the effectiveness, excellence and efficiency of the whole education system. Pearce reasoned that during the 1980s this rationality had been inverted. The individual public school was perceived to be the key organisational unit of education systems and it was the effectiveness and excellence of individual schools that determined the excellence and effectiveness of education systems.

These developments were described in the late 1980s by Caldwell and Spinks (1988; 1992) in terms of the emergence of the ‘self-managing school’, something resembling the Independent Public School. The self-
managing school designates a model of school that under the condition of decentralisation assumes a range of responsibilities for the day-to-day management of schools. While central education bureaucracies maintain strategic and legal functions, the rationalities, techniques and practices of management expertise are employed in the pursuit of the management of schools as relatively autonomous organisations. This includes assuming the responsibilities of managing school budgets and staff recruitment, creating school policies and development plans, implementing performance management regimes, and building school cultures (Beare et al. 1989; Brennan 2009; Caldwell and Spinks 1988; Caldwell and Spinks 1992; Harman et al. 1991). Considering these past developments, today’s Independent Public School initiative appears to be linked to a continuing reform to the organisation of schools and their relationship to the education system. The central concern of this thesis is this ongoing reform towards achieving school autonomy and self-management (as witnessed by the IPS initiative), and its continued relevance to political and educational decision-making. This concern can be posed as four broad questions about self-managing school reform: (1) How should it be understood? (2) What are the conditions of possibility for its existence? (3) What is its significance to contemporary politics and government? (4) What might an analysis of its relationship to politics and government tell us about contemporary reforms like the IPS initiative?
A Foucauldian approach to studying self-management

A number of perspectives on self-managing reforms can be discerned from the literature. One explanation for ‘self-managing reforms’ is that these merely signal education systems being dragged into the twenty-first century. For too long, it is said, education systems have been organised archaically (Beare et al. 1989; Caldwell and Spinks 1988). In this reasoning, the creation of self-managing schools is a reasonable solution to the putative endemic inefficiency and dysfunction of antiquated public bureaucracies and bureaucratic modes of governance. Contemporary economic, management and organisational research points to a de-bureaucratised and devolved mode of governance as a form of organisation that is superior to centralised bureaucratic management (Bennis 1975; Buchanan and Wagner 1977; Du Gay and Hall 1996; Osborne and Gaebler 1993; Peters and Waterman 1982). Here, self-management is construed as largely an organisational reform made possible by the advancement of technical knowledges of organisations and human beings.

Another explanation for school autonomy and self-management is that it reflects a social, political and cultural movement towards freedom and empowerment. On one side of this argument are those who criticise the welfare state and its supposed trampling of individual freedom and choice through its excessive regulation (Howard 2005; Kemp 1997). For these liberals and neo-liberals, the policy of school self-management represents a welcomed demise of the power of government bureaucracies and the vested
interests ensconced within them, and the restoration of individual and community power. On the other side of this explanation in terms of freedom and empowerment are social progressives who, although sceptical about liberalism’s valuing of markets and choice, nevertheless construe school self-management as empowering for schools, teachers and communities (Dudley and Vidovich 1995; Rizvi 1994). An essential element of self-management, so the argument goes, is its capacity to empower individuals from the unnecessary constraints imposed on self-determination by bureaucracy and the state.

Related to the social progressive’s perspective is another explanation for the emergence of self-management that comes from a critical theoretical trajectory. Often advanced by critical sociologists, it is argued that self-management is the regrettable scion of the political programme of the New Right and neoliberal ideologues (Gewirtz 2002; Whitty et al. 1998). This analysis locates the emergence of self-management in a crisis and restructure of the welfare state in the 1970s and 1980s, and it seeks to uncover the veil of obfuscation that supposedly hides the political ideologies and economic interests self-management serves (Ball 1990a; Gewirtz 2002; Smyth 1993). Of particular importance to this mode of analysis is how self-management addresses the state’s need to secure the control, consent and obedience of the population in order to secure its own legitimacy.

While I do not reject these popular perspectives in toto, my approach to self-managing reform is somewhat different.
Unlike the above ‘technical’ explanation, this thesis does not regard self-managing reforms as merely ‘organisational reform’ because to do so circumscribes the field of analysis to the domain of ‘organisations’ and to questions of structure and function. Firstly, it is not clear that decentralisation and self-management actually produces the benefits its advocates claim, with many studies finding little or no detrimental impact on academic outcomes caused by school self-management policies (Grissmer et al. 2000; Levacic and Hardman 1999; Malen et al. 1990; Walberg et al. 2000). Secondly, this perspective fails to engage analytically with the link between the discourses of politics and government and the production and enactment of organisational reform (Angus 1994; Miller and O'Leary 1989; Miller and Rose 1995; Rose 1999a; Smyth 1993). This thesis construes self-managing reforms to be governmental.

My concern for ‘government’, however, needs to be distinguished from the social progressive and neo-liberal perspectives that equate self-managing reforms with the functions of freedom and empowerment. This perspective glosses over how freedom and empowerment are deployed within the objectives and practices of government. So enamoured by the normative ideal of individual autonomy and self-governance, the idealisation of freedom and empowerment comes at the expense of properly understanding the governmental conditions of individual self-governance. Alternatively, I do not regard government as a coercive instrument for securing control and the legitimacy of the state and capital. This perspective is fraught with a limitation. It adopts the posture of what Rose (1999a) terms socio-critique, whereby political authorities and government
are construed as principally concerned with the functions of control, capital accumulation and legitimacy. Socio-critique too narrowly understands self-management as serving the interests of the state and capital by oppressing autonomy, instrumentalising consciousness and conduct, and obfuscating reality and the exercise of power.

I attempt to overcome what I perceive to be the above analytical pitfalls in the analysis of self-managing reforms by drawing upon Foucauldian studies of government (Barry et al. 1996b; Burchell et al. 1991; Dean and Hindess 1998; Foucault 2007; Foucault 2008; Marston and McDonald 2006; Meredyth and Tyler 1993). The insights and concepts of these studies open up a field of analysis beyond the conception of government as reducible to the activities of a sovereign power seeking legitimacy and control.

While Foucault and his studies have increasingly influenced sociological studies in education, particularly around his notions of power and discipline, Foucault’s studies of government have been less widely elaborated and used. To address this gap, I want to explore aspects of Foucault’s studies in government so as to illustrate and justify their relevance and significance to the study of education and contemporary education reform. Broadly, I use this exploration as a basis for examining how the self-managing school developed from emerging ways of rationalising the problems of government and the government of the state, and how the resulting self-managing school constitutes both an instrument and object of government that re-regulates the domain of education.
The approach I take in this thesis is to explore the relationship between self-managing school reforms and how we think about and enact government. I pursue this exploration using the theoretical and historical insights of Michel Foucault’s studies of power and government (Foucault 1988a; Foucault 2007; Foucault 2008), as well as Foucauldian scholars that have pursued historical and theoretical investigations using the insights of Foucault (Barry et al. 1996b; Burchell et al. 1991). Specifically, I draw upon the family of studies termed ‘studies in governmentality’, ‘governmentality studies’, or ‘Foucauldian studies in government’, and the important elaboration of and research on governmentality conducted in particular by Nikolas Rose (1999b) and Mitchell Dean (1999). Although this thesis does not apply some kind of ideal-type conceptual ‘framework’ derived from governmentality studies to the study of education reform, there are key elements and insights from ‘governmentality studies’ that I use.

Foucauldian studies of government illuminate the connections between how the problems and objectives of the state are rationalised by political authorities, and the knowledge, technologies and practices used in the cultivation of individuals as citizen-subjects. For example, as with governmentality studies I too am concerned with those “practices that try to shape, sculpt, mobilize and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups” (Dean 1999, 12). Such studies explore how political discourses are translated into the
everyday lives of citizens, and how regulatory knowledges, techniques and practices structure the individual’s field of possible thought and action, instrumentalising people’s freedom and autonomy. Hence, these studies are very much concerned with how freedom and autonomy are conditions for the exercise of power in the modern liberal state.

Employing this broad conceptual orientation, what Dean terms an ‘analytics of government’ (Dean 1999), this study researches a range of everyday, political, expert, social and cultural texts and practices that constitute the truths and knowledge of the present (Popkewitz et al. 2001). This examination of texts, knowledge and techniques is the basis for exploring the relationship between the self-managing reform of schools and transformations in how political authorities and others rationalise the government of the state. Specifically, it links the techniques, practices and objectives of school autonomy and self-management with the emergence of new ways of thinking about the objects of government, the problems that government should be directed to, to what ends government should be directed, and through what means government should occur.

Therefore, the methodological approach of this thesis is distinct from methods that analyse self-management in terms of freedom, or as a technical development for maximising the functioning of the educational organisation. My approach is also distinct from socio-critique because it does not analyse self-management in terms of how it seeks to control and oppress individuals to pre-determined and often obfuscated interests and ends. Instead, I attempt to set out a way of analysing education reform that is distinct from these approaches. The analytics of government I adopt here
explores the link between self-managing school reforms, as the regulatory techniques and practices of government occurring at local sites, and the problematisation and rationalisation of the government of the state and its population. In other words, education and social policy is not construed as simply a system for state control, but sets of knowledge and practices that “produce and promote certain means and ends” (Marston and McDonald 2006, 7).

*Thesis overview*

This thesis puts the case that self-managing reforms can be understood in relation to transformations in how political authorities think about the population and society, the human being, the problems that beset individuals, and the resulting ways of acting upon and intervening in matters of life and state. By this I do not mean that self-managing reforms are self-evident solutions to the problems of governing presented by brute reality, for example, self-management as an inevitable response to the inexorable globalisation of capital and culture. Rather, my proposition is that problems related to schooling and its organisation emerge from problematisations occasioned by certain ways of reasoning related to governing individuals, national populations and problems related to the state. Specifically, I examine the link between school self-management and the emergence in the late twentieth century of a discourse of enterprise and autonomy in the rationalities of government.
But these transformations in the rationalities and modalities of
government are not merely the product of changes occurring at the end of
the twentieth century. I argue that this contemporary transformation in
governmental rationalities and technologies, what Foucault (2008) terms
the ‘crisis of liberalism’ (2008, 69), evokes an enduring dilemma at the
core of liberal government and today’s welfare state. This dilemma is a
product of the historical development of the liberal state and it refers to
contestations around how governmental power is rationalised and
exercised. Specifically, for liberal government, this crisis revolves around a
tension between the state’s pastoral role, or its care for the welfare of
individuals, and the fact that how individuals are cared for (their
individualisation) is inseparable from how the state’s existence,
government, wellbeing, productivity and security is reasoned (totalisation)
(Dean 1994; Dean 1999; Foucault 1988a).

This coincidence of totalisation and individualisation manifests a
tension at the heart of liberalism. This is a tension between the development
of an extensive normalising apparatus of administration that has occurred in
the name of care and welfare, and the ambition of producing freedom for
individuals, the economy and civil society as a condition for the liberal
state’s security. This thesis argues that the critique of the welfare state in
the 1970s and the consequent emergence of advanced liberal rationalities
and modalities of rule, including self-managing school reforms, can be
interpreted as a product of this inherent tension in liberal rule. In short, it
manifests a critique and scrutiny over the welfare state’s crossing of the
threshold between freedom and ‘unfreedom’.
I then examine how self-managing reforms in education insert into the domains of the family and school an advanced liberal rationality of government, as it seeks to establish increased choice, autonomy, self-governance and empowerment from the state and bureaucratic control. In relation to the domain of the family, self-managing reforms and the diminution of central bureaucratic control have reconstituted the relationship between the family and schools. Parents are seen to be key to the success of the educational enterprise and this increasingly requires them to be ‘empowered’ and actively engaged in their children’s schooling by supporting early intellectual development in the home, by becoming actively involved in matters related to their children’s schooling, and by making decisions about the best school for their children to attend. In relation to the domain of school, these reforms have also reconstituted the space of schooling and teaching. A new ‘empowered’ professional identity for school leaders has been cultivated. This is an identity that emphasises the capacities to self-manage, to be entrepreneurial, to operate in the education marketplace, and to be responsive to local circumstances and consumer demands. By reorganising the centralised management of schools, self-managing reforms appear to support increasing parental choice, community empowerment and school leader autonomy.

I conclude that self-managing school reforms are indicative of a shift in how government and the government of the state is conceptualised and enacted and that self-managing reforms enact a re-regulation of the domain of education. Indicative of a transformation in our modality of government created by a crisis of liberal government, this re-regulation
seeks to establish increased autonomy and freedom for citizens that were supposedly diminished by the welfare state. Both schools and parents have been empowered to take charge of their lives and activities as ‘autonomous choosers’ operating in a market setting (Marshall 1996). This has involved orienting the management of schools to the interests of parents and asserting that parents, rather than the state, bear the principal responsibility for the education of children. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of construing the government of schools in terms of self-management and self-governance.

Thesis structure

This thesis is composed of three parts. Part I, ‘Self-Managing Reforms’, offers a definition of the object of my investigation, the self-managing school, and puts forward an explanation for its emergence in terms of a transformation in how government is rationalised and technologised.

Part II, ‘The State and Government’, uses the genealogical work of Foucault to examine more fully the historical conditions for the contemporary crisis of the welfare state and the transformation of the rationalities and technologies of government. Considerable attention is given to Foucault’s historical account of the formation of the modern liberal state because it is an account that has not been used extensively in education research.

Part III, ‘Programs of Freedom: Empowerment and Entrepreneurial Management’, returns to the analysis of self-managing reforms in the
domain of education. Utilising the insights of government outlined in the preceding chapters, it focuses on two case studies to illustrate the transformation in educational governance generated by the crisis of liberalism: the family-school relationship and then on the organisation of schools.
PART I: SELF-MANAGING REFORMS
Chapter 1: The Self-Managing School

Introduction

What is the self-managing school and how should this ‘big idea’ of contemporary education policy (Whitty et al. 1998) be studied? This chapter begins the task of defining this object of investigation by first examining Caldwell and Spinks’ (1988) The Self-Managing School. While The Self-Managing School is not the definitive text of school self-management, it does describe two important dimensions of the reform to schools and their organisation that are central to any understanding of self-management. The first dimension is the accordance of autonomy to schools from central education bureaucracies, and the second dimension is the employment of management techniques that enable schools to manage their affairs as relatively autonomous organisations.

Although Caldwell and Spinks (1988) perceive the merging of these two dimensions in the self-managing school as a largely administrative
change brought about by the refinement of technical knowledge of organisations and people, it would be remiss to attribute their emergence to a merely ‘technical’ explanation. To do so fails to adequately grasp the political dimension of self-managing reforms, which includes their connection to the broader reform of government occurring during the same period. This chapter provides an overview of this political dimension of self-management in order to arrive at a definition of the self-managing school not merely as a technical object but as a political-technical assemblage. This chapter, therefore, utilises Caldwell and Spinks’ notion of the self-managing school in order to extend our understanding of what it is.

The self-managing school

One of the most influential education management texts of the past four decades in Australia and the United Kingdom has been *The Self-Managing School* by Caldwell and Spinks (1988). Since the publication of this text, the ‘self-managing school’ has been rendered into an object of deliberation, evaluation and elaboration by education management researchers, sociologists, bureaucrats, politicians, principals and teachers. The ‘self-managing school’ has entered into the lexicon of many within the field of education, and this partly explains why its authors have acted as consultants for education departments, policy-makers, bureaucrats and principals the world over on school-based management. Indeed, during the twenty years or more since their text’s first printing and after many variations of this text since (Caldwell and Spinks 1992; Caldwell and Spinks 1998; Caldwell and
Spinks 2008), Caldwell and Spinks continue to be invited to consult and speak as authorities on the self-managing school.

While I too use the ‘self-managing school’ as a term to define the modern organisation of the school, I do this not because Caldwell and Spinks created this object or definitively defined it. It cannot be said, for instance, that Caldwell and Spinks’ text was a blueprint for education reformers that resulted in an unfettered implementation or emulation of their model of the self-managing school. Rather, there are many variations of the ‘self-managing school’ and these differ depending upon the political and policy context within which school reform and self-management have been enacted. Hence school self-management in New Zealand (Codd 1993) looks different to what school self-management looks like in Western Australia (Angus 1995; Haywood 1994). Moreover, continuing school reform since the text’s publication means that the 1988 description of the self-managing school differs from the kind of description made of it today.

I do not use ‘self-managing school’, therefore, to refer to a model of school that Caldwell and Spinks outlined in their publications. Rather, the term ‘self-managing school’ is a portmanteau term for describing a general contour of reform in school management and governance that has occurred since the 1970s, which Caldwell and Spinks identify, and which has continued to occur since the publication of The Self-Managing School\(^1\).

What, then, are the two dimensions of school reform identified by Caldwell and Spinks and which are also pertinent to the existence of the self-managing school?

\(^1\) See Appendix (a) for an outline of significant policies.
The ‘self’ in self-management

The term the ‘self-managing school’ encapsulates two dimensions of the object of Caldwell and Spinks’ analysis. The first pertains to the first term in the hyphenation, ‘self-managing’. The self in ‘self-managing’ gives emphasis to the organisational autonomy of schools, as captured in the following definition provided by Caldwell and Spinks:

the self-managing school [is] one for which there has been significant and consistent decentralisation to the school level of authority to make decisions related to the allocation of resources. This decentralisation is administrative rather than political, with decisions at the school level being made within a framework of local, state or national policies and guidelines. The school remains accountable to a central authority for the manner in which resources are allocated. (Caldwell and Spinks 1988, 5)

Caldwell and Spinks distinguish the self-managing school from the centralised, bureaucratic form of school administration that had dominated public education for most of the twentieth century. With this mode of governance, an external authority managed the school and to this extent the school was conceived as dependent upon the policies, procedures and activities of centralised educational bureaucracies. These were responsible for the school’s programmes, policies and budgets and the mundane aspects of school operations such as plant maintenance and purchases. In comparison, the self-managing school designates a school that although in certain ways is still accountable to central authorities, also has considerable
management independence. The self-managing school has a range of responsibilities that include managing budgets, setting priorities, devising policies and educational programmes and allocating resources in response to these.

The emergence of the self-managing school was therefore inextricably tied to a discourse of devolution and autonomy. Indeed, at the time of The Self-Managing School’s publication, research had increasingly linked the effectiveness of schools to gaining their organisational autonomy from bureaucracy (Caldwell and Spinks 1988; Chapman 1990). The value of decentralisation or devolved structures of authority were championed by education research (Gittell 1972; Lopate et al. 1970), organisation research (Owens 1995; Sergiovanni and Carver 1973) and school effectiveness research (Purkey and Smith 1983; Reynolds 1976; Reynolds and Cuttance 1992; Rutter et al. 1979). Given this emphasis on autonomy, it is unsurprising that Caldwell (2003) attributes the ‘foundation text’ for their self-managing school to the Interim Committee of the Australian Schools Commission’s landmark report, Schools in Australia (Karmel 1973), a report that argued for the devolution of authority and independence from centralised education bureaucracies for the formation of their curriculum and pedagogy.

Therefore, the first term ‘self’ in the hyphenation ‘self-managing’ designates a growing emphasis on schools as key organisational units of the education system. Caldwell and Spinks identified a trend away from the bureaucratic management of schools and a shift towards individual schools
managing their affairs as organisations relatively autonomous from education bureaucracies.

*The ‘management’ in self-management*

The second dimension of the self-managing school pertains to the second term in the hyphenation. This refers to the capacity of the public school to manage itself. In Caldwell and Spinks’ (1988) estimation, the school has a potentially autonomous organisational form that has been stifled under the conditions of bureaucratic management. Their text attempts to intervene in this situation by rendering the school intelligible as a composition of properties and processes readily amenable to management. Utilising the knowledges and techniques of organisational theory and management expertise (for example, Ackoff 1969), Caldwell and Spinks describe the features, techniques and practices of the effective organisation, such as objective setting, corporate planning and budgeting. Moreover, they provide *pro formas* for use by school leaders on many aspects of managing a school.

Caldwell and Spinks’ descriptions of the school as well as their provision of templates amounts to rendering the public school into existence as a self-managing, discrete organisation. The reader of their text is left with a clear impression that the school is composed of knowable organisational properties and processes. As schools are organisations they necessarily have goals and outcomes and these can be optimised through practices of objective setting and corporate planning. By implication, then,
the intended reader, the school leader, is compelled to utilise management techniques and practices to support its capacity to manage its autonomy. Importantly for the authors, the instituting of this capacity to self-manage will correct the deficiencies produced by the central bureaucracy’s control of school management.

Therefore, the second term in the hyphenation, ‘managing’, designates the second dimension to the self-managing school; that is, the self-managing school is constituted by the employment of management theory and manageable techniques and practices that enable those working within schools to manage their autonomy effectively and efficiently.

Caveat

Implicit in my descriptions above is that since at least the 1970s a range of school management and organisational experts were elaborating organisational and managerial features of schools along the lines of self-management, long before Caldwell and Spinks (Owens 1995). For example, school effectiveness research established a purportedly neutral and objective knowledge of the properties, processes and problems of school organisations by marrying organisational theory and management expertise with the collection and calculation of school statistics (Mortimore 1988; Reynolds 1976; Rutter et al. 1979; Slee et al. 1998). From these taxonomies of the processes and components of the ‘effective school’, or the effectively managed school, education administrators were offered practices and techniques for improving organisational management and
performance. This marked the beginning of improvement and development plans. Therefore, well before the publication of *The Self-Managing School*, an albeit inchoate self-managing school existed in the employment of organisational and management theories, techniques and practices that were carving out the individual school as a distinct object for improvement. My point, however, is that Caldwell and Spinks formalised these trends.

**The self-managing school as a technical assemblage**

One troubling aspect of the definition of school self-management adopted by Caldwell and Spinks (1988) arose for me when I was presenting preliminary findings of this research to colleagues. After outlining these two dimensions to the self-managing school, a colleague suggested that the self-managing school was a necessary development in response to the inefficiency of the centralised control of schools by education bureaucracies. His point was that central bureaucracies constrained how schools managed their resources, that school autonomy was a progressive development away from the outmoded model of bureaucratic management, and that this reform would without doubt improve efficiency and educational outcomes. What troubled me about his contribution to the discussion were the assumptions embedded in his interpretation of school self-management as a response to the failures of bureaucracy.

His argument about the failure of bureaucracy was an understandable observation insofar as it was informed by the commonly accepted anti-bureaucratic analyses of experts of organisations and
management. Bureaucratic features, such as a hierarchical command structure and an emphasis on rules, have been construed by researchers as harmful to individual rationality, efficiency, creativity, enterprise, initiative and self-reliance (Blau and Meyer 1971; Caiden 1982; Crozier 1963; Emery and Emery 1974; Hummel 1977; Osborne and Gaebler 1993; Peters and Waterman 1982). Merton (1957) famously argued, for example, that a rational-formal model of bureaucratic management produces an emphasis on procedures and rule-compliance and this delimited worker decision-making discretion. For Merton, this meant that the identification, pursuit and optimisation of organisational goals were displaced by an obsessive regulation of the minutiae of behaviour required by the rules of the organisation.

My colleague’s reiteration of this criticism of bureaucratic design’s poor fit with human behaviour is supported by the expertise of workplace psychology and management. His comments during the discussion that bureaucracy assumes that ‘man is a machine’ resonated with the criticism made by management psychologists that classical bureaucratic management failed to take account of the motivational complexity of human beings, often assuming the individual worker is lazy, irresponsible and dependent (Argyris 1957; Davis and Chens 1975; Herzberg 1966; McGregor 1960; Porter 1961; Warr 1976). Bureaucracy, it was claimed, had outlived its usefulness because psychology, and other ‘truthful’ disciplines such as management and organisational theory, had shed light on a “new concept of man, based on increased knowledge of his complex and shifting needs…”
[instead of] an oversimplified, innocent, push-button idea of man” (Bennis 1975, 287).

With this type of analysis of bureaucracy, my colleague could be forgiven for accepting as commonsense the idea that self-management emerged out of the inherent failures of bureaucracy. Indeed, people’s negative personal perceptions of bureaucracy, as characterised by Hummel in the following quote, probably make the above negative appraisal of bureaucracy appear self-evident:

Everyone has trouble with bureaucracy. Citizens and politicians have trouble controlling the runaway bureaucratic machine. Managers have trouble managing it. Employees dislike working in it. Clients can’t get the goods from it. Teachers have trouble getting an overall grip on it. Students are mystified by the complexity of it. (Hummel 1977, vii)

What troubles me about my colleague’s assessment of self-management, and indeed what troubles me about the organisational and management knowledge he draws upon, is that the identification of the weaknesses of bureaucracies and bureaucratic management is perceived to be the product of the progressive refinement of our supposedly neutral, objective and technical knowledge of human behaviour, the ‘human psyche’, the management of workers, and organisations. Thereupon, the motor of organisational reform in education is assumed to be a product of our developing knowledge of the world in the human and social sciences. This has supposedly afforded us the increased capacity to describe the effective properties, functions and practices of the autonomous, self-
managing school, as if they were hidden realities discovered by the technical advancement of our knowledge of humans and organisations.

However, this assumption is problematically sociologically realist. That is, the fields of organisational and management theory are assumed to be disinterested disciplines that present solutions to self-evident sociological problems. Hence, Caldwell and Spinks (1988) asserted to the chagrin of critical sociologists that self-management is “administrative rather than political” (1988, 5). However, a technical and functionalist account of self-management that assumes that the experts of management and organisations are engaged in a relatively neutral and objective process of finding more effective and efficient techniques and practices for optimising schools fails to engage with the substantive political dimension of self-management (Angus 1993; Angus 1994; Ball 1998b; Gunter 2000; Smyth 1993). It neglects, for instance, the relationship between political power and the knowledge produced in the disciplines of management, organisational theory and psychology, as well as the role of these in constituting the reality these purport to describe. I argue that organisational and managerial truths are political rather than simply neutral and technical.

2 Hence Ackoff’s (1969) corporate plan was utilised by Caldwell and Spinks (1988) as a largely technical practice for rationalising the activities of schools so that school leaders could be responsive to the new realities being discovered of the organisation of schools. For Caldwell and Spinks, this was seen as an improvement on past practices because it recognised that organisations possessed inputs and outputs, that workers desired self-management and responsibility in their work, and that the energy of teachers could be harnessed to the achievement of school goals. For Caldwell and Spinks, the corporate plan was merely a technical elaboration of a refined knowledge of school in light of the errors and weaknesses of past practices. It could be deployed for the purpose of achieving the seemingly neutral ends of improved efficiency and productivity of individuals and the organisation.
The self-managing school as a political-technical assemblage

In defining the self-managing school as a product of policy developments related to bureaucratic decentralisation and knowledge developments in the disciplines of management and organisational theory, Caldwell and Spinks’ (1988) field of visibility is severely obscured. It does not perceive self-management and its anti-bureaucratic discourse as tethered to political forces in any substantial way.

Fortunately, education management’s inattention to the political has been corrected by researchers who have sought to understand the self-managing school politically by situating its formation along a trajectory of the technical and political knowledges and practices associated with ‘welfare state restructure’ (Fergusson 1994; Gewirtz 2002; Smyth 1993). In particular, it is argued that the self-managing school is inextricable from the politically driven de-bureaucratisation of public services (Gewirtz 2002), and the politically-driven processes and practices of public sector deregulation and re-regulation (Meredyth 1998), or what Rose (1993; 1999b; Rose 1999c) similarly terms the double movement of ‘autonomisation’ and ‘responsibilisation’ (also Dean 1999).

We can begin to establish how these processes and practices are positioned in relation to politics and the state by drawing attention to a number of important features of political discourse in this period, not all of which are necessarily novel (Miller and Rose 1990). In particular, political authorities were concerned with optimising national economic
competitiveness, improving the productivity and competitiveness of corporations and individuals, reinvigorating the economy and culture around enterprise, and eradicating inefficiencies from the public sector created by its centralised, planning oriented, bureau-professional organisation (Clarke and Newman 1997; Newman and Clarke 1994; Rhodes 1994).

These concerns constitute a problematisation of government insofar as these problematised the contribution of current governmental rationalities, technologies and programs to the improvement or otherwise of the nation’s economy and its people. Indeed, there was regularity to these concerns and problematisations. Many Western liberal democratic nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and Australia began to be suffused with a political discourse that construed that if their nations were to continue to foster social and economic wellbeing, then they needed to limit the size of the state and government, foster active, competitive and entrepreneurial behaviour, improve organisational management, flexibility and accountability, and remove incentives to dependency and passivity, or the expectation that the state owes people a living (Dean 1999; Rose 1999). This way of understanding and reasoning the field of government, politics and its objects of concern has been termed ‘advanced liberalism’ or the more narrowly defined ‘neo-liberalism’ (Barry et al. 1996a), and this encompassed the perception that the excessive regulation of the state and its government stifled the creative, enterprising and wealth-generating exercise of autonomy by individuals and private enterprises.
This arc of political and governmental criticism was extended to what Clarke and Newman (1997) term the bureau-professional organisation of the public sector, in contrast to its managerialist organisation. The former was increasingly construed as antipathetic to the emerging discourse of government, as represented by the idiom of ‘smaller government’, ‘entrepreneurship’, ‘flexibility’, ‘privatisation’, ‘deregulation’, ‘competition’, ‘performance’, ‘autonomy’, ‘markets’ and ‘consumers’, and more besides (Du Gay 2000a; Du Gay 2005). The public bureaucracy became an unenviable emblem of ‘big inefficient government’. Its monopoly of the provision of public goods and services was a threat to liberal and democratic ideals (Buchanan and Wagner 1977; Friedman 1968), and a frustration to national economic growth, economic competition, public sector efficiency and the fostering of active, competitive and entrepreneurial citizens.

Numerous official investigations into public services and private enterprise were mobilised within the grain of these concerns and objectives (Burke 1986; Coombs 1976; Government of Western Australia 1992; Hilmer 1993; Public Service Commission 1994; Reid 1983). The result was reform variously termed ‘new managerialism’, ‘corporate managerialism’ and ‘new public management’ (Clarke et al. 2000; Davis et al. 1989; Hoggett 1996; Hood 1991; Pollitt 1993; Yeatman 1993) that occurred along two axes. Along the first axis was increasing organisational and individual autonomy and agency (autonomisation), and along the second axis was increasing the responsibility of organisations and their members for
organisational performance through a range of responsibility-inducing mechanisms (responsibilisation).

This double movement involved in the first instance the devolution of responsibilities from bureaucratic and political centres to dispersed departments, agencies and programmes. These entities were to operate with relative autonomy from centres of political and bureaucratic calculation, fostered by the use of markets and contractualism. These devices would foster a high degree of individual discretion, increased local decision-making responsibility and organisational self-determination (Yeatman 1993). In the second instance, these technologies of autonomisation were bound to a swarm of technologies of responsibilisation. Technologies of responsibilisation encompasses the assemblage of knowledge, techniques and practices applied to relatively autonomous public organisations for the purpose of regulating at a distance their activities and outcomes. These include the use of management regimes that emphasise objectives and outcomes, and organisational and personnel performance management regimes that transfer data from dispersed sites to centres of calculation (Powers 1997).

These reforms remodelled the public sector according to the political and governmental concepts and technologies of performativity, entrepreneurship and the market (Clarke and Newman 1997). Downsized and rendered lean, public service organisations entered into competitive relations in the provision of public goods and services, whilst rationalist forms of management such as auditing and management by results sought to render ever-present the calculation of output and performance. Just as
importantly, the bureaucracy’s calculation of needs and interests informed by the “scientifically informed production of truth by professionals” (Dean 1999, 169; Rose 1993) was eroded by user-pays and market mechanisms that used individual consumer preference to regulate organisational activity. One significant effect of this remodelling, therefore, was to extirpate from the welfarist governmental machine the enclaves of bureau, professional and union power that putatively frustrated efficiency and the exercise of private choice (Clarke and Newman 1997).

Pertinently, this displacement of the bureaucratic and professional modes of governance fostered by the welfare state (through the techniques of autonomisation/agency and responsibilisation/performance) reflected a concerted attempt to reconfigure how power within the state was to be exercised. Construing the bureaucratic and professional ‘enclosures’ fostered under the welfare state as a problem for social and economic wellbeing (Clarke et al. 2000; Clarke and Newman 1997; Du Gay 1996), the bureau-professional organisation of the public services was reformed by the insertion into the public sector of new politically desirable rationalities, practices and calculative regimes (Dean 1999; Rose 1996). Through this, “the relations of power within the state [were] unlocked and transformed” (Newman and Clarke 1994, 22), and for reformists this could not come soon enough.

Given the link between political discourse and public sector organisational reform it is difficult to maintain a purely technical explanation of self-managing reform. Public sector reforms constitute more than technical organisational improvements based upon the neutral and
objective advances of management and organisation theory. Rather, with the concerns, language, concepts and objectives of political authorities (such as accountability, competition, efficiency, enterprise and responsibility) translated into knowledge produced of and instruments used in the public sector, the expertise of management and organisation together operated as “‘indirect’ mechanisms for aligning economic, social and personal conduct with socio-political objectives” (Miller and Rose 1990, 2).

In short, organisational reform is political.

No doubt this process is complex and I am not suggesting that organisational and management expertise is a mere servant of state power, for the knowledge produced in the human and social sciences also shapes political discourse (Barry et al. 1996b; Miller and O'Leary 1987; Rose 1996b; Rose 1999a). However, the nub of my argument is that we cannot excise politics from our discussion of self-managing reforms as many like my colleagues do. To do so is like a surgeon eschewing the use of the scalpel. Including politics into the analysis renders perceptible to the analyst the alignment between a political discourse centred on autonomy, enterprise, competition and markets (and its political problematisations), and experts’ problematisation and analyses of public sector organisations.

From this perspective we can scrutinise the assumption that self-managing reforms emerge from the self-evident failures of bureaucratic design. We can also question the notion that it was the neutral and objective progress of human reason that discovered the problems of bureaucracy; those problems being bureaucracy’s lack of autonomy, enterprise and resistance to new management techniques and practices. Indeed, the public
bureaucracy’s proceduralism, inflexibility and lack of entrepreneurship have previously been seen as its strengths (Du Gay 2005). That these were now its problems says quite a bit about the current political valuing of choice, competition and entrepreneurship and the criteria according to which the public sector and government will be judged today. In what way, then, has the organisation of schools and school systems resembled the above problematisation and reform of the public sector?

The politics of school self-management

It is perhaps unsurprising, given the vociferous attacks on the public sector and its bureaucracy, that Australian education systems and their central bureaucratic management, which had served the nation’s interests well throughout most of the twentieth century, was now seen as beset by a number of problems. What were some of the problems said to afflict Australian education systems?

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, it was increasingly argued that Australian education systems and schools lacked proper incentives for improving educational standards and the efficient and effective use of resources (Karmel 1985; McCarrey 1993). Schools were construed as being inadequately integrated into the national economic infrastructure and were therefore a frustration to national economic competitiveness (Bell and Stevenson 2006; Lingard et al. 1993; Lingard et al. 1995; Marginson 1993; Marginson 1997a). Many blamed the quality of teaching for a perceived lowering of literacy and numeracy standards, economic recession and
social indiscipline. Education bureaucrats and teacher unions were frequently criticised for protecting their professional power at the expense of proper accountability to the public for their outcomes and use of resources (Berliner and Biddle 1995; Chubb and Moe 1990; Scott 1990). For Australian Federal Education Minister David Kemp, the best way forward for public education was to:

- ensure that government schools can compete effectively, to give them greater autonomy from bureaucratic control and more freedom to exercise this leadership... I want to be sure that these funds are going to schools which are autonomous and effective and this funding is not being used to support schools which are non-competitive and ineffective... I believe a move to greater autonomy for government schools will provide Australia with the sort of schooling that this country needs for the next century: competitive, vibrant, diverse, and flexible. (Kemp 1997)

Mirroring reforms to the public sector more broadly, Kemp’s vision for Australian education systems involved: (1) the devolution of responsibilities away from bureaucratic centres, and (2) the introduction into schools of what others describe as ‘post-welfare’ managerial and entrepreneurial calculative regimes (Arnott 2000; Fergusson 2000; Gewirtz 2002; Hatcher 1994; Mac An Ghaill 1994; Troman 1996). These self-managing reforms have included:

- The introduction of performance management and accountability regimes for managing staff relations, staff performance and organisational performance, which include staff appraisal systems,
performance-based pay and school-wide audits (Education Department of Western Australia 1996b; Mahoney and Hextall 2000; McNeil 2003).

- The introduction of corporate management techniques and practices that specify and guide the pursuit of organisational objectives and targets, which include through corporate, strategic and school development plans (Hargreaves and Hopkins 1991).

- The introduction of technologies for measuring and comparing the performance of schools and education system, both nationally and internationally (Bracey 2000; Bracey 2003). Standardised tests render visible to teachers, principals, bureaucrats, parents and politicians the outcomes of teaching and learning in schools, especially in relation to politically valued criteria, such as literacy and numeracy (Gleeson and Husbands 2001; Husbands 2001; Meier 2002; Torrance 1997). These have enabled schools to take increased ownership over their results and the means to their improvement, as well as enable centres of bureaucratic and political calculation to monitor and govern schools at a distance and to specific ends.

- The publication of exams results, benchmark testing results and graduation rates. On the one hand, publication makes school performance transparent and accountable, enabling comparisons that facilitate the identification of and intervention into low performing schools (Gillard 2009; Kemp 1999a, 1997; Nelson 2004b). On the other hand, publication of results provide “parents
and the community with the information they need to make informed choices about schooling” (Kemp 1999a).

• The use of novel techniques for fostering increased competition between schools to stymie the problem of ‘provider capture’ (Ball 1994; Gewirtz et al. 1995; Whitty 1997; Whitty et al. 1998). In the United Kingdom, choice and autonomy were pursued through the policy of giving schools the opportunity to opt out of the state system. These ‘grant-maintained schools’ are currently free from the control of Local Education Authorities. The Australian Commonwealth Government’s Economic Planning and Advisory Committee also touted this strategy in 1993 (Clarke and Johnston 1993). The reasoning behind this was that if improvements in responsiveness and accountability were not achieved through devolution alone, schools should be encouraged to opt out of the government systemic school system (Angus and Olney 1998; Caldwell 1998). The Independent Public Schools policy mentioned in the introduction of this thesis is an example of this strategy.

• The loosening of rules governing student enrolments has fostered autonomisation. Under the comprehensive model of the neighbourhood school that developed post World War Two, students were obliged to attend their local schools, as determined by the education department (unless they attended a private school). In Western Australia, if a student wanted to attend a school outside of their boundary, a ‘cross-boundary application’ needed to be made. By the late 1980s and through the 1990s restrictions on student
intake have been progressively removed by a policy of de-zoning in many Australian states (Campbell and Sherington 2006; Scott 1990). However, in Western Australia this has only occurred in the last decade. Under the current policy, students are entitled to attend their local school yet they also have the right to apply to schools outside of their catchment area.

- The authorisation of selective and specialist schools also supports autonomy and choice (Department of Education 2010d). These schools operate within the public education system, however, they have special rules that enable them to recruit particular students and implement specialist programs.

- Enabling school leaders increased freedom to manage their schools. For instance, in its School Assistance (Learning Together – Achievement Through Choice and Opportunity) Act 2004, the Australian federal government made as a condition of state education funding agreements, that states give principals increased control over their schools (Smyth 2006). Increasingly, principals have been encouraged to exercise this freedom in market oriented ways, such as developing business partnerships, promoting their school and building a positive profile of their schools through the media and prospectuses (Meadmore and Meadmore 2004).

- The continued financial support to the private school sector, including loosening the regulations to enable private schools to be established close to public schools in the same area.
While we should be cautious of not only over-stating the extent of this self-managing reform but also simplifying its causes (Arnott 2000; Hatcher 1994), self-managing school reform is nevertheless incontrovertibly constituted from the abovementioned political trajectory involving reform to the welfare state and its machinery. Performance management techniques have penetrated the bureau-professional enclave of schooling with a new set of rationalities and practices of performance, measurement, accountability and competition. Through increasing the autonomy of schools and the authority of school leaders over a range of responsibilities, schools have been enjoined to operate more as business-like competitive enterprises. To the extent that the above knowledge, techniques and practices of organisational and management expertise have been indispensable to the achievement of political ambitions around autonomy, competition and enterprise, the ‘self-managing school’ cannot be said to be a product of an incremental improvement in organisational knowledge. It is in this sense that the self-managing school is a political-technical assemblage.

**Conclusion**

The above discussion has given some form to the object of the self-managing school. The self-managing school is, as Caldwell and Spinks (1988; 1992) assert, a school that has been devolved a significant level of authority from the bureaucratic centre. It is, therefore, a relatively autonomous organisation. Indeed, autonomy and self-management appear
to have been to some degree an objective or vision of policy-makers for some time. An inchoate form of the self-managing school can be found in the devolution of authority and organisational autonomisation that increasingly occurred in Australia during the 1970s and 1980s. Caldwell and Spinks also draw attention to how this autonomy is to be responsibilised by utilising management expertise. The knowledge, practices and techniques of management are employed to develop the capacity of those working within schools to manage its freedom towards the ends of organisational optimisation, for instance, efficiency and effectiveness.

However, this double movement of autonomisation and responsibilisation can only be understood fully if we eschew a purely technical account of self-management. Self-managing reform to the public services has involved reforming the bureau-professional forms of organisation associated with the welfarist bureaucracies post-World War Two. As Clarke and Newman (1997) astutely point out, this organisational reform is linked to the politically inflected reform of the welfare state. Self-managing reform, therefore, should be understood through this political trajectory inasmuch as political authorities have sought to reform the public sector in response to its political prerogatives, particularly to install more efficient, entrepreneurial and consumer-oriented forms of governance.

I concluded this chapter by illustrating how this reform manifests in the educational domain today. While Caldwell and Spinks define the self-managing school principally in terms of management frameworks within devolved structures of authority, I have included the more recent
introduction of performance management techniques and practices, and the techniques and practices related to the market and marketisation, that have over the past two decades enveloped the school and teacher. The rationalities, techniques and practices of these broader self-managing reforms have effectively reconfigured Caldwell and Spinks’ (1988) model of the self-managing school into a competitive, market-oriented and entrepreneurial form.
Chapter 2: The Political Dimension of Self-Management

Introduction

In the previous chapter I provided a definition of the self-managing school as a political-technical assemblage because its emergence was inseparable from political machinations related to reforms to the public sector and the welfare state. Having established that self-management and elements of school self-management are tied to the political realm, and having given an indication of this link, I wish to explain in more detail the nature of this relationship and what this might tell us about the emergence of self-management.

I will examine three explanations that relate the broader trend of self-management to the late twentieth century reform of politics,
government and the welfare state. First, there is what I term the ‘liberal’ account of these reforms, whereby self-management signals a move towards a freer and more empowered citizenry through the unwinding of the welfare state and its regulation. Here self-management is a part of a meta-narrative of increasing personal autonomy. Second, there are ‘critical’ accounts which construe self-management in an idealist form, attributing to it the value of individual empowerment and political self-determination. Third, there is an alternative critical sociological explanation in which self-managing reforms are generated from welfare state restructure and the crisis of its legitimacy.

This chapter outlines what I perceive to be the limitations of these conceptualisations of the political and governmental dimension of this reform. My goal is to come to grips with a more fine-grained understanding of the political and governmental dimensions underpinning the emergence of school autonomy and self-management. In the chapter that follows, I finalise these insights by outlining my methodological approach to the analysis of school autonomy and self-management, which draws from the conceptual and historical insights of Foucauldian studies of government.

**Freedom from the state**

Self-managing reform has been described in the language of ‘freedom and empowerment’. This idiom is used in public choice theorists’ analyses of the provision of public goods and services (Buchanan and Wagner 1977), in business management texts on the organisation of private enterprise
(Peters 1992; Peters and Waterman 1982), in management analyses of public administration (Osborne and Gaebler 1993), and in education management texts (Caldwell and Spinks 1988, 1992; Hargreaves and Hopkins 1991; Schmuck 1984). In these accounts central bureaucracies represent oppressive institutions constraining the freedom of individuals to make and act upon personal decisions, while self-managing, quasi-market reforms promise to empower those working in the public sector by removing bureaucracy’s constraints on individual and organisational freedom.

The goal associated with this discourse of ‘freedom’ and ‘empowerment’ was not limited to un-encumbering public bureaucracies and schools from the structural and administrative constraints imposed on individual enterprise. As broadly mentioned in the previous chapter, many market advocates, politicians, political and social commentators, and education management writers perceived that reform of centralised bureaucracies and providers of public goods and services needed to also address the ‘villainous’ (Pollitt 1993) sectional political and professional interests of the bureaucratic officials and trade unions deeply rooted in these organisations (Beare 1990; Beare et al. 1989; Chubb and Moe 1990; Down 1968; Niskanen 1971; Niskanen 1973; Ostrom 1973). As they saw it, these ‘bureaucratic enclosures’ were riven with entrenched structures of power through which individuals and groups pursued their self-interest at the expense, not only of the excellence of organisations, but also, and just as importantly, of the interests of the nation and its citizens.
The language of freedom and empowerment, therefore, also reflected deep-seated concerns about how the authority of the public services was being exercised and the effects of this on the freedom and rights of citizens. While the concern for individual freedom and the state’s exercise of authority constitutes a feature of the broader debates around bureaucracy and education in Australia throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Howard 2005; Kenway 1990; Preston 1994), they dominated education policy during the Howard government’s reign from 1996 to 2007. For example, former Federal Education Minister, David Kemp, styled himself as a champion for the rights and freedoms of citizens against the ‘provider capture’ of public education and the interests ensconced therein:

The sad voices of the opponents of choice desperately attempting to defend the rigid centralised systems inherited from the 19th century are more and more out of tune with the times and with what we now understand about the dynamics of a democratic system…. The nature of the defenders of educational monopolies – principally the union leaders whose power rests on centralised industrial relations processes – reveals that it is a narrow sectoral self-interest which is the principal opponent of a more democratic society based on empowerment through choice. The centralised systems have perpetuated the alienation of disadvantaged parents and the educational disadvantages of their children. (Kemp 1997)

Two years later he commented:

The centralised welfare state based on bureaucratic provision of services has now been recognised in many countries as not merely an inefficient and wasteful way of providing for those who need assistance, but arranged around incentives where service to the client
was often the lowest of priorities. Too often this welfare state was disempowering and alienating in its scale and remoteness from the ordinary person. (Kemp 1999b)

While Kemp’s concern is obviously with how bureaucracy constrains the activities of teachers, public servants or parents, his concern extends beyond this. He construes education policy as a field where the very principles of liberal democratic society are in contest. He argues, for instance, that in their defence of a non-market driven system of education the established interests of those within the field of education frustrate the empowerment of ‘ordinary’ citizens. In this policy contest, Kemp unambiguously portrays the teachers’ unions as self-interested ‘defenders of educational monopolies’ opposed to democracy, and he positions his government on the side of defending the ‘democratic system’, ‘democratic society’ and the ‘empowerment’ of citizens.

Kemp was not alone in characterising the field of contemporary education in this way. Former Federal Education Minister, Julie Bishop, feared for the “social engineers working away in state government education bureaucracies… Ideologues who have hijacked school curriculum and are experimenting with the education of our young people from a comfortable position of unaccountability, safe within education bureaucracies” (Bishop 2006). If only, it was reasoned, schooling could be returned to the citizens that it was meant to serve. This was also the reasoning behind former Prime Minister John Howard’s observation that there was a “frustrated mainstream in Australia which sees government decisions increasingly driven by the noisy, self-interested clamour of
powerful vested interests with scant regard for the national interest…” (Howard 1995).

In this clamour of criticism, these politicians targeted the welfare state, its bureaucratisation, and the interests purportedly vested within it. In this battle, they perceived that there was something fundamentally principled at stake in the bureaucratic organisation of education systems, specifically, individual liberty. Hence, when former Federal Education Minister, Brendan Nelson, declared that freedom of choice within education markets was a “fundamental democratic right” (Nelson 2004a), he sought to reconcile social organisation (specifically education) with what he perceived to be the liberal foundations and principles of Western civilisation. It is in this vein of thought that John Howard unabashedly remarked that the goal of his government’s education policies was “to free the individual” (Howard 2005).

Believing in the moral righteousness of individual freedom and the need to restore freedom as a principle of social organisation so as to secure the vitality of liberal democracy, how was freedom to be restored and therefore the individual empowered?

*Freedom and self-managing reform*

For those thinking and behaving within this discourse of liberal empowerment, organisational autonomy, decentralisation, markets and individual choice were bulwarks of the regulatory welfare state and its bureaucratic power. Conceiving freedom to be the capacity to make choices
within a market setting relatively free from the constraints of the state and bureaucratic power, re-organising the public sector around markets and fostering the autonomy of public organisations promised to restore individual freedoms.

Rather than concentrating power in particular sites, such as bureaucracies, and with particular people, such as bureaucrats, markets would disperse power across the state. Through the mechanisms of consumer choice, markets would enable public organisations like schools to be disciplined by the ‘free’ choices of individuals rather than by ‘established interests’. Professional, bureaucratic and union groups would be less able to exercise a monopoly over the decision-making of individuals or constrain the autonomous actions of individuals, the expression of individual preferences, or their self-determination (Beare et al. 1989; Chubb and Moe 1990). For the former Prime Minister, John Howard, this amounted to re-organising the public sector around the ‘great liberal principles’ of incentive, choice and self-reliance (Howard 2001), sentiments that market advocates like Chubb and Moe would undoubtedly agree with.

For those working within the public sector, self-management and its techniques promised to remove the constraints on managers imposed by its entrenched bureau-professional organisation. Government departments and agencies would be encouraged, if not forced, to develop their own mission statements and objectives, making budgetary decisions and generally managing their performance (Davis et al. 1989; Weller and Lewis 1989). Freedom here was associated with enabling public organisations and those
within them to determine their collective destiny in the same way as an individual would shape his or her own life.

Self-management also promised to liberate schools and citizens. The creation of a market of educational providers promised to restore power to individual citizens for the education of their education, and end what some construed as the socialisation of educational objectives. For example, market advocates, Chubb and Moe (1990), write:

Effective authority within market settings, then, is radically decentralized. In private sector education, the people who run each school decide what they will teach, how they will teach it, who will do the teaching, how much to charge for their services, and virtually everything else about how education will be organized and supplied. Students and parents assess the offerings, reputations, and costs of the various schools and make their own choices about which to attend. No one makes decisions for society. All participants make decisions for themselves. (Chubb and Moe 1990, 29)

While on the one hand schools would be disciplined by the choices of empowered parents choosing which schools their children are going to attend, on the other hand, greater school autonomy would empower school leaders. Like their management counterparts in the public sector, principals are to be accorded managerial decision-making authority for such things as staff recruitment, day-to-day management, school publicity, and budgeting. ‘Freedom to manage’, as it has been described, promised to free principals from the constraints and influence of bureaucrats, professionals, unions and experts. Understanding self-management in terms of freedom has led some to claim, “management arrangements are what empower people.
Empowerment, in short, is the purpose of management” (Hargreaves and Hopkins 1991, 15).

Resembling Fukuyama’s (1989) infamous characterisation of Western society’s irresistible progression towards individual freedom and market liberalism, in these descriptions freedom and empowerment are the motors of the reform of the welfare state and the goal of self-management, and their ultimate ethical justification. These are the principles according to which liberal democratic societies are to be organised. How satisfactory is it, however, to explain this reform as a progression towards a society free from bureaucratic, sectarian and excessive governmental power? Can we use this rhetoric of freedom as a way to legitimately understand the basis and nature of reform of the public sector and education systems?

Freeing the liberal subject?

The rhetoric of freedom used by the above self-managing reform proponents represents a ‘mode of intelligibility’ that Hindess (1987a; also Hunter 1994; Meredyth 1994) characterises as ‘principled’. In this mode of perception, society and governmental programs are to be, or are expected to be, organised around a priori moral philosophical principles drawn from canonical liberal political and philosophical doctrines. For liberals, freedom is one of those immutable absolutes, and the market is the form of that principle. Accordingly, government activity and policy must be an expression of freedom through the market form.
With freedom (and the market) constituting the overriding principle for social and political organisation, government is to be put to the service of freedom. Hence the above commentary and analyses construe the problem with the welfare state and its bureaucracy as one of organising social and political life around state power rather than individual freedom and the market. Neo-liberal thinkers and politicians perceived these interventions into the civil and economic spheres of life as a threat to individual liberty. In contrast, securing the organisation of social and political life according to the principle of freedom required the state to divest itself of the civil and economic spheres of life by circumscribing its activities to securing the ‘natural order’ of these realms, in this case by instituting the market, and maintaining the state’s legal and constitutional infrastructure.

However, this perspective problematically essentialises both the market and the state. That is, both are seen to have “an essence or inner principle that produces necessary effects simply by virtue of its presence” (Hindess 1987a, 8). In this case, the market is an index of freedom whilst the state and its planning is an index of control. Markets are seen to denote progress towards freedom whilst the welfare state and its planning *modus operandi* signal a dominating power essentially incompatible with the exercise of personal liberty enabled by the market. While this essentialised and dichotomous conceptual premise enables the pursuit and assessment of social and policy developments in terms of freedom, or the “actualisations of economic or political theories” (Meredyth 1994, 181), it fails to grasp the conditions and complexity of government (Hindess 1987a). In
particular, freedom and government are not binary opposites but mutually constitutive in so far as the rationalities and practices of the governmental state form free citizens (Foucault 2007; Foucault 2008; Rose 1999b).

For example, in liberal democracies, the freedom of individuals is dependent upon individual self-government and this is made possible through the civilising apparatuses associated with liberal state formation (Burchell 1996; Hunter 1988; Hunter 1994). The disciplinary and governmental technologies associated with the exercise of state power, such as schooling, social work and health institutions, provide the “practices of governmental self-formation” (Dean 1995, 563). Through these practices, norms of behaviour and thought are enfolded into the individual’s being, and the attributes and capacities of the rational, self-determining and autonomous individual are formed. Here, the ‘free individual acting in the market place’ is a product of enrolling individuals in governmental technologies that do not seek to crush their freedom and autonomy, but instead shape it. The market, for instance, operates optimally not when individuals are ‘free’, but when they think and act in ‘market-oriented’ ways.

This important link between government and freedom and its exercise in the market is blurred in neo-liberal perspectives that invoke a rhetoric of freedom and empowerment (from the state and government) in their descriptions of self-managing reform (Kemp 1999a; Nelson 2004b). Because it is caught up in the essentialist dialectic of freedom and government, where freedom is the over-riding rationality of reform, anchoring the analysis of self-management to this point of view fails to
acknowledge that self-managing reform (including decentralisation, freeing schools to compete in a market place of providers and therefore providing parents with choice of schools), rather than signalling freedom through the diminution of the state and government, is evidence of governmental power, its reconfiguration and its extension. In other words, while neo-liberals may justify self-managing reform with the rhetoric that it empowers individuals and restores individual freedom, this rhetoric and claim does not constitute an adequate basis for us to understand what self-managing reform actually is.

Take, for example, the characterisation of the marketisation of schools and the performance management regimes of testing and the publications of results that have accompanied self-management (Buckingham 2008). While marketisation and performance management regimes may be lauded for giving freedom of choice of school for parents, these regimes actually cultivate in citizens certain forms of calculation related to exercising one’s freedom in the education marketplace. In a context in which parents can no longer expect the state to choose which schools their children will attend, parents are to think about their children’s education in terms of choosing the most suitable provider of educational goods and services. This choice is to be informed not by parental intuition or community gossip but through assessing the performance data of schools in respect to key indicators, such as exam results and rates of graduation. Therefore, far from returning to individuals the possibility of making free, rational choices free from the state, bureaucracy or other constraining relations of power (Lauder 1991), these markets and market mechanisms
install certain ways of reasoning how one will exercise free choice (Besley and Peters 2007; Smith 1993).

Put simply, freedom is being re-shaped around governmental imperatives rather than being retrieved in some un-distilled form. So, while John Howard claimed his government’s policies attempted to ‘free the individual’, his policies for greater freedom involved an assemblage of regulatory techniques for guiding the individual in making certain free rational calculations and decisions. These regulatory techniques actually give rise to the autonomous, rationally calculating and self-governing self that is assumed to be a priori (Hindess 1996b).

We should, therefore, approach with scepticism the belief that the proliferation of choice, markets, devolution and self-management are generated from a kind of evolutionary logic of human freedom and self-government. The ‘neo-evangelical’ claims (Derrida 1994) that such reforms to contemporary liberal democracy signal not only the restoration of individual liberty but also the indomitable power of freedom and empowerment in shaping social organisation and social and historical developments (Fukuyama 1989) should be taken with a bucket of salt.

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3 I describe his notion of ‘the end of history’ as infamous because as Derrida writes: “For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangelize in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realized itself as the ideal of human history: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity. Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy and of the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history, instead of celebrating the ‘end of ideologies’ and the end of the great emancipatory discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, have so many men, women and children been subjugated, starved or exterminated on the earth” Derrida, J. (1994).
Education policy cannot return society to a pre-social and pre-political reality free from relations of power and out of which individual freedom will be restored because freedom is conditional on the exercise of governmental power and the objective of government is not reducible to the principle of freedom.

Is empowerment ‘de-governmentalisation’?

A similar rendering of reform is evident in some accounts of social progressives. These too have represented self-managing reforms in terms of freedom, empowerment and autonomy, which suggests a ‘de-governmentalisation’ of the educational arena. Rather than reject this language outright as obfuscation, mystification or myopic, I want to wrest this discourse of freedom, empowerment and autonomy from its ‘principled’ use and to instead locate it firmly in relation to the realm of the government of the state and its people. Let me elaborate.

Some critics have keenly described devolution, school autonomy and self-management in the language of freedom and empowerment. For Rizvi (1994), the ‘devolutionary thrust’ in the Schools in Australia (Karmel 1973) report and the subsequent reports of the Commonwealth Schools Commission (1975, 1976, 1978) represents attempts at creating an empowering autonomy for schools, teachers and communities in the face of bureaucratic instrumentalism. He reasons:

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the loss of a sense of community in modern society which had led to increased alienation and disaffection, a sense of powerlessness in the face of organizations that had become too large, too complex and altogether too remote from the cultural meaning by which humans live… devolution and self-management are central mechanisms for releasing a ‘tremendous reservoir of social energy, now locked in resentments of bureaucratic and hierarchical organization’. (Rizvi 1994, 1)

Rizvi evokes an image of a monolithic bureaucracy, a fear of popular alienation and powerlessness, and a conviction that reforming bureaucracy will produce community empowerment. Large bureaucratic education systems were perceived to be oriented to control and means-ends rationality, frustrating authentic self-determination. Rizvi concludes that in diminishing the power of these constraints devolution and self-management supports the empowerment of citizens, particularly for the working class and disadvantaged (see also Lingard et al. 2000). With a similar sentiment, Dudley and Vidovich (1995) reflect on the advocacy for devolution, decentralisation and school autonomy in the reports of the Commonwealth Schools Commission:

in spite of its contradictions and inconsistencies, the ideology of the Schools Commission as espoused in these early reports did have a coherent focus which could best be described as the democratic empowerment of the individual. (Dudley and Vidovich 1995, 117)

This kind of description resonates with the abovementioned politicians and experts of management who proclaim that the de-bureaucratisation of education systems removes constraints on individual
activity and decision-making imposed by an over-bearing state and government. In limiting the power and monopoly exercised over choice by political authorities, unions, professionals and the state, devolution, school autonomy and self-management are said to empower individuals by increasing their exercise of personal freedom (Beare et al. 1989; Caldwell and Spinks 1988; Chubb and Moe 1990). Here, self-managing reforms through the ‘logic of empowerment’ resemble a move towards a more liberal state and less government.

Anyone conversant with the topic of self-management might object to this comparison between education management theorists and critics by claiming that they represent two very different perspectives. And this is true to an extent. While the former construed managerial and market strategies and practices as concomitant to de-regulation, self-determination, self-reliance and therefore empowerment, critics such as Dudley and Vidovich (1995), Rizvi (1994) and Lingard et al. (2000) have been critical of, if not hostile towards, their use. Management and markets represented the corruption of the democratic empowerment essential to devolution and self-management by individualistic, economistic and instrumentalist rationalities. These rationalities and practices, it was argued, produce:

an institutional culture in which ends are separated from means and where people are valued only for what they produce… the importation into education of instrumentalist values, grounded on such motives as the self-interest of the individual. (Olssen et al. 2004, 191-192)
However, despite this difference the belief of critics that devolution and self-management can be empowering reinforces their similarities with the above proponents of managerialist approaches to self-management. Both assume that devolution, self-management and school autonomy constitute a desirable form of social organisation that possesses the potential to create individual and community freedom and empowerment, where freedom and empowerment are understood essentially and philosophically. Rizvi writes, for example, that “devolution is not simply a decision-making system; rather, it is a moral principle for organising social life, essential for securing human dignity and freedom” (Rizvi 1994, 2). The argument he presents is that devolution is the organisational principle for freeing and empowering individuals, communities and schools from bureaucracy’s iron cage of excessive and restrictive constraints on individual and community authentic self-determination. It promises an empowered, democratic and free society.

These critics’ account, therefore, are beset by a similar limitation to that of the liberals’ account just described. When liberal or progressive accounts describe devolution as a ‘moral principle’ for securing freedom rather than, say, a governmental program or technology for ‘conducting’ people, their analysis tends to operate at the level of abstraction and philosophy. While abstraction is not problematic in itself, we must exercise caution when assuming that this mode of analysis can describe the actual decision-making that occurs in the field of public policy (Burchell 1994; Hindess 1987a; Mereythy 1994). Its method of deriving principles such as freedom, emancipation and self-determining personhood from theoretical
abstraction risks a “contemplative bracketing of the actual ‘governmental’ organization of the school” (Hunter 1994, 29).

In other words, for critics, the problem of educational administration is frequently understood as a broadly philosophical problem (Hunter 1994; Meredyth 1994). For example, for Rizvi the administration of education is expected to be reconciled with the achievement of democracy and our “highest moral principles of justice and equality” (Rizvi 1994, 2). Drawing upon Marxist theorist, Raymond Williams, Rizvi casts devolution as a principle of organisation reconciled with the theoretical domain of Marxism. That is, devolution and self-management are a means to authentically empower people from government, bureaucracy and economic exploitation. The problem here is that Rizvi reduces the domains of government and its technologies of administration to abstract principles and their realisation. He indexes the organisation of education to the achievement of an historical mission of individual freedom, moral self-development and self-determination. In so doing, his analysis privileges the abstracted principles derived from Marxism and liberalism whilst ignoring the actual historical formation and discursive practices of the educational arena.

In summary, then, self-management, freedom, emancipation and empowerment do not signal the achievement of a principled freedom or the restoration of an autonomous subjectivity. The fact is that they are invoked in governmental programmes and strategies aimed at administering individuals in relation to problems that confront education systems and the prosperity and wellbeing of the state, economy and population. The
language of ‘freedom’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘empowerment’ are, to use the language of Dean, “inserted into a system of purposes” (Dean 1999, 169) that aim to shape individual conduct in response to determined problems (Baistow 2000; Cruikshank 1999). In other words, rather than indicating an absence of government, their employment in political reasoning and programmes of government suggest that they to operate as ‘solutions’ to the perceived problems of state power, government over-reach and regulatory excess. In other words, self-managing reforms constitute government through empowerment and autonomy.

The crisis of legitimacy

The final explanation of the link between politics, government and self-managing reforms that I want to canvass comes from those who link self-managing reforms in education to a crisis of the welfare state and the subsequent need for its restructure (Dale 1989; Gewirtz 2002; Hall 1998; Whitty et al. 1998). Derived from a Gramscian and a Habermasian line of thought, this explanation of reform may be termed the legitimacy thesis.

Prevalent in the critical accounts of reform in the United Kingdom, this thesis begins with the idea that between the end of World War Two and the 1970s there emerged an agreed form of political and governmental organisation: the welfare state (Clarke and Newman 1997). This welfare state was based upon a settlement or compromise between capitalists and socialists, the Left and Right, and labour and capital (Offe 1984). The consensus included limiting the role and size of the capitalist market,
combating the anti-social elements in the capitalist market economy (Hindess 1987a), and fostering government’s protection of the wellbeing of all through the expansion of welfare programmes and activities designed to protect the welfare and the social, civil and political rights of citizens (Marshall 1964). This included the provision of comprehensive schooling, universal health care and social security programs and payments.

Being a settlement between different interests, the welfare state rested on contradictory, tenuous and unstable foundations. This was the condition for cracks in the consensus slowly appearing in the late 1960s and 1970s under the weight of a global economic downturn, a tightening of private capital investment, rising unemployment, a shrinking youth labour market and the counter-culture movement (Offe 1984). The legitimacy of the welfare state was subjected to scrutiny. Continued disparities between social groups in the distribution of resources and social, health and educational outcomes were used as evidence by liberals, social progressives, the New Right and conservatives alike of the failures of the welfare state, its expansive bureaucracy, and its welfare programs (Dean 1999).

According to these accounts of crisis, this ‘legitimation crisis’ of the state in the 1970s was constituted by the following three crises (Ball 1990; Dale 1989; Dudley and Vidovich 1995; Gewirtz 2002). First, there was a fiscal crisis of the state, which pertained to securing the accumulation of capital and economic growth under the weight of global economic recession. Second, there was a crisis of legitimacy of the state on account of the scepticism about the efficacy of welfare and the achievement of
equality, for instance, through compensatory and redistributive policies. Third, and related to both of these, was a crisis of social control, with doubts over the ability of the state to secure the welfare of the population leading to civil unrest and disputes between industry and workers.

With the capitalist welfare state coming under siege, securing the consent and obedience of the population was necessary to avoid bringing instability to the entire governmental system. This ‘problematic of legitimacy’ was fertile territory for the political ideologies and social values of conservatives, the New Right and neoliberals to take root and territorialise the social, political and economic landscape (Dudley and Vidovich 1995; Smyth 1995). Moreover, the capitalist state, keen to avert questioning of its legitimacy and hence the disobedience of its citizens, sought to install more efficient and economic methods for generating economic growth and regulating citizens.

The ensuing reforms resemble those I have termed self-managing reforms. These included the reduction in the size of the public sector, reform to public sector organisation through managerialism and commercialisation, the privatisation of public sector agencies and entities, the atrophy of the power of unions, the creation of quasi-markets and competitive mechanisms in the delivery of public goods and services, and the reduction in corporate taxes in order to stimulate private capital investment. These reforms averted the crisis of capital accumulation by supporting public sector efficiencies and fostering private sector models of action, private investment and, consequently, wealth creation.
The market and managerial reform of the public sector would also perform a hegemonic function. As markets depoliticised economic and social matters, because the market is seen as a blindly neutral means for distributing resources based upon personal attributes such as enterprise and self-reliance, social and economic disparities were attributable to individual conduct rather than contestable structural inequalities (Apple 2005; Whitty et al. 1998). As well, by enrolling individuals into market-based activity and consequently tying people’s personal ideology and conduct to the capitalist hegemonic order and its goals, markets countered the potentially explosive effects of growing cynicism regarding capitalism and the welfare state (Gewirtz 2002; Whitty et al. 1998). Moreover, markets, although described in the language of empowerment, freedom and autonomy, were a means for disciplining individuals for efficient conduct modelled on private enterprise (Pollitt 1993).

This perspective, therefore, attributes self-managing reforms encompassing the use of markets and management to the crisis of the state and its legitimacy. These reforms promised to strengthen the welfare state’s popular legitimacy by disciplining individual conduct around economic imperatives, and thereby diverting people’s criticism of its capitalist functions and its ineffectiveness in guaranteeing social equality.

*A welcomed or regrettable reform?*

Critics and proponents of self-managing reforms would largely agree with many empirical descriptions of changes to the welfare state occurring from
the time of the crisis in 1970s. This would include the move towards decentralised forms of authority and organisation, the reconfiguration of the centralist regulation of educational activity, the use of quasi-markets and market mechanisms, the exercise of restraint by governments and political authorities in acting in ways that may distort the market, and the undermining of the legitimacy and influence of bureaucrats, professional groups and unions (Lingard, Knight, and Porter 1993; Marginson 1997a; Olssen, Codd, and O'Neill 2004). Despite this agreement, the perspective drawn from the ‘legitimacy thesis’ takes a more critical position on the intent and effects of self-managing and welfare state reform that liberals would care to embrace.

Liberals, such as those affiliated with the New Right, regard self-managing reforms positively because these reconcile political and social organisation with the supposed liberal fundamentals of Western civilisation. That is, in reducing the power and influence of the state and government over the civil and economic spheres of life, these reforms strengthened the private sphere including individual freedom, personal responsibility and self-reliance. The individual and his or her freedoms were restored as the ontological precept of social and economic activity, and a more efficient, just and democratic means for distributing scarce resources was offered to the modern liberal state. Even those affiliated with the Left, such as the Australian Labor Party (ALP), welcomed these reforms: markets, many with the ALP argued, offered individuals freedom while also being an efficient means for distributing scarce resources (Marginson 1993; Marginson 1997a; Marginson 1997b).
In contrast to liberals, critical sociologists perceive the intent and effects of such reforms rather negatively. In the eyes of many critics, the increasing use of markets represented a means for “defeating socialism” (Leys 2001, 12). Conceiving the welfare state as a “little island of socialism created by the working class in the sea of capitalist society” (Hindess 1987a, 100-101), and essentialising the market as rapacious and exploitative, many critics have expressed concern that individual self-interest had become a privileged organising principle of governmental activity at the expense of educational, social and moral principles (Ball 1998; Gewirtz, Ball, and Bowe 1995; Gewirtz 2002; Olssen, Codd, and O'Neill 2004). Reinforcing the status quo and serving the power and interests of society’s most privileged, both marketisation and managerialisation threatened social democratic values (such as the protection of citizenship rights and a commitment to social equality) and democratic practices (such as democratic decision-making in organisations and stakeholder negotiation in policy formulation).

For Gewirtz (2002), self-managing reforms, paradoxically, are the foundations for another looming crisis of legitimacy for the state and capitalism. She anticipates that social instability, fragmentation and conflict will result from the welfare state being hollowed out and its role reduced to driving efficiencies and supporting economic competitiveness. For Gewirtz, this crisis can be averted only if those individuals with a social democratic and welfarist ideology once again control the state.
Distinguishing between sovereign power and governmental power

Those working with the crisis of legitimacy perspective have made important contributions to the self-managing reform debates. As I mentioned, such research has linked self-managing reforms to the reform of the welfare state, and they have identified many of the knowledges, techniques and practices that have made this reform possible. However, I believe new insights about these reforms can be gleaned by approaching this period from a different perspective. Specifically, while I agree that self-managing reforms are related to a crisis in the 1970s and 1980s, evident in industrial conflict, global recession, reform of the public sector, and fiscal restraint on government and attacks on state power in the name of individual empowerment, I want to approach this as another type of crisis, not necessarily one of legitimation. This begs the question, then, what kind of crisis was it? And why did it precipitate self-managing reforms?

From the perspective of a Foucauldian “analytics of government” (Dean 1999, 18), the form of political analysis associated with the ‘legitimation crisis perspective’ runs the risk of conflating government with the sovereign state. Let us consider this conflation in more detail.

In his later genealogies of the liberal state and government, Foucault cast doubt on a form of political analysis that centred on state power. He made a remark oft repeated in Foucauldian studies of government that we had yet to “cut off the king’s head” (Foucault 1998, 89). This is a fascinating turn of phrase to say the least. Foucault’s imputation was that modern political theory continued to use political concepts of earlier
centuries to describe the exercise of political power in the twentieth century.

The problem with this kind of analysis is that it remains transfixed by the notion of a sovereign form of power, usually identified with the state. This analysis assumes Hobbes’ (1996) Leviathan image of the state. The state is construed as a centre of power with tentacles of control sprawled out over the entire social body of the nation, a “vertical encompassment” (Ferguson and Gupta 2005, 107). It is composed of instrumentalities or institutions invented largely by the state, which enact its functions, including its most basic including creating and enforcing laws and rules, protecting the commonwealth, and in Marxian analysis supporting capitalist relations of production. Beyond these functions, the state is inescapable and all-powerful, shaping all social and economic relations in some way.

This image of the state produces a very specific conception of political power. It takes as the principal rationality of politics and government the maintenance of the obedience, legitimation and consent of the population, and in turn the maintenance and augmentation of the state’s power, or the power of those that ‘control’ the state. Consequently, analytical privilege is accorded to a “conception of government as the work of a sovereign power that is founded on, and operates through, the consent of its subjects” (Hindess 1996a, 131). This form of political and social criticism targets the repressive and ‘reproductive’ role of state institutions in securing consent or obedience through legislation, domination, subjugation, obfuscation and coercion (for example, Althusser 1971).
This conception of political power is clearly evident in the analysis of the crisis of legitimacy. Indeed, use of the word ‘legitimacy’ gestures to its conceptual lineage from the classical liberal political philosophy of Locke and Hobbes in which consent is the function of power (Hindess 1996a). In its contemporary deployment, the 1970s is described as a crisis of legitimacy because the people’s consent to the exercise of sovereign power was questioned: did the state have the legitimacy to exercise its political power? Did those in power have the consent of the people to control the state? How could the obedience and consent of the people and hence the power of the state, its instrumentalities and those in control be secured?

This form of reasoning political and governmental power is possible because government is conceived as the sovereign state securing consent and legitimacy, often in the interests of “an impure sovereignty residing elsewhere: in the prince, the old ruling elite or the new capitalist classes” (Hunter 1994, xviii-xix). However, because governing merely serves the interest of preserving and extending the legitimacy, strength and force of the state, state sovereignty and the exercise of governmental power are problematically conflated. In separating state sovereignty from government, Foucault (Foucault 1998; Foucault 2007; Foucault 2008) illuminated how the practical problems of governing related to the population and the processes, phenomena and institutions proper to it, shape the concerns of the political sphere and the state beyond the question of legitimacy. Moreover, the state was not a magical ‘source of power’ inasmuch as “the state only rules through specific instruments of government” (Hunter 1994,
According to Foucauldian studies, and I expand upon this in the following chapter, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries government gained autonomy from the problems of sovereignty (Hindess 1997). This meant that the administration of the state increasingly became concerned with governing the population and its social and economic activity for the purpose of optimising its health, wealth, tranquillity and wellbeing. The exercise of sovereign power based on rulers issuing edicts for securing the citizens’ obedience and the state’s territory, power and legitimacy made way for rationalising the exercise of political power governmentally. The pre-eminent political concerns were now governing the population, the field of social interaction, and the processes of the economy based upon the nature and knowledge of these objects of government.

By expanding our perspective on the matter of state and political power to include this field of government, it is possible to propose that securing the state’s legitimacy was not the over-riding concern of policy-makers and politicians in the 1970s. It is fanciful to imagine, for instance, a room full of politicians and policy-makers deliberating on how to secure the state’s legitimacy or the consent of the people. I do not deny the existence of specific tactics used to legitimise political and governmental decision-making, or to create the appearance of effective and reasonable governmental decision-making and action where perhaps there is little (Zipin and Brennan 2009). Rather, my point is that the rationalities of consent and legitimacy do not exhaust the field of rationalities and concerns that traverse the domain of politics and government (Dean 1999; Hindess 1996a). The political thought of the 1970s and 1980s was concerned with
addressing a panoply of issues confronting the nation, including civil disorder, what probably appeared to be the troubling or foreboding problems of rising unemployment and slowed economic growth, the need to stimulate economic activity while keeping inflation under control, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public services, addressing the social consequences of the idleness of unemployed youth and poverty, and increasing young people’s access to and participation in education (Hall 1986).

In pointing to these practical problems of government I do not mean that the analyses of the crisis of legitimation ignore or gloss over their political significance. However, that form of analysis potentially reduces to questions of legitimacy, consent and obedience any political deliberations on and responses to the raft of problems within the state, such as those described above. As with centuries in political philosophy, the crisis of legitimation analytic maintains a focus on analysing social and policy developments, such as self-managing reforms in education, in terms of how these secure the obedience of the population of rational and autonomously willed individuals and the state’s legitimacy.

An alternative to this approach is to move away from deferring complex social and policy developments such as self-managing reforms to a single logic of legitimacy, as if the object of government was to establish the state’s legitimacy and secure the obedience of the population. By treating the political concern for government as a domain linked to but relatively distinct from the question of state sovereignty, the doors are thrown open to the possibility of analysing the complex array of self-
managing reforms that proliferated from the 1970s in terms of (1) the specific problems these reforms responded to, (2) the expertise, knowledge and techniques that were brought to bear on these problems, and (3) the specific political and governmental ends to which these interventions were directed.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have argued that the analysis of the relationship between politics and self-managing reforms should not: (1) construe self-management as aligning the organisation of social, political and governmental life with the principle of individual liberty; (2) construe self-management as authentically empowering individuals and communities in their self-determination; or (3) give too much weight to the idea that school self-management is a product of a crisis of legitimacy that confronted the welfare state in the 1970s.

While these perspectives do provide insights into self-managing reform, they also have their limitations. In the first and second instances, the question of government is often erased, as if we had moved into a state of individual liberty, self-development and self-governance. In the third case, the state and its relationship to the government of the population are frequently seen through the prism of legitimacy, consent and obedience and, consequently, the causes for and effects of self-managing reforms are reduced to securing its own legitimacy and power.
My task in the following chapter is to outline a different set of concepts for explaining the link between self-managing reforms and politics, and therefore, to offer an alternative approach to the analysis of self-management.
Chapter 3: History, Theory and Method

Introduction

I concluded the previous chapter by gesturing towards the limitations of placing the state’s legitimacy as the privileged object of political analysis. I suggested that this obscures the importance of a separate ‘governmental domain’, which I characterised as a realm of political and governmental problems beyond that of consent and legitimacy. It is the task of this chapter to explore in greater detail how this distinction between state sovereignty and government emerged and how this opens the way for analysing self-managing reforms not at the level of state legitimacy, or ‘state restructure’, but as a transformation at the level of, what Foucauldian studies in government term, governmental rationalities and techniques (Dean 1999; Rose 1999a). I argue that there are key insights and concepts derived from this Foucauldian perspective that are useful for thinking about the relationship between self-managing reforms, government and politics.
Rethinking the state and government

Foucault’s genealogies and subsequent Foucauldian studies in government support the case that the crisis of the 1970s should be analysed not in terms of changes in the ‘state form’ occasioned by questions of its legitimacy, but in terms of a transformation in the government of the population and the processes, phenomena and institutions proper to it. This focus on the transformations within the fields of government and politics has been given considerable currency by the increasing scepticism raised about the power of ‘the state’ to significantly explain social and political developments and here I want to elaborate on what this entails (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991; Dean 1994, 1999; Foucault 1977, 2007, 2008; Rose 1999a, 1999b).

As discussed previously, the studies by Foucault and his followers into the formation of the modern liberal state cast doubt on the conceptual architecture of conventional political theory by disaggregating the sovereign state from government. By analytically beginning with “the heterogeneous and dispersed microphysics of power” (Jessop 2006, 36), these studies identified an important historical development that occurred around the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe. This was the emergence of a distinct mode of exercising power that involved acting upon the social body for the purposes of maximising the health, wealth and tranquillity of a state’s population.

This signalled a transformation in the administration of the state away from a sovereign mode of administration towards one concerned for
governing the population. Administration based on the constitution, law, edicts and the use of brute force made space for a mode of regulation of the population based upon knowledge of the internal features and processes of the population and the economy. This government of the population, governmentality, rather than sovereign power and its concerns, became the “common ground for all modern forms of political thought and action” (Rose et al. 2006, 86). While one important consequence of illuminating this transformation has been the criticism of an analysis of the state and political power solely focused on consent, legitimation and obedience, there is another important methodological point to be drawn from a close examination of how this transformation occurred.

Put simply, this transformation in social administration is irreducible to the thoughts and actions of ‘a state’ or its politicians seeking obedience, control and its legitimacy. This might be a conclusion drawn by state-control or state-centred analyses (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 1981; Dale 1989; Gewirtz 2002). However, such a perspective underestimates the influence of a range of actors and entities beyond the political realm that composed the social body, which included social reformers, educationalists, churches, charities and philanthropists. Organised around a multiplicity of rationalities, practices and activities, these diverse actors and entities were engaged in regulating various aspects of the life and conduct of individuals and organisations. It was from these heterogeneous actors and organisations and their haphazard knowledges, techniques and practices of researching, caring, educating and correcting
that the state assumed responsibility for caring for the population and the processes and phenomena immanent to it.

Described by Foucault (2008) as the ‘governmentalisation of the state’, the state’s taking responsibility for the care and welfare of the population involved rulers and political authorities increasingly connecting their calculations, strategies and technologies to the diverse assemblage of largely non-political rationalities, practices, projects and groups “that in different ways had long tried to shape and administer the lives of individuals in pursuit of various goals” (Rose et al. 2006, 87). Consequently, the Foucauldian analysis of government does not treat the state as a fixed and united entity that gives rise to government and its practices and techniques. Rather, the state is, counter-intuitively, a composition of multiple and dispersed agents of rule and the resulting “patterns of regulation” (Popkewitz 1996, 29). The state is continually reshaped and its limits continually shifted as a consequence of the activities of these heterogeneous agents, organisations and individuals engaged in administering the health, wealth and education of the population. If the state has the appearance of an essence and of being a centralised power, this is a consequence of, firstly, its congealing of these mobile relations between the instruments of political authority and the agents of social rule and, secondly, its being a rationality of these diverse agents for the exercise of governmental power across the social field. In treating the state as “a dynamic ensemble of relations and syntheses that at the same time produces the institutional structure of the state and the knowledge of the state” (Lemke 2007, 48), the state is re-imagined as a centripetal rather than
centrifugal force, drawing things into a ‘centre’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987).

Consequently, if the state is effectively an instrument and effect of government, then the analysis of political and governmental power is irreducible to the state construed as an essentially unified, all-powerful and calculating actor seeking legitimacy and obedience through government. The state is not the cause and originator of modern forms of government because it does not occupy the entire field of power relations and regulatory practice, and in fact it “can only operate on the basis of the other, already existing power relations” (Foucault 1980b, 64). The analysis of politics and government must instead give considerable regard to the activities of this multiplicity of agents of social rule and their normative knowledges, practices and techniques. These make the modern state and its government possible.

**A transformation in the modalities of rule**

*The state and techniques and practices of government*

If the state does not have a central ‘body’ from which it deliberates and calculates, or is limited in its possession of techniques and instruments for the calculation and enactment of government (instead relying on heterogeneous social agents for these), then the link between the crisis of the welfare state and self-managing reforms cannot be explained by reference to a state deliberating on and utilising its instruments in relation to the problems of its form, strength or legitimacy. Instead, based upon the
preceding discussion this link is best explained in terms of how the plethora of agencies, organisations, programs and practices at this time engaged in what appears to be a “transformation in the modalities of rule” (Larner 2000, 251; Popkewitz 1996; Popkewitz 2000c)

To focus on transformations in the modalities of rule involves eschewing the state-centred legitimacy approaches employed by Gewirtz (2002), Dale (1989) and the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (1981). Because the ‘legitimation analytic’ conflates sovereign power and governmental power, it construes these reforms as being generated from three crises that agents within the state “feel the need to resolve” (Gewirtz 2002, 10). Consequently, it narrows these conflicts to problems bearing on the state in terms of control and legitimation, which the state as a social actor needed to act on in order to secure obedience and the interests of sovereign rule. Here the state originates, enacts and determines the ends of social, political and policy developments in top-down fashion.

However, as I have noted, when we separate the sovereign from the governmental then the state as some unified entity with pre-given functions cannot explain these reforms to the government of the population, to the field of education, or to the public sector. By instead focusing on government as in large part the activity of a plethora of seemingly non-political and indirectly governmental entities and actors (which may include community groups, social movements, the expertises of economics, management, psychology, sociology and social work), the problem-space of analysis becomes how the relatively recent transformation in the government of the population, education and the public sector (commonly
described as neo-liberalism), evinces a transformation in how this array of spatially scattered agencies, organisations and programmes were practising and therefore regulating.

Self-managing reforms constitute this late twentieth century transformation of the techniques and practices of regulation of the welfare state. This transformation included: the introduction into the public services of new management techniques that governed public sector employees to the ends of improving objectives and outputs rather than bureaucratic or ‘public service principles’; the introduction of performance management techniques that sought to shape the calculations and conduct of individual employees and the organisation as a whole around ‘performance’; the devolution of responsibilities from central authorities that would accord greater autonomy for self-managing various aspects of the public enterprise; and the employment of quasi-markets and market techniques which facilitated both parental choice in the selection of schools and competitive and entrepreneurial practices within schools.

In this description, the crisis of welfare state, or its ‘restructure’, is this transformation in the techniques and practices of government. Moreover, this transformation is not the product of a centralising state augmenting its power, although state institutions have harnessed these techniques and practices. Rather, it is the product of an assemblage of fragments of knowledge, theory, concepts and practices created and used by a variety of social actors, expertises and agents of regulation, including social progressives, management consultants, sociologists, psychologists
and educationalists, who endeavour to manage aspects of the personal, social and economic life of the population.

Therefore, the study of self-managing reform must concern itself with self-managing reforms as a multiplicity of governmental techniques and practices. This involves eschewing an analysis of ‘the state’ as some material and institutional structure controlled by doctrines and principles and rather paying attention to the relationship between self-managing school reforms and the scattered organisations, knowledge producers, actors and programs engaged in managing specific problems of human existence.

**Rationalities of government**

Focusing attention simply on the technologies, techniques and practices of government risks analysis being conducted in the style of the ‘sociologies of governance’ (Dean 2007; Rose 1999b). Sociologies of governance are realist in that they are pre-eminently concerned with mapping the “actual organisation and operations of systems of rule, of the relations that obtain amongst political and other actors and organisations at the local levels and their connections into actor networks and the like” (Rose 1999b, 19). But merely documenting the techniques, practices and connections that produce governance tells us little about why these techniques and practices for governing emerged at this particular time and with what authority they emerged and proliferated.
Foucauldian studies in government enable the analyst to move beyond this analytical straightjacket. These studies provide a ‘toolkit’ for asking what the conditions were for the transformation in the technical regime of government. We may ask, for instance: what were the truthful ways of knowing, speaking and acting that enabled a transformation in how we thought about the individual and society and their government? What problems emerged for government, and in relation to what truths and authority were these rendered into problems to begin with? What are the presuppositions and the assumptions of these regimes of government?

According to Foucauldian studies in government, we can approach these questions by attending to an element intrinsic to the technical modalities of government and their emergence; that is, governmental rationalities (Dean 1999; Foucault 2007, 2008; Gordon 1991; Rose 1999b). For Foucault, government always contains an element of thought, and is in fact conditioned by thought. A rationality of government refers to a “way or system for thinking about the nature of the practice of government… capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it is practised” (Gordon 1991, 3). This consists of reasoning about what is to be governed, for what reason things are to be governed, through what means government should occur, and with what authority and to what ends.

These rationalities are inscribed in the theories, programmes and know-how of dispersed regulatory social agents and authorities, and are therefore, implemented in their employment. Reaching beyond the fixation of sociologies of governance on documenting the networks of governance,
the Foucauldian analytic of government examines the form or systems of reasoning about the perceived legitimate objects of government, the desirable ends of governmental intervention, and the legitimate means for enacting government embodied in the deployment of regimes of governmental practices, which may include a program of social intervention or educational reform.

Although these rationalities pertain to ways of thinking about government and the exercise of governmental power, these are not necessarily created within the realm of political interests or sovereignty. Governmental rationalities are historically and institutionally contingent inventions of humans (Dean 1994; Gordon 1991). For modern liberal government, it is in the truth making of the disciplines and expertise that form is in large part given to governmental reason. Dean describes this in terms of the:

forms of expertise, knowledge, information and calculation that are the conditions of government, its programmatic character, the language and vocabulary of rule, the formation of administrable objects and domains, and the changing forms and rituals of truth that authorize and are authorized by governmental practices and agents. (Dean 1995, 560)

Here our investigative lens is directed towards the historically and institutionally formed regimes of truth and knowledge that shape our reasoning around what constitute the proper objects, means and ends of government. However, it should also extend to how new ways of thinking about government are invented in ad hoc ways that link up and integrate
into a coherent logic an array of “practical attempts to think about and act upon specific problems in particular locales, and various other existing techniques and practices” (Rose 1999b, 27).

In short, then, an analysis of the governmental techniques and practices of self-managing reform, and the crisis it manifests, is impoverished without engaging with the transformation in how Western liberal democracies came to reason government and the exercise of governmental power in the late twentieth century. That is, how Western liberal democracies came to think about what were the proper objects, means and ends of government. This is unlike sociologies of governance because it assumes a constructivist theoretical stance. It opens to critical thought how our forms of visibility, intelligibility and action, especially around government, are shaped by the production of knowledge and truths, which constitute the condition of possibility for the techniques, practices and programs for our own government.

**Political discourse**

I have thus far outlined important historical facts, ideas and concepts in order to outline an approach to the analysis of self-managing reforms. This analysis is predicated on the notion that self-managing reforms are linked to a crisis of the welfare state during the 1970s and 1980s. I have made the case that this crisis represents a transformation in the rationalities and techniques of government and therefore self-managing reforms can be studied as a manifestation of this crisis of government. If, however,
government is distinct from the state and politics, what is the connection between politics and self-managing reforms that I have described in previous chapters?

In response to this question, and putting it simply, the political realm has a specific form of reasoning and these articulate with the rationalities of government of the heterogeneous organisations, agents and discourses engaged in the administration of the population. This link exists because when the diverse arts of government involving the complex of organisations, agents and programs were linked into the circuits of political power, political authorities then made the improvement, optimisation and individualisation of the population, and the means through which these would be achieved, their interest. In brief, the political rationalisation of the government of the state became ineluctably tied to social agents’ rationalisation of the regulation of life-conduct (Dean 1994; Reueschmeyer and Skocpol 1996), or the attempts made to govern the conduct of people by structuring their field of possible thought and action.

Take, for example, the link between governmental rationalities and political discourse that I raised in chapter one. In the 1970s and 1980s political authorities became concerned with, among other things, the problem of industrial and corporate competitiveness, the levels of dependency and passivity in the population, and the sense of entitlement to welfare. Political authorities increasingly construed the rationalities, technologies and programs of the welfare state as a problem for the government of the state. The expansion of political power across the social body and into the details of people’s personal lives was construed as too
controlling, detrimental to personal and economic freedom and a threat to national economic competitiveness. Increasingly it was reasoned that the regulatory power of the state should be restrained, that government should empower individuals from the state by enabling their self-fulfilment, autonomy and enterprise, and that the competitive market and private enterprise should take the lead in social and economic development.

This political rationalisation of the state in terms of how to secure the state, its population and its economy, did not remain in the domain of politics. It could not because the only way political objectives can be achieved is by translating these into the activities of those with the technologies that could shape the conduct of individuals and organisations. Consequently, the above political discourse of enterprise and competition spread throughout the social body, including into the enclosures of experts and their bounded expertise. Rose (1999a) draws our attention to the ‘inscription’ of this political discourse into the knowledge production in workplace management. Since the post World War Two period, fields within psychology were producing theories, knowledge and concepts of human beings as enterprising, autonomous, self-motivated, and self-actualising. As well, management researchers problematised private and public sector organisations in terms of their failure to create opportunities for personal autonomy, motivation, self-fulfilment and enterprise (Miller and Rose 1995; Rose 1996b; Rose 1999a).

This alignment between the concerns and objectives of political authorities and the techniques and knowledges for governing the workplace in an enterprising manner was not coincidental. Through political
discourse, as a “relatively systematic, explicit, discursive problematization and codification of the art or practice of government” (Dean 1994, 187), the political strategies, moralities, epistemologies and idioms were translated into the government of specific problem-spaces such as the workplace (Callon and Latour 1981; Wittrock and Wagner 1996). Through this process, the knowledges of the human and social sciences increasingly corresponded with the political domain’s new diagnosis of the problems confronting the state and the ambition of political authorities to create an enterprising, active, flexible, self-motivated and empowered society as a way to improved national wealth, health and wellbeing (Rose and Miller 1992).

Suffusing governmental and social domains with the political discourse of enterprise, autonomy, responsibility, initiative and flexibility was not the work of an all-powerful state or a political class. These new rationalisations of government by political authorities brought a diversity of experts, authorities and disciplinary and government technologies into a centre, through a range of mechanisms and incentives (see for example Rose and Miller 1992). And alternatively, the knowledge and techniques created outside of the political domain by these experts and authorities fed back into the reasoning of the political domain. Here, state institutions extended their scope of operation:

by a complex set of strategies, utilizing and encouraging the new positive knowledges of economy, sociality and the moral order, and harnessing already existing micro-fields of power in order to link
their governmental objective with activities and events far distant in space and time. (Rose 1999b, 18)

Political authorities and social experts and authorities were effectively brought into a common project of transforming the modalities and rationalities of government.

**Conclusion**

To the extent that critical sociology of education has taken up the analysis of self-managing reforms in terms of the exercise of political power it is laudable. However, the type of analysis that focuses on the legitimacy of the state or which construes the state as a key social actor fails to adequately engage with self-managing reforms as ‘governmental’. This chapter has provided a number of key insights, concepts and perspectives for an alternative analysis of self-managing reforms and its relationship to the exercise of political power.

I have argued that instead of using the state as the principal object for explaining both why and how the state and the field of education were transformed, such analysis might begin with examining the transformation of a plethora of governmental rationalities, practices and techniques. This has not meant I have rejected the state as an important category for analysis. I have argued, for instance, that the political domain has translated its socio-political objectives related to the state into the activities of social actors and the practices of knowledge production of a range of experts and authorities. What I have focused on, however, is that the change to the state
reflects a transformation in the modalities of government made possible by a transformation in the rationalisation of government by a range of social, governmental and political authorities.

In short, then, self-managing reforms might be thought of as an instance of, or program that reflects, this transformation of the modalities of government made possible by a transformation in the rationalities of government, including the government of education, by a range of social and political actors.

What, then, explains the causes and basis of this transformation in political rationality and governmental rationalities and practices that occurred most fully in the 1980s? Why this transformation and why at this time? In Part II of this thesis I examine how the crisis and critique of the welfare state might be understood as a manifestation of a tension intrinsic to the historical emergence of the modern exercise of political and governmental power and how it has come to be reasoned and enacted in our modern governmental state. It is at the roots of the rationalisation of the exercise of state power that we can find the source of that which causes grief to the welfare state at the end of the twentieth century. By implication, this will provide us with a better understanding of the emergence and nature of self-managing school reforms, to which I shall return in Part III of the thesis.
PART II: THE FORMATION OF THE LIBERAL STATE AND ITS CRISIS
Introduction

Part I set out a definition of the self-managing school by exploring the key texts and reforms that gave pertinence in expert and policy circles to the individual school as a discrete organisational entity. The contours of the self-managing school are created from the currents of self-managing reform occurring through the public sector. As these have been inextricably linked to the rationalities and machinations occurring in political and governmental discourse around ‘welfare state restructure’, I argued that the self-managing school might best be thought of as a political-technical assemblage.

I then argued that while the self-managing school’s emergence reflects a re-organisation of the welfare state, it should not be understood as being propelled by some sort of cultural progression towards freedom, empowering self-determination, or as a product of a crisis of the state’s
legitimacy. Introducing the contributions of Foucault and Foucauldian researchers on the subject of government, I outlined key concepts and ideas of an alternative approach to analysing the reform of this period that focuses on the transformation of rationalities and technologies of government. However, attributing this transformation of the state (and therefore self-managing reforms) to ‘new’ governmental and political ways of reasoning and enacting the regulation of the individual and population does not reveal the conditions for the emergence of this crisis of the state and the new way of reasoning its government. Understanding the emergence of this emergence will help us explain the emergence of self-managing schools reforms. Part II of this thesis addresses this concern.

My approach to this problem is informed by Foucault’s proposition that the welfare state crisis reflects a “crisis of liberalism” (Foucault 2008, 69). What did Foucault take this to mean? How does this relate to governmental rationalities and technologies? What is its implication for our understanding of self-managing reform in education? To answer these questions, it is necessary to examine elements of Foucault’s novel genealogy of the historical formation of the modern governmental state (Foucault 1988a; Foucault 2007; Foucault 2008). These have not been extensively used in education research so I want to elaborate upon them in some detail and then draw out their analytical significance for inquiries into education reform.
A genealogy of the modern liberal state

Foucault considers the liberal welfare state in his 1977-1978 lectures, *Security, Territory and Population* (Foucault 2007), in his 1979-1879 lectures, *The Birth of Biopolitics* (Foucault 2008), and in his *Tanner Lectures* at Stanford University (Foucault 1988a). The subject matter of Foucault’s lectures and writings are not confined to the welfare state. The welfare state is only a fragment in an inquiry that spans the pre-modern and modern eras and which has purchase on broader concepts such as the state, government and political power. Notwithstanding, Foucault’s explication of modern government and the state and his remarks on the welfare state provide a diagnosis of the 1970s and 1980s crisis of the welfare state. What is this diagnosis and how does he arrive at it?

Foucault’s genealogical method

Let us begin by considering the methodology that rendered Foucault’s diagnosis of crisis into existence. The method employed by Foucault and others engaged in ‘histories of the present’ is described as genealogical (Foucault 1980a; Kendall and Wickham 1999). The ethos of this work does not involve plotting a history of the welfare state with ‘the state’ the subject of history. These investigations eschew an understanding of the present based upon using grand theories, structuralist frameworks, or finding single origins or causes. It does not presuppose that there is a true and timeless meaning of an object with essential properties or hidden meanings that once
revealed can explain that object. Neither does it involve uncovering the great meta-narratives underpinning human history. So, what does the genealogical method do?

The genealogical method takes current forms of being and truth as the objects of historical investigation, presupposing truth and the style of our being are humanly invented and products of contingencies, including historical and political contingencies. This method involves investigating the complex and fragmented group of relations across a dispersed field that provide the conditions of possibility for the formation of rationalities, concepts, objects and practices that constitute the basis of our current concepts, truths and practices. In so doing, it provides a new point of view, along with innovative concepts, through which the present and its taken for granted truths and norms can be rendered knowable differently, and new forms of political action offered up (Dean 1999). This is one reason that Foucault’s analysis did not assume the existence and nature of the state, especially as an a priori (Lemke 2007).

Researching the complex of practices, knowledge and truths through which the existence of the modern state and government were made possible, the Foucauldian genealogy of the modern liberal government moved beyond the modernist discourse of the state through which political thought and analysis had predominantly occurred (Rose and Miller 1992). Foucault’s studies do not take for granted the concepts indebted to political thought from nineteenth century liberal political philosophy. The state is not construed as a totalitarian monster. The contract does not define the relationship between the state and the
individual. Civil society cannot be accepted as an *a priori* reality distinct from the state. The citizen is not narrowly defined as a juridical-political subject of rights. Indeed, rather than conducting his studies from the grand texts of political philosophy from which these notions might be derived, Foucault’s insights on political power were generated by a focus on “the more minor texts of political thinkers, polemicists, programmers and administrators” (Rose et al. 2006, 86). Where, then, did his research of government and politics lead him?

The genealogical method led Foucault to trace the regularities in the practices and thoughts of those who reflected on and acted upon all sorts of problems of political power, the state, the economy, the population, and so on. The study of ancient, pre-modern and modern rationalities and practices, led Foucault and his colleagues at the *College de France* (including Ewald 1991; Pasquino 1978) to illuminate in the most innovative way the various historical trajectories constituting the modern state’s formation. In particular, and pertinent to the diagnostic ethos of genealogy, these studies rendered intelligible the historical formation of key elements of political thought which inhere as deep foundations of the rationalities, values and techniques of government today, and consequently, what causes the welfare state grief. What are the key elements identified in Foucault’s analysis?

In these genealogies Foucault makes the argument that the liberal welfare state is a product of the formation of ways of thinking about and enacting political power beginning in the seventeenth century. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, termed ‘governmentality’, this refers to
a specific mode of the exercise of political power, one in which “the conduct of the totality of individuals becomes implicated in the exercise of sovereign power” (Dean 1999, 46). Governmentality brings into existence the governmental state wherein the population that inhabits the state is rendered into an object of government through political and intellectual technologies (such as statistics and school systems) for the achievement of the state’s security and prosperity. Governmentality, therefore, refers to the “certain way of thinking and acting embodied in all those attempts to know and govern the wealth, health and happiness of populations” (Rose and Miller 1992, 174).

Foucault draws attention to a dilemma at the core of the exercise of this political power. Because it is fashioned from two ancient and incompatible models of governing (termed the city-citizen and shepherd-flock games), and the doctrine of reason of state and the science of police (1988a, 1988b, 2007), the governmental state assumes a pastoral responsibility. However, a tension is created in this amalgam because this pastoral function occurs within a rationality of the state. This imbues the governmental state with an ‘individualising’ and ‘totalising’ potential and effect. That is, one of caring for the welfare of individuals, yet acquitting this role in relation to a more global concern for the security of the state. Exploring this dynamic and the tensions it produces is the subject of Part II.

In the following chapters I examine:

- how our current ways of thinking and enacting government are shaped by this pastoral role of the state and its antagonist
relationship with a liberal modality of government that seeks to produce freedom for the individual and the economy;

• the transformation in governmental technologies and rationalities beginning in the 1970s as a manifestation of this inherent problematic at the heart of the governmental state.

Part III will return us to the analysis of recent education reform.
Chapter 4: The Roots of the Pastoral State

Introduction

This chapter examines what Dean characterises as Foucault’s tracing of the “deep but obscure foundations of the values and ideals encapsulated in our twentieth century welfare state” (Dean 1999, 74). This is an important task because the critique and crisis of the welfare state was not merely generated from the pressures of the brute reality of contemporary life. As Foucault elucidated, this period of crisis of the modern liberal welfare state has just as much to do with economic downturn and industrial conflict of the 1970s and 1980s as it does the historical formation of political government and our beliefs about what it means to govern. It is the task of this chapter to explore the roots of the modern liberal state by tracing key elements and thoughts of Foucault’s genealogy of political rationality, and in particular
his examination of the doctrine of reason of state and the science of police as its key constitutive trajectories.

It is not my intention to draw immediate conclusions about the significance of Foucault’s genealogy to the problems of the welfare state. This will be done in chapter six. Instead, in this chapter I highlight our current state’s indebtedness to the historical emergence of ‘the state’ as a means for rationalising the exercise of political power, and its marriage to pastoral forms of government. I argue that this signifies the emergence of the state as a form of pastoral power, and this pastoral role is a fundamental element of the modern liberal state.

**The shepherd-flock and city-citizen games**

According to Foucault (Foucault 1988a; Foucault 1997), two ancient and incompatible models of governing inhere in the modern state, which has shaped how we rationalise and enact the exercise of political power. Let us consider these in more detail.

The first is the *Old Testament* notions of pastoral power modelled on the shepherd-flock relation, what Foucault terms the shepherd-flock game (Foucault 1988a). In Hebraic accounts, the shepherd must secure the salvation of the souls of members of the flock while exercising power over them. There is an individualising tendency in this art of governing because the shepherd must maintain constant individualised attention over the flock’s members. The shepherd’s duty is to do what is good for the flock and this requires the shepherd getting to know the flock both in detail and
as a whole. The shepherd must exercise vigilant surveillance without rest, ensure that the flock’s needs are met and they are properly cared for, and that they are protected from danger. The shepherd, as in today’s image of the politician, must more or less guide them.

This image of the shepherd-flock game was reconstituted in Christian thought from the fourth to sixteenth century and this prevails today. Christian notions of pastorship changed the relationship between the shepherd and the flock. The relationship was between God, the pastor and the flock. In Christian thought the individual was to contemplate his or her existence and to evaluate it according to external moral codes. The individual was compelled to confess to the shepherd who required a detailed knowledge of “the contents of their soul” (Dean 1999, 75). The individual was to renounce their existence to a higher will or authority such as God or the Church, on whom they would be dependent. Salvation would be a product of obedience, self-transformation and the exercise of self-control in light of established moral codes.

The second model of government comes from Greek antiquity and its Athenian notions of the *polis*, termed by Foucault the city-citizen game (Foucault 1988a). In the city-state the shepherd rule relation existed but this was markedly different. The image of the individual was legal and political. The individual citizen was equal to everyone else, exercising their freedom and rights within a juridical-political structure of the community. The important relationship was that between the individual citizen and the whole community set in the framework of the city.
This model of government is unlike the Christian pastorate in which care was the responsibility of the shepherd. The leader does not make individual citizens the object of government by caring for them or fostering their life. Rather, the leader pilots the state like captain piloting a ship (Foucault 2007), which means providing for the city-state conditions for interaction and living, and securing the city’s unity. “The political leader was to quiet any hostilities within the city and make unity reign over conflict” (Foucault 1988a). In the city, the individual was free and to this extent responsible for his own care and conduct as a matter of choice: obedience involved self-cultivation, self-mastery and austerity through the application of reason.

Here, then, we have two influential and incompatible models of governing (Dean 1994; Dean 1999). The shepherd-flock relationship illustrates a long trajectory of pastoral power concerned for every member of the community in his or her life, death and existence. To the extent that this model of governing and its practices are concerned with each individual member of the flock, these involve processes of individualisation and administration. By contrast, the city-citizen game conceives of the ruler’s power and the conception and government of the community rather differently. The Athenian city-citizen game models the exercise of power on a notion of the free, self-governing political community. Here, governing pertains to the survival and wellbeing of the city and therefore citizens are governed as legal-political citizen with rights and obligations indexed to the city. This model represents an act of totalisation insofar as
the significance of each individual is understood in relation to the wellbeing of the city.

As these are described, neither of these models of governing are images of governing a state so it is difficult to make direct correlations to our current modern state. However, this does not mean these are irrelevant to the current organisation of governmental and political power. These ancient models constitute enduring conceptions of government:

   Among all the societies in history, ours – I mean, those that came into being at the end of Antiquity on the Western side of the European continent... they alone evolved a strange technology of power treating the majority of men as flock with a few shepherds. They thus established between them a series of complex, continuous, and paradoxical relationships. (Foucault 1988a)

Foucault’s claim is not that today’s government and politics are direct heirs of these models, however, these models of governing have undergone a series of displacements and modifications and therefore continue to have an enduring relevance to the contemporary organisation of politics and the life of people.

Foucault spent time exploring the relationship between these two models of government and the historical formation of our own modern government. He was deeply concerned with how their instantiation into political reasoning transferred into today’s thinking and enactment of government both totalising and individualising capacities and effects. A cursory glance at contemporary government indicates the instantiation of this individualisation and totalisation in modern political discourse. This is
evident in that the welfare of individual human beings is an object of concern and administration to the state, yet this pastoral role co-exists with a form of government also concerned with exercising sovereign forms of power for the protection of the state, which also includes the protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens. How does this tension manifest today, and especially in relation to the crisis of the liberal state?

Before we consider Foucault’s apprehension about this individualising/totalising dynamic, we must firstly trace the series of displacements and modifications of these models in the formation of today’s modern liberal state. Foucault understands these modifications through examining the historical emergence of two constitutive trajectories of our secular liberal state and the governmental form of policy: the doctrine of raison d’État (reason of state) and Polizeiwissenschaft (science of police). Our current governmental and political life is indebted to their formation because each offers to political rationality key elements that endure today.

**Reason of state**

The first object of Foucault’s (1988a, 1988b, 2007) investigation was the doctrine of reason of state, which can be traced to a number of Italian, German and French political writers from the late sixteenth century and seventeenth century. Both Foucault and notable Machiavelli scholar Quentin Skinner (2000) agree that the emergence of reason of state’s conception of political power and the state occurred between Machiavelli’s
The Prince and reactions to it. This doctrine formed out of two increasingly problematised traditions.

The first is a notion of sovereign power and the state embodied in Machiavelli’s The Prince. According to its translator, Guillaume d’Auvergne, The Prince was written so as to “teach the powerful (the seigneur Politiq) how to conserve and augment their domain” (Kelly 1970, 549). For Machiavelli, the objective of rule was maintaining the strength of the relationship between the prince, his territory and his subjects. In this form of rule the wealth of nations was measured according to the size and successful protection of the principality and the prince’s interests, and the personal fortune of the sovereign. The problem for the prince, however, was that the relationship between him and his territory was not automatic and certainly not assured (Dean 1999). Indeed, it was tenuous because the prince was external to it, having secured it either through conquest, treaty or inheritance.

A particular conception of the exercise of political rule flows from this problematic. It required the need to identify the external and internal threats to the sovereign’s rule, and concomitantly the development of techniques for ensuring the protection of the sovereign’s territory and his rightful rule and ownership of things. Therefore, the prince’s power was exercised in order to strengthen the bond between the prince, his territory and his subjects, of which making the prince’s subjects obedient was key:

The sovereign exercised his right of life only by exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing; he evidenced his power over life only through the death he was capable of requiring. The right which
was formulated as the “power of life and death” was in reality the right to *take* life or *let* live. (Foucault 1998, 136)

The second increasingly problematised tradition from which reason of state emerges is the Christian and judiciary traditions of government as ‘essentially just’. This required rulers to respect “a whole system of laws: human laws; the law of nature; divine law” (Foucault 1988a, 75). Such Christian notions of rule shaped Machiavelli’s thought, which reflected the orthodoxy that the sovereign’s power was divinely ordained:

The king’s government of his kingdom must imitate God’s government of nature; or again, the soul’s government of the body. The king must found cities just as God created the world; just as the soul gives form to the body. The king must also lead men towards their finality, just as God does for natural beings, or as the soul does, when directing the body. (Foucault 1988a, 75)

Here, the sovereign’s rule was to be directed to the ends of divine laws, to transcendental principles, heavenly bliss, to the service of the sovereign’s greatness and to leading “their subjects to their natural and divine purposes and ends” (Dean 1999, 85).

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, this tradition of political thought was increasingly displaced by forms of government more familiar to us. Foucault notes that at this time the doctrine of the prince, sovereign power and territory were increasingly absent from discussions of rule and instead a range of political and administrative writers began to scrutinise these orthodoxies and pose questions concerning ‘government’.
They asked: what does governing consist of? Who can govern? Who or what can be governed?

While the primary concern found in descriptions of sovereign political rule was the prince’s power and his relationship to his principality, the scope of rule was broadening to mean the government of things, humans and their relationship. The Renaissance scholar Guillaume de La Perriere recalls “that we also talk about “governing” a household, souls, children, a province, a convent, a religious order, and a family” (Foucault 2007, 93). Similarly, Francois de La Mothe Le Vayer’s typology of government in 1653 included the government of oneself (morality), the art of governing a family (economy), and the science of governing the state (politics).

Another breach to the sovereign notion of rule was the descriptions of a diversity of specific ends to government, or “specific finalities” (Foucault 2007, 99). La Perriere’s 1567 definition that government was “the right disposition of things, so arranged to lead to a convenient end” (La Perriere quoted in Dean 1999, 73) was emblematic of this emerging way of thinking about the ends of rule. Foucault took this to mean that unlike the theory and practice of sovereign monarchical rule associated with the mechanisms of constitutions and laws, the ends of government were immanent to things themselves. That is to say, the ends of government are “internal to the things it directs” (Foucault 2007, 99).

This indexing of rule to the ‘disposition of things’ represented a significant attack on the abovementioned Christian doctrine on wise government. The latter conceived sovereign rule as emerging from the
‘cosmo-theological’ order where divinity, nature and law were the reason and justification of government. However, the descriptions of political rule in terms of the ‘disposition of things’ meant, firstly, that the ends of government were to be immanent to the world, such as health and wealth. That is, proper rule is to be ‘secular’ rather than transcendent (Dean 1999). Secondly, it also meant that the prince’s right to rule, through enforcing subjects’ submission to law, could no longer constitute the ends of the exercise of sovereign power. Instead, the plurality of objects of government required the mobilisation of a diverse range of tactics for ‘arranging things’ as they should be.

Gradually given form through these developments was an object that would become integral to our contemporary understanding of politics and government. This was the governmental state. In the anti-Machiavellian and administrative literature, the state began to emerge as the principle rationality for the deployment of the above diversity of tactics and ends. Put simply, political rule was to be exercised for reason of state. This meant that the ends of political rule began to be thought about in terms of those things important to the strength and wellbeing of the state, such as its wealth, natural resources, fertility, accidents, famines, means of subsistence and epidemics. Government was to concern itself with things that sustain, augment or threaten life (Foucault 1998; Foucault 2003; Foucault 2008), hence, “Government will have to ensure that the greatest possible amount of wealth is produced, that the people are provided with sufficient means of subsistence, and that the population can increase” (Foucault 2007, 99).
With no external purpose to ruling or reliance on wisdom, prudence and divine knowing, rule increasingly depended upon a “concrete, precise, and measured knowledge” (Foucault 1988a, 76). This rational knowledge of the state, political statistics or political arithmetic (Hacking 1990), rendered naked to the eye of rulers the worldly forces within the state, and the properties of the state and their interrelationships. With this knowledge governors could ensure the ‘right disposition of things’ within the state, meaning that the multiplicity of things could be arranged in the state’s image, that is, to ensure the state’s strength, its internal peace and its economic wellbeing. This constituted a “perfect knowledge of the means by which states are formed, preserved, strengthened, and expanded” (Botero quoted in Foucault 2007, 288). Political authorities, therefore, were to act in light of this rational knowledge, and this undoubtedly proved indispensable for the rational government of the state and its survival to the present.

While the anti-Machiavellian literature attacking sovereign power and divine right are given significant coverage in Foucault’s analysis of the emergence of the rationality of the state, the emergence of the “‘worldliness’ or mundanity of the administrative state’s political objectives” (Hunter 1994, 41) was linked to another trajectory that others believe has been given short shrift by Foucault (Hunter 1998; Wickham 2006). Drawing upon the historical analysis of Koselleck, Hunter insists that reason of state, or the political drive for the survival and security of the state itself, emerged as a “circumstantially driven instrument for ending religious slaughter and imposing civil peace” (also Dean 1999; Dean and Hindess 1998; Hunter 1994, 41-42; Koselleck 1988).
In Europe during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the vicious religious civil wars waged between and within rival Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist confessional states were fuelled by the notion that the state was to pursue the will of God, absolute moral principle and spiritual perfection (Koselleck 1988). This conflict and carnage led statesmen, administrators and intellectuals to question the legitimacy of basing government on spiritual politics that construed the sovereign as God’s representative, and the state as an expression of divine law. In his analysis, Hunter draws upon Hobbes’ account of reason of state, a political thinker Foucault shunned:

He understood that its capacity to put an end to religious civil war had allowed the state’s pursuit of its own security and prosperity to float free of ‘higher’ religious and philosophical justification. (Hunter 1994, 41)

New conceptions of the state emerged, such as that found in Henning Arnisaesus’s political science, where the state was not “born to combat human sinfulness” but “it was the empirical form in which the order of domination in any society was maintained” (Hunter 1998, 253).

Hunter therefore redresses Foucault’s absence of a thorough analysis of the ambition of reason of state to pacify warring religious factions by the ‘moral neutralisation of politics’. Hunter’s reference to Arnisaesus’s political science, where the objectives and activities of the sovereign and the administration of the state were not the pursuit of moral, philosophical or spiritual ends, illustrates how a new political expertise that
was available to anyone regardless of religious persuasion could secure civil peace and security. This innovation almost certainly consolidated “the idea that the state had properties and objectives of a kind that did not depend on disputed theological justifications” (Hindess 1996a, 108).

Police

The second constitutive trajectory of the rationalities of the modern state, according to Foucault (1988a; Foucault 2007), was the technology of police, which was “put to work and used and developed in the general framework of the reason of state” (Foucault 1988b, 153). But by police I refer to its seventeenth and eighteenth century meaning and not as it is conceived today. Prior to the nineteenth century, police was not an institution or quasi-military body made up of uniformed officers who went about detecting crime and apprehending criminals in the interest of keeping the peace and maintaining the law (for example, Colquhoun 1806b). This defines the constabulary notion of police that dominates today. However, dating back to at least the sixteenth century police has variously designated a community, association or society governed by public authority, the

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4 Hunter describes this as a ‘deconfessionalisation’ of politics which involved “a protracted and incomplete process – beginning in the early seventeenth century, gaining strength in the wake of the Thirty Years War, and continuing today – in which the instruments of political governance were intellectually and constitutionally separated from the instruments of religious discipline, and the state was reconstrued as the political apparatus of a secular civil order” Hunter, I. (1998). "Uncivil Society: Liberal Government and the Deconfessionalisation of Politics", in M. Dean and B. Hindess, (eds.), Governing Australia: Studies in Contemporary Rationalities of Government Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
assemblage of actions for governing these communities, as well as the product of good government (Foucault 2007; Pasquino 1978; Dean 1999; Neocleous 2006).

In spite of the varied forms and usages of police, there is no doubting their regulatory intent and effect. Seventeenth and eighteenth century police involved monitoring and regulating literacy, household behaviour, the circulation of goods, the necessities of life, work, commerce and commodities, the prices of goods, weddings, cleanliness, health, habits, the wearing of extravagant clothing, diet, security, blasphemy, vagrancy, idleness, cursing, perjury, roads, bridges, town buildings, behaviour of servants, families and their domestic problems, and it sought to minimise law breaking and harm, increase wealth and wellbeing and maintain good order (Dean 1991; Dean 1999; Foucault 2007; Neocleous 2006; Oestreich 1982; Pasquino 1978).

Foucault (1988a; Foucault 2007) takes as exemplary of police texts Nicolas Delamare’s compendium, Traité de la Police, and Turquet de Mayerne’s La Monarchie Artisto-démocratique. The former compiled the police regulations of the kingdom of France, while the latter proposed a police administrative arrangement to the Dutch State General in 1611. These covered the monitoring and intervention in cultural rites, production techniques, intellectual life, religion, education, morals, supplies, roads, highways, public safety, the liberal arts and science, trade, factories, manservants and labourers. Mayerne’s proposal included making people useful and employable, determining and recording their aptitudes and
tastes, as well as ameliorating negative aspects of life by providing assistance to the poor, widowed and the aged.

With such a catalogue of regulations, it is tempting to analyse police as an aberration to the formation of liberal government, or as a “regulatory mania” for the purpose of social control (Oestreich 1982, 157). However, police is much more than this. Sure its regulatory horizon complemented and embraced the already established judiciary, army and exchequer, and it did have an eye to the conditions of life, everything people do, or the ‘details’ as Catherine II put it (Foucault 2007). However, police made important contributions to political reasoning and government as we know it today because it attempted to fabricate an order through an art of government indexed to the rationality of the state. Hence, rather than perceive police in terms of the pejorative notion of ‘police state’, Neocleous (2006) suggests police might be thought about in terms more aligned with today’s use of the term policy, or seeking to know, order and strengthen the state from within.

Take, for example, the emergence and effect of the methods and body of knowledge now indispensable to modern government called statistics. Statistics, etymologically the science of the state, was integral to the organisation of police and bureaucratic administration (Hacking 1990), although rather than being the inductive form of statistics we know today, this was more an “inventory science” (Curtis 2002, 325). It was a collection of information on the state, its properties, its regularities and probabilities.

Pasquino refers to this link between knowledge of the state and the state’s wellbeing by quoting Montchrestien (1615), “One thing alone is lacking to you, O
(Pasquino 1978), such as von Justi’s *Elements of Police* which effectively drew up a grid through which the state could be observed through categories such as territory, goods and individual conduct and their sub-categories, which include the population, the army, its natural resources, production and commerce and monetary circulation. As Pasquino remarks, a technology like *censura* renders life into discourse; it is a “great general and uninterrupted confession” (Pasquino 1978, 49).

Like today’s ‘policy’, this information was collected for the purpose of recording and calculating the state’s resources and “constitutive forces” (Foucault 2007, 315). This represented an attempt to combine a description of the state with the art of government. By rendering phenomena and certain regularities related to the co-existence of individuals visible, such as the nature of the circulation and distribution of goods, persons and money between households, police rendered intelligible the form, properties, capacities, strengths and weaknesses of the state in order to improve its conditions, wealth and health (Tomlins 1993).

These attempts to know and regulate individuals, their co-existence and their relationship brought into existence the population or populousness (Curtis 2002) as an entity or object of administration (Dean 1999; Foucault 2007; Pasquino 1978; Rose 1996). Foucault distinguishes this rudimentary notion of the population from the biopolitical sense he identifies emerging in the latter half of the eighteenth century (Dean 1999; Foucault 1998, great state, the knowledge of yourself – and the image of your strength”, and Moheau (1778), “There can be no well ordered political machine, nor enlightened administration in a country where the state of population is unknown” Pasquino, P. (1978). "Theatrum Politicum. The Genealogy of Capital - Police and the State of Prosperity." *Ideology & Consciousness*, Autumn(4), 41-54.
The notion of the population in police was often circumscribed to its categorisation according to basic information such as ages, sexes, births, deaths, size and occupations (Pasquino 1978), but also to certain ‘incalculables’ of living resulting from this co-existence, for example, epidemics.

The point of this description of statistics and its capacity to think about and calculate at the level of groups, communities or population, no matter how inaccurate and rudimentary (Sir William Petty relied upon simple averages) (Redman 1997), is to draw attention to the fact that police and its technologies is irreducible to regulation for the sake of control or survival. Rather, as it is described by one of its proponents: “The sole purpose of the police is to lead men to the utmost happiness to be enjoyed in his life” (Delamare quoted in Foucault 1988a, 81). In police, happiness and the goodness of the soul and the body are principal concerns. These are products of living in a ‘society’ and therefore keeping good order, keeping individuals useful and improving their living through regulation was a means to ensuring the happiness of individuals. Police’s concern for religion, public peace, manufacture, sumptuary law, the theatre, games and the care and discipline of the poor encompasses, therefore, an aspiration to ensure the happiness of each individual by seeing to their living, by

Moreover, concerns for the population were narrowly defined in terms of maximising the state’s resources and wealth, ascertaining the number of individuals or households in a community, understanding the circulation of trade, goods and money and identifying groups according to the degree of danger they posed to social order, especially in relation to idleness, such as the poor, domestic labourers, prostitutes and the young. Neocleous, M. (2006). "Theoretical Foundations of the "New Police Science"", in M. D. Dubber and M. Valverde, (eds.), The New Police Science. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
regulating society, by caring for the individual’s soul and body, and ensuring each individual’s industriousness (Pasquino 1978).

This objective of securing ‘happiness’ was not ideological or the obfuscation of control by a state hell-bent on subjugating, dominating and securing obedience. Sure, police was regulatory, however construing it in terms of control and domination ignores the partnership that these rationalities, techniques and practices of police forged between the individual and the state. Police writers including Justus Christoph Dithmar, Delamare and von Justi, distinguished Politik as a negative task in which the state fights against its internal and external enemies for the state’s security, from Polizei, which was a positive form of regulation concerned with fostering the lives, peace and happiness of citizens so as to strengthen the benefits of living in a society (Tribe 1980). For von Justi:

Police is the set of laws and regulations that concern the interior of the state, which endeavour to strengthen and increase its power, to make good use of its forces… and procuring happiness of its subjects. (von Justi quoted in Foucault 2007, 327)

As it is described here, the technology of police, or Polizei, rendered the happiness and wellbeing of the individual commensurate with enlarging the internal power of the state. Through maintaining good order and securing the wellbeing and happiness of individuals, political power was to be wielded to supply individuals with “a little extra life” and in doing so “supply the state with a little extra strength” (Foucault 1988a, 79). In Foucault’s estimation, therefore, police was a political technology for:
integrating men’s activity into the state, into its forces, and into the
development of these forces, and it will have to ensure that the state,
in turn, can stimulate, determine, and orientate this activity in such a
way that it is in fact useful to the state. (Foucault 2007, 323)

In summary, then, the administration envisioned and enacted by
police utilised the individual as an instrument for securing prosperity at the
level of the population, that is, the wellbeing of each and therefore all,
*omnes et singulatim* (Foucault 1988a). Here, the activities of individuals
were to be rendered productive and useful to the state through a general
‘disciplinarisation’ (Foucault 1977). In light of this rationality, from the end
of the sixteenth century, individualising procedures developed for
identifying, combining, increasing and developing human and non-human
forces within the state proliferated in the form of disciplinary technologies,
such as workshops, schools, and the army. Through working on the
physical, cognitive, moral and affective attributes of individual members of
the population, this specific mode of power would be exercised for
attaining the common good measured in terms of the state’s strength and
order.

This individualisation also served the very pressing purpose Hunter
(1998) described earlier, that is, of securing civil peace. The disintegration
of feudal ties and religious networks weakened the traditional modalities
for shaping individual moral conduct. Now, amidst secularisation, the
shaping of morals, respectability and obedience became mapped onto the
political sphere. The internal security and peace of the emerging
secularising state increasingly depended upon an attentiveness to policing social morality, respectability, manners, conduct and other minutia of human interactions:

In this respect, police ordinances could be viewed as an intensive ‘coaching’ of citizens in how to behave in towns and regions that had become more populous, in which feudal structures of authority were giving way to more centralized forms of internal sovereignty, and in which ecclesiastical authority had ceased to hold sway. (Dean 1999, 91)

In other words, police performed an important function of managing the civil peace of the state by integrating members of the population into civic and pacific forms of existence (Oestreich 1982), a task increasingly performed by public and non-public authorities such as philanthropic organisations emerging within this new state (Hindess 1996a).

**Political rationality**

We may well ask to what extent this exploration of the ‘deep but obscure’ foundations of the liberal state, from the shepherd-flock and city-citizen games to reason of state and police, has unnecessarily detoured us from the current crisis of the state. I would suggest the contrary; that these have made a significant contribution to the formation of political rationality and the organisation of political and governmental life today, including to political reforms such as self-management. Let me explain.
By positing the state, its strength, peace and security as the object and goal of political rule, reason of state broke from the traditions of the sovereign. Reason of state introduced an “autonomous rationality of government not reducible to a reflection on the personage of the prince or the principles of the divine order” (Dean 1999, 84; also Hindess 1997; Skinner 1989):

raison d’ Etat carves out a new division, or even introduces a radical break, the state, which looms up and reveals a new reality with its own rationality. There is therefore a break with the old naturalness that framed medieval political thought. There is a non-naturalness, an absolute artificiality, if you like, at any rate a break with that old cosmo-theology, which brought the reproaches of atheism. (Foucault 2007, 349)

To the extent that the state is government’s unique rationality, reason of state also instantiate into modern political rationality the city-citizen game described at the outset of this chapter. The polis or res publica as a self-governing politically united community found in the city-citizen game is reformulated in reason of state in the form of the secular state. Sovereign power is to be exercised in the name of this community, ‘the state’. This would involve securing its internal weaknesses, checking its external threats and ensuring the wellbeing of its citizens, but only to the extent that this has significance for the state.

By comparison, police was a governmental technology subject to the principles of reason of state. Its concern was with developing a detailed knowledge of governed reality coupled with an aspiration to intervene in
that reality. This brought the population into the field of visibility and action of political authorities, effectively freeing Europe from the Machievallian limitations of political thinking that posited the sovereign as the end of government (Gordon 1991). Here, the strength and wealth of the state was no longer equated with securing obedience to the sovereign but in securing the felicity and wellbeing of each individual.

It is this individualised attention to the population that sets police apart from reason of state and its city-citizen game. Unlike the more detached relationship between the ruler and citizen in the city-citizen game, police exercises an individualised attention for each member of the population, or flock. This involves getting to know in detail their personal existence and co-existence, as well as guiding and caring for individual members. But this is not altruistic benevolence. The state is adopted as its principle of regulatory activity, and therefore police involves acting upon the population of individuals to achieve the state’s objective. Police, therefore, is a “government which defines itself as being ‘of all and of each’” (Gordon 1991, 12), that is to say, public authorities assume their roles as shepherds overseeing the flock so as to extend the happiness, productivity and wellbeing of all.

The state as pastoral power

For Foucault, there is much to be concerned about in this “alliance of bureaucratic and pastoral technologies” (Hunter 1994, 64). It illuminates how the political reasoning of our state of policy possesses totalising and
individualising roots and effects. Firstly, through reason of state, the state emerges as a centralising power insofar as it constitutes a form of reasoning that encompasses a responsibility for securing the state’s survival and strength. Here, the ruler governs the state like a captain piloting a ship. By comparison, police’s technologies bring to the government of the state an individualising power. Human beings are construed and acted upon as things to be known, improved, corrected and regulated for securing the quality of life within the state. Here, the ruler is a husbandman and a shepherd who governs as much as cares for the welfare of his flock (Hindess 1996a).

In effect, the knitting together of reason of state and police enabled the state to emerge as a “new form of pastoral power” (Foucault 1982, 334). That is to say, pastoral power is generalised beyond ecclesiastical confines through the formation of a state that cares for its population. Unlike the theological form of pastoral power, however, the care for the welfare of the individual by the state occurs according to a rationality of state. Here, processes of individualisation are correlated with the logic of state totalisation. This means the individual cannot escape the scope of the state’s fledgling governmental power and its statist rationality, not only because the citizen is encompassed by a sovereign form of power that aims to secure the state’s existence and ensure citizens meet their obligations. But also because there is now a pastoral responsibility for the state and its rulers that involves developing “those elements constitutive of individual’s lives in such a way that their development also fosters that of the strength of the state” (Foucault 1988a, 82). What are the consequences of this
dynamic for today’s state and the exercise of political and governmental power? And what are the consequences of this dynamic for our understanding of self-managing reforms?

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explored the historical formation of how we reason and enact government, specifically tracing two of its constitutive trajectories: reason of state and police. I have drawn attention to how these have instantiated into political rationality two ancient models of governing, and how this has shaped how we conceptualise and enact the exercise of political and governmental power. Specifically, the state has totalising and individualising roots and effects, and their correlation has given rise to a state that has assumed pastoral responsibilities.

It is the task of the next chapter to give greater contemporary relevance to this phenomenon by examining how reason of state and police relate to the formation of liberal government. This, I argue, has entailed combining an extensive pastoral technology of discipline and security with the government of a political community of free, self-governing citizens. I argue that this precipitates ongoing political and governmental tensions because the liberal state will govern for freedom and free processes, yet it will also maintain its interventionist pastoral role.
Chapter 5: Liberal Governmental Rationality and its Dilemma

Introduction

This chapter follows the line of modification of the political rationality discussed in the preceding chapter and its twin games as they arise in the political and governmental formation we call liberalism. This is an important task because our present governmental rationalities, techniques and practices, or how our society has come to think and act both politically and governmentally, are underpinned by the development from the eighteenth century of liberal governmental rationality. Gordon writes, “the whole governmental history of our society can be read in terms of the successive topological displacement and complications of this liberal problem-space” (Gordon 1991, 16). Therefore, if we are to understand the crisis of the welfare state, and self-managing reforms, as a transformation in the modalities of governing, then we must understand liberalism.
I follow Foucault’s argument that liberalism signifies a new way of reasoning and enacting government than that provided by reason of state and police. But it is not my argument that liberal government restored freedom from the clutches of state power represented by reason of state and police. Rather, having adopted political rationality, which correlates individualisation with a logic of state totalisation, liberalism invents novel concepts, artefacts and forms of government that limited state power in some respect, but in others accelerated its extension. This chapter opens to examination two linked domains. The first is these innovative concepts and artefacts of liberal government, and the second is the tension between freedom and security that besets this liberal modality of government.

Liberalism

Liberalism can be characterised as a shift in the eighteenth century from governing focused on sovereign power and family economy to an ‘arts of government’ focused on political economy. Foucault (2007; Foucault 2008) refers to three key elements shaping the emergence of liberalism as an art of government. Firstly, conceptions of the economy found in the work of the économistes and political economists from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, who included Francois Quesnay, Adam Smith and David Ricardo. The second influence is notions of the population as possessing its own laws, characteristics and regularities, which emerge from economic analysis and disciplinary and social interventions. The third key element is the discovery of the domain of civil society. I address these
in order. This examination begins with an excursus through the seventeenth and eighteenth century and the domain of grain production and circulation.

*The economy*

Police forms of government were particularly interested in the population’s relationship to the processes of production, market and trade (Pasquino 1978; Tribe 1980). Foucault observes:

> If governmentality of the state is interested, for the first time, in the fine materiality of human existence and coexistence, of exchange and circulation, if this being and well-being is taken into account for the first time by the governmentality of the state, through the town and through problems like health, roads, markets, grains, and highways, it is because at that time commerce is thought of as the main instrument of the state’s power and thus as the privileged object of a police whose objective is the growth of the state’s forces. (Foucault 2007, 339)

Commerce was seen as a key instrument for maintaining and extending the strength of the state and it was in the image of the market town that police ordered and regulated the activities of individuals so that the market could function and goods and monies circulate. For this reason, mercantilism, or the governmental theory and practice of commerce heavily weighted to police intervention, was inseparable from police (Tribe 1980). But by the early eighteenth century, this model of police was breached by a series of developments beginning with Quesnay’s conceptualisation of the economy as a quasi-natural order.
It was the policing of marketing, scarcity and circulation that provided a fundamental basis of criticism of the mercantilist approach of police. Économistes called into question key tenets of police’s approach to the production and circulation of goods. Put simply, under mercantilist policy there must be plenty of grains in order that prices are kept low, wages are kept low, grains can be sold abroad and all this will enable the importation of the greatest amount of gold. Here, economic activity occurs in a rigid sovereign system and it must be regulated to ensure that prices are kept low and the scarcity of supply is eradicated. For économistes, however, avoiding the scarcity of grain meant making sure that it was well paid for and this was to be achieved not through regulation. Rather, cost must be an index of supply and demand, or the balance between scarcity and consumer desire (Higgs 1968). If prices are high farmers will sow as much as they can to secure the greatest profit, and this will ensure a greater harvest and less temptation to accumulate the grain for future scarcity. This ‘just price’ thesis of the économistes’ analysis called into question regulation, the desired mode of intervention of police.

The économistes’ argument was premised on the assumption that there is a “certain course of things” (Foucault 2007, 345; Higgs 1968) or a naturalness in economic activity that cannot, indeed should not, be artificially modified lest negative consequences ensue. Foucault refers to Louis-Paul Albeille’s analysis of scarcity, which combined most of the physiocrats’ positions (Marcil and Pressman 1999). Albeille’s analytical scope is broad, encompassing processes of production, the market, and detailed knowledge of peasants, their behaviours, motivations and their
calculations of possible situations. Albeille concluded that grain scarcity is not an inevitable outcome of living in an unpredictable world with finite resources. Rather, scarcity is artificially constructed on account of the state’s intervention into the market.

Albeille argued, for instance, that regulating the price of grain to prevent its dearness leads people to stockpile their grain and therefore the more prices are lowered the more scarce grains will become. For économistes, this occurs because production and the market operate according to natural self-regulating principles. For example, prices will stabilise and be ‘true’ when the relationship between the cost of production and demand are allowed to naturally occur. Accordingly, the problem of mercantilist policy was that in attempting to control scarcity through regulating the price of goods, their circulation, how they were sold, where, when and by whom, it introduced artificiality into this natural system and this consequently distorted its natural functioning, or ordre naturel. What, then, makes this reality natural and self-regulating in the first place?

For économistes and subsequent political economists, the motor of this self-ordering is the “spontaneous bond” (Foucault 2007, 352) that occurs with the coexistence of persons (Gordon 1991). This spontaneity signifies that there is a naturalness that obtains in the interactions and exchanges between autonomous people that is independent of any willing or intervention of the state (Ferguson 1995; Smith 1976). The motor of this spontaneous bond is individual and collective interests and unfettering these renders the market into a self-regulating natural system. Interest, therefore, reveals itself to be the basis of ‘true’ market activity because it is
only when private individuals naturally compete for their best interests by seeking their maximum advantage that things will be ascribed their ‘true’ price.

This should not be taken to mean that economic theorists were ideologically captured by the image of the free individual, or that their theories were obfuscations for the extension of economic power for the capitalised classes. Rather, de-regulating economic activity and enabling individuals to pursue their interests was conceived as conducive for the health of the economy and the population at large based upon the analysis of the economy\(^7\). This is because as Smith made clear, obtaining the true price of things is profitable for the seller and buyer as constant fluctuation of prices enables sellers to independently adjust to situations so as to attain maximum profit while buyers incur minimum expense (Smith 1976). Therefore, from the eighteenth century economists reached the consensus that with both exchangers seeking their best in the context of competitive free exchange, the free economy is not a zero-sum game because through the action of the invisible hand it creates possibilities for “mutual enrichment” (Foucault 2008, 54).

I have used the term ‘natural’ to describe how the économistes and political economists thought about the economy. This is important because naturalness supports a belief in non-interventionism. But this naturalness

\(^7\) For économistes, the exercise of freedom within the state is not justified philosophically or morally. “It means, simply, that [government] arm its politics with a precise, continuous, clear and distinct knowledge of what is taking place in society, in the market, and in the economic circuits, so that the limitation of its power is not given by respect for the freedom of individuals, but simply by evidence of economic analysis which it knows it has to be respected. It is limited by evidence, not by the freedom of individuals” (Foucault 2008, 62).
was not an ideology of a rising bourgeois class that enabled the obfuscation of reality and the extension of their power. Rather, this non-interventionist reasoning was supported by a belief in the economy’s naturalness and its attendant ‘science of man’, developed by économistes and the Scottish enlightenment thinkers such as Adam Smith, and shaped in part by Isaac Newton, his empirical method and his natural law theory (Redman 1997). Newton and natural law theory heavily taught in the time of the classical political economists such as Smith and eighteenth century philosophers who employed Newton’s methods to the science of human behaviour, or moral philosophy. Newton’s discovery of the laws governing the order and harmony of the material universe led philosophers to reason that “disorder must be man-made and could be averted by studying human nature and ascertaining the natural laws or connecting principles that govern society” (Redman 1997, 111). Consequently, philosophers searched for the immutable laws, principles and regularities of governing society, the universals of human nature, and the mental state of human being as mirrored by the natural history of the physical universe.

The methodological approach to this moral philosophy was natural history because the science of human behaviour and the human and social world was seen to derive from the natural history of humanity. “Once these basic common elements – certain characteristics of human nature – were determined, human development could then be traced through time” (Redman 1997, 114). Smith, influenced by natural history (Redman notes the large number of books he owned on the topic), attempted to find a natural order of things. It was posited that change was natural, slow,
progressive and predictable, and the history of humanity and society was thought to be natural and leading towards perfection. Importantly, because

…progress was natural and anticipated, it was not the conditions under which progress takes place but the obstacles hindering a natural course of development that became the Scots’ focus. The study of the improvement of society consisted in investigating the causes that had hitherto impeded the progress of mankind toward happiness and then examining the effects of the total or partial removal of these causes. (Redman 1997, 126)

Based upon this methodological premise of the naturalness of regulation and progress, Smith and other Scottish enlightenment thinkers concluded that the balance and order of self-regulating systems, such as the economy and society as expressions of natural order, come about through individual self-interest, free will, and a legal structure ordained by nature, and not through the workings of centralised political government (also see Poovey 2002).

As a consequence of this methodological premise of naturalness, économistes and political economists displaced the police model of economic activity with the free economy. The basis of the police model of economic regulation was the household and the circulation of goods and money between households, and this was maintained by incessant regulation. By comparison, with interests the basis for an elaboration of a ‘physics’ of market activity, in the late seventeenth century and eighteenth centuries the ‘economy’ emerges as a life of its own. It becomes a quasi-natural reality subject to natural processes, described by Dean as a “bio-
economic reality” (Dean 1999, 115). This reconceptualisation of the domain of economic activity by physiocrats such as Turgot, Quesnay, Albeille, and political economists such as Smith, Ricardo and Malthus brought to the thought and actions of governors the economy as a naturally existing, spontaneously ordered, self-regulating entity (Foucault 2007; Ohara 1999; Redman 1997).

Therefore, the lesson for governors or those who aspired for a rational and effective government was that, through a free economy, “a regulation based upon and in accordance with the course of things themselves must replace a regulation by police authority” (Foucault 2007, 344). To do otherwise is pointless and harmful because intervention into free exchange invalidates the economy and the proper functioning of things, which is why Albeille argued scarcity is a product of an intervention that disrupts the spontaneous regulation of things that would naturally prevent scarcity. This emerging axiom of naturalness, of a social order ordained by nature, also began to pertain to the notion of the population, and conceptualisations of its government in the interest of the state.

*The population*

This analysis of economic activity and the interactions of individuals mark the emergence of a new conceptualisation of the population, what Foucault (2007) says is the second major influence shaping the emergence of liberalism. Let us recall first police’s approach to the population. For police, the population as the co-existence of individuals was important
mainly in terms of its numbers and how this related to production and the
strength of the state. Why? The greater the population, the more people
were productive, which resulted in lower wages, which resulted in a lower
cost of goods, and a stronger state. What matters in this notion of
population is the number and not so much the biological attributes and
regularities of the species. In the analyses of économistes and political
economists, however, the population was not merely the sum of productive
individuals inhabiting a territory, or political-juridical subjects of the
sovereign to be employed in the state’s production machine (Burchell
1991). It was something natural and variable.

In the economic rationalities and practices that developed from the
eighteenth century the population appeared to have its own natural
regularities determined more or less by modifiable circumstances of a given
place. For example, the population moves and diminishes according to
wages, prices, and the availability of work, consumable goods, natural
resources and means of subsistence. Perceiving phenomena and effects at
the level of the population led to the problematisation of the economy of
police that existed under the sovereign, as this was largely based upon the
household and the family and therefore Cameralism was imperceptible to
phenomena at the level of the population. In comparison, the analyses of
subsistence and the supply of grains for the population by Ricardo, Malthus
(Redman 1997) and Albeille (Foucault 2007) introduced a host of
relativities into the economy through the population, whilst a whole host of
relativities were introduced into the notion of population through economic
factors; for instance, that the population is attracted to high wages and
when these stabilise population growth ceases, or Ricardo’s theory of wages (Redman 1997).

What is particularly remarkable about the notion of population as it was used in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is that it is no longer intelligible merely as a composition of households, communities or even individuals motivated by private interests who make rational economic calculations and decisions. Instead, the population is rendered visible in its economic, biological and social dimension, and these have a reality perceptible at the level of the population rather than merely at the level of the individual. To the extent that the population possesses biological regularities and natural phenomena that are dependent upon a multiplicity of variables, it too attains in rational analysis a degree of naturalness comparable to the nature of wealth.8

Interestingly, this economic analysis of the population as quasi-natural mirrors the rendering of the population as a set of natural phenomena by these social rationalities and techniques directed at the problems of urban living. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there was a proliferation of apparatuses of social/moral statistics, calculation and regulation. Social reformers, philanthropists, doctors, teachers and public hygienists concerned with social order, morals, pauperism, theft, criminality, hygiene, disease, insanity, wealth and general wellbeing collected information on these (Foucault 1977, 1984b; Hunter 1994; Rose

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8 Foucault notes: “It is the naturalness of those mechanism that ensure that, when prices rise, if one allows this to happen, then they will stop rising by themselves. It is the naturalness that ensures that the population is attracted by high wages, until a certain point at which wages stabilize and as a result the population no longer increases” (Foucault 2007, 349).
1999a, 1999b). Supported by the emerging fields of social medicine, public hygiene, statistics and demography, these processes of inquiry, inscription, calculation, analysis and intervention created new ways of conceiving the population as a biological and bio-social object.

Like the economy in economic analysis, the population had discernable biological and social regularities, constancies, averages, probabilities, effects and phenomena. With its own norms and regularities, the population was rendered intelligible as a natural entity, a life of its own, subject to natural processes and phenomena that shaped or were shaped by a multitude of variables (Foucault 2007). Consequently, and departing from police’s rudimentary use of population as something primarily linked to order and strength, from the eighteenth century the features and effects of the human species and its collective existence were rendered into an object of governmental concern: what was its condition, its health and its wealth? The population became something that should enter into political calculation and strategy, what Foucault termed biopolitics (Foucault 1998; Foucault 2008).

The approach subsequently taken to the population was informed by the discovery of its putative naturalness. Like the approach to the economy, if the state was to take responsibility for the population, it would be circumscribed to acting upon it as a “set of processes to be managed at the level and on the basis of what is natural in these processes” (Foucault 2007, 70). This explains the increasing significance of the technical ‘norm’ to human and social inquiry and to the rational approaches to government. For Hacking, one can “use the word ‘normal’ to say how things are, but also to
say how they ought to be. The magic of the word is that we can use it to do both things at once” (Hacking 1990, 163). In other words, the norm represented the natural features or processes of the population, yet it also gave access to the population, its processes and phenomena, and to individual bodies. So, for example, the intellect, psyche, personality, morals, behaviour and bodies of members of the population could be measured, judged and intervened in so as to optimise the wellbeing, productivity, wealth and health of the individual and the population.

Civil society

The economy and population were increasingly conceptualised as coexisting in a single domain, namely, society (Ferguson 1995). For economic theorists such as Ferguson civil society was “as old as the individual” (Ferguson quoted in Burchell 1991, 134). But this is not the politico-juridical conception of society, that is to say, where society is the product of juridical-political subjects consenting to be governed through a social contract involving the surrender of their natural rights and freedoms for the mutual benefit of the individual and the state. In the economic and social analyses and interventions conducted by the disciplines, reformers, administrators and governors from the latter half of the eighteenth century, society designated a realm of existence composed of natural processes, economic and non-economic interests, bonds and relationships resulting from humankind’s life in common (Burchell 1991).
No doubt this still contained the legal-political sphere and the legal subject of rights, but it was also a container for a range of separate spheres and quasi-natural processes, such as the economy, the population and the mechanisms of government.

This new object, society, is made up of the concrete exchanges of the economy, of the lives, infirmities, frailties and death of individuals, of the occupations, customs, habits, patterns of family life and modes of communication of the population, of the quest by the population for subsistence, and of the ensuing distribution of wealth. It is a domain of harmony and conflict, with its own historical forms of development, its own origins. (Dean 1999, 125-126)

To the extent that these elements were pertinent to government, civil society became the new domain for a series of problematisations of government and the elaboration of the instruments, tasks and objectives of government.

However, although civil society now became that concrete thing to be governed, it also established a limit to liberal governmentality. As the constituent elements of civil society were putatively naturally ordered, or contained quasi-natural processes of the economy and population, it appeared as something that was not the product of the state but in fact naturally separate from it. It was, for instance, composed of natural processes, of the biological dimension of human kind’s collective existence, and the self-regulating activities of the economic subject of interest.
Conceiving civil society as a domain consisting of naturally occurring rules and regularities and therefore separate from the artifice of the state, meant that it could not possibly be fully known or fully directed by governors. Effectively, then, the économistes’ identification of this “object-domain of government as possessing a naturalness of immanent, self-regulatory mechanisms and processes… make the sovereign’s despotic imposition of regulations both futile and harmful” (Burchell 1991, 126). For the économistes and political economists the exercise of political sovereignty must respect civil society and its natural processes in order that the natural dynamics of the market and the collective benefit of its free play are optimised.

Now, we have covered the key elements of liberalism that we can identify in contemporary governmental rationalities: the market economy, the population and civil society. I have also emphasised how each is thought about as natural. How, then, might these be understood in terms of the rationality of liberal government? How does freedom get instantiated in the mode of government known as liberalism?

**The governmental rationality of liberalism**

Liberalism was not rendered into a functioning rationality of government by the canonical texts of the philosophy of natural liberty. Rather, it emerged from the many attempts to reason and govern those aspects of living that confronted collective human existence. An important feature in the development of this new way of reasoning was the creation of the
domain of civil society and within it the population and economy. It was the ascription of a naturalness to these domains, in antipathy to the artificiality of ‘the state’, that was a key influence in the instantiation of freedom in the rationality of liberal government. This naturalness defined for liberalism the limit to the exercise of an interventionist political and state power.

Liberal government conceived of civil society as a domain of existence beyond the state and political authority. This realm was conceived as being constituted by natural and self-organising properties, entities and processes. This meant that civil society required freedom in order that the self-regulating processes, such as the market economy, could occur unimpeded. Consequently, with its free and natural processes, civil society was outside of the scope of direct political activity. In fact, civil society would function as an “instrument of critique” (Burchell 1996, 28) because government was to respect that which obtains in civil society.

This limit represents a break from reason of state and police. These were embedded with the principle that government is its own end and that the reason for government is securing the existence and strength of the state. The techniques of police aspired to a totally administered world, conceiving that the state’s actions were necessary for securing everyone’s wellbeing, the happiness of each and all. Directed towards maximising the happiness and strength of the state enabled the maximisation of government
and regulation without limitation⁹. Liberal political rationality displaced these dreams and schemes.

However, this did not mean that police’s concerns for the order of the state and the link between the state’s security and its internal welfare was subsumed under a dogged pursuit of freedom. This belief would lead us to incorrectly define liberalism as a “passive abstentionism” (Gordon 1991, 17), or reduce liberalism to a constitutional form of government that simply sets the juridical framework for protecting and enabling individual liberty and economic exchange. This may appear to be the case when we consider liberalism’s embrace of free enterprise, or when we find historical examples such as that in the early nineteenth century when governmental policy involved abolishing the legal right to public assistance so as to ensure the economic independence of the population and the self-regulating mechanisms of wealth creation (Beeson and Firth 1998). However, the conditions of liberal self-limitation imposed by the constraints of the natural order, self-regulating systems and freedom, produced a novel art of government.

That is, for liberal political rule, welfare, security and order were to be obtained by respecting and maintaining that which is natural to civil society. Liberalism, therefore, sought to govern with the grain of things by securing the automatic and optimal functioning of the natural processes contained in civil society. This involved respecting the freedom of society’s

⁹ As Foucault puts it, the principle underpinning police was: “Not enough attention is being given to things, too much escapes control, too many domains lack rules and regulation, order and administration are lacking. In short, there is too little government” (Foucault 2008, 318).
properties and processes to be naturally, and allowing these to define the limit of the government of the state. For liberalism, therefore, it was “necessary to arouse, to facilitate, and to *laissez faire*, in other words to manage and no longer control through rules and regulations… to ensure that the natural and necessary regulations work” (Foucault 2007, 353).

Circumscribing its task to “fostering the self-organizing capacities of civil society” (Rose and Miller 1992, 179), liberalism has been aptly described as an ‘economic government’. Not only because of its orientation to the market but also because its use of governmental authority and methods were to be economical and frugal (Burchell 1991), demarcating certain domains as not within the scope of state power. For example, fear of disrupting their natural and autonomous functioning, the market, the family and individual free will were privatised in the sense of placing them outside of the direct reach of state activity, and only subject to the law (Rose 1999a).

However, “liberal government offers the most fundamental and enduring extension of the power of the government of the state so far witnessed” (Dean 2007, 100). This is because, perhaps paradoxically, the objective of securing society and its natural processes *in their freedom* generated a need to know society’s domains, objects and its processes in their naturalness so that the natural laws and logics governing these domains would be allowed to occur undisturbed (Burchell 1991; Dean 2007).

This represents an important innovation of liberalism: it resulted in a growth in the techniques and processes of individualisation and
regulation. Liberalism propelled the expansion of institutions and disciplines concerned with inquiring into the properties, phenomena and mechanics of civil society, such as the human and social sciences in universities (Reueschmeyer and Skocpol 1996). A swathe of disciplines, experts and professionals were empowered by political rule to engage in objectifying civil society, economic processes and the population in order to acquire knowledge of these. This enabled regulatory intervention to be modelled on the ‘natural’ regulations, processes, expectations, norms and values (‘the normal frame of life’) uncovered of civil society, the economy and the population (Dean 2007). Respecting the limits of the state and the autonomy of society, those mechanisms, agencies, experts and organisations existing in civil society (rather than direct political actors) would undertake this regulation (Rose 1993).

Does this explosion in the administrative apparatus actually reveal that freedom in liberal governmental reason is an illusion or an ideological means for exploiting the various classes of society? In an innovative interpretation of liberalism, Foucault (2008) argues that the liberal rationalities and techniques of government were not antithetical to freedom but sought to instrumentalise it. Économistes and political economists, for example, did not construe freedom to be a threat to order and government because they believed the market-exchanging conduct of individuals enabled the natural and optimal functioning of the market, and by implication the accrual of social and economic benefits to one and all (Burchell 1996). Therefore, the importance of liberalism is not that it was an ideological ruse for the advancement of economic interests or that it
“first recognised, defined or defended freedom as a right of all citizens. Rather, its significance is that for the first time the arts of government were systematically linked to the practice of freedom”\(^\text{10}\) (Rose 1999b, 68).

Therefore, having established this relationship between the freedom of individuals and the achievement of order, liberalism conceives the exercise of governmental power in terms of shaping the exercise of that freedom, so as to ensure “the proper use of liberty” (Burchell 1991, 139). The ‘proper use of liberty’ was defined according to the characteristics of the normal, natural and optimal functioning of individuals, the population, the economy, and civil society developed through the abovementioned social and human inquiries and interventions (Hindess 1996a).

Hunter’s (1988; 1994) genealogy of the popular school is exemplary of this government through freedom. State administered schooling emerged from practical concerns about the population’s moral and social wellbeing, which included problems of idleness and crime. Through its teachers, organisation, curriculum and pedagogical techniques, schools brought expertise and their normalising knowledges into the realm of child development. Through schools, the behaviours, morals and affects of the nation’s children could be monitored, supervised, corrected and equipped with the capacities required to govern themselves according to society’s norms. Schooling, therefore, was a training ground for the responsible

\(^{10}\) Foucault writes: “Government... did not only cover the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection, but also the modes of action, more or less considered and calculated, which were destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the field of action of others” Foucault, M. (1982). "The Subject and Power", in J. D. Faubion, (ed.), Power. New york: The New York Press.
exercise of freedom, and it was increasingly crucial for securing peace, order and greater freedom within the liberal state.

Therefore, administrative technologies and practices were increasingly employed by political, social and economic rulers to align individual self-government, or how people exercised their freedom, with the natural regularities, tendencies, values and truths of civil society and the individual (Dean 2007). This involved transforming the knowledge of biological processes, productivity, education, delinquency, personal hygiene, public health, poverty, and much more besides, into social and political programs so as to “structure the possible field of action of others” (Foucault 2000, 341).

**An internal dilemma for liberalism**

In the constitution of the free economy, population and civil society that has taken place over the past three or so centuries there is a tension that has developed at the heart of liberalism, and which has contemporary relevance. If freedom is the principle of liberal governmental thought and practice, how can benefit accrue to the state and the total population where the exercise of freedom by individuals, especially in increasingly populous and urbanised territories, may produce parlous effects? How can liberalism ensure public order, peace, thriving markets and responsible citizenship whilst also respecting the naturalness and freedoms of the market, population and the individual?
For Foucault, at the heart of liberal government is a “mobile problematic relationship between the production of freedom and that which in the production of freedom risks limiting and destroying it” (Foucault 2008, 64). Personal or collective interests and the autonomous activities of individuals potentially pose a danger to the wellbeing and security of property, the state, practices of government, or the population (Hindess 1997). This is indicative of a tension in liberal government between the “dangers of governing too much with the dangers of not governing enough” (also Miller and Rose 1990; Rose 1996b, 69; Rose and Miller 1992), or determining between, in Jeremy Bentham’s imprecise terms, the agenda and non-agenda of government (Gordon 1991).

Isaiah Berlin (1979) rationalised this problematic by distinguishing between negative freedom, where individuals are left to their own devices, and positive freedom, in which authorities intervene in people’s lives in order that personal freedom may be fully realised. In creating and setting the conditions for freedom, liberalism finds itself engaged in seemingly illiberal activities, for instance, enforcing compulsory education for its young. But the tension here is not the product of a philosophical inconsistency as Berlin suggests. Rather, this dilemma sheds light on the fact that liberalism is not the realisation of the philosophical principle of liberty, but that it constitutes an ‘arts of government’ linking the government of the state with the government of the individual through their freedom.

Liberal government, therefore, is beset by a seemingly paradoxical situation in which it must secure freedom and the effects of too much
freedom (Foucault 2007; Foucault 2008). On the one hand, freedom is a condition for the security of the state. Therefore, liberal government must secure enough freedom to enable the natural self-regulation of human activity, thereby securing the social order and averting the corruption of the market and the debasement of the mind (Hindess 1996a). On the other hand, security is a product of a government that regulates populations and individuals, and what happens within states, in ways that avert the abuse of their freedom. Hence, in his advocacy for the panopticon Bentham argued regulatory mechanisms are a condition of liberty (Dean 1999). In both of these instances, governmental power is called upon to exercise constant vigilance and activity in order to secure civil society, the state and the rights and freedoms of individuals.

To conventional liberal political philosophers, including Berlin (1979), this issue plays out in the form of the juridical protection of rights, liberty, property and contracts, the employment of regulatory techniques aimed at the juridical-political subject or those who contravene the law, and the disciplinary techniques such as education for training the citizen-subject in their rights and responsibilities. No doubt these are important interventions that proliferated with liberal government but in liberal government the complex apparatus that developed from the eighteenth century for investigating, normalising and correcting human bodies, minds and affects has become central to securing civil society and the state. This pastoral role, inherited from the pastoral role derived from the confluence of reason of state and police, was mentioned above in relation to securing
the proper exercise of liberty through cultivating normalised and prudent self-government.

So, in relation to the twin pressures of security and freedom, liberalism has come to depend upon cultivating self-governing citizens that can discharge their freedoms responsibly for the good of the welfare of all within the state. Through the elaboration of individualising technologies, the individual’s personality, habits, disposition, psyche, conduct, affect, bodies and desires are shaped according to the standards and norms characteristic of the rational, autonomous, responsible and self-governing individual derived from the inquiries into the population, civil society and economic activity (Hindess 1996a). For example, nineteenth century governmental and disciplinary practices of correction and improvement, such as education on child-rearing, parental roles and savings (Donzelot 1978), equipped individuals with the necessary norms, knowledge, attributes and skills for assuming their obligations to the social contract as responsible, free and self-governing citizens:

These mechanisms and devices… seek to produce the subjective conditions, the forms of self-mastery, self-regulation and self-control, necessary to govern a nation now made up of free citizens. (Rose 1993, 289)

Those not fitting the normative range were subject to more coercive forms of biopolitical management as they were either deemed incapable of exercising their liberty responsibly or it was thought their exercise of liberty threatened the security of civil society and its domains and natural
processes. Many of these transgressors were regarded as anti-social, degenerate, feeble-minded and subject to incarceration, medical treatment, correction and supervision.

This represents an obvious dilemma for liberalism.

On the one hand, the state is subject to scrutiny to ensure the protection and strengthening of the political and civil rights of individuals as autonomous, self-governing and political-juridical subjects of rights and freedoms (Hindess 1996a). On the other hand, the security of the liberal state and the possibility of a liberal government of free individuals have come to depend upon liberal government’s capacity to order, care for, and administer individuals and society. Critical to this endeavour was effectively integrating individuals into the collective through cultivating self-governing citizenship defined and policed according to the ideals of the population and civil society. Because of this dual role, Dean estimates that:

Liberalism is a particular form of articulation of the ‘shepherd-flock game’ and the ‘city-citizen’ game, of a pastoral power that takes the form of a bio-politics of the administration of life and form of sovereignty that deploys the law and rights to limit, to offer guarantees, to make safe and, above all to legitimate and justify the operations of bio-political programs and disciplinary practices. (Dean 1999, 132)

An agonistic dilemma for liberalism, therefore, is that while it seeks to enable individuals to assume their role as individuals engaged in their own self-government, it also assumes responsibility for cultivating the free individual self whose attributes are shaped by governmental norms and
ideals indexed to the population, civil society and state security. This dilemma exists because liberalism has inherited a responsibility for the pastoral care of the individual, and this invariably occurs within a totalising state rationality. And while liberalism subjects the pastoral role of the state and its sovereign legitimation to continual scrutiny and calls for its limitation, it also construes its pastoral role and technologies of government as a condition of freedom.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined how the liberal rationality and its arts of government emerge as a general critique of the early forms of government known as reason of state and police. However, against conventional political theory, these forms of government were not subject to critique and replacement by reflections and meditations of moral and social philosophers based on juridical protection of human liberty and rights against the encroachments of the state and rejection of regulation. Indeed, économistes and not jurists first made criticisms of the police state. Liberalism emerged as a critique of how to regulate the biological lives of humans within a system that accentuates respect for legal subjects and free enterprise. While the liberal state acts upon its citizens as self-governing individuals who belong through a system of rights and freedoms to a political and civic community, individualising technologies of the disciplines and government have subsequently developed, especially in relation to the totalising concerns of the state.
Liberalism generates great distrust of the state and political power, inserting freedom into its modalities of rule. But because security is a condition of freedom, liberalism generated a novel art of government that seeks to shape the free conduct of individuals by shaping and normalising their wills, personalities, habits, values, to dispense their liberties reasonably. The objective of securing the self-governing political community in whose name political power is exercised has become tethered to mechanisms for securing the population’s welfare under the condition of freedom. Hence liberalism is just as concerned with normalising and integrating individuals so as to shape their exercise of freedom as much as guaranteeing their rights and freedoms.

I venture to add that this history of the pastoral governmental state’s formation and the tension that has developed between the ‘register of social administration’ and the ‘register of freedom’ (Popkewitz 2000c) may be shaping contemporary governmentality. For instance, this tension appears to exist in the seemingly contradictory situation where, on the one hand, the state and government powers have been vociferously attacked for being paternalistic and diminishing the freedom of its citizens. And yet, on the other hand, the liberal state has also been condemned for failing to protect the welfare of its most vulnerable citizens, or to protect ‘normal citizens’ from the abnormal or incompetent. While I do not claim that this tension between freedom and administration is the ‘essence’ of our contemporary welfare state problem, it does support the analysis of the welfare state crisis as a crisis of liberal governmentality.
Chapter 6: The Crisis of Liberalism: From Welfare to Advanced Liberalism

Introduction

In the previous chapter I examined the formation of the modern liberal state and the political reason from which it is formed and which continues today. This opened up to examination two distinct domains. The first was the space of liberal government and its rationalities and techniques. These were a product of modifications from earlier forms of governmental rationalities and technologies, in particular reason of state and police. The second domain pertains to a dilemma in governmental rationality on account of the state’s historical formation as a pastoral power. In the liberal state, this dilemma circulates around the problem of securing freedom and securing order. The following explores how this dilemma manifests in the 1970s as a crisis of the rationalities and modalities of rule within the welfare state.

This chapter begins by outlining an understanding of the welfare state as a social liberal rationality and modality of rule. This was a pastoral
form of government of the nation that like liberalism was pegged to governing through people’s freedom. However, while the welfare state was concerned with securing freedom in the face of conditions and events that threatened it, its socialisation of the economy, social processes and insecurity and the centralisation of state power that this required became an object of liberal critique. This critique and the governmental rationalities associated with it, known as neo-liberalism and advanced liberalism, sought to diminish the totalising power of the state and restore personal and economic freedoms. This transformation from social to advanced liberal government designates the crisis of liberalism, and this was the condition of possibility for contemporary self-managing school reforms.

**Liberalism and the welfare state**

The welfare state is central to the transformation of the rationalities and technologies of rule that has beset many Western liberal democratic countries. So, what is the welfare state? Assessments of the welfare state vary. Some have argued that the welfare state is an ideological mystification performing an ideological function for controlling the working class under the guise of humanism (Gough 1979). For others, the welfare state and its associated bureaucratic apparatus resemble a socialist and authoritarian form of government that tends to be undemocratic and illiberal (Buchanan and Wagner 1977). These characterisations are

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countered by the welfare state’s construal as an expression of social democratic ideology. That is, it is an expression of a settlement between the working and capitalist classes (Offe 1984) whereby the social and economic domains are intervened in so as to protect individuals’ welfare, citizenship rights and social equality, not unlike Marshall’s sense of the welfare state (Marshall 1964). With such variations in the understanding of the welfare state, where should our analysis begin?

A desirable place to begin is with the notion that the state is not a unified social actor whose acquittal of policy merely depends upon its internal will, a point I have made earlier. This is because government, as an activity or set of techniques, is constituted by ad hoc, heterogeneous, pragmatic and coincidental institutional, expert, professional and local knowledges and technologies. This means we should not assume the state is a centralised actor that dispenses government under the influence of coherent ideologies, philosophies or doctrines (Hindess 1987a). This top-down conception of government assumes “there is an essential unity to the practical strategies of political practice which can be described as their ideological determinants” (Burchell 1994, 325). This is the kind of assumption that leads one to reduce liberalism to means the doctrine of laissez faire and rule of law, and the welfare state to signify citizenship and care.

Therefore, an examination of the welfare state and its contemporary relevance must begin with the premise that like liberalism it is foremost constituted by a multitude of regulatory agents and governmental programmes scattered throughout the social field, each pursuing specific
objectives, through a variety of limited technical methods and with a range of criteria of assessment (Hindess 1987a). Moreover, these cannot be analysed as if readily amenable to political rule or political ideologies (of welfare or social democracy) because although political authorities seek to govern at a distance through this multitude of authorities, these too “have sought to govern economic, familial and social arrangements according to their own programmes and to mobilize political resources for their own ends” (Rose and Miller 1992, 181).

What, then, is the formula of rule constituting the welfare state, or the patterns of regulation that make the welfare state discernable as a specific kind of political object? While the concerns and practices of liberal government characteristic of the eighteenth and nineteenth were grounded in the putative natural laws of society, market and the self-interested individual, as a mutation of liberal rationalities and technologies of government, the welfare state shares with liberalism a commitment to political and economic freedom, and an ambition to understand and improve the condition of the people and the economy and to secure the state. Moreover, political authorities still govern at a distance by authorising a range of expertises, disciplinary knowledge and technologies that aspire to govern the freedom of individuals in responsible and productive ways remains. However, the ‘regulatory regularity’ to the dispersed mentalities, technologies and programs of government of the welfare state is that it enacts a ‘social liberalism’ (Hindess 1996b). That is to say, the welfare state’s formula for governing was refracted through a
notion of the ‘social’, meaning governmental questions were asked and answered from the “social point of view” (Rose 1999b, 130).

*The emergence of social government*

The welfare state emerged when the social not only came into being as an object of government but also became wedded to political thought and action. But the social did not come to government ready-formed. Philip Abrams noted in his seminal text, *The Origins of British Sociology*, that nineteenth century social science lacked sociology but was suffuse with stultifying moralism (Driver 1988). That is because throughout the nineteenth century it appeared to governors and agents of rule that that which harms the freedom of individuals and the order of society can be found in the moral dimension of existence (Hunt 1999; Rose 1999b; Valverde 2008).

London Magistrate Patrick Colquhoun in 1806 in a *New and Appropriate System of Education for the Labouring People* wrote of the need for:

> guiding and properly directing the early conduct of the lower orders of the community... giving a right bias to their minds... The prosperity of every state depends on the good habits, and the religious and moral instruction of the labouring people. By shielding the minds of youth against the vices that are most likely to beset them, much is gained to society in the prevention of crimes, and in lessening the demand for punishments. (Colquhoun quoted in Donald 1992, 21)
Colquhoun was concerned for the rapidly declining morals of the ‘inferior classes’ and this required instructing them in their religious and moral duties. Informed by contested ethical and theological principles, reformers such as David Stow (1850) and Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth (1862) coded problems such as disease, criminality, pauperism and indigence in a moral form; these were problems of character, degeneration and demoralisation (Dean 1999). It was the moral that explained and shaped individual conduct and attitudes, and therefore it was the moral dimension of existence that was the sphere of regulatory activity of politicians, churches, philanthropists, doctors, moral statisticians and educationalists. Rose writes:

The term ‘moral’ here referred to a set of phenomena that seem confused to our eyes but which once had a characteristic unity. The moral was a kind of plane of intersection between experience, inheritance, conscience, character and conduct, located within a wider space of the character of a people as a whole. (Rose 1999b, 103)

The moral cannot be readily transposed onto the social because governmental intervention was directed to shaping the character, moral civility, will and conscience of ‘moral subjects’ (Collini 1991). This reflected a specific problematisation and objective of government; countering the corrupting “dense working-class enclaves created by industrialization and urbanization” (Donald 1992, 23), and vices posed in respect to sexuality, disease, will, purity and virtue. The state, it was reasoned, should be concerned with the “virtues of character – self-reliance,
sobriety, independence, self-restraint, respectability, self-improvement” (Rose 1999b, 105), for as Colquhoun suggests, “If the morals of the inferior orders of society are not of the highest importance to the state and to the country, it is difficult to discover in the various ramifications of political economy what is really important” (Colquhoun 1806a, 68).

Technologies such as pauper and monitorial schools, reformatory prisons, washhouses, the psy disciplines, friendly societies, and even libraries and museums sought to cultivate the habits of personal hygiene, introspection and obedience, “foresight, prudence and planful relation to the future”, and new regimes of the intellect such as literacy and numeracy (Rose 1999b, 104; Valverde 2008; Wohl 1984). Schooling as a means for securing the moral condition of the population, and especially the working class, became the subject of intense inquiry and debate (Cousins 1838; Horner 1840; Stow 1850). Inspector of Schools, Joseph Fletcher, envisioned a schooling system for cultivating the young with “physical strength, intellectual vigour and passions and affections” for making its recipients “good and wise” (Fletcher 1851; Silver 1994, 23).

Given that moral government encompassed a concern for the environmental context of individual behaviour (Driver 1988), it is probably not a surprise that these moral problems of government were ripe for reframing in a way more familiar to us; that is, in terms of ‘the social’. While the use of the terms ‘social’ and ‘society’ was not new to the nineteenth century, what was novel was the invention of the social as an objective sector of reality to be targeted for inquiry and regulation (Poovey 2002). A labour of inquiry, documentation, statistics, censuses and surveys
into phenomena or problems related to the conditions and health effects of factories, unemployment, casual employment, poverty, criminality, illness, suicide, and the dangers of civil unrest particularly around the meaning of citizenship, rendered the moral domain thinkable, knowable and calculable differently. In these attempts to calculate about and regulate reality, regularities and characteristics were construed as attributes of collectivities and indicative of social rather than individual causal factors (Reueschmeyer and Skocpol 1996). Here emerged the social as a specific domain of collective existence that possessed its own natural rules and phenomena irreducible to the individual (Dean 1999; Deleuze 1978; Donzelot 1978; Poovey 2002; Rose 1996b).

Previously political or moral problems such as unemployment now appeared as social problems with significance to the social whole. When an individual was out of work, for example, this was not just a problem for the individual but also for the health and wellbeing of society or the social whole, conceptualised in terms of social efficiency, social wastage, social promotion, social mobility and social rights. *Fin de siecle* Australian education reformer, Peter Board, was concerned with educational and social wastage and its effects on the welfare of the social whole:

It is as a city problem that the subject of the training for industrial efficiency of the youths of the city who now drift aimlessly and wastefully in what should be the most educative period of their lives, has to be considered in its bearing upon the welfare of the state as a whole. (Board quoted in Campbell and Sherington 2006, 30)
Where once the moral order was a grid that encompassed nations, bearing upon the character and habits of individuals and something shaped by individual stock, habits and conduct, it increasingly appeared that people’s experiences were enframed by a national-social architecture. People belonged to a society and were principally social beings, and that this was formative of individual character and attributes and a source of individual and collective problems. The social, therefore, was a domain of problems that beset the proper government of individuals, the population and the state, and therefore it was a “problem space within which one must pose a range of questions and struggles about the matter of life, of conduct, of powers and authority” (Rose 1999b, 114).

Interestingly, while philanthropic, medical, educational and working-class associations were proselytising the importance of the social and engaged in albeit dispersed, provisional and partial social policy (Dean 2008; Rose 1999b, 130), liberal political authorities were not easily converted to this social point of view. For the welfare state to emerge these social rationalities and modalities needed to be inscribed in political rationalities. This occurred when the state and political authorities could no longer resist not intervening into society and social processes. What caused this?

While there is no single causal factor to be found, there were influential factors. One was that the descriptions of the “ills, problems and risks” (Dean 2008, 30) posed by social, economic and industrial processes generated a growing appreciation by social liberals and social democrats of the limits of political economy to remedy the maladies of modern living.
Civil unrest in the mid nineteenth century raised questions about the role of the state. Evidence mounted that much phenomena that had significance to the wellbeing of the nation and population were social in character. In the “face of rising political unrest and evidence of the malign effects of irregular employment, poor living conditions and squalor”, demands for extensive social intervention to “mitigate what were now seen as the inevitable social consequences of capitalist economic arrangements” (Rose 1999b, 118) gained traction in the political domain.

By the early twentieth century the relatively unsystematic and haphazard array of social devices for addressing specific sectors, issues or problems became linked into the formal political apparatus. This was a sign that politicians increasingly accepted that “at least some aspects of this social domain should be added to the responsibilities of the political apparatus and its officials” (Rose 1999b, 117). It was here, when political rationalities became indexed to ‘the social problem’, when ‘society’ took responsibility for the individual, and the diverse agents of rule were more tightly knitted into the political machinery, that governmental modalities gained a level of consistency such that we could name it the welfare state.

The governmental rationality of social liberalism

Political authorities now perceived that the optimisation of the life of the population, national wellbeing and its prosperity were inextricably tied to the health and wellbeing of the processes of the social domain, to preventing social fracture and fragmentation, neutralising social threats and

159
to securing social cohesion, social responsibility, social promotion, social stability, social solidarity and the collective destiny (Dean 1999; Rose 1999b; Wittrock and Wagner 1996). In other words, the welfare state, although still committed to the liberal government of the people, involved reasoning liberal government and its objectives, means and objects around ‘the social’.

This capacity to assume responsibility for governing society and the social was undoubtedly a consequence of the pastoral role of the state inherited from its historical formation. Signified by the term ‘welfare’, it reflected a pastoral form of government that liberalism itself invoked in the elaboration of biopolitical rationalities and technologies of government. With the welfare state, however, the pastoral role of the state intensified.

In the domain of the economy, social democrats and social liberals argued that laissez faire and the economy’s boom and bust cycle created the problems of unemployment, social fragmentation, exploitation, economic insecurity and isolation. Political authorities sought to mitigate the negative effects of the economic machine by regulating it, or harnessing it to the interests of the nation and social wellbeing through its regulation. During the period 1850 to 1950, political authorities took responsibility for economic planning, making investments on the state’s behalf, providing benefits for individuals struck by unemployment or disability, regulating contracts, working hours, safety and work conditions, child labour, the regularity of employment, effectively socialising risk and insecurity by guaranteeing a social wage and protecting workers from the potential loss of their labour power through accidents and illness (see for example Carney

The social state’s pastoral responsibility was also extended to social regulation. With the state assuming responsibility for society, the number of areas of existence that had public and political significance multiplied. The social life in families and workplaces, for instance, had growing significance to the wellbeing of society and the nation. Political authorities authorised a brigade of social experts to intervene into these civil and ‘private’ relations for the purposes of correction, optimisation and education in the pursuit of social health and wellbeing (Donzelot 1978; Rose 1993), supported by the human and social sciences that were linked into these new political imperatives (Reueschmeyer and Skocpol 1996). The insolent employer, the ignorant parent, the maladjusted child, the lazy employee and the poor were targets of preventative and reactive strategies of social workers, social assistants, social scientists, sociologists, statisticians, industrial experts and other agents that flourished around the imperative for proper social rule, social stability and social adjustment (Miller and O'Leary 1989; Rose 1996b; Rose 1999a).

One clear example of the leading role taken by political authorities and its bureaucratic apparatus is in the expansion and management of education. In the name of care of society and the social citizen, Peter Board argued in 1910 that education should en masse cultivate individuals with the capacities and attributes for a productive citizenship that would contribute to national efficiency, prosperity and wellbeing. Board argued:
The conception of a nation as merely an aggregation of units, each struggling for its own selfish ends, has carried with it the elements of national decadence. On the other hand, in contrast to this individualism, it is the development of corporate responsibility, the partial merging of the individual in the community, the subordinating of personal freedom to the welfare of the State which, added to the personal progress of the individual with regard to his own private interests, has produced the most stable and contented communities. (Board quoted in Meredyth 1997, 289)

Linking education to fostering economic efficiency and social welfare prescribed for the social state a central role in expanding education and its administration (Donald 1992; Harman 1990; Hunter 1994; Meredyth 1997). This is because, as Board indicates, individual self-interest and personal ambitions were to be subordinated to corporate responsibility, integration and cohesiveness. There was now a responsibility in the name of state security to reduce social and educational wastage by “smoothing out the unevenness due to inherited disadvantages” (Board quoted in Meredyth 1997, 288), compensate for social and familial disadvantage (Hunter 1994; McCallum 1990; Smith 1990), develop individuals’ “ability to enter into satisfactory relations with one’s fellows” (Howie 1960, 67), and enable economic participation in the industrialising economy.

For education reform of the twentieth century, the achievement of these objectives were reasoned by many in terms of the systematic expansion of public primary and secondary schooling, a standardised education involving standard routines, common school and classroom facilities and environment, and standardised curriculum and forms of
assessment (Meredith 1997). Although supporting individual freedom remained a key concern, the injunction for political authorities was clear; a proper education system required immense political and bureaucratic activity, which included centralisation (Partridge 1968).

Take the case of the monopoly held by education bureaucracies over parental choice of school. Post World War Two, political authorities became committed to the standard neighbourhood school, which local children were obliged to attend for the benefit of society at large (Campbell and Sherington, 2006). This was at least partly because the neighbourhood school was a microcosm of society, and therefore the interaction of the diversity of children meant every child would develop respect for the “talents of a different order from his own, and comes to know that the ongoing life of a free community requires the pooling of many individual contributions” (Howie 1960, 78). The monopoly of school choice could be justified by the ambition to achieve social solidarity and cohesion by providing a standard education and training for all members of the population in the attributes and capacities of respectful and productive social citizenship (Hunter 1994; Silver 1994).

Troubling trends of the social state

It is perhaps unsurprising, given that the pastoral role of the state is a source of dilemma for liberalism, that the social rationalities and technologies of government which evinced the totalisation of state power, including the interventionist economic and social policies of John Maynard Keynes and
William Beveridge, produced reforms that activated classical liberalism’s sceptical vigilance of the state and government.

On the one hand, social government fostered a plethora of professionals, experts and bureaucracies empowered by political authorities to care for, educate, research, regulate and responsibilise individuals and their relationships (Rose 1993). This swathe of experts executed an ever-increasingly refined and detailed surveillance, inquiry and intervention into people’s personal and social lives, keeping political authorities abreast of the state of the nation, like a shepherd being kept informed of its flock (for example Central Advisory Council for Education 1967; Commission of Inquiry into Poverty 1976; Jackson and Marsden 1966). This expansion in expert regulatory knowledges and activity redrew the supposedly natural, or at least taken for granted, boundaries between the private and public established under liberal government. It brought the nation’s economy, work, education, sexual behaviours, parenting, health, families, communities and psyche into the realm of public interest, and therefore detailed political programming and regulation.

On the other hand, this use of expertise and professionals to achieve society’s wellbeing represented an affront to individual autonomy and precepts of political liberal democracy. It enabled experts to establish expansive bureaucratic and professional centres of calculation with a monopoly over the authoritative production and use of knowledge and truth. As much as the intensive surveillance of the population drew criticism from liberals and critics, so too did the perceived insulation of these expert enclosures from individual and community influence, who
were becoming more enmeshed in the complex network of social regulation (Rose 1993).

Moreover, this extensive professional and expert network was perceived to strengthen the power of political authorities. With these networks integrated into bureaucratic and political calculations (Rose 1993; Rose and Miller 1992), the centralising and totalising power of the state flourished more than it had under pre-twentieth century liberalism:

In Britain and most European nations, this array of social devices for the government of insecurity, poverty, employment, health, education and so forth would increasingly be connected up and governed from a centre. New links, relays and pathways were to be established to connect political aspirations, calculations and decisions to events at a multitude of local points – in households, educational establishments, health clinics, courtrooms, benefits offices, workplaces and the like. (Rose 1999b, 131)

The strengthening of these networks meant that political authorities attained a legitimated capacity to centrally direct and intervene in the economy, society, and the details of life in the homes and workplaces of citizens, with a goal of adapting individuals to society, often in the name of protecting the social framework. From the point of view of liberalism, this growth of the power of professionals, expertise, public bureaucracies and political authorities was a worrying sign of the incremental loss of economic, political and personal freedom. Akin to the shepherd who leads his flock, centres of political and administrative calculation assumed a central role in steering society rather than allowing the free play of individuals to direct society. By orchestrating and directing social and economic processes to
politically calculated ends, such as social progress, social promotion, social responsibility, the protection of social rights and social solidarity, the welfare state took charge of the levers of destiny and control over society’s future. Consequently, it increasingly appeared less as “a power protecting society’s solidarity but as the positive manager of its progress, the agent of its destiny” (Donzelot 1978, 242). From where did this problematisation of social government emerge? Was it simply a reactivation of classical liberalism?

Reactions to the welfare state and social government

This kind of criticism and problematisation of the social state was increasingly mounted throughout the twentieth century by a growing number of intellectuals, administrators, social movements, economists and political actors. A small group of these became known as neo-liberals and their scrutiny of the welfare state can be traced to the 1930s, although it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that their themes gained significant currency in social, economic and political circles in Europe, the United States and Australia, where they were employed in emergent political programmes. Who are the neo-liberals, from what political and social milieu did they emerge, and what vision of society and government have they propagated?

No doubt these questions could form the basis of an entire thesis on its own, so I will limit myself to an examination of the programmatic vision elaborated in neo-liberal thought and practice in response to state power.
Neo-liberals are especially concerned with the excesses of the welfare state and its social government, especially in relation to its effect on the freedom of the market and individuals. Their response to these perceived threats involved both the elaboration of new ways of reasoning the relationship between the state, government and the people, and new ways of enacting government. In order to grasp their relevance to contemporary government and the crisis of liberalism, my examination follows Foucault’s analysis of the emergence of German neo-liberalism and American neo-liberalism from a deep seated “state-phobia” (Foucault 2008, 187).

*German neo-liberalism and the market*

Neo-liberals on both sides of the Atlantic asked: what were the costs, measured economically and in terms of freedom, of the social state? Did the Keynesian form of intervention into the social and economic domains ultimately pose a threat to freedom? Neo-liberal criticism and reform took aim at the social and welfarist interventions occurring from at least the 1930s largely in response to the Great Depression and World War Two, and pursued up until the 1970s. These interventions included the Beveridge and Keynesian programmes, Roosevelt’s New Deal and the Johnson administration’s War on Poverty. However, Foucault draws attention to the kind of innovation in governmental rationality produced by German neo-liberals’ (the *Ordo*-liberals) critique of Nazism and the post-war reconstruction of Germany.
According to Foucault, Nazism constituted for German neo-liberals their analytical “field of adversity” (Foucault 2008, 106) inasmuch as it delineated the borders of their political, social and economic analysis, providing it with enemies and obstacles that needed to be overcome. For instance, while many such as the critical theorists blamed the rise of Nazism on the rapacious logic and activity of the capitalist market, German neo-liberals took a different stance. As they saw it, Nazism was able to gain a foothold into Europe because of state intervention into the functioning of the market and the regulation of economic and social life to state-defined ends. In particular, they referred to the Keynesian-style interventions such as protectionist policies and the planned economy, some of which were part of political and economic life in Europe prior to the twentieth century.

German neo-liberals used this analysis of the rise of Nazism in the analysis of Soviet planning and the welfare programs of the United States and the United Kingdom. And what they concluded worried them about Europe’s political system. These neo-liberals concluded that there appeared to be a principle of attraction between Keynesian policies and Nazism. That is, National Socialism and a super state were eventual outcomes of illiberal Keynesian interventionism, central planning and the protection of the economy, hence Wilhelm Ropke, Professor of Economics and advisor to the German government, claimed the English Beveridge plan was Nazism: “English Labour party socialism will lead you to German-style Nazism” (Foucault 2008, 110-111). As the growth in state power diminished economic and personal freedom, it was concluded that “the collapse of democracy in Germany is not caused by a functioning market economy but
rather the consequence of the fact that such an economy did not exist” (Lemke 2001, 193).

Because it was reasoned that it was not the market that had destructive and defective effects but the intrinsic defects of the state, it is not surprising that in transforming the German economy from a war footing to peace, its administrators and advisors such as Wilhelm Ropke and Ludwig Erhard, held great suspicion about using domestic planning as a principal instrument in German reconstruction, as advocated in Marshall’s *European Recovery Program*. Instead, an alternative orthodoxy was being established. In 1948, the Scientific Council that formed alongside the new German economic administration for the rebuilding of the German state accepted unanimously that economic processes should be directed by the price mechanism rather than price control by the state.

In relation to this, Erhard, who had responsibility for the post-war economic administration of the Anglo-American zone, made an interesting remark that gives an insight into the governmental thinking of the time. He suggested that this deregulation of prices on food and industrial products was needed to “free the economy from state control… only a state that can establish both freedom and responsibility of the citizens can legitimately speak in the name of the people” (Erhard quoted in Foucault 2008, 81). Occasioned by the context of German reconstruction, in Erhard’s assertion that the legitimate state is one that can establish both freedom and responsibility of citizens, Foucault detects a concern for how to found economic freedom and a state in the context of an occupied and divided state with no claim to juridical legitimacy or sovereignty. In other words,
these proposals were not merely a revival of conventional liberal concerns for market deregulation. It reflected a radically different way to pose questions of the market and state than classical liberals had.

Classical liberalism, you see, was confronted with the problem of what freedoms the state would leave for the economy or how to establish market freedoms within an already existing state. By comparison, the post-World War Two circumstance meant the problem for German neoliberals was reframed around how to found a state on economic liberty; that is to say, “how to create a state that did not yet exist on the basis of a non-state domain of economic liberty” (Lemke 2001, 196). This was a problem created by, not only the German state’s annihilation but also the deep suspicion of the state’s power and role, for the dark shadow of National Socialism and its totalitarian attempts at securing progress towards an historical end remained. For Foucault, the implication for policymakers was that they needed to make the state “acceptable to those who most mistrusted it” (Foucault 2008, 117).

This extraordinary circumstance led neo-liberals to demand more from the market economy than even classical liberals. As Foucault interprets it, in creating a space for economic freedom wherein every individual had the opportunity for exercising freedom, this exercise of freedom would give implied consent to those decisions taken to secure this economic freedom. Political and administrative actors therefore believed that the freedom of the economy would have a “state-creating function and role” (Foucault 2008, 95), effectively being a siphon or point of attraction for “the formation of a political sovereignty” (Foucault 2008, 83). In other
words, so long as the republic’s institutional framework was circumscribed to securing this economic freedom it would be acceptable to its citizens.

Therefore, the circumstance of German reconstruction and the scepticism of state power created an extraordinary reversal in governmental thought that remains relevant today. That is, the market was not the problem to be governed, supervised or limited by the state as it was in social government, but in fact the state was to be placed under the supervision of the market. Free prices and markets constitute “the only economic order compatible with human freedom, with a society and state which safeguard freedom, and with the rule of law” (Ropke 1960, 5). This would guarantee that the state’s legitimacy was to be founded on economic liberty and the state’s role was not transcendental, such as pursuing an historical mission for racial purity. Instead, the activities of political authorities must be delimited to securing the rules of economic exchange and securing economic prosperity through economic growth.

*German neo-liberalism and competition*

This is not the only contribution by German neo-liberals to the critique of the social state and to the formation of contemporary governmentality more attentive to freedom. Neo-liberals did not believe as classical liberals did that the market is a natural, spontaneous and autonomous existence to be respected by the state. This is because neo-liberals believed competition ensures market rationality by regulating prices and choices and so it, and not free exchange, was the principle of the market. Although this notion
can be found in late nineteenth century liberal economic theory, German neoliberals do not agree with their eighteenth and nineteenth century predecessors that *laissez faire* was the principal requirement of competition. This reflected a “naïve naturalism” (Foucault 2008, 120) because it assumes incorrectly that the market and competition are quasi-natural and spontaneous creations with their own laws that rise to the surface under conditions of freedom.

By contrast, German neo-liberals thought that competition was not “a natural game between individuals and behaviour” (Foucault 2008, 120) but a product of the structures, mechanisms, institutional practices, techniques or economic processes that constitute it. It is a “formal game between inequalities” (2008, 120). Consequently, if market competition possesses formal properties then there must be certain required conditions for competition to produce its optimum effects, and therefore these conditions must be carefully constructed. Therefore, neo-liberalism did not embrace market *laissez faire* because neo-liberals believed that “market mechanisms and the impact of competition can arise only if they are produced by the practice of government” (Lemke 2001, 193).

An obvious problem arises for these neo-liberals by thinking that market competition requires an “active governmentality” (Foucault 2008, 121). If the German neo-liberals sought to place the state under the supervision of the market yet market competition required certain conditions that needed to be contrived and sustained in and by government, then what is to limit the exercise of state power that neo-liberals so feared?
Would not this extend the power of the social state, which they were so keen on dismantling?

The German experience of excessive state power was fructuous territory for advocating an active governmental policy that would be circumscribed to securing economic freedom by creating and sustaining entrepreneurial competition and markets. In other words, market competition must be the rule for defining governmental conduct, not in the sense that one must govern because of the market but rather one must govern for the market. Pegging liberal government to the prevention of monopolies and the creation of entrepreneurial competition in the market signified a radical departure from the welfare state and social government. For German neo-liberals, the social field is composed of a multiplicity of differentiated enterprises acting freely and guided by tactics and calculations of objectives and planning, creating and pursuing projects:

…the whole ensemble of individual life [is to] be structured as the pursuit of a range of different enterprises: a person’s relation to his or her professional activity, family, personal property, environment… are all to be given the ethos and structure of the enterprise-form. (Gordon 1991, 42)

In this ‘enterprise society’ (Foucault 2008; Gordon 1991), individuals could be governed economically, or as enterprises. Economic and social policy could be grounded on the economic mechanisms of supply, demand and competition, according to which social relations could be modelled. Therefore, rather than state power crafting society, and this leading to the entrenchment of social rationalities and the centralisation of political, state
and bureaucratic power, state power must instead respect economic freedoms and foster entrepreneurship.

But this was not to be a return to the harsh and cold economic relations of previous generations that provoked social forms of government. Alexander Rustow reasoned that promoting “the conditions of the free, entrepreneurial conduct of economically rational individuals” (Dean 1999, 156) would be an antidote to all that threatened economic freedom, such as Fascism, the appearance of competition as harsh and cold, and labour as monotonous and meaningless (Rose 1999b). Enterprise would create a life worth living, where people could be empowered to shape their lives, to experience themselves as self-actualising, and thereby give a reason for individuals to invest in personal and political freedom. Through the notion of entrepreneurial competition, neo-liberals provided both a critique of and alternative form of society than that of social liberalism.

*American neo-liberalism and entrepreneurship*

But a more radical contribution to this emerging governmentality of enterprise came from the American neoliberals of the Chicago school. Economists such as Gary Becker (1983) and Milton Friedman (1968), as well as economist and public choice theorist John Buchanan (1968), were influential in the formulation and promulgation of the image of the individual as an entrepreneur, particularly through their application of a mode of analysis that rendered human behaviour intelligible as basically economic. These economists applied an economic grid of intelligibility to
all purposive human choices and actions, and all behaviours whether rational or not that responded systematically to changes in environment (Gordon 1991; Lemke 2001). Their objective was to bring “to light the calculation – which, moreover, may be unreasonable, blind, or inadequate – through which one or more individuals decide to allot given resources to this end rather than another” (Foucault 2008, 223). Their effect was to bring into existence an entrepreneurial form of the human that while congruent with the German neo-liberals’ notion of enterprise was also far more radical.

Take, for example, their theory of human capital. In short, this schema posited that individuals were human capital, a composition of genetic/natural make up and environmental influences, or an individual’s acquired investments, such as education or nutrition. Although not a new concept (Marginson 1993; Marginson 1997c), mid to late twentieth century human capital theory construed the human not as merely a cog in the economic machine but as an ongoing capitalisation that could be personally developed and traded in the market. Individuals make strategic choices about how to use the means available to him or her. For instance, choices related to investment in knowledge and skills are calculable in terms of a rate of return on their decisions, such as on an individual’s earning stream (for example, Becker 1983).

Because this human capital grid of intelligibility renders all human behaviour rationally economic and calculable, the economic domain is cast as “one social domain among others with its own intrinsic rationality, laws and environment” (Lemke 2001, 197). The social sphere is made identical
to the economic domain, or it becomes “a form of the economic” (Gordon 1991, 43). This created a new imperative for government more state-phobic and radical than those derived from the German neo-liberals. As individuals were basically ‘entrepreneurs of themselves’ in an economic domain, there was no need to govern society. Society does not exist, at least not as an organic, cohesive, integrated and fragile matrix of solidarity through which each needy and frail individual should be connected and their destiny linked (Rose 1996a). For neo-liberals, the individual is positive and enterprising and society is “regarded less as a source of needs that are individually distributed and collectively borne and more as a source of energies contained within individuals’ exercise of freedom and self-responsibility” (Dean 1999, 152). Therefore, governmental reason is to be pegged to a form of economic government of the rational choice-making individual, because choice was perceived as a universal and principal faculty of human behaviour above and beyond social and anthropological categories and frameworks (Gordon 1991).

This government of the entrepreneurial individual required creating the conditions for individuals to exercise their entrepreneurial freedom to make capital or investment decisions. Believing that the state should not manage a collective security but instead seek to install a new set of ethical and cultural values that accord individuals the power to shape and secure their own lives, political authorities have sought to remove constraints on people engaging in competitive market behaviour (Beeson and Firth 1998; Hilmer 1993). From the 1980s, national and state policy in Australia, for example, has been increasingly organised so as to foster opportunities for
human capital formation. Previously non-economic domains, such as healthcare, childcare and education, have been linked into economic circuits through the creation of markets, removing constraints that may limit the individual’s capacity to act and choose freely in their process of capitalisation (Marginson 1993; Lauder 1991; Brown and Lauder 1996; Marginson 1997a; Spring 1998).

The dilemma of freedom and security

This sketch of neo-liberalism goes some way to explaining the critique of the welfare state and the concerted attempts in Europe, Canada, New Zealand and Australia over the past three decades to discard or transform the social rationalities and technologies of government established over the past century in order to secure society. The social modality of government was construed as a problem in that it signified the excessive power of the state, the diminution of personal and economic freedom, and it hindered industrial competition and competitive behaviour. We can use this notion of ‘transformation’ to understand the emergence of policy steered in the direction of deregulating the national economic infrastructure, privatising government-owned utilities, downsizing and breaking up central bureaucracies into competing agencies and departments, and instituting competitive mechanisms across a range of industries in order to optimise the national economy. However, while the above descriptions enable us to understand these policies and reforms in terms of a transformation in
governmental modalities, it also illuminates why the welfare state crisis resembles a crisis of liberalism, or a crisis of governmentality.

On the one hand we have the social state whose pastoral role leads to securing freedom and society through the augmentation of political power, the socialisation of economic life, interventionist social policies, and the expansion and centralisation of public bureaucracy and experts of the social and human conduct. On the other hand we have a critique of this government from the social point of view. Neo-liberals were highly suspicious of this kind of state interventionism, particularly honing their criticisms on the management of the economy, the expansion of public bureaucracies and the vast administration of social life by the authority of bureaucrats, professionals and experts. Neo-liberals asked about the economic cost of the exercise of freedom and the costs to freedom incurred by the use of devices intended to produce freedom. For example, although the Keynesian compensatory policies of the social state were designed to maintain the individual’s purchasing power within the economy, such policies risked producing the opposite, such as excessive bureaucratic, professional and disciplinary intervention into the lives of people and the market.

For those who governed from the social point of view, these interventions and mechanisms of social government were a means to securing greater economic and political freedom of individuals in the face of too much freedom and too little attention paid to the wellbeing of society as a condition of that freedom. But viewed from a different pair of eyes, these represented ‘illiberalism’. Neo-liberals, such as public choice
theorists, saw policymakers, bureaucrats, experts and politicians as taking the reigns of economic and social processes at the expense of personal liberty, now to be understood in terms of autonomy, enterprise, competition and choice. This lay behind the analysis of the public sector and public bureaucracies by neo-liberals and public choice theorists.

In the welfare state, the bureau-professional bureaucracy was oriented to public service and welfare, it was routinised and had predictable outputs, and it relied upon professional technical knowledge in decision-making (Clarke and Newman 1997). For neo-liberals such as Friedrich Hayek, the public bureaucracy associated with the welfare state represented the worst excesses of the social state and a threat to freedom. One evil of bureaucracy lies in its ‘social engineering’, inasmuch as it was the state that was to determine what social and economic policies should be pursued and to what ends drawing upon its regulatory instruments to these ends. This did not conform to Hayek’s ontological presupposition that the ordering of society’s affairs should be the product of the spontaneous forces of society (Hayek 1960). It was in this sense that Hayek lamented the diminution of personal freedom and feared that this growth in public administration may well come to define the end of politics, ‘a road to totalitarianism’ (Hayek 1945).

By the 1960s, major technical in-roads were made into the criticism and analysis of the public sector and this would reform the public bureaucracy in accordance with neo-liberal principles. With deep suspicion of centralised planning and bureaucrats becoming the new “political masters” (Ostrom 1973, 129), public choice theory in particular rendered
the public services intelligible through neo-classical economic theory. Presupposing humans as rational, economic and possessing the capacities for entrepreneurship, and believing market competition to be the desirable means for providing goods and services to efficient and just ends, public choice theorists lambasted the conventional model of public bureaucracy, their monopoly in the provision of goods and services, and their relationship to politics (Buchanan and Wagner 1977; Niskanen 1971; Niskanen 1973).

Public choice theorists asserted that the organisation of bureaucracies was not congruent with the rational, entrepreneurial individual who sought personal advantage and utility maximisation. The lack of competitive market mechanisms of incentives and rewards fostered decision-making by bureaucrats that led to inefficient organisational performance, undemocratic and illiberal conduct, particularly evident in their unresponsiveness to the interests of clients by effectively presenting the market with “all-or-nothing choice” (Niskanen 1971, 25). Indeed, neo-liberals asked how politicians could be trusted to make rational and fair choices in the distribution of scarce resources while being subject to the influence of electoral politics? Congruent with Hayek’s concerns, public providers had grown into illiberal monolithic monopolies that determined what was right for society and the economy, while the politicians, bureaucrats and experts who were ensconced in public bureaucracies sought self-advancement, insulated from accountability.

Such criticism questioned the merit of a key rationality of social government; that there was a collective good (Foucault 2008; Olssen et al.
This was because, firstly, bureaucrats in fact operated like competitive enterprises in a market of competing interests and therefore could not be relied upon to devise and pursue the public good, and secondly, the collective good could not be calculated, “at least, not within an economic strategy” (Foucault 2008, 279). Instead, as it was believed that private enterprise and individuals were best placed to make economically efficient decisions regarding their lives and best placed to determine and pursue their interests, then the organisation of the bureaucracy and its provision of public goods and services should be modelled on the competitive market.

This above diagnosis of the problems with central planning and public bureaucracies generated reform that reconfigured governmental rationalities and technologies along the lines of individual autonomy, choice and freedom. Accepting and instrumentalising human nature, and therefore political and bureaucratic actors, as innately entrepreneurial and economic, the public sector was to be re-modelled on entrepreneurial economic exchange. This entailed privatisation and dismantling large departments into autonomous organisations competing for government funds and private custom. Here, the relationship between the provider of public goods and the citizen was to be consumer based, for “producer efficiency in the absence of consumer utility is without economic meaning” (Ostrom 1973, 62). Therefore, this transformation in the regulation of the public sector sought to secure the liberal state and its prosperity and wellbeing by freeing the bureaucrat (to be free to manage
entrepreneurially), freeing departments (devolved/quasi-autonomous) and freeing citizens (to be empowered consumers).

What does this description suggest about the crisis of liberal governmentality represented by the neo-liberal transformation of governmental rationalities and technologies? It suggests that the objects, means and ends of liberal government were being contested, that much of this contestation occurred around the problematic of freedom, and that this was occasioned by the inherent tensions in the governmental rationality and arts of liberalism, that is, between the generation of technologies of security and those that seek to limit these, paradoxically, in the name of freedom and the aversion of danger. While the security of the state once depended upon securing society, strengthening the bonds of the individual to the social whole and regulating the social and the economy in the interest of the society, neo-liberalism now construed the social state and its governmental rationalities and technologies as over-stepping the, albeit labile, threshold between freedom and un-freedom, consequently presenting a danger to individual freedom and the security of the liberal state. This crisis of liberal governmentality also explains the broader reform that has occurred in many Western liberal democracies.

**Advanced Liberalism**

I want to conclude this chapter by considering the broader context of this transformation in the rationalities and technologies of government, or crisis of liberalism. It would not be accurate to suggest neo-liberalism
exhaustively constitutes the field of modern governmental rationalities and modalities. While neo-liberalism more specifically refers to a political programme of market creation, there was a broader assemblage of governing rationalities and practices that neo-liberalism sits within. Rose terms this new modality of government which has social and cultural reach, ‘advanced liberalism’ (Rose 1999b; Rose 1999c).

Arguably, the most notable example of this social and cultural reform is that propelled by the New Right in the 1980s, of which Margaret Thatcher was its poster child. Presupposing an image of the individual as active, autonomous and enterprising, the New Right’s criticisms of the welfare state circulated around the political aspiration to cultivate individuals who were active, enterprising, autonomous, responsible, self-motivated and self-reliant (Hall 1986; Heelas and Morris 1992). The welfare state was accused of treating individuals as passive recipients of handouts and fostering a deleterious culture of dependency in which individuals expected the state to satisfy their every need (Mead 1986). This criticism linked the wellbeing of the nation to empowering citizens to exercise their freedom entrepreneurially and to take responsibility for their own self-government.

Now, compare this image of the citizen and political government with the presuppositions of personhood elaborated by the alterative side of the political spectrum. During the 1960s and 1970s, a whole range of domains became targets of the Left and social progressives. Representative democracy came under attack as an inadequate form of democracy, with one criticism being that it largely rendered individuals politically passive,
save for electoral participation (Almond and Verba 1965; Pateman 1970). Others were far more critical and pessimistic about the welfare state in particular. The welfare state and its supposedly Kafkaesque bureaucracies were variously characterised as alienating, paternalistic, masculine, agents of social control, dehumanising and disempowering (Gough 1979; Hummel 1977; Whitlam 1972; Wilson 1977).

Criticisms also targeted the monopoly over professional knowledge held by professionals, increasingly seen as servants of power that unduly reinforced their authority at the expense of empowering the individual (Illich 1971; Rogers 1977; Schon 1983). This criticism also operated in the opposite direction. Alternatively, professionals were themselves disempowered by bureaucracies because bureaucratic management disabled them from being genuine “autonomous practitioners” (Schon 1983, 337).

The proponents of a politics of voice, recognition and identity argued that a robust civic and political culture required a participatory democracy in which citizens, even workers, were active in their own government, the authority of expertise detached from the apparatuses of political rule, and social authorities oriented towards empowering individuals (Rose 1993; see for an example Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration 1976).

We can discern from this comparison between the New Right and the Left that while the bloc of social progressives and the Left were critically hostile towards the neo-liberal change in political rationality, they nevertheless engaged in the formation of new rationalities of government that were mapped onto the neo-liberal critique of government. Both the
Left and the Right plotted their critiques and projects along the conceptual coordinates of state control, active citizenship, autonomy and self-determination. This occurred not because the former had come under the ideological spell of the latter, but because both were connected to a common problematisation of government based on many premises of neoliberalism: a distrust of the state, a cultural revival of freedom and emancipation, a rediscovery of a “culture of the self and its actualization” (Dean 1999, 155), and a belief that individuals were enterprising, active and self-determining with the capacity to be “potentially active in their own government” (Rose 1999b, 142).

Interestingly, the progressive movement is largely ignorant of its positive connection to neo-liberalism. Arguably, this is because it only dimly grasps how key notions of its theories and programs, such as individual agency and empowerment, are “inserted into a system of purposes” (Dean 1999, 168), and how the ‘free subject’ is deployed as a “technical instrument in the achievement of governmental purposes and objectives” (Dean 1999, 155). Today, for instance, the empowered, self-actualising and autonomous citizen who is potentially active in their own development and government is central to the rationalisation of neo-liberal government and the profusion of advanced liberal governmental technologies. Therefore, a radical politics based upon an empowered, free individual fails to see that across the political spectrum, practices of government have become concerned with “structuring, shaping, predicting and making calculable the operation of our freedom, and of working off
and through diagrams of free subjects constituted by forms of governmental and political reasoning” (Dean 1999, 166).

A caveat to this description of advanced liberalism is that it should not be taken as a ready-formed or coherent political rationality that has been or is being implemented by Western democratic countries. This is because the formation of mentalities of rule is an “utterly contingent and pragmatic affair driven by what is thought might work [and only] over time does a process of systematization generate government rationalities” (also Larner 2000; Peters et al. 2000, 111; Rose 1999b). Therefore, we should avoid construing advanced liberalism as a universal and totalising rationality and instead recognise that as a governmental rationality it is a contingent, mobile and ad hoc lash up of thought and action continually being invented and reconfigured.

**Conclusion**

The crisis of liberalism refers to the transformation of governmental rationalities and technologies that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. To call it a crisis of liberalism is to gesture towards the roots of this transformation in the endogenous dilemma of liberalism. The historical formation of the state as a pastoral power enabled it to take ever-increasing responsibility for the care, welfare and administration of the population. Yet this created a tension with the rationalities of liberalism, which sought to secure the freedom of individuals. Throughout the course of the twentieth century, social government, although a liberal form of government that sought to
keep citizens free, was seen to have erred in its centralisation of power and its regulatory ambitions. The rise of advanced liberalism and neo-liberalism may therefore be construed as attempts to arouse and manufacture freedom in the face of that which was perceived to threaten it. From de-regulating the economy and creating markets in new sectors of reality, such as in health care, to fostering the regulatory role of non-government and voluntary organisations, advanced liberalism sought to re-organise the conditions in which individuals could be free to pursue their interests.

What, then, is the relationship between this crisis of liberalism and the self-managing reforms described in Part I? Part III of this thesis specifically examines self-managing reforms in education as a manifestation of this crisis of liberalism.
PART III : PROGRAMS OF FREEDOM: EMPOWERMENT & ENTREPRENEURIAL MANAGEMENT
Introduction

Part II canvassed some implications of the historical formation of the modern state. In its formation from the early rationalities and practices of governing in reason of state and police, the modern state attained an individualising and totalising power. Here, the state took responsibility for caring for the welfare of individuals and the population, while at the same time seeking to govern individuals as members of a common community of citizens. I then argued that this dynamic was translated into the rationalities and practices of the liberal state. Liberalism assumed responsibility for the welfare of individuals as members of a flock, a dynamic that evokes the title of Foucault’s lectures on this subject matter: *omnes et singulatim*. Importantly, under liberalism freedom is linked to the security of the state, and an extensive disciplinary and governmental apparatus has accompanied this. I concluded Part II by arguing the recent crisis of the welfare state is indicative of a tension at the heart of this governmental rationality, what Foucault describes as a “crisis of governmentality” (Foucault 2008, 68).

This crisis of governmentality involved a re-appraisal of government around the question of freedom, and this has been pivotal to
the emergence of new projects in the art of government formulated immediately before and after the war in Germany (Foucault 2008). These projects involved a transformation in the political and governmental rationalities and technologies of many Western countries, a transformation often based around a discourse of freedom, emancipation, empowerment, self-determination, autonomy, choice, and self-actualisation (as well as a discourses of security, threat and risk). What, then, is the relationship between this transformation in the rationalities and modalities of government and self-managing reforms in education?

Part III of this thesis addresses this question. It interprets self-managing school reforms as a ‘program of freedom’ in that it transforms the rationalities and technologies of government employed in the field of education away from social rationalities of governing (which gave emphasis to the authority of the state, bureaucracies, experts and professionals) and towards neo-liberal and advanced liberal ways of conceptualising the world and enacting a ‘freer’ government of states. In relation to the field of education, I am thinking about this transformation specifically in terms of a shift away from the centralising, standardising and prescriptive role of education bureaucracies towards a decentralised, marketised education system that ‘empowers’ school leaders, parents and communities.

My argument is not that such reforms mean that school leaders, parents, communities and students are free from the state and government. Rather, I use the term ‘program of freedom’ because the advocates of self-managing reforms construe it as a sort of program or technology of
freedom and empowerment. For me, this reasoning indicates that the crisis of liberalism defined and generated self-managing reforms. In other words, self-managing reforms reconfigure the relationship between the pastoral role of the liberal state and the ambition of liberal rationalities of government to secure and protect the freedom of individuals. Exploring this transformation is the goal of Part III. This will involve exploring: (1) the problematisation of the domain of education by advanced liberal rationalities of government; (2) the instantiation of the discourses of freedom and empowerment in self-managing reforms; and (3) the re-regulation according to advanced liberal rationalities of the domain of education and the state’s educational enterprise.

Because mapping and analysing the contemporary transformation in the government of schooling is a potentially limitless endeavour, I will limit my analysis to two case studies. The first is the reframing of the relationship between the family/home and the school around the notion of empowerment, and the second is the managerial and entrepreneurial reform of schools and teachers’ work. I have chosen these two cases because the family/school relationship and the internal administration of schools have been focal points of self-managing reforms, both in terms of providing justifications for reforms and in being sites of intervention. How, then, will the analysis of these two cases proceed?
Analysing the link between government and self-managing reforms

Informed by the Foucauldian literature on government (Barry et al. 1996b; Burchell et al. 1991; Dean 1999; Rose 1999b), my analysis begins with the premise that how we have come to reason government is tied to how we have come to problematise reality, because how we problematise reality shapes how a range of authorities attempt to shape, intervene, program and improve reality. It is for this reason that Foucault remarks in an interview with Paul Rabinow, “the work of a history of thought would be to rediscover at the root of these diverse solutions the general form of problematisation that has made them possible” (Foucault 1984a, 389). He continues:

This development of a given into a question, this transformation of a group of obstacles and difficulties into problems to which the diverse solutions will attempt to produce a response, this is what constitutes the point of problematisations and the specific work of thought… it is a question of a movement of critical analysis in which one tries to see how the different solutions to a problem have been constructed; but also how these different solutions result from a specific form of problematization. (Foucault 1984a, 389)

In this interview, Foucault insists that for action, behaviours or practices to enter into thought, they must be rendered uncertain, unfamiliar, a problem or difficult. This problematisation is a product of the intellectual processing of reality because it is the specific form of knowledge and truth that renders aspects of reality into thought and constitutes aspects of reality as certain kinds of problems. It is the production of a general form of
problematisation from this intellectual processing that diverse solutions to purported problems are proposed.

In other words, problematisations develop “the conditions in which possible responses can be given; it defines the elements that will constitute what the different solutions attempt to respond to” (Foucault 1984a, 389). Therefore, social developments, including such things as governmental practices, techniques, strategies or programs that purport to be solutions to determined problems, should not be approached analytically as inevitable responses to self-evident difficulties or problems, nor as effects of ‘fundamental’ transformations in culture or the economy. Rather, we must engage with these developments, such as education reforms, in terms of how the problems they were intended to solve are rendered into existence to begin with.

*Problematisations and government*

Foucault’s emphasis on problematisations (Marshall 2006) is consistent with the constructivism of Foucauldian studies of government. According to Rose and Miller (1992), government “is a *problematizing* activity: it poses the obligations of ruler in terms of the problems they seek to address” (1992, 181).

It is these problematizations that accord the activity of politics its intelligibility and possibility at different times; it is these problematizations that shape what are to be counted as problems; what as failures and what as solutions. (Rose 1993, 286)
This begs the question of how governmental problems are created. The rejoinder is that this how governmental problems are created is related to how governed reality is rendered knowable. Illustratively, Foucault found in his studies of early government that whether “the concern was the economy or the moral order, each was made thinkable and practicable by governors as a knowable and administrable domain” (Rose et al. 2006, 86).

In other words, when those who sought to administer the state, and to govern through people’s freedom attempted to do so, they first sought to conceptualise and know the domains or phenomena to be governed.

This twin process of objectification and problematisation can be analysed in policy documents. This is because these are “as much about constructing a policy problem in a given way, as about anything else” (Porter et al. 1993, 232). However, analysis should extend beyond official policy texts. This is because liberal government does not simply depend on achieving goals articulated by policymakers in official policy documents.

Rather, government is made possible through the knowledges and techniques of a plethora of relatively non-political disciplinary, governmental and social experts who have taken responsibility for rendering reality knowable and administrable.

Representing to authorities, social agents and governors the reality to be governed, the expert knowledges of the human and social sciences, such as psychology, make it possible to say things truthfully and consequently, “to conceive and do things politically” (Rose 1993; Rose 1999b, 275). For example, the discipline of psychology, with its particular language, theories, techniques and style of truth making, produces truths of
human behaviour and psychology that shape how experts, governors, political authorities and everyday citizens think about and act upon people and the world (Rose 1996b; Rose 1999a). Therefore, as the disciplines and experts have this role in the conceptualisation, problematisation, organisation and regulation of liberal societies, the analysis of government must be attentive to what expertise and their knowledge claims associated with it can do and make possible, both politically and governmentally.

This also means being attentive to the complex relationship between expert knowledge and the political realm. Political authorities do not merely use expert knowledge to their own ends, but they forge alliances with independent agents so as to link socio-political objectives to the expert conceptualisation, problematisation and administration of life. Rose and Miller explain that experts:

...ally themselves with political authorities, focusing upon their problems and problematizing new issues, translating political concerns about economic productivity, innovation, industrial unrest, social stability, law and order, normality and pathology and so forth into the vocabulary of management, accounting, medicine, social science and psychology. (Rose and Miller, 1992, 188)

So, for instance, while the disciplines of the human and social sciences give objects, techniques and strategies to political and non-political governors, the knowledge about human being/s developed within this discipline is also shaped by political reflections on the state. The liberal mode of governing that seeks to equip individuals with the knowledge and attributes for their self-government is made possible by the knowledges, strategies, techniques...
and problems developed in fields such as psychology, and its related fields of behaviourism and management, enabling self-government to occur.

It is my task in Part III of this thesis to analyse this objectification and problematisation of the field of education that occurred in the latter half of the twentieth century. This involves examining how authorities, agents, programs and texts have rendered the domain of education visible, knowable and problematic such that school autonomy, devolution and school self-management emerged as legitimate policy goals. This also requires us to ask how these problematisations link to how political authorities have themselves “posed and specified the problems for government” (Rose and Miller 1992, 177).

The background to this analysis has been described in the preceding chapter. I have indicated, for example, that advanced liberal rationalities of government have powerfully shaped the objectification of domains of government from the late twentieth century. What has this involved? In many Western liberal democracies, there has been a recalibration of government away from social and state-centred rationalities that were associated with excessive regulation, welfare dependency, and the over-extension of the authority of professional and expert authority. The crisis of liberalism has witnessed a shift towards regulatory rationalities and technologies that emphasise freedom, activity, entrepreneurship, autonomy, empowerment, choice and responsible self-government. Government, politics, individuals and society are being thought about and acted upon differently according to these new conceptualisations (for example, Business Council of Australia 1991c; Hilmer 1993; Industry Task Force on
If we accept these presuppositions, how, then, did advanced liberal rationalities recast the conceptualisation and problematisation of education within new political prerogatives of the 1970s and 1980s? How was the domain of education re-regulated as a result of the enactment of advanced liberalism and the crisis of liberal governmentality?
Chapter 7: Governing the Family-Education Nexus Through Empowerment

Introduction

Building a strategic alliance between the family and the state’s educational enterprise has been an ongoing political ambition for liberal government. Self-managing reforms are not exempt from this problem. In fact, the policies of devolution, self-management and school autonomy are frequently justified with reference to the family. This chapter examines the relationship between self-managing school reforms and the family and the community of the child.

I begin with a discussion of how the family figures historically in liberal government and the nature of its relationship to education, and then I analyse how this pastoral relationship has been reframed contemporarily within the rationalities of advanced liberalism. I argue that within this way
of reasoning, building the strategic alliance between the family and school, in order to improve the educational and citizenship outcomes of schooling, was construed as a problem that called for de-bureaucratising the education system, according schools greater autonomy and empowering the family, child and community. I then canvass how this self-managing reform was to contribute to governing the education of citizens now construed as empowered, autonomous and active.

**Sketching the persistent problem of the family and parenting**

Terms such as devolution, self-management and school autonomy immediately invoke a sense of organisational reform, something done to organisations to improve their functioning. Consequently, social and political analysis has frequently focused on how self-management transforms teachers’ work, how system devolution and school autonomy improves organisational flexibility and efficiency, and even how decentralisation produces centralisation at different levels, for instance, the political use of accountability regimes. The relationship between school self-management and the family has not been a major object of interest, particularly in how concerns for the latter have shaped the former. When this relationship is canvassed, analysis often circulates around the regrettable effects on the family of the competition between schools, or how the rhetoric of local participation actually obfuscates the reality that working class parents and communities are largely excluded from participating in school decision-making (Ball 1994; Gewirtz et al. 1995).
There is, however, an important relationship between the family and self-managing reforms.

The family figures centrally in the *Schools in Australia* (Karmel 1973) report, one of the most influential early reports advocating decentralisation and greater school autonomy. This report was concerned with the strain on the administration and effectiveness of education systems and schools because of the expansion of educational provision post World War Two. Increasing levels of participation in education meant that young people of social backgrounds that had not previously been well represented in the upper years of schooling were now staying at school longer, and this was increasing the cultural, economic and intellectual diversity of the student population. Importantly, this problem of diversity and the disparity in educational participation and outcomes was linked to the problem of the family and the child’s community.

The report contended, for instance, that student backgrounds, specifically low socioeconomic and non-English speaking backgrounds, often militated against educational success. It claimed that many of these parents were ignorant of educational matters, that many students’ home dwellings did not support studious conduct and desirable habits, such as literacy practices, and that difficult material circumstances were exacerbated by the culture of the home and the attitudes of family members, such as parents’ negative attitudes to schooling and their low aspirations for their children. It reasoned that if schools were to improve the learning and life outcomes of these students, education policy must take into account students’ family life. The family, therefore, had pertinence to
the government of schooling and its outcomes, something that should be
central to the concerns, activities and organisation of schools.

This is just one example of the significance accorded to the family
in educational policy and decision-making. I want to suggest that given the
significance of the *Schools in Australia* report and the important place it
accords to the family and community in how it reasoned the organisational
reform of education systems, further investigation of the relationship
between the family and self-managing reforms is warranted, and
particularly how the concern for the family has shaped school autonomy
and self-management.

*Schooling and the family*

To begin this examination, I want to make a brief historical sketch of this
political and governmental concern for the family. In the United Kingdom,
the family was raised as an object of governmental concern in the inquiries
and debates in the 1800s about how to protect the moral and social welfare
of the working class and poor. For ‘pastoral technicians’ of the nineteenth
century, such as Wilderspin (1840), Stow (1850) and Horner (1840), the
moral and social welfare of children was corrupted by their economic
exploitation by industry and their parents, by the vices of the street, and by
the deficiencies within the family home. The state was increasingly called
upon to protect the nation’s children.

In the mid 1800s, laws emerged dictating the legitimate ages and
hours of child labour. As well, there was growing agreement that children
should spend at least part of their time being educated, reflecting the growing legitimacy of schooling as a means for mass social and moral governance. Inspector of Factories, Leonard Horner, wrote in 1837:

To put the necessity of properly educating the children of the working classes on its lowest footing, it is loudly called for as a matter of police, to prevent a multitude of immoral and vicious beings, the offspring of ignorance, from growing up around us to be a pest and a nuisance to society; it is necessary in order to render the great body of the working class governable by reason. (Donald 1992, 22-23)

This education was to be “both gentle and reasonable, and, at the same time, most extensively, efficacious” (Horner 1840, 16). Through the school and classroom layout, its pedagogies and learning routines, and its pastoral regimes, the child’s moral, physical and social growth were to be placed into circuits of continual examination, and subjected to the normalising yet caring gaze and techniques of the agents of moral and social rule, such as teachers, and the human and social sciences (Hunter 1994; Jones and Williamson 1979).

Hunter observes that schooling was to operate as a means by which “‘wild human beings’ would learn how to concern themselves with their own conduct and acquire the moral ability to conduct themselves in accordance with this concern” (Hunter 1994, 11), although it was acknowledged by reformers that “one day’s teaching in schools was not equal in effect to six days’ training on the streets” (Hunter 1994, 9). Schooling, therefore, represented the state taking responsibility for
cultivating productive and civilising attributes in its citizens by compensating for and protecting young people from the corrupting influence of their families and the communities where they lived, worked and had their recreation. The school would substitute for the deficient family and in a sense “with its caring teacher, its domestic routines and its supervised spontaneity… provide a simulacrum of an ideal family milieu” (Hunter 1994, 123).

While the school was to correct or compensate for the problem of the family by cultivating productive and civil citizens, the effectiveness of the state’s educational enterprise was also dependent upon reforming that which stifled its optimisation: the family. Increasingly the order of the liberal state was perceived to be dependent upon the order of the family, or strengthening the family in its role of supporting the proper government of the population. From the nineteenth century the family constituted fecund territory for enacting programs and strategies for the moral and social regulation of the population (Donzelot 1978; Rose 1999a). This is because as greater demands were placed on the state in the nineteenth century to address civil problems such as pauperism, poor living conditions, disorder, unplanned pregnancies and unemployment, the scope of inquiry, surveillance and intervention by public authorities and a range of normalising disciplines expanded.

The composite of expertise, programs, techniques and social actors rising up around the child and the technology of schooling, from human and social scientists, public assistance officers, doctors, philanthropists, educators and social workers, made the family amenable to all manner of
problematisation, surveillance, evaluation and intervention (Donzelot 1978; Hunter 1994; Rose 1999a; Smith 1990). Of particular concern was the problem of child rearing. The child’s social, intellectual and moral development, as well as their future prospects as adults, was linked to the environment of the family home. The intellectual environment and the emotional relationship between the child and his or her parents were construed as pivotal to the child’s successful intellectual and psychological development. Rose explains:

The group life of the family, its relational economy, the dependencies, frustrations, jealousies, attachments, rivalries, and frustrations that traversed it, became both the means of explanation of the troubles of childhood and the means of construing the ideal family. The processes of emotional development of the child within its family were reconstructed as delicate and fragile, liable to distortions in so many directions that would produce the pathological child, ranging from naughtiness through criminality to insanity. (Rose 1999a, 160)

Because of the increasing importance given to the child’s development in the family, optimising the moral, social and citizenship outcomes of education required reforming the conduct, beliefs and attitudes within the family home so that, for instance, parents and their children possessed the attitude that education was valuable and relevant in the modern world (Campbell and Sherington 2006). A line of communication between the family and the school was to be necessary for achieving this task, so that the school could communicate the state’s ambitions into the quasi-private realm of the family home. Donzelot (1978) observed, for
example, that normalising techniques and knowledges, such as the norms of hygiene and behaviour, were taught in nineteenth century French schools with the expectation that the child would take this civilised teaching into the family home. Hence:

Many reformers thus told the same (doubtless exemplary) story of the child who, returning from school imbued with the sweetness for which they should have been responsible, shamed and reformed its debauched parents. (Hunter 1994, 123)

Effectively, the family home was to be put into the service of social rule through instilling in it the norms of education, the norms of behaviour, and the norms of psychological and social health. In so doing, the pursuit of the state’s pastoral role re-constituted the family and what was considered its desirable form.

**Strengthening the home-school link: disadvantage, compensation and socialisation**

In more recent times, the post-World War Two social and statistical mapping of the population, its social ills and patterns of education and health outcomes, rendered these governmental concerns and rationalities into a problem around the ‘disadvantaged child’ (Rose 1999a). Post War studies in health, education and psychology drew attention to the encumbrances of a culture of poverty and deprivation on the families and communities, and the normal development of the disadvantaged child (Central Advisory Council for Education 1967; Commission of Inquiry into Poverty / Fitzgerald 1976; Floud et al. 1956; Karmel 1973). These children
were more likely to experience truancy, drop out, maladjustment, disaffection, delinquency and criminality.

The link between the family and the child was increasingly conceptualised in terms of a ‘cycle of disadvantage’, whereby children inherited the disadvantage and deprivation of their parents through such things as dysfunctional family relationships, poor parental attitudes, neglect, indiscipline and parental academic under-achievement. Identifying the inequalities and disadvantages that children and families were to contend with led policy makers and governmental and social authorities to attempt to halt and compensate for the deprivation and deficit of ‘disadvantaged’ parents being visited upon their children (for example, Central Advisory Council for Education 1967; Karmel 1973). However, these programs of compensation were not an attempt to equalise the economic and social conditions of the entire nation, or to provide the conditions for individual self-realisation and full human development. Rather, these interventions were less principled and more worldly. They reflected the long-standing governmental aspiration for strengthening the family-school alliance.

According to Schools in Australia (Karmel 1973), the cycle of poverty, ‘culture of deprivation’ and the influence of the family and community on the child’s development constituted a problem for the development and socialisation of the child through schooling. Schools in Australia reasoned that, “Complete parental control over the educational welfare of their own children could limit the perspective of the school and deny the authority of teachers in professional matters” (Karmel 1973, 13).
This was an important issue because as the studies and interventions based around compensation and disadvantage revealed (Central Advisory Council for Education 1967; Coleman 1966; Commission of Inquiry into Poverty 1976), disadvantage was not only a problem of inequity and individual and social waste, but also alienation and:

the production of a group of children who were unwilling or unable to respond appropriately to the values, rewards, and expectations that formed the culture of the school, and the culture of the larger society for which school was a vital preparation. (Rose 1999a, 193)

For *Schools in Australia*, then, when schools exert a limited influence on children, as they were increasingly perceived to, there is heavy reliance on social mobility through the socialisation provided by the child’s family and community. However, as the cultural capital of many parents was narrow, improving the educational and life prospects for children required strengthening the socialising role and authority of teachers and schools. This was a way in which the child’s inheritance of disadvantage from the family and community could be disrupted and the valued norms of conduct of civil society cultivated in the child, home and community.

Because social background, the norms of family life and parental conduct and attitudes shaped the interests, intellectual development, academic attainment, health and life destinations of the child, the compensatory strategies and programs recommended in the Plowden Report in the United Kingdom (and those developed under the banner of Head Start in the United States, such as pre-schooling and Child
Development Centres) attempted to institute into the family home the normative attitudes, knowledge and behaviours that were perceived to be conducive to the early intellectual, emotional and social development of the child. The school was a vital relay for this:

the world outside the school was to be utilized in the service of cognitive development and school motivation. The aspirations, values, and techniques of the school were to be channelled into the home. Mothers were to be encouraged to participate in the preschool schemes, which would enable them to be more or less subtly instructed in the attitudes and responses central to an effective pedagogy. (Rose 1999a, 195)

Resembling earlier approaches to the problem of the family and schooling, compensatory approaches for redressing disadvantage and inequality involved strengthening the home-school link. However, the assumptions, objectives, language and priorities were specific to this new context. The objective was to optimise the family as a pedagogical machine for improving children’s early education, their psychosocial development and the cultural capital of the home. During the course of the twentieth century, increased responsibility was to be shared among: (1) parents and families who were to create a home environment conducive to the child’s social, emotional and intellectual development and success; (2) the state and political authorities that were to provide massive investment in education and welfare, as well as increased monitoring of and intervention into families and communities; and (3) the experts of social and psychological rule that would provide the normative knowledges and
techniques through which this government of others and the self could be achieved (Rose 1999a).

Importantly, it was in the context of this ambition to strengthen the authority and effectiveness of schools in socialising children that a focus on the bureaucratic organisation of the school system and advocacy for devolution and school autonomy were championed in Australia. What, then, was the relationship between system devolution, school self-management and the ambition to have schools exert an influential socialising force on children given the weight of the overwhelming influence of his or her family and community? To answer this question, we need to first ask how the problem of the family and its relationship to education was conceptualised in Australia in the latter half of the twentieth century. I argue that this relationship was increasingly problematised in terms of the individual’s power and that this reflects the rendering of the domain of education into an object of advanced liberal government.

**Governing through empowerment**

At first glance, many official reports of the late twentieth century argued for the need for students from a range of backgrounds to have access to an education that would overcome the constraints of family background (Commission of Inquiry into Poverty 1976; Karmel 1973). This was particularly conceived of in terms of enabling all students to have the opportunity to fully participate in society and its opportunities. The Schools Commission writes:
in order to give them the opportunity for full participation in the society and access to its rewards it is important that children raised on the margins of the mainstream culture should be enabled to enter it. (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1975, 8)

Although construed by some as a social democratic ideology concerned for equality (Dudley and Vidovich 1996), this ambition to “initiate [all] children into mainstream society” (Karmel 1973, 92) merely signals a long standing objective articulated in nineteenth and twentieth century political rationality that through schooling individuals are to be provided with the knowledge, skills and attitudes that enable them to overcome obstacles placed on them by their family background.

As with the liberal discourses mobilised by education reformers associated with nineteenth century descriptions of schooling, this was to take the form of cultivating self-responsible, self-reflective and self-regulating liberal citizens (Hunter 1994). For the Schools Commission, this was conceived of in terms of an aspiration to imbue young people with the capacity to have “power over their circumstances” (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1975, 6) so that they may “shape the character of their own lives and participate in the character of society” (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1975, 7). The Schools Commission states:

Greater equality of educational outcomes begins in a view of schooling the aim of which is to pass increased responsibility over to the learner with his increasing competence, with the objective that he will ultimately take more responsibility for organizing himself and will be assisted to find relevance to the present in the past
achievements of the human mind. (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1975, 8)

The Schools Commission perceives that in cultivating the individual’s competencies schooling should be directed towards the ends of fostering independent, self-directing, autonomous and active selves, and this accrues benefit for the nation at large (Bartos 1993).

What is more specific to the contemporary context, however, is how this objective is conceived. Increasingly, this ambition for developing the basic knowledge, skills and competencies of the individual for their full social and economic participation was embedded with the notion that the individual was enmeshed in a complex network of influential psychosocial relations. It was argued that for the individual to shape his or her life, to optimise the outcomes for him or her self, and to work on his or her self and their environment, the individual must have confidence, goals, a positive sense of self, self-efficacy and sense of power:

We also know that the influence of social circumstances on individual success is not only a direct one; it occurs also through intervening variables such as intelligence and motivation for learning. Motivation, for example, is influenced by expectations about the future, which in turn are influenced by what children see around them, most concretely in the success or failure of their parents in school terms, in the degree of control which children perceive their parents to have over their own circumstances and by the expectations which parents, teachers and peers have for them. (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1976, 11)
Within the context of the United States, the *Equality of Educational Opportunity* report (Coleman 1966) similarly enacted a psychosocial problematisation of the individual and society. It argued that the success of schooling was confronted by the problem of the deleterious psychology of students. Student achievement was perceived to interact in complex causal relationships with students’ self-concept and their sense of control over their environment, or students’ perception of themselves and their abilities, and the degree students felt forces beyond their control determined their lives (Brookover et al. 1964; De Charms 1972; Purkey 1970). Coleman’s (1966) report stated:

> The special importance of a sense of control of environment for achievement of minority-group children and perhaps for disadvantaged whites as well suggests a different set of predispositional factors operating to create low or high achievement for children from disadvantaged groups than for children of advantaged groups. For children from advantaged groups, achievement or lack of it appears closely related to their self-concept: what they believe about themselves. For children from disadvantaged groups, achievement or lack of achievement appears closely related to what they believe about their environment: whether they believe the environment will respond to reasonable effort, or whether they believe it is instead merely random or immovable. (Coleman 1966, 320-321)

This problem of student psychology was especially pertinent for students at disadvantage, whose family backgrounds and early childhood experiences militated against students fully capitalising on schooling’s offerings, and by implication frustrating the influence of the school.
Such a state of affairs could be expected to lead to passivity, with a general belief in luck, a belief that that world is hostile, and also a belief that nothing he could ever do would change things. He has not yet come to see that he can affect his environment, for it has never been so in his previous experience... Thus, for many disadvantaged children, a major obstacle to achievement may arise from the very way they confront the environment. Having experienced an unresponsive environment, the virtues of hard work, of diligent and extended effort toward achievement appear to such a child unlikely to be rewarding. As a consequence, he is likely to merely “adjust” to his environment, finding satisfaction in passive pursuits. (Coleman 1966, 321)

In contrast, by promoting the child’s sense of personal power over their lives, including their confidence, self-esteem, aspirations and their positive self-image as learners and citizens, the individual child would perceive themself as an active agent capable of effecting change, and responsible for their choices and life outcomes. The disadvantaged child, of every child really, could be self-activating, resilient and have the ability to “take personal responsibility in the whole range of contingencies facing people in industrial societies” (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1975, 7). At stake in failing to cultivate these competencies and psychological attributes is that the child may perceive that his or her environment is “capricious, random, or beyond his control” (Coleman 1966, 288) and this would risk self-debilitating alienation, victim-hood, learned helplessness, a culture of handouts and blame, passivity and a personal sense of powerlessness and futility (see Baistow 2000). These developments evince the re-regulation of the domain of education.
An advanced liberal orientation to governing

This form of reasoning applied to the educational domain marks an important development in how this domain was conceptualised, rendered visible and acted upon governmentally. The psychosocial problematisation of the individual and society which centred on the individual and his or her sense of power, and which had the objective of enabling individuals to exercise increased control over their lives (Baistow 1994, 2000; Cruikshank 1999; Rose 1996b, 1999a), aligned with a new conceptualisation of the individual and their proper government. Rose describes this individual as a self that:

…is to aspire to autonomy, it is to strive for personal fulfilment in its earthly life, it is to interpret its reality and destiny as a matter of individual responsibility, it is to find meaning in existence by shaping its life through acts of choice. (Rose 1996b, 151)

This is a model of human nature associated with advanced liberal rationalities of government, which were gaining ground in governmental and political discourses of the New Right and neo-liberals in many Western countries. In tandem with this new ‘regime of subjectivity’ was a shift away from conceiving and administering society as unstable and self-fracturing and the individual as a social citizen whose needs were to be secured by the state. Instead, the assumption of the empowered individual of neo-liberal and advanced liberal rationalities and technologies of rule treated society as a “source of energies contained within the individual’s exercise of freedom
and self-responsibility” (Dean 1999, 152). This meant that the problems of government, and indeed their solutions, increasingly became a “matter of ‘one’s self’” (Rose 1996, 150), with the proper exercise of governmental power being facilitating, cultivating and maximising the individual’s autonomy, sense of power, self-realisation, ambition, initiative and self-responsibility.

It is my contention that this way of reasoning the individual and the exercise of political and government power shaped how the educational domain was conceptualised and therefore acted upon. This is evident in how the concern for the psychology of the family and child, their negative attitudes to schooling, their experiences of alienation, their self-esteem and their sense of powerlessness (Bardsley 1976) challenged the authority of social rationalities of educational governance. These social rationalities emphasised needs and environmental influences on behaviour and educational outcomes, but these were increasingly characterised as environmentally determinist. Proponents of these rationalities and programs were accused of representing students’ family and social backgrounds as debilitating albatrosses hanging around students’ necks (see for example Rutter et al. 1979).

In contrast, in the discourses of psychological empowerment, social forces are not conceived of as exerting a determining influence on the child because these are mediated through variables such as the individual’s perceptions of themselves, society and schooling fostered in families (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1976; Purkey 1970; Rutter et al. 1979). Consequently, sociological explanations of disadvantage and
educational achievement were deemed to be limited not only in understanding how individuals shape their personal lives though their environment, but because their explanations could be construed as fostering passivity and the acceptance of failure, or the expectation that it was the state’s responsibility to fix their problems. Sociological explanations underestimated the potential power embodied in every human being.

This problematisation of the social and the embrace of psychosocial discourse of empowerment and autonomy are described by Baistow (2000) as evidence of political programs converting problems located in the social domain, such as poverty and disadvantage, into problems located in the individual and his or her psychology. She writes:

The inability of disadvantaged people to regulate their lives, located in their high ‘externality’ and ‘inefficacy’, was held to be self-debilitating, personally and collectively demoralizing, and threatening to the social good in a number of ways. (Baistow 2000, 111)

In other words, through the creation of psychological concepts such as external and internal locus of control and self-esteem, new governmental realities were created. There was a relationship of causality between an individual’s experience of a sense of powerlessness, or the incapacity to perceive them selves as having the ability to positively act upon themselves and the world, and a range of deleterious personal and social effect, such as academic under-achievement and alienation.
Baistow’s analysis draws attention to the fact that this transformation in expert knowledges of the individual, society and their regulation was not a consequence of the objective and neutral development of our knowledge of these entities. It was complexly related to the emerging de-socialised political and governmental discourse around, for instance, individual activity and responsibility. The same assessment can be made of the above-described transformation in education.

Congruent with this emerging political discourse of individual activity, autonomy and responsibility, the regulatory concern with education developed around the psychological dimension of individual, family and school life, the individual’s sense of power, control and autonomy, and those things that mediate the effect of social background and hinder individual development. In the domain of education, the health and wellbeing of the nation was perceived to rest upon empowering individuals and families, conferring power over individuals’ circumstances through developing the individual’s competencies and their positive sense of self, and supporting and facilitating self-development (Simons 2002). For example, the Schools Commission made a telling distinction between conventional welfare measures such as ‘handouts’, which it construed as a charity exercise that fostered individual passivity, and schooling, which constituted a positive form of welfare because it developed the competencies of individuals (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1975). The latter enabled individuals to relate to themselves and their communities as resources with the capacity to shape their lives as active, choice-making and autonomous beings.
In summary, liberal government’s objective of building a strategic alliance between the family and the educational enterprise was increasingly conceptualised from the late 1960s in terms of powerlessness and empowerment. This problematisation of the family and its relationship to education construed the nature of human nature as innately powerful, active and autonomous, and government was to be pegged to this normative ideal. Education policy was aligning itself with a political discourse that increasingly construed the wellbeing of the nation as dependent upon a modality of government directed towards such things as removing constraints on individual autonomy, fostering the individual’s empowerment, and supporting their capacity to self-govern. It was expected that individuals were to take personal responsibility for improving their social and economic position in society rather than expect the state to guarantee their position through redistributive means (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1976). This meant effectively giving every child the opportunity of an “equal starting point in the educational race” (Marginson 1997a, 55) from where they will determine their own destiny.

**Liberating parents from bureaucracy**

This governmental reasoning around empowerment and the autonomous, self-directing individual rendered problematic the existing bureaucratic organisation of schooling. As I have just described, since the late twentieth century individual conduct was increasingly problematised in terms of their power, activity and capacity for autonomy, and in this logic those things
that constrain personal autonomy were assessed as disempowering and requiring reform. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that this “wish to restore control to the citizen as a free individual” in work organisations and production processes (Miller and Rose 1995, 453) led to a critique of bureaucratic management and the public bureaucracies that had expanded with the growth of the social liberal state. Public bureaucracies were assessed as a contributor to the sense of powerlessness experienced by many individuals and communities.

As I have described in Chapter 6, in the late twentieth century bureaucracies and bureaucratic management associated with the welfare state and its regulatory excess, were increasingly portrayed pejoratively as monolithic organisations essentially antipathetic to the individual human being, their needs and desires. They were variously described as rule and process driven, authoritarian, insufficiently flexible, and lacking the incentives that would drive improved individual satisfaction, motivation and performance. Critical theorists inveighed against the state’s administration on account of its instrumentalist rationality and its supposed diminution of the individual’s autonomous subjectivity (Blake and Masschelein 2007). Public choice theorists, social progressives and philosophical libertarians criticised public bureaucracies for holding a monopoly on the choices of individuals, for disempowering citizens, and for being undemocratic and unresponsive to the needs of the citizens they were meant to serve (Buchanan and Wagner 1977; Clarke and Newman 1997; Hummel 1977; Nozick 1975).
Similar to the criticisms employing the discourse of powerlessness and autonomy, arguments for according schools and teachers greater autonomy from centralised education bureaucracies gained currency. For many scholars in the field of education, restricting the local control of schools by the centralised bureaucratic management of school systems had damaging effects on the individual (Anderson 1973; Clark 1965; Gittell 1972; Kanter 1981; Lopate et al. 1970; Sarason 1971; Sergiovanni and Carver 1973). Take as an example the research by Lopate et al. (1970), who use the Human Relations research on the psychological benefits of working in small groups. They argued in their analysis that central education bureaucracies were damaging for teachers because those working within schools were denied autonomy and decision-making power and therefore could not identify with their tasks. This meant they were less satisfied and had lower productivity.

But of greater concern for Lopate et al. was that education bureaucracies contributed to the sense of ‘alienation’ experienced by many students, families and communities, especially those experiencing disadvantage. This was because as bureaucracies were monolithic governmental institutions reliant on prescription and authority structures, these restricted the opportunity for community members to participate in decision-making at the school level. They argued:

These groups feel they have little access to power in educational and other social-political institutions, and since they have found the public school ineffective in fulfilling their needs, they have become
unwilling and at times hostile second-class participants in society.  
(Lopate et al. 1970, 148)

The conclusion Lopate et al. drew from their study was that when individuals, especially those from ‘disempowered’ social groups, feel incapable of determining their lives and being self-sufficient, a range of negative effects ensue. These include alienation, a sense of powerlessness, low self-efficacy, and poor academic achievement. By contrast, when there are opportunities for parents to participate in the life of the school, positive effects ensue.

In other words, the central bureaucratic management of schools, once considered central to the pastoral role of the state, was now a problem because it created a distance between the school and the family. It was therefore a hindrance to improving the strategic alliance between the family and the school. With the education bureaucracy now a problem, breaking down bureaucratic enclaves by devolving decision-making to schools and communities promised to bridge this gap between the family, community and school, which so troubled political authorities. Decentralisation, and associated innovations such as school boards, constituted a ‘program of freedom and empowerment’ facilitating the “active participation of parents in school affairs” (Lopate et al. 1970, 143), effectively taking the school into the community and bringing the school into the community (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1975).
Government or freedom?

On the one hand, this program or strategy of freedom is clearly governmental. The Schools in Australia report stated “the openness of a school to parents is a means both of extending its educational influence and of reinforcing pupil motivation” (Karmel 1973, 13-14). In other words, breaking down the bureaucratic government of schools extends the educational influence of the state because through greater interaction between the school and home the cultural capital, values, habits and normative knowledges of parents and communities could be developed. This could occur, for instance, through consciousness-raising around issues of educational matters, educating parents on child development issues and counselling them in their own personal problems (see for examples Karmel 1973). This would extend the governmental reach of political and social authorities by developing and increasing the compatibility between the activities, goals, values, expectations and nature of school life and the students’ family and community life (Gittell 1972).

The governmental nature of this program is also evident in the fact that parental participation was expected to alter the negative perceptions and attitudes to schooling that many parents possessed, and which they often unwittingly passed on to their children. When individuals and communities fail to have sufficient influence over their schools and they feel their personal autonomy is diminished, they feel alienated and helpless. However, parents that participate in school matters and decision-making
not only develop positive relationships with the school and its teachers, but through their interactions with the school they also develop knowledge and skills related to educational and parenting issues. This then increases their sense of power over their circumstances, giving them a “greater sense of fate control” (Lopate et al. 1970, 144). By enabling parents to participate in school decision-making by decreasing bureaucratic power and increasing the school’s capacity to be self-determining, parents’ aspirations for their children improve and children sense their parents’ increased control. This empowerment of the parent and school is said to produce a positive flow-on effect to the child’s own sense of control and their educational achievement (Lopate et al. 1970; Sarason 1971), although not always (Skeen 1974).

Therefore, as devolution and school autonomy opened parental behaviour and the socialisation of the child in the family home to the scrutiny and intervention of a range of expert, civil and educational norms and values, it constituted a governmental strategy for extending the school’s educational influence, or its pedagogical apparatus. It was, as the Commonwealth Schools Commission (1978) described it, a positive form of welfare because it had the capacity to empower citizens through cultivating desirable attributes in citizens rather than compensate individuals through ‘passive’ welfare. However, framed by advanced liberal rationalities of government, this governmental strategy sought to translate the political aspirations for free citizenship based around individual empowerment, autonomy, activity and full participation into the personal desires and aspirations of families and community members. The Schools Commission in its description of school autonomy intimated this:
The complexity of public issues in a society such as our own, which is also a political democracy, requires that ordinary citizens, not just a minority of experts, be able to consider alternatives and evidence and to accept the provisional rather than absolute nature of social arrangements and solutions. Attitudes as well as knowledge are involved. Participation in decision-making in a community seeking workable solutions to problems facing it, in an atmosphere of respect for persons, may give people an appreciation of their own capacity to participate in shaping circumstances and the obligations to take the wishes and interests of others into account in doing so. (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1975, 11)

Here, devolution and school autonomy encourages parents to participate in the decisions of their local schools, develop the knowledge, skills and techniques for cultivating a sense of power and control over their lives, take ownership over their community and problems, partake in the amelioration of the problems that confront it, and in the process be trained in the competencies for democratic citizenship. So, while de-bureaucratisation, devolution and school autonomy constitute governmental strategies, if not programs of government, these nevertheless sought to create self-governing, autonomous and empowered citizens. And as is becoming clear, the autonomous, empowered life is a site of power relations.

**Liberating teachers from bureaucracy**

The objectives of bridging the gap, fostering participation and developing individual capacities also required schools and the conduct of teachers to be corrected, developed and reformed. In particular, while family and
community life was to resemble the values and expectations of schools, the empowerment of teachers through the devolution of responsibility for curriculum, pedagogy and resource allocation re-regulated the internal life of schools so that they would reflect the life of the community they served.

As briefly mentioned above, Lopate et al. (1970) and Gittell (1972) were critical of the restrictions placed on the teaching profession by the bureaucratically organised education system. They argued that bureaucrats monopolised decision-making power and therefore, stifled by centrally devised mandates of curriculum and school policy, teachers and principals were powerless to participate in substantive educational decision-making and influence at the local level. But more than being just a liberal concern for the individual’s rights to freedom, the implications of this lack of local participation and influence were perceived to be very practical.

This bureaucratic organisation of schooling limited the individual schools’ responsiveness to the interests and needs of their students and communities, meaning that there was an incompatibility between the activities of the school and the life of the student. This, it was reasoned, exacerbated students’ powerlessness and alienation (Karmel 1973). A standardised curriculum, for instance, assumes prior knowledge and experiences that students may not in fact possess. Consequently, many children were said to experience school as unnecessarily difficult or irrelevant to their lives and future prospects. With negative perceptions of schooling extending to negative perceptions of themselves as learners, schooling becomes an alienating experience.
Educational knowledges have increasingly recognised that improving student engagement, retention, achievement and self-perception depends upon tailoring pedagogy and curriculum to the life of the community, that is, devising these in light of the prior knowledge and experiences of its students (Connell 1993). The important question arising from this for schools and school leaders is: what are the optimal organisational conditions that may give teachers the authority, flexibility and autonomy to devise and enact curriculum in response to local circumstances?

Framing the problem in this way, the bureaucratic management of education systems emerged as an obvious target of reform because these centralised systems were organised around standardisation and centralised processes, procedures and prescription. This top-down organisation disempowered teachers, who were becoming increasingly professionalised and sought greater authority within the education system (Beare 1990), because teachers did not have the capacity to make autonomous decisions and to act upon these. As education management scholar Kanter reasoned, “People need power… just as they need opportunity” (Kanter 1981, 561). The centralisation and uniformity of education systems came at the “expense of initiative, enterprise, and experimentation” (Pratt 1975, 13).

I am not suggesting that these descriptions of bureaucracy were accurate, because all education bureaucracies differ. Crane (1969) wrote, for instance:
Although the Australian education system varies considerably in its degree of professionalization and openness as one moves from state to state, it would be a misunderstanding to assume that all state systems are closed monolithic bureaucracies whose atmosphere of operation is that of unimaginative maintenance. It is an equally grave misunderstanding to imagine that a bureaucratic organization cannot innovate within itself at the managerial and technical levels. (Crane 1969, 258)

My point, however, is that a particular form of problematisation and reform of educational governance emerged from a certain notion or understanding of bureaucracy, regardless of its accuracy. Hence, this image of bureaucracy was juxtaposed with the flexible, self-managing organisation of the system consisting of devolved authority for decision-making within schools in respect to curriculum, pedagogy and many administrative responsibilities. This would give teachers the autonomy necessary to be responsive to their local communities, to have the flexibility to involve students and parents in educational decision-making and therefore to successfully convert cultural differences into educational advantage (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1976; Karmel 1973).

But devolving authority to schools did not mean ‘freeing’ teachers, as if the fair, efficient and reasonable exercise of autonomy and authority would naturally occur through de-governmentalising schooling. This is because, firstly, school autonomy would remain regulated by central bureaucracies and teacher professional knowledges. Secondly, and less obviously, devolution and autonomy are governmental strategies for producing a certain kind of ‘responsibilised’ teacher identity, illuminated by
findings in management theory and psychology that greater worker autonomy improved motivation, satisfaction, productivity, commitment, engagement and a sense of responsibility (Kanter 1981; Lopate et al. 1970).

For the management theorist, Kanter, it is “powerlessness that corrupts” (Kanter 1981, 560) and, therefore, empowering teachers by de-bureaucratising schools and giving teachers increased autonomy was a means of regulating them to more effective and efficient ends.

Devolution had the benefit of empowering individuals because, unlike under bureaucratic forms of management, teachers working with greater autonomy and in smaller organisations are less likely to construe themselves as merely instruments of others’ will and therefore be empowered. According to the Schools Commission:

It is also becoming more generally accepted that people able to make their own decisions are likely to act more responsibly and to have a stronger commitment to the success of the enterprise in which they are engaged than are those who see themselves merely as instruments of the will of others. (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1978, 8)

Hence, it was expected that devolution, rather than freeing the teacher from regulation per se, would more effectively produce desirable objectives, such as a curriculum and pedagogical approaches consistent with the educational needs and interests of the community in order to improve educational achievement. The consequence of this was that the practice of devolved authority gives the “responsibility to the people involved” (Karmel 1973, 104) rather than relaying it up the chain of command:
Its belief in this grass-roots approach to the control of the schools reflect a conviction that responsibility will be most effectively discharged where the people entrusted with making decisions are also the people responsible for carrying them out, with an obligation to justify them, and in a position to profit from their experience. (Karmel 1973, 10)

Importantly, then, rather than being a statement of trust in the teaching profession, devolving authority to teachers represents a calculation of power. Congruent with governmental techniques applied to private enterprise and the public services, the Karmel Report and the Schools Commission concluded that increasing teachers’ responsibility would increase the degree to which teachers viewed themselves as responsible for outcomes. Consequently, increased discretion and responsibility in work would improve work and educational outcomes because of teachers’ increased “capacity and willingness to influence it” (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1975, 231). Once again, empowerment reveals itself as a governmental strategy pegged to a notion of individual freedom as freedom from constraints on autonomy and choice.

**Capitalising the self**

Finally, presupposing that the individual is empowered, autonomous and active, system devolution, de-bureaucratisation and school autonomy also constitute a response to an expectation that citizens are to live like enterprises that calculate their life choices in terms of investments and risks.
As I mentioned previously, the Human Capital School promoted by Becker (1983), Schultz (1960) and Friedman (1968) conceptualised human nature in terms of individuals who invest in their selves and make choices in relation to the development of their capital, or potential sources of income. The principal idea here is that humans are ‘capitalizable’ and consequently all social behaviour could be conceptualised and governed economically. For theorists of human capital human, and neo-liberals, this meant markets constituted a sufficient condition for governing individuals because they created a domain for relatively unfettered individual choice making.

As these ideas rooted themselves into political thinking, the choice-making, investing and enterprising individual was seen to be ever more pivotal to national economic prosperity. Through the faculty of choice, citizens were obliged to maximise their human capital. Government activity began to take on two clear roles in relation to this ‘capitalisation of citizenship’:

A negative role: to remove disincentive to this process of maximization of human capital and to improve incentives… And a positive role: to facilitate the infrastructure of resources that will enable individuals to obtain access to the skills and capacities necessary to enhance their human capital (skills, training and the like). (Rose 1999c, 483)

Illustratively, throughout the 1980s many constraints imposed by governmental or bureaucratic regulations were loosened. Labour markets and foreign purchases of domestic equity were deregulated, whilst public
utilities and services were privatised or rendered into quasi-public entities operating in market settings. No longer were social and economic health conceived as necessarily derived from extensive government planning, intervention and regulation. Rather, individual choice-making needed to be freed from many political, governmental or bureaucratic constraints.

Where, then, does schooling fit into this governmental rationality?

The bureaucratic organisation of education systems was increasingly criticised because it represented a disempowering constraint on individual activity and choice. The bureaucratic control that determined which schools students attended, the prescribed policies that effectively standardised public schools, and the dismal funding arrangements for private schools were seen to stifle the efficiency and moral supremacy of a system of individual choice making (Chubb and Moe 1990; Friedman 1997; Friedman and Friedman 1980). This bureaucratic control reflected what was seen, and continue to be seen, as the imposition by a paternalistic state of constraints to individual capitalisation, such as the pursuit of family prerogatives and interests, full individual self-realisation, and access to the rewards that supposedly flowed from these.

This constraint on human capitalisation and self-realization was especially problematic for the organisation of education systems because schooling was increasingly being construed in terms of human capital. Translating the value placed on education by political authorities into the value schemata of citizens, citizens increasingly perceived schooling and education to be a key site for empowerment, personal investment, skills development for full participation in the modern economy, for overcoming
the limits of one’s own capabilities and background, and for the production of personal capital (Marginson 1997c; Simons 2006). Indeed, in a competitive globalised world a lot more now seems to depend on getting a ‘good education’, and going to a ‘good school’ (Ball 1998a; Wolf 2002).

In light of this, the governmental or bureaucratic monopoly and regulation of choice was perceived as incongruent with, not only the cultivation of ‘the family’ making responsible decisions geared towards its best interests (Hunter 1994), but also the individualism embodied in the political reasoning associated with this notion of human capital and capitalisation. For political authorities:

Education can no longer be led but the producers… Education must be shaped by the users – by what is good for the individual child and what hopes are held by their parents. (Kenneth Baker quoted in Silver 1994, 142)

Unsurprisingly, then, across many Western countries political authorities began to fund the expansion of the private education sector, and they sought to create more flexible and competitive public education systems that offered a range of choices. As the Schools Commission reasoned, “there is little point in choice among schools which are all the same” (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1976, 14). Hence, individual public schools have been enjoined to operate as relatively autonomous enterprises competing with other schools for the custom of economically calculating and ethically responsible parents.
It is true that this shift from bureaucratic prescription towards organisational autonomy and freedom has been varied across public education systems in Australia. And there is still much criticism of the size and influence of educational bureaucracies and the inability of schools to deliver non-standardised programs. Nevertheless, through reforms such as devolution, and the creation of selective, specialised schools and Independent Public Schools, constraints on parents making prudent investment choices in relation to the choice of school have been loosened. As well, public subsidies for private schools, National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) testing, and the MySchool website have sought to facilitate parental choice making, with the latter providing parents with information on school performance in order to inform their decision-making.

Despite appearances, however, such reforms are not evidence of government abstaining from protecting the welfare of its citizens. As Part II indicated, the care and welfare of citizens are in the genes of liberal political rationality. Peters et al. (2000), therefore, observe in relation to the market’s creation of ‘autonomous choosers’ as enterprises:

These changed notions can and should be understood as involving changes in the forms that governmentality takes. But in providing leadership and husbandry successive governments… have, at the same time, claimed to be providing a better form of security for those for whom access to educational services has been difficult, by targeting individuals who for whatever reason cannot afford to because skilled and qualified. They have not abandoned security,
but rather reassessed it in terms of individualism and the autonomous chooser in particular. (Peters et al. 2000, 122)

For Peters et al., education and social reforms indexed to human capitalisation represent a transformation in how the state’s security and welfare are conceptualised and enacted. The state’s interests are to be secured through empowering individuals through de-bureaucratisation, competition, fostering individual and organisational autonomy, self-reliance and individual choice (Peters 2001a), that is, by contriving “the conditions under which entrepreneurial and competitive conduct can be allowed to come into play and the market can hence operate” (Dean 1999, 157). So here we see two instances of the same strategy of ‘positive’ welfare: (1) in the instances described in the preceding sections, by increasing the autonomy of schools, parents can be self-empowered, more involved in school decision-making and practices, and schools can thereby better reflect the interests and needs of their community; and (2) in the descriptions of human capitalisation outlined here, school autonomy and diversification give parents greater capacity to choose the right or best school for their children (Harrison 2004), that is, to make responsible and prudent choices about their children’s education and future.

While these are two distinct objectives, and some may claim they oppose each other because one centres on the pursuit of self-interest and the other community participation, both objectives conceive parents as critical to the educational enterprise. Both are linked to the same governmental reasoning that seeks to cultivate as a matter of personal and state welfare
empowered, self-responsible, active citizens who have increased power over their immediate environment and who are engaged thoughtfully in the education of their children, what Smith (1993) describes as the fostering of ‘educational agency’.

Conclusion

I began this chapter by suggesting that parenting, the family and the family’s relationship to the state’s educational enterprise have been a persistent problem for government. However, how these problems have been understood and acted upon has undergone constant transformation. I argued that political and governmental thought has been influential in shaping this problematisation of the family and schooling. There is temporal and thematic compatibility between the types of governmental reforms in the education sector to emerge in this period, and the advanced liberal political culture of the 1970s and 1980s, with its invocation of the empowered and active individual, and a conception of government in terms of a “community of free, autonomous, self-regulating individuals” (Peters 2001a, 68). The de-bureaucratising, self-managing and devolutionary reforms of this period are indexed to this model of the empowered human being.

Importantly, although devolution is linked to the downsizing of centralised bureaucratic management and the break down of bureaucratic barriers between citizens, their communities and government, this is not for the purpose of empowering citizens from government, or about diminishing
the state’s concern for the welfare of the population. It is instead an advanced liberal governmental strategy for limiting certain powers of the traditional instruments of the state, such as the educational bureaucracy set up for administering the welfare of the population. This reform is linked to political thought that attributes deleterious economic, social and moral effects to ‘big government’, individual passivity and irresponsibility, and a belief that the best way to govern citizens for their welfare is to empower them in their own self-government, effectively reducing, or at least re-configuring, the social and economic responsibilities of the state.

Therefore, the ‘autonomisation’ of education systems is linked to a longstanding governmental aspiration to bridge the gap between the family and its private practices and the school and its public concerns. I have described this aspiration as having taken the form of fostering the participation of parents and communities in the life of school, a strategy of which parental choice is an offshoot. This freedom to participate is understood as possible by limiting the power of the educational bureaucracy over individuals and communities, while enabling the freedom of choice. So, with parents having greater freedom to participate in educational choices, and yet parents also being increasingly made aware that it is not merely the state’s responsibility for the education and care of society’s children, self-managing school reforms have at the same time de-regulated and re-regulated the domain of education.
Chapter 8: Analysing Entrepreneurial Self-Management

Introduction

As I have argued thus far, the key to understanding why and how self-managing reforms emerged is to grasp that it constitutes a governmental program or strategy emerging from a crisis of liberal governmentality. Self-managing reforms, I have argued, enact an advanced liberal governmental rationality, by which I mean self-managing reforms re-regulate the domain of education in response to the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries’ rationalities and techniques of autonomy, choice, freedom, self-realisation and enterprise.

The preceding chapter illustrated this in its examination of the attempts to maximise the effectiveness of the instruments of education. With a focus on the case of the family and its relationship to schooling, I argued that there was a transformation in how the relationship between the
family and the state’s educational enterprise was to be strengthened for the purpose of achieving national security, wellbeing and prosperity. Indexed to an advanced liberal governmental rationality, devolution, school autonomy and self-management emerge from the problematisation of bureaucratic over-reach and individual disempowerment. A range of social actors including political authorities, critical sociologists, psychologists, and organisational and management theorists variously argued that the organisation of the education system should be pegged to empowering parents, teachers and communities in their own self-government.

How, then, is another significant feature of self-managing reforms, managerialism, to be understood in terms of advanced liberalism and the crisis of liberalism? Surely, the use of management expertise in schools could not possibly signify a move towards empowerment and freedom. As the very label suggests, management is about managing, regulating and controlling people. The rise of managerialism appears to discredit the argument that self-managing reforms are tied to a crisis of liberalism which sought to revive such things as individual freedom, autonomy and choice.

In the following two chapters I address this line of questioning. Examining what Brennan (2009) refers to as the first and second waves of neo-liberalism, specifically managerialism and marketisation, I argue that the expertise, techniques and practices of corporate management, and associated technologies of self-management, have rendered central bureaucratic management problematic and re-regulated the domain of schooling around advanced liberal rationalities of government, which include entrepreneurialism (Ball 2002; Gewirtz 2002; Mac An Ghaill 1994;
Peters 1996; Peters 2001a; Troman 1996). The discourses of management, I argue, have not only been pivotal to the regulation of schools, but also to a certain kind of ‘empowerment’ of schools, school leaders, parents and communities.

In order to mount this argument, I must distinguish my analysis from some common representations of managerialism and marketisation found in the education and sociology literature. Through an examination of critical accounts of management, I argue that the technologies of management should be construed as liberal technologies of government rather than as necessarily coercive, oppressive and exploitative.

**Representations of management**

Over the past four decades, the organisation of the public sector administration has undergone ‘managerialisation’. Management practices favoured by private enterprise have been embraced and applied to the management of the public sector, a trend variously termed New Public Management (Hood 1991), New Managerialism (Pollitt 1993) or Corporate Managerialism (Weller and Lewis 1989). Integral to this transformation of the public sector has been a diminution of the centralised planning of public services and an increase in organisational and individual autonomy. As Du Gay (1996) observes, this has meant “‘offering’ individuals involvement in activities – such as managing budgets, training staff, delivering services – previously held to be the responsibility of other agents” (1996, 157). In others words, increasing the autonomy of public sector organisations has
been accompanied by techniques for securing the responsible exercise of that autonomy. Modelled on the commercial enterprise and its putative ‘virtuous’ practices (Ball 2007; Du Gay 1996; Du Gay 2000b; Du Gay and Hall 1996), this ‘responsibilisation’ has included the insertion into the public organisation of rationalities and techniques related to outcomes, plans, standards, targets, audits, continuous improvement and performance management (Powers 1997).

The expertise of management that shaped the managerialisation of the public sector also informed the reform of education systems. Education management experts construed management know-how as a tool for overcoming the dearth of management knowledge at the school level, which left schools adrift and unable to manage themselves, a consequence of central bureaucracy management (Bush et al. 1980; Caldwell and Spinks 1988). The ethos of education management texts is that management expertise offers schools a method for rendering the internal features or processes of the school organisation knowable and amenable to improvement in order that teachers, under the condition of devolved authority, can be empowered from bureaucratic constraint so as to manage their own destiny responsibly, efficiently, effectively and equitably (Beare et al. 1989; Caldwell and Spinks 1988; Caldwell and Spinks 1992; Hargreaves and Hopkins 1991; Schmuck 1984; Short and Greer 2002).

As I discussed at the beginning of this thesis, an important influence in this project in Australia and internationally was *The Self-Managing School* (Caldwell and Spinks 1988). The authors of this text outline a comprehensive management apparatus in response to what they perceive to
be *ad hoc* and auxiliary management practices (such as development plans and reviews) used within education systems that are governed largely by central bureaucracies. The authors provide frameworks for corporate planning, policy development, programme budgeting and methods for in-school evaluation. These techniques aim to engage schools in making decisions about their priorities, objectives, procedures, and the allocation of resources within the school. How are we to understand these developments from the perspective of governmentality? In answering this question, I want to distinguish my analysis from critical analysis, which has heavily influenced the criticism of managerial reform in education.

**Critical Analysis: Instrumentalism**

As I discussed in chapter two, the critical literature which associates self-managing reforms with a restructuring of the welfare state and the problems of legitimacy, control and efficiency, tends to describe management know-how as a means employed by the powerful to gain popular consent, to discipline conduct and to improve economic outputs. Managerialisation within schools, it is often concluded, renders schools into institutions for servicing the state’s needs, which includes pursuing the economic interests of the state and powerful capitalists (Ball 1990; Ball 1993; Bottery 1992; Gewirtz 2002; Hatcher 1994; Knight, Lingard, and Porter 1993; Lingard, Knight, and Porter 1993; Whitty, Power, and Halpin 1998). It achieves this, so the argument goes, by centralising the control of school curriculum and pedagogy, inserting a capitalist logic into schooling through curriculum
change and educational commodification, and subjugating teachers through efficiency-driven neo-Taylorist and performance-based management regimes, and much more besides. Accordingly, the language and objectives of social justice, citizenship, public service and the public good have been increasingly replaced by the language, knowledges and techniques of business and markets. In this context, the contemporary discourse of autonomy and empowerment associated with education reform is said to be hegemonic because it masks the economic instrumentalism, compliance, control, social reproduction and disempowerment wrought by managerialism and marketisation.

But what is the conceptual ground upon which this specific characterisation stands? This account is indebted conceptually to Weber’s rationalisation thesis and its adaptation by subsequent critical theorists, one of the most notable being Habermas (Blake and Masschelein 2007; Dean 1994). According to Weber, a unitary form of institutional rationality termed purposive or instrumental rationality threatened the historical rationalisation that promised to both emancipate humans from tradition and reconcile social action with humanity’s essential rationality (disenchantment). Instrumental rationality represented the subordination of the human form to forms of calculation and action determined by means and ends rather than, say, the individual choosing and acting autonomously and in accordance with some absolute value (values-rational action). This phenomenon, which Weber disparagingly perceives as a general process of rationalisation of the whole of existence, or a “transmutation of the history of progress of reason into one of the intensification of the domination of
instrumentalism” (Dean 1994, 61), is said to lie at the heart of modernity and the development of Western civilisation, bureaucracy and the capitalist system.

Accepting this proposition to be true, the work of subsequent critical theorists such as Horkheimer and Adorno (1982) and Habermas (1979) extend Weber’s analysis by giving instrumental reason an all-encompassing capitalist form by attributing it to the “bourgeois epoch” (Dean 1994, 102). For Dean, this theoretical manoeuvre enabled contemporary critics to directly link ‘non-critical’ reason or rationality to structures of class domination and exploitation, the economisation of the world, and the capitalist domination and deformation of authentic and autonomous human subjectivity. This mode of intelligibility underpins much analysis of the domain of education reform.

Gewirtz (2002), for example, conceives education management as a form of instrumental reason embedded with a capitalist logic. This technical rationality encompasses the formal structures, techniques, procedures and practices that “facilitate speed of decision-making, coordination, the setting and reviewing of objectives, good financial controls and information, cost improvement, responsiveness and consumer loyalty” (Gewirtz et al. 1995, 92). The standardising and calculative nature of management practices represents an economic rationalisation of the educational process, serving strategic and economistic ends such as economic efficiency, competition and commodification, and hence representing a capitalist logic (Clarke and Newman 1997; Lauder et al. 1999). Gewirtz sets as her task the unveiling of management’s inherent
systems of capitalist domination, the “normalizing vulgarities of capitalist modernization” (Blake and Masschelein 2007, 43), and its distortion of individual autonomous conduct, thought and values. For Gewirtz, critical analysis will reveal how management renders individual identity congruent with private, capitalist interest.

At stake for Gewirtz is the organisation of schooling around a substantive rationality that emphasises the “intrinsic qualities of the ‘product-process’ – here education, teaching and learning” (Gewirtz 2002; Gewirtz et al. 1995, 92). The reason Gewirtz is so alarmed by the threat to these ‘intrinsic qualities’ of schooling is because Gewirtz understands popular schooling to have originated in democratic societies as the means of realising individuals’ capacities for political self-governance. Embodying a value-oriented rationality signified by absolute values such as equality, freedom, human self-realisation and social and political citizenship (Hunter 1994; Hunter and Meredyth 2000; Meredyth 1994), popular schooling is construed by Gewirtz as an essentially democratic forum that should be beyond extraneous relations of power and economic distortion. With this presupposition, the supposed economic rationality of management expertise and other related self-managing reforms, such as the use of markets, corrupts the foundations of schooling by subordinating education and its promise of genuine human and social development to technicist, mean-ends calculations and commodity exchange relationships (Ball 1990b; Bates 1995; Bottery 1992; Porter 1993).

This dichotomous characterisation between an instrumentalism that seeks economic efficiency and a substantive rationality that seeks the
materialisation of just human and democratic values constitutes the conceptual architecture around which the critical analysis of management-as-instrumental rationality by Gewirtz is mounted. This analysis is indebted to Weber for his concept of a unitary instrumental rationality that is opposed to an essential rationality embodied in humanity, to Horkheimer and Adorno for their argument that the autonomous individual needed rescuing from the totally economised capitalist world, and finally to Habermas for his appeal to liberate dialogic communication from the colonisation of the ‘lifeworld’ by the forces of capital. But from the perspective of Foucauldian scholarship and governmentality, this conceptual presupposition has its limitations.

Two troubling aspects I wish to address are: (1) the dichotomous conception of an instrumental rationality opposed to a substantive/critical rationality, and (2) the assumption in much critical analysis of a rational, autonomous and self-determining individual that requires emancipation from extraneous and corrupting relations of power.

Instrumental rationality versus multiple rationalities

In the dichotomous construction of instrumental rationality and substantive or critical rationality, critical rationality, construed as an essential human faculty, is perceived as genuinely ‘reasonable’ and ‘true’, while instrumental rationality, construed as a product of capitalist relations of domination and exploitation, is judged as false or ideological. As Dean (1994) points out, here critical rationality constitutes truth purified of
power, while instrumental reason, being intertwined with extraneous elements of power, constitutes a fabrication of truth from false knowledge.

Consequently, the critical method often seeks the ‘truth’ of social developments and phenomena, such as management, through a process of distilling from these phenomena their hidden relations of power, and the ideological content and interests underlying these. Through this process of critique, social phenomena such as management are revealed to be increasingly refined instruments of control associated with an economic rationalisation of society, which purportedly serves the interests of the most powerful, although disguised by the language of autonomy, self-management and empowerment. Criticism of this kind then goes on to recommend social, political and economic change and emancipation, that would raise:

the consciousness of the irrational motives and dependences that limit and restrict the rationality and freedom of individuals, which prevents them from seeing and defining their own true motives and aims and thus alienates them from their true humanity. (Masschelein 2004, 354)

Importantly, however, criticism which assesses management as an instrument of a totalising and inexorable economistic rationalism in contest with a liberating critical or substantive rationality that enables individual autonomy and self-determination needs to be held up to interrogative light. Let me illustrate how Foucauldian inspired examinations of disciplinary and governmental institutions, knowledges and techniques justifies such
scepticism of socio-critique (for example Barry et al. 1996b; Burchell et al. 1991).

Approaching the question of rationality not as dichotomous but as “multiple, pragmatic, practical and problem-oriented, rather than unitary, formal, theoretic, and general” (Dean 1994, 116), many Foucauldian studies of government have been attentive to the multiple and contesting rationalities, problems, institutional practices and social actors that traverse domains of existence as wide and varied as the realm of work, the medical clinic, the school, the field of management and government (Barry et al. 1996b). These studies illuminate how the ways of thinking, seeing, speaking and acting within the varied domains of life are not explicable with reference to unified ‘global’ entities such as the state or capital pursuing their interests, nor in terms of the dichotomous distinction between rationalities of liberation and control, or human values and economic efficiency.

The field of management is no exception to this. Despite its instrumentalist portrayal by many critics such as Gewirtz, the complex of management knowledge and techniques are so varied in their genesis and effects that it is imprecise to assume management to be a coherent body of knowledge. Corporate management, for instance, “has no single author, no unitary logic. It was never designed as a coherent, intellectually justifiable program. This is a coincidental coming together of public and private initiatives, a reaction to internal problems and external pressures” (Davis 1989, 176). In fact, the knowledge and techniques of management, from classical to corporatist, have varied and heterogeneous histories, composed
For example, economic concerns for the efficient use of human resources in the management expertise of the Quality of Working Life movement were formulated in relation to a range of psychological and social criteria (Davis and Cherns 1975; Miller and Rose 1995; Rose 1999a). Job satisfaction, individual autonomy, personal responsibility, positive social relationships and democracy were key rationalities according to which this field of management developed. The economic purposes of management were to be balanced with concerns for the welfare of the individual, their self-perception and self-esteem, and for their relationships with others, which explains Wagner’s observation that the management of work has increasingly conceptualised workers “as subjects developing their own sense of tasks, responsibilities and satisfaction with regard to the work they are doing” (Wagner 1994, 129).

Of course, socio-critique may argue that these concerns for the welfare of workers obfuscate the real intentions of employers or capitalists, or that such concerns merely reflect more refined means for improving efficiency and exploitation (Smyth et al. 2000). However, such an assertion overlooks that a multitude of management practices and knowledge claims, such as objective-setting, strategic planning, decentralisation, motivational strategies and the democratisation of workplace decision-making, are assembled from a range of social and psychological fields in response to a plethora of concerns. The practices and knowledge of management do not have a single point of genesis or intent located in an economic doctrine or
capitalist rationality affiliated with a single group’s putative interest, including capitalist domination and instrumentalisation. This makes it difficult to assert that management is reducible to a single, unitary project (Miller and O'Leary 1989; Miller and Rose 1995).

This is not to deny that the public sector, including the domain of education, has been subject to an increasingly economic manner of government. It has. However, it is one thing to argue that an economic rationality exists and quite another to assess it as an unproblematic realisation of a utilitarian and exploitative economic ideology, that it exhaustively constitutes the approach to defining a field, and moreover that that rationality and its techniques are mere servants of the powerful. The *Self-Managing School*, for instance, does not read like an economic text book but delves into behaviourism, psychology and sociology and it expresses concerns for not only efficiency, but also for traditionally progressive concerns such as collaboration, the goal of equity and teacher satisfaction (Caldwell and Spinks 1988).

Therefore, acknowledging this intricate web of connections that constitute the relationship between management, politics and government means re-considering the use of top-down analysis that begins with “an assumption that the outerworkings of power can be detected and made intelligible by reference to a broad historical postulate such as that of capitalist domination” (Miller and O'Leary 1989, 263). Foucauldian inspired studies attempt to move beyond a critical form of analysis that reduces social developments to single rationalities, such as control, instrumentalism or domination. A part of his analytical approach is to ask,
in relation to the use and analysis of reason and rationality, ‘Which rationality?’ That is, which rationalities constitute any domain of existence and indeed the conditions of human thought and action at any moment? I return to this notion of rationalities below. What, then, is the second troubling aspect of the analysis of management that I want to address before I explain how I will analyse management?

*The unified versus the decentred self*

A second challenge to critical analysis pertains to its presupposition of a rational model of the human whose emancipation can be secured through retrieving the individual’s critical reason. Critical theorists often interpret the specifics of social developments and reform in terms of a broader set of principle conflicts, such as of individual autonomy versus subjection, and of domination versus freedom (Blake and Masschelein 2007; Dean 1994; Masschelein 2004). At the centre of this mode of analysis is a classical philosophical conception of the rational and autonomous subjectivity of the individual. This individual’s capacities have been instrumentalised by the domination of a unitary Western reason that seeks to establish standardisation, market relations, quantification and means-ends conduct, which ultimately ‘falsifies’ ‘true reason’, as well as the individual’s true nature (Dean 1994). This mode of critical analysis seeks to bring to light the deformation, repression and domination of rational human subjectivity
by revealing the instrumentalism and ideological content of knowledge and its application.

This perspective, however, problematically assumes the *a priori* existence of the individual as autonomous, rational and self-determining, and that this notion of the individual should form the basis of their actions, identity and government. This belief forecloses the possibility of recognising the: 

historically specific modalities within which diverse practices of self-formation take place… such an analysis is concerned with displacing notions of the founding rational subject by way of an analysis of the means which seek to establish and promote particular human capacities – including those we might wish to regard as ‘reasoning’ – within bodies of knowledge and types of rationality, forms of power and government, and ethical practices. (Dean 1994, 63)

In other words, human rationality and autonomy should not be presupposed as essential to humans and their conduct and therefore something to be defended and retrieved. Dean’s point chimes with the argument of Foucault and Foucauldian scholars that human rationality and autonomy are an effect of the exercise of disciplinary and governmental power:

the argument from Habermas and the Frankfurt school has taught us to view technocratic reason as emanating outside civil society – as part of the state – which is directed at its citizens for purposes of social control and administration. Habermas talks of technocratic reasons and the “scientification of politics” in terms of the increasing administration of society as a whole and the colonization of the life-world. Against this view, then, the neo-Foucauldian approach
recognizes “technocratic reason” not as something purely negative that necessarily originates from a source outside which is then applied in coercive fashion to us; rather it is part of “technologies of the self”, a practice we engage in willingly in the process of producing ourselves as “free” subjects of a certain kind. (Peters 2001b, 78)

Individuals find themselves implicated in a web of institutions and communities where a plethora of regulatory and normative bodies of knowledge, techniques and practices are deployed. It is in this web that “various identities of humans are made and unmade” (Dean 1994, 72) and individuals are constituted with a range of cognitive and physical capacities, attributes and affects, including the capacity for ‘rational’ thought and autonomous self-government.

Those critical of the critical method argue that the focus on the production of human rationality and human autonomy, that is, on subjectification, must move beyond the discourse of control, oppression and emancipation (Marshall 2004). Based upon this assertion, I suggest that the techniques of management have had effects on individuals and schools that are irreducible to merely economic instrumentalism, control and diminished autonomy.

For example, in concert with Peters’ above observations, many principals and teachers have actively engaged management expertise in cultivating their own professional identities and practice of self-government, which has more recently taken the form of managerial and enterprising identities (Grace 1995; Leithwood et al. 1999; Mac An Ghaill
This reflects the use of management for forming an autonomous self. Moreover, managerial reform in education has been highly contextual and shaped by pre-existing professional cultures in schools. Evidence suggests that teachers have not passively received managerialism but they have drawn upon multiple interacting rationalities of teaching, learning and the organisation of schooling, which have included welfarism, social justice and corporate managerialism (Arnott 2000; Bailey 2000).

This is not to say that many teachers have not experienced managerialisation as oppressive. However, we should be circumspect about drawing the conclusion that freedom and autonomy are the antithesis of power and government, or that the power of power is its capacity to deform human identity. Management has played an important part in the creation of calculating and responsible free subjects. With this presupposition, we can ask ourselves what the role management is/was in the crisis of liberalism, or its role in the recalibration of government around notions such as autonomy and freedom.

Two principles for the analysis of management as a liberal technology of government

I could provide a more comprehensive discussion of the limitations of the critical approach to the analysis of education as well as management in self-managing reforms from a Foucauldian analytic of power (see for example Hunter 1994; Masschelein 2004). However, the above will suffice because it enables me to elaborate two key principles for the analysis of
management as a liberal technology of government: management regulates by shaping the exercise of people’s freedom, and this regulation is shaped by problematisations and rationalisations related to administering the population.

*Managing through freedom*

Rather than perceive management as an instrumentalist tool for the deformation and suppression of autonomy and subjectivity, we might understand it as an expertise composed of knowledge and techniques that act upon individuals with respect to their freedom. Gewirtz’s description of the objectives and effects of management in terms of control and oppression does not acknowledge that freedom and autonomy are key elements of the rationalities and practices of management. This is because management works not necessarily by diminishing freedom or disguising domination as freedom, but by structuring and defining the individual’s field of possible action, shaping their conduct and providing the tools for relating to themselves as individuals and workers.

This perspective attends to Larner and Walter’s (2004) concern regarding the “conclusion that such techniques [managerial techniques of auditing and benchmarking] are ‘partial, incomplete and ultimately ideological’” (2004, 214). As Larner observes, while such a view is understandable, it misses how managerial reforms reconstitute spaces and subjects by introducing into the modern workplace new ways of perceiving work and the workplace. For example, the discourses of corporate or
entrepreneurial management have rendered schools intelligible according to such things as objectives, missions, outcomes and targets, and consequently teachers have increasingly come to perceive and regulate their conduct according to this form of perception and reasoning. The autonomous subject, therefore, is enwrapped in managerial language, techniques and practices through which the individual makes sense of themselves and their world. In the case of managerialism, enrolling individuals into forms of calculated reasoning and activity (such as objective-setting) induces them to think and become ‘managing selves’, consequently enabling an indirect rather than coercive regulation of the individual (Peters et al. 2000).

Of course some may argue that any freedom exercised under these conditions is illusory and a tool for further subjugation, and that indeed my argument resembles an apologist’s case for the worst aspects of management. However, acting upon the conduct of conduct by structuring the possibilities for individual thought, decision-making and action, management is one apparatus of techniques, practices and meaning making through which the individual in contemporary liberal society has come to experience their freedom. Therefore, and as described above, my analytical concern is not with how management crushes human freedom and autonomy but rather how management shapes it in particular ways, for instance, rendering individuals entrepreneurial.
A rational and independent expertise

Analysing management in terms of control and instrumentalism too readily reduces management to being an instrument of the state and capital without proper consideration of its relationship to the liberal government of the population. Gewirtz’s (2002) analysis is illustrative of this limited form of analysis. While beginning her argument with a mild positive assessment of Foucault’s contribution to the analysis of power, Gewirtz claims that Foucault fails to take account of the macro machinations of power, such as the forces of the state. Her response to this perceived oversight is to employ a state-centred analysis of self-managing educational reform, which she sets apart from an analysis that perceives the state as essentially controlling. This state-centred analysis remains troubling, however, because Gewirtz continues to attribute self-managing reform to the crisis of legitimation and the actions of the state. Management, therefore, is still analytically approached as essentially an instrument for increased state and capital control, both in origin, purpose and effect (also Watkins 1992).

My point is not that management is not regulatory. It clearly shapes human conduct. However, the relationship between management and the regulation of individuals is complex and irreducible to political or economic instrumentalism or to the function of control and domination. There can be, for instance, some distance between political and economic interests and the regulatory knowledges and techniques developed by
management expertise. This is because while management expertise has indubitably developed in response to the problem of managing the efficiency of the enterprise and regulating the worker, it is nonetheless a relatively independent body of knowledge and practices composed of a range of rationalities, interests and purposes. The fact that many conceptual and technical developments in management expertise have occurred independent of political or economic interests, such as its use of behaviourism, psychology or psychodynamic theory, indicates the problematic nature of this relationship. The field of management is subject to its own internal rationalities, practices and transformations, as well as being open to the rationalities and transformations occurring in other domains, such as accounting, psychology and philosophy\(^{12}\) (Miller and O'Leary 1987). This limits its capacity to function as a direct mechanism of control by states or capital for the purpose of worker submission or increased economic efficiency.

In fact, management expertise rather than necessarily being a vehicle for exploitation and oppression has delimited the use of overt political interference in work and the abuse of power by the state and capital (Bendix 1974; Miller and O'Leary 1989). From the late nineteenth century, management became one of many authoritative expert sciences constituted by a rational body of knowledge and techniques employed governmentally within liberal democratic states. This development was in

\(^{12}\) Even if management were unitary and coherent, the state and capitalism would not be able to directly manufacture new forms of knowledge and techniques within them because the state and capitalist enterprises are not unitary thinking bodies that have the facility to make decisions and then act upon them Hindess, B. (1987a). _Freedom, Equality and the Market_, London: Tavistock Publications.
large part a product of liberal political rationalities seeking to make regulation a civil matter by using the rational knowledges and truths produced in the human and social sciences for supervising and administering the population of human individuals.

Management, therefore, promised to offer the world of industry and work a scientific and rational framework for the just regulation of the worker and the production process (Bendix 1974; Edwards 1979; Miller and O'Leary 1989). As an expertise, it developed a rational and scientific knowledge of the individual, the worker and work, and as its authority to speak the truth grew, it became a legitimate basis upon which the administration of the population was to occur (Meyer et al. 1985). With management expertise increasingly providing a reasonable basis for regulating the employee, the workplace could no longer be regulated according to the arbitrary exercise of authority by political authorities and exploitative employers as it often had been prior to the twentieth century.

This promise of a scientific management continues to be embedded in the views of those who seek to use management expertise. Pollitt observes the view held by public sector reformers of the 1980s that “if only management and administration could be established as a scientific discipline, then public officials would be better protected against the irrationalities of ‘political interference’” (Pollitt 1993, 15), whilst the management scholar, Peter Drucker, suggests that “performing, responsible management is the alternative to tyranny and our only protection against it” (Drucker 1974, x).
Of course, political and governmental problematisations have shaped management expertise and how the management of work is conceptualised (Rose 1999a), and there is no reason to suggest that management cannot be used oppressively. However, the nature of the relationship between government, capital and management needs careful attention. While there is, for instance, the contemporary alignment of the political discourse of enterprise and the knowledge and techniques of enterprise produced by the field of management, management is not at the behest of pre-determined political and economic interests that readily translate their interests directly (and unproblematically) into truthful knowledge and techniques. Management should be analytically approached, therefore, as a rational and relatively independent expertise whose relationship to government is problematic.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has raised important questions around management and the analysis of managerialisation. Departing from the precepts of critical analysis of managerial reform, I argued for the analysis of management as a liberal technology of government. Specifically, I have pursued the idea that managerialism, as Peters et al. (2000) describe it, “functions as an emergent and increasingly rationalised and complex neoliberal technology of governance” (Peters et al. 2000, 110). As a technology of government, the rationality and effects management can be thought about beyond the discourse of control, instrumentalism and domination. This is useful to the
study reported in this thesis because understanding the power of management to contribute to individual freedom and autonomy, and not simply to individual repression, enable us to analyse management as a pivotal feature of a crisis of liberalism that aimed to transform the government of the welfare state with a government privileging personal autonomy and empowerment.
Chapter 9: Entrepreneurial Self-Management

Introduction

For at least the last three decades, one trajectory of reform to the government of the Australian primary and secondary public education system has been decentralisation and the facilitation of school self-management. Although centralisation has been criticised throughout the twentieth century (Thomas et al. 1975), significant attempts at decentralisation and self-management have marked the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This recent development, I have argued, has been linked to the development of advanced liberal rationalities of government, with their emphasis on autonomy, empowerment and enterprise.

Arguably, the claim that decentralisation and self-management are linked to what has been described as a crisis of liberalism appears relatively self-evident. It is probably reasonable to assume that the terms
‘decentralisation’ and ‘self-management’, when used in the context of government, indicate the diminution of the influence of the centralised instruments of the welfare state and by implication greater autonomy and freedom for somebody. However, I want to suggest that the installation of corporate managerial forms of school autonomy that accompany decentralisation and self-management is linked to the crisis of liberalism. While the term ‘management’ conjures up images of control, domination and sometimes coercion (Parker 2002), it is also the case that corporate forms of management are linked to the governmentalities of autonomy and empowerment. My point is not that management expertise creates some kind of authentic or essential personal autonomy or empowerment, but that managerialisation and corporate forms of management are linked to a reconfiguration of the rationalities and technologies of government that now emphasise empowerment, choice, autonomy and self-governance.

This chapter explores this link between the emergence of entrepreneurial forms of school self-management and the problematisation of organization and governance of schools in terms of the socio-political objective to turn citizens into free and enterprising autonomous choosers (Peters et al. 2000). I argue that corporate forms of management, including the regimes of performance calculation and management, equip school leaders and teachers with the politically sanctioned capacities to be enterprising, calculating, prudent and rational autonomous choosers. Here, management “creates the condition for teachers to govern themselves as enterprising selves” (Simons 2002, 629), while corporate forms of management also enjoin parents as consumers to make choices in the
education market. I interpret this as the installation of practices of freedom (distinct from those created by centrally directed bureaucratic administration) linked to an advanced liberal government of the education domain.

**The problem with schools**

The argument I wish to begin with is that recent problematisations and developments have contributed to the emergence of the self-managing, entrepreneurial school and its corporate form of management. Let me draw attention to two developments within this milieu, one being a concern about the management of teachers and the other about the organisation and outcomes of schools.

*Teachers and the discourses of derision*

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, scrutiny of the standards and quality of the teaching profession and the standards and effectiveness of education systems cast a shadow of concern over the activities of teachers and the organisation of schooling. This is not new, though. In relation to the quality of teaching, the probity of teachers has been an ongoing concern in the administration of schooling, as witnessed by the school Inspectorates and ‘payment by results’ regimes of the nineteenth century (Silver 1994). The existence of this concern is hardly surprising given that teachers have such an important role in cultivating socially adjusted and productive citizens for the nation, and that they do this with a high degree of autonomy. Who, for
instance, knows what really goes on in the thousands of closed classrooms around the nation every minute of every school day?

In the latter part of the twentieth century, concerns for the standards and quality of teachers coalesced in a ‘discourse of derision’ (Ball 1990b) that brought the ethical and authoritative standing of teachers and the ‘educational establishment’ into question. Teachers were accused of being politically motivated, self-interested, deterministic in their thinking (Rutter et al. 1979), and insulated from accountability. Teachers, particularly progressive teachers, were frequently denounced as a threat to educational standards, and deemed responsible for social indiscipline, crime, violence and even economic downturn.

Reflecting the advanced liberal rationalities discussed previously, this discourse of distrust and derision scrutinised the authority of experts, bureaucracies and the institutions of the state from the point of view of an increasingly ‘empowered’ citizenry. Evidence of this was the creation in these public attacks of a divide between what many perceived to be the antagonistic interests of the public, and the ‘education establishment’, which included teachers. The goodness and reasonableness of citizens was opposed to the supposedly self-interested and dangerous teaching profession, with the latter described as “those ‘experts’, ‘specialists’ and ‘professionals’” and the “‘educational establishment’” (Ball 1990b, 18). In short, the ‘educational establishment’ appeared to frustrate the power of free citizens.

While Ball’s description of the discourse of derision describes the situation in the United Kingdom, conservatives in the public debate in
Australia throughout the 1980s also whipped up a sense of crisis and panic by construing teachers and education bureaucrats as subversive agents who wielded too much authority without proper public accountability. The dichotomous nature of the discourse of derision identified by Ball was also evident in Australia:

We have seen children’s rights juxtaposed against those of teachers; teachers’ unions and bureaucrats constructed in opposition to parents and taxpayers… Tradition, authority, discipline, and the ‘disciplines’ have been equated with quality education and with excellence, while in contrast, progressivism and alternative curricula have been constructed in such a way as to signify chaos, and educational, social and economic decline. (Kenway 1990, 199)

Teachers were perceived to be “a threat to intellectual rigour, to parent control, to established values and to the national interest” (Marginson 1997a, 120). The nation’s school children and their parents were the victims of both unruly teachers accused of not working hard enough, of failing to modernise, and for being poorly trained and managed (Merson 2001). Along with the supposedly unscrupulous unions, teachers were seen to actively deny parents their supposedly rightful influence over educational decision-making, evident in the private-public school debates (Kenway 1990; Susskind 1987).

From the 1980s, public confidence in teachers discernibly waned and expectations rose that: (1) teachers’ work needed better management and rigorous and monitoring, and (2) parents needed greater involvement in and say over their children’s education. Decentralisation and the
introduction of corporate managerialism could be seen to attend to these two issues. Management expertise offered the possibility of regulating the authority and conduct of teachers, particularly to politically defined ends, while corporate managerialism’s association with private enterprise promised to support the self-management of schools and the creation and operation of an educational market where parents could be empowered to choose which schools their children should attend. I will address these points later.

*Outcomes and the organisation of schools*

Running alongside these problematisations and developments, concerns also mounted about the level and quality of output of the Australian education system (Lingard 2000; Marginson 1997a). In the context of diminished national economic growth, rising unemployment, increasing international competitiveness, and the perceived problems of the centralised bureaucratic control of schools, economic development was linked to improving the performance of education systems. For example, the *Quality of Schools* report (Karmel 1985) reasoned that the massive increase in educational investment from the early 1970s to mid 1980s, from $285 million to $1775 million (Dawkins 1988), required more openness and clarity about educational objectives and outcomes, a better use of existing resources to facilitate improved outcomes, and greater attention to the assessment of outcomes.
Doubts existed as to whether centralised education bureaucracies could make the kinds of improvements required to achieve the goal of maximizing system performance. For example, the bureaucracy’s concentration of power was understood by many in the Australian business community to be a frustration to delivering school efficiency and effectiveness (Business Council of Australia 1991a; Scott 1990). This contention was supported by the empirical analysis of education systems across the globe by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). These studies found that highly centralised education systems were too driven by rigid compliance to centrally determined procedures to have the flexibility required for school improvement and economic responsiveness (Spring 1998; van Velzen et al. 1985). While this anti-bureaucratic and neo-liberal discourse led to reform of education bureaucracies, with head offices being made “much smaller and focused on finance, facilities, computing and personnel” (Brennan 2009, 343), another development occurred.

At the same time that education bureaucracies were problematised in terms of their inability to deliver system-wide improvement, increased attention was devoted to the role of individual schools and their institutional conditions in improving educational outcomes. Educational research about the degree individual schools had an effect on student outcomes was placing increased importance on the organisation and management of schools. The Coleman (1966) report played a significant part in this shift because that report’s scepticism about the educational influence of individual schools generated an unrelenting stream of contrary
educational, organisational and sociological research (Silver 1994; Thrupp 1995). Contrary to Coleman’s contention, this research demonstrated that the organisation of individual schools did indeed have an effect on students’ educational outcomes above and beyond social forces and the school’s social composition (Brookover et al. 1979; Klitgaard and Hall 1973; Weber 1971).

These studies linked students’ scores on a range of cognitive, emotional and social tests and indicators to features of the school organisation, which included organisational culture, organisational structures, organisational practices and teaching practices (Bidwell and Kasarda 1975; McGaw et al. 1991; Owens 1995; Rutter et al. 1979; Sammons 1999; Silberman 1970). The supposedly inescapable truth emerging from the fields of school effectiveness, school improvement and education management was that educational performance and outcomes were associated with the school’s organisation. Moreover, organisational performance was amenable to maximisation by those working in schools more effectively managing the school’s internal organisational features. Writers and scholars within these fields, as well as political authorities (Ministry of Education 1987), encouraged school leaders and teachers to have a greater appreciation of the school as a manageable organisation composed of organisational structures, practices and norms.

The increased attention to the individual school, and its organisation, performance and management, directed the attention of political and governmental authorities to intervening into the organisation and management of schools as a matter of public interest. It was in relation
to this appetite for reform that the self-managing school and its use of corporate forms of management emerged.

The entrepreneurial, self-managing school

One goal that emerged in the context of the denigration of centralised bureaucracy and the purported potency of a school’s effective organisation was the creation of school autonomy and freedom from bureaucracy (Thomas et al. 1975). Former Australian Federal Education Minister, David Kemp, unambiguously evokes this enduring discourse in his *Quality Schooling for All* speech: “I would argue the way forward, to ensure that government schools can compete effectively, is to give them greater autonomy from bureaucratic control and more freedom to exercise this leadership...” (Kemp 1997). Diminishing the power of the ‘education establishment’, such as the bureaucracy, and strengthening schools’ autonomous organisation, decentralisation and devolution were associated with enabling schools to “maximise their potential” (Dawkins 1988, 2), ‘unlock their future’ (Western Australian Department of Education 2010b), and “take charge of their destiny” (Caldwell & Spinks 1988, 61). Importantly, however, it has been the image of the private enterprise that has very powerfully shaped the emerging discourse of this autonomous school’s organisation and management.

This is evident in the ‘form’ of school organisation that has appeared in the descriptions of schools in education management texts. The description of the school organisation in the texts by education
management writers such as Caldwell and Spinks (1988; 1992) drew upon the researchers and gurus of private sector management and leadership, which included Tom Peters (Peters and Waterman 1982) and James Burns (1978). Putting their backs to bureaucratic management, political authorities and education management scholars and gurus employed and elaborated for the educational context the management theories, techniques and practices used in the corporate world.

The private enterprise was construed as a model of the excellent organisation for an increasingly dynamic and economically competitive world (Ball 2007; Beare 1995; Beare et al. 1989; Bottery 1992; Bottery 2000; Business Council of Australia 1991b; Caldwell and Spinks 1988; Thrupp 2003). The ‘excellent’ business was innovative, competitive, flexible, entrepreneurial and responsive to the preferences of individuals, able to “hold a place among those companies which were unusually productive and which were seen as market leaders” (Beare et al. 1989, 21). Given its glowing assessment, and the rise of the neo-liberal program for market creation, the private competitive business was held up as the model of organisation to be replicated by schools. Politically, the Federal Education Minister, David Kemp, argued that because the competitive global economy called for entrepreneurship, and “Entrepreneurial institutions create entrepreneurial attitudes” (Kemp 1999b), schools should be entrepreneurial and competitive organisations. What was this to entail?

Creating the school as a private enterprise in the competitive market required more than school autonomy from bureaucracy. Rather, it required that those within schools adopt the managerial language, techniques and
practices more commonly associated with private business, which include organisational objective-setting, targets, corporate plans, strategic plans, development plans, partnerships and performance management systems, as well as a focus on serving the client, increasing productivity, resource management, accountability to stakeholders, and being responsive to market forces (Beare et al. 1989). The integration of such rationalities and technologies into schools might be described as the creation of the self-managing entrepreneurial school (Peters 2001a; Peters et al. 2000; Simons 2002). Let us consider how the management techne of objective-setting and the corporate plan contributed to rendering the entrepreneurial self-management into existence.

**Objective-setting in the self-managing school**

Management expertise is concerned with the decision-making of organisational members so that the internal space and activity of the devolved organisation can be effectively managed. The bureaucratic management of schools troubled Caldwell and Spinks (1988; Caldwell and Spinks 1992) because its ‘administrative’ approach did not adequately take account of the research showing that individuals continuously made decisions, that they were motivationally complex, and that they performed best with autonomy and responsibility. Schools needed greater decision-making at the local level.

However, the administratively run schools were not up to this task because, for Caldwell and Spinks, the bureaucratically managed school
lacked adequate management techniques and practices, such as organisational objective-setting. Without these, how could the autonomy and increased discretion of school leaders and teachers be adequately harnessed to the ends of the school? In relation to the absence of systematic organisational goal-setting, they asked:

When schools lack mission, when there is no meaningful way of saying what it is they are supposed to accomplish – how is it possible, even in principle, to design an effective organization? Effective for what? (Caldwell and Spinks 1988, 55)

For Caldwell and Spinks and other education management scholars, the logic is self-evident: by creating an organisational mission or goal, the needs and priorities of schools can be known, and therefore the improvement of schools practicable. Objective-setting constitutes a managerial framework inasmuch as these known and shared objectives enable the decision-making of school leaders and teachers to be continuously shaped at a distance to organisational ends, however these are defined. This not only assists schools in managing themselves, but it also supports entrepreneurship by enabling a degree of discretion, while orienting this discretion to a calculus of objectives and outcomes.

The corporate plan in the self-managing school

The second managerial technology related to the entrepreneurial, self-managing school is the corporate plan. The corporate plan is an organisation-wide device, linked to the identification of objectives, that
attempts to encompass the decision-making and activity of organisational members (Ackoff 1969). It involves teachers engaging in a range of planning and policy-making activities across the various domains of the school, such as the whole school, the subject faculty, or the classroom, and systematically linking these activities to the organisation as a whole:

This integration of functions leads us to define corporate planning as a continuous process in administration which links goal-setting, policy-making, short-term and long-term planning, budgeting and evaluation in a manner which spans all levels of the organization, secures appropriate involvement of people according to their responsibility for implementing plans as well as of people with an interest or stake in the outcomes of those plans, and provides a framework for the annual planning, budgeting and evaluation cycle. (Caldwell and Spinks 1988, 61)

Linking the setting of organisational goals, the identification of needs, policy-making, planning, budgeting, teaching and learning and evaluation, the corporate plan serves an administrative function in that it converts the organisation’s goals and values, however these are defined, into individual behaviours.

For Ball (2003), harnessing the conduct of the organisation’s members to the achievement of the school’s ‘effectiveness’ (as described by Hargreaves and Hopkins 1991) involves cultivating calculating capacities compatible with the entrepreneurial, corporate model of private enterprise. He writes:

Within this ensemble, teachers are represented and encouraged to think about themselves as individuals who calculate about
themselves, ‘add value’ to themselves, improve their productivity, strive for excellence and live an existence of calculation. (Ball 2003, 217)

Through managerial knowledges, techniques and practices, such as devising and implementing the school’s mission, policy, programs and evaluations, school leaders and teachers employ the discourse of corporate management as ‘technologies of the self’, shaping how school employees think about and act upon themselves, their schools and the world.

In particular, school employees develop a calculative capacity. This refers not only to the calculation of numbers as a result of the devolution of school budgets and the increased use of benchmark testing as a means to measure a school’s teaching and learning. It also refers to a means-ends economic calculation involving the calculation of the organisation’s inputs, outputs, problems, quality and effectiveness.

For example, the corporate plan induces school leaders to make calculations that support the school’s entrepreneurial self-management. Education department policies and management texts, such as Caldwell and Spinks (1988; Caldwell and Spinks 1992), induce the school leader and teacher to make calculations about the objectives of their school by identifying the current needs of students and the school, to identify their school’s deficiencies and strengths in respect to achieving goals, and to calculate the use of resources, organisational efficiency, educational outcomes and customer desires and needs.

My concern is not whether the calculations or needs identified within this managerial framework are valid and defensible. Others have
made that analysis (Angus 1994). The point I make here is that the corporate plan, like the business plan (Oakes and Townley 1998), is a pedagogical tool that trains the school leader and teacher to act upon the school as an autonomous and entrepreneurial organisation capable of improvement. To the extent that this positions the principal and teacher as active managers in the educational enterprise, both the corporate plan and objective-setting carve out the school as an autonomous, enterprising, self-managing and mutable organisation.

**The principal as an entrepreneurial manager**

In both of the above descriptions, the *techne* of objective-setting and the corporate plan create a institutional field that shapes the individual’s exercise of autonomy. This institutional field, informed by the governmentalities of autonomy, empowerment and enterprise, has been reshaping the conception and conduct of those working within schools, especially the principal. Up until the 1970s and 1980s, an administrator notion of the principal was predominant. This administrator function was associated with top-down bureaucratic forms of public sector governance, which worked well for education systems, given that school organisation and curriculum were relatively standardised, and most senior administrative positions were held by classroom teachers not trained in management (Farquhar 1975). However, the political and governmental goals of autonomy, flexibility, initiative, self-realisation and enterprise, along with
the increased pertinence accorded to the effective school organisation, rendered the ‘administrator’ problematic.

The effective principal was increasingly positioned, not as someone who simply follows procedure and ensures compliance, but as someone who had a range of managerial and entrepreneurial attributes that enabled her or him to lead their schools like a CEO directs her or his company. Within this discursive re-working of the principal’s identity, it is unsatisfactory to rely on bureaucracy. Reliance on centrally devised policies and procedures was a sign of ineffective management, partly because the contingencies of school life in what was construed as an economically and socially unstable world could not be adequately responded to by a ‘one size fits all’ approach associated with bureaucratic governance. This is an argument that remains powerful today (Government Media Office 2009).

In contrast, instead of denying school leaders autonomy and decision-making power, the self-managing entrepreneurial school requires the principal to be a manager capable of exercising power over his or her immediate organisational environment. Corporate managerial techniques, such as objective-setting, the corporate plan, cost-centres and public relations, enjoin school leaders to self-manage. Self-management is equated with the capacity to calculate and act in response to needs, objectives, outcomes and quality (Simons 2002), to respond with alacrity to the competitive market and changing environment (Beare et al. 1989; Caldwell and Spinks 1992; Gerstner 1994), and to problem solve and innovate in response to local social and educational circumstances, demands and
problems (Angus 1994; Gunter 2000; Popkewitz 1996; Popkewitz 2000a; Whitty et al. 1998). Attaining this power over their circumstances enjoins school leaders to act as entrepreneurs with “self-direction, self-reliance, ingenuity and initiative” (Crowther and Caldwell 1991, 8).

With a focus on “vision, autonomy, courage, empowerment of others, strategic planning and development of self” (Caldwell and Spinks 1992, 24), the effective school leader has resonated with the image of the effective business leader from popular leadership texts. With freedom to engage in the competitive market, and now enmeshed in the rationalities, practices and techniques of corporate forms of management, the enterprising leader calculates about and acts upon the school as a business that is open and responsive to external demands, including to its stakeholders, the private sector and consumers (Ball 2007; Burke and Picus 2001; Leithwood et al. 1999; Sanders 2006). Like a commercial enterprise, the enterprising leader uses a range of management techniques and frameworks to promote their school to potential customers, to collect statistical information and data so as to improve and promote the school, to read market signals, and to adjust organisational practices in response to shifting demands and market fluctuations. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Gewirtz observes that principals from her case study schools now believe that “market driven, financial or managerial decisions were compatible and indeed could enhance good educational practice” (Gewirtz 2002, 46).
Freeing the manager?

The governmental effect of this entrepreneurial management is two-fold.

On the one hand, entrepreneurial self-management accords school leaders and teachers increased discretion for managing their schools. School leaders and teachers experience themselves, not as teachers conforming to established ‘roles’, but as decision-makers, innovators and problem-solvers. The knowledges, technologies and practices of corporate management have fostered the capacities of schools leaders to self-manage their school, and to have power over their environment (Bottery 2000; Gewirtz 2002; Thrupp 2005). Even exposure to the vagaries and existential risks of the market is construed in the enterprise mentality as empowering, an opportunity, something that engages the individual’s self-optimising impulses, including their self-motivation, self-reliance, self-determination and self-responsibility (Du Gay 2000b).

On the other hand, entrepreneurial self-management brings “responsibility back into the school” (Karmel 1973, 12), effectively rendering the school’s organisational members responsible for the school and its outcomes (Silver 1994), which is why Beare et al. suggested in their education management text that there “are no learner failures, only programme failures” (Beare et al. 1989, 168). Here, the individual school leader interprets reality and destiny as a matter of individual responsibility. The technologies of entrepreneurial self-management place the onus on school leaders and teachers to take responsibility for identifying and resolving the contingencies that confront their school, and respond to the
diverse demands of local contexts. Within this rationality, “a good school is usually a reflection of its principal and staff” (Karmel 1985, 111).

**Entrepreneurial management and the crisis of liberalism**

This consideration of the freeing and regulatory effects of self-management leads me to propose that the self-managing and entrepreneurial model of schooling was central to the crisis of liberalism that afflicted the domains of politics, government and education. The entrepreneurial self-managing school responds to political and governmental concerns about individual autonomy and powerlessness, government over-regulation and bureaucratic constraint, the authority of bureaucrats, professionals and experts, the inefficiency of public sector organizations, and the failure of state institutions to provide opportunities for individual discretion and choice, for both parents and school leaders (Kemp 1999b).

To address these maladies of the welfare state, entrepreneurial self-management and the competitive market are conceived by their proponents as means to empower school leaders from a range of unnecessary regulatory constraints. Entrepreneurial self-management and market competition ensures that the school leader and teacher are, in the words of management advocates, “liberated, inspired and empowered to face an uncertain future with optimism, [and] to seize the opportunities it offers, and to develop creative solutions to its problems” (Crowther and Caldwell 1991, 13). This autonomizing from the traditional constraints of the bureaucracy by devolving to principals the responsibility for managing
schools has been described as a doctrine of ‘freeing the manager to manage’ (Clarke and Newman 1997), and it has been observed that the empowering the school leader in local management and market entrepreneurship has been “experienced as modern, progressive, dynamic and stimulating developments” (Grace 1995, 138-139).

Importantly, however, ‘freedom to manage’ does not designate enabling complete autonomy for school leaders or managers. As the above descriptions indicate, ‘freedom to manage’ refers to according managers increased power over their immediate environment as part of a process of shifting from highly centralised and direct bureaucratic governance towards an autonomous and competitive organisational arrangement (Kanter 1985; Osborne and Gaebler 1993; Peters and Waterman 1982). In its place, therefore, has been put a new governance assemblage. So, while the principal is free from some constraints imposed by the centralised management of education systems, the manager is now enwrapped in the regulatory discourses of organisational and managerial expertise that shape and instrumentalise the individual’s self-steering capacities. Entrepreneurial self-management, therefore, reflects a transformation in the rationalities and technologies of government.

At this point we can discern the reasons for linking corporate forms of self-management with the crisis of liberalism. Despite corporate self-management not producing some authentic form of freedom and autonomy, for advanced liberal and neo-liberal rationalities of government, the market economy, competition, choice-making and entrepreneurship evince freedom. Therefore, the proponents and implementers of advanced liberal
and neo-liberal programs conceive self-managing reforms to the organisation of the state and education systems to be liberating. Entrepreneurial schools create autonomy from statist political technologies (a threat to the autonomous self) whilst strengthening individual activity and self-government (particularly by means of local calculations of strategies, tactics, costs and benefits) within the putatively free domain of the market economy.

Reflecting a re-calibration of the relationship between the power of the state and the individual, advanced liberalism rationalities and technologies of government seek to establish the conditions for competitive, entrepreneurial conduct because this is equated with the exercise of freedom, now defined as “the capacity for self-realization which can be obtained only through individual activity” (Rose 1999b, 145). So, the fact that school leaders and teachers increasingly exercise their freedom “in more cost-effective, flexible, competitive, consumer-satisfying and innovative ways” (Gewirtz 2002, 6) is indicative of governmental reforms that have set the conditions for freedom, or at least the exercise of a particular form of freedom. Here, the school leader takes responsibility for their school as they now do their own life, being active in the formation of both.

**Performance calculations**

It is in relation to the production of freedom that I want to explore the more recent collection and use of data on schools and students. Although not an
exhaustive list, this measurement apparatus refers to benchmark testing to measure ‘what people know’, the collection and publication of data on such things as retention and graduation, and the comparisons of data within and between countries to enable judgments on the performance (Berliner and Biddle 1995; Bracey 2003), productivity and quality of schools and education systems (Dale 1999; Smyth 2006) for the purpose of maximising educational output and national economic competitiveness (Levin and Kelly 1994; Spring 1998; Wolf 2002).

Of course, information about school and student performance has existed for some time and its use and implementation in education has not been smooth\textsuperscript{13}. In relation to benchmark testing, resistance from teachers’ unions and the contest around states rights in respect to education responsibilities in the 1970s and 1980s ensured a slow and troubled take up in Australia. In the late 1980s there was agreement between state education ministers that there needed to be collection of data on the output of the education systems, and having these reported to governments and other interested stakeholders, including parents (Brennan 2009; Ministerial Council on Education 1989). However, it was not until the commencement of a new funding agreement between the Commonwealth and the states in the mid 2000s that national standardised testing became institutionalised as a prominent feature of the education landscape (Smyth 2006).

\textsuperscript{13} National Assessment of Educational Progress Program in the US existed in the 1960s, the Assessment of Performance Unit existed in the UK in the mid 1970s, and in Australia there was a Survey of Literacy and Numeracy conducted in 1975 for the House of Representatives Select Committee on Specific Learning Difficulties and a survey in 1980 by the Australian Education Council.
The use of these monitoring and accountability regimes has been subject to a number of criticisms: that rather than improve the performance of schools and students these reforms do the opposite because all that matters is what can be counted and quantified (Gillborn and Youdell 2000); that the political ‘culture of performativity’ sacrifices social and educational principles on the altar of economic efficiency and competitiveness (Ball 2003); that testing now constitutes the means of fixing the supposed ‘crisis’ in education (Meier 2002); that schools would invest in those things that demonstrate measurable short-term gain whilst complex educational problems would be reduced to simplistic analysis that foster simplistic solutions (Thrupp 2005); that schools would engage in fabricating their performance, concealing as much as they reveal (Ball 1998c); and that the technologies of performativity direct teacher conduct toward the pursuit of targets and outcomes rather than relationships or educational values (Smyth 2006).

These criticisms of the measurement apparatus and numerical monitoring, calculation and publication raise important questions. No doubt technologies of performativity exact a transformation in the identity of school leaders and teachers, as Ball identifies. And no doubt this is partly a consequence of a political culture that is concerned with efficiency, outcomes and standards. However, does this “metrics of accountability” (Ball 2003, 223) do more than mystify, commodify, terrorise, instrumentalise and dominate? What are the implications, for instance, of the fact that monitoring, measuring and testing have emerged in Western liberal democratic countries whose political authorities also value freedom,
democracy and the rights of citizens? Consider, for instance, the political discourse on this matter.

For political authorities, the introduction of benchmark testing is not necessarily a means for increasing political control of education and coercion of teachers. Rather, it is an attempt to drive a national agenda for improved educational standards. How? Numerical measurement and accounting place schools under public surveillance (Gleeson and Husbands 2001) and in so doing, according to former Federal Education Minister, Julia Gillard, shed a light on underachievement. This would make it possible to identify well performing and ‘failing schools’, to focus attention on improving teaching, to provide school leaders with information for improving their management, and increase the availability of information to parents on school performance so as to support their choice of schools (Gillard 2009; Kemp 1999a; Nelson 2004b).

When described thus, these regimes take on a significance not captured by the critiques of the ‘metrics of accountability’ centred on their coercive effects or how they diminish teacher autonomy. In the following section I want to draw attention to how these numerical performance regimes are linked to an ambition to, not only monitor and regulate schools at a distance, but also cultivate empowered, self-managing, entrepreneurial schools and schools leaders that operate in a marketplace with equally enterprising, autonomous and calculating parents. In short, I want to examine how these performance regimes constitute technologies for governing (and therefore bringing into existence) the enterprising, autonomous chooser.
The authority of numbers

The critics’ criticism of testing and numbers resembles aspects of the conventional histories of quantification and numbers put forward by American scholars such as Cline (1982). In these accounts, numbers are construed as politically useful in that they ‘decomplexify’ reality and this enables them to control, dominate and discipline populations of democratic nations (Rose 1991). Similarly, educational research frequently construes the use of testing and statistics as damaging attempts to quantify the qualitative, of making schools and individuals compliant to political and economic needs, and of diminishing the “autonomous or collective ethical self” (Ball 2003, 226).

An alternative perspective on the procedures of quantification is that numbers and quantification have been and continue to be critical to how policy makers and governors govern for people’s freedom. In brief, the collection and calculation of numbers make democratic government operable (Rose 1991; Rose 1999b). Sure, quantification can be put to spurious and deceptive ends. However, numbers possess an objectivity and impersonality that enable political authorities and public bureaucracies to quantify and impersonally calculate about a qualitative world riven with political, social and economic self-interest (Neylan 2008; Porter 1995). From the calculation of births and deaths to cost-benefit analysis, the collection of numerical data forms an integral part of the way in which
political and governmental actors of liberal and democratic persuasions think about and enact their regulatory activities.

In other words, in democratic governmental discourse, numbers, statistics and the calculations made of them are not “univocal tools of domination, but mobile and polyvocal resources” (Rose 1991, 684). For example, the collection, calculation and dissemination of numbers are especially valuable in the case when there is distrust of authority:

When the authority of authority is secure, when authoritative judgments carry inherent authority, when the legitimacy of their authority is not subject to sceptical scrutiny and challenge, experts have little need of numbers. But where mistrust of authority flourishes, where experts are the target of suspicion and their claims are greeted with scepticism of politicians, disputed by professional rivals, distrusted by public opinion, where decisions are contested and discretion is criticized, the allure of numbers increases. It is in these circumstances that professionals and experts try to justify their judgments on the ground of objectivity, and frequently frame this objectivity in numerical form. Numbers are resorted to in order to settle or diminish conflicts in a contested space of weak authority. (Rose 1999b, 208)

This analysis of distrust and authority may sound familiar to the ears of those living in ‘advanced liberal societies’. In the context of rabid critiques by both the Left and the Right of government overreach and bureaucratic and professional authority, numbers and their instruments of collection such as testing promise one way in which the exercise of authority could be re-regulated. Here, quantification and the publication of numbers and statistics promise political and public accountability. These procedures and
technologies can be used to monitor the activities and outcomes of public officers, steer these activities to politically desirable ends, and enable organisational self-reflexiveness and improvement.

This type of analysis is also appropriate to the case of education at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries. The governmental technology associated with the collection, analysis and publication of numbers, such as standardised testing, (1) governs the conduct of teachers and school leaders to politically desirable ends because what is measured is what matters, and (2) provides the public with information on schools so that parents can make informed choices about which school their children should attend.

Perhaps, therefore, we could consider the power-effects of the employment of the regime of numbers and statistics in the domain of education not necessarily in terms control and domination, but as ethical technologies. Because, as Rose (1991) explains:

Democracy requires citizens who calculate about their lives… Henceforth, the pedagogy of numeracy was an essential part of the constitution of subjects of a democratic polity. If government was to be legitimate to the extent that it was articulated in a discourse of calculation, it was to be democratic to the extent that it required and sought to produce responsible citizens, with a subjectivity disciplined by an imperative to calculate. (Rose 1991, 683)

With numbers “purporting to act as automatic technical mechanisms for making [objective] judgements, prioritising problems and allocating resources” (Rose 1991, 674), the procedures and technologies associated
with the collection and dissemination of numbers constitute one set of ethical technologies for producing responsible, autonomous and democratic subjectivities. Therefore, a commitment to a “public habitat of numbers” (Rose 1991, 689) enables individuals to exercise foresight, discipline and rational decisions for achieving personal or public objectives, depending on whether the person making the calculation is a private citizen or a public servant.

How, then, does this notion of numbers and their calculation as ethical technologies integral to liberal democratic societies relate to the self-managing reform of schools? The next section suggests that these ethical technologies attempt to (1) make the calculation of school data integral to managing the effectiveness of schools, and therefore to better serving students and local communities, and (2) use these data and its calculation to orient the organization and activities of schools to citizens through the market. Let us consider these in turn.

*Testing and statistics in school self-management*

With school leaders and teachers increasingly required to manage themselves and their schools, the capacity to know, understand and calculate about the performance of individual schools by those within them has become vitally important.

It must be remembered that school self-management aimed to remedy a number of deficiencies of bureaucratic management prior to the 1980s, including a lack of adequate knowledge of schools as organisational
entities and a limited capacity to assess organisational effectiveness. A new rationality was being inserted into the educational domain that sounded like this: how could effective and informed decision-making regarding schools and education be made without statistical information being locally available? The lack of local data discouraged school improvement and innovation, as well as discouraging openness and responsiveness to the needs of students, parents and communities (Beare et al. 1989; Chubb and Moe 1990).

With principals and teachers increasingly obliged to self-manage, problem-solve and employ organisational missions, targets and other management practices, information about school performance has become integral to their current duties. The Western Australian Department of Education introduced data software such as Educational Assessment Reporting System (EARS) for principals, and workshops to train school leaders in data interpretation to make it “easier for district office and school staff to incorporate into their school review and whole-school planning processes” (Western Australian Department of Education 2010a). In these workshops school leaders learn to use data triangulation templates, use a line of inquiry framework, manipulate data sets at the individual, class and cohort level, identify strengths and weaknesses in numeracy and literacy, and use data as an evidence base for school improvement planning. In other words, the collection and analysis of data about schools creates a new domain of knowledge for introspection and school improvement.

This quantitative data is not, therefore, merely an administrative tool for centralised authorities to monitor educational performance, or for
improving efficiency of the enterprise by identifying needs and targets and assessing their achievement. Ready access to quantitative information by schools also has the potential to shape organisational behaviour (Hoggett 1996) because with the expectation that schools are to self-manage, school leaders and teachers are enabled to calculate and make rational decisions in light of the facts provided by numbers. For example, a strategic priority of the Western Australian Department of Education over the last decade has been to encourage and support teachers and schools in the use of a range of “achievement data over the course of a student’s schooling to plan a personalised approach to each individual’s learning”, and to “help principals work together to analyse data, set targets for improvement and match interventions to identified student needs” (Department of Education 2010a). In short, this enables school leaders and teachers to “question how we do things better” (Gray et al. 1999, 77).

Supporting the means-ends rationality of management, statistics and facts represented by examination results and standardised testing results could be tools for school leaders and teachers to calculate their actions in relation to the objectives, outcomes and targets of the organisation. Hence, numbers support self-management to the extent that they give decisional authority and therefore flexibility to those who know the local context. Decisions could be responsive to local needs and issues, and when used within the abovementioned corporate management framework (such as objective-setting or responsiveness to customers), these could improve the effectiveness of decisions. In so doing, this institutional arrangement of schools attempts to bring into existence the
empowered, rational, goal-driven, problem-solving and self-governing school leader and teacher (albeit also steered at a distance by centrally devised targets and procedures).

Data and the market

While performance data encourages those within schools to improve their organisations based upon the purported authority of numbers, performance data such as rates of graduation, exam results and results of benchmark testing, also orient the activities and management of schools to their ‘customers’. This is because publicly available data enjoins parents to make certain calculated choices about which is the ‘best school’ to enrol their children in. These data supports the choice-making of parents because it differentiates schools by establishing for the consumer what are deemed by political and other social authorities, such as newspapers, to be valuable if not supposedly neutral indicators of educational quality and the desirable end product of the education process.

With school leaders positioned to see themselves as providers of educational goods and services (Chubb and Moe 1990; Friedman 1968; Friedman and Friedman 1980; Harrison 2004) who must therefore attract the parent (or student) for custom, the publication of school performance data appears to be an essential factor to how parents make the choice of which school to send children to. As a tangible indicator of the ‘educational product’ provided by schools to be used by consuming parents, school performance data facilitates the use of the market economy
to govern schools and individuals, both in terms of encouraging parents to be active in choosing the ‘best’ school for their children, but also by orienting the activity of school leaders towards satisfying consumer demands for delivering a ‘quality product’. Whether or not the majority of parents actually use this performance data to make such decisions, performance data is increasingly understood, particularly by political authorities, as a ‘market signal’ denoting ‘excellence’ and ‘quality’. This orients management decisions towards satisfying the demands of parents as consumers as a way to attract parents to their school. In this scenario, then, data collection and publication play a significant role in fostering competitive relations between schools and, therefore, a neo-liberal government of the educational domain.

In this circumstance, school leaders are regulated by the competitive market and consumer choice and in the process become “business decision-makers” (Buchanan and Wagner 1977, 71). Supported by technologies such as EARS and NAPLAN, school performance data enters into the decisions (at least that is the expectation) of school leaders and teachers who monitor and manage their own performance and activities in the context of market activity. This means that the educational organisation is remodelled around the market. As central bureaucracies diminish in their direct management of the activities of schools, individual entrepreneurship, creativity, self-reflexivity, flexibility, commitment to outcomes and a planful relation to the future emerge as a powerful commonsense discourse of corporate styles of management by school leaders (Gee and Lankshear 1995).
An important point to mention here is that the collection of statistics and data fail at cultivating in school leaders and teachers a capacity to be critical about the numbers and statistics that are used and collected about schools. While the data collected may be based upon the premise that we can generally predict school outcomes according to levels of literacy and numeracy, these do not teach teachers or parents about the limits of testing and performance regimes, such as how social influences influence performance results. However, numbers and statistics support the cultivation of school leaders and teachers as “public entrepreneurs” (Ostrom 1973, 129). While school leaders and teachers may object to the quantification of educational outcomes, the regime of performance data nonetheless positions them to take responsibility for the outcomes and quality of their schools.

**Conclusion**

The self-managing entrepreneurial school is constituted by the individualising technologies of management and the market and these have brought into existence the self-managing entrepreneurial school leader. I began by linking these developments to the political and governmental concerns for the conduct of teachers, the outcomes of the education system and the pertinence given to the effect of school organisation on student outcomes. In this context, the self-managing entrepreneurial school leader is regulated according to the putatively neutral and objective knowledge and techniques of management and the market. Corporate management and
the markets have cultivated the school leaders’ capacity to: (1) calculate about the management of the school as an autonomous entity driven by goals and outcomes, (2) ensure an entrepreneurial and even economic calculation of activities and resources, and (3) direct their activities to satisfying the needs of parents and communities.

Importantly, management and the market provide the normative structures, roles, frameworks and standards though which teachers are empowered to understand schooling and its processes, be active in goal setting and decision making, to reflect and make rational calculations, to be professionally and personally responsible for their activities, and to be in charge of and responsible for managing their school’s destiny. This is also the case in the use of test results and the statistics compiled from these. These technologies enable self-managing schools to identify problems and improve school practices.

It is worth noting, however, that although texts like *The Self-Managing School* encourage teachers to reflect upon themselves and their world in terms of objectives, planning for the achievement of objectives, and evaluating the extent to which these objectives have been achieved, this does not mean that is all school leaders and teachers calculate. Teachers continue to bring to bear their expert pedagogical and curriculum knowledge on problems and decisions. Nevertheless, with the authority bestowed on corporate styles of management and the market by a range of authorities including policymakers, these are held up as the legitimate means according to which individuals can enact forms of teacher professionalism responsibly in a devolved system of governance where
school, school leaders and teachers are empowered and autonomous choosers. Embedded in this reasoning around empowerment and management are advanced liberal rationalities. Believing that big government and bureaucracy have stifled the natural benefits that arise for the economy and society from individual empowerment and the exercise of initiative and entrepreneurial freedom, corporate styles of self-management foster the exercise of greater economic freedom for school leaders and parents. While school leaders and teachers are positioned as active, adaptable, flexible and entrepreneurial, corporate forms of management within the market position parents as discerning choice-makers calculating about their investment decisions. This lay behind the claim that parents and communities are empowered by school performance information and the capacity to exercise choice.
Conclusion

School self-management and school autonomy are key reforms to the field of education in Australia over the past three to four decades. The aim of this thesis was to offer an analysis of these self-managing school reforms using the historical and theoretical insights of Foucauldian studies of governmentality. I pursued this line of inquiry because these reforms appeared temporally and thematically connected to the emergence of advanced liberal and neo-liberal government. My concern in this thesis was to explore this connection between self-managing school reforms and the emerging ways of rationalising and enacting the government of the state. To a large extent, this thesis has been confined to the study of a specific rationality impinging on and constituting the domain of education; that is, governmental rationality. Some key points emerge from the preceding inquiry. By way of summary, these include:
• Self-managing reforms are a feature of late twentieth century governmental and political life, including a feature of the field of education;

• In the late twentieth century there was a transformation in the rationalities and modalities of government of many Western liberal democratic societies, which many have understood as a crisis of the welfare state but which Foucault describes as a crisis of liberal governmentality;

• This crisis of liberal governmentality involved a critique of the social mode of government (for instance, as excessively regulatory) and a concomitant valorisation in political and governmental discourse of the notions and techniques of empowerment, autonomy, choice, competition and enterprise;

• Self-managing school reforms are effects of this late twentieth century transformation of the rationalities and modalities of government, evincing a reshaping of how the government of schools, parents, teachers and communities is thought about, rationalised and enacted;

• The cultural renewal of freedom, emancipation and autonomy associated with this advanced liberal rationality of government reconceptualises government as well as reconceptualising the conditions for the state’s welfare and security.

Below I review these points and I draw out some implications of this study for the future of school governance.
Self-managing reforms

Since the 1970s, the bureaucratic and professional organisation of the provision of public goods and services in many liberal democratic countries, while still a feature of these countries, has been reformed. This reform has included the introduction into the public sector of rationalist and corporate styles of management, the privatisation and commercialisation of the provision of public goods and services such as health care and utilities, the detachment of public departments or agencies from bureaucratic control and the strengthening of their autonomy to operate in competition with other providers of goods and services, the increasing use of the rationalities and techniques of standards, outcomes and targets, the collection of performance data on these increasingly autonomous organisations, and the use of market devices and practices to coordinate the provision of goods and services through competition for consumers. I have termed this assemblage of reforms ‘self-managing reforms’.

The autonomous, self-managing and entrepreneurial school manifests this reform in the field of education. While I do not want to overstate the extent of decentralisation and devolution, schools have nevertheless been increasingly detached from bureaucratic centres and their prescriptive forms of management. This process of autonomisation, or deregulation, has been accompanied by technologies and practices of responsibilisation, or reregulation. These technologies and practices include corporate managerialism, which has cultivated education bureaucrats,
school leaders and teachers with the capacities for thinking and acting in terms of objectives, outcomes, targets, quality and customers. This has been supported by performance management regimes that involve the collection of data on schools and teachers. These data have a regulatory function in that they enable the monitoring and improvement of school performance, as well as supporting parents’ ability to choose schools by publicising the supposed effectiveness or quality of schools. Schools are now subject to the competitive pressures of the market as restrictions on enrolments are loosened, political authorities endorse selective and specialist schools, and the private school sector is strengthened through state funding. I have termed this assemblage of reforms in education ‘self-managing school reforms’.

A transformation in the rationalities and modalities of government

The inquiries pursued in this thesis have outlined the link between these self-managing reforms and the political discourse of many Western liberal democracies at the end of the twentieth century. However, distinct from analyses that attribute self-managing school reform to (1) politically disinterested technical developments, (2) a crisis of legitimacy of the welfare state, or (3) the ascendant ideologies of those in control of the state’s levers of power, I have used the methodological, historical and theoretical insights of Foucauldian studies in government to make an alternative assessment of reform. What has the use of Foucauldian studies in government made possible to the analysis of self-managing reforms?
With an emphasis on the study of governmental rationality, I have argued that self-managing reforms reflect the late twentieth century transformations in the government of the public sector, economy and society, and this transformation is an effect of a transformation in how the government of the state has been rationalised and enacted.

The character of this transformation was canvassed in Part II where I argued that the transformation of governmental rationalities and technologies involved the problematisation of the social modality of government associated with the welfare state. Where once proper government involved an extensive regulatory apparatus of state bureaucracies, experts and professionals that were authorised to socialise the economy, the instruments of the state, and citizens’ interests and activities, by the late twentieth century the role of the state and the objects, ends and means of government were re-appraised. Many features of political and governmental life, including centralised planning by politicians and bureaucrats and the leading role of the state in determining social and economic progress were construed as a threat to the economic, social and moral wellbeing of liberal democratic nations.

This critique of the social rationalities and modalities of government reflected a crisis of liberal governmentality. This crisis, I argued, was generated from an internal dilemma of liberalism. This dilemma, a product of the liberal state’s twin practices of totalisation and individualisation (where the state becomes governmentalised), refers to an agonistic tension in liberal governmental rationalities between the pursuit of personal and economic freedom and the pursuit of the security and wellbeing of the state.
This constant review of the exercise of political and governmental power in terms of freedom can be seen to have framed the problematisation and critique of social government. For example, the critique of the social state was conducted in terms of the perceived costs to political, economic and personal freedom of a state that had grown too large and whose pastoral technologies and networks had become too intrusive, too encompassing and too insidious. These state-phobic critiques of excessive government were linked to a cultural renewal of notions of freedom, empowerment, autonomy and emancipation, and the rediscovery of a culture of the self and its actualisation. For many, the emerging forms of rule promised greater individual and economic freedom and less interference by the state, politics and government.

Influenced by German and American neo-liberals, governmental and political reasoning began to be shaped by notions such as (1) human nature was autonomous, active, self-realising and enterprising, (2) that all human activity could be understood through an economic framework of human capitalisation, and (3) that competitive economic activity was the epitome of personal and political freedom. As a consequence of these views, the objective of government was the empowerment of people and the restoration of their freedom, increasingly conceived in terms of an economic freedom. Rose observes that “the wealth, health and happiness of the nation” was now thought to be best fulfilled not when the individual was dependent or had an obligation to the state but “when they seek to fulfil themselves as free individuals” (Rose 1999b, 166). The state’s objective was to foster the institutional conditions that enabled individuals to behave
like enterprises in a competitive market economy relatively free from constraints on personal autonomy and the personal exercise of choice.

*School reform and transformations of the rationalities and technologies of government*

I have argued that the problematisations and rationalisations of the government of the state that emerged from this crisis of liberalism have played a part in moves “to pass progressively wider decision-making powers to the school community of teachers, parents and students” (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1976, 13). The ‘de-bureaucratisation’ of the education system was linked to deep-seated concerns that the welfare state and its role in coordinating social and economic activity was producing economic, social, personal and moral ills. The welfare state’s bureaucratic and regulatory orientation was said to frustrate economic freedom, efficiency and growth, as well as disempower parents and teachers by fostering passivity and the attitude that the state was to cater for their needs and security. By contrast, decentralisation, school autonomy and self-management promised to empower the parent and the school leader by establishing the conditions for increased autonomy and freedom from an increasingly downsized bureaucracy.

The case studies in Part III of this dissertation explored these transformations in the field of education. I made the case that the late twentieth century emphasis on empowering parents and communities with authority to participate in or to influence decisions related to their children’s education (including choosing which schools to enrol their
children) was not necessarily an encroachment of an instrumentalist rationality into education, nor the realisation of the social democratic ideal of authentic community self-determination. Using insights and concepts derived from Foucauldian studies of governmentality, I examined the policy of devolution and community empowerment as a reflection of an emerging advanced liberal rationality of government and its suspicion of the power of the state, bureaucracies and professionals. At this time, education was increasingly seen as a domain of government that required the activation and empowerment of citizens in their autonomous self-government.

I also examined the employment of corporate managerialism in the organization of school life in terms of its links to emerging ways of rationalising and enacting government. I suggested that the discourses of corporate management and private enterprise have sought to empower school leaders and teachers to run their schools like autonomous competitive enterprises that are responsive to local circumstances, consumers and market signals. The practices of entrepreneurial self-management support individual and organizational autonomy, competition, choice and empowerment.

The recent development in Western Australia of the Independent Public Schools (IPS) policy attests to the continued relevance of self-managing reform and its influence by advanced liberal rationalities of government. IPS builds upon earlier innovations of school autonomy by offering selected schools greater independence in such things as staff recruitment, student recruitment, budgeting, school management, school
promotions and curriculum development. In an information pamphlet for parents and communities, the Department of Education and Training explained:

One of the WA government’s major pre-election policies for education was to empower school communities, giving them greater capacity to shape the ethos, priorities and direction of their school… Independent Public Schools will be freed from many central controls and have greater flexibility to respond to their communities. They will create more diversity in our public school system and provide real choice for school communities. (DET 2009, 1)

An anti-bureaucracy discourse that privileges autonomy, self-governance and choice pervades the reasoning behind this policy. Introducing the initiative, the Premier, Colin Barnett, described the IPS policy as cutting the “suffocating red tape that prevents imaginative leadership” (Government Media Office 2009), while the Education Minister, Liz Constable, is quoted as saying the transfer of authority from the education bureaucracy to local schools would ensure school decisions “match the needs and aspirations of their students and staff as well as their local communities” (Government Media Office 2009). Clearly, then, as an instance of self-managing reforms the IPS policy is propelled by a characteristically advanced liberal problematisation of the government of the state.

Importantly, however, it has not been the intention of this thesis to assess whether or not self-managing reforms, such as IPS, actually live up to the hype and rhetoric that surrounds them. Clearly many elements of
self-managing reforms require much unpacking and inquiry, including whether devolving increased authority to schools does in fact improve educational outcomes, or whether parents and communities actually do behave in ways these policies anticipate. However, the subject matter of this thesis has been restricted to describing and exploring the relationship between changes in how we rationalise and enact government, and the self-managing reform trend in education.

*Freedom, autonomy and government*

The crisis of liberalism and self-managing reforms has not resulted in citizens in liberal democracies enjoying freedom and autonomy from governmental or state power. Although neo-liberals and those associated with the governance literature may mistake advanced liberal rule for a march of progress towards an authentic freedom unbounded by the state, no matter what language is used to describe self-managing reforms, these reforms must be thought of governmentally. As I established in Part II, even liberalism is committed to the goals of state security, prosperity and wellbeing and achieving these through an extensive pastoral government of the population.

So, while it is true that political authorities of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in countries like Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada have sought to limit those things that constrain the capacity of individuals to make economic and personal choices related to achieving their self-realisation, this should not be interpreted as the absence of
government. It is a government pegged to limiting the direct interference of ‘the state’ into the lives of ‘normal’ people, whilst also fostering the ‘normal’, autonomous and self-managing capacities of individuals, especially through the contrivance of markets and the conditions for competition. This is a modality of government that seeks to foster the independent use of professionals, experts, the cultural industries, and voluntary and non-government organisations in the government of individuals and the population.

In other words, the discourse of empowerment, autonomy, freedom and self-realisation is indicative of a mode of government that now (1) creates new ways for individuals to exercise their freedom or autonomy, and (2) construes the task of securing the wellbeing, prosperity and security of the state as depending upon fostering personal autonomy, empowerment and enterprise (Peters 2001a; Peters et al. 2000). Let us consider, for example, the two case studies explored in Part III.

In the first case study, the promotion of ‘educational agency’ (Smith 1993), which involves empowering parents to participate in educational activities and decision-making outside of and within the school, is seen as a way of maximising the welfare of one and all. Insofar as making prudent education-investment choices works to insure against personal risk and insecurity (Besley and Peters 2007), parents are enjoined to choose the best school to enrol their children. This choice-making is supported by a complex of books, manuals, websites and school prospectuses created by experts, professionals and marketers to guide the parent in making responsible, normative, child-rearing choices (Smith 1993). Proponents of
neo-liberalism and advanced liberal programs claim or assume that citizens making responsible choices about their own welfare will ensure the welfare of all, and the security of the state.

In the second case study, the wellbeing of the state and its population is conceived to be a product of education systems that delimit the influence of central bureaucracies in local educational decision-making while fostering the freedom and capacity of schools to operate in a competitive market setting. Empowering school leaders to pursue the delivery of a quality product for consumers through entrepreneurial forms of corporate management is construed as a means to strengthen the economic and social wellbeing of ‘one and all’.

Both of these cases suggest that self-managing reforms reflect a reconceptualisation of state security and welfare. Increasingly, the state is not expected to fully cater for the individual’s every need or to protect the individual from the insecurities of unemployment or the risk of a poor education. Instead, the wellbeing of the state and its population requires a degree of freedom not afforded by the social forms of government associated with the welfare state. Individuals are enjoined to be free in order that they may care for themselves, to empower themselves and to be active in their own government. This means enjoining individuals to personally seek out opportunities, information and professionals, and to make choices, that will help improve their lives. Consequently, the pastoral role of the state will be best fulfilled in the domain of education by fostering an education system that is modelled around this autonomous individual that is enterprising, competitive and an active choice-maker.
Whether making schools less dependent on education bureaucracies and more responsive to the market does fulfil the needs of the state remains a moot point, but it is nonetheless a belief informing many people involved in the government of education.

Concluding thoughts

Having argued that there is a link between self-managing reforms and the transformation of governmental rationalities and technologies occasioned by a ‘crisis of liberalism’, I want to use this final section to consider the potential risks of the governmentalities of self-management and autonomy.

In particular, this focuses on liberal governmental rationality’s inherent concern about the costs in terms of freedom of governing too much, and the costs measured in freedom of not governing enough. This tension and torsion between the register of freedom and the register of administration produced the ‘tricky adjustment’ we have called the social or welfare state from laissez faire. It has also informed the subsequent neo-liberal critique of the welfare state and its pastoral technologies. It is at the juncture of these registers that questions about advanced liberal government may also be raised. This may concern, for instance, the consequences that ensue from a belief that the market economy, consumer choice, competition, self-governance and the commercial enterprise can be the motor of social stability, economic prosperity and the protection of the collective welfare.
In other words, advanced liberal rationalisations and technologies of government have not resolved the internal dilemma of liberalism (the limits of state and government power versus the scope of individual freedom) but are generating further problems of government to be resolved. For example, can we expect that empowering individuals in their self-governance, as self-managing enterprises, or creating markets and market type behaviour, necessarily produce that which is conducive to the wellbeing of the state and the population, for one and all?

Let us consider the potential limitations of advanced liberal government in relation to the more recent literature on educational self-management. This literature has begun to speak of networks, self-governance and self-organisation as the path to improve educational, social and economic outcomes (Caldwell 2006; Caldwell and Harris 2008; Educational Transformations 2007; OECD 2003). Brian Caldwell (2006) has recently argued that conventional managerial approaches to self-management (the use of structures, roles, responsibilities and accountabilities) are insufficient for optimising the effectiveness of schools. Caldwell’s goal is to create independence for schools by getting them to draw upon what he terms their horizontal relations of authority. That is, to build and align the cultural, social and material capital existing in schools and their communities, to build networks and partnerships, and to operate in competition with other schools.

Caldwell (2006) justifies this network and self-governing vision of school governance, not by claiming any economic merit in re-organization, but by claiming self-governance is more in tune with the autonomous, self-
determining and self-governing modern identity. His argument is that the self-governing citizen is a product, not of the state and its associated political instruments, but of grassroots empowerment, the strengthening of communities, and the capacity to make choices. He argues, therefore, that respecting and fostering individual autonomy and self-government requires reform to the welfarist organisation of civic and political life. Enacting an advanced liberal rationality of government, Caldwell’s future-oriented portrayal of the government of education systems links national wellbeing to, on the one hand, the withering of the power of political instruments such as bureaucracy and, on the other hand, to the empowerment of self-governing individuals and communities.

What Caldwell’s program of autonomous, self-governing and self-organising schools reveals is a worrying belief that there is little positive, or at least a highly circumscribed, role for the state, politics or government in contemporary life. This belief exists partly because Caldwell ignores the constructedness of autonomy (Hindess 1996b), or the conditions that make personal or community autonomy possible. Caldwell fails to see that it was the technologies of the governmental programs of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that now lead us to view individual autonomy as a ‘natural presupposition’. We are so accustomed to thinking that individual autonomy is a natural feature of human life that we are now ignorant of the fact that responsible personal autonomy and self-government is a product of governmental programs and interventions. In the governance literature, however, these interventions are now construed as inappropriately interfering with the natural state of autonomy.
In the field of education, this belief in individual, school and community self-governance contributes to the assessment that the state, political authorities and education bureaucracies are irrelevant, or at least a hindrance to proper government. But this belief is troubling because failure to appreciate the political and governmental conditions required for the formation of autonomous and self-governing citizens actually risks limiting the capacity of education systems to deliver key outcomes such as the responsible exercise of autonomy, or the wellbeing and security of civil society and the state.

That is to say, the belief that education systems, and through these individual members of the population, can be governed through the self-regulating capacities of markets, communities and individuals with only limited political and bureaucratic intervention we may lead to further marginalisation of bureaucratic instruments capable of overseeing and intervening in the entire education system (Meredyth 1998). Diminishing the power of education bureaucracies, and celebrating individual choice, may limit not only the technologies available to political authorities but also the reasonableness of pursuing educational equity and social cohesion and stability. This may be evidenced in parents’ demands for, or proclaiming their rights to, exercise school choice without concern for, say, public schools becoming ‘residual’ schools.

Similar risks are posed by the expectation that school leaders, parents and communities have the requisite knowledge, skills, time and resources to effectively self-govern or to engage in market type behaviour to the benefit of students. Increased local responsibility for student
outcomes may mean the success of schools may unfairly become a function of the management and enterprising skills of individuals within schools. This risk is posed by the Conservatives’ ‘Free Schools’ policy in the United Kingdom (Gabbatt 2010) and the Gillard government’s recent briefing paper for Australian state education ministers that proposed the creation of a national system of self-governing schools (Ferrari 2010).

In these scenarios, the freedom of school leaders, parents and communities to take charge of the education of their children and communities is prioritised over bureaucratic involvement in educational decision-making. We may ask, however, what happens to those schools, school leaders, parents and communities that do not possess the requisite capacities to make schools successful? This is an important question because evidence indicates that financial, social and cultural capital is unevenly distributed among the population. Moreover, will failure to make schools successful be understood politically as local school leaders, parents and communities being incompetent or irresponsible? Will this therefore provide a reason for targeted authoritarian forms of government reminiscent of police, such as the United Kingdom’s ‘Special Measures’ policy? What roles will bureaucracy increasingly assume in this scenario?

In a potentially extreme outcome of these initiatives, political authorities may have to contend with a situation in which individuals and communities who take charge of their children’s education teach values and beliefs that the majority of society find repugnant, or which are antagonistic to the creation of a peaceful and cohesive civil society.
I am not suggesting that self-managing reforms and their embedded governmental rationality raise these questions today as a dire matter requiring immediate response. In Australia, schools do not operate in a context of *laissez faire*, and political instruments such as education bureaucracies remain influential. Indeed, many of the recent self-managing reforms have required immense regulatory effort on the part of bureaucracies.

Moreover, any threat to civil and economic peace and security created by an education system that fails to deliver on the goals of state peace and security will draw political and governmental responses. As Rose and Miller (1992) observe, governing is a congenitally failing enterprise and therefore the current governmental mutations and ‘experimentations’ will no doubt mutate again, influenced by political and governmental authorities. The pivotal role of education in the formation of the liberal state’s future citizens makes this assertion a certainty.

Despite this, the above concerns may be heightened by the belief that the education of the nation’s citizens will be better served by devolving ever-greater authority to individuals and communities expected to govern themselves within a marketplace of autonomous education providers. These governmental rationalities that construe the state and political instruments, such as education bureaucracies, as threats to individual and economic freedom risk atrophying the authority of educational bureaucracies and professionals in educational decision-making, a development which itself is not risk free. Further research is required into the link between the continued elaboration of advanced liberal governmental rationalities in
education, and their wide-ranging implications for the liberal democratic state.
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<th>Policies, reports and Acts</th>
<th>Relationship to self-management</th>
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<tr>
<td>Schools in Australia (Karmel 1973)</td>
<td>This national report called for an increase in resources for public and private schools, resulting in a doubling of outlays by the Commonwealth. Through its funding arrangement, the Commonwealth nourished the existence of the private school sector. It supported in principle the right of parents to choose schools. Most significantly, it also argued for the devolution of a range of responsibilities for schools in order to improve educational innovation and the congruence between educational programmes and student and community life.</td>
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<td>Triennium reports 1973-1982 (Commonwealth Schools Commission 1975, 1976, 1978)</td>
<td>These reports covered many concerns about the state of education in Australia. While these did not offer a clear image of the modern school, they nonetheless consistently argued for greater independence and autonomy for schools and improved educational choice for parents and students as a means to improve access, participation, engagement and outcomes.</td>
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<td>The Beazley Report (Committee of Inquiry into Education in Western Australia 1984)</td>
<td>This report outlines curriculum, pedagogical and organisational reform to schools in Western Australia, including greater organisational independence for schools. Although professional development and a performance appraisal system were advocated, the system did not respond with an fervour to these recommendations.</td>
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<td>Quality in Schools (Quality of Education Review Committee 1985)</td>
<td>Acknowledging the limits of direct Federal government intervention into state education systems, this report sought the best way to direct Federal funds for the purpose of raising standards in communication, literacy and numeracy and improving the relationship between schooling and post-school options. The report marks a shift at the Federal level from an emphasis on inputs to an emphasis on educational outcomes. In order to achieve system improvement, the report argued that education systems needed to be clear about the competencies they expect students to develop, and to have greater accountability for educational outcomes. Education is construed as a means for improving the economic prospects of Australia in an environment of fiscal restraint and increased economic competition.</td>
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<td>Managing Change in the Public Sector (Burke 1986)</td>
<td>Western Australian Premier, Brian Burke, outlined corporate managerial reforms to the public services. The benefits of such reform included improved efficiency, effectiveness, community responsiveness and public sector accountability. To achieve these reforms, the human resources of public sector needed to be developed, specifically through supporting the acquisition of management knowledge and skills.</td>
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<td>Better Schools (Pearce 1987)</td>
<td>This report introduced into the deliberations of policy-makers in Western Australia the object of the autonomous school. It concluded</td>
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that the policy focus on educational systems and the concomitant rationality that good educational systems make good schools was incorrect because it was good schools that make good educational systems. In concert with many educational management and organisational research of the time, the report oriented policy development towards improving individual schools while containing costs. It recommended greater self-determination, the flexible use of school development plans, and improved accountability according to the designated outputs outlined in school development plans. Moreover, parents were encouraged to be involved in school decision-making through school councils.

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<tr>
<th>School Renewal: A strategy to revitalise schools within the New South Wales state education system (Scott 1990)</th>
<th>Although pertaining to the New South Wales education system, this was a significant report. It emphasised local management within corporate managerialist framework. The report supported a reduction in bureaucracy, which the report construed was ensconced with a self-serving educational establishment that constrained the activity of schools and parents. Organisational efficiency and effectiveness were cornerstone principles.</th>
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<td>Devolution: the next phase (Black 1993)</td>
<td>The path to decentralisation has been a troubled one in Western Australia. This report caused much consternation in the public education sector on its release. It sought to extend the devolution of responsibilities to schools implemented from the Better Schools report.</td>
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<td>Independent Commission to Review Public Sector Finances (McCarrey 1993)</td>
<td>The McCarrey Commission inquired into the reform of the Western Australian public services. Within its remit of investigation was the education system. This report supported corporate managerial reforms in the public sector and advocated the devolution of responsibilities to schools already under way. Furthermore, it recommended staff reductions and the contracting out services such as cleaning and payroll. Although acknowledging improvements made by the implementation of Better Schools, the Commission argued that there has still too much dependence on central bureaucratic management.</td>
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<td>Review of Education and Training (Vickery 1993)</td>
<td>Occurring in close succession with the McCarrey Commission, the Vickery report supported a client-focused system within a strategically agreed set of parameters. It also argued that decisions should be made closest to the site where they are carried out and hence the continuation of the policy and program of devolution.</td>
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<td>Schools of the future (Directorate of School Education 1994)</td>
<td>Although pertaining to the Victorian education system, this report by the Kennett government articulated a bold vision of the autonomous, self-managing school. It devolved 93% of the state’s public education budget to individual schools. School boards approved the budget and devised school charters. More than any other report of its time in Australia it envisioned the self-managing school as operating in a competitive market environment.</td>
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<td>Devolution of Decision-Making Authority in the Government School System of Western Australia (Hoffman 1994)</td>
<td>The Hoffman report was concerned with the processes of devolution and involved key stakeholders such as parents, department, the teachers’ unions and industry. The report supported local control and authority, flexibility to respond to local needs and diversity, improved performance management of teachers, and a curriculum framework indexed to national profiles for the flexible formation of local curriculum and pedagogy. It also recommended schools be accorded the capacity to select staff based on merit or suitability.</td>
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<td>Policy framework for Performance management (Education Department of Western Australia 1996a)</td>
<td>This policy developed out of a long process of consultation and formulation dating back to 1989. It instituted performance management processes into Western Australian schools which had the purpose of fostering an environment which ‘fosters an individual’s growth and development while focusing on the achievement of the organisation’s goals’ (EDWA 1996a, 8).</td>
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<td>School Education Act 1999</td>
<td>This Act of the parliament of Western Australia makes provisions for greater school choice for parents. It removed restrictions on the enrolment of students outside school catchment zones, with the effect that parents could choose to have their child attend public schools outside of their neighbourhood.</td>
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<td>School Assistance (Learning Together – Achievement Through Choice and Opportunity) Act 2004</td>
<td>This Federal government legislation sought to reform schools by making funding conditional on State agreement to increase the autonomy of schools and principals and to enable benchmark testing and the publication of their results.</td>
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<td>Independent Public Schools policy (IPS) (Department of Education 2010b)</td>
<td>This policy was introduced immediately after the election of the Barnett government. It promises to increase the autonomy and flexibility of a range of aspects of individual schools, but schools must apply for and be accepted for IPS status in annual rounds.</td>
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