A shift from elite to mass higher education is producing radical changes at universities in North America, Europe, and Oceania during a period of economic constraint. Governments, the main providers of higher education, have been pressuring universities to demonstrate maximum outputs from public funds and to supplement their budgets from private sources. Ideologically, education is being reconfigured as a key element in the micro-economic reform agenda—both as a high-budget industry in itself and as a supplier of human capital to other industries in the competitive global marketplace. This ideological shift, which privileges corporate organizational models, has been promulgated by supranational organizations such as the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These changes are underscored in a recent statement by Australia’s minister of education, Senator Amanda Vanstone: “To survive and prosper in a rapidly changing world, universities must embrace the marketplace and become customer-focused business enterprises.”

She went on to describe the government’s vision of change that would allow universities to adjust to the forces of globalization and deal with microeconomic reform already faced by other industries.

Some countries are farther down this road than others. Universities in the United States, which were the first to become mass providers of higher

This study was funded by grants from the Australian Research Council and Murdoch University. I thank them and the 253 respondents who were interviewed and gave us insights into their lives as academics. The research was a team effort that included Lesley Vidovich, Anthony Welch, and Harriett Pears in Australia; and Ed Berman in the United States.


education, also were the first to feel economic constraints leading to restructuring and higher tuition fees. Sheila Slaughter reported that roughly two-thirds of U.S. public research institutions faced substantial cuts in 1991–92 and many private universities also were engaged in various forms of retrenchment. She noted that “higher education, paralleling the American economy, probably has to restructure to deal with the future.”4 The decline in public funding has drawn universities closer to the market in a number of ways: creating more links with industry, establishing commercial arms, selling education to foreign students, and restructuring campuses. Several writers have described this phenomenon in Australia, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom.5 Many countries have followed the U.S. lead in privatizing universities, but not all have emulated the American model. Throughout much of Europe, where higher education is not as competitive and market oriented, a university education often is still without fees.6 In Germany, for example, the constitution mandates that higher education should be free. Some observers suggest, however, that an eventual shift in Europe toward the American model is inevitable.

Globalization Practices

The widespread economically motivated reforms generally related to “globalization” have been described by various observers as “McDonaldization,” “Toyotism,” “post-Fordism,” or “neo-Fordism.”7 Although each takes a slightly different form, all emphasize economic efficiency, and there is a tendency toward homogenizing practices.

Although the term globalization first appeared in the 1960s, the first author to use it in the title of a sociological article was Roland Robertson in 1985. He defined globalization as “a concept that refers to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole.”8 Writers including Anthony Giddens and Malcolm Waters subse-

quently have distinguished the transnational economic, political, and cultural dimensions of globalization, while also suggesting that economic integration is more advanced than the other forms.\textsuperscript{9} The major factor affecting universities has been the economic ideology prevalent in globalization that calls for the primacy of the market, privatization, and a reduced role for the public sphere. It deregulates the economy and restructures work, which leads to an intensification of work for the remaining “core” workers.\textsuperscript{10}

One of Waters’s contributions to the debate is his focus on the culturalization of economic life. He shows how Toyotism—in which employers seek to develop a commitment among workers to the organization—was “lifted” out of its social setting and restructured across time and space so that Japanese organizational practices are now global. To develop this “quasi-familial community,” the company creates a corporate image and communicates directly with its employees. Managers worldwide seek out business ideas, and global communication networks help create a homogenized view of “best practice” models. The company as family is now considered one of those best practices.\textsuperscript{11}

Waters notes that one of the peculiarities of these globalizing trends is that they are no longer restricted to particular types of organizations. And, therefore, “\textit{horribile dictu}, universities can exhibit the full panoply of symbolic trappings from the new cultural paradigm—mission statement, strategic plans, total quality management (TQM), multi-skilling and staff development.”\textsuperscript{12} At universities, the “functional flexibility” that results from these processes generally leads to academics taking on more jobs requiring little skill and spending considerable time upgrading their technological skills but with little reward. University managers, in turn, create more casual jobs for academics by reducing tenured positions and thus producing greater “numerical flexibility.” Managers, in these leaner times for the public sector, are very interested in worker flexibility.\textsuperscript{13}

Globalization is not simply about transnational homogenization, however. Its complex and contradictory character has been emphasized by a number of commentators, including Stuart Hall, David Held, and Tony


\textsuperscript{11} The Japanese model is not without its critics, however, and more recent studies suggest that Japanese companies should not be held up as the model of progressive practices. See P. Burkett and M. Hart-Landsberg, “The Use and Abuse of Japan as a Progressive Model,” in \textit{Are There Alternatives? Socialist Register, 1996}, ed. L. Panitch (London: Merlin Press, 1996), pp. 62–93.

\textsuperscript{12} Waters, pp. 85–86.

McGrew, who described a dual effect of global-level homogenization on the one hand and localized differentiation (e.g., ethnic revival movements) on the other.14 Sandra Taylor et al. argue clearly that all nations do not respond in the same way to globalization and that specific historical, political, cultural, and economic contexts will influence the way globalization trends develop in each country.15 Individual nations—and institutions, for that matter—actively construct distinctive responses to globalizing trends. Richard DeAngelis, for example, found patterns of Australian and French higher education policy reform to be nearly polar opposites.16 Nevertheless, many countries—especially Anglo-American ones—are adopting policies based on globalization practices. In Australia, for example, the chairperson of the 1997 Higher Education Review identified globalization as one of the “very very pressing issues” facing higher education.17

Although the rationale given for change is the need to respond rapidly to a changing external environment, especially economic constraints, John Ralston Saul doubts the validity of these claims and argues that “globalization and the limits it imposes are the most fashionable miniature ideologies of our day.”18 He fears that universities—in instead of easing the crisis of conforming to this market-oriented ideology and the corporate structures it has developed—are aligning themselves with specific market forces and no longer fulfill the role of active independent public critics.

This view receives support from Donald Fisher and Kjell Rubenson, whose study of approximately 1,049 academics and administrators in Canadian universities revealed “an intensification of the current trend toward organizational models that are both bureaucratic, corporate and directed to the market.”19 They confirmed conclusions drawn by other studies suggesting that academics will experience the following changes: an intensification of work practices, a loss of autonomy, closer monitoring and appraisal, less participation in decision making, and a lack of personal development through work.

The study reported in this article, which was carried out from 1994 to 1996 with follow-up interviews in 1997, collected data from academics in Australia and the United States to explore two globalizing practices: “governmentality” and the logic of “performativity” as accountability, and corporate

15 Taylor et al. (n. 2 above).
16 DeAngelis (n. 6 above).
managerialism. These intertwined practices rely on accounting language to reshape the university with a business mentality, and this article examines their impact on the professoriate at three universities in Australia (Sydney, Murdoch, and Edith Cowan) and three in the United States (Arizona, Florida State, and Louisville). Additional information is drawn from studies and interviews in Canadian and New Zealand universities. There were 153 academics interviewed in Australia and 100 in the United States, representing a range of disciplines and ranks. Approximately one-third of both samples were women. The NUD.IST software program facilitated both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the interviews, but the focus is on observations by academics about rapid changes at their and other universities. As summarized by one interviewee at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, a major concern about allowing globalization practices to dominate universities involves disagreement over the notion of accountability:

This notion of accountability again is a concept that has been generated by a wider ideological kind of apparatus...it has become a watchword for financial accountability for public funds per se, and what that has done is to narrow the debate away from issues about representation and styles of decision making and the nature of democratic institutions, which is the bit that seems to be forgotten in the cost-cutting environment. I would like to turn the notion of accountability back into democratic theory. In the guise of the accountancy kind of version of accountability, it has cut across the substantial democratic foundations of universities.

"Governmentality" and the Logic of "Performativity" as Accountability

In many Anglo-American universities, government ministers or legislators are attempting to increase productivity through regulatory mechanisms including performance indicators and quality assurance exercises. The Australian minister of higher education, Peter Baldwin, when delivering the Higher Education: Quality and Diversity in the 1990s statement in October 1991, was proud to think that he had dragged the nation's 36 public universities firmly into the corporate world of Quality Assurance.

Michel Foucault describes "governmentality" as the modern state's goal of coupling "individualisation" and "totalization." Technology has made it possible to develop policies that can regulate and control populations more effectively, and one of the aims of modern states is to mobilize the working

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classes to adopt the bourgeois ethic that emphasizes the individual life, conceived as an enterprise—the enterprise of oneself. One has the civic obligation to care for oneself and reduce the burden of risk on society, with the self seen as a product that can be maximized for efficiency. Thus, according to Colin Gordon, individuals are developed to have economically useful lives so that they can foster the strength of the state.23

Foucault also contributed the “totalizing” concept of “regimes of truth,” which proffer one “right way” and are open in that sense only to fundamentalist and closed discourses.24 A good example is the way universities have been captivated by performance indicators.25 Although content (how the index is derived) and efforts to improve performance indicators can be critiqued, their use cannot be questioned.26 Once performance indicators are set, the formula is put into the computer, the data are entered from each academic and aggregated by department, and funds are distributed accordingly. It is very efficient. No one can criticize the system because it is “objective.”

Drawing on Foucault’s concept of governmentality, Simon Marginson and Les Terry described power relationships in Australian universities.27 Terry pointed to quality audits as “one of the key parts of this education panopticon.”28 The quality exercise was a way for the Australian government to “steer from a distance” and to produce indirectly a greater devolution of the quality process and concurrently tighten central control.29 Local management voluntarily did what the government wanted.30

This form of governmentality extends from the state to universities and down to individual academics. As governments ask universities to reduce their financial burden on society through privatization measures, individuals working in universities increasingly are being asked to “pay” for themselves and to account for how they spend taxpayers’ money, whether on research,

24 Foucault. A good example of a “regime of truth” is economic rationalism, which has captivated many governments in the 1980s and 1990s. Economic rationalism is a neoliberal, microeconomic agenda that favors the corporatization and privatization of government enterprises and is based on the concept of efficiency. Inherent in this discourse of economic rationalism is what Gordon has described as the active meaning of laissez-faire—which means a form of deregulation or the devising of forms of regulation that permit and facilitate natural regulation, i.e., removing any government interference. For different views on economic rationalism, see M. Pusey, Economic Rationalism in Canberra (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and S. King and P. Lloyd, eds., Economic Rationalism: Dead End or Way Forward? (St. Leonards, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 1993).
20 Polster and Newson.
28 ibid.
30 Marginson (n. 20 above).
teaching, or other activities. A female academic at the University of Louisville described the extent to which legislators are focusing on accountability:

The latest form we had to fill out was on time management. The legislature wanted to know just exactly how you spent every hour of the day. It asked not only how many hours you are in the classroom, but how many hours you are in preparation for class, for grading, for community activities, in original research, in writing. It was bizarre. It depressed me because I came up with 60 hours and I didn't report all 60 hours because I thought it was outrageous. Then I thought, I shouldn't be working like that! I talked to other people who did the same thing. I started counting my hours and it was so unbelievable that I downplayed the number I was actually working. A lot of people talked about the form and considered what we will have to say next—how long we stay in the bathroom! [laughter]

Jean-François Lyotard in his discussion of postindustrial societies notes how performativity—with its distinction between efficiency and inefficiency—privileges input/output equations. He alludes to the effect this can have on universities when he writes, “The criterion of performance is explicitly invoked by the authorities to justify their refusal to subsidize certain research centers.” 31 He says that the question asked by universities is no longer “Is it true?” but “What use is it?”—which also can mean “Is it saleable?” or “Is it efficient?” 32

Lyotard questions whether this quest to measure efficiency is appropriate in the postmodern world where “science does not expand by means of the positivism of efficiency.” 33 He argues that the emphasis on performance in a paradigm stressing control and a highly stable system is unrealistic in a world filled with contradictions and instability. In fact, using a “positivistic” science in a postmodern world actually lowers the performance level. He ends his book on the postmodern condition with this warning: “We are finally in a position to understand how the computerization of society affects this problematic. It could become the ‘dream’ instrument for controlling and regulating the market system, extended to include knowledge itself and governed exclusively by the performativity principle.” 34

One University of Auckland academic referred directly to Lyotard’s logic of performativity in discussing the effects of increased supervision and administration: “It comes back in theoretical terms, to what I call the logic of performativity and the way Jean-François Lyotard uses that term; conceptually that seems to substantiate my experience. Each year, as the years go by, more and more is expected. And it is measured in terms of an input-output matrix and the logic of the system is to expect more, to demand more always.” He went on to describe the New Zealand government’s emphasis on

32 Ibid., p. 51.
33 Ibid., p. 54.
34 Ibid., p. 67.
building within public institutions “a more flexible performance culture” and developing “performance management systems.”

The movement to performance indicators in Australian higher education was foreshadowed in a 1988 white paper from John Dawkins, the minister of education: “The Government supports the development of a funding system that responds to institutional performance and the achievement of mutually agreed goals. It intends to develop funding arrangements that take into account a range of output, quality and performance measures and will initiate moves in this direction during the 1989–91 triennium. This in turn will require a comprehensive and nationally consistent data base, the continued development of which will be a high priority for the Department of Employment, Education and Training (DEET).” Since 1991, the proportion of government funding based on performance indicators has risen for university research and that is likely to be the case for teaching in the near future. Within institutions, parallel systems of distributing resources based on research and teaching performance indices already exist. In the United States, efforts are under way to measure productivity in ever greater detail, a trend underscored by an academic at the University of Louisville: “The central administration is seeing the university as if it were a business, cost efficiency kinds of considerations—Fordism—which is not just an economist’s assembly line model but also this idea of a productivity model—judging the quality of what goes on in the university not in terms of what goes on in the classroom but how many students are processed, at what rate and how efficient the system is. The intensity of that has grown, as well as the sense that the central administration has to control the faculty.” Attempts by administration to control the professoriate are reflected in a memo to staff from the Office of the Provost at Florida State University announcing the “redirection” of state funds “mandated” by the 1994 legislature from research, service, and academic administration to teaching. The response of the administration was to demand greater faculty productivity: “In short, we must offer more courses at the higher levels and we must do so without reducing our teaching effort at other levels. We have asked each dean to prepare a plan for increasing credit hour production in each school.” The memo also asked deans to examine all departmental data for the average percentage of teaching effort and ask whether any “underutilized” service could be redirected to instruction, and the 1994 legislature asked the Board of Regents to develop measurable objectives on faculty productivity. One Florida State University academic, commenting on the state’s interference, echoed Lyo-

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36 Memorandum to staff regarding “Redirection of Resources, Full Faculty Productivity” (Florida State University, Tallahassee, May 16, 1994).
tard’s concerns that a performativity culture tends to make universities less collegial and create internal tensions: “The legislators have tried to micro-manage and it’s very clear that over the past 5 years, each year there is some kind of initiative that constrains or in fact structures the faculty collegial making process. It seems to me that it’s a cardinal rule that each time the legislature tries to improve things around here, they make things worse. The more the legislature and the Board of Regents tries to impose new mandates from the top down, the more it circumvents the collegial process.”

From the sample interviewed, there is no doubt that the respondents are experiencing increased accountability. The vast majority—slightly more than 85 percent in both U.S. and Australian universities—said that accountability had increased, and no respondent reported that accountability had declined over the last 5 years. One faculty member of Murdoch University described the effect of this new kind of surveillance:

I think that our conditions of work are being transformed in ways which involve both much more intrusive policing from the system and also that involve value shifts within the system as well. For the first time this year we had to submit very detailed written statements to our supervisors about the work that we had completed for the previous year and a set of objectives for the following year. There was then a process of direct intervention which involved changing some priorities which I would have wished to continue for that year, because of what were seen as institutional priorities. So that’s a direct impact which, from my university experience, has never happened before, and I think it is going to increase in the future. I think Quality Assurance provides another mechanism in addition to the way in which the supervisor system is working, to justify intervention in the way in which people work and attempt to regulate their work and to discipline their work.

In addition to the way academic activities are being scrutinized, there is a perception that information is being gathered without any clear vision of how it should be used. A department chair at the University of Arizona, in response to the question, “In terms of accountability, does that involve more forms to be filled out?” answered,

Yes! Lord yes! One of the favorite acts of this administration is to have us write more elaborate reports with more numbers that document things we’ve done, or should do or didn’t do or whatever. When I came to this department the first thing I had to do was this huge audit over everything. This report took about a year, and then they threw another one right at me. And then another one and another one, lots of committees, lots of wandering around trying to write reports that show we’re doing stuff. You don’t mind doing that a couple of times but then it really gets frustrating. It’s like a monster with an appetite that can’t be satisfied and you just have to keep piling it in. So yes, a lot more paperwork in the accountability business in the form of charts, graphs, numbers, counting, reports, committees that have to generate those reports. One’s never sure if they’re read but they certainly are filed and some of it’s pretty redundant.
Corporate Managerialism

A number of commentators in Australia, the United States, and Canada have observed a shift in power from academic departments to central administration.\(^{37}\) This change has been accompanied by a new kind of fundamentalism suggesting managers have all the answers and that answers to managerial issues are to be found in imitating business practices.\(^{38}\) Jason Hecht quotes a University of California, Los Angeles, administrator as stating, “Can a university be run more like a business? You bet it can. . . . Most universities can do a significant job of cutting costs through the same reengineering of processes and work that have characterized the best for-profit corporations.”\(^{39}\) Such corporate managerialism assumes that managers should make the most important decisions and make them quickly, leading to restructured institutions whose streamlined operations give only a few people the information on which to base decisions. Books abound that tell managers how to bring about reforms quickly, and one University of Auckland academic talked about one of these publications: “If you read Roger Douglas’ [former Treasurer in New Zealand] book, Unfinished Business, he talks about the politics of successful reform and he articulates a number of principles for successful reform. I quote them to you off the top of my head. One of them is ‘institute the reforms in quantum leaps,’ ‘big packages neutralize opposition,’ ‘once you start the ball rolling never let it stop,’ ‘speed is essential, just keep on going,’ and ‘consult with the community only to improve the detailed implementation of decisions that have already been reached.’”

A faculty member at the University of Louisville also noted the rapidity of changes in response to a question about whether bureaucratic tendencies are increasing:

> It seems that bureaucratic tendencies are increasing. The faculty has a lot less control over the institution. There were a number of changes imposed on the faculty: not electing deans; changing the definition of what we do, making teaching only and research only streams; a post-tenure review, evaluating what you do which could lead to termination; increasing the proportion of faculty without tenure. The faculty met for the first time in donkey’s years and voted against these proposals, like


to 15—and these were faculty from all the colleges—the medical school, the law school. They all said this sucks. The Board of Trustees said we don’t care, this is what is happening. There is a contempt for the faculty. But also a sense that they are running a business. You know when you are running an auto plant, you don’t ask the workers how to run the plant, at least in America and if you are running a university, you don’t ask the faculty how to run the institution.

In making these changes, management delineates which aspects of decision making academics can be involved in and which aspects the administration should control. An administrator at Florida State University noted in a memo to one of his deans that “matters such as curriculum belong to the faculty, but decisions about the development and monitoring of resource allocations are the responsibility of administration.” 40 This was not always the case in many U.S. universities, however. 41 In May 1972, for example, the Council of the American Association of University Professors endorsed a statement that made it clear that faculty should have a voice in budgetary matters: “The faculty should participate both in the preparation of the total institutional budget and in decisions relevant to the further apportioning of its specific fiscal divisions.” 42 The statement also emphasized the importance of having an elected representative committee of the faculty deciding the overall allocation of institutional resources.

Budgetary control by faculty in the United States and Australia is declining, and Roger Scott argues that universities have fallen under the spell of public choice theorists who assume the superiority of private-sector approaches to management. 43 The view that universities no longer think of themselves as primarily educational institutions is reflected in a motion passed during a staff association meeting at Australia’s University of Newcastle: “The general perception is that academics are generally excluded from significant decision making, that a great deal of money is expended on salaries and ancillary costs at senior- and middle-management levels, and that an administration designed to serve the academic function of the university has succeeded in having that function made secondary to managerial imperatives.” 44

40 R. Glidden, “Internal Memorandum to Dean, Florida State University” (Tallahassee, July 1993), p. 12.
41 This discussion is not to suggest that there was a golden era of collegiality in Australian and American universities before corporate managerialism began to be practiced. To the contrary, many universities had practices that could be characterized as autocratic, patronizing, and bureaucratic. For example, the head of department who acted as “God Professor” was alive and well in many Australian universities, particularly in the older, traditional ones like the University of Sydney. And converted teachers’ colleges (like Edith Cowan University) often had headmaster-types chosen as vice-chancellors who ruled in an autocratic and often arbitrary fashion. However, there were the newer alternative universities, such as Murdoch University, established in the 1960s and 1970s to break down hierarchies and create more collegial structures. The 1970s and 1980s could be thought of as being a golden era in Australia before corporate managerialism arrived.
43 Scott.
Although a number of respondents said that academic issues are more likely to be decided by collegial processes and administrative issues by managerial or bureaucratic processes, these differences might work better together in one institution if other divisions between the faculty and the central administration were not widening. As a professor from Florida State University remarked vehemently: “The university administration is approaching corporate managerialism. If you look at the salaries of administrators, they’re paid enormous salaries comparatively speaking; they’re in the top 10 percent [nationally] and the faculty is in the bottom 25 percent nationally. There is a lot more of the administrative fiat being passed down to faculty.” Staff at Australian universities also reported rising salaries for administrators and the growth of corporate managerial tendencies. Donald Fisher and Kjell Rubenson note that, in Canadian universities, “privatization continues to be the overwhelming trend. Institutions are changing their practices in order to accumulate power. Our universities are becoming more corporate, more technocratic, more utilitarian, and far more concerned with selling products than with education. Full cost recovery is a major theme.”

Faculty in Australia and the United States are critical of efforts to run the university like a business:

You want to talk about the one thing that has changed; it is striving to put industrial-driven productivity models into a service and scholarship profession. Productivity models as applied to education are terribly misplaced and terribly abused. They do nothing but promote a labor versus management concept. That’s one thing that has been more complicated and different, as I think we have been striving to meet the legislature’s push for industrial and production models into the educational process. [Florida State University]

The central administration has gained more control. The President has attempted to centralize decision making. He has a business mentality. He’s a CEO, a jargon term used in business. A lot of the vocabulary and rhetoric used is deceptive because he may say we want to achieve equity, but there are such disparities between the different units. He suggests that he is looking for some kind of social justice, but I think it is an attempt to run things from the central administration. [University of Louisville]

Of course, much of the Dawkins agenda was an argument about the lack of accountability of institutions. The inappropriateness of their governance structures demands that they be run much more like business corporations and the “knock on” effect of that right down from reduced numbers in the Senate to the kind of line management universities are adopting. [Murdoch University]

The majority of faculty respondents—73 percent in the United States and 59 percent in Australia—responded that decision making had become more bureaucratic, top-down, centralized, autocratic, and managerial. Those who said that there was a combination of decision-making styles—19 percent

in the United States and 17 percent in Australia—often identified more democratic decision making at the departmental or faculty level and more bureaucratic and corporate managerial procedures at the institutional level. A minority—18 percent in Australia and 6 percent in the United States—said that decision making was still democratic and faculty were participating in decisions, while 4 percent in each country said that they did not know enough to comment.

Representative quotes from each of the Australian and U.S. universities in the study demonstrate the similarity of changes:

It is more managerial. It is less democratic as a result. Any sense of a coherent university has been lost by the production of fiefdoms, where the different faculties are run by robber barons who call themselves pro-vice-chancellors and who get motor cars and so on. They are called senior management. It came with the previous vice-chancellor and the appointment of the Boston Consulting Group and the throwing of at least a million dollars at them to produce a bunch of flow charts. . . . It had almost no beneficial impact, but it gave the green light to restructure or managerialize. [University of Sydney]

For the worse. More bureaucratic, less accessible, and less responsive to the central mission of the university—students, faculty and the curriculum. Much more responsive to the Board of Regents and the legislature. It's become an outward process rather than inward. We simply become conduits to feed data upward and that's accountability. [Florida State University]

I'm not sure what they're called. The deans of the faculties come together with the vice-chancellor and the deputy vice-chancellor and the representatives of the major service organizations. Effectively that's where the power is, and then their decisions are passed along to Academic Council, which effectively is a rubber stamper. [Edith Cowan University]

In the department it is still very collegial, very democratic. At the point of central administration . . . it's as autocratic as is possible for the central administration to make it. It maintains a facade of consultation, but the president makes it very clear that he does not feel himself bound by any consultation. . . . He made himself chair of the last provost search committee. He said the only thing he was mandated to do was consult with the faculty advisory committee, and that he was not bound by their decision (which previous presidents had considered themselves bound by) nor by the search committee. In short, he could go to someone never considered by the committee and name that person provost. That's about as authoritarian as you can get. [University of Louisville]

Important decisions are passed down from the top I think. This university has made a decision about extending to another campus at Kwinana. . . . I think that was probably one of the least democratic decisions, but it had to be made quickly because we were in competition with other institutions. . . . So we were driven very much by outside forces. [Murdoch University]

It's moving to top-down management on a corporate style that almost deliberately elicits hostile relations. Adversarial, I guess I would say. [University of Arizona]
In short, these interview data reveal a shift of decision making to senior or middle managers at all six Australian and U.S. universities, a trend that intensified over the previous 5 years. However, the Australian universities had not moved as far along the continuum from collegiality to corporate managerialism as the American universities sampled. And one university, Edith Cowan, was moving from an autocratic base to one that was more participatory—although staff expressed some cynicism that the more devolved structure was giving more power to executive deans than academics.

It is clear that the U.S. universities are experiencing more interference from legislators and members of the Board of Regents, including a demand by legislators that more attention be given to the teaching of undergraduates. How this is addressed varies, but this study shows that globalization often has unintended consequences that the universities then have to confront. In discussing similar shifts in Canadian universities, Janice Newson shows that the marginalization of faculty is “rooted in the complex changes that must be understood as more than simply the adoption by university administrators of a corporate style of management.” 46 She argues that these changes are interwoven with the links between universities and the corporate sector, and that not all academics are opposed to these connections, as many benefit from the increased flow of industry funds into their areas for research and development. There are also those who lose. Sheila Slaughter has written about retrenchments within U.S. universities, and the simple rule is that those closer to the market are deemed to be sacrosanct and those farther away must battle to survive.47

Conclusion

Globalization has brought market and business practices into universities, but with serious negative ramifications and significant costs. The subtle way practices inspired by globalization infiltrate institutions weakens resistance to its managerialist agenda, requiring Herculean efforts to counteract these changes—particularly in view of daily faculty responsibilities in teaching and research. Yet, without more awareness and organized resistance to the globalization agenda that links universities to markets, the result will be a greater shift in faculty expectations from “scholar” to “entrepreneur.” By examining these practices in familiar proximity to gain a better understanding of the way managers are operating in this new globalization paradigm, academics then can begin to suggest alternative practices, not only in their own workplaces but also in other public-sector organizations that have already altered their practices to conform to these globalizing trends.

Within their recently enhanced roles as chief executives of corporate

46 Newson (n. 37 above), pp. 239–40.
47 Slaughter (n. 4 above), pp. 247–49.
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universities, vice-chancellors and presidents might consider preserving and extending existing fragments of collegial, participatory decision making. Otherwise, universities and their “clients” are likely to suffer in the long term. Administrators also should consider the effect on the professoriate of using performance indicators. Claire Polster and Janice Newson suggest the need for research to study the effects of performance indicators on staff morale, on the diversity of teaching formats, and on the breadth of research. They believe that this research would show the deficiencies of performance indicators and indicate that different forms of accountability should be considered. They suggest that a link between democratic styles and accountability is an important one in universities and that accountability embedded in democratic theory has been neglected in favor of financial accountability derived from the corporate sector.

Finally, it is salient to heed the advice of Ken McKinnon, a former Australian vice-chancellor, who advocates that universities be run more like legal partnerships than businesses, with all constituencies—including students, staff, governments, and taxpayers—participating in decision making. He reminds us that “the university is one of half a dozen institutions that has lasted for a couple of thousand years so that form of governance is not one you would give up lightly.”

48 Polster and Newson (n. 20 above).