THE WELL-TEMPERED SELF:

FORMATIONS OF THE CULTURAL SUBJECT

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This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Murdoch University,
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DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains as its main content work which has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary educational institution.

Toby Miller
ABSTRACT

This thesis shows how the liberal-capitalist state seeks to produce loyal subjects through the work of cultural policy. Cultural policy operates by inscribing ethical incompleteness onto citizens via technologies of power which subjectify people. They are defined as lacking in a variety of areas of life. The technologies construct citizens as subjects in need of reformation in the following terms: their own self-knowledge as persons; their feeling of loyalty as part of a nation; their appreciation of the value of parliamentary democracy; and their situation as rational consumers in a market. The thesis examines these technologies and alternatives to them via a series of case studies.

I argue that these processes of subjection take place inside postmodernity. Meaning circulates in ways that are more complex than empiricist (ontic) or structuralist (epistemic) accounts of the connexion of signifier and signified will allow. As part of changes towards a service industry basis to liberal-capitalist economies, this has made for an aestheticised politics of civic identity. Processes of subjection manufacture subjects with a superficially free will that is in fact carefully invented through cultural policy and then self-administered. This effect of postmodernity is considered in foundational theoretical chapters prior to the case studies.

The thesis concludes that this is a significant factor limiting the utility of citizenship as a technology to be deployed by marginal social groups. I contend that whilst citizenship and its reformist logic are valuable tools for such groups, they also need to find technologies of the self which deny the notion of a fixed subjectivity that cultural policy ultimately seeks to inscribe.
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is principally about well-tempered, manageable cultural subjects which are formed and governed through institutions and discourses. These institutions and discourses work by inscribing ethical incompleteness onto subjects in a process of two-way shifts between the subject as singular, private person and the subject as collective, public citizen. These shifts can be discerned in the political technology of the subject that is known as policy. They operate to produce a loyal citizen that learns to govern itself in the interests of the liberal-capitalist polity. This outcome is not, however, inevitable or unidirectional, and for this reason I also consider the unruly subject seeking to reform itself.

The title to the thesis tropes Johann Sebastian Bach's Das Wohltemperierte Klavier [The Well-Tempered Keyboard] of 1722, which used all the major and minor keys of the clavichord across two dozen preludes and fugues. As an exercise in freedom and structure – all produced from technique – it was regarded as exemplary. The following year, Bach wrote a foreword to the published edition, explaining that one of his intentions was to train people in 'good inventions and a cantabile manner of playing'\(^1\). The music is essentially an exercise in mutability, always within the domain of a polite, coordinated tone that does not jar and is consistent, 'a pedagogic work'\(^2\). The title itself functioned as an argument against the previously dominant method of tempering (i.e. tuning). This method, known as the 'mean-tone system', always left some keys out of tune, while others were well in tune. Bach favoured small adjustments to the system that would find each key equally pleasant to the ear, even if none would have the mathematically perfect tuning available to certain digits under the existing method. In order to play Das Wohltemperierte Klavier, one would have to follow Bach's new system, called
'equal temperament'. The work's mercurial changes of direction across the keyboard were specifically designed to pick up the limitations inherent in the orthodox system, which most other writers studiously avoided exposing. For Schoenberg two centuries later, the outcome was a series of provisionally 'horrible, incomprehensible dissonances' rendered beautiful. As a title and an intervention into musical technology, the piece represents a move towards \textit{politesse} and consistency over unruliness and difference, a move that was to typify the incorporation of music into popular education in the nineteenth century as part of a training in equable citizenship.

Unlike the ideal subject produced by the careful pedagogic norms of Bach's tutelary text, some subjects are outside sweet reason. Their situation is akin to Grossberg's 1980s distinction between the fan and the ideologue, and how it was that \textit{littérature} colleagues derogated his desire to teach popular music because of his absorption in the phenomenon. The power of Grossberg's 'affective investment' seemed to differ from their own engagement with literary forms. They privileged the horizon of the disinterested expert that adjudicates via discrete sets of values removed from the everyday and applied across sites and categories of person. This was preferred to his principles of 'relevance and effectivity'.

One might say that these colleagues favoured a studied order over potential rancour and raucousness. This is not, of course, to suggest that popular music or its incorporation into academic discourse represents systemic revolt. Popular music is clearly deeply involved with the structures of production and exchange which characterise the economic system in which it operates. But its hold on a politics of identity – or rather, the shifting hold of various fractions of popular music on various fractions of the community at given moments – is both different from and potentially unsettling for the project of government through culture exemplified by the pedagogic routine of \textit{Das Wohltemperierte}.
The sweet reasonableness of *Das Wohltemperierte* is akin to the desired subjects of civic culture which this thesis addresses. It examines five types of cultural subject, produced by public policy under the sign of civility:

- the ethically incomplete subject in need of training into humanness
- the national public in need of a dramatological mirror to recognise itself
- the ethnic subject in need of integration into the national public
- the politically incomplete public subject in need of democratic training in citizenship; and
- the rational consuming subject in need of alignment with this public citizen.

These five types have been chosen because they exemplify central issues for the liberal–capitalist state. That state needs to produce a sense of oneness amongst increasingly heterogeneous populations, at a time when political systems are under question from new social movements and the internationalisation of cultures and economies. Following a theoretical account in Chapter One, the next four chapters of the thesis address cultural subjects produced by cultural policies designed to achieve this unity. Chapter Six considers the unruly subject that seeks and makes a special truth for itself, in sex. I shall elaborate further on how the various chapters of the thesis deal with this process later in the Introduction. For the present, I wish to define some critical terms and provide a schematic history of the person that is the subject of this inscription.

This thesis is about a determinate indeterminacy. This indeterminacy is an ethical incompleteness which cultural subjects are encouraged to find in themselves and then remedy. The process works through the operation of technologies of governance, which are a means of managing the public by having it manage itself. This is achieved through the material inscription of discourse into policies and programs of the liberal–capitalist state. A technology is defined here, after Foucault, as 'a matrix of popular reason'. It may be divided into four categories. '[T]echnologies of production' make for the physi-
cal transformation of material objects. 'Technologies of sign systems' are about the use of systems of meaning. The two categories of chief concern to this thesis are 'technologies of power', which form subjects as means of dominating individuals and bringing them to define themselves in particular ways, and 'technologies of the self', which are applied by individuals as a means of transforming their conditions into those of a more autonomous sense of happiness.

Discourse here is understood not as a universe of meaning but as a complex that combines 'the action of imposed scarcity, with a fundamental power of affirmation'. The chapters on "Civic Culture and the Postmodern Subject" and "Textual Theory" will clarify the ways in which discourses function. What follows is not designed as a comprehensive definition, but rather a signpost of orientation. A discourse is a set of statements that determine actions and thoughts. So a given discourse is a particular vocabulary and grammar which permits the making of choices only within its own rules. It decides what can and cannot be said, done or represented. At various times, different discourses may or may not intersect, producing meaning at their conjuncture and between their own constitutive vocabularies. Intertextuality, for example, may occur both via the meeting of discourses and the appropriation of one by another. Discourse is an area in which knowledge is produced and operates, both openly and in a less than overt way. It fixes norms, elaborates criteria and hence makes it possible to speak of and treat a given problem at a particular time. So for Foucault:

The unity of discourses on madness would not be based upon the existence of the object 'madness', or the constitution of a single horizon of objectivity; it would be the interplay of the rules that make possible the appearance of objects during a given period of time.

These rules include: what it is to be human; what it is to be social; and the procedures and institutions that circulate such information. In the arena of the cultural subject, considered doubt is achieved through the attribution of ethical incompleteness to human
subjects. They are thereby encouraged to recognise themselves as existing within an imperfect world of indeterminacy which, like them, must be worked on. This is a strategy for training and reforming the subject. It is with this subject that I begin.

The subject has a distinguished history in social and cultural theory. Whether one takes its nominated referent of the person as a basis, a coefficient, or a product, the concept of the human formed through and forming knowledge has developed as a significant trope. The signs are there in the anthropomorphism of attributing human cognition, recognition and misrecognition to entities such as nations, states, public and private bureaucracies, trading entities and interest groups. They are there in doctrines of self and society, the double movement between categories so beloved of social theory from Aristotle through Hobbes and on to sociology. They are present in the discourses of neoclassical or marginalist economics, with all its remarkable extrapolations from Benthamite psychologisms about consumers onto collective consumption and a vast array of non-human entities. They are present in the consumer's ambiguous relationship with its stalking partner, the liberal citizen, permitted an untrammelled access to itself and its natural attributes in the name of personal development and contribution to social renewal through the alleged dynamism of what Berlin calls a 'free trade in ideas'. They are present in the exemplary pedagogue who is an exemplary reader that runs literary studies, exemplary for its capacity to: see the self in the text; translate the text to the self in the classroom; and identify and then treat the imperfections in each. This is the pedagogue that meets Leavis' 'demand that the user shall be able, in the fullest sense, to read'. These signs are also present in accounts of true and appropriate personal practices, such as sexual technologies, which are held up for their ability to demonstrate, form and discipline the true (if hence potentially alarming) characters of persons.

The human sciences here display the power of the doctrines of evolution that appeared in the nineteenth century. The subject is said to have evolved through a complex process of differentiation. There has been a horizontal movement, extrapolating from
the singular to the collective. But at the same time, a vertical movement founded on organised hierarchy has spread the sense of self down from the collective to the singular\textsuperscript{18}. For Saunders and Hunter, this is a trajectory in which 'the public attributes of the person are internalised and identified with an inner entity'\textsuperscript{19}. The regularity, constancy and velocity of this series of movements from self to public and public to self has worked to preclude the meeting of incommensurate doctrines whose junction might make for conflict. Such a junction would involve the dialectical interplay between, for example, the rationally selfish consumer and the rationally selfless citizen and between the ideal fealty of the "native" subject and the split loyalty of the migrant. Equally, it would establish a contradiction within the call to culture that asks texts to form persons at the same time as it claims simply to reflect them and within the use of technologies of populism such as television that are said to narcotise and repress but are, relentlessly, expected again and again to enliven and develop.

Foucault discerns three methods of manufacturing such subjects. Firstly, the human sciences produce subjects by pronouncing the conditions and operation of speech, of material productiveness and of physical morphology. Secondly, various practices divide the subject within itself and divide it from others in terms of healthiness and appropriateness of conduct. Finally, the subject recognises itself as a subject. It works on itself in order to perform these classificatory operations and then to recognise itself within one or several of them\textsuperscript{20}. This process manufactures 'two meanings of the word "subject": subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge'\textsuperscript{21}. The subject is thus both subject to institutions of power, such as governments, and subject to discourses, such as theories of the person. In fact, it is known through these very modes, as the subject of governance by itself via knowledge and administration; via policy\textsuperscript{22}.

To accept this position on the subject and the state is radically to rewrite the classic account of government. It is to argue against the understanding of a 'necessarily antagonistic' relation between 'subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government' that
juxtaposes 'liberty and authority', 'society...[and] the individual', in John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* \(^2\). It suggests that there is no preexisting category of the person that is knowable outside the knowledges and categories enumerated through the governance of that subject. Put another way, there is no primal scene to be found, no meeting of person and government as chronologically distinct entities. Lacan refers to:

> the drama in which the original myths of the City State are produced before its assembled citizens...[as a moment which] stands in relation to a history that may well be made up of materials, but in which a nation today learns to read the symbols of a destiny on the march...[He argues, after Heidegger, that this manufactures the] subject as *gewesend* – that is to say, as being the one who thus has been\(^2\)!\(^4\).

This raises a number of questions about what Althusser calls the 'problem of origins'\(^2\)\(^5\). Which came first: the state legitimised by this drama of the public will, or the characters that formed that public? How could there be a public without a state? When did the citizen become a citizen? What is 'the nature of the act by which a people is a people'?\(^2\)\(^6\) Does it then become possible for 'the people [to] sin against themselves'?\(^2\)\(^7\)

Derrida knows about the difficulties in being clear about this. He found out when he was willing himself to be in Virginia in the seat of Jefferson. He was asking who it was that authored/authorised the *Declaration of Independence*. It was a collective text: Jefferson edited the work of others, who were held to represent the rest of an emergent America. The document was actually signed by an entity called 'the American people', operating 'in the name of God'. Which came first? The document that 'the people' made sovereign? Or 'the people', that were made sovereign by the document? Derrida knows one or two other things after having pondered this for a time, things about 'the people':

> the American people did not exist as the American people before having signed the Declaration of Independence. And it is in signing that they conferred upon
themselves the right to call themselves the American people and the right to sign. It did not exist before the signature. Thus, the scriptor does not exist before the signature. The signature itself, which imposes the law, is in itself a performative act which in a certain way produces its own subject.28

This drama is a mythic installation and iteration of tradition, a tradition that argues for a compact with a polity and a belonging and fealty to a nation. The compact extends to a faith in particular procedural norms of debate and a particular definition of the tasks of the state in setting up and managing a framework of property relations and the definition of identity. Rather than being a point in past time that can be isolated, the 'primordial 'moment' which 'has made a people a people'...is the always contemporary primordial 'moment', contemporary for Althusser because it is always being reinvented in accordance with the enunciation of an object called the 'general interest' by the state, an enunciative form that relies on a mythic 'general will' for its legitimacy and pretends that the latter preceded it.29 This is the source of the paradox identified by Rousseau, the paradox 'of making men free by making them subject'. It is necessary to do this if one is to resolve the problem of needing a rational public allocation of resources at the same time as guaranteeing individual rights to property; or put another way, to resolve the problem of believing in absolute individual liberty as a source of good government whilst also requiring absolute authority for that government over the individual.30 Hence the installation of the mythic compact and the endless dialogue it encourages between those living under it and their imagined 'ancestral citizens', to use Herbert Spencer's phrase.31

The original contractors lacked faith in each other beyond their preparedness to hold to the agreement to cede their governance to rules and representatives that created a timeless, depersonalised public aura.32 Habermas provides a useful gloss of this:

According to the official version, political power springs from public will-formation and flows, as it were, through the state apparatus via legislation and
administration, returning to a Janus-faced public that takes the form of a public of citizens at the entrance to the state and a public of clients at its exit.\textsuperscript{33}

Habermas both historicises and philosophises in his prescriptive account of a public sphere that can make this relationship intellectually and politically valid. The public sphere is a space for the enactment of politics through talk, the site where subjects meet as citizens to discuss topics common to them that require collective deliberation. These may include criticism of: the state; the economy; or the political or economic systems themselves. What was common practice for bourgeois men in Enlightenment Europe becomes a model for debate in a form that lays claim to the possibility of a homogeneous language as a guarantee of consensus.\textsuperscript{34} In the United States, for instance, such a model appears as overtly elaborated doctrine in juridical discussion of the First Amendment to the Constitution.\textsuperscript{35} And in Prague in 1989, the Civic Forum's "Eight Rules of Dialogue" institutionalised conduct within such a space with such precepts as 'When searching for the truth together, your opponent must not be an enemy', 'Try to understand the other person', 'A statement without proof is not an argument', 'Do not try to have the last word in the discussion at all costs', 'Do not threaten the dignity of your opponent', 'Do not forget that a dialogue requires discipline' and 'Do not mistake dialogue for monologue'.\textsuperscript{36}

There is a much older history supporting the propositional value of this essentially procedural, enunciative mode. From the time of the Enlightenment, the emerging modern sovereign-state took upon itself the task of producing modern individuals that would function effectively and progress singly and together towards the perfect meld of private and public advantage.\textsuperscript{37} From the position of elite theory, Michels refers to this, somewhat dismissively, as the 'amour propre of every citizen'.\textsuperscript{38} For Engels, the apparently transcendental nature of rule through reason that was heralded by the French Enlightenment simply indicated the realities of a specific point in history that saw the bourgeoisie breaking up an old regime and institutionalising its power in new laws of property. The timelessness of particular philosophical claims merely reflected the power
of their subordination to the economic conditions of the time. Marx put such claims into the category of a 'legendary primordial condition...[that] asserts as a historical fact what it should explain.

In fact, each of these positions turns on the rule of reason and the subject that Kant announced in 1784 in his reply to the query of a puzzled priest: 'Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity.' For both the sense of persons learning to be themselves in a new way that abjured a dependence on others, and the drive of the state to define the available ways of so doing, represent the impact of the emergence of the human sciences. This is a fundamental tension of the age, as great as those of public against private or individual against collective.

If 'the public' is best understood as 'the inescapable collectivity of any society', as Ranson and Stewart would have it, the question remains of how this collection is made inescapable. The Federalist Papers show evidence of the need to manufacture a single political public in their desire to do something about the ineffable fallibility of humanity, the way in which 'reason' is said to be subordinated to 'passions. For just as the market is enshrined as a deity expressed through the drive to consume, so politics must be elevated beyond such immediate motives inside citizenship's 'threnody on the corruption of political virtue by market greed', as Ignatieff puts it.

But there are practical difficulties in any case with the ideal speech-act model of making decisions. If all the relevant information needed to decide a matter of public significance were to circulate, the chances of a workable outcome would be minimised by the time and space taken up with the process. And there are problems with the opposite system, one that imposes a total control on people by the state, because of its waste of productive resources in the task of policing. In recent formulations of this problem, it is often argued that government from on high is being displaced by a governance of the self. This does the work of fulfilling the desires of the state by manufacturing a public comprised of subjectivities that can work towards that goal.
Foucault suggests that: 'To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others'\textsuperscript{48}. This is done in order to make people more productive and have them do this under their own cognisance. Self-governance as a set of technologies comes to displace the management of populations by directive material intervention. Just as the subject recognises itself via one set of discourses as the lone individual, even at this moment of loneliness, it is to recognise itself as part of a public. It knows itself as a citizen.

**THE DOMAIN OF THE THESIS**

It is these processes which the thesis is concerned to look at: how such a public is formed and governed via a technology of the cultural subject known as the cultural citizen, the virtuous political participant that is taught how to scrutinise and improve its conduct through the work of cultural policy; and what the limits are of this technology. The domain of this thesis may be defined, then, as the rules of knowledge and practice that describe a range of activities to do with the formation and governance of subjects. The thesis argues that the human subject is a critical component in the formation of a discourse of "the public" and of distinct "publics". This discourse is not to be found in the domain of an ideal sphere of rationality, or in pure representativeness, or in the marks of class power. It is to be found and explicated in particular technologies of cultural governance. The subject may be split; but it is split in discourse, split in the sense that its characteristics are always described with an eye to their deployment as rationales for very diffuse types of conduct. So this is a policy thesis: it is concerned with policies for producing subjects that are about the formation of repeatable methods of conducting oneself, either at the level of the individual or the public.

The thesis draws extensively on work appearing under the name of Michel Foucault. It presumes a starting point of Foucault's accounts of the ways in which formations of persons as individual subjects and collective publics may be seen to operate with rela-
tive autonomy from each other. This is taken to be so in the sense that the rise and fall in popularity of these accounts, their constitution as objects of apprehension and their knowledge-effects, may not necessarily see them in dynamic relation with conventional categories derived from the sociology of knowledge, such as intersection with changing external reality or the work of research exposing flaws in argumentation; what Jameson calls 'classical and paradigmatic scientific discoveries achieved by triumphant accident'\footnote{Foucault's insistence on the corporeal, somatic efficacy of the knowledges emanating from the human sciences – his anti-idealist sense that only in such moments could these developments be regarded as significant occurrences – argues for an anchored account of modernity and postmodernity and the definite effects which these knowledges have on the exchange of terms of existence undergone by the body and its knowing subject. The operation of knowledge, then, becomes an exercise in a tracery of power, power exercised by institutions formed by and themselves in turn forming knowledges about available subjectivities. At the level of political philosophy and political economy, this has very significant implications for ideas of: individual rational actors; adherence to the state and capital; relationship to the self; and possibilities for making epistemological breaks that will allow new forms of subjectivity. I shall deal with some criticisms of Foucault in Chapter Six. Here, I wish to signal that it is my desire to break down by attrition the allegation that his work is simultaneously impeccably radical and impenetrably apolitical. It is said that Foucault combines anti-humanism with a neglect of the specificity of political systems in such a way as to allow no analytic or practical logic for the organisation of cultural activism within liberal-capitalist states.

Foucault's non-\textit{a priori} account of the person does not deny the significance of the category, or its utility. Rather, he calls for an interrogation of the discourse of the human and the conditions of its emergence. Foucault thus hauls us away from both the conventional split between base and superstructure in Marxist accounts of the person "under" a given mode of production and the romantic or liberal humanist aesthetic of the individual, propelling us instead towards what Patricia O'Brien calls a 'thesis of
massive normalization\textsuperscript{50}. Doctrines of free expression, of the individual realisation of the self and autonomous self-governance, circulate plentifully. But these doctrines must limit even as they define; for to set out criteria for freedom and humanness is simultaneously to police conduct politely, to endorse the animated working hypothesis of democracy, in which to individuate is to normalise.

**THE SUBJECT IN AND OF THE THESIS**

Paradoxically, this process of normalisation may operate via differentiation. I argue that the operation of a normalising power within cultural policy in liberal-capitalist democracies inscribes a radical indeterminacy of the subject. Although the rationale for much cultural policy may claim to be about the discovery and protection of real selves – even, of inalienable ones – the following move is necessarily made: cultural policy exists to ramify what is apparently already there.

Foucault knew about this type of contradiction. He knew about it when he identified two critical philosophical postulates underpinning the development of the discipline of psychology:

\begin{quote}
que la vérité de l'homme est épuisée dans son être naturel; et que le chemin de route connaissance scientifique doit passer par la détermination de rapports quantitatifs, la construction d'hypothèses et la vérification expérimentale
[that the truth of man is exhausted in his natural state; and that the road to proper scientific knowledge must follow quantitative methods, the construction of hypotheses and their verification through experimentation]\textsuperscript{51}.
\end{quote}

Falsifiability is not natural. Experimentation is not natural. So "man" is not natural, since "he" does these things and is the professional embodiment of science. "His" scientific truth is assuredly not to be found in a "natural man", then. The preexistent self
ends up not uncovering itself to itself, but making a new self under the sign of the rules of scientific (or bureaucratic) method. But of course it is always also doing so in the name of an empiricism that claims not to disturb what its rules of discourse are, even then, beginning to form and cradle. So the discipline of psychology exists at the interstices and contradictory junctions of a consistent set of oppositions: totality and singularity; gene and environ; performance and potential; institutional law and individual conduct. This is akin to the contradictory manoeuvres that cultural policy is called upon to make, manoeuvres which oscillate between self and society, nature and reform and selflessness and selfishness.

And whilst cultural policy seeks to make and govern manageable subjects, it does so within an epistemological frame of dispersal and chaos, a frame which is investigated in "Civic Culture and the Postmodern Subject". This chapter describes the morphology of the citizen, both past and present, as a preliminary to establishing the connexions between culture and policy as technologies which form citizens. It then situates this discussion inside a broader context of social theory by reworking some Althusserian positions into what is termed the social surface, concluding with a discussion of ontic, epistemic and postmodern forms of knowledge and their relationship to these questions.

A backdrop of indeterminacy has, paradoxically, been made to function as the lodestone of cultural policy. It offers culture the task of aiding the subject in finding out the truth of itself, a truth necessarily of enigma. This radical indeterminacy is most prolifically constituted within textual analysis, the human science protocols of reading decipherment which institutionalise the impossibility but necessity of knowing the self. It is argued in the chapter entitled "Textual Theory" that this is a critical component of literary and screen studies, as evidenced in a wide range of hermeneutic practices and proclivities. These disciplinary fields may be seen to take the discovery of the incomplete subject and its partial, essayistically-achieved reformation into a satisfactory whole as their reason to be. In the case of literary studies, this has made for its installation into the secondary curriculum in many countries as the mandatory point of
entry into humanness, and within the humanities academy as the site of still further achievement of this set of reformations. It is argued that this is an exemplary instance of civics, of the building of the person that is central to its governance and entry into full participation in the ethic of citizenship and the notion of a public. The theory underpinning ethical incompleteness as the touchstone of cultural criticism is expounded and justified in this chapter via a tracery of the contemporary dispositif of aesthetics. It is argued that the textual critic/pedagogue must be an ideal reader, ideal in its propensity to find and transfer textual incompleteness from diegetic characters onto itself and the readers under its tutelage. This ethical manufacture of a preferred self and a preferred public through pedagogic guidance will be a recurring theme through my argument, its account of the cultural critic as tour guide to the self a measure of the aestheticisation of postmodernity. For cultural criticism is the epicentre of postmodernity. The public imbrication of the aesthetic with the political is therefore the epicentre of this thesis.

Following these scene-setting chapters, the thesis branches out into establishing the different forms of subjectivity sanctioned/created by different discourses, arguing for a series of generally parallel drifts between differing accounts of subject and public which are occasioned and nourished by various discourses of the person. These discourses are frequently carried both by parts of the state and parts of the person itself in a double move of governance. I ask what happens in the movement between the constitution of the individual and the collective subject that informs our apprehension of both a person and a public, arguing that these technologies have been most obviously used in the analysis of texts. This move is critically important for the formation of an interpretative public, a reading and receiving public that has learnt to fossick for indeterminacy and incompleteness in cultural products and to map this back onto itself.

The next three chapters examine this contention about the separation of spheres of subjectivity and what may happen when they meet. In each case, the liberal-capitalist state is a motor of governance. "Nation, Drama and Diplomacy" looks at the enduring qualities of a particular ethic of self-formation within aesthetics that is mapped onto
public policy. Through an investigation of reactions to attempts by the United States to open up a free trade in television programs via the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, it is argued that a range of governments have responded in ways that indicate an abiding faith in reflectionist accounts of screen texts and their capacity to inhere national cultural formations. This faith expresses itself in the name of forming an adequate (national and individual) self. Postmodernity finds the proliferation of televisual messages and a developing decentred internationalism as mutually reinforcing; hence their centrality here and the choice of this site.

The remainder of the thesis considers issues that are both common to most advanced industrial societies and possessed of qualities quite specific to one such country: Australia. By linking questions of postmodernity to a particular place, a focus on the policy discourse becomes possible without, I think, jeopardising a purchase on general explanation.

"The Unmarking of Ethnicity" looks at attempts by a series of semi–private and semi–public bodies to remake a mythic subject, namely the ethnically–marked soccer person, which within Australian convention is regarded as (unfortunately and seemingly incorrigibly) metonymic for the absence of a properly subsumed migrant population that meets the criteria of the amalgamated, fully Australian person. The particular locus of inquiry is the moves made by soccer and celebration bureaucrats during the organisation of an international competition held in Australia as an official part of the state's celebration of the two hundredth anniversary of white invasion, the 1988 Bicentenary. Discourses from the domains of public policy, media commentary and soccer management are mobilised in the act of establishing how this ideal subject was to be erected and what it was supposedly to displace. The chapter investigates the multicultural subject, the person created as culturally split and politically single, and its incompleteness in both these domains. The decentred, displaced subject that problematises the integrity of nation and state is a further postmodern trope; hence its placement here.
The next chapter in this sequence, "Making Citizens and Consumers", further addresses the discursive construction of citizenship and how it is called up and informed, via twin case studies. The first looks at the televising of parliamentary democracy and how this allegedly aims to teach the viewer to respect, value, comprehend and participate in the institution. My contention here is that this is as much about refashioning the politician as it is about detailing and remedying the inadequacies of the elector. In each case, a culturally-trained citizen is being produced. The second study examines what happens when such disinterested notions of citizenship meet with an account of the utilitarian, maximising consumer of neoclassical economic theory. It does this in the context of questions of authorship and the deployment of successful businesspersons to voice particular doctrines of human capital on behalf of fractions of the state against doctrines of critical educationalism, a move that sets up and then destroys an opposition between training and educating the person. Again, there is both a formation of the subject speaking – the apparent author of a given speech – as well as of the addressee. This works over the contradictory imposts of the two critical public forms of political postmodern subjectivity, in the citizen and the consumer, and the important textual question of authorship.

The subject constructed here is, following Foucault, always already divided, ready and readied to be redisposed:

according to a certain grid of explicit or implicit interrogations, he is the questioning subject; according to a certain programme of information, he is the listening subject; according to a table of characteristic features, he is the seeing subject, and, according to a descriptive type, the observing subject53.

A similar set of moves is countenanced/required by connexions to a series of theoretical domains in the bureaucratic, economic and political registers54. These are brought out in Chapters Three, Four and Five.
The final sequence of the thesis, "New Technologies to Form New Selves", commences with a consideration of the criticisms of Foucault's politics and its utility as an analytic and pragmatic tool of social change. Following this dialogue, the chapter evaluates the possibilities for subjects reforming themselves in one of Foucault's principal fields of engagement, the domain known as sex. It is based on an ethnography of a disturbance by a male homosexual order of nuns made at a university speech given by Pope John Paul II. The argument moves outside the conditions of the day, and how they were set up by various speeches given then, to consider the ethics of self-formation promulgated by the order. It asks why the nuns' preferred selves were deemed unacceptable at that time and place, whilst tolerated at others, as a consequence of a further problem that occurs when accounts of the subject which are habitually kept quite separate are permitted uncomfortable junction. This junction is notable for its emergence as an overtly dialogic and unruly moment, its significance deriving from the fact that the critical enunciators of self-formation in this case were quite outside the politesse of the civic public sphere. This marks them off from the official selves considered in previous chapters. It also offers a dialogue between what Habermas calls '[e]xpressive self-realization and moral-practical self-determination', that shift from alienation to utopia which he finds 'rooted in cultural modernity. Against an account of the ideal public sphere, the chapter also thinks about how dependent the notion is on incivility, on an account of unacceptable conduct and how such conduct may in fact be necessary in order to form an alternative sphere. This draws us back to the polite sociability ethos of recent theories of citizenship and suggests that they are logocentrically dependent on an excluded grotesque, a grotesque that is a different form of cultural technology, one which seeks to make the move from a technology of power to a technology of the self. To return for a moment to the well-tempered reference of my title, this chapter may be seen to problematise the reasoned sweetness of Bach and his attendant cultural subject. For Foucault, 'listening to music is becoming more and more difficult, to the point that its notation is stripped of any recognisable shape or sign.' The 'conventional transpar-
ency' of classical music is gone, along with its 'iterability'. This leaves some room open for the invention of a technology of the self, room for unruliness and difference.

It should be stressed that the thesis makes no claim to do more than aim at the surface. There is no desire or design to know what lies below or to place a value on the subjectivities or selves described in terms of their appropriateness as descriptions of or prescriptions for the actual conduct of living persons. Rather, this thesis essays an evaluation of subjectivity as a public cultural technology. No "real" person is found, no essence against which one might measure the subjects of policy.

The thesis does, however, claim to contribute across a range of disciplinary settings and methodologies. It presumes a competence to write authoritatively inside, between and against such fields as: literary and screen theory; international political economy; the sociology of sport and nationalism; political philosophy; discourse analysis; public policy; neoclassical economics; ethnography; and gender studies. Further, it presumes to do so with a specific perceptual grid overdetermining the application of these knowledges and redisposing the fields of their intersection from the norm and onto the category of the formation and governance of persons as subjects, subjects of knowledge and subjects to authority (authority from both within and without the subject itself). This reading against the grain presumes to uncover what Foucault called 'rules of formation...never formulated in their own right, but...to be found only in widely differing theories, concepts, and objects of study'. Such rules are about the barely perceptible shift in gear made between constituting subjects as publics and publics as subjects, each category serving radically different purposes at different times but with an apparently static conception of the "good" person and the "good" society underlying them. I argue in this thesis that these are actually radically unstable, mutually contradictory formations. They are conventionally kept apart but nevertheless share a propensity for this set of discrete double moves between "self" and "social" that mark all such forms out in terms of ethical incompleteness. It is the connexions across sciences, the points of commonality, that produce this line of reasoning and, I trust, its
warrant\textsuperscript{58}. Ultimately, then, to be ethically incomplete, and engaged in an endless process of self-remedy, is to be the subject of this thesis.
NOTES


7. On the issue of this pluralised status, see Lawrence Grossberg, ""I'd Rather Feel Bad than not Feel Anything at All": Rock and Roll, Pleasure and Power", Enclitic, 8 (1–2), 1984, p.95.


22. Ibid. p.790.


49. Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Verso, London and New York, 1991, p.188.


52. Ibid. p.174.


54. Ibid. p.53.


CHAPTER ONE

CIVIC CULTURE AND THE POSTMODERN SUBJECT

Two hundred years after the French Revolution, citizenship is a renewed and significant trope in everyday political discourse. Within a few months of the start of that bicentenary, free elections were instituted in Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, Chile and Nicaragua. Systemic changes of polity and economy were underway in Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Further energy was being devoted to the infrastructural corollary of glasnost in the Soviet Union. And new debates were emerging in Western countries over how to define citizenship and whether it was necessarily related to particular forms of economic management. Alain Touraine's gloss of this period goes so far as to describe it as supplanting an age of revolution (1917 to 1989) with an age of democracy, in a reaction against authoritarianism that shifted the rhetoric of the people and their interests away from vanguards and towards 'the free choice of governors by the governed'. In this chapter, I argue that an accompanying change is underway in the relationship of culture, government and subjectivity, connected to significant epistemological ruptures.

The chapter commences with an account of the morphology of the citizen, tracing the history of the concept and its recent transmogrifications. This is followed by a consideration of the interrelationship between culture and policy. I then outline the idea of a social surface, concluding with an explanation of the foundational prejudices which traverse and inform the formation of the postmodern subject of theory and policy.
THE MORPHOLOGY OF THE CITIZEN

Classical political theory supports the notion of a 'government which derives all its powers...from the great body of the people'. It therefore places much store on political virtue amongst the citizenry. In Aristotelian Athens, the search for the active expression of virtue and a rational world is the reason for political activity. In ancient Rome, the goal becomes the protection of the commonwealth. The Latin for citizen, *civis*, comes from the verb to hail or summon, *cieo*. The citizen can be called up to perform certain duties as a *quid pro quo* for access to the processes of politics. For Rousseau, the 'body politic...may be taken as an organized, living body, resembling that of man'. Law and custom are the brain, business the mouth and stomach, and 'citizens...the body which make the machine live, move and work' via a 'general will'. This will is the source of the law. It constitutes the conditions of intersubjectivity amongst 'members of the State' and with the state itself.

These positions are ready to prize 'public over private good in action and deliberation'. They recommend three ways of constructing the virtuous subject of such a polity. The options, as outlined by Shelley Burtt, are *the education of desire*, *the accommodation of interests* and *the compulsion of duty*. The doctrine of the education of desire wants to acknowledge human drives. It seeks to mould them, to transform them into public goods rather than private ones. Citizens are to be educated to define fulfilment in terms of public service. Pleasures will not be sacrificed. Rather, they will be redefined in the interests of putting personal satisfaction in alignment with the public good. Conversely, the position which accommodates interests identifies people as genuinely rational actors who calculate the costs and benefits for themselves of various possibilities. This essential nature can be made consonant with virtue where it is 'structured by the norms and institutions of the commonwealth'. Finally, compulsion of duty says that citizens serve because they understand rationally that it is their duty to do so. Denial of desire is important and self-aggrandisement is eschewable under the sign of service. Each
option assumes, with Rousseau, the need to 'create citizens', to teach them virtue as part of a process of 'learning to deserve to live'.

The conventional pluralist political science position is much simpler. According to Lasswell and Kaplan, 'Citizens are those in a body politic who share in the allocation of power'. But what form does this sharing take? It simply means that citizens are eligible: to stand for public office; to vote for candidates for such offices; and to engage in a very vaguely intimated, more general participation in social life. Even with the revisions to pluralism that have come in the wake of decades of withering critique, this sense of the citizen remains relatively untouched. Consider Charles Lindblom's influential book, The Policy-Making Process. It represents a *volte face* from the sanguine nature of pluralism up to that point. Rather than seeing governments making decisions between competing groups that even out over time, as his previous work had argued, Lindblom here stumbled onto the fact that the bulk of critical decisions taken by the administration in the United States favour business lobby interests over others. So this was a really decisive break within that literature. Now Part Three of the book is entitled "The Citizen in the Play of Power". But nowhere is a citizen defined. For it is in an implicit union with "voter". It is simply left for the reader to inscribe in the cartographic interstices of elections, parties, policies and imagined satisfaction. Citizens vote at elections. Their next act awaits the next election. They are, in Marxist terminology, 'abstract citizen-voters', subjects engaged in a repeated process of disaggregation and reaggregation.

This does not exhaust the available discourses on citizenship. I want to examine briefly critiques from feminism and the left, prior to elaborating how various revised doctrines of civility and civil society – doctrines of the operation of cultural subjectivity – are animating discussions of citizenship right across the geopolitical spectrum.

Some feminist accounts of the desirable polity have entailed a return to the classical association of politics and virtue. Active citizenship is to be entered into as a communal
search for the good life outside particular or personal necessities. The attraction/association lies in the Platonic doctrine that citizens must be treated equally, whatever the inequalities between them in other spheres of life, as part of the desire to form just and good persons. (Of course, Plato and Aristotle's support for "natural" inequalities is rejected)\textsuperscript{11}. Other critiques regard women's general economic dependence on men as so endemic and powerful as virtually to invalidate any apparent utility in citizenship and point to the way in which defining citizenship as a public technology instantaneously creates a private sphere that is outside it, a sphere in which men have traditionally oppressed women\textsuperscript{12}. The timelessness of idealist theories of citizenship is said to sit poorly alongside a past that has either routinely denied women the rights of suffrage or set them up as problems complicating the disinterested exercise of male virtue\textsuperscript{13}. One might also point to the extensive connexions between citizenship rights and the making of brotherly bonds through war\textsuperscript{14}. Much of the idealisation of the figure of the republican has been achieved via a series of oppositions or exclusions. The republican is not–woman in its virtue. It is austere and measured\textsuperscript{15}. Alternatively, it must be ready to be 'virile' at times of crisis, as a former editor of \textit{The Times} of London once put it\textsuperscript{16}.

But it is the loss of the certainty once offered by the patriarchal rule of tyrants, the certainty of straightforward firmness and obvious oppression, that troubles some feminist critics. MacCannell characterises the modern promise of liberty, equality and fraternity as 'the Regime of the Brother, of modernity'. In true Totemic fashion, the incest taboo imposed as guilt after the democrats' murder of the tyrannical father has led to a Narcissistic assumption of an identical fit between their own selves and others. Modern democracy is consequently centred around 'the narcissistic ego' and not 'the other'. It is founded on faulty extrapolations by men from their own misrecognition of themselves, their needs and their history, in a way that denies that anyone is outside the discourse of citizenship. This acts to prevent any arousal of the preconditions necessary for encouraging active participation in the affairs of state. Civil society is an imaginary projection that further denies the real democracy of 'diverse, recognized relationships'\textsuperscript{17}.
Already, questions are being asked about the status of women under the newly forming democracies in Europe, which show signs of the renewed influence of nationalism and religion that once consigned women to domestic roles. Anne Phillips gives this example of the limitations to the technology of citizenship that allow for such developments:

we would be acting as citizens if we publicly campaigned for men to take a full share in the household tasks; we would not, however, be acting as citizens when we sort out the division of labour inside our own home. In the older language of democratising everyday life, each of these was equally 'political'. In the new language of citizenship, only the one that takes place in a public arena can seriously contend for the name.

Against this, a return to Aristotle finds a useful problematisation of the split between the private and public spheres. 'Politics as the master science of the good' includes 'household management' as one of its 'most honored capacities'. It is a space of equality. Plato even gestures at a theory of difference when he suggests that women may need another program for citizenship than the recto-verso of male models. Bryan Turner makes much of the coeval emergence of citoyenne with citoyen in 1789. And it has been claimed that feminism can be understood as part of the development of citizenship, a last phase in the drive towards universal suffrage.

But the argument continues to be made with some force that the idealised notion of the public sphere of citizenship has been created by the exclusion of women. A revived citizenship, on this reading, would have to be accompanied by a radical rewriting of the current relationship between public and private. This would reject the idea that difference and the particular, the peculiar, the microeconomic or the domestic necessarily belong in the private domain.

Marxism is also cosmically ambivalent about citizenship. Marx took the concept of civil society, after Hegel, as 'the material conditions of life', the domain of political economy.
that held the key to understanding a given polity and its legal relations. It was the 'mode of production of [this] material life' that determined the shape of the state and its members' relationship with it. Any attempt to think through profound social change inside or outside this relationship could only occur once the beginnings of new social relations had put in an appearance. For without the signs of transition to a new mode of production there could be no methods for conceiving of real innovation: 'mankind always sets itself only such problems as it can solve'\textsuperscript{25}. In 1848, what can citizenship offer to those who know that '[t]he executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the comon affairs of the whole bourgeoisie'\textsuperscript{26}? Engels was clear about the fundamental problem with the idea of a republic and its potential for representativeness: 'The state was the official representative of the whole of society, its concentration in a visible body, but it was so only in so far as it was the state of that class which in its time represented the whole of society'. He argued that the state would lose its reason to exist if it was indiscriminately representative, because its foundation must lie in servicing one class over another\textsuperscript{27}.

But as the possibilities of action by the left within parliamentary democracy emerged with time, this position periodically seemed to soften. Consider Gramsci. At one point, he states that:

within the general configuration of an industrial society, each man can actively participate in affairs and modify his surroundings only to the extent that he operates as an individual and citizen, as a member of the democratic-parliamentary State. The liberal experience is not worthless and can only be transcended after it has been experienced\textsuperscript{28}.

But at another point, this is a distortion. Democracy is a technology of life 'for large-scale production, for busy exchange, for the concentration of the population in modern, capitalist cities'\textsuperscript{29}. It must clearly be destroyed as a precursor to socialism.
The two classic left perspectives on citizenship as it would function under a socialist mode of production are as follows. Firstly, it is a prize granted as the pleasure of collaboration in pursuit of the good life. The citizen is a political agent of morality, actively engaged in the determination of the workings of society. Secondly, the citizen is a cooperative economic worker. As everyone is multiskilled in an interchangeable way and happily engaged in the physical manufacture of the good life, there is no need for a politics. There is nothing in citizenship as such. Civics is work\textsuperscript{30}. The problem with the legacy of this approach for state socialist societies was the absence of a lexicon for detailing social, economic and political problems inside socialism\textsuperscript{31}.

At a sociopolitical level, the sovereign–state and the citizen of suffrage are perhaps the defining signs of modernity\textsuperscript{32}. All these morphologies seem to share the notion that citizens have a common or at least transportable code of conduct; a civics, or sociability. When the United States sought to replicate itself in a decolonising Africa, it did so not only via the dogmas of industrial modernisation, but also by ideas of civility. The infrastructure of modernity involved a landscape of subjects, modelled on a special notion of civic/civil conduct. David Apter refers here to:

\begin{quote}
the double marketplace, i.e. the economic market place and the political. The inequities arising out of the operations of the first in social life can be rectified in the second to produce a moving equilibrium. The political problem is to find those specific instruments of economic and political organization which will enable those two marketplaces to work in tandem in an environment of increasing growth\textsuperscript{33}.
\end{quote}

Thirty years on, that rhetoric is revived as a trope, this time to be manufactured in the United States as well as in those places unfortunate enough to be overseas. It is being increasingly argued, from a multitude of political positions, that in civility 'lies the difference between a well-ordered and a disordered liberal democracy\textsuperscript{34}. For Shils:
The institutions in which beliefs and desires or interests are proposed and confronted in argument and the institutions in which beliefs and interests are taken into account and digested discriminately into law cannot work acceptably without some constituent civility and consensus of the contending parties

This concept of civility emerged in mid-sixteenth-century Europe with the publication of Erasmus' *De Civilitate Morum Puerilium* [On Civility in Children] in 1530. Translations into English, German, Czech and French soon appeared and the book was quickly adopted as a school primer. It was reprinted over thirty times in the next few years, with a hundred and thirty editions appearing by the end of the eighteenth century. The notion of civility entered everyday educational parlance across cultures as a key to the formation of young people and an index of the emergence of a problem of the social. The subject matter of *De Civilitate* is very much that of proper conduct: how to look at others; how to present and maintain clean nostrils; how to dispose of spittle; and how to eat. So this is clearly a case of the public presentation of a decent self as both the sign and the mechanism of social cohesion.

By the nineteenth century, civility is institutionally located inside something called civil society, what Foucault called 'the great fantasy...of a social body constituted by the universality of wills'; a fantasy that, it is argued, produced a seachange in the constitution of politics across Central and Eastern Europe in 1989. Civil society is outside the family, clan or locale but short of the state. It has autonomous institutions which are of the economy, religion, intellectual life and the political party (but not the parliament or executive government). The connectedness lies in a shared understanding of 'civil manners'. The civil subject exists within this space and is known as such when its conduct is ordered by other than basic collective identification or the force majeure of the state. Outside the formal laws of that state, everyday conduct is extremely autonomous. On the one hand, it is routinely contained, constrained and defined by respect for all sectors of the populace, because the Other is also part of the Self.
But for Rousseau, civil society is a process of unending envy, initiated by the proposi-
tional form of reasoning about a state of being other than one's own. Whereas natural
'man' simply dealt in the business of subsistence, civil society produces an incomplete-
ness as part of its panoply of alternatives, plans, contingencies, collectivities and indi-
vidualities. The innate propensity to care for the self is supplanted by an 'Amour-
propre' that defines the meeting of needs in competitive relation to others, a relation that
is engendered by reason and confirmed by reflection. Civil society is, in short, a
mechanism of distinction. One can see connexions to the elitism within this doctrine
that marked out its first emergence within American political science. It is held to be the
case that some citizens are cleverer, more decent and more polite than others and can
therefore best be entrusted with the management of those others. There is another
lineage to this pastoral tending, one that operates via an isomorphic relationship
between the ideal elite office-holder and the ideal social order. It is most significant
that this line is currently being publicly enunciated very audibly by Edward Shils, the
high priest of such logics in the 1950s and 1960s, whose profile was long in relative
eclipse.

Nevertheless, the referent for this civility seems to have changed. Andreas Huyssen
argues that one of the key distinctions between modernity and postmodernity is the new
relationship that the West has to the Third World. This new relationship is designated as
one of respect in place of control, of difference in place of hierarchy. The develop-
ment studies that emerged alongside decolonisation placed their faith in forms of
knowledge which are now in question. Centralisation, modernisation, industrialisation,
modelling – in fact, development itself – are supplanted by dispersal, fragmentation and
the aesthetic. There is no centre providing the criteria by which others are judged up-
to-date. Under postmodernity, European historiography finds that 'the history of this
appendage to the Eurasian continent is no longer world history'. Its accounts of an
industrial proletariat, of the emergence of reason, of the centrality of the West, are of
'local importance'. Weber's argument that the West developed in terms of a 'rational
potential' which is of the essence of human existence now is made to refer to specific,
bounded rationalities inscribed in culturally particular technologies of the subject. While certain revived liberal tropes concentrate on an individualistic basis to citizenship, communitarian political philosophy emphasises collective participation; but as Mouffe insists, this collective must equally be recognised for the proliferation of publics that constitute it and were denied by the Enlightenment's effortless ethnocentric and androcentric extrapolations from an 'undifferentiated concept of "man"'. To confirm the idea that the Third World has been a key node of instability under post-modernity, one could turn back three decades to doctrines of Négritude and find almost these very words appearing. Senghor, for example, differentiates between 'European civilization and Negro–African civilization' as the difference between the Cartesian cogito and "I feel, I dance the Other; I am". This is still the outcome of reason. But it is 'the reason of the touch' rather than the 'reasoning–eye'. Its talent is logos over ratio in its ability to blend logic and the material world. The idea of an absolute, Western doctrine of 'progress' has been leavened if not discredited after the deployment of instrumental reason and the goal of growth for a multiplicity of problematic outcomes over the past century; 'reason as despotic enlightenment', Foucault calls it.

For Balibar, though, the question that still needs to be asked following the installation of the subject by Descartes and Kant is whether human subjection is ended by the advent of the citizen, whether the rupturous events of 1789 represent a break from domination, a departure from the era of absolutism that brings with it the desire and capacity to understand and influence events of government. The West's "local" history clearly continues to be made the centre of many political and cultural typologies. This much is evident from the resilience of doctrines of civil society. More than a century ago, Lord Acton defined its task as 'the establishment of liberty for the realisation of moral duties'. Compare that with Michael Walzer's argument that '[t]he words "civil society" mean the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks – formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology – that fill this space.'
We can discern a renewed interest in identifying the networks that make for the civility which animates this society. The motivation for such a turn comes from two sources. Firstly, it is a response by Western intellectuals and policymakers to the breakdown of codes of conduct in Western cities. Secondly, it is a response by Eastern and Western intellectuals and policymakers to the new democracies and economies of Central and Eastern Europe, a term to describe the wonder of the West and its non-Leninist apparatus. This apparatus is noted for its freedoms and the space it provides to influence public policy from outside the state but inside the public. Both approaches still tend to focus on an idealised Western past or present, exemplified by this quotation from Gabriel Almond:

My most striking and moving experience during my 1989 teaching stint in the Soviet Union was my encounters with the members of Chairs in Scientific Communism at the universities in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. With almost no exception, they were quite disenchanted with Marxism–Leninism and were turning to empirical Western–style political science, which they called politology. I carried back with me about a dozen curricula vitae of Soviet colleagues who would like to be retooled in the U. S.57.

Uncertainty produces an invocation of a lost mythic certitude, here from within the confines of state socialism. But one can see a similar sense of loss and appeal under the sign of Western social movements amongst those who might, on the above account, be responsible for "retooling". Their invocation is of sociability as a telos, a process guaranteed by the provision of equal conditions for communicability. Laclau trusts that these conditions will bring...to the fore a multiplicity of limited, fragmented and partial social agents, who together enter into the constitution of a 'collective will". This model is much more oriented towards social equality than the one espoused by the pluralists, although such an outcome is to be garnered not by the methods of command economics, but rather through the will of a community. This will must emerge from the conduct of the citizen, a new citizen which will emerge to displace older models of
political or economic "man". For these models have failed to deliver acceptable outcomes in the eyes of many subjects in the areas of an ethic of the utilisation of power (under Marxist–Leninist regimes), the management of the environment and the condition of gender. Environmentalism and feminism have been quite foundational in their combinations and permutations of broad-based social critique interspersed with a politics of the everyday that has broken up the anti–individualist certainties of the left. This new citizen must be in some sense a cultural citizen if it is to manage itself and also be ready to take its place in what Hindess terms 'the political life of a self-governing community.'

As has been indicated, the desire for this subject is ecumenical. While Shils is hailing the citizen, the New Statesman and New Society is selecting citizenship as its 'radical theme of the year.' The citizen is a polysemic category, open to contestation; an avatar for all parts of the spectrum. Citizenship is an open technology, a means of transformation ready for definition and disposal in dispersed ways at dispersed sites. My concern here is with how elements of the state work to make it a cohesive technology, one that binds its subjects in fealty, and how it may be problematised by other groups. I am doubtful about its ultimate utility as a technology of self-formation without subjection, but conscious of its significance inside the liberal–capitalist state.

Althusser argues that the 'category of the citizen realizes the synthesis of the State in man himself: the citizen is the State in the private man. This is the technology that ensures subjects see themselves – and willingly – as such. It is a technology that produces a 'disposition' on their part such that they do not accept passively the imposition of a particular form of government, but actively embrace it as an expression of a collective expression of themselves (even though this very expression itself has derived from preconditions for knowledge set by the state). Virtue comes to be defined as 'the passion for the general' under democracy, in a way that derives from self-regard. Self and society are one. Citizenship involves membership of a community and therefore political participation in the running of that community. This implies a doctrine of rights
that are granted on a broadly-based, social level but, paradoxically, are made to live on an individual level in such areas as freedom of: association; speech; information; and personal liaison. Rights are granted by a state which also polices their exercise through the doctrine of *e pluribus unum*. This doctrine requires the citizen to forge a direct link between 'the defence of his ideas and interests and the laws or political decisions providing the basic framework for public life'.

For Foucault, the special feature of the development of the state in the West has been its deployment of 'pastoral power' on the model of institutions of the Christian church. This power has four special facets. Firstly, it promises heavenly salvation. Secondly, it lays itself down for others. Thirdly, it promises care of both the community and the solitary self. And finally, it requires that it knows those for whom it cares. It must know them so that it can direct them. This knowledge must be complete, its computation a critical production of the truth of the person, a truth that is hence only knowable within this mode of subjection. No longer ecclesiastical, this power has multiplied as it has dispersed over the centuries into a 'modern matrix of individualization'. The name of this matrix is normally voiced as 'the state'. The notion of a legitimacy attached to both private and public opinion founded on individual rationality best expresses and codifies ideas of natural rights that become the mechanism binding person and polity.

Now salvation is to be had in the *hie et nunc*. It is a salvation that is somatic, to be understood in terms of being healthy, wealthy and secure. The immediacy of this salvation necessitates many and varied forms of pastoral care, such as the hospital, the police and a reformed family. And knowledge is now deployed towards two, interconnected, ends. Firstly, the broad social body of the population is an object of care via quantification and extrapolation. And secondly, the individual body is an object of care via various forms of analysis that explain how and to what ends it is singular. So it is that, for example, attempts to understand the public mind will find 'the level of wife, self and dream...most significant' as sources of truth and will seek them out with all the earnestness they can muster. We must all confess and confide if we are to uncover the truth.
of ourselves, a truth that is trained into us as we become cultural subjects through the operation of policy as part of the mission of the state to 'gain access to the bodies of individuals', a necessary precondition to what Foucault calls 'obtaining productive service from individuals' in a way that is 'more efficient and less expensive' than by means of force\textsuperscript{72}, a way that 'teaches caring as a moral disposition'\textsuperscript{73}. Less poetically, this might be seen as a restatement of Rousseau's dictum that persons must quickly become 'accustomed to regard their individuality only in its relation to the body of the State' as the most appropriate means of ensuring that they 'identify themselves in some degree with this greater whole'\textsuperscript{74}. Coupling culture with policy is an cost-effective way of developing such dispositions.

CULTURE AND POLICY

'Culture' and 'policy' might seem odd words to bring together and then match up with 'subject'. The two most common definitions of culture do not suggest that it is the object of policy. On the one hand, it is often held to refer to the artistic output of a particular person or group, defined and valued according to aesthetic criteria and in some way emerging organically from a community of creative people. The other definition, less specific, takes culture to be an all-encompassing concept that incorporates how we live our lives, the sense of place and person that make us human. Conversely, policy is usually taken to refer to a regularised, systematised position statement or guide for action that has been adopted by an organisation as an instrument for achieving a goal. In short, it is bureaucratic, not creative or organic.

But this distance between the terms is problematic. For both the senses of culture that I have outlined are linked to a notion of care, a duty to tend and improve ourselves and others through exposure to the best creative work produced by the best persons at their personal best. Looking more closely at these meanings of 'culture' and 'policy' we can see that each is in fact quite related to the other. It is organisations that educate, circu—
late, sponsor, circumscribe and exclude actors and activities that go under the names of artist or artwork, through the activation of policies. Governments, unions, training institutions, community groups and profit-making bodies all support, fund, regulate, advertise, train and evaluate creative persons; in fact, they often articulate the very criteria which are deployed to make possible the use of the word 'creative'. This may be done through: law courts which permit erotica on the grounds that they are works of art; secondary curriculum bodies that set texts on the grounds that they are improving; public film authorities that sponsor scripts on the grounds that they reflect national concerns; or private impresarios who print ballet programs justifying an unusual season on grounds of innovation. In turn, these criteria may themselves derive respectively from: legal precedent; governmental education; citizenship or tourism aims; or the profit plans of large corporations.

The second, seemingly all-inclusive, understanding of culture amounts either to an ethnographic exploration of ways of living or to a colour supplement account of the prevailing Zeitgeist. It is quite significant that the sense of the term is best expressed in locations that once more involve the use of particular conventions and regimens of training to construct their categories. For instance, references to indigenous culture made by anthropologists before land rights tribunals are in part determined by the rules of conduct decided by the state in the light of a particular perception of political power and ethical rule. Similarly, references to merchant bank weekend culture made by "quality newspaper" feature writers are in part determined by the rules of conduct decided by their editors/proprietors in the light of a particular perception of market segmentation and professional practice. We hear about these lifestyle/ritual practices because of – and through the utilisation of – policy. And the arrangements which permit particular forms of knowledge to circulate as legitimate and distinguishable from others (the foreign and the juvenile) are, in turn, the stuff of culture. Donzelot brings the terms together implicitly in his concept of policing, by which is meant 'methods for developing the quality of the population and the strength of the nation'. Cultural policy, then, becomes a site at which the subject is produced. This is to follow Saunders
and Hunter in arguing that 'the subject-form is not something promised by history or required by language; it is something brought into being and maintained as a definite mode of conduct by certain ethical institutions'.

It is only relatively recently that culture and policy have been bracketed and colonised by university study and become subject to regular high-level consultation via colloquia, mirroring the recency of the formalisation of international cultural diplomacy as standard ministerial fare. The newness of the field makes the task of slicing it up into typologies difficult. Any survey of cultural policy would need to consider both the programmatic and the determinate, the discretionary and deliberate as opposed to the non-discretionary and latent. Some account must be given of the difference between those policies which have been definitely selected as positive interventions and those imposed by the requirements of a particular conjuncture of the social, the economic and the discursive. To help in this, it is best to consider some history.

The model of the patron of the arts derives from the cultural subvention provided to ruling class iconography by the absolutist monarchs of mid to late millennial Europe, up to the advent of bourgeois democracy. The principal concern of the old absolutism was the maintenance of what Vitanyi calls 'a high standard of culture within a very narrow context', in part via the reproduction of the ruling classes through the training of their progeny. Popular, general education was not part of this process. Pedagogic demotics had not yet had their moment. It is important to note, though, that we can already discern the two great wings of cultural policy flapping energetically: subvention and training. As Rousseau insists: 'It is not enough to say to the citizens, be good; they must be taught to be so'.

The appearance of laissez-faire capitalism marked the desire to supplant automatic transfer of privilege by its earnt equivalent. Capital was to take priority over the former system of inherited control of land and state. The development of modern industries brought with it cultural policy, perforce the emergence of the modern city. Although
there have been cities for six thousand years, capitalism accelerated their growth dramatically. David Gross identifies four discourses determining the meaning of the city: as religious site; as public gathering place; as architectural structure; and as semi-otic possibility. We might connect these shifts in discursive register with, respectively: the very ancient world of Mesopotamia, with significance on through the Middle Ages; pre-Christian Athens and Rome, with relevance also to late mediaeval and Renaissance cities; the Industrial Revolution, with precursors in the Renaissance; and postmodernity. The latter two periods are of principal concern here.

With the modern city of the Industrial Revolution came the notion of public opinion and a public culture. Weber argues that its emergence was the precondition for an art history. Production and its infrastructure certainly formed the stimulus to networks such as libraries and theatres, and there then developed the need to train a proletariat to manufacture and to consume; and hence, to appreciate. Equally, there was the need to form a sense of belonging in the wider populace. This wider populace included new types of person and what Habermas terms 'new spheres of life...The diffusion of culture to the middle class and the formation of a broader educated public interested in the arts. Sometimes in imitation of aristocracy and sometimes as an act of its own invention, the bourgeoisie becomes an innovator in the sense that it strives for TH Marshall's 'consciously constructed culture' as a means of building a new social order.

Citadin, citoyen, civic, civil, citizen; all were henceforth related to notions of a refined public civilization intimately connected to this city. The state's crucial defining factor became its capacity to divide itself up as an organiser of morality – the definition, encouragement, execution and prohibition of morality/immorality – and simultaneously to enunciate the values of obedience and patriotism. In the absence of what Elizabeth Wilson calls the 'controlling paternosters of kin, clan or indenture', the modern city provided the first comparatively open site for people to meet promiscuously, if sometimes with additional policing of the movement of bourgeois women. Simmel's account of the 'touch-and-go elements of metropolitan life' underscores the polysemic
'reserve with its overtone of hidden aversion' that, paradoxically, offered an anonymous history and new 'individual independence and differentiation' along with the 'right to distrust'\(^9\). As the great migrations towards, and hence formations of, cities took place in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the emerging liberal–capitalist democracies, time and space were reordered outside the sense of them which had obtained in the sealed–off worlds of rural management\(^9\). For the city requires of its inhabitants that they have a 'cognitive map' as well as a strictly spatial one, a map that can encompass all the 'vaster and properly unrepresentable totality' that Jameson attributes to the social\(^9\).2.

We might assign this a task to the realm of cultural policy A classic, mundane instance may be found in the constitution of rules of the road and hence of the footpath with the arrival of the automobile in the early twentieth century. This exemplified a confusion about the relationship of the policing state to an active self–governance by the citizenry.

In striving to manage such an articulation, TA Wallace put it this way:

In Sydney people promenading the public streets must always keep to the left of the footpath. For a long time the reverse was the rule. At the time of writing – 1922 – much confusion is still being experienced...The new rule of the road, "Keep to the Left," is introduced because of the street traffic...By keeping to the left, pedestrians face the vehicular traffic that is coming towards them\(^9\).3.

At a more overtly political level, by the nineteenth century the city had become a place of discussion and assembly and hence a place requiring new forms of democratic control: the control of citizenship. This was to be the genius of the liberal–capitalist state: to ensure 'that nobody may deem himself so humble as not to constitute a part of the body politic', as Woodrow Wilson put it\(^9\).4. Trust in the system cheapened the cost of its maintenance and renewal. And this trust could be engendered by an investment in public education which took the onward march of the people towards freedom as its organising principle whilst seeking to produce what Lyotard terms 'le projet humbold–
tien': the simultaneous acquisition of knowledge by individuals and their insertion into a subjectivity that legitimised the emerging social form of the nation95. This was frequently set up as a struggle between reason and unreason for what Norman Angell named 'the public mind'. The irrational aspects of subjects were to be made known to them as a preliminary to their mastery of life and its drives. Angell's speech in acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1935 could be said to stand as a representative of the policies informed by such anxieties. In it, he called for public education to found itself on, effectively, demonstrating the subject's ethical incompleteness to itself, in order that this indeterminacy could be worked on in the interests of social harmony: 'First, the ordinary citizen and voter must acquire a greater awareness of his own nature, his liability to certain follies, ever recurrent and ever disastrous96. In the fifty years that bracket the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a country such as England is urbanising so quickly that its chaotic lack of city planning and services unhinges policymakers and encourages them to instil the virtues of thrift and self-help into the dross of the city via education of the poor into civility97. Angell was speaking just such anxieties, transposed onto the global scale.

The laissez-faire economy animating many of these developments only existed in a few places at the global core of world capitalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Other countries, outside Europe and North America, came to be colonial and semi-colonial plots with huge debts to and limitations imposed by imperialising states and internationalising corporations. The need of countries on the periphery of the system to progress beyond agrarian economies domestically while competing internationally produced a more planned approach to all kinds of development, including the cultural. Educational policies were formed which were designed to produce a citizenry capable of speaking to other peoples and trading with them; in short, capable of competing with others. This presupposed the competence to know differences and the means of bridging them. The state and its citizenry/the citizenry and its state came to be connected by a complex of coercion, representation, provision and mobilisation that worked to define these differences98.
Where eighteenth-century Europe has been characterised as the era that saw the emergence of the human being as the centre of the new sciences, a centre that is moving towards a new freedom in self-knowledge, the nineteenth century is thought to have required a specialised division of person and labour. By the middle of the twentieth century, there is seen to be a kind of crisis between the logics of civility and management: 'in the sphere of politics there has been an overcoding of economic rationalism whose apogee is technocratic centralism', as Kristeva summarises it. American sociologists of the late 1950s and 1960s are referring to a lack of fit between the logic of developing technology and the values it is supposed to serve. This is said to be an unconscionably quirky time, an unsettled moment of becoming that C Wright Mills introduces to readers of The Listener as the 'post-modern period' of 1959. Postmodern because the unity of freedom and reason which were the joint inheritances granted to liberalism and socialism by the Enlightenment have 'virtually collapsed' in the sight of the overweening priority given to rationality, a rationality which is opposed to both freedom and reason in the name of efficient centralisation. A decade after Mills, even the customary rules of rigour of instrumental reason have been problematised by this metaterm. The social scientist is alienated from its profession when Daniel Bell declares in 1971 that 'the post-modern, period or society, is not a definition, but only a question. There is an important economic corollary of/influence upon these developments in the expansion of products whose properties of signification are of the essence: pedagogy; the audiovisual; publishing; tourism; and advertising. Information has displaced production of the physical necessities for survival as the trope of the postmodern economy by the 1980s, as the actual locus of production of such necessities has been removed to newly industrialising countries.

An enormously far-reaching process of urbanisation is connected to these developments, making ever more relevant the issues of public management and identity that the modern city first threw up two hundred years ago. In 1950, the member states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development encompassed thirty-eight
cities with a population of more than a million persons. Projections for the turn of the century have put this at three times that number. The rest of the world in 1950 had thirty-three such cities; a projection for the year 2000 multiplies this tenfold. Although there is now much debate over this proposition and its effects, we clearly live in circumstances derived from the belief that individual and collective productivity increase with urban growth. There are important cultural corollaries of this shift to the cities. Janet Staiger points to the significance of multinational corporations utilising global signifiers to identify themselves that reference the anonymous, mobile monumentalism of their headquarters, a significance located in imposingly immovable buildings that are nevertheless ready to influence life anywhere at any time. The contrast of this modernist architecture with the postmodernist chaos underneath and around it is drawn out for Staiger in such texts as Blade Runner, Brazil and Max Headroom through their sites of random protest inside the dark decay of space, protests that serve to call up further surveillance and training in the sight of insistent critiques of the identities on official offer. The continued capacity to mount such critiques and elicit such responses is indicative of decentred fields of power. For all the desire to manage that world below, the very reach of the multinational is indicative of the dispersed operation of power, the fact that it can no longer be said to organise fixed, immobile spaces as part of a single movement towards centralised authority and a unitary subject. An example of this duality emerges from a consideration of the concept of time. World Standard Time was introduced progressively from 1884 as a means of dealing with infrastructural/economic developments across and between different places. This made for a significant contrast with what had gone before, as Kern points out in stating that there were two hundred different zones of time between Washington and San Francisco in 1870. It might be thought that this innovation represents the preconditions for the ultimate in standardisation and substitutability; but it both accompanies and stimulates a mutability, a plasticity of space that may encourage problems of management rather than eradicating them, a theme taken up in much modernist writing.
Bell's postmodern 'question' of twenty years ago has become one of the public presentation of identity. It is far from a purely economic issue. The state's legitimacy is often drawn from its capacity to speak for its citizens, to be their vocalising agent. This is achieved, depending on the type of society, at least in part through a doctrine of nations, a concept of a particular space that is defined by the state itself but informed affectively by something else\textsuperscript{110}. The 'something else' is a cultural belonging. Faced with the loss of belonging flowing from 'overcoding', Kristeva suggests that there are two options: either the state recognizes its moral prerogatives and integrates them into its economic rationalism – which would result in a fascist or Stalinist totalitarianism – or the state abandons this role and plays its part indirectly through technocratic liberalism – a course that entails a proliferation of aesthetic practices on the level that concerns us\textsuperscript{111}.

For Charles Taylor, this overcoding raises the spectre of the loss of democracy to extremism because of the alienation of modern life from active political participation. He refers to the risks of instrumentalism producing 'a desert of public space'. Conversely, for Gellner, engendering a 'self...underwritten by the social and general environment' is precisely a matter of instrumentalism, and worthily so\textsuperscript{112}.

On each side, the ideal space outside the scope of monetary and methodological individualism and technocratic reasoning—for—growth seems to be that occupied by citizenship. We can now hone our investigations of citizenship, paring them down to find the subject of this thesis by redividing citizenship into four moods.

In the first mood, classical political theory decrees that citizens have the political right to parliamentary representation in search of what, after Aristotle, might be called the arithmetic equality of political association\textsuperscript{113}. In the second, liberal political theory confirms this right and adds to it the doctrine of the civil right to relative freedom of personal conduct (up to the point where this contravenes the same right of others). This
identity is a community identity. The third, distinctively modern, component of the discourse of citizenship is the social right to a minimum standard of living guaranteed by a welfare state. The most recent decisive innovation, the postmodern guarantee, falls in the area of providing access to the technologies of communication as crucial integers in the set of polity and identity. Where the modern move depended on subjects that would recognise their debt to the great institutions of the state, the postmodern derives its power from a sense that such institutions need to relearn what sovereignty is about in polymorphous sovereign-states and transnational business and social milieux which are diminishingly homogeneous in demographic terms and increasingly heteroglossic in their cultural competence.114.

It would be misleading to presume that there is a direct empirical fit between material changes to populace, polity and economy on the one hand and the discourse of citizenship on the other. For no idea of popular sovereignty can serve as a total account of political institutions.115. But we can discern significant changes within certain areas that combine accounts of citizenship with an institutional effect, such as the law. In their survey of changes to legal relations in the United States over the past hundred years, Eskridge and Peller underline the different foundational constituencies to which new movements in law conventionally lay claim. 'Common Law Formalism', established at the turn of the century, based itself on an account of the community as a collection of individuals in pursuit of liberty. The appearance of 'Legal Process' in the 1940s shifted the focus of legitimacy onto the community as represented by the state acting as a neutral entity. Both these trends were brought into question in the 1970s by the 'New Public Law'. It rested on the notion of the community as a combination of interacting groups, whose relative autonomy from each other should be guaranteed by a guiding principle of formal and social equality.116. Elements of this new law, such as Alternative Dispute Resolution, have grounded themselves in a critique of liberal legalism, arguing for a doctrine of the self that is tied to 'community norms' and their relations, such that adjudication is not the province of a removed, properly civic, figure of principled authority and jurisprudence. Nor should it be based on the rights of the individ-
ual¹¹⁷. This position poses some problems for a totalising account of what it is to be a citizen and the space of nature in which that citizen is located.

The discourse of citizenship now assumes that the technologies for calling citizens up and training them produce a different kind of ideal subject as their preferred product, even if they continue to do so in the name of a preexistent, essential person. This thesis presumes that such a move is part of Nietzsche's despised 'snare of language...,' presenting all activity as conditioned by an agent – the "subject"' when in reality 'there is no "being" behind the doing, acting, becoming¹¹⁸.

It is cultural policy's object to find, serve and nurture a sense of belonging, through educational and other cultural regimens. These regimens are the means of governance, the means of the orderly formation of public collective subjectivity in what Mill termed 'the departments of human interests amenable to governmental contro1¹¹⁹. Some of this is done in the name of the maintenance of culture, in the name of preserving senses of person and how to divide them up. This can be managed in terms of ethnicity, age, gender, faith or class, though the last two are rarely cited as justifications for state intervention. Or it can be managed in other terms, which generate new modes of expression. The latter tend to embrace developments in the social technology of culture in ways that talk about the need for a citizenry to have available the latest and the best from wherever. The former wants a type of cultural audit performed that takes account of the need for indigenous cultural production. It places a premium on locally–made meanings and their systems. In this rendering, local culture exists to produce. In the other rendering, it exists to relay¹²⁰.

Celebrants of postmodernity frequently accord culture a privileged place outside utility. Ankersmit maintains that it is a category mistake to evaluate culture or use it, because culture is the domain of consciousness, a domain that is separate from advantage or disadvantage. It is the space within which such judgements may be made but is itself outside their capacity to calculate¹²¹. Matthew Arnold, by contrast, knew that there
were definite, productive goals for culture, to be enunciated as part of policy. It was neither autotelic nor accidental: 'Culture is...a study of perfection. It moves by the force, not merely or primarily of the scientific passion for pure knowledge, but also of the moral and social passion for doing good'\textsuperscript{122}. Culture is both the object of commentary and the site of metacommentary, in this reading. At the same time as it can deliver the means of recognising and attaining perfection, it is also the source of identifying these means. Both the object to be evaluated and the criteria for evaluation are on offer. So perhaps Arnold is holding up culture as autotelic after all when he says that its 'great aim' is 'setting ourselves to ascertain what perfection is and to make it prevail...through all the voices of human experience which have been heard upon it'\textsuperscript{123}. In any case, all such accounts still require technologies to animate them. Let us move forward a century, to the site of one such technology: the business magazine.

The \textit{Australian Director} advises its 1988 member–of–the–board reader to invest in art, a recommendation initially made on the grounds of potential for return on investment. Artworks are expected to hold or increase their value. But there is another side to all this, the putative, unspecifiable humanness of pleasure that exists in another domain, in the domain in whose name capital is accumulated but whose values are separated from it. This is humanness itself. This is taste:

\begin{quote}
Art is certainly an investment for the future and not only in crass commercial terms. One can hardly imagine sitting back in the lounge room and staring at a pile of dollar bills on the table. However, art affords not only a handsome dividend, but unlimited visual and sensual pleasure in the meanwhile\textsuperscript{124}.
\end{quote}

The \textit{Australian Director} goes on, less disingenuously, to note that the first modern private art patronage derived from American railway systems paying artists to depict scenes advertising areas through which the company's tracks would pass. This provides a bridge to a further statement that needs to be kept somehow separate from the first:

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The prime motivation to initiate corporate collecting is probably most often generated through public relations consultants, the aim being to establish an image for a company entering the market or to adjust the image of an already existing company.  

This is clearly to do with the formation of a self, the refurbishment of a subject. In this instance, the self is a business entity. Conversely, when the British Parliament first purchased paintings on behalf of the nation, in 1753, it did so as a means of forming a public by that very phrase: to buy on behalf of was to form. Policies are neither static nor disinterested, and the public formed often changes as a result. Its changeability is part of the warrant for such subvention. Two hundred and forty years later, the British Arts Council enunciated three raisons d'être/d'acheter: the generation of employment; urban renewal; and the capacity for assisting and producing a spirit of enterprise amongst the people. These clearly reference the political problems and coda of the time. They are objects of instrumental rationality that seek to be calculable means of reforming the citizenry. For my purposes, their legitimacy as aims or methods and their standing as pointers to history are of lesser moment than their mode of address. It is their work to constitute a public which is to be worked on.  

The Australian Government's very ability to fund culture rests on an implied constitutional power to develop national sovereignty. In keeping with this license, consider the following rationales for state support of culture, expressed by Richard Eggleston, a Board member of the Australian Elizabethan Theatre Trust, in 1969. The reasons he gave included: indicators of quality of life; elevation of taste; preservation of culture; education; awakening a dormant but natural facility in the public; preservation of heritage; and community inspiration through the presentation of excellence. HC Coombs, whose career included periods as Governor of the Reserve Bank and Chair of the Australian Council for the Arts, accorded culture an a priori status outside economic and political cost–benefit calculation because of the lack of fit between high quality and high profits. Culture went beyond such a locus of decision and into the same realm as
sport. National pride could be encouraged through a metonymic identification of self with Australia and art with Australia. Twenty years later, his successors were continuing this unspecifiability ethos of humanness. As Donald Horne, then chairing the Australia Council, put it, 'when we talk about arts support policies we are talking about the meanings given to existence within a society.'

This reconciliation of the twin definitions of culture advanced earlier is part of the fabric of policy. The Australian Labor Party's 1986 Platform, for instance, maintained that the 'basis of Australian society lies to a significant extent in the strength of its own artistic and creative expression. Government has a responsibility to encourage the development of an Australian culture.' Similarly, the law which enacted the United States' National Endowment for the Arts and National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) stated that:

'It is necessary and appropriate for the federal government to help and create and sustain not only a climate encouraging freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry but also the material conditions facilitating the release of this creative talent.'

Looking back a quarter of a century later, one of the original Congressional sponsors of this legislation, John Brademas, maintained that 'the arts are essential' because 'art and artists make an immense difference by enriching our lives as individuals and building a culture that illumines and enobles us.' He argued that art would 'nurture the creativity of our nation'. The evidence given in support of this took the form of a quotation from a worker in the field, the late Robert Motherwell, that gives renewed focus to discovering real selves: 'actually, what an artist is, is a person skilled in expressing human feelings.' In discussions of crises of reason and information, such an elevation is now a nostrum for the likes of Saul Bellow and Octavio Paz. This need not be in opposition to more overtly programmatic economic or political goals, such as are
revealed by Catharine Stimpson's tracery of successive NEH Annual Reports. This was the "official" mission of American culture in 1985:

> The humanities are vitally important to the educational and cultural life of our nation, constituting as they do the soul of civilization, which has been formed over the course of the centuries. Preserving and transmitting this tradition serves to nurture and sustain our national character, helping to make the United States worthy of its leadership in the world\(^{136}\).

This mission reveals a significant degree of fit between the humanist faith in renewal of the social order through expression of the artistic \textit{persona} and the more vigorously confident notion of an aesthetic underwriting of global leadership. Such a leadership needs more than financial or military coherence. But there remains the need to assess the connexion of culture with economy and polity. This necessarily raises broader questions of recent social theory and its accounts of the cultural subject.

THE CONCEPT OF A SOCIAL SURFACE

This section sketches the concept of an overall social surface. It provides a setting for the remainder of the thesis, in a way that perhaps differs methodologically from much analysis "after Foucault". This is done primarily because the thesis works fairly consistently with the operation of various arms of the liberal–capitalist state in different locations, frequently touching on questions of the differences and links between economy, polity and culture. This section sets up the concept of a social surface in the light of such a reading and the context it provides for the formation of subjectivity.

The preexisting foundational subject of conventional social theory is done away with, or at least modified, by Althusser\(^{137}\). What was once an ontology of the subject becomes something to be explained and situated, not uncovered as a transcendental truth. It is
now a contingent truth that depends on the conditions of the social surface on which it is found. For Foucault: 'One has to dispense with the constituent subject...to attain an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within the historical texture...that is, a form of history which accounts for the constitution of knowledges [savoirs], discourses, domains of objects'.

Althusser provides the following formulation of Marxism as social theory. The economic base is comprised of the productive forces and the relations of production. Its superstructure is comprised of the law and the state plus ideology, which in turn is subdivided into religion, ethics and politics. One can understand the social order, then, as a place or building. He develops the metaphor of base (or infrastructure, or substructure) and superstructure in the following mode, which has become extremely influential in a way removed from its historical genesis, because of the productivity of its meaningfulness and certain slippages between Althusser and Foucault; specifically, Althusser's contention that: 'A topography represents in a definite space the respective sites occupied by several realities'. Foucault uses a metaphor of site to make from it a material history of discourses; and this sense of the site, of a social surface, is integral to the formations of subjectivities investigated in my thesis. There are difficulties with mapping all of Althusser's social theory onto that of Foucault. But I want to consider Althusser's position more fully, prior to looking at a revised terrain. Much of his writing remains important, for all the denigration of it as obscurantist, arcane, incorrect and alienating. It is fairly clear that to understand Foucault's accounts of culture and society, it is necessary both to understand how they can be constructed away from doctrines of the sovereign subject and how dialectical reasoning can be redispensed from the grand stage of history towards an analysis of conjunctures. Both these precepts appear to have come from Althusser. One recalls here Foucault's suggestion to 'open Althusser's books'.

The utility of a material trope of edifice resides in the foundational notion of the economy, above which lie the visible, daily workings of the social order. The foundational is
a bedrock which must exist for the rest of the edifice to stand 'to represent above all the 'determination in the last instance' by the economic base'. But away from this 'last instance', the superstructure has a "relative autonomy" and can even effect a "reciprocal action" onto the economy.

The state is a critical component of this social surface. It has two chief characteristics. The first involves the use of force and its threat as a means of eliciting obedience to authority. This characteristic is composed of the army, the police, the courts, the bureaucracy and the prisons. Its work is done by sanction and interdiction. This is 'the (repressive) State apparatus' ((R)SA). The second characteristic is the existence of numerous 'Ideological State Apparatuses' (ISAs). These include religious and educational institutions, the family, the polity, the trade union and the communications and cultural ISAs. So where there is a singular and unitary (R)SA, there is a 'plurality' of ISAs. In addition, many of these belong partially to what is conventionally styled the 'private domain', unlike the (R)SA. But, after Gramsci (or, for that matter, Durkheim), Althusser regards such a distinction between public and private as 'internal to bourgeois law', a system of law which the (R)SA is not subject to because of its putatively legitimate monopoly on the exercise of force. And whereas this violence is the touchstone for (R)SA work, the ISAs 'function by ideology'. Ideology also exists in each part of the (R)SA, but it is secondary in importance to force. The ISAs may contain elements of force, but they are secondary to ideology as determinations on how ISAs function.

Much of this analysis is convivial to the account of social surfaces used in this thesis, but as a methodological, heuristic base rather than a description of an organic society. Giddens argues that the central defining characteristic of (for him, a continuing) modernity has been how the social system organises 'time and space' in a cultural sense. Hence my use of the term "surface" even as the metaphor of base and superstructure is mobilised. This then provides the means for conceptualising the circulation of discourses and the formation of subjectivities within the sphere of governance in a
way that can position such practices sometimes alongside capital and its critical economic role and sometimes quite separate from it.

The problem with the public–private division discussed above remains a critical one, as it determines a role for the state in policing the ownership of property. This is especially important given the methodological and political individualism of the rational consumer side to both the new citizenship and neoclassical economics. But even these discourses operate as technologies forming a public in ways that are primarily connected with their own internal logics of subjectivity. The best means of understanding such technologies is not simply through reading them off against the absolute logic of capital accumulation, but as formations of rules mobilised to manage populations. This is a micropolitical play of power in the governance of subjects.

Foucault argues that there is a risk of reductionism in concentrating on Marxist understandings of the subject. It may well be that subjection derives from forces connected to production, class conflict or ideology. But he is sceptical about the assumption that these are the 'more fundamental mechanisms', suggesting that there is a circularity in their relationship to modes of subjection. He points to the enormous impact of the sheer growth in size of the sphere of influence of the political domain of governance over the past five hundred years, arguing that the efficacy of the state's attempts to manage populations derives from two sources. The loci and logic of its power are not merely to be found amongst the interests or persuasions of the class that controls it, because it operates at a micro level as well as at the totalising level of general economic forces. This micro level relies on the formation of various kinds of public subject, and the determining logics of those subjects may not necessarily provide intelligible accounts of action if they are always led back to the economic. In fact, the path of research that works with ideology may be said to presuppose the idealist subject of philosophy imbued with a consciousness ready to be worked on.

Whilst acknowledging their overlap, Foucault signals the need to distinguish between: relations of power; relations of communication; and 'objective capacities'. Power works
to transform the real world. Communication works to give that world meaning and conditions of semiotic exchange. And the 'capacities' work to make for inequality and domination. Each is mutually imbricated with the others, but not in a coordinated or consistent way that would make for an equilibrium. Different sites will see different points of connexion between them, with each sphere frequently operating by its own internal rules and regularities.

When the issue of people as a collective public is addressed, developments since Althusser have in any case problematised his findings about who controls the apparatuses of the state and whose interests they may be said to serve. In fact, his crucial category of class may be unusable. Leaving to one side the accounts of class derived from self-apportionment of attributes through questionnaire sociology, or the Weberian stress on position within the labour market and the additional grids of status and authority, the Marxist tradition itself offers discontinuities in this area.

Resnick and Wolff list four different Marxist understandings of how class divisions may be discerned. Firstly, there is a division between those with property and those without; secondly, between those with power or authority and those without; thirdly, between those with control of the forces of production (technology) and those without; and fourthly, between persons in differing relationships to a shifting set of processes of the production, appropriation and distribution of surplus value. It is difficult to find agreement within or between these positions. And it is also increasingly awkward to use class as a category of identifiable agency. When and how does a class "act"?

Rosenthal has sought to recuperate class by attributing the confusions surrounding it to a category mistake. He argues that class is quite different from categories with signifiers that may be read against signifieds in the material world. Perhaps it has no connexion, for instance, to real-world positions that become typified in signification. The counter-example cited is that of women inside a discourse of gender. Unlike this subject position, he argues, class is a theoretical object inimical to referentiality in any sense of
social identity. It is not already constituted as a group of real persons. Jumping off from this issue, understanding that there are degrees of definiteness attached to "woman" that are different from those attached to "ruling class", we might redispense the difficulty with class onto the broader terrain of signification, to break open these categories and indicate how they might be used methodologically rather than organically. The heuristic device of Althusser's social theory is reformed as a topographic map as it passes through a postmodern transmogrification. Ironically, perhaps, this takes us onto a path not dissimilar to that prescribed by TH Marshall, the recently reinstated high priest of the virtues of citizenship. This is a path that seeks 'stepping-stones in the middle distance' as a guide to social analysis.

It is instructive here to consider the 'postmodern Presidency', the concept marking the arrival of institutionalist American political science at the gates of cultural theory. The argument runs that the Presidency was essentially founded as an agency of high foreign policy, removed from the everyday sphere. Congress was the site of domestic public policy initiatives. Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson represented the coming of the modern Presidency, on this account. The modern manifested itself in their customary practice of a direct address to the public and their party organisations as well as in their adoption and elaboration of doctrines of efficiency, reformism and local intervention. The modern period reached its apex in the 'personal, plebiscitary presidency' of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. It was his skill to govern discursively via a politics of identification, of culture. His radio broadcasts called up a citizenry and then called upon it to identify the best of each person and the best of society with the Presidency. This identificatory process has heightened with the advent of the postmodern Presidency, even as the significance of the incumbent is problematised via the developing reach of the unelected into the management of the population. As the President returns, perhaps, to the domain of first lord of wars, he becomes ever more insistent on his rhetorical placement within the discourse of the domestic everyday. The rhetoric of certainty expands in accordance with an actual uncertainty about its apparent essential basis in fixity. The uptake of postmodernity within the discipline of public adminis-
tration becomes similarly anxious about its own project of reformism and the public's faith in the validity of notions of preconditions for ideal argument and policy. What had been a thoroughgoing critique of Reaganism in the mid-1980s, based on modernist premises of accountability and equity which promised a better order of principled debate and management, is transformed. It becomes 'Public Administration in a Time Without a Name'\textsuperscript{159}. It becomes indeterminate.

Consider this specific site of emerging indeterminacy, and the metaindeterminacy placed onto the manufactured and managed subject that I have already outlined, along-side Althusser's account of ideology as 'a 'Representation' of the Imaginary Relationship of Individuals to their Real Conditions of Existence'\textsuperscript{160}. He argues that to criticise an ideology, for example faith in god, is to presume that this ideology is illusionary, but that it at least alludes to reality and hence has grounds which are both true and germane to itself on which it can be criticised: '(ideology = illusion/allusion)'. The next presumption is that the act of interpretation can unfold this and give the lie to falsehood/underscore truth\textsuperscript{161}. It will be seen presently that this is quite critical as a hermeneutic wellspring for a stream of methods for reforming subjects and publics.

Althusser maintains that such practices give rise to a query as to the sources and reasons for this 'imaginary transposition of the real conditions of existence'. For such an ethic of interpretation assumes that:

what is reflected in the imaginary representation of the world found in an ideology is the conditions of existence of men, i.e. their real world...[when] it is not their real conditions of existence, their real world that 'men' 'represent to themselves' in ideology, but above all it is their relation to those conditions of existence represented to them there\textsuperscript{162}.

Let us now consider a little more closely what this signifies about the category of the knowing and doing individual subject. It suggests that ideas are material practices,
rituals such as the act of prayer (material faith in religion) or payment of a social debt (material faith in justice) which are carried out by the subject at the same time as they define that subject. For the subject is hailing and being hailed through this set of practices. And not all the practices will be compatible. This need not be a problem until and unless they come into conflict.

The separation of potentially conflictual spheres, both of which may be necessary for the constitution of the ethical subject of liberal–capitalist citizenship and the maximising subject of the free market, involves a further move, the emergence of a smaller unit of analysis than the ISA, and yet one that is constitutive of it. This is what Foucault terms 'those systems of micro–power that...we call the disciplines'. Liberties and disciplines are the dual inheritance of the Enlightenment, whereby the subjection of 'forces and bodies' must accompany the guarantees of sovereignty. 'Mechanisms of power' travel alongside and go guarantor of freedoms. Power may sometimes silence, but it also hails, articulates and requires speech. It works to produce truths.

It is through the training or schooling of the subject achieved under the agency of disciplines, for example, that the subject may be known. And it is via similar methods that a 'will to knowledge' appears. The emergence of categories of person produced by forms of knowledge ('the child, the patient, the madman, the prisoner') cuts persons up, making them the object of understandings that divide them into insides, outsides, conduits and passages into and out of cohorts. This achievement is to be seen under the sign of a 'technology of power', a productive manufacturer of truth: 'The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.' So the state, while "it" exists in a definite structural relationship to persons, executive governments, the market and the delineation of these groupings, operates with and may be understood by the work of differing knowledges. This is Donzelot's 'provisional bracketing' of "state" with "power". Neither exists other than relationally, as productive forces doing the work of 'activating and managing a population'.

Such an understanding is in stark contrast to the two standard logics of the state. The social compact and functionalist views argue for a unified subject placing sovereignty in
it because of a perceived 'community of interest'¹⁷⁰. This derives from a foundational humanism that is clearly foreign to my argument. Neo-Marxist accounts, in some sense after Althusser, see the state as a set of fractions ultimately dedicated to protecting capital accumulation¹⁷¹. Both discourses are totalising and essentialist, one in its mythic first instance (the signing over of sovereignty) and the other in its mythic last instance (the servicing of capital). Each hour, be it first or last, is too lonely for this thesis to occupy. Neither discourse pays more than scant attention to the formation of subjects or the politics of culture. Instead, the tendency is to account for the state as a vehicle eliciting obedience and social actors as having definite, pre-discursive, immutable interests (albeit that are frequently not self-evident)¹⁷². Once again we see Mill's self/society/state struggle discussed in the Introduction to this thesis. But what of the question of technology: that is, the question of power?

For de Jouvenel, the essence of the state is power¹⁷³. This power is akin to Russell's 'production of intended effects'¹⁷⁴, although '[t]he power relation is give–and–take' for pluralists ¹⁷⁵. Power can also be put in antinomic relation to knowledge, distorting the flow of information¹⁷⁶. For Lukes, notions of power and the subject are all about interests. He proposes a final and conclusive level of its operation when 'A exercises power over B in a manner contrary to B's interests'¹⁷⁷. Power thus offers a unifier for discourses around the state and the subject, promising their union and difference a mutual solidity. Power is produced here as a property¹⁷⁸.

But it is possible to rewrite the state and power as productive processes, fundamentally unfixed and relational in their circulation. The question "cui bono?" is now displaced by "qui parle?". Aspects of that question are reconceived by Foucault as 'superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, knowledge, technology and so forth' ¹⁷⁹. On this reading, there is no central field of force functioning as a logical, coherent whole to repress or order the social, and there are not so much determining interests as determining formations of interests and subjects to have them. The interests are epiphenomenal, in a sense, to the lines of power.
that form them. In seeking the shifting *loci* of power at different sites, Foucault chooses not to seek:

the headquarters that presides over its rationality; neither the caste which governs, nor those who make the most important economic decisions which direct the entire network of power that functions in a society (and makes it function); the rationality of power is characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed\(^\text{180}\).

Significantly for the domain of this thesis, the discursive tactics of cultural policy will frequently be founded on accounts of subjectivity, of how to produce civil subjects. And the realm for so doing will be that of conduct, which must mean culture if it means more than force. The logics and *loci* of power are here plural and often discrete, their rationality self-referential and restricted to particular inscriptive systems as means of keeping incommensurate accounts of the subject apart. Power is, then, not so much Frow's 'consolidation of production of all speech'\(^\text{181}\) as it is the consolidation and dislocation of specific forms of speech at specific times. Power is the production of meanings in a decentred way. It does the work of demolition at certain points and construction at others because its principal task is the engineering of relations between subjects\(^\text{182}\). The primary site of this engineering is at the level of governance through culture. This next section explains the terrain of available meanings which this governance must traverse and how that terrain has altered.

**THE ONTIC, THE EPISTEMIC AND THE POSTMODERN**

The terrain of meaning has undergone significant epistemological and institutional changes over time, such that the relationship of signifier to signified has become increasingly complex. Foucault has systematised the question of the connexion between discourse and object in the following terms:
There is a problem: how can it happen that real things, things that are perceived, can come to be articulated by words within a discourse. Is it that words impose on us the outline of things, or is it that things, through some operation of the subject, come to be transcribed on the surface of words[?]183

The move he makes here points towards the central, critical foundation for the arguments enunciated in this thesis: namely, that three prejudices have informed Western understandings of the formation of subjects. These three prejudices are the ontic, the epistemic and the postmodern. The ontic register presumes that the world is stable, that a metaphysical realism is possible which renders entities perfectly recognisable on their own empirical footing184. Signifieds beget signifiers. For Aristotle, a perfect match can be achieved between language and object: 'an object of scientific knowledge exists of necessity, and is, consequently, eternal. For everything that exists of necessity in an unqualified sense is eternal, and what is eternal is ungenerated and imperishable185.

The ontic has undergone regular renewal and confirmation since Aristotle, through its elaboration by English empiricism and sociological positivism. Its status is that of a certain kind of commonsense logic. On this account, we can know subjects in a positivistic way that is congenially realist and the value of meanings is determined functionally. Just as I am describing the postmodern as one of a series of prejudices, so Comte thought that his 'positive philosophy' had emerged from a process of development through successive stages of 'leading conceptions'. The previous two were 'the Theological, or fictitious...[and] the Metaphysical, or abstract'. They were supplanted by 'the Scientific', which was a 'fixed and definite state' of reason and observation that connected 'single phenomena and some general facts'. With the 'progress of science', the number of these general facts would diminish in the face of a program based on the certainty of '[a]ll good intellects...that there can be no real knowledge but that which is based on observed facts'186. At an institutional level, attempts to utilise this way of thinking as a guide to the structure of society conceived of the ontic as a final stage of
evolution towards order. Herbert Spencer presented the paradox of a nexus between heterogeneity and cohesion. The 'structural and functional unlikeness' of the 'civilized nation' correlated differentiation with integration. Where nomadism was chaotic and charismatic authority slightly less so, the fully achieved nation had organisational systems melding custom with law, the generic with the specific and clarity with 'multi-formity'187. Just as the world could be known on its own terms, so this empiricist freedom from cant could also deliver rational forms of life.

The epistemic register contradicts the ontic, asserting in its stead that objects are formed through knowledge. The signifier begets the signified. The subject is known according to a particular means of apprehension. In Durkheim's memorable phrase, 'thought...must become the creator of its own object'188. For a "middle period" Baudrillard, for example: 'there is no reality or principle of reality other than that directly produced by the system as its ideal reference'189. The arbitrariness of significance resides both in the unmotivated connexion of signifier to signified, and in the restrictiveness which correlates particular signifiers with particular signifieds and those signifieds alone (a 'one-to-one assignation')190. Value is determined structurally. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault is arguing that a statement is tied to a "referential" that is made up not of 'things', 'facts', 'realities', or 'beings', but of laws of possibility, rules of existence for the objects that are named'191. Similarly, Weber refers to 'the discursive nature of our knowledge', a nature produced by the Gedankenbild, a system of analysis that brought disparate and dispersed phenomena together and made them relate anew on its own terms of trade, the terms of a 'unified analytical construct'192. Meanings are henceforward never 'true' in some metaphysical sense'. Rather, they are necessarily the outcome of either the understanding of actual persons in terms of their own codes, or imaginary collectivities conceived and deployed in the practice of theorising193.

The epistemic derives much of its force from modern linguistics and the elaboration of semiotics into a semiology across sites. Meaning is generated through the operation of binary opposites inside relatively discrete systems of signs that are carefully
differentiated from one another and that assign value inside each system's Eigengesetzlichkeit, or sphere of self-legislation. The value of a cultural object is determined by the rules of the system within which it is discussed. These rules are relatively autonomous from the social world, in keeping with the miniaturisation and differentiation of modernity. The corollary for the subject is to be found in the task which Weber set for sociology: that it ask about the conduct required of just such 'differentiated' categories of person in order for 'cultural uniqueness' to continue. This has great significance institutionally. In place of Comte's teleology of philosophy, Weber suggests 'pure types of legitimate authority', founded on tradition, charisma and the rational. Specifically, the validity of the most modern and complex of these systems, the rational, resides not in custom or personality, but 'patterns of normative rules'. This may be seen to give a warrant to Foucault's removal of power from groups of persons and its placement inside institutional machinery and discourse.

To return to the Well-Tempered Keyboard of the title to this thesis, it is significant that this was one of the first of what are called works of 'organic structure', which is to say that it functions through 'its own growth-determining logic'. The musical events that comprise it take on the task of building blocks that make each next step natural within the work's particular terms of reference or sphere of legislation. It is an epistemic piece of music in this sense.

The postmodern is another set of problematisations again, following the dominance of the epistemic. It queries the very notion of there being an object and a history to its understanding. Here, signifiers beget signifiers in an endless, importunate array of meanings that denies a connectedness of signifier to signified. They are loose from one another; Baudrillard's assignation of signifier with signified can no longer be fulfilled. One might be in an epistemic or ontic register but the layers of signification, the sheer plenitude of signification, always already render these as category mistakes. Now there is what Deleuze and Guattari call a rhizome, a chaotic root-system, in place of the logical trees of meaning that formed the knowledges of the past. The rhizome is founded
simultaneously on 'the principles of connection and heterogeneity: any point on a rhizome can be connected to any other point, and must be. Instead of a structural relationship between internal positions or points, the rhizome is made up of proliferating lines that lack any underlying force generating them. The postmodern derives from the promiscuous actual connexion of all signifiers pointed out by critics of the binarism of the epistemic. Binarism is displaced by the logocentric interdependence of all aspects of a virtually indivisible set of signs. This is a prejudice driven by the proliferation of different language games, comprised of heterogeneous elements and rules and dedicated to a relentless antagonism between participants.

By analogy, then, it may be said that discourse is now seen both to form its object of study and to hide that productivity. The idea of value as functionally, or even structurally, determined is lost. There is no referentiality in either reality or representation. All terms are commutable now and 'indeterminism reigns'. Baudrillard discerns this as the outcome of a passage through the three prejudices, at the end of which:

[a] possible definition for the real is: that for which it is possible to provide an equivalent representation... At the conclusion of this process of reproduction, the real becomes not only that which can be reproduced, but that which is always already reproduced: the hyperreal.

The process sees a 'mutual fulfillment' of 'reality and art' via the exchange of 'foundational privileges and prejudices'. All life is now aesthetic. It is experienced as interpretation; and all interpretation is made as experience. Reality and fiction can no longer be poles. Scott Lash calls this 'de–differentiation' for its undoing of the processes of autonomous spheres of being and control that characterised modernity. For this is not merely a shift in university knowledge, but in how to live, in how to talk and listen and make do with life.

This aestheticisation has considerable significance for any understanding of subjectivity. Where the Romanticism of the eighteenth century had installed the artist as...
the model of the subject operating outside the commonplace rules of conduct207, postmodernity aestheticises the rules of both conduct and misconduct. What began principally as a debate within architecture, literature and criticism, primarily in the United States, has shifted to the very condition of politics and culture in the Western world208. The postmodern subject is known as many, never one; it is not it, but split. But this split cannot simply be laid at the door of the psychically-divided subject of the psychocomplexes. This is a subject which is split inside discourse. The amount of information available to the subject and required of it exceeds its capacities and turns it away from a transcendental view of itself209. The television set and the screen-based knowledge of experience have institutionalised at public and private sites the 'metropolitan blase attitude' that Simmel found characteristic of the modern city's chaotically 'swift and uninterrupted change of outer and inner stimuli'210. Postmodernity is held by some to offer the chance of a reappropriation of the 'moyens de production de subjectivité' [the means of production of subjectivity]211. Alternatively, it is said to engender regression via a return to the ontic in an attempt to refashion restrictive concepts of Bildung212. The corollary of this is that institutions are now critical, if contradictory, sites for the promulgation of subjectivity and struggles to define the self. This latter issue is addressed more fully in Chapter Six.

Foucault travels two-thirds of this route across the prejudices in The Order of Things in his tracery of the emergence and efflorescence of the human sciences. He discerns a shift in the dominant Western mode of conceptualisation occurring towards the conclusion of the eighteenth century:

negatively, the domain of the pure forms of knowledge becomes isolated, attaining both autonomy and sovereignty in relation to all empirical knowledge...positively, the empirical domains become linked with reflections on subjectivity, the human being213.

When every conceivable mode of breaking up the person into a set of components named and known through the human sciences has been achieved, a total understanding
of a unitary subject is, ironically, forever dispensed with as achievable and forever inscribed as desirable:

> modernity begins when the human being begins to exist within his organism, inside the shell of his head, inside the armature of his limbs, and in the whole structure of his physiology; when he begins to exist at the centre of a labour by whose principles he is governed and whose product eludes him\(^\text{214}\).

This route has seen the person go through several transformations via the three prejudices discussed above. Once it simply was, it obtained, and was amenable to an act of description that could in turn be made accountable for its referentiality back to a pre-significatory real (the ontic). Then it was formed through knowledge held by and about the person that doubled back on the person and made it the subject of that knowledge (the epistemic). Then it became a series of subject positions enunciated through intertextual games of language, no longer knowable within certain, hermetically-sealed, discrete rules of those games. Slippage and indeterminacy predominated (the postmodern). The conditions of the production and interpretation of texts became the cradle of self-significance.

So it is that Julia Kristeva begins her essay "Postmodernism?" thus: 'This question could be reformulated to read: first, in what way can anything be written in the twentieth century, and second, in what way can we talk about this writing?\(^\text{215}\). Consider that against Habermas' argument that the Enlightenment's 'normative content' was to be found in 'self-consciousness, self-determination, and self-realization'. This self was publicly asserted in its individualistic organisation and disposal of objects. Two hundred years later:

> The paradigm shift that has occurred in the realm of theory speaks for itself: An anonymous society without a subject is taking the place of an association of free
and equal individuals who regulate their communal life themselves through democratic will-formation216.

This piece of writing seems a world away from the quotation from Kristeva immediately before it. Her statement speaks its postmodernity in its epigrammatic indeterminacy. Habermas, by contrast, exemplifies explicitness and specifies, almost, the conditions under which he may be contradicted. And where one addresses inscription and analysis, the other turns more towards political philosophy. But they have a nexus in the mystery of subjectivity, the mystery of where it is, how it is formed and what this means. The link between them may be found in the concept of the différend, Lyotard's formulation of 'the unstable state and instant of language whereon something which must be able to be put in phrases cannot yet be'217.

It is the hallmark of the era to seek to find words to speak différends; a hallmark of indeterminacy which must extend to person and polity from philosophy. When Lyotard amends his previous term "grand narratives", a term describing the liberal, Marxist, capitalist, Christian and speculative world-accounts that have collapsed with postmodernity, it is significant that he chooses 'subject-systems' as his neologism218. For these have been models seeking to explain and modify subjectivity. They are, in short, models of human governance. It is now the surfaces that are to be moulded in a contingent way, contingent not on finding the inner truth of subjects, but on the available means for manufacturing their outer truths. Foucault discerns a shift away from querying 'What are we in our actuality?' and towards 'What are we today?'219. Critiques of metaphysics go tandem with problems of intellectual and governmental legitimacy as, inter alia, the diffusion of technologies of communication breaks up established sources of the control of information and the definition and administration of persons220. Rather than drawing on interiority, the subject is constantly reinvented 'in order to satisfy certain requirements of personal advancement and of safety'. For Saul Bellow, this reaches its apogee in the United States in the institutionalisation of
processes whereby 'Americans have received advice on what to be like and how to behave'.

Of course, one could also break up these categories in economic terms. Clearly, the ontic preceded the modern economy, but also obtained within it. Jameson uses Ernest Mandel's work to periodise what he sees as the 'three fundamental moments of capitalism', which we might redissepos to describe the shifts in the organisation of production, distribution and politics that have been part of these changes over the past four hundred years. These moments are: market capitalism; monopoly or imperial capitalism; and postindustrial or multinational capitalism. Each stage involves the progress of capital into previously uncommodified regions, whether they be new geographical markets and sources of production or new types of product and new technologies for their creation and transfer. Other terms for the period might emphasise the force of multinational capital, the predominance of image and spectacle and the formative power of the media. These issues are explored further in Chapter Three, but for now we should note the suggestion that the relative autonomy of culture from the economy seems to have been succeeded by an 'explosion' of culture into all other realms. Far from having disappeared, its aestheticising tentacles have merged with the direction of Western economies towards service industries and emotional labour and away from the production of goods. This is both informed by and informing the prejudice of knowledge called the postmodern.

There is a great deal of debate about the value of the postmodern era. Zygmunt Bauman argues that the formerly political doctrine of liberty has been displaced by the notion of consumption. A subject's freedom is marked by its capacity to acquire. This means that symbolic exchange, and hence the circulation of meaning and taste, is now the defining factor of the person. Consumption is 'the cognitive and moral focus of life, integrative bond of the society, and the focus of systemic management' and the consumer has displaced the producer as the centre of social engagement. Popular culture and democracy meet now; the former engagement of quality and reason that
typified the hierarchised link between an aesthetic sense and the enlightened citizenry at work in the public sphere is no more\textsuperscript{227}. For Mills in the 1950s, '[s]ociety in brief has become a great sales-room\textsuperscript{228}.

This makes for an aestheticised politics of civic identity. Hence my argument that the objects of cultural policy are concerned with producing civil subjects. Whether or not Habermas' association of the free ever existed materially, its existence as a knowledge functions in a formative way, troped again and again in the discourses of liberalism and citizenship. This troping is more than political philosophy. It provides the foundation for the form of pedagogic Enlightenment that bureaucracies engage in, for the production of policies and programs that talk about self-discovery, autonomy and identification; in short, for instruments that take the absence of an originating subject as an unspoken given and shore up the state by forming a governable subject. This is done in the name of the apparently transcendental subject whose free will is magically always there but magically has to be formed and reformed time after time, a move that is close to Kierkegaard's frustrations about the discursive power of doctrines of:

"the public", consisting of real individuals who never are and never can be united in an actual situation or organization – and yet are held together as a whole.

The public is a host, more numerous than all the peoples together, but it is a body which can never be reviewed; it cannot even be represented\textsuperscript{229}.

The postmodern condition of the displaced subject is resisted through an appeal to the ontic, as a warrant for intervention by the state. Cultural policy exists to confirm what is apparently already there. Social engineering becomes social conservation. But there is a contradiction. Whilst postmodernity may be 'defined entirely by absences', it calls up a sense of loss of something never had\textsuperscript{230}. This leads to a plenitude of representations – and hence formations – of publics and their appropriate conduct, as the remainder of this thesis will show. The postmodern acts in the name of the ontic despite the fact that
it has substituted for the latter\textsuperscript{231}. For the postmodern is nostalgic for an historically ramified and derived meaning\textsuperscript{232}. Ironically, this means that, at the level of policy, the state is enabled to instantiate the new as the already extant, precisely by virtue of what Jameson calls 'an age that has forgotten how to think historically'\textsuperscript{233}. 
NOTES


15. Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy", Social Text, 8 (3)–9 (1), 1990, pp.59–60.


43. Andreas Huyssen, "From Counter-Culture to Neo-Conservatism and Beyond: Stages of the Postmodern", *Social Science Information*, 23 (3), 1984, pp.615–616.


46. Ibid.


50. Ibid. pp.73–74.


55. Walzer, op cit., p.293.


59. Ibid. p.299.


65. Ibid. pp.45 and 80.


70. Ibid. p.784.


73. Michael Ignatieff in Daniel Bell et al., "The Post–Industrial Society", in Bourne
et al., op.cit., p.68.


83. Vitanyi, loc.cit.


103. Lash, op.cit., pp.43–44.


111. Kristeva, loc.cit.


113. Aristotle, op.cit., V.6, p.129.

114. Graham Murdock and Peter Golding, "Information Poverty and Political Inequality in the Age of Privatized Communications", Journal of Communication, 39


121. Ankersmit, op.cit., p.139.


123. Ibid. p.47.


125. Ibid.


129. Ibid. pp.35, 37 and 41.


133. Ibid. p.104.

134. Ibid. p.105.


137. Stratton, op.cit., p.250.


145. Ibid. p.130.

146. Ibid. pp.136–137.


166. Ibid. p.170.

167. Ibid. p.73.

168. Ibid. pp.192 and 194.


171. Brian Head, "Recent Theories of the State", Politics, 19 (1), 1984, pp.41–42.

172. Donald McQuarie and Marc Spaulding, "The Concept of Power in Marxist


175. Lasswell, op.cit., p.10.


190. Ibid. p.81.


200. Ibid. pp.54 and 57.


204. Ibid. p.146 and Ankersmit, op.cit., p.143.

205. Lash, op.cit., pp.11 and 8.


210. Simmel, op.cit., pp.87 and 83.


212. Ankersmit, op.cit., p.151.


214. Ibid. p.318.


221. Saul Bellow in Bellow and Amis, op.cit., p.20.


223. Ibid. p.xviii.

224. Ibid. p.48.


CHAPTER TWO

TEXTUAL THEORY

This chapter argues that the principal methodology of textual analysis involves the inscription of ethical incompleteness onto both textual characters analysed and their readers. The account I give of literary history maintains that this has effectively functioned as a means of offering literary studies as a pedagogic technology for reforming the human subject through the discovery of personal indeterminacy. This indeterminacy can be seen to operate both in the technologies of mainstream criticism and its overtly politicised alternatives. In policy terms, the burden of such textual analysis is to form civic subjects through a training in problematising themselves. The chapter argues that, despite various recent developments in theory, a form of reflectionism remains integral to such a training.

I want to say that debates about reflectionism, realism, naturalism, history, the text and the audience have essentially only been relevant inside the sphere of cultural criticism. In recognition of this, and as part of a desire for change, numerous littérateurs have recently commenced the process of reinventing themselves, under the sign of a reformist relevance, as experts in cultural policy. This is exemplified by Tony Bennett's significant bid to readjust the settings of cultural studies. Similarly, Elizabeth Jacka's survey of the impact of cultural criticism/academic discourse on cultural policy, which concentrates on signs called "cultural imperialism", "critical theory", "endless signification", "psychoanalysis", "populism" and "empiricist behaviouralism", reports minimal influence other than in the case of the first and last named. She pronounces the need for change. And in one domain, this is absolutely right. On the stage of cultural policy, the issue of reflectionism is not. It is not a question. It is not a category. Nor is the efficacy
or desirability of screen texts of any particular kind, other than as objects of nationality which can implicitly be made to interpellate through a form of moral training via symptomatic decipherment. The mirror phase, Brechtian distantiation, phallogocentrism and other such terpsichories are not the stuff of Cabinet submissions. But it is another thing again, and I think represents a major error in such interventions, to suggest that cultural criticism and educational practice as presently constituted are irrelevant to the conduct of policy. For cultural criticism is more than trends in fairly marginal academic enterprises. It is a mode of self-formation inscribing incompleteness – but potential for something more – in an inexorable relationship that is the touchstone of the claim made by the humanities to manufacture civic subjects. Because this interpretation of literary history and textual analysis is atypical, it needs some supporting evidence. Much of the work of this chapter is to excavate in search of such evidence.

It was the special capacity of the humanities to instil and inspissate doubt and *politesse* into citizens that so disturbed Rousseau. Whilst at one level he condemned 'that numerous herd of obscure writers and idle *littérateurs*, who devour without any return the substance of the State', he was equally horrified at the way in which the qualities necessary for warfare and the running of the economy, qualities encouraged by patriotism and religion, had been brought into question by the processes of 'rendering mankind more sociable' via 'the urbanity of manners'. The rise of philosophising and the absence of what came to be known as a Romantic male self were the reasons he gave for the demise of a succession of empires from ancient Athens on to his own time. Whilst Rousseau clearly abjured this notion of self-formation, he certainly did not doubt its capacity to produce subjects of its own knowledge.

Rousseau would presumably have preferred a notion of personal transcendence that led to a strengthening of the passion of the public through Romantic renewal. But his position might also be amalgamated with an ethic of self-formation via textual analysis. Consider his arguments alongside the kinds of logic mobilised in the *Declaration* adopted by *Mondiacult 1982*, a world conference on cultural policy organised by the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). Its litany of the critical components of what make for "culture" and the reasons for its maintenance includes the following:

it is culture that gives man the ability to reflect upon himself. It is through culture that man expresses himself, becomes aware of himself, recognises his incompleteness, questions his own achievements, seeks untiringly for new meanings and creates works through which he transcends his limitations.

The Canadian Commission for UNESCO – operating in a First World context but with an ultimate purchase on the tribulations of unequal cultural transfer – called for a 'proper cultural education' as a guarantee of the appropriate amalgam of auto–critique and auto–appreciation that would make for the well–rounded individual, an outcome that could be worked for by a combination of maintenance and renewal through critical reflection. The account presented in this chapter presumes that this subject and its 'proper' education will be geared towards positioning the self inside the text in order to know it better.

The chapter is composed of five sections: approaches to text and society; a case study of television drama; reading reflections; criticism, the self and aesthetics; and three recent metanarratives from literary, television and film studies. The first section examines accounts of the relationship between text and society that have emerged from the study of: literature; national cinema; film and popular memory; and feminist psychoanalysis. It concludes that all these areas demonstrate the operation of a practice of self–formation via the tracery and treatment of ethical incompleteness. The second section looks at television (TV) more specifically, for two reasons. Firstly, it is important to other parts of the thesis which cover national screen drama, sporting multiculturalism and parliament and the media. Secondly, it has a much less fully–achieved status within cultural criticism than do literature or film, in terms of the degree of sophistication and industry generated as formal TV exegesis. This fact, combined with its prevalence as a
source of information on being a cultural subject and making policies about cultural subjects, makes it a good place to clarify the process of inscribing ethical incompleteness via textual indeterminacy. The third section considers in greater detail how the connexion between text, reader and world might best be conceived. It argues that the norm is for readers to map onto the fictive a series of knowledges deriving from the human sciences as methods for writing themselves into texts. The fourth section examines an account of literary history and television criticism that demonstrates how aesthetic critique has functioned as a pedagogic technology to write this self into texts. The last section uses recent disciplinary metanarratives by Terry Eagleton, Gregory Ulmer and David Bordwell to validate these claims.

**APPROACHES TO TEXT AND SOCIETY**

As part of his attempt to work with a variety of approaches to Romanticism, Geoffrey Thurley opts for a symbiotic aetiological and conceptual relationship between Romantic forms and their historical context. For the purposes of my argument, his position will stand for the conventional *littérature*’s sociology of culture.

It is Thurley’s contention that ‘[a]s symptomatic structures, works of art preserve certain homologies with the social and economic structures of their time...every work of art is, *inter alia*, an important social document’. Nevertheless, Thurley’s image of the male-bound social theorist requires granting to art not only a history of its own form that is a determination on each artefact, but a privileged autonomy, an autonomy that is of quality as well as type:

whether he accepts art as being explained by the historical facts, or as, on the contrary, itself throwing light on history, the sociologist of literature is guilty of reductivism unless he accepts that the work of art is a source of experience
otherwise unattainable and that this experience is its real value...the source of the identifying experience it offers.\textsuperscript{10}

The best of Romantic and Lyric poetry and the Realist novel can here be made to interact and forge a contest between the competing drives towards expression and mimesis, between a will towards an extension of the creating self's subjectivity and the capacity to represent the real social order. In its turn, Modernism restores the reader to a position of prominence by drawing attention to the manufacture of the text.\textsuperscript{11} The figure of the author unites these strands of cultural formation. Authors are valorised as guarantors of an ultimately unitary culture by their status as speakers of what is known, hence of what is experienced and hence, perforce, of what can or must be shared with their audiences:

the common ground occupied by author and reader: the ground of a common humanity...human experience...[offers an access to] inherited and public themes and contents [by] subjectifying the objective.\textsuperscript{12}

It is this very sense of the best understanding the best which underpins screen critic John Hinde's important distinction between 'Cinema' and 'Film industry'. His contribution is significant for its rare facility with auto-interrogation and the unearthing of dearly held and barely debated foundational principles. 'Cinema' here occurs at the junction of a fruitfully 'disturbed local culture' and filmmaking. 'Film industry' is a profit-making, export-oriented practice. It is unconcerned about achieving any special fusion with the local community.\textsuperscript{13} 'Cinema' provides a new mode of telling stories that is inexorably intertwined with an 'entirely new concept of self – of self as individual, defying the gods'.\textsuperscript{14} For a 'national cinema' to assert itself, there must be a special, productive kind of audience that is seeking 'a cinema of its own, not to be a mirror (although it is so tempting to say so) but to be a monitor and a comforter in the way a map can be when you're not sure where you're going'.\textsuperscript{15} This combination of Baedeker and polymath presumably finds its mystic expression in some kind of market-like relay between the "right" audience and the auteur filmmaker.
But Hinde has performed a great service here by acknowledging the role of the viewer, as someone who is part of and subject to a public critical and pedagogic apparatus. In doing so, he takes the position one stage further politically than Thurley, by pointing out the constitutive work of critic and viewer in setting up the text. Thurley's statement stops short of this. It remains a beguiling amalgam of the contradictory dictates of a dual faith in creative genius/idealism and broader social, but never materially determining, forces.

I want to turn now to the classic left position concerning the intersection of cultural products and their consumption. Terry Lovell argues that 'any sociology of art must confront first and foremost the question of the relationships which exist between art and social reality, relationships both at the level of meaning and of cause/effect'. This is the world where authentic art displaces the rule of a misrecognising imaginary domain and yokes the symbolic onto our apprehension of an art that is past ideology and adjacent to science. Raymond Williams humanises such lines with his (always partial) insistence on the value of the avant-garde work's taste for the 'fragmented ego in a fragmented world', defying as it does capitalist neatness and notions of a monopoly on quality in a unilogical realism. This is not, however, to disregard the importance of doctrines of representation or realist/reflectionist aesthetics. For Williams, 'representation is not a subject separate from history, but...part of the history, contributing to the history.'

The British Film Institute's National Fictions publication is an attempt to explain the media experience of the 1982 conflict in the South Atlantic by referring back to the Second World War in British film and television. It mobilises much of the above in ways that exemplify the cultural and screen studies adoption of such left protocols. I read it here as a means of understanding mid-1980s militarism that assumes the presence of both realism and reflectionism in screen drama accounts of earlier conflicts,
either in contemporaneous or archival mode, and claims that these are productive of a broader politics on the part of the consumer.

Editor Geoff Hurd's introductory essay sets the tone for an account that is almost constant throughout the volume in its reflectionist and pedagogic certainties:

Wartime cinema played an active role in mobilising support for the war effort by successfully constructing an image of popular unity, one which placed ordinary men and women at its centre...cinema had to construct an image which attempted to resolve in its narratives the social contradictions which challenged any simple notions of unity (class, gender, region, etc.)...the need to represent 'the people' could not in itself determine the limits on what those representations might be21.

For Hurd, this set of requirements that the state has imposed on film involves contradictions. It necessitates a direct address to the real, everyday concerns of people in their social location in order to interpellate them effectively, but in such a way that inequality and difference can ultimately be overridden by the pull towards national unity. He endeavours to tie these elements together under the moniker of hegemony, a cultural practice of consent—in—unity that continues to resonate in later work in the field22.

This is done in isolation from evidence of readings at the time of the first circulation of these texts and in isolation from specific textual analysis of the emergence and trajectory of contradictions and their suture. Cinema is anthropomorphised and rendered non-specific. It is a mere extra product of history that is rarely even described as specifically visual and auditory. There is no explanation of: the mechanism whereby representations eluded the control of the state; whether the state found this to be the case; or how it reacted to the fact. No concession is made to the need for evidence of the mode, place,
time or even existence of a site or sites of negotiation between and within state, film-maker, distributor, exhibitor and audience.

When the collection actually does the work of writing history, rather than reading pictures unselfreflexively, it provides valuable information about how such texts have circulated (for instance, occasions when Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament rallies were disrupted by groups playing tapes of the theme music to The Dam Busters\textsuperscript{23}. This is both cacophony and ideology. It is a deployed representation, its re-producers active in their coterminous appearance with their product).

But the dominant tenor of National Fictions is set with typical force by Colin McArthur's essay. He maintains that British films of the 1950s and 1960s which looked back to the Second War:

repressed the 'people's war', presenting it as a series of heroic actions (mainly) by middle-class white men supported by compliant other ranks with women as waiting sweethearts or mothers. In retrospect, this can be seen as contributing to the 'commonsense' construction of the war which was animated, to such devastating effect during the South Atlantic War. There is a lesson to be learned here which will hopefully shape future film and television research and practice\textsuperscript{24}.

There appears to be no requirement for McArthur to trace the lineage of either this original putative "commonsense" or its redisposal four decades later.

Leaving left screen history for the moment, similar methods can be seen to animate various feminist critiques of representation. We could turn to the powerful accounts of images of women in the feature film and advertising, with the work of Laura Mulvey and Judith Williamson encouraging a stream of research and teaching practices\textsuperscript{25}. As
an instance of a politics that is concerned with reflectionism and the ethical incompleteness of its subjects, the former will be taken as exemplary.

Mulvey's article, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema", was an intervention into Althusserian and psychoanalytic accounts of classical Hollywood that were emerging in the 1970s within Screen and elsewhere. This mode of writing talked about the inscription of positions for spectators to adopt that were structured into texts, in terms of class dominance through ideology. It also used Freudian accounts of the formation of personality, particularly the first moments of the process of seeing oneself as oneself, as someone other than one's mother, that young children go through when they encounter mirrors. Films became mirrors. The Mulvey article represented a call for this tendency to be redisposed onto gendered territory. It deployed these mechanisms to look at the particular impact on forming gendered subjects of the gazing pleasure offered to men by classical Hollywood films. Since that time, the argument has been reused to describe: sporting events; television situation comedy and other dramas; advertisements; avant-garde cinema; lecture halls and a variety of public sites of spectacle. It is a frequently cited article for the warrant it provides to discuss any kind of gazing and notions of the formation and address of gendered subjectivity within that domain. It is no longer about narrative cinema, no longer (if it ever was) about psychoanalysis as a scientific theory to be disproven and considered within the context of the psy-complexes and their rules of evidence. It is the cultural critic's lodestone for discussing the gaze and the unconscious.

Mulvey wants to use psychoanalytic theory enmeshed with film history as a 'political weapon' that will allow readers to see how 'the unconscious of patriarchal society has structured film form'. So already we have some significant assumptions. It is presumed that the formal components of film are determined by a very broad object called 'society'. It is further presumed that this object 'society' can be specified as dominated by men and as having an unconscious. "It" is to be understood anthropomorphically. Mulvey argues that this society is paradoxically dependent on women to define itself,
which it does by pointing to what it has and women do not. In other words, it defines by exclusion, pitting women as castrated subjects against itself as properly phallically formed. Unless it can show that their inadequacy and lack of fulfilment go penis-in-glove with the lack of the phallus, the phallus ceases to be important and worthy of its standing. In 'the last resort', lack is all that women represent in the cinema. Men project onto these silenced creatures of their gaze their own other side, a side that might wish to give birth to children, but instead runs society. Women look on their child-capacities as compensation, cause and replacement for their castration. Similarly, film audiences use the gaze to project onto diegetic characters their own suppressed exhibitionism. This process becomes political once women realise that while they are oppressed, they can use the tools of patriarchy – such as psychoanalysis – to analyse how it works. The analysis of existing grammars of pleasure will ultimately help to subvert that pleasure.

It will be apparent that this writing strategy depends on the inscription of incompleteness. "Society" is incomplete because for all its dominance it still requires the dominated to serve it and help it to define itself. Women are incomplete because they lack power and the phallus. Men are incomplete because they need to objectify women on screen in order to pleasure themselves and because they have to deal with their own inability to bear children. The audience is incomplete because it needs to project its inadequacies onto screen characters, who do the work of acting out audience desires for attention. The audience is like a child, always seeking mastery of its surroundings via relations extrapolated from the mirror; but such projections are always misrecognitions. The analysis that allows the cultural critic and its pupils to reveal this truth is incomplete because – like those in the pedagogic relationship that the article forms – itlabours under terms of understanding that are patriarchal.

Moving away from filmic sites for a time, I want to consider Linda Nochlin's important writings as emblematic of a women's art history and politics that depends on the successful mobilisation of a plaintiff's complaints. These complaints are either based on
invisibility and silence, or partial and unwelcome visibility and noise. This reflec-
tionism is if anything more certain than the writings of a Thurley or a Hurd: 'represen-
tations of women in art are founded upon and serve to reproduce indisputably accepted
assumptions held by society in general, artists in particular, and some artists more than
others about men's power'\textsuperscript{27}. But more than that, it is about practice at the level of art
here and now and an intersection between social values and that practice which is
apparently identical across sites, leading to a unity of politics and interpretation.

It is exceedingly difficult for an alternative politics to operate in the cultural arena
without recourse to these ethical categories. Everyone, it seems, reads in literal, realist
and reflectionist modes. But the cultural critic, alone amongst us, is aware of the fact. In
her contribution to the \textit{National Fictions} dossier, Tessa Perkins' chapter on men and
women and their reading and argumentation helps to break up such certitudes. She is
writing about debates over the gender politics rectitude or otherwise of the 1980 British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) TV play \textit{The Imitation Game}, debates which occurred
at the Summer School that gave rise to the volume in which her essay appears:

\begin{quote}
Could women argue it wasn't pro-feminist if it engendered guilt in men about
patriarchy? Should we take women's anger as a mark of the play's failure (surely
a pro-feminist play shouldn't make women angry at it?) or men's positive reac-
tions to it as a mark of its success?\textsuperscript{28}
\end{quote}

There is, here, the \textit{littérature}'s uncertainty about the residue of meaning. Does the
ultimate referent reside in the text? Is that where battles over meaning can be fought, via
reference back to it? Or is it in audience responses? And if so, should these be ordered
by political effectivity, personal feeling or category of person? In the last instance, a
symptomatic reading is reinstalled that diagnoses via exegesis. The issue of the
audience is addressed in a way that permits cracks around the analysis which are not
observable in the unity of most criticism. Token references to spectatorship were
common to textual analysis as far back as Aristotle\textsuperscript{29}. But the value of ethnography as a
means of determining political utility is always and necessarily secondary to a process of close reading that seeks symptoms hidden within the text.

This symptomatology is a yoking together of anthropological and literary studies' accounts of culture. Bhabha refers to two key:

- traditions in the discourse of identity: the philosophical tradition of identity as the process of self-reflection in the mirror of (human) nature: and the anthropological view of the difference of human identity as located in the division of Nature/Culture.

The mechanism for their merger is an undercarriage of humanism. From a geographer's perspective, Yi-Fu Tuan has argued that:

- culture is near the core of one's humanity...Without grounding in a specific culture, the world loses shape and focus. Culture may be conceived as a pair of spectacles that we need to wear so that the world can seem vividly particularized and real.

It is this way of seeing what touches the person that animates the manifestations of reflectionism gathered together above. For all the critiques of doxification from post-structuralism and postmodernism, mimesis remains one of the principal wings of the practices that assign literary value. If anything, much textual analysis is resurrecting mimetic evaluation in reaction to anti-canonical manoeuvres.

And on the screen front, the special triumph and quality of drama is said to be its inevitable commitment to 'a language of detail, to the employment of many relevant trivialities. This drives the special anxiety attached to recorded images, in a way that Raymond Williams has effectively captured in his discussion of the shock that the mechanically reproduced picture can render, 'that extraordinarily significant cultural
moment which began with photography...[where] pleasure is found in the reproduction of wholly familiar people and places. From its earliest days, photography established a realist aesthetic. Its special referentiality in the real was a source of one of the first arguments mounted over authorship and ownership of images. The notion of an artist impressing a personal stamp on a painting was blocked from an immediate carry-over into film, its redispersion brought into question by the technicality and objectivity of the new apparatus. This had the side-effect (or was itself a side-effect) of the depersonalised hold on realism that was immediately attached to the form. Reflectionism became an everyday hermeneutic code, routinely deployed by readers as a consequence of the realism of their personal collections of photographs as much as anything else.

The moving image relies on readers with similar skills in the registers of the iconic and the indexical, as well as the directive but also polysemic confluence of picture and sound that encourages a permissive intermingling of sign systems. Real world referents are interpreted phenomenologically because of the realist system of TV. Written another way, one might point to how the coming of photography gradually elevated its authors to a status previously attained by poets, a status that afforded them a privileged position from which to enunciate a 'staging of the imaginary self' on account of the medium's effect of truth. This effect is sustained because of the photographic image's hold, as a classic material cross-referent between the natural and the manufactured, on the mirroring of the split between the two that is the foundational substance of both cultural/critical and anthropological accounts of self-formation. The next section indicates how the effect of this reflectionism is driving the development of academic writing on television.
TELEVISION DRAMA

Horace Newcomb has called for a conceptual placement of the television drama series alongside the novel and away from radio and film. This is because it is a form which can offer a 'sense of density', exploring complex themes in very lengthy treatments with slow build-up and multi-sequenced sites of character problematic. It has been convincingly argued that the continuous serial, like the novel, permits an asymptotic development. Beyond that, it offers travel through time that mirrors the time the viewer has passed since the previous episode in a way that makes for an intertextual merging of characterological acquaintance. This encourages a view of the TV drama text as neither mirror nor window, but rather as part-generator of the manufacture of experience by the viewer.

Newcomb was making his claim in the context of an appeal to the question of the academic study of television of his day, i.e. whether it was worthy of formalist (or any) textual analysis, as opposed to behavioural research or generic condemnation. A decade on from Newcomb, a revised critical theory has emerged. It can still condemn, but only in the context of detailed knowledge. Television is seen to be a medium and form that can reveal the traces of domination and the cultural politics of the prevailing mode of production. For Douglas Kellner, myths 'provide stories which dramatize society's values, ideals and ways of life; they are enacted in story-telling media'. TV is 'the electronic ideology machine'. Formulaic drama series offer 'hegemonic ideology for advanced capitalism'. And their internal form would, of course, encourage such a functionalist reading. They are generally realist texts, meaning that they have neat aetiological chains, an everyday *mise-en-scène* and continuity editing; their routine location is within everyday cultural competence.

There is still no accepted methodology for reading screen evidence as extra-diegetic history, however. So, attempts to account for the efflorescence of the detail-rich, sociology-poor, anally-retentive historical period piece television drama of the 1970s -
what Rupert Murdoch has termed 'drama run by the costume department'—have gone beyond the possibilities offered by the arrival of colour TV in Britain. Such explanations now tie this genesis to a realisation on the screen of past days of class equanimity in order to remove or redispose attention from the real of the present. Or, alternatively, these accounts argue that it was precisely the calling up of contemporary issues to do with class, gender and nation that drew such sizeable ratings.

John Tulloch's survey text of television drama serves as an attempt to recuperate reflectionism to respectability by renaming it, allowing him to accept and recycle interpretations such as the one above. He works within a protocol that he calls 'a counter-discourse of the real'. This describes a domain in which extra-discursive, extra-subjective realms of the real exist and can be explicated via the application of social theory. Here, meaning occurs not purely in the empty interstices between signifiers, but at the junction of signifiers, objects or events and people. It is a move that reinstates symptomatology, a diagnosis of the times that continues to claim for artworks the status of encapsulations of prevailing political, metaphysical and economic tempora et mores. Texts are accounted for as products and producers of the forms of consciousness available at a given period to particular categories of person, defined in relation to mode and means of production and/or reproduction. The putative warrant for these certainties is twofold. It resides equally in the form and content of the text screened and in the accounts made of it by audiences. Hence the installation of ethnography as a new critical trope.

Or so it seems. But Tulloch continues to read meanings off from texts, except when he explicitly performs or reports the results of ethnographic research. An effortless—and unexplicated—move is made from the exegetic to the field and back again, with each approach seemingly providing the same type of result. It remains the case, for instance, that the police drama series 'does its work as an agent of ideological control' by denying the class power aspect of the repressive state apparatus. But just to be safe...
from anti-reflectionist critiques, *Miami Vice* and *The Sweeney* refracted, rather than reflected, their time. Where does one begin and the other end?

Australian historical mini-series produced by the Kennedy–Miller organisation are valorised for giving multi-perspectival accounts of the recent past (the Vietnam War and the vice-regal removal of an elected government). This move argues that the offering-up of different explanations and stories about apparently identical events is an approach which problematises any notion of a single truth. Such an approach is said to be particularly effective when it involves the interspersal of: documentary footage; re-enacted historical figures; and other, more everyday units acting as emblems of the time (e.g. a family *Bildungsroman* that develops via encounters with drugs, the contraceptive pill, feminism, conscription etc.).

The argument here is borrowed from Stuart Cunningham's work on the historical mini-series. Cunningham argues that the nature of the mini-series form, a sprawling yet condensed narrative sequencing that displaces a fixation with events by attention to aetiology and outcome, makes for 'an unparalleled upgrading of the terms within which historical information and argument is mediated through mainstream television'. The multi-perspectival element is provided by the *Bildungsroman*-like 'multiplication of authorising perspectives', for example within the family, which are set against maturational questions and historical debates and imbricate self and social in a multitude of points of disagreement and negotiation. Albert Moran valorises this as:

> a grass-roots history that puts the common people on the historical stage...The central strategy of the Australian historical mini-series is to portray the development of national consciousness inside emergence of an individual consciousness.

He regards these tendencies as attributable not only to the internal generic dynamics of television production, but equally 'the play of ideas within the larger society'.

99
These positions, like that of Tulloch, work hard to acknowledge problems with a mirror-image understanding of the relationship between cultural production and the wider world. In the case of Moran's work, they fall back on such protocols. Cunningham's material — hence, perhaps, its uptake by Tulloch — assumes the productive, if not necessarily realistic, power of the extended documentary-drama, arguing that its referentiality back to the historical record encourages its audience to discuss that history in other contexts. We are reminded here of Aristotle's distinction between history and drama that finds a superiority in the latter because of its capacity for the general and the complex, the explanatorily powerful and conflictual over and above the empiricist: 'the standard of correctness is not the same in poetry and politics'\textsuperscript{59}. Like Cunningham, John Fiske argues that it is a referentiality in systems of knowledge, not an unalloyed conduit to actuality, that makes for TV realism\textsuperscript{60}.

In keeping with the latter-day valorisation of split narratives of history, though, such mini-series are ultimately deemed to be politically worthy because of the unresolved contradictions which they present. Yet this is dependent on a particular array of pedagogic as much as textual norms. It is to assume that audiences read methodologically, that the viewer is interested and able to analyse the text in terms of an historiography. This historiography allows for contending purchases on truth and ultimately exposes truth as an effect of political contestation. Significantly, to repeat, it is that very narrative of self-discovery, the Bildungsroman, that is the story's motor in all this, when allied to specifically non-realist protocols of decipherment. One is drawn here to Benjamin's position that all epic forms are closely related to historiography\textsuperscript{61}.

This line is identical to the move that Althusser makes in his valorisation of Cremonini's painting of the relations between objects and "their" people, although his derives from a more anti-humanist position than could allow for so straightforward a support of the Bildungsroman as Cunningham suggests. Both arguments rely for their championing of the products they discuss on an impossibility of absolute self-recognition and an
encouragement of a concentration on a multitude of relations forming an apprehension of history in the spectator. There are resonances here, also, of the argument that ancient Greek tragedy's apogee lay in its movement beyond character and towards an account of actions and in Godard's line from Pierrot le Fou that finds Ferdinand yearning '[n]o longer to write about people's lives...but...[w]hat goes on between people, in space'.

Cunningham calls for an appreciation of the form as a moment in which the viewer is hailed 'as knowledgeable citizen, rather than distracted consumer'. Similarly, the makers of Days of Hope have argued that whilst it was an account of British working class radicalism set many years before, the mini-series was read by the public as a commentary on latter-day events, viz. miners' actions against the previous Tory Government. (A modernism that would have satisfied Baudelaire.) Again, when asked his opinion of the film of I, Pierre Riviere, Foucault stressed the worth of contemporary peasants acting the part of peasants from another historical time not because of any purchase on authenticity which this might offer, or as a process of learning one's class past. Rather, it was seen as a junction of representing themselves to themselves and of their history to themselves. At the formal educational level, it is significant that the Minister of Education in France officially recommended that students watch the Holocauste mini-series in 1979; an act without precedent that illustrated the position that the form was attaining.

One can perhaps best summarise this revisionist reflectionism in the words of James Donald. Writing in a revised Screen, he is concerned to absent his writing from a theoreticism of the sidelines that fails to engage with the practice of schooling and the context of the labour market. Donald argues for a non-utopic, grounded means of distributing screen studies knowledge. He continues to do so, however, from within a position that gives power to the set in its interpellative qualities. Again, we can see the force – almost "merely" immanent, now, in the light of doctrines of active readers and multiple determinations on meaning – of the social power of TV: 'television constructs
a calendar of public events and a schedule of private routines, as well as the pedagogic rhetoric of its address simultaneously to the listener/viewer as individual and to the people–nation as One. Such continued faith in the cultural critic as the subject able to break the circuit between ideology and public is what places TV textual analysis alongside older formats.

READING REFLECTIONS

It is to this partially extra-exegetical mode of literary and other cultural studies that I now turn, taking as a beginning Terry Eagleton's characteristically pithy certainty about indeterminacy:

The hallmark of the 'linguistic revolution' of the twentieth century, from Saus-sure and Wittgenstein to contemporary literary theory, is the recognition that meaning is not simply something 'expressed' or 'reflected' in language: it is actually produced by it.

Meanings derive from language, then, in its actual use. "The" meaning of a text is indeterminate and beyond, to the point where the text's very existence is indeterminate. It has been supplanted by readers. The primary referent may be any or all of: the real; the reader's self; the intratext; or the intertext. Struggles enacted between total determination and total indeterminacy across the body of literary theory encapsulate the critical question here: namely, whether symptomatic textual criticism actually does anything other than be written and taught; whether it has a political efficacy or a civic value.

It has been suggested that the extant terms of debate in the field are such that either the internal structure of the text is everything or nothing and that referentiality to the world outside is either impossible or massive. The characteristically leavening but
inconclusive evidence from empirical studies of readers suggests that literary texts have a 'regulative structure' which determines much of the reading process, but little of the content of readers' responses\textsuperscript{72}.

(The reader will have ascertained already the cavalier way in which I am using the terms "audience", "reader", "viewer" and "text", such that the precision of form is lost. This is because, at a theoretical level, the cross-pollination between literary and screen theory has come to be very significant. It becomes commonplace for the metaphor of book usage to be applied to television and film in such a way that many of the best writings across forms, whilst paying due attention to the specificity of textual content and presentation, mobilise very similar hermeneutic and research protocols. Hence the terms of debate about reflectionism on screen are, to a certain extent, set by arguments over art, poetry and the novel and claims to the rare status of TV drama by the traditional valorisation of the immediacy and quality of live theatre. All this in spite of the touchingly impressionistic prognostications of littérateurs and historians like Edward Said, Dominick LaCapra and Leonie Kramer, who might argue for the specifically non-redemptive non-sensibility of television watching\textsuperscript{73}.)

Where, though, is the text that people read? Consider the sense we might make of the following quotation from John Frow. To what could it be made to refer?

"The text" is not given but is constituted and reconstituted in relation to synchronically and diachronically variant systems. Or rather: the text is given not ontologically but socially; and its "meaning" is a function not of its origin but of the multiple historicities which constitute it\textsuperscript{74}.

Does this mean that textual analysis itself becomes the point of reflection of its times? Catherine Belsey has maintained, in arguing along similar coordinates, that critical writings about \textit{Othello} reveal traces of the racisms current at the time they were written. This is just as productive – and reflectionist – as readings of the play that hold the
reflective meaning at a four hundred-year-past node of closure. She distinguishes between: the racism relevant at Shakespeare's time, which is tied to the conditions of an emergent system of sovereign-states; the racism of the confident apogee of imperialism displayed in AC Bradley's account of the play; and finally, the racism of colonial méconnaissance exemplified by FR Leavis75.

But of course, the division between reader, critic and text is frequently unclear. Roger Chartier's project of 'a history of practices of reading' has found that many systems of interpretation conclude with 'interpretation of the self'. He refers particularly to Ricoeur here, but can also illustrate the point from the past. For instance, he mentions Fernando de Rojas' Celestina of 1507. It contained the following prefatory instructions on how proper readers would make sense of what was to follow. Such readers:

"will understand its essential matter and profit from it, they will be amused at its wit, and they will store away in their memories the maxims and sayings of the philosophers, in order, when the proper time comes, to use them to advantage"76.

This protocol is designed to encourage what Chartier calls 'a plural reading that distinguishes the comic from the serious, and that extracts the moral that best illuminates each person's life, whose 'first person' is applicable to everyone77.

Like the metacriticism of Belsey, this acts to reinscribe the legitimacy of reflectionism in a way very similar to that parlayed by Tulloch, Moran and Cunningham. It is a system of reading reading which suggests, in keeping with the empirical findings mentioned earlier, that meaning is fixed at the level of the structures of the text, but compromised by shifting relations between particular discourses of the human sciences and the representational text, for instance the state of popular medical knowledge and its intersection with an account of science fiction medicine in a short story78. It is a serious lacuna that even the later accounts of the active television reader rarely appear to
consider the role of the human sciences in prefiguring interpretation. This at the same moment as lettrateurs, in danger of becoming yesterday's pedagogues, are alive to the need for a teaching of reading that works across every kind of communicative study; that metaphor is, in some sense, always metaphor and hence amenable to a particular form of decoding. I shall return to this point shortly.

It is in tracing the deployment of these protocols of mapping, the actual cartography of placing non-fictive knowledge onto fictive, that we may find the meaning, the referentiality and the political effect/affect of texts. No aesthetic form can be said to have a necessary meaning and therefore a necessary political effect. Rather, the latter is held outside, where people receive and make their intertexts. It has been argued that there is value for a feminist politics in an unambiguous, explicit fictive borrowing from social experience in narratives of self-disclosure. This value can then be determined against a Habermas-derived, gyno-reformed group of 'objectives of a feminist public sphere', in place of a text-bound aesthetic. One could work other categories of person into such terms in addition to the category "woman", other elements of the human sciences than "experience" as motors of change in both the production and reception of texts. Where reflectionism was once a property, it is now an act.

Early film theorists were in little doubt about the mechanical reproductivity of the medium as a guarantor of its realism. They differed more over the political legitimacy and artistic value of, for example, the mortgage on authenticity proffered by the long take. But for Godard in La Chinoise, '[a]rt is not the reflection of a reality; it is the reality of that reflection. Recent attempts to work through the implications of transporting something called "film theory" to the site of television have come back, when they address texts stylistically, to just this point, that 'what is called truth, is a camera doing what it can'. As Foucault says, 'by representation one must not understand screen or illusion, but real mode of action.'

So the formal properties of the filmic text are a material base. But the tendency to use that as a jumping-off point for reflectionism is abiding. Because I want to go through
the literature that offers a detailed critique of such tendencies, we shall now traverse ground in a sense already presumed by the readership emphasis elaborated above. The point I wish to make via this writing strategy is that the critique of reflectionism, which properly comes somewhere between a discourse of reflection and a discourse of readership, is more continuous and powerful than such positioning might suggest. By mounting the critique here, I hope to confer on it a renewal that will illustrate the problems with any recuperation of reflectionism (under stealth) and push us back to the formative couplet of pedagogy and aesthetics.

I shall begin with some of the work done in the journal *m/f*, a manifestation of the realisation within English Marxism and feminism's junction that discourse created its own object. In seeking a political practice of feminism that acknowledged this, *m/f* described itself in opposition to unitary referential logics. One could, for the purposes of my argument here, write the words "nation", "person" or "culture" over the word "woman", the word "formation" over "oppression":

It is the shifting ground between the construction of the category woman that we have at present and that category that feminists struggle to construct, that gives rise to the temptation to fall back on the notion of a pre-given unity of women and a simple notion of women's oppression.86

Elizabeth Cowie's influential questioning of the practice of scrutinising film texts for their appropriateness of representation is important here. She encounters two problems in evaluating women in film. Firstly, there is the matter of the production of the category "woman". And secondly, the matter of the production of film as a signifying system. The latter is frequently undervalued in political analyses of film texts which take an assured and unquestioned referent in the real as a means of weighing up the rectitude of gender representations on screen. Such symptomatic, non-formal criticism presumes to know that film merely reproduces, well or ill, already fully-achieved accounts of what women are.87 Cowie problematises this type of criticism:
What is important is not that film falsely signifies women, or appropriates the signifier (image) woman to another signification, but the particular mode of constituting woman as sign within film. What is of concern is the specific consequences of that mode of constitution both within film and in relationship to other signifying systems and discourses.

Films, then, may be deemed to be part of the fixing of patriarchal values, but they are not reflections of a system that is already in place. So in discussing the progressiveness or otherwise of the depiction of the female protagonist in *Coma*, Cowie is dismissive of a reductionism that concentrates solely on the issue of women because this:

demands a fragmentation of the film into its elements and ...denies the productivity of the film, both across the film as such, and in its insertion into structures and discourses of distribution and exhibition, and also film reviewing and even theoretical writing.

Such a fragmentation makes for a content analysis in which the critic adds up the number of progressive representations, subtracts the non-progressive ones and comes up with a final audit. This is faulty because it assumes that what is shown has definite, fixed meanings in relation to a separate, accurate and appropriate category of "woman-outside-representation". In place of such an approach, an audit of value can only usefully be made by asking about the text's deployment in the kinds of institutions and discourses listed above.

In his discussion of the attempt to downgrade the status of a particular poet for a supposed failure to achieve the supposedly possible – an adequate articulation of the social world of his country at a particular node of history – Ian Hunter makes the following assault on reflectionism that calls for a still further limitation:
What is it that gives all the things that might be located in the geographical and
temporal boundaries of Australia in the fifties – everything from sexual manners
and legal statutes through forms of economic and political organisation to hair-
styles and welfare policies – a single general articulation or movement, that a
poet might align himself with or not?92

These criticisms of blanket assertions about the necessity of texts displaying the social
world in which they were formed are powerful, whether they are made about: the
comparatively apolitical turn of a discourse of "art and society"; the Lukácsian–
Hegelian call for the transcendent and yet illuminative ur–object of its generation; or
the liberal reformist carpings at representation of categories of person. Texts are most
clearly the outcome of negotiations between conventions of genre, fashion, personal
concern, industrial circulation and the deployment of interpellative mechanisms by
writers, teachers and readers, with slippage between categories. How might such inter-
pellations occur?

The subject is said to be a routine process of invention under modernity and its succes-
sor, not a given. Television is a prime site of this creation, especially under the prevail-
ing sign of notions of freedom of choice rationally exercised93. Hence the paradoxical
argument of a former columnist on television for Sydney's Daily Mirror newspaper,
writing in the 1960s. Her argument empowers the viewer whilst denying the effectivity
of viewing: 'A weekly injection of Peyton Place is not going to turn a Richmond River
dairy farmer into an Idaho potato grower...For television to determine our character or
attitudes we would have to take it seriously94. This is to deploy the recyclable nativist
view of David Hume in its elaborate dependence on the primacy of feelings or senses
over representation: 'All the colours of poetry, however splendid, can never paint natu-
ral objects in such a manner as to make the description be taken for a real landscape95.

But the capacity to distinguish "authentic experience" from "televisual experience", let
alone to determine which comes first, may not be so straightforward. It has been televi-
sion's distinctive contribution since its introduction to be at one and the same time possessed of the double status of community and industry, a people's medium precisely because of the absence of a critical apparatus – until media studies – informing people about what each text properly means.96

There is, of course, intense argument about how different forms of texts can be read. In particular, the ruling Brechtian aesthetic of distantiation in 1970s Screen theory was arch in its derisiveness towards what became known as the "realist text". The notion of textually inscribed rules of reading – solid interpellations of viewers – as a function of naturalism/realism problematised the value of, for example, social realism. It was an orthodoxy that linear and resolved narratives which compelled closure were reactionary in their inevitable construction of the possibility of perfect knowledge (fore-echoes here of Cunningham and Tulloch's valorisation of the multi-perspectival mini-series). Instead, audiences should be confronted with the constructedness of their positioning and the seams of weaving of each text made explicit via selfreferentiality. It was more radical to address the camera directly and quiz the viewer than to demonstrate the condition of the oppressed. For the text was the real site of material relations, and that limit was also its potential benefit as a radicalising force which could problematise passivity.97 Great claims continue to be made for certain kinds of TV narrative on the grounds that they refuse the 'linearity and resolution' of other forms of communication.98

This finds resonances in Barthes' preference for the writerly text, a text which sees readers productively engaged via the problematisation of a literalist signification that draws attention to itself in place of feigning a transparent realism. This is said to contrast with the readerly text, which denies its condition as a sign. The irony, that further leavening produced by the type of empirical work in this area to which I have already referred, is that the formally experimental metanarrative has been shown to generate an inevitable hermeneutic (of relativistic positions on truth). It is the realist text that routinely encourages divided protocols of decipherment.99 This suggests that there
is a need to consider how and to what end people are schooled to read texts: to unpack the relationship of critic, pupil and text.

CRITICISM, THE SELF AND AESTHETICS

Literary studies functioned as a critical site within the emergence of the human sciences in the late eighteenth century, a site of Foucault's 'double representations – representations whose role...[was] to designate representations'\textsuperscript{100}. One might, for instance, read Benjamin's romanticisation of the age of the storyteller, the spirit of communal experience that was savagely displaced by modern, commodified life and hence made for a dislocation of self from heritage (further developed in the displacement of the \textit{Bildungsroman} by the \textit{monologue intérieure}) as an account of the emerging anomie that only literary history could redeem\textsuperscript{101}. Literary studies' longevity and influence under this sign of metaincompleteness are striking. Let us consider some of the changes and continuities in the discourses of exegesis.

Up to the late eighteenth century, character in drama is routinely evaluated through a set of rules organised around the quality of representation in the light of other, organisational elements within the play, be they prosaic or otherwise. No account of the value of the characters is given; rather, the concentration is on the realism of their description in terms of their social type (viz., do barons conduct themselves like that?). In the nineteenth century, this rhetorical form is supplanted as a mode of decipherment by the quest for an ethical interiority that is in a dynamic relationship of homology with the reader's own inner self. Such readings borrow from the emergent human sciences, notably social psychology. In themselves, these shifts also amount to a change in the \textit{locus} of moral supervision from the ecclesiastical to the literary-pedagogic, including the auto-literary (the confessional diary, the biography and autobiography). There comes to be a new kind of nexus between rhetoric and morality\textsuperscript{102}. It is this which establishes the prospect for a Kristeva to be valorising literature as the privileged site
for movement 'from the "ego" to history. It is a shift which we have already encountered in Chapter One with Foucault's notion of the transfer to secular from pastoral salvation. For Raymond Williams, this amounts to a renunciation of metaphysical or religious concerns in favour of the 'exclusively human terms' of realist drama.

One might also cite a Third World postmodern cultural critic to see the remarkable perennialism of this reasoning of the interior self and its relations with the world outside, a reasoning that abjures – or perhaps partially informs – the buffets given First World, or ruling class, or male cultural practices by alterities. For Ihab Hassan: 'Literature... is literature of the self, a self in the world, self and world made into worlds.

The pedagogic–critical expression of this mode of symptomatic reasoning is further evident in a recent survey of the condition of TV criticism: 'It is the television critic's job – perhaps in concert with the audience researcher and surely in concert with the audience – to identify the unspoken or unenacted in a text.

I shall contend that pedagogy has been the primary mode of cultural criticism/aesthetics. For the abiding norm of aesthetics, wilfully continuous under other signs that frequently sheath it, is self-formation, the recognition and transformation that, this next section will demonstrate, are the touchstone of criticism as an ethic. I am presuming here that criticism makes its own object; that a latent but orthodox tendency to inscribe indeterminacy as a means of requiring work on the self is an integral component – and definite possibility – of textual analysis. In short, I shall argue that modes of criticism are 'not pre-destined by a representational relation to a common object.

This returns us to Foucault's position from The Order of Things discussed earlier. To insist on the prevalence of ethical self-formation within criticism is not to deny the point made by Dollimore and Sinfield that 'most struggles involve a struggle in and for representation', that 'culture is the place where norms are specified and contested.
knowledges affirmed and challenged, and subjectivity produced and disrupted. Rather, it is to specify the realm of production and performance of the self as central to culture, to concur with their assertion of the signal triumph of literary studies in establishing itself as the key point of inculcation into civic conduct. Then one might begin to wonder about technologies of the self operating outside technologies of power.

A concentration in curriculum on the formal properties of texts makes for a mutuality of possession. There is a seeming equality of access to the apparent object of understanding; the document is, after all, in everyone's hands. In fact, this leads to an extrapolation from the hermeneutic of the pedagogue and other particular human science doctrines. These will determine the array of knowledges that can play with the text, with particular consequences for the treatment of alterity. "Resistive" pedagogy/scholasticism still depends on what Hassan has termed the protocols of 'how the best readers read'; that is, with an ultimate determination of a sense of self. Such a process is entirely in keeping with a routine drill installed along with the development of popular education in nineteenth-century Britain that sought a license for cultural criticism as the maker of effective and affective personality. From that time to now, as Hunter has shown, 'knowledge of texts catalogued as Literature would be inseparable from the production of an endlessly repeatable knowledge of the self.'

Critically, though, expanding on the available voices of interpretation needs to be seen as a process not so much of correcting representation as some absolute object all its own, but of encouraging new areas of training and civic presence. In the work that Dollimore and Sinfield want to have done, alternative sexual practices to those of the heterosexual male seem to be important. In a self-forming ethic of reading, this would not be about adequate representation in terms of the numbers of alternatives presented or the quality of their display. Rather, the concern would be to guide oneself and others to form a relation to, and thereby make real, this alternative or alternatives. Foucault says that: 'To be "gay", I think, is not to identify with the psychological traits and the visible masks of the homosexual, but to try to define and develop a way of life.'
Indeed, John Bowen's survey of the poststructural turn in criticism concludes that the central question for literary theory continues to be how the body can be the 'object of a self-stylisation without presuppositions in the aesthetic production of a life'\textsuperscript{113}.

This is itself insufficient for some; a still more radical incompleteness is expected in what EM Forster called 'the proviso 'English Literature''\textsuperscript{114}. In his lament over the failure of literary study to have a single ethical base or a technocratic appeal, Graham Hough emphasised over a quarter of a century ago that 'a literary education is concerned with personal values; it does not really stand for anything, has no aim or purpose, without some ideal of personality behind it'\textsuperscript{115}.

In a manifesto that seems surprisingly blind to the emergent efflorescence of subjectivity as a critical component of radical politics, Fredric Jameson ended the 1970s with a frustrated call to close off the referent of the self to which Hough was referring. In listing what he regarded as anti-progressive trends in the study of literature, Jameson attached particular obloquy to:

\begin{quote}
the rhetoric of the self and of identity, in which literary works dramatize the integration of the hero's psyche or personality, and in which thereby some psychologizing and subjectivizing stance is encouraged or fortified in the American student\textsuperscript{116}.
\end{quote}

His position here may be seen to stand for a general trend within literary theory in reaction against ethical criticism on the grounds that it fails to theorise representation. Yet ethical criticism has been consistently influential since the advent of German Romanticism towards the conclusion of the eighteenth century. Hunter argues that its longevity may result not so much from its silencing of subjects or their perversion, not from denial or cathexis as such, nor from 'the power of prejudicial representations'. Rather, it derives from 'the stability of a specific ethical practice' that can be understood as 'a set of specifications, imperatives and techniques for working on the self through
literature\textsuperscript{117}. At the centre of this practice is to be found not the preexistent subject that is to be fought over in a struggle for intelligibility, but an object to be worked upon. Such criticism operates without mediation by the subject so much as by educational institutions and their drills.

We can see a connexion in contemporary claims made for the humanities to Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, born out of a sense of radical separation of the people from their traditions, a process which had rendered them anomic\textsuperscript{118}. From Schiller's time on, citizens were to have their tastes and natures formed under the sign of the Bildung. The split between thought and feeling occasioned by an emerging industrial division of labour was to be mitigated by a process of cultivation. The homologous divide between content and form, evident in new types of textuality, could be deployed dialectically as models for the unification of the reader. The text here must be dragged down, its form unpacked and ethical moves displayed and performed. This is a turning-point in literary analysis. The problem set up from now on is how to uncover signposts of well-being for the reader. In encountering the work, one is to be made aware of being incomplete. As a consequence, an endless dialectical process of self-transformation is entered into.

The translation of this practice into popular education in the nineteenth century was not merely a change in criticism itself. More, it came to pass through new student–teacher technologies that Hunter calls 'moral supervision'\textsuperscript{119}. In modern education, then, 'the self–problematising relation to the text that guarantees the reader's ethical 'incompleteness' also opens him to the aesthetico-ethical supervision of an exemplar who is above all else an exemplary reader\textsuperscript{120}. This is to place a literally unbounded optimism in literary studies. George Steiner has shown that:

The study of literature was assumed to carry an almost necessary implication of moral force. It was thought self-evident that the teaching and reading of the
great poets and prose writers would enrich not only taste or style but moral feel­
ing; that it would cultivate human judgement and act against barbarism121.

Renaissance and eighteenth-century views of Latin and Greek as humanising agents fed a nineteenth-century redeployment of this function onto literature that was necessitated by an association of the need to form the self with the need to place this self within a concept of nation. From Herder on, to know one's local literary history was to affirm one's national identity. And after Taine, this was also the conduit to a sense of the public122.

Technologies for tracing the structures or experiences which are held to underwrite texts come to be heralded for their ability to express or expose forms of consciousness. But their productive capacity, their making of that consciousness, is rarely considered. This functions as a significant political force within institutions of education. It serves to establish cultural criticism as a transcendent pathway to humanness that is beyond tech­nique in its access to the real nature of persons123. It centres readership, however, quite decisively, by virtue of pedagogy's guiding hand over each reader–critic's shoulder. And recent trends in North American literary education, for example, may be seen to under­score a self–conscious turn towards an ethic of training students to put themselves into the text in order to remake themselves in the life outside124.

This displaces the ancient support for aetiology and plain plotting such that drama pleases its audience by analogy to the unity of the human person or to specifics of category of person125. Walter Benjamin, the lyric belletrist in advance of cultural studies, comes to argue that the most memorable narratives do not offer closed, fully and self–evidently psychologised accounts of character. Rather, it is their special capa­city to require readers to carve out plot and story aetiology and relate them to the inte­riority of diegetic persons126. For him, 'the essential substance of a literary work [is] what it contains in addition to information...the unfathomable, the mysterious127. The human sciences have intervened decisively.
Geoffrey Hartman has made this more specific. He has indicated that we are dealing here with a technology of the subject: 'Representation, in short, is Coming Out. The self makes its debut'. Hartman concludes his essay "The Interpreter" with a dialogue between 'Interpreter' and 'Book': 'Interpreter: Who's there? Book: Nay, answer me; stand, and unfold yourself'.

This is part of a move in Western thought that Foucault has identified, towards both the invention of the unknown self and the search for its insistent other in order to understand this self:

in Hegelian phenomenology, it was the An sich as opposed to the Für sich; for Schopenhauer it was the Unbewusste; for Marx it was alienated man; in Husserl's analyses it was the implicit, the inactual, the sedimented, the non-effected – in every case, the inexhaustible double that presents itself to reflection as the blurred projection of what man is in his truth, but that also plays the role of a preliminary ground upon which man must collect himself and recall himself in order to attain his truth. For though this double may be close, it is alien, and the role, the true undertaking, of thought will be to bring it as close to itself as possible; the whole of modern thought is imbued with the necessity of thinking the unthought...of ending man's alienation by reconciling him with his own essence...modern thought is advancing towards that region where man's Other must become the Same as himself.

Notions of misunderstanding and even the impossibility of ever understanding are crucial preliminaries to the emergence in the nineteenth century of the human sciences and their central postulate: the subject and its capacity for misrecognition as a systematic modus operandi and raison d'être for the task of interpretation. Textual criticism that uses semiotics, sociology, the psy-complexes, history or politics must needs have misrecognition/misinterpretation as prerequisites, not as occasional aberra-
tions. All such modes depend on the notion that the unconscious or a dissociated sensibility is always already present and in need of attention. This is significantly redolent of the very ancient notion of the self as always only capable of representation, even to the self, through a series of masks. Lacanian criticism makes a similar move in its desire to work with 'the impossible attempt that literature is to master the movement of unconscious desire'; or what Catherine Greenfield has productively termed 'the textual production of individuals, that is, as missing or failing to see the element of human subjectivity.

Recent surveys of the field of aesthetic theory have stressed the need for a consideration of how notions of truth have functioned within the field; a fairly clear nodding towards Foucault. This is done in a way that resonates with the postmodern politics of identity identified in the previous chapter. It is done very much in the name of the formation of an authentic subjectivity. Charles Altieri, for instance, stresses the requirement for theorists of aesthetics:

> to supplement our concerns for proper sense by processes of self-reflection, on who we become as interpreters and how that activity may be directed to improve the quality of individual lives or modify our approaches to social issues.

As grand narratives fail, they are replaced by hope for 'successful communication among agents who may not need thereby to surrender their most treasured differences.'

Altieri maintains that cultural critics are always working with three basic tasks in mind. The first of these is to search for cognitive measures which can be used as the basis of debate over the value of an artwork. The second is the utilisation of 'first-person response' in the interests of being 'self-reflexive'. The third is the establishment of 'enduring relationships with certain works based either on the intimacy of dialogue they offer or on the mode of authority they can take on for our imaginative lives.' This is
to enter ethics into the register of cultural analysis as a metastandard, above the notion of validity of judgement that has been so dominant within aesthetics. The resonance of the "I" in interpretation is now held to derive from its access to a personal meaning that is beyond doctrines of accuracy of observation\textsuperscript{139}.

The newer areas of aesthetic criticism display similar features to literature and art. Walter Benjamin paid particular heed to the synchronicity of cinema and Freud, prefiguring the doxic status of psychoanalysis in screen critique. He argued that film permitted a special view of the environment, in a mode similar to that of Freud's finding that small, slight elements of life (for example, slips of the tongue) may be worthy of greater characterological/psychological attention than conventional perception would admit. Both can then become privileged sites for the examination of conduct\textsuperscript{140}.

There are other effects of the coeval advent of the human sciences and photography. Romanticism and photography may seem odd as a couplet, but theirs is a powerful nexus. It is achieved as a drive towards the consideration of the self in the light of the relativity of experience and emerging questions of historiography\textsuperscript{141}. The photographic image is the symbol of the development of mechanical reproduction at the point of maximal alienation between public and work, such that anxiety emerges as to whether people will be capable of seeing themselves anywhere in it. Henceforth this is to be the critical test of form\textsuperscript{142}. \textit{L'art pour l'art} may be situated in reaction to the threat posed by the casual availability of the image; even as \textit{anomie} might prevent self-recognition, it might manufacture misrecognition by virtue of its very immediacy and propensity to demystify the ritualistic nature of production\textsuperscript{143}.

Calls for cultural studies to keep 'the possibility of social change alive' have even inscribed utopianism (the ultimate in incompleteness) as a \textit{sine qua non} for qualification as feminist literature. Hence, Marge Piercy writes feminist fiction, but Iris Murdoch writes something else because moments of dreaming the unachieved are prerequisites for readers making dreams come true\textsuperscript{144}. Ethical incompleteness based on textual

\textit{118}
indeterminacy must be recognised before change is possible. And this incompleteness should extend to a conceptual Angst or sense of modesty on the part of the reader. It is a certain critic's failure to register these uncertainties that draws opprobrium from Elaine Showalter: 'What I chiefly miss in The Rape of Clarissa is any sign from Eagleton that there is something equivocal and personal in his own polemic, some anxiety of authorship that is related to his own cultural position'.

As part of the positive impropriety of claiming a textual knowledge of ultimate signifieds, Cheryl Walker has recently queried various developments in the discussion of authorship within contemporary criticism. She juxtaposes the authoritarianism of the conventional placement of meaning in the author's psyche with the need to reinstate the identity of the person writing as part of rescuing women thinkers hidden from the reading list. Walker calls for a selective iteration of questions of authorship, because of the necessity for 'reading not for ultimate meaning but for positional readings'. These readings will be non-authoritarian and all-inclusive because of their combination of Marxism and feminism; but the all-inclusiveness will be guaranteed to avoid claims to exclusivity by its grip on positionality (and hence, implicitly, incompleteness). There will now be 'persona criticism'. This will look to a relationship between author and reader, because the status of the woman writer to her work must not be erased in the name of deconstructive indeterminacy; to do so is to oppress. There must be some consideration of the mark of identification that the text constituted at the time of its manufacture and constitutes at the points of its redisposal. This move away from singularity of meaning and experience but towards a personalised account of the trajectory of the work, its "feelings" status along the track of alignment between author and critical reader, is a further installation of this pedagogic move, a move that is equally perennial in the decoding of media texts.

There is plenty of evidence to suggest that TV critics use evaluative criteria derived from literary analysis. As I stated above, it is clearly the case that the emergence of media studies in the humanities is partly about the redeployment of littérateurs.
Taking a new, apparently distinct object of study and locating it within familiar theoretical and institutional paradigms and practices is likely to result in a reading of the "new" form of text in accordance with established literary protocols: to alter the text whilst retaining the apparatus. One might see this process at work in screen studies in the English-language uptake of auteurism (after Leavis) and Propp.

Research into screen critics and their trainings has been exceedingly sparse. What there is suggests that from the earliest days of television drama criticism in Britain and Germany, there was acknowledged to be a routine mapping onto the task of coordinates derived from literary commentary, and it is clear from survey work that American reviewers regard a college training in English literature as a favoured starting-point for their job. It has been plausibly suggested that people watch TV drama on the basis of the evaluative criteria imbibed through literary studies. Just as the visual media seem to be displacing the written, these ancient protocols of meaning raise themselves up to take charge of the task of understanding.

We can see abundant evidence of an institutionalised faith in the efficacy and prevalence of what has here been termed ethical incompleteness. For example, in trying to account for the simultaneous popularity in Britain of ruling-class fantasy American family drama and its local working-class realist equivalent, Michael Bywater has argued for a hermeneutic organised around the valorisation of interiority, where the locus of significance resides in the degree of diegetic personal completeness in a way unrelated to affluence or indigence: 'The belief that it's what you are which counts, not what you've got.' This may take the form of a concentration on absences, as in elaborations of melodrama which take the gap and its fill as points of departure; or, it may identify homologies between the social experience of underprivileged (i.e. incomplete) categories of person and the appeal of certain types of text. So writers attempting to explain away the international success of Dallas have almost all argued that it achieved an important degree of fit between incompleteness of narrative and incompleteness of domestic work experienced by women in the double roles of viewer.
and housewife. And for Stuart Hall, Coronation Street matters because of the viewers' use of it as a set of 'fictional rehearsals' of 'questions' about 'how they really live their lives'. Studies of television comedy continue to work with an insistent dynamic of always-coming-never-arrived subjectivity within the audience, "its" fragile ego emerging and retreating in engaged laughter. Accounts of the way that humour works dutifully concentrate on the primacy of 'the unsaid' and the engagement that this offers. In a move that is both more prosaic and more overt, some academic television criticism has recently moved into the area of Isocratean rhetoric. It was Isocrates' practice to give students an ethics grounded in how people live their lives. What citizens actually did on a diurnal basis became the object of their knowledge and training. The idea is now to tie this in to TV scholarship. Television's special place within everyday life becomes the raison d'être for screen studies, which is now able to work with the special meanings which the uniting of text and reader can have for a comprehension of how to live in 'human association'.

Manuals of instruction in how to make television drama institutionalise the mid-shot, the close-up of speech or the reaction to it as dominant norms. This clearly makes for a concentration on evaluation of character. Leavisites are pleased to decry such easy identification as productive of an improper 'relationship between viewer and performance' formed out of superficial access to surface signs of personality, to the point where this is held to be promoting an unwelcome 'moral and aesthetic counter-education'. From a more radical position, we can discern an assault on easy viewer identification with texts that is in fact calling for easy viewer non-identification, an oddly unselfreflexive double move. So the left polemic of 1960s British television, exemplified in Cathy Come Home, can safely be catalogued as 'worse than bourgeois individualism'. For all the pains it suffers and inflicts in order to bring us face-to-face with the rigours of welfare, it is naturalistic and deploys routine systems of encouraging empathy. This empathy is regressive because of the paradigmatic relationship that is held to inhere to the choices of personal catharsis and public action. Either one acts politically to reorganise the structures that have produced the inequities exposed in the
text, or one cries away the anger in identification and ends up with emotional release in place of material intervention. The argument runs that spectators of naturalism are driven to believe that an emotional response to suffering is adequate. The viewer here is: ethically incomplete; vulnerable to offerings with an insufficiency of distanciation; and inexpertly tutored in the skills to compensate for this lack. The move of identifying an unfinished, account in both originating text and viewing subject appears to be inexorable.

It is a similar move that Rabinovitz makes when she sets up the portrayal of single mothers in situation comedy as a place for discovering identity and its inevitable contradictions. She points to the taste that TV critics display for finding lack of completeness in character, what Forster called: 'starting life with an experience they forget and ending it with one which they anticipate but cannot understand' in his account of the "right" sort of characterisation in the novel.

Similarly, Jerry Palmer's survey of screen humour organises it as the place in which moral, rhetorical and political dilemmas are enacted through the exemplification of conduct unpopular and popular and comedy's propensity for rejuvenation of "life". The doctrine of bifurcating characters as plausible or implausible is held up as a watershed between realism and fantasy, discerned through a measurement by the audience of the diegesis against its knowledge of itself. Complexity of character is the motor of a hierarchisation of comic forms, with Hancock's Half Hour granted exemplary status because of psychological depth. In his notes accompanying the release of a 1991 film version of Hamlet, Frank Kermode was able to advise readers both that the 'modern...popular, youthful audience' was significant and that it could be trained as Shakespearian because of its familiarity with generic screen fictions, such as the police drama, which 'at their best can, like "Hamlet," [sic.] be about deep and anxious human relationships.

Michèle Mattelart is performing the same operation in her search to explain the genius of American TV, when she finds it able to argue to all and sundry, "I am your
Imaginary. Psychoanalysis, in querying whether there can really be a 'discours de l'autre or only an interrupted monologue, is inscribing this indeterminacy as an argument for the need for vigilance. The force of the human sciences as intertextual riffs of interpretation is thus given full vent.

What would happen if we ceased to care to interpret? This would mean nothing more nor less than a conclusion to the practice of cultural criticism as legitimised within the moniker of entry into a true self. Feminisms seeking to work inside literary studies have clearly recognised that the discipline has made itself the privileged domain for retrieving the genuine self and reforming it. While Ariel Dorfman's claims for his denaturalising of our reading of popular fiction reside in his certitude that: 'By asking readers to take another long...look at these cultural products, I am in fact challenging them to look at their own selves.'

This set of reasonings is solid with Hunter's account of the humanities. He characterises their sense of mission as twofold: firstly, to elaborate the person; and secondly, to elaborate the truth. These are held to be mutually reinforcing; to be, in effect, double movements. Humanising knowledge is dispensed, a knowledge which itself depends on humanisation. The aim of this schooling becomes utterly endogamous: to fulfil the requirements set by the humanising enterprise (whether these are the appropriate display of drills held to be externalisations of a properly reforming subjectivity, or adequate treatments of great texts). Commentary works by continually reinvesting primary texts with new meaning, if in a way that claims to be discovering what was already there. Even when the commentary is new, it religiously returns to the primary text in search of both its referent and its warrant. The commentary is consigned, in Foucault's words, 'to repeat what had...never been said.' The dismal task of criticism is to fill out 'the critical space' with 'a certain manner of coding and transcribing a book'. It is on the basis of the rules by which it remakes such books that this criticism is best judged. It cannot be seen to have a referent in the text itself.
The mechanical limits of such drills, the endogamy of their process and destination, is not, however, matched by a humility of intent. For Leavis:

to insist that literary criticism is, or should be a specific discipline of intelligence is not to suggest that a serious interest in literature can confine itself to the kind of intensive local analysis associated with 'practical criticism'...a real literary interest is an interest in man, society and civilization, and its boundaries cannot be drawn176.

Consider the recent complaint that people have lost both the taste and the capacity for ruminative reading and the contemplative reconsideration of the text that it is said to offer. Why should this matter? The answer comes back from James Sloan Allen, in the best global but non-specifiable certainty of the ethos of the litterateur, that: 'Reading is different. Because reading deals with words, not numbers, its contents are not disembodied quantitative relations but human experience177. Reading at its best can force us to reach out and ask who we are by relating our sense of self to the great characters of literature: 'It entails saying to a book: "I will read you not to fathom your author's intention, or to add to what scholars know of you, but to learn what you can teach me about my life"'178.

In most cases, the frame of public policy or liberal humanist politics – depending on the sources of both funding and intellection – is able to carve from out this self-view a rent-seeking and rent-finding role for the humanities in their productivity. Radical educationalism, for instance, now identifies itself as such by its claim to work on the self via the popular179. This is decidedly not a productivity amenable to calculation via figured norms. Rather, it may be calculated, if at all, by proverbial ones, by the identification of the processes of the humanities academy with the processes of criticism, a criticism that is always named after renewal. This renewal is from the point of a knowledge that is disinterested on an individuated basis, from case to case as it were, but which amounts in sum to a caring, sharing social unit. To cease to care to interpret,
then, would be to select another discipline as the formative mode of entry into personhood and active, academy-endorsed citizenship.

It is significant that the early calls for a semiotic of television were founded on the claim that:

like going to school, watching television has become a fundamental component of social being, by now an obligatory requirement for full membership of the modern capitalist state...The subject of television is a citizen in a world of communication\textsuperscript{180}.

Equally importantly, this context sees the following claim made for textual analysis as a critical intervention into this field:

Such a procedure is absolutely necessary in that it is only in the detailed consideration of particular instances that the effective reality of television production can be grasped (it should be noted, too, that there is an immediate intervention made, and a potentially decisive gain to be won, with those working in television, by the very fact of 'stopping' programmes, 'exposing' them in all the detail of their functioning)\textsuperscript{181}.

Whilst there may be an instantaneous reward for such a practice in alerting workers to what critics know they are really doing, the longer term goal is clearly a general reeducation of the viewing and reading citizen via the elaboration of critics' truths and textual/personal absences or distortions. The indispensable element of symptomatic readings has always been to contrast bearers of dominance, be they called "Hollywood" or "the BBC", with adequately selfreflexive texts that exhibit an awareness of their plasticity and the contingent nature of their accounts of themselves and others. Even critiques of such accounts may be seen to rest their own signifying ground in notions of

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inadequate spectatorial knowledge (viz., Noel King's discussion of So That You Can Live and analyses of it)\textsuperscript{182}.

\textbf{LITERARY, TELEVISION AND FILM STUDIES: THREE RECENT METANARRATIVES}

This interdependence under the sign – sometimes a secret one – of self-formation is a continuing theme of cultural critique. To demonstrate this, I shall make some extensive use of three significant recent metatexts in the field of cultural theory: Gregory Ulmer's claim to rework the pedagogical and research trajectory of communication studies, in \textit{Teletheory}; David Bordwell's excoriating critique of symptomatic film criticism, in \textit{Making Meaning}; and Terry Eagleton's magisterial \textit{Ideology of the Aesthetic}\textsuperscript{183}. I want to use \textit{Teletheory} and \textit{Making Meaning} to reinforce claims already made about the automaticity of transference from literary theory to screen theory, as well as the seemingly deeply-inscribed, if not in fact perennial, tracks of the self as characters found outside, inside and around the text and its available human science readings. Prior to that, however, it is necessary to consider the claims I am making about the longitudinal continuity of concerns with self-formation within aesthetics by using (perhaps against its grain) Eagleton's book.

I read \textit{Ideology of the Aesthetic} as a work of political philosophy addressing ways of knowing the self and the things around it, in the sense that its terrain is how subjectivity is formed, or thought to be formed. For the purposes of this chapter, there is an especially productive tension running through the text between the notion of self-formation as a worthy ideal and its actual exercise as an entry into an imaginary domain where ideology reigns and subservience to a class-laden state is masked within various brands of individualism or misallegiance. Eagleton positions Burke and Hume as the starting-point for the treatment of the aesthetic in this way. From their time, it becomes customary for Western social formations to discuss and protect themselves by referring to

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culture, here understood as 'a plea for the values and affections richly implicit in national tradition'\textsuperscript{184}.

Common means of reasoning and feeling become the grout holding together eighteenth-century British social order. Taste is provided with an objective and necessary status as a semi-automatic psychological affect. The suffering engendered amongst the audience to a tragedy is held to mimic and explicate its interiority of sensibility, vital to the functioning of society. In gender terms, this is seen as a blending of a profoundly womanly aesthetic of emotional identification with a man's sense of moral duty. Both rely on a confidence in extrapolation, in the universality of governance guaranteed by the universality of the senses. Learning a balance between these poles, uncovering one's capacity for self-restraint via aesthetic awareness, is a prerequisite for stable social governance. Here a kind of community of spirit can be formed that will work to minimise the need for a coercive state, an apparatus of consanguinity through cultural consent being preferred to one of repression\textsuperscript{185}. Inevitably, this is a developing trend. For Foucault, the history of political life in the West since the nineteenth century can be deemed to be 'the manner in which power gives itself over to representation'\textsuperscript{186}. The body of the society, not the monarch, becomes a binding that is to be attended to; less obviously literal in its manifestation than the body of one ruler, a mythic 'universality of wills' is formed\textsuperscript{187}.

Through the nineteenth century, with major economic change underway, this story becomes ramified and further elaborated coterminous to a process of the commodification of artefacts. The advent of factory-like production and the elevation of individual authorship to transcendental genius occur simultaneously. The recovery of the self alluded to earlier in Schiller's \textit{anomie} cure sees art made into 'a paradigm of more general social significance – an image of self-referentiality which in an audacious move seizes upon the very functionlessness of artistic practice and transforms it to a vision of the highest good'\textsuperscript{188}. This is seen to be an autotelic value, deriving paradoxically from a mimetic connexion to the otherwise unspecifiable nature of existence itself,
in a way that harks back to Aristotle's suggestion that the propensity towards imitation was the essence of humanness\textsuperscript{189}.

Eagleton stresses that with Kant, the aesthetic moves outside cognition. It has the force of law at the level of affect, producing a 'reciprocity of feeling' that unifies subjectivity in a way that politics and morality are unable to achieve\textsuperscript{190}. This force becomes the Schillerian foundation for the exercise of rationality in the public sphere. Without an adequacy of aesthetic self-awareness and contrition, the citizen cannot function effectively\textsuperscript{191}. Thus for Wittgenstein, '[e]thics and aesthetics are one'\textsuperscript{192}.

The Romantic version of personal identity sees the act of creation as one of self-discovery via differentiation between Self and Other, subject and object,\textsuperscript{193} just as there continues the development of the economy to the point where contradictions are apparent between two spheres: that of civil society, in which civility is prized; and that of economic society, which values competitiveness\textsuperscript{194}. More will be said of this in Chapter Five.

As other writers have pointed out, Hegel is a critical figure in any aesthetics because of his standing at the crossing point between idealism and materialism, his defining and eponymic quality for the former matched by his methodological generation of the preconditions for the latter. The lectures on aesthetics position drama as the highest form of art for its capacity to resolve the distinction between objective and subjective sense. This is said to be critical in the education of persons through and in the phenomenology of spirit because of the form's proclivity for presenting ethical actions. Drama, Hegel argues, moves a step past the evocation of feelings and adventures found in lyric and epic poetries respectively. It brings together the inner world of the subject and the outer of the subject matter\textsuperscript{195}. Tuan's elevation of the West for its propensity towards self-reflexivity takes \textit{Antigone} and its treatments as exemplary of this. Nature is mastered via the assemblage of the human sciences. Self, society and nature are controlled through cultural armature\textsuperscript{196}. (Nor has this been an elite pastime, even
before the introduction of general education. In France, for example, popular forms of melodramatic and violent plays of the early nineteenth century were crucial elements of Romanticism for their use of the everyday ego as a key component and point of question. Rarely, however, is this sort of concern addressed to questions of governance; rather, it has tended to operate within a field that opposes self and society as objects with an existence independent of discourse. It is Eagleton's particular achievement to deal with the aesthetic as an ethic of citizenship, in the sense of the articulation between person and polity and the invention of subjects out of a dialectic between the individual and the "corporate". Radical literary criticism and its pedagogic lode/load are made to meet in Ideology of the Aesthetic under the sign of philosophy.

By contrast with the relatively congenial and familiar approach adopted by Eagleton, which pays due obeisance to cultural theory's apparatus of referencing, commitment, distance and - principally - survey work that cares to consider all the arguments that matter, Ulmer's book works on very different terrain. Their differences seem to match the comparative academic status of literary and television studies.

Teletheory is a polemical call to destabilise the pedagogic and research protocols and relativities within college life. It calls out to be read under the sign of Derrida, which is to say - in this instance - a playfulness that is irreverent of the teacherly subject whilst requiring that subject (or subjects) to be examined as much as it is examining. Ulmer matters as an articulator of Derrida, and he matters as the critical point of entry for a television studies that looks at itself as an institutional object. (All of this regardless of the possibility of reading the book as a paradoxically unselfreflexive confessional owing more to the uptake of a Rogerian call to "own" one's feelings and hence "grow as a person" within a particular therapeutic norm than to deconstruction or anything related to screen products or critique.)
Ulmer seeks a new admixture of three levels of intellectual work, what he terms the 'private, public, disciplinary' prongs. He regards these as structuring forces determining academic output which are customarily left merely implicit both in their impact and their actual existence as formative elements in intellectual work. It is the putative denial of the putatively determining efficacy of the personal which the book aims to uncover and reverse.

The import of such a move resides in the fact that this is perhaps the first major work of communication theory which is not to be catalogued as any out of the following: survey text; empiricist exemplar; or outcome of critical politics. Teletheory announces itself as a new genre, or at least its first marker. This genre, founded on the Benjamin/Derrida trope in its subtitle of Grammatology in the Age of Video, takes as its generative basis the presumption that it is both a true and an interesting statement to say that identity is partly the outcome of 'a life story that people believe in and tell about and to themselves'. Ulmer produces just this account of himself at the end of the book in a way that seeks to blend the three levels of academic determination. It is anticipated that there will emerge from out these revelations a new version of college writing about the screen, a collage genre that seeks a telos only of doubt/scepticism. This is based in part on psychoanalysis and the unity of subject and object which it achieved via the union of Freud's emotional history and his cultural accounting. Critically for my purposes here, Ulmer maintains that even if the articulations which the psy-complexes claim to make between screen criticism and other domains are inaccurate, if they in fact fail to deliver a finally compelling account of the social, they can still be rendered serviceable. Their value lies in the fact that they offer a 'calculus of composition, as an invention. They offer, another might rather say, a new servicing of a much older imperative: to uncover personal incompleteness – each reader's unfinished self – and encourage an unendable odyssey, if one that is challenging rather than eldritch.

The book ties this in to the specifics of TV via another kind of subjectivist warrant. Ulmer argues that we are presently the prisoners of a culture which ascribes TV-
watching to the right brain and artificial intelligence to the other. This results in an inimical splitting of intelligence which disables the folk. It is left to criticism to offer interlocution and the possibility of integration. Feminist quests for a new aesthetics are valorised because they are said to be voyages in search of a non-reificatory practice of knowledge that will displace the habit of presenting objects for the inspection of the dominant. In this sense, they are the hook back to a new communications pedagogy, one in which: 'The student and teacher are the object of the exploration, engaging their own stories in the information set forth as scholarship'\textsuperscript{200}. The semiotic outcome of this will be undying semiosis, a processual move of 'Post-meaning' that will refuse ultimate certainties. The new form is to be 'mystery', a riposte to logical positivism that denies any chance of the researcher being positioned as satisfactorily knowledgeable. Our very ignorance will make for an openness to finding the truth of us, a conduit to adequate apprehension of individual interiority\textsuperscript{201}. There is a gaze, but it is known and valued as a gaze at the self.

It will be gathered that there is an arresting quality of self-disclosure to all this, complete with: photography of the author's father; cartography of his sense of Custer's Last Stand; and lengthy explanations of John Cage's collection of books on mushrooms and why this opens us up to indeterminacy, all done with liberal use of the pun and the academic reference. The book is what it wants its readers to institute and thereby become: a \textit{bricolage} that wants to be ready to change. In one sense, this is massively to anticipate, if it anticipates anything at all, possible moves within the television studies academy that appear quite aberrant and idiosyncratic. In another, it is an unusually open move by a senior scholar to claim a new trajectory for research and teaching which does nothing of the sort at other than a rhetorical level. So the success or failure of \textit{Teletheory} is not to be. It can only be effectively known as an emblem of the stickability of the inscription of exegetical indeterminacy, and its homology within the textual analyst, that is criticism's reason to be. This is so even when we appear to be at the outer limits of academe.
If the political within the personal and the personal within the pedagogic are the concerns of Eagleton and Ulmer respectively, then Bordwell's labour is to uncover the very morphology of exegesis itself. Making Meaning is a similarly bold claim to rewrite how people should read. Its central topic is 'the conventionality of criticism...a significant American industry'. The book uncovers sets of conventions subtending even those critical moves that seek to differentiate themselves from each other quite radically. These unifying tendencies derive from how it is that 'an institution constructs and constrains what is thought and said by its members, and how the members solve routine problems by producing acceptable discourse.'

It will be gathered that the sense of place is very American; Making Meaning seeks to look at college critique. But it does so via a narrative and analysis that range across Cahiers du Cinéma, Movie, Screen, Positif, the British Film Institute and others. And whilst the rhetorical analysis of the moves made to situate political and exegetical positions within critical fields is compelling, the institutional correlatives drawn out may be said to suffer from the comparison of unalike: none of the above may be seen in the same space of history, it seems to me, as the rise of Ivy League screen studies.

The argument distinguishes between comprehension of a film, which is said to involve 'apparent, manifest, or direct meanings', and interpretation, which seeks 'hidden, nonobvious meanings'. It sets up four typologies of the construction of meaning in the act of criticism: diegesis and *fabula* (the referential); explicating abstractions (the explicit); calling up of wider meanings (the implicit); and extrapolating to make the hidden knowable (the symptomatic). These moves match those made by Lanson in the nineteenth century. His ultimate point of *explication de texte* was to be found in the evocation of morals as part of the decoding of a "secret". Bordwell discerns links here with the infiltration of the symptomatology of the human sciences and the structured indeterminacy of psychoanalysis and Marxism as part of the desire of film and television academics to associate with established university reasonings (initially, New Criticism and moving on – with due timelags – down the line of fashions in literary
studies until postmodernism). So even when screen studies' trajectory affronted institutions politically, or argued with itself, it was also enshrining itself in the academy\textsuperscript{205}. The shift from literary to film criticism by students and critics is managed routinely, easily and competently because of the disciplines' mutual history. Bordwell points out that this consanguinity was first signed by Bazin in the 1940s through the act of mobilising writing metaphors to account for cinema\textsuperscript{206}. They have been a continuing trope since then.

Although he is far from concerned with discussing cultural subjectivity, or publics, or citizenship -- in fact, the issue of the value for students or readers in watching films and being taught about them is utterly absent from the book -- Bordwell gives magnificent detail on the ascription of indeterminacy to which this chapter of my thesis has laid claim. He discerns trends in North American criticism of the 1960s and 1970s towards treating modern avant-garde works as analogues of consciousness in their epistemology via mirrors to the "movieness" of the text, thus encouraging the viewer to an awareness of the act of signification. Bordwell then extrapolates from these early days to the further development of symptomatic readings which are founded on the presumption that 'the text cannot say what it means; it tries to disguise its actual meaning'\textsuperscript{207}.

In his account of the history of the psy–complexes, Foucault explains how such a symptomatology operates. There are clear ties to criticism and its attempt to mortgage truth as the secretion of the secreted:

\begin{quote}
Dire qu'un symptôme reproduit symboliquement un traumatisme archaïque implique que le passé n'envahisse pas totalement le présent, mais que le présent se défende contre sa réapparition. Le présent est toujours en dialectique avec son propre passé\textsuperscript{208}
\end{quote}

[To say that symptoms reproduce symbolically the experience of ancient traumas implies that the past can never really be evacuated from the present, for
all the efforts of the present to deny such reappearances. The present is always in a dialogue of struggle with its own past].

The repressed will return everywhere and always, but often camouflaged. As per the Mulvey article analysed earlier, only the cultural critic can find the true self within this thicket of repressed meaning, a move that works through what has been termed 'one of the dominant tropes of western metaphysics: truth lies hidden behind a veil'. Being unable to say what it means makes the text, like the person, subject to the ancient tag 'Quae negata, grata – what is denied is desired'. For Baudrillard, this preoccupation with 'latent discourse', presuming as it must that the latent overdetermines and properly explains 'manifest discourse', denies the reciprocity of the relationship. For him, the surface may frequently determine what is beneath it. But to deny the primacy of the latent is to refuse the 'moral law' that requires of the subject that 'you know your will and your desire'.

Bordwell refers to the doctrine of 'repressed meaning' as a mnemonic for the denial/revelation couplet of textual criticism. Even in the period between the 1930s and the 1950s, he argues, psy-criticism manufactured Hollywood as at one and the same time symptom and denial of questions of collective fear and anxiety. The advent of criticism influenced by texts signed by Lévi-Strauss, Foucault, Barthes and others is itself symptomatic for Bordwell, as he stresses the fact that it is in their exegetical modes of writing that these authors have been taken up and redeployed by others. Similarly, the utilisation of Lacanian visual metaphor work is correlated with the transfer by the literary critic into films, as part of the grand cultural shifting of sites for the public search for the self.

There is one significant problem in Making Meaning. Bordwell's admirably tight rhetorical analysis has no account of these trends in other than careerist or institutional terms that find rational academic actors carving out lives for themselves within the limits of an industry. He never offers an explanation for: why there should be any
criticism; whether there is any ideal viewing or projected subjectivity and inter-subjectivity; or why any sorts of politics do in fact emerge from criticism. (There are symptomatologies and symptomatologies: one might valorise the experience/worth of certain categories of person over another because of correlation with material, non-cinematic areas of practice.) There is no address of the purposes – the imposts within the selected ethical register – for which criticism has made itself a pedagogic necessity.

But *Making Meaning* remains a fine tracery of, for instance, the critical trope of anthropomorphising, of seeking out opportunities to "find" personhood in cinema; viz.: 'To ascribe...voyeurism to movie cameras, and duplicity to narrators is to make meaning by "making persons"'. It then becomes necessarily commonplace to articulate the spectatorial process as an (of course never straightforward) series of movements between identification and detachment, a fecund trope that Bordwell directly attributes to trainings in literary decipherment. (One might render this observation more specific. Consider King's productive distinction between the analytic treatment meted out to the 'political film versus the political analysis of films'. King points out the propensity for left critique to suspend disbelief in its treatment of certain texts, a suspension discernible via the reinstatement of peculiarly literary forms of analysis in the name of a solidarity in charity. So we see the return of the disabling oppositional couplet feeling/theory and the reassertion of the requirement that there be a strong degree of fit between criticism and its object in preference to a counter-indicative reading. In addition, as one might anticipate, there is a reinsertion of authorial intent as the measure of rectitude.)

Bordwell concludes that:

Interpretation takes as its basic subject our perceptual, cognitive, and affective processes, but it does so in a round about way – by attributing their "output" to the text "out there"...Interpretation answers to a widely felt interest in motives, intentions, and ethical responsibility by showing that artworks which do not
offer explicit guides for behavior can raise significant issues of thought, feeling, and action217.

The issues raised in a traversal of these three metatexts are central across my thesis. They are issues to do with how the cultural subject and public are thought about and formed in terms of an appropriate politics and an understanding of what cultural criticism can realistically achieve. For to repeat, the thesis addresses the formation of citizenship through ethical incompleteness and whether it is feasible to fill such an empty pedagogic donnée with a politics that responds to democratic and demotic notions of what comprises a citizenry, its training and its tastes.

The editors of Routledge's "Popular Fictions" series of books exemplify this type of project when they explain the need for textual study across forms, reasoning that popular fictions:

help to define our sense of ourselves, shaping our desires, fantasies, imagined pasts, and projected futures. An understanding of such fictions...is thus central to an understanding of ourselves; of how those selves have been shaped and of how they might be changed218.

This prospectus realises these twin needs as dictates of "relevance" operating under dual, shifting heads of power: one, the increasing utilitarianism of educational policy and the need to protect a space for texts and margins; the other, the responsiveness to voices of dissonance from the conventional and how they might renew that sense of what a citizen might be. This turning away from grand anti-statism and towards a recognition of an always already achieved compromise with the institutions of learning, teaching and making entities is a response to both the enunciation of "new" subjectivities and the falling by the side of the road of monist accounts of the social.

To repeat, the crucial question politically that has been forwarded under postmodernity and the collapse of grand narrative explanations of all and sundry has been the issue of

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subjectivity. Hence the irony of a return to these issues, their reconsideration by the most eminently qualified anti-humanism. In his essay "What Is Enlightenment?", Foucault answers that for Kant it is a moment of maturation, which is to say a following of others, a deferral of authority away from the self in certain areas in order to render the self autonomous in others. This knowing of oneself inevitably leads to auto-critique. It becomes the basis for a redeployment of the subject by the state. But this is not a simple, straightforward exercise of domination. This is a relationship between the state, the self and the ceded subject that is especially important in the field of culture as a site of non-coercive adherence.

After Nietzsche, aesthetics is about the production of value, not mimesis. Art forms reality anew, but never as a utopia; rather it is made into an insistent, infinite process, a mode of becoming that is criticism's unacknowledged touchstone. This ethic, not crises of criticism over representation or quality, has been an abiding theme in aesthetics and cultural policy. The implication of a call for representation is that it is insufficient for a subject to be "present" in its own person or substance. It must have a form of advocacy lest it be inadequate to itself. This is an implicit recognition on the front of cultural protection that the citizen, the public, the consumer or the nation is insufficiently self-evident. And for those consumed by the burden of the Enlightenment, this is a lacuna that must be filled in. Habermas refers to the (apparently absolute) value of 'a communicative rationality in whose forms modern societies, that is, societies which are not fixed once and for all and which have no guiding images, must reach an understanding about themselves'. This is a revival in the secular of the Augustinian imperative, that requirement to uncover what Foucault describes as 'a mind in profundity...a mind folded back in the intimacy of itself which is touched by a sort of unconsciousness, and which can develop its potentialities by the deepening of the self'. The systematic incorporation of writing as a practice of everyday cultural life went hand-in-hand with the elaboration of invigilating doctrines of the self and its institutionalised mysteries over and above the more apparently outward world of orality. In terms of the allocation of resources, the question posed by Foucault for
those dealing with the formation of cultural subjects is finally: 'How much does it cost
the subject to be able to tell the truth about itself?' This truth will be known through
a process of cultural subjectivity. For if modernity offered earthly salvation through a
pedagogic, rather than an ecclesiastical, tending of the flock, as was argued in Chapter
One, then postmodernity has struck back to require the replaying of errors of the self
that can never be worked through. The sentence imposed by the promise of finding
a true self in literature is that the process cannot be brought to a conclusion. And the
particularity of postmodernity is of an 'age without instruments' to take the 'tempera-
ture', but nevertheless an age which Jameson almost celebrates for the accompanying
directive to take 'uncertainty as its first clue. Such is the burden of an aestheticisa-
tion of politics, when identity is central and the available technology for forming it is in
the thrall of cultural critique.
NOTES


5. Ibid. pp.4–5.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid. pp.7–9.

12. Ibid. pp.29–32.


16. See his auto-critique for summarily dismissing Australian sex comedy films of the 1970s, which he later came to regard as potentially cleansing expressions of a haphazard aspect of the Zeitgeist, ibid., pp.123–124.


18. Ibid. p.3.

20. Ibid. p.178.


35. Williams, 1989, op.cit., p.112.


43. Ibid. pp.152 and 133.

44. Cary Bazalgette, "TV Drama Goes Back to Front", in Hurd, National Fictions, 1984, op. cit., p.43.


47. Tulloch, op. cit., p.3.


51. For examples of Tulloch's use of ethnographic material, see op. cit., pp.215–216 and 259.

52. Ibid. pp.70–71.

53. Ibid. pp. 91–92.


55. Ibid. p.46.

56. Ibid. p.47.
58. Ibid. p.255.
71. Ibid. p.85.
75. Catherine Belsey, "The Plurality of History", Southern Review, 17 (2), 1984,

58. Ibid. p.255.


71. Ibid. p.85.


75. Catherine Belsey, "The Plurality of History", Southern Review, 17 (2), 1984,
pp.140–141.


77. Ibid. p.155.


79. Sonia M. Livingstone, "Interpretive Viewers and Structured Programs", Communication Research, 16 (1), 1989, p.27.


83. Quoted in ibid., p.65.


87. Elizabeth Cowie, "Woman as Sign", m/f, 1, 1978, p.49.

88. Ibid. p.62.

89. Ibid. p.63.


93. McQuire, op.cit., p.20.


110. Hassan, loc.cit.

111. Ian Hunter, "The Concept of Context and the Problem of Reading", Southern


120. Ibid. p.165.

121. George Steiner, "To Civilize our Gentlemen", in George Steiner: A Reader, Oxford University Press, New York, 1984:1965, p.27.

122. Ibid. pp.27 and 26.


129. Ibid. p.19.


133. John Forrester, "A Brief History of the Subject", in Institute of Contemporary
Arts, op.cit., p.13.


137. Ibid.

138. Ibid. p.270.

139. Ibid. pp.271–272.


141. Lingwood, loc.cit.


147. Ibid. p.571.


154. Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Verso, London and New York, 1991, p.68.


156. See, for instance, the account of certain film and television in Nina C. Liebman, "Leave Mother Out: The Fifties Family in American Film and Television", Wide Angle, 10 (4), 1988, pp.26 and 33.


162. Fiske, op.cit., p.149.


166. Forster, op.cit., p.58.


170. Hartman, op.cit., p.34.


175. Michel Foucault, "Monstrosities in Criticism", Diacritics, 1 (1), 1971, p.58.


178. Ibid. p.90.


181. Ibid. p.9.


191. Ibid. p.106.


196. Tuan, op.cit., p.272.


199. Ibid. pp.36, 43 and 60.

200. Ibid. pp.68, 85 and 89.


203. Ibid. p.xii.

204. Ibid. p.2.

205. Ibid. pp.8–9, 16–17 and 22–23.


210. Ibid. p.106.

211. Jean Baudrillard, "On Seduction", in Mark Poster, (ed.), Jean Baudrillard:


216. Noel King, "Recent 'Political' Documentary: Notes on 'Union Maids' and 'Harlan County USA'", Screen, 22 (2), 1981, pp.7–8.


221. Hartman, op.cit., p.75.


As was noted in Chapter Two, recent developments in cultural analysis have both problematised the conduct of representation and – most latterly – the very concept, presupposing as it does an already extant realm of the real that is outside imaginary/symbolic knowledges. At a policy level, this might be expected to have significant implications for notions of cultural sovereignty and rights, notably the assumption that subjects within national formations need to have dramatological mirrors in which to observe themselves and audit their maturational development. Yet official discourses on art consistently exhibit a faith in the doctrine of mirror images of reality. This continues to provide the foundation to a pedagogically-derived technology of public self-formation designed to make readers into willing civic subjects.

This chapter elaborates further on some themes raised in Chapter Two, arguing for a continuity and coincidence between cultural policy and textual analysis in their utilisation of hermeneutic protocols of ethical incompleteness, if not in any transfer of interest towards political critique. It considers the debates in progress between trade negotiators at the recent culture round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT) in this context, juxtaposing the position enunciated by the United States (US) team (with its internationalist laissez-faire logic) against the "no-go-zone" discourses articulated by legatee cultures.

As was argued in Chapter Two, my position rests on the following claims, here transferred to cultural policy. Firstly, the will to read by measuring texts against a desirable or real social order is longstanding and diffuse. Secondly, within the domain of textual
analysis, the privileged site for the production of the fully achieved human subject in its
time, the drive towards measuring quality through a finely-managed mimesis is strong
from left and right, feminist and "gender-free", post-colonial and dominionist alike.

A mortgage on referentiality in the real may be seen to be problematic in the light of
various theories of language and narratology which insist upon the primary determina-
tions on texts as arising from their internal combinations of elements, in turn reliant on
relatively arbitrary meanings and specific requirements of story, discourse, genre and
morphology. We could turn to theories of indeterminacy for further mortgage on such
doubts about the significatory disposal guaranteed by the apparently closed world of a
given text, of texts which must all always already be readerly if the will to read politi-
cally continues to be exercised in the ways I have suggested. Nonetheless, numerous
governments and culture industry workers around the world have mobilised a reflec-
tionist protocol to justify what amount to ripostes to American cultural dominance, the
unequal exchange of cultural goods and services that marks so much of the United
States' textual traffic with Second and Third World countries. From all brands of
politics and polity, concerns are raised about the imaging that, it is held, flattens out and
homogenises with a view to a Pax Americana Pollyannaisms that fails to address the
special needs and discrete histories of people living in other cultural formations. This
American product clears its costs by a combination of huge domestic sales and a broad
international reach, which allows it to drop into foreign markets at costs that no local
producer could possibly match. There is no basis for real "competition" between the
parties in terms of the taste of the viewing public.

These policy anxieties are all about the need to form national subjects, about the need
for cultural maturity to be expressed or invented in that moment of auto-mimesis when
an anthropomorphised nation stares back at itself via the privileged site of drama.
Without this shock of recognition, it is held, we fail to know ourselves. In addition, we
fail to open ourselves up to the excoriating, searing, uncomfortable but finally
amelioratingly liberal gaze of the artist. For the artist is a creature that can know us by
being of us, but who stands away from the everyday cycles of accumulation and dispersal in order to see what we fail to be but might have it in us to become. In turn, reading such output becomes a cultural right. Hence, the humanities academy's justifications for training readers in reading texts often amount to the dispersal of an assembly of technologies designated as "developing critical thought". But in fact these technologies operate at the level of a set of quasi-Polonian imposts organised around means of knowing oneself as part of a national culture. And this quite critical end of cultural production, that point where meaning is finally invested, that moment when protocols of reception really determine signifieds, is left unable to touch the discourse of sovereign cultural production that sets all store by the nationality of texts themselves. Points of origin and inaugurating registers of address overdetermine the relatively autonomous procedures for investing such texts with local significance. It is assumed that readers will interpret in terms of self and nation.

Such anxieties have gathered around them a contour of urgency in the context of recent developments in the freer trade negotiations conducted under the sign of the GATT, an Agreement originally forged between states from the industrialised market economies (IMECs). The GATT is the principal forum for the IMECs to work through their contradictions on a whole realm of issues, negotiating the complex terrain that makes for sudden plenipotentiary disjunctures between the discourse of the imaginary market enshrined in the neoclassical school of economics and the political pressures already deriving from the real material conditions of constituencies at home. It is of course also subject to the everyday tactic of diplomacy that calls insistently on negotiating representatives to have lists of items that they will give up and lists that are sacrosanct.

As the capitalist world order is transformed into one of services, in its First and Second World manifestations at any rate, attention moves to free trade in this sector. The United States has a huge balance of payments surplus in the area, for reasons already noted. It pushes very hard for the removal of all barriers to free trade in screen texts. And the implication of such yearnings extends beyond the negative aspect of state intervention –
keeping things out – and into actually proscribing active modes of subvention, such as government-assisted film industries.

This chapter sets the geopolitical scene of: the GATT; the international cultural order; and the global economy. It then considers the status of the realist reflectionism which undergirds a particular cultural nationalist policy on screen drama. I am seeking to illustrate that the critical component informing this policy is the ethical self-formation of a preferred cultural subject as per the mission of literary and screen studies outlined in Chapter Two. This is to argue for an interpretation that sees a very significant continuity in accounts of aesthetics in their sustained interest in the formation of entities, mostly persons but sometimes nations or other non-human categories of agency. The policy discourse has been very largely formed in debt to this set of precepts, but, to repeat, with almost no reference whatever to recent debates on, for example, the realist text or reflectionism. I conclude that this is an instance of the continued sway of an ethic of self-formation in logics underpinning cultural production and its public subvention that has remained relatively immune either to the specifics of mode of production or littérateurs' debates. It will be my contention that we can see real connexions to the type of invigilation described by Foucault in his account of Epictetus' policing practices:

To keep constant watch over one's representations, or to verify their marks the way one authenticates a currency, is not to inquire (as will be done later in Christianity) concerning the deep origin of the idea that presents itself; it is not to try and decipher a meaning hidden beneath the visible representation; it is to assess the relationship between oneself and that which is represented, so as to accept in the relation to the self only that which can depend on the subject's free and rational choice.
THE GATT

From the time of its emergence as one of the key trading and monetary protocols of the late 1940s until the shifts and shocks of the 1970s, the GATT enshrined the key principles of the world trading system: multilateralism; non-discrimination; and codified methods of regulation in place of sovereign administrative discretion on the part of individual states. It became, rhetorically, the bureaucratic champion of free trade, dedicated to the removal of blocs or blocks to the "natural" operation of a perfect market organised around the preferred rhythms of supply and demand under the intersecting signs of pure comparative advantage and consumer sovereignty.

This was very much the United States' agenda and it worked well for the great and powerful until the appearance of the European Community (EC) and Japan as fields of real economic force. This effect was doubled by some internal loss of faith that a liberal trading regime necessarily coincided with the best interests of the US. By the 1980s, the rules of discourse of international debates on trade set up binary opposites of liberalism and mercantilism, but with no major player staking lofty moral terrain other than on a contingent, site-specific basis; protectionism was accepted when it worked for the speaking subject, rejected when it worked for some other entity to that speaker's detriment. The IMECs have differing material interests in different spheres of their formations, such that today's laissez-faire representative on issue x is tomorrow's insistent voice declaring issue y to be outside the spirit of the Agreement. In addition, the GATT's record has suffered through the very success of its legalism, which has encouraged resistance via the emergence of new forms of protectionism appearing under the signs of non-tariff implements and, latterly, industry policy. This comes as no surprise to dissident economists, who have reacted against the neoclassical model over the last hundred and fifty years for its tendentious dependence on 'individual preference orderings, endowments, and technology'. In particular, they have noted that the signified of "free trade" is the self-interest of the most powerful. US demands for a deregulated domain of cultural openness have been criticised as a form of 'corporate
libertarianism. By the end of 1990, the influence exerted on the US Executive to increase or at least sustain its own protectionism in the area of both agriculture and services was a most significant counter-pressure on policy. This was possible because the President's authority to strike agreements on these matters is legislated for within sunset clauses. It does not reside in freestanding Constitutional authority and is therefore highly contingent. The US may have been planning a less totalising approach to service industries diplomacy, one that relied on bilateral discussions until and unless the GATT paid dividends.

The late 1980s saw a massive expansion in the quantitative importance of trade in services (TIS), with obvious significance for the realm called "culture". Prior to this period, it was a convention in economics to downplay the significance of TIS, because of technological limitations and networks of domestic regulation. Traditional colocation of production and consumption militated against international development of the sector. This was always less true of non-contact services, particularly service products. And with changes to the American and British macroeconomies, in particular, knowledge has expanded to encompass tests of neoclassical theory in this domain. TIS expressly includes broadcasting, film, television and television commercial (TVC) production and distribution within the terms of the GATT. Current negotiations on freeing the sector from market distortion could affect such areas as: legislation by particular sovereign-states for local content quotas in the media; foreign ownership of broadcasters; public subvention of the screen industries; and state assistance given to indigenous bourgeoisies to move into export markets. The problem with active assistance is that it contravenes one of the principal formative elaborations of GATT logic; namely, that forms of state aid should be via tariffs instead of restrictions or non-tariff measures, in order that such distortions to the market are visible, predictable and thus capable of being planned around as well as verified. None of this, of course, denies the desired telos of GATT: the eventual elimination of all actions by states that hamper free trade.
The theoretical logic underpinning this critique of state protection of industries is that economies will eventually attain a mutual natural equilibrium if they are organised around already extant (i.e. non-legislated) factor endowments that provide them with a comparative advantage over others. Despite their awareness that this has favoured the already-strong, over ninety sovereign-states are signatories to the hundred-plus agreements that manifest the GATT. When the US put TIS on the agenda, it threatened to leave the GATT if others rejected the move, coinciding as this did with a decline in the value of traditional, secondary US industrialism but a clear development of its advantage in the services sector. Having failed to cover the culture industries under the Free Trade Agreement with Canada signed in 1988, representatives of the US Trade Department were briskly lobbying the EC at the same time against the threatened imposition of quotas on TV programs coming from outside the Community.

The US is especially scathing of the notion of a pan-European culture. After years of supporting European unification, there is now something of a reaction in the light of terrors about what Forbes magazine has called 'a protectionist, corporatist, anti-American Frankenstein'. In reality, the proposed limit of 50% of broadcast time devoted to imports would make very little difference to existing practice, with the US currently providing a (sizeable) fraction of this amount. But the developing proliferation of stations in the wake of deregulation across Western Europe means that new entrants, faced with high start-up costs, have already shown themselves willing to ignore or abuse any directives on localism in the interests of filling airtime with cheap US product, and this will presumably develop as a problem in the near future. It has been claimed, for instance, that some years in the recent past have seen more than half the drama on British television being imported from the States, despite 86% quota limits. And this predates deregulation. At the end of the 1980s, TV in Western Europe was using about a hundred and fifty thousand program hours a year, which was expected to rise to three hundred and fifty thousand hours by 1995 because of new technology and deregulation. If one may anthropomorphise, it could be said that the US archives were waiting. And as they waited, lobbyists for the American screen
industries and US trade negotiators were mounting increasing critiques of the Community's *Television Without Frontiers* directive on the 50% limit for being in direct conflict with GATT principles; ironically so, as it may be the services trade element that puts culture within the legal power of the EC to consider, as opposed to any general authority to make directives in the name of the conservation or production of identities. (One might, however, also note the oft-cited comment by Jean Monnet, a founding parent of what became the Community, that 'si c'était à refaire je recommencerai par la culture' [if I had my time over, I'd begin the process with culture]20.)

We can gain some sense of the relative dispositions within the GATT on this matter by reference to the August 1990 meeting to discuss the TIS sub-topic document, entitled *Draft Services Trade Framework for Audiovisual Services*. Most states represented in Geneva referred in debate to 'the cultural importance of the audiovisual sector'. India and Canada argued for the addition of a clause which would exempt 'assistance measures imposed for cultural reasons' from *laissez-faire* protocols. The European Community preferred a 'sectoral annotation', which would allow for greater flexibility by permitting space for future assistance measures that might be required to develop various aspects of the audiovisual continuum. Japan and Australia spoke favourably of the need to maintain cultural sovereignty but were non-committal on the specifics of the draft. The United States was unequivocally and implacably opposed to any form of exception or notation. Its negotiating team was quoted as saying that the GATT should 'agree to disagree on motives – cultural sovereignty or business opportunity – and then start negotiating'21. There is more than a little irony in this, when one considers that US Government diplomacy, information-gathering, quotas and tariffs were critical to the establishment of Hollywood's success in setting internationally attractive cost structures in place and expanding monopolistically through the 1920s22; but then history is not the motor of neoclassical discourse. One might, however, have expected a certain amount of reflexivity concerning two decades of generous tax credits for US investors in American film and television, in addition to numerous tax shelter schemes and evidence that US businesses operate a selling cartel each year at the Cannes Festival23.
In another sense, though, this represented strong continuity in US policy. During the first GATT negotiations in 1947, it had pushed for free trade in film, inscribed in Article IV of the original Agreement; and the early 1960s had witnessed attempts to have trade restrictions on TV removed.

These positions exist against a backdrop in which there is almost no importation of TV by the American networks. Contrastingly, more than 10% of TV time in Western Europe is taken up with US programs. The figure is 30% in Canada and Latin America. Drama varies significantly in these statistics. Fiction comprises 37% of European TV, but just a quarter of that is produced locally; American imports account for 44% of the rest. Only the United Kingdom (UK) and the former Federal Republic of Germany made more TV than they bought in the 1980s. American balance of payments figures are assisted by an estimated US$500 million a year from television exports, up more than five times on the 1972 dollar value. In 1983 it had 75% of the value of all international television trade, mostly in drama. 1988 brought US$5.5 billion in revenue from overseas sales of entertainment, the nation's second largest earner after the aerospace sector. And between those two years, American TV sales to Europe went from US$212 million to US$675 million. The Columbia Prix Entertainment company's overseas revenues from television doubled in 1988 to US$200 million. Predictions for 1991 suggested that exports of film and TV would generate US$6.7 billion in foreign earnings, up 13% on 1990 and nearly double the 1985 figure. This should be seen in the light of a context in which the US had an overall trade deficit of US$100 billion in 1989, was moving towards being a net importer and was the world's most indebted nation.

So the stakes in TV were high for the US. As its key image market trade paper, Variety, put it, the prospects for the 1990s were that 'as old borders come down and old ideologies give way, preach the true believers, the lingua franca of motion pictures will command a greater worldwide audience than ever before.' More prosaically, the majority of US TV drama was being financed on a deficit basis. Producers were selling
programs to the domestic networks at well below cost, having planned on recoupment and profit through US syndication to domestic stations allied to sales overseas. What had once been the source of super-profit was now effectively an iterable component in the servicing of debt.

Importantly for my purposes here, there are correlative cultural policy views. As Sandra Braman has argued:

> The focus on information as a commodity by the US is part of an overall rejection of cultural, social or political valuation of international information flows that is embedded in background studies for policy-makers, congressional hearings and policy statements in a quite self-conscious way.

The intellectual training ground that might have provided a *locus* of calculation in this domain was simply absent at the policy and academic level outside critical communications scholarship (consider, for instance, the routine *lacuna* in American college trainings in international relations of any consideration of cultural politics.) The area of left scholarship that has considered these questions has tended to do so from within a realist media effects paradigm. It uses a conventional content analysis of news flows from North to South to pronounce on media imperialism, without any consideration of readership protocols or, significantly for my argument, the specificity of screen drama. The realm of news and current affairs is privileged in a way typical of the political science discipline. Similarly, policymakers in Europe from the 1950s on had routinely conceived of television as a critical pedagogical instrument in the formation of citizens and the elevation of public taste, primarily via the disciplinary genre of current affairs. The officially endorsed genre never proved to be as popular as American entertainment programs. And even the model of the public broadcaster able to guard and produce morality came to be problematised through developments in the spheres of satellite, cable, US marketing and new modes of viewing practice. Public policy has come to recognise that more drama is watched around the world than at any other time.
in history. Drama has its moment, because of the international screen. And it may well be that the flow of television makes for a transfer of what has been called the 'aura of truth' from news and current affairs to fiction. Quite clearly, this presents a dilemma for cultural policy. It is a dilemma with historical contours wrapped around the development of a series of policy constructions of the United States as the mountebank of twentieth-century visual culture.

THE INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL ORDER

So before shifting to world systems economics and the terrain of recent debates within the GATT, it is as well to consider in more global terms why it might be that so many countries adopted strategies of special pleading on this matter and how and when they went about it.

In 1926, the League of Nations sponsored an International Film Congress to discuss the issue of American dominance of the market, but attempts to act in concert as particular trading blocs against Hollywood failed. By the following year, the Daily Express newspaper worried that the exposure of British youth to US entertainment was making them 'temporary American citizens'. This has been an enduring complaint. Nearly sixty years later, the Commission of the European Communities was prescribing 'a common market for television production...if the dominance of the big American media corporations is to be counterbalanced.'

This might also be read as a reaction to the simple magnitude of the US presence in the global economy. For all its huge debts, America continues to be the industrial concentrate of the world. In 1989, the five hundred biggest multinationals were located in just nineteen urban centres, ten of them in the US. This kind of concentration makes for perceptions of imbalance, particularly when it is allied to an aggressively interventionist and moralistic foreign policy presence. The concomitant move is
twofold: US companies and the US Government are conceived as coterminous; and their ideological work is seen to be done through the culture industries.

A dynamic new force emerged in the 1960s that provides some conceptual link between these spheres. The development of a cultural imperialism thesis, in Latin America in particular, argued that the US, as the world's leading producer and exporter of television, was transferring its dominant value system to others. There was said to be a corresponding diminution in the vitality and standing of local languages and traditions, and hence a threat to national identity. International organisations became the domain for the mobilisation of these logics by governmental agencies.

Since 1973, in particular, via the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and the Non-Aligned Movement, Third World countries have been lobbying at a series of meetings and conferences for what has been variously termed a New International Information Order or New World Information and Cultural Order (NWICO), mirroring calls for a New International Economic Order and a revised North-South dialogue. This is a dialogue that is reenvisaged as an ideal speech-act, one where it is possible and indeed necessary for the sovereign-state to supertend relative differentials of economic power and call for an end to processes of unequal exchange whereby First World countries create and manage markets in other places. What began as a concentration on news flow and the TV presentation of Third World countries has been broadened to include the place of the computer in economic and social development and the allocation of telecommunications frequencies. This has continued to occur under the imprimatur of what was announced at the 1973 meeting of Heads of State of Non-Aligned Countries as 'the need to reaffirm national cultural identity'. Of these institutions, UNESCO was the agency with an infrastructure to implement policies flowing from this rhetoric, but it has operated from a complex set of imperatives, combining the proclamation of a universal humanness and tolerance that sees culture as singular and inalienable with a more specifically politico-diplomatic drive towards the recognition and veneration of difference that obeys the founding dictate of an organisa-
tion based on sovereign–states. UNESCO has now ceased to be the critical site for NWICO debate, in part perhaps because the Americans withdrew from it in 1984 in the sight of the Organisation's 'increasing politicization'. Australian diplomats have argued that the US chose to debate TIS in the GATT because, as a forum, it 'is not strongly influenced by ideological controversies'. Less–developed countries have fought hard to resist the US push for the GATT to open up TIS, both on the grounds of cultural sovereignty and the desirability of establishing their own industrial infrastructure of culture for economic reasons.

But it would be misleading to isolate this – as opposed to the very broad debates on restructuring global inequality – within the domain of the Third World. At Mondiacult 1982, the Mexico City world conference on cultural production referred to in Chapter Two, Jack Lang, the French Minister for Culture, caused a major split amongst First World nations with the following remark:

> We hope that this conference will be an occasion for peoples, through their governments, to call for genuine cultural resistance, a real crusade against this domination, against – let us call a spade a spade – this financial and intellectual imperialism.

One recalls Diogenes' mocking of Demosthenes for claiming to provide a lead to the people of Athens while himself being sexually "passive" in bedroom relations. The homology between sexual and civic standing arches across history to the homology between cultural and national independence: 'When one played the role of subordinate partner in the game of pleasure relations, one could not be truly dominant in the game of civic and political activity.'

It will be gathered that the United States reacted to Lang's statement after the fashion of the interpellated, accusing him of chauvinism. That critique is certainly a powerful one. There are major problems with a notion of cultural identity as a discrete and super–
legitimate phenomenon when this primarily serves as a warrant for an 'asphyxiating localism' created and policed by culture bureaucrats. Its principal effect under such conditions has often been to champion hierarchical and narrow accounts of culture\textsuperscript{53}. Dallas, for instance, is routinely held up as an exemplar of 1980s cultural imperialism, notably by Lang himself. One response to its commercial success has been for local producers to model other programs on it within their own milieu, to render its textual referent local whilst recycling many of its generic components\textsuperscript{54}. This has driven some authorities to more and more prolix accounts – very limiting accounts – of what may be termed authentic and local. The net effect of this has been a quaint dynamic of inter-penetration and symbiosis between discourses and capital movements going under the apparently diffuse signs of globalisation and regionalisation, but both dependent on very homogeneous, integrated understandings of culture\textsuperscript{55}. This is just one illustration of the tendency in European debate to conflate the sign "mass culture" with the sign "American", denying in the process the power of the extraordinary heterogeneity of the domestic US audience and conflating source of supply with impact at point of consumption\textsuperscript{56}. At the Symposium International sur l'Identité Culturelle Européene in Paris in 1988, the \textit{leit motif} was terror in the sight of 'la déferlante américaine – the American wave'\textsuperscript{57}. One is reminded here of Billy Wilder and IAL Diamond's 1948 screenplay to \textit{A Foreign Affair}. A US Congressperson is referring to postwar relief efforts in Europe: 'If you give them food, it's democracy. If you leave the labels on, it's imperialism'.

Of course, the next move for the subordinated is to form oneself as distinctly different and able to represent that difference via the concept of a nation. And, as will be seen in Chapter Four, there is little agreement over what nations are, what national identity is, or how to explain national movements\textsuperscript{58}. But culture is clearly important here at the level of the constitution of community, the performance of 'typical doings and sayings'\textsuperscript{59}. Elements such as idiom and syntax are important means for the transmission of retraining at times of economic change as well, so that these matters quickly become of formal, instrumental concern in the governance of populations\textsuperscript{60}. A standard
language – Parisian French – was, for example, an essential component in the emergence of a bourgeoisie after the French Revolution. And when considering what can go into a public's constitution of itself and its surroundings, it is hard to decry the presentation of facts such as that 87% of English-language Caribbean television was imported in 1988, up 10% in ten years, with most of it in the field of drama.

But to repeat, the point has been well made that the valorisation of traditional cultural formations is frequently profoundly repressive of particular categories of person. The enunciation, disposition and protection of a culture may be done by and for local elites alone in the name of a romanticised harking after authentic community spirit. There is great force behind US Trade representative Carla Hills' uncomfortable question about the EC's TV policy, as to whether 'English culture is promoted more by a film produced in France by 'Europeans' than by a film of New Zealand origin'. After six years of trying, attempts to bring together the "quality" stations of Europe in order to create a deliberately European drama series continue to encounter difficulties with notions of discrete national dramaturgies and fears of creating the ultimate blandness of 'un euro-pudding'. And away from the attempt to create the alchemical European, how plaintively should Jack Lang appeal to national specificity in the language of freedom from media domination when his Ministry worked strenuously to wrest the balance of TV programming away from the US and Britain via the formation of a Latinate audiovisual locale of France, Iberia and Latin America? It may be that the rhetoric of a single Europe is not much more than an attempt to cut the costs of advertising through standardisation.

Most conceptions of cultural conservation are forwarded by a particular group which claims to possess a particular geopolitical space and goes guarantor of its cultural validity and authenticity. The dominant definition, for example, of the "new European" is organised in terms of: a Judaeo-Christian set of religious beliefs; Hellenistic accounts of the polity, arts and science; and Roman jurisprudence. EC directives deploying such logics are increasingly under attack for the partiality of this amalgam.
and its connexions to imperialist tropes. Critics refer to the EC as 'the official magisters of culture'. (Similar issues are assessed in greater detail in the next chapter through a discussion of the multicultural subject.) Using this analysis, some would, for instance, question whose interests were served by Israel's decision to hold up the introduction of television until 1968 because of the supposed dissonance between American entertainment messages and appropriate local values. Such a line of questioning would be encouraged by the eventual enabling legislation forming a TV system, which called on the medium to be constituted around 'the life, struggle, creative effort and achievement of the State'.

When she was Prime Minister of Britain, Margaret Thatcher always insisted that the EC eschew any fantasy of 'some identikit European personality' on the one hand and a Leviathan-like 'super-state' on the other. She was very dubious about an extra-economic component to the Community. At the same time, a powerful position is being enunciated on the left about this, as the following quotation from Michèle Mattelart indicates:

How will commercial logic be aligned with the social logic governing the interests of groups, the widening base of audiovisual production, the participation by citizens in the choice of technologies, and the definition of their use? Is a "local product" one that would permit a particular collectivity to express and to appropriate its sounds and images, compatible with the international market? Is there an "alternative" product that could be international yet not in the mould of a transnationalized mass culture?

In 1945, Hans Kohn suggested that, paradoxically, the 'age of nationalism represents the first period of universal history'. What is apparently by definition an enclosure may in fact provide the first prerequisites for internationalism, particularly in terms of the internationalisation of commerce. That process is dependent on formal entities organised around national lines speaking for different peoples, especially in the provi-
sion of legal and organisational infrastructures for the accumulation and investment of capital. Same and Other can only be understood individually in relation to their apparent opposite. The nation is best understood as a constantly reformed remaking of tradition and coherence on ever-altered terrain. The original account of the nation as 'a body of people with a common history and descent, a common language, common customs, and a long-standing attachment to a particular piece of ground' is no longer tenable, as JDB Miller points out. The polyethnic nature of most nations now sees them bonded together 'by the fact of the state's existence' and the detritus of the diplomatic cartography of decolonisation73. Hence the state's need for vigilance in forming, surveying and reforming cultural subjects.

Writing two decades before Lang's outburst, a Vice-President of NBC International chose this way of discussing difficulties in the export of television programs to Saudi Arabia to do with lip-sync dubbing: 'This problem has been encountered before with such languages as Japanese, and will be overcome as American television know-how continues to expand throughout the world'74. His position as an aid consultant provided a fine degree of fit between expanding markets for US products overseas and promulgating doctrines of modernisation and development. This may be seen to typify the dominant industrialisation and democratisation logic of the 1960s, the era when mainstream US researchers and trainers valorised 'the "free flow of information" principle...as powerful instruments for achieving the announced goals of socioeconomic modernization, national integration, and cultural expression75.

There are strong institutional and theoretical links between this logic and Shils' recently revived doctrine of civility outlined in Chapter One. Auto-critiques and those from outside the paradigm flowed both from the failure of the model to deliver its planned Panglossian outcomes and as part of the questioning of American overseas conduct connected to the war in Vietnam. Its proponents were accused of imposing a Western telos on notions of progress/development by: misrecognising the political and problematic nature of the nexus between tradition and modernity; applying a trans-
cendentalist social psychology; and neglecting issues of dependency/unequal exchange. Cultural imperialism was regarded as a means of eliciting consent to economic domination from outside, not least through the formation of endemic consumption via advertising\textsuperscript{76}.

In turn, however, the functionalist and statist underpinnings of dependency theory were brought into question for their failure to account adequately for factors outside the sovereign-state and inside national boundaries (viz., respectively, the operation of effectively undomiciled multinational corporate capital and the emergence of bourgeoisies within developing countries)\textsuperscript{77}. World systems theorists would assert that class formation is not necessarily to be found at the site of production, but rather in relation to core-periphery connexions, specifically the multifarious locations of different aspects of the delivery of services\textsuperscript{78}. This will be considered in more detail in the following section.

The point about NBC executive Anderson's line is not that it is of itself wicked or even interesting as an expression of self-confidence, but that it could be made in the form that it was. It should be recognised as a method of forming populations outside one's own in one's own image, itself of course necessarily partial and an ideal type. This can only lead, assuming that I am correct in setting it up as emblematic of a wide range of similarly positioned utterances, to the kind of restless desire for counter-power evidenced in Lang's outburst and other critiques of textual imperialism. In 1960, for instance, the European and African Societies of Culture held their 'Rome Conference'. It broke up after the Europeans had claimed to be the only group ever to have conceived of the universality of culture\textsuperscript{79}.

Anderson fits into the 1950s and 1960s logic of aid, which rested on the presumption that the media were a means of dispensing knowledge – the West's owned object – to those less fortunate. This applied equally at the levels of the development of the polity, the economy and what was called the 'modernized individual' (again, as per Shils'
notion of how to form public subjectivity). Throughout those decades, the US and UNESCO promulgated research paradigms which directed less-developed countries to reinvent themselves in the image of the First World. The Anderson mission and its confident report fit this period's command metaphors and material manifestations, the process of enabling 'taste transfer'.

That process can be contrasted with statements made two decades later by Josh Elbaum, then a sales representative with the US overseas distributor, Telepictures, about exports to the Soviet Union: 'Knowing their political sensitivities and constraints, we gave them a catalogue that took these sensitivities into account'. He went on to explain that: 'The hardest thing to sell in the Caribbean are music specials, because music is a very strong component of their own culture. Even a Bette Midler special with computer enhancement – you couldn't give it away there'.

This demonstrates a fully achieved business sense of the need to blend international sales with import cultures' own patterns. A shift has occurred since Anderson, since a time when knowledge was brought to the willing simpleton. The centre now understands, with Elbaum, that shifts in the global political economy require a dedomiciling of corporate thought and planning to incorporate local cultural contours as one more configuration to be parcelled as a "market niche". This is one of the critical turns towards the postmodern outlined in Chapter One. Models that extrapolate from an ideal West are in question, but remain a dynamic force; the consumer is a critical trope; and a politics of identity is determinate.

Along with the boom in services which it was created to manage and alter, the NWICO paradigm has had real effects. It has encouraged a discursive and marketing streamlining that acknowledges the senses of self expressed and determined in the world according to the Other. Sony's in-house term for this is the splendid oxymoron, 'global localisation':

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The aim is to be present in many local (or national) markets simultaneously, with the aim of reaping global economies of scale in distributing products across different markets and different media. The challenges facing global companies are to transcend, on the one hand, vestigial national differences in order to create standardised global markets, but also to be sensitive to the peculiarities of local markets and differentiated consumer segments.

This is not uncontested terrain, however, and this counter-counter-power in turn elicits responses, such as parodic local production that offers a sardonic critique of its own status as an import culture. To position the South as hopelessly weak in the field of culture is also to ignore the tremendous contribution to balance of payments figures that exports from, say, the Indian screen make to its economy. And it is worth noting that the fifth biggest US TV chain is the Spanish International Network. Owned by a Mexican, it feeds more than three hundred stations with Mexican, Brazilian and Argentinian drama, reaching between six and ten million viewers. By the end of 1990, just three of Hollywood's seven biggest studios were owned by American capital. There even emerged a critique of foreign control of American business on the grounds that 'self-determination is the solid core of citizenship motivation'. Internationalism was becoming a keyword, a keyword both of opportunity and constraint. As Richard Collins points out, '[q]uite who is the Coca-Colonized and who the media imperialist is hard to identify exactly here.

This is not to deny the powerhouse that is provided by the US. For example, a recent feature on co-productions of television drama between different countries, published in the American trade magazine Broadcasting Abroad, saw the interviewer put it this way to a panel of television executives and producers from Britain, Australia and the US: 'Let's look at the harsh reality of co-production. Rather than seeking a true creative co-venture, aren't American producers just looking for silent overseas partners, bankrolls, facilities houses?' The primacy of the US is undeniable, but shifting in its impact. To
see how these shifts may have occurred and what their future form may take, we need to consider how to theorise the global economy and its effects on culture.

**THE GLOBAL ECONOMY**

Immanuel Wallerstein is installed as the key historical theorist of world economic systems. It is his work that has argued persuasively for the globally determined nature of business, in particular the understanding that, regardless of the economic and political formations internal to sovereign-states, if they trade they are part of a capitalist sphere. In his reading, capitalist production is seen to move through various processes. Initially, goods of a certain type are produced and consumed in the centre, by an IMEC. The next phase sees these goods produced there and exported to peripheral economic points. The cycle concludes with production moving to that periphery once technology is sufficiently standardised and labour in the right mix of docility and skill. But products owned at the periphery rarely make their way to the centre.90

In response to accusations of economic determinism and the exclusion of categories of person and practice eluding this approach (categories such as women, ethnic minorities and various forms of cultural distinctness) Wallerstein has latterly considered other areas to broaden the support for his basic position. He suggests that two critical and distinct definitions of culture have centred nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western debates. These are: (a) 'the set of characteristics which distinguish one group from another'; and (b) 'some set of phenomena which are different from (and "higher" than) some other set of phenomena within any one group'91. The key element mobilised in the process of difference described in system (a) is a means of self-formation that permits a recognition of relative sameness in some but not others: 'some kind of self-awareness (and therefore a sense of boundaries)'92. Both usages can be understood in the context of their position and deployment within the emergence of the capitalist world economy. System (a) sees culture signifying a field of constancy in a space that is
actually undergoing, necessarily, constant reinvention because of the dynamic of growth and newness that emblematises capitalism. System (b) is invoked to justify inequalities emerging from this process. The valorisation of modernity in the West, he maintains, has amounted to a unity between the West's own view of itself and modernity; they become indistinguishable one from the other. Those entities that fail to thrive are held to have mistakenly followed the hermetic conservation precepts of system (a) instead of the competitive ethos of system (b). This binary opposition regards cultural maintenance under the sign of relativism or charity as a form of retardation. Attention to the "rights" of minorities or formations of persons which are not culturally strong in the face of globalisation, or nationalism, or masculinity, is regarded as an act of economically irrational folly.

Wallerstein may be right about certain aspects of the impulse towards hierarchisation in culture, but he seems to make the discourses of modernisation and rationalisation applied to economies and polities into the masters of modernity. In doing so, he overrides a significant autonomy and reciprocity across these domains. It is a commonplace of the Enlightenment and modernity to fetishise representation because of the complex interrelationship which it is held to have with reading protocols and the structure and operation of the public sphere, in such a way that a cultural openness and relativism are regarded as integral components of much liberal discourse. This has become a heterogeneous and confused process which is much less totalising than his account allows. There has also been a significant impact on the politics of subjectivity deriving from the confluence of an expansion in trade and a relocation of production (to the point where distribution is now a critical site). It is a process in which capital formation, state–corporate relations and dispensations towards ethnicity are constitutive of TIS rather than supplementary to it. As a consequence of the world's greatest industrial force trimming itself towards services because of its comparative advantage in the area, there has developed what Jonathan Friedman has called the 'intensive practice of identity...this desperate negotiation of selfhood.'
Such is the discursive quintessence of the postmodern part of the century. It is an immensely productive force, ushering in Pollyannaish McLuhanites, who may speak of the new cosmopolitan subject. That subject relates permissively to a plenitude of cultural forms and formations because of its desire to confront and integrate alterity through a new practice of expansive cultural competence. Its self becomes reformed in the interstices which describe the contiguity and disparity of different cultures; the self becomes an intertext in a new phenomenology. This auto-management achieves a collective, hybridized expression in transnational cultures, namely business and state outpourings from North America and Western Europe. Persons and meanings are thought to be globally networked to the point where 'there is now one world culture'.

One could write this differently. It is assuredly true that daily life is increasingly determined in places and time zones far distant from it. We can all acknowledge the timelessness, placelessness and permissiveness of multinational corporations and their awkward meetings with local cultural norms that are precisely historical, geographical and indigenous, at least rhetorically. This has, though, been seen by some as a fairly straightforward search for a lingua franca of the commodity, not a new world citizen. Yet this account, too, has been found wanting by the sacerdotal celebrants of subcultural resistance. They might not wish to travel the distance with the 'one world culture' position, but they refute the view that cosmopolitanism is always and everywhere imperialising. The new form of image-tourist may be anybody with access to a television service, the immediate audience to dynamic shifts in the world order.

Rupert Murdoch is not alone in rendering paradigmatic the terms "nation" and "information", as in his celebrated suggestion that Adam Smith writing two hundred years on would have retitled his *ur*-text, *The Wealth of Information*. It is clear that the terms of the debate must now consider a cry to address (which is to form) particular subjectivities, whether as a response to pressures from the right or the left. Utopias have shifted from the domain of free labour and free will to free communication. For cultural policymakers, this has often meant an equation of such freedoms with an idea of national sovereignty that is not always identical to immediate economic concerns.
AUSTRALIAN SCREEN DRAMA

This next section of the chapter is particularly concerned with Australian positions on TV trade, which have to be apprehended against the context of the overall diplomatic and trading imperatives of a middle-range power. Australia has a particular need to go with the flow of the GATT's liberal logic because of the country's dependence on natural resources and its vulnerability to barriers to agricultural exports. This is in the context of an increasingly unfavourable set of balance of payments figures from the 1970s on. Australia had to struggle – first tempestuously, then carefully and in coalition – to get the GATT to address agriculture, everyone's favourite protected zone\(^{102}\). The Government's formal technical advisor, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, has repeatedly called on trade delegations to argue against protection across the board\(^{103}\). (Although it would be as well to note the cynicism with which some commentators have disparaged Australia's faith in free trade. The removal of overseas rural subsidies may not in fact assist Australian agriculture because of the competitive advantage of US and European technology\(^{104}\).)

The economic policy discourse in Australia has been dominated since the early 1980s by a faith in the imaginary market unparalleled anywhere else in the world\(^{105}\). So it was automatic for the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC), an advisory body to the Australian Government, to be charged with the task of informing the Treasurer about 'how Australia may liberalise its trade in services' after the GATT had adopted the area for scrutiny. There was no element of doubt about the efficacy of this logic. The IAC acted from the explicit presupposition that Australia would ultimately benefit even from unilateral action to remove barriers to TIS\(^{106}\).

Formal (that is to say, spoken and signed) responsibility for the carriage of Australia's negotiations in such matters rested with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), which regarded the audiovisual sector as an area which could usefully be traded–off in return for critical concessions by other countries in matters of greater

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significance for Australian balance of payments figures. It was commonly held that a liberalised TIS environment would in any case be of direct benefit to Australia, but in such domains as education, finance and consulting\textsuperscript{107}. Of course, the argument was also made that removing restrictions on market forces would ultimately make for the right conditions for a private sector screen industry anyway\textsuperscript{108}. Some Government economic advisers even maintained that the export success of Gallipoli, Crocodile Dundee and Neighbours evidenced the already extant presence of comparative advantage for Australia in the entertainment fields as reasons for supporting a reduction in protection for the services sector\textsuperscript{109}. And 1988 did see seventy Australian drama and documentary programs on British TV, with Neighbours screening twice a day, whilst US pay television was showing two Australian dramas each week\textsuperscript{110}. To some European critics, Australia is one of the principals in the field of TV drama trade\textsuperscript{111}. But such exports were born of the stimulatory side of regulation, something which appears to escape marginalist economists.

The United States Embassy in Canberra had already responded to pressure from the Motion Picture Association of America by coming out against the 1989 announcement that Australian commercial networks would move up to a 50% local content policy as a result of pressure from the state. It had indicated that restrictions on overseas content and participation in Australian TVCs may offend GATT obligations\textsuperscript{112}. As the pressure increased, the Australian Writers' Guild and the Australian Film Commission (AFC), a statutory authority acting multifariously as a source of script development assistance, film investment and policy advocacy, sent representatives to the GATT negotiations in Geneva, in part to lobby Australia's own diplomats. The Guild official said on return of the DFAT mission: 'they now understood that serials like Neighbours, and TV commercials, were aspects of Australian culture'\textsuperscript{113}. This sort of lobbying is typical of disputes over economic paradigms within a policy-making constellation. The formation of public policy globally over the 1980s tended to privilege a faith in the market over demand management\textsuperscript{114}, but both approaches lacked the capacity to theorise culture in ways acceptable to those working in the field, those that used it in the
the trade-restricting effects of some interventions may be insignificant when weighed against the broader social purpose for which the intervention was instituted. It is beyond the scope of this inquiry to comment on the merit of these goals\textsuperscript{115} – original emphasis.

The Guild pushed hard for extension of the draft exception clause to the TIS agreement to include 'a clear statement of principle that questions of cultural development are not made subservient to those of trade policy\textsuperscript{116}. This is precisely the sort of opposition that one also finds within other, particular, cultural formations, of course. Consider the line enunciated by Canadian filmmakers in the Winnipeg Manifesto of 1974: 'We wish to state unequivocally that film is an expression and affirmation of the cultural reality of this country first, and a business second\textsuperscript{117}. Success for this logic would have the effect of positioning culture alongside other "no-go zones" for the GATT, such as 'public morals and order, safety, health, the environment and essential security interests\textsuperscript{118}. Put another way, it would seek to assign cultural values to a sphere of calculation that rejects a \textit{locus} of power organised around the formation of prices in favour of one concerned with the formation of subjects.

At the level of television drama, there is a process of deliberation that is now a routine policy \textit{donnée} across different polities, a \textit{nostrum} with no need of justification. This process is about reconciling the commercial imperatives enunciated by television proprietors with the imperatives of cultural formation enunciated by policymakers. Within this debate, Australian screen cultural nationalism has been remarkably constant in its themes. Consider a letter sent by David Williamson to the national daily, The Australian, in his 1989 capacity as President of the Australian Writers' Guild. Williamson argued thus:
It is not to protect an industry, or even employment, that Australian content in commercial television is so crucial. It is for the sake of an Australian culture. We as children grew up seeing ourselves as exiles from real life which only happened in the rest of the world. That is not what we want now for ourselves or for our children.

In describing the impetus underlying the lobbying of the Australian Government for screen subvention in the early 1970s, former Film Commission chair Phillip Adams has spoken of the desire 'to dream our own dreams', making special reference to a famous cartoon from the Vietnam War period which depicted an Australian family watching a TV that had emblazoned on it: 'Have your emotions lived for you tonight by American experts'. And calls for the protection and promulgation of a 'national literature' continue to be couched in terms of what McLaren sees as the:

need to strengthen local voices so that they are not lost in a global homogeneity...[and to protect Australians from] becoming passive consumers of the product of the metropolitan centres... Cultural independence is the freedom to take part in the global conversation on our own terms.

There are preconditions and externalities of this move, which become strangely imbricated with each other in such a way that their conceptual and chronological relations of primacy become unclear. But they all pick up the critical theme of knowing/forming the self:

The most important argument for supporting Australian writing – and Australian film and television – is...that we need to carry on a continuing dialogue amongst ourselves if we are to understand ourselves and our place in the world.

This line has had far-reaching effects. In its search for numerical justifications in a public policy world dominated by rhetorical flourishes borrowed from marginalist
economics, the Australia Council (the Australian Government's policy advisor and
distribution of public subvention in the non-screen arts) recently asked a selection of
citizens a series of questions: did they gain a sense of achievement from the success of
Australian artists?; did the arts have an important role in making Australians look at
their way of life?; and did the arts help Australians to know their country better? These
are questions of metonymic self-knowledge. They give culture the task of
mirroring. This mirroring will eventually lead to better images, as those looking at
themselves begin to practise self-help.

We can turn this back to PR Stephenson's writings on Australian culture. He argued in
the 1940s that the country would gain self-respect and the respect of others when it had
a 'distinctively Australian culture...[a] genus loci – the spirit in-dwelling in a Place'.
This tradition of littérateur nationalism is a discourse of self-awareness and self-
improvement that anthropomorphises and unifies the nation, deploying the search of the
subject to know its own body and mind in a teleological metaphor that glides towards
the apotheosis of competent adulthood. Along the way, this knowledge is mobilised
sometimes as one of appraisal and evaluation, sometimes of discovery, and sometimes
of development.

In 1969, the Australian Council for the Arts' Film Committee reported to Government
that the need for public subvention of the screen industries was 'self-evident' because of
the necessity for Australia 'to interpret itself to the rest of the world'. Similarly, a
Senate Select Committee of 1963 had called for the export of Australian screen texts to
South-East Asian television in the interest of showcasing the nation. But this restless
search for knowledge which characterises public policy on the screen was equally self-
directed. In 1965, Sylvia Lawson argued for a halcyon period of neo-realism in the
1920s Australian feature film, an anachronistic forerunner to de Sica. In doing so, she
referred to a 'sense of identity which a community's own film-making confers upon it
as nothing else can. Now, when most of our diversions are processed and packaged
elsewhere, we probably need it more than ever.'
In his survey of the history of Australian television drama, Albert Moran has noted the divergence – in fact the intense separateness – of the discourses of Australianness mobilised in broadcast regulation and producers' and writers' rhetoric on the one hand, and in drama texts themselves on the other. In the case of the former, great play is made of the role of TV drama in opening up a multifaceted awareness of the country and its people. But the actual product is monomaniacally concentrated on the heterosexual nuclear family; specificities of Australia in terms of geography, demography, history and social relations are almost utterly marginalised. Significantly in terms of the concerns of the Romantic author, the publicly-funded Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) has traditionally been valorised by scriptwriters because, in the words of one such person, the genre dictates of commercial television 'gave very little room for them to explore their own personalities'.

It is these commercial determinations which have been vital to the intermeshing cultural remits of both regulatory bodies and state-owned broadcasters. At the license hearings prior to the introduction of television to Australia in 1956, it was commonly held to be the case that there would be no more than eight or nine hours a week of overseas programming on the commercial stations. But by the end of the first year of operations, technological developments meant that American TV series were available on film. Such series had already cleared their costs domestically and thus had very elastic pricing opportunities at the point of on-sale. But audience figures for television were diminishing by the early 1960s as the networks flooded the market with US materials. Whilst the absolute number of viewers continued to increase with population growth and the distribution of sets, time spent in front of the screen was decreasing. Advertisers reconsidered their departure from print and radio. When allied to the licensing of a third commercial network in 1963, this led to a shortage of American product. The commercials rethought the quick fix of imports. In a move that consolidated these influences, the ABC began to show more local drama, with a commensurate improvement in ratings. So the eventual imposition of a drama quota on the commercials in 1966,
requiring thirty minutes a week of locally produced material, was effectively institutionalising what market forces were already configuring\textsuperscript{129}.

Nevertheless, twenty years after the plaintive calls for a local film industry and a locally concerned television industry, it is still possible, in fact necessary, for a key academic text on Australian feature film to refer thus to Australians' multifaceted dependence on Hollywood: 'They feel second best with their own markets and culture, forced to second guess what their authentic indigenous culture should be'\textsuperscript{130}. For Sylvia Lawson, the country remains 'a colony of Hollywood'\textsuperscript{131}.

Yet this flies in the face of the actual operation of much of Australia's screen market. Throughout the 1980s, the key profit centres were local television, US home video and coproductions with British broadcasters\textsuperscript{132}. And as indicated earlier, the end of the decade saw international financial movements which meant that it was the Japanese and expatriate Australians who were in fact owning much of this supposed imperial centre\textsuperscript{133}.

Nevertheless, in spite of an increase in the cost of foreign programs of 40\% between 1987 and 1989, an hour of Australian drama still cost several times its American equivalent. One has to question, of course, the relevance of these concerns outside cultural policymaking. The evidence is complex. It is not that Australian production is comparatively uneconomic; drama costs more to make than sport, light entertainment and news everywhere\textsuperscript{134}. Thirty minutes of US drama might be sold to Australia for A\$12–14,000, despite an initial production cost of A\$1 million\textsuperscript{135}. As was pointed out earlier, Australian drama is exported to over seventy countries\textsuperscript{136}; but even in 1987–88, a fiscal year distorted by the huge success of the \textit{Crocodile Dundee} pictures, Australian film and television trade amounted to a balance of payments deficit of A\$224 million\textsuperscript{137}. (This is not, of course, aided by the fact that Australia and Canada routinely pay exceptionally high prices for US programs; in Australia's case, twice the price paid by Britain for TV movies\textsuperscript{138}.)
A recent survey undertaken for the AFC found that Australian television advertisers show little if any concern about the country of origin of programs in which their products are showcased\footnote{139}. And some of the fairly sparse empirical work done on spectators and texts has suggested that Australian children accept the dissonance between their own cultural domain and that presented to them in US drama as attributable to the operation of television convention, if in a way that denies the specificity of experience portrayed. Extrapolations from American programs do produce opinions about Australian society, however, for example in the area of crime\footnote{140}. It would be wrong, of course, to identify such anxieties as either new or restricted to television.

Before Canadian confederation, the 1850s were already seeing pressure for the imposition of cultural protectionism in the shape of a tariff on books as a means of promoting national identity through indigenous literature\footnote{141}. One might consider this in the same light as the proliferation of Canadian Government investigations of cultural nationalism since the Second War (three Royal Commissions and two major policy reviews, going to such matters as the need for locally owned and locally textual culture industries) and the eleven major surveys of public opinion on cultural identity over the same period\footnote{142}. Surveys such as these, like the Australia Council and AFC findings discussed above, represent an anxiety about cultural identity, in particular the desirability of the transmission of cultural capital of putatively "discrete" national entities in the face of a homogenising multinational/American superforce. Such concerns sometimes amount to moral panics, but moral panics that are frequently derived from very obscure enemies and friends, as I have indicated above.

Pressures to make local drama which can be sold elsewhere may, in any case, lessen the claim to a specific cultural address\footnote{143}. In Britain, the requirement to produce with an eye to the audio dub has led to the predominance of "inauthentic" 'air-traffic-English' in TV drama\footnote{144}. Such issues are gone over in an invested way in the 1978 feature film
Newsfront, which traces the history of competing newsreel companies and their coverage of current affairs in Australia. Towards the end of the film, expatriate Frank Maguire returns after time overseas, replete with American accent. He is back to complete a Cain and Abel relationship with his brother Len, to kill not by force, but with the kindness of an export culture. Frank offers Len, who has stayed with the local company, a job as the Australian end of an American–funded TV series. It is to be shot in Australia, but with US iconography. Len is tempted by the prospect of on–set control, but is dissuaded by the prerequisites of American themes and unimpressed by Frank's insistence that it will be an Australian series simply as a result of being filmed there.

Len's position, well enunciated academically by Jacka, is one that seeks textual signifiers:

applying to particular and specific sets of circumstances and forces that operate at any given time and place, be they signs of place, accent, and idiom, or more diffuse but no less vivid ways of hooking into the social unconscious or social 'imaginary' of a particular subculture.145

The search for the resistive, progressive object is never–ending, it seems, and influencing policy is the latest route to encouraging its production and reception. An elitist critique of mass culture as a manufacturer of cultural and political incompetents has been supplanted by a valorisation of popular culture at sites where it is held to reflect localisms.146 This presumes that the local, in a mass–produced, consumed and analysed culture, can become a powerful, shifting, slippery yet isolable icon of radical change. In his discussion of the processes of simulation, Baudrillard talks about the impact of recognising its preeminence, about what it means to discover that there is no ontology beneath, for example, iconography. He identifies four phases in the development of our understanding of the image:
1 It is the reflection of a basic reality.
2 It masks and perverts a basic reality.
3 It masks the absence of a basic reality.
4 It bears no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum.\textsuperscript{147}

The reaction to a loss of referentiality in the real is toheighten efforts to manufacture it.\textsuperscript{148} So whilst policymakers retain the tenets of reflectionism, they add to it a complex weave of innovation/administration in response to the internationalisation of images. Ultimately, as will be shown below, this amounts to precisely the selfreferentiality to which Baudrillard alludes, a kind of desperate desire to form a definite root system in the face of the rhizome. One does not have to fantasise as touchingly as does Laclau about the decline of the sovereign–state to discern the urgency of such moves.\textsuperscript{149}

Cultural critique became policy formation in the late 1980s when the regulatory Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (ABT) decided to reconsider television drama in this particular way, a way that became known as 'the Australian look'. Instead of using production indices – the locus of creative control – as a means of determining the Australianess of drama, it decided to move towards a policy of on-screen indicators of 'theme, perspective, language and character'.\textsuperscript{150} A bureaucratised form of cultural nationalism had replaced the old arrangements, when regulators and programmers had basically been in step.

A representative of the AFC used the Jacka material to criticise this new logic, claiming that the disruptiveness, newness and self-formative potential of TV drama would be lost under such a proposal. In its stead, a pan–Australianism constituted from essentialist protocols would preclude the hitherto inevitable emergence of local political concerns from the participation of Australian production personnel.\textsuperscript{151} But it is precisely a reflectionist protocol, I shall argue, that drives this argument for localism. It continues to mobilise accounts of an authentic Australia in just the same fashion as the Tribunal's 'Australian look', but in a less overt manner that requires a more mystical –
and unspecifiable – manifestation of Australianness to appear in order for an inexplicit cultural mission to be accomplished. What binds these putatively disparate positions inexorably together is their conceptual undergrowth, a thicket of unstated assumptions about the formation of the self that is an amalgam of reflectionism and pedagogy. It emerges on such occasions as the Australian Minister for Transport and Communications announcing in 1990 that the Government would restrict foreign (i.e. US) ownership of local television networks to 20% because of the need to ensure 'the exploration of cultural identity'; and when the AFC calls for a broad exception for audiovisual materials in TIS in the name of 'cultural development'.

ABT policy in general has often been read by the AFC and academics as crassly essentialist, unworkable and ignorant of critical literature in this and other, adjacent domains. But the Tribunal was deploying a set of logics here that was identical to the Australian Film Commission's in Geneva, for all the apparent differentiation by the latter between these positions. Such logics demonstrate an abiding concern with a particular aesthetic practice of self-formation which has remained relatively immune to the criticisms levelled at it by littérateurs, screen theorists and subcultures. Paradoxically, it necessarily subtends both those critiques and what they ostensibly seek to bring into question.

Towards the end of its deliberations on local content – considerations which went to amount, genre and testing methods – the ABT maintained that:

\[
\text{drama...enables Australians to see themselves in their own environment and experience their own stories...There appears to be a growing consensus that 60\% of prime-time television programming represents the desirable level to preserve a national identity.}
\]

In 1989, the Tribunal announced that 35\% of broadcast time between the hours of six p.m. and twelve a.m. would be Australian, rising to a top limit of 50\% in 1994 (the
consensus had lost 10% over twelve months). It also established a quota system for

drama and confirmed the limit of 20% of foreign content in advertising.155.

The revised Television Program Standard (TPS) 14, covering local content, had the
following objectives:

(1)

to encourage programs which

• are identifiably Australian;

• recognise the diversity of cultural backgrounds represented in the Australian

community

• are developed for an Australian audience; and

• are under Australian creative control.

(2)

...to encourage Australian drama in which:

(a) the theme (if set in Australia) is recognisably Australian, that the subject

matter portrays aspects of life in Australia or the life of an Australian or

Australians; or

(b) the perspective (if wholly or partly set outside Australia or if the subject

matter is not Australian) is Australian, that is, the subject matter is presented

from an Australian viewpoint;

(c) the language is Australian, that is, the speech of Australian characters is the

speech, including idiom or accents, found among people who meet the

definition of an Australian; and

(d) the character of the production is Australian, that is the visual depiction of

the scenes set in Australia including locations, backgrounds, props and

costumes is recognisable as Australian, the interpretation of the material is

Australian and, casting accurately reflects the Australian characters

portrayed.156.
The Standard represents the contorted outcome of negotiations between competing determinations. These include: actors' industrial requirements; producers' investment requirements; and the Tribunal's sense of its cultural remit. TPS 14 is a prolix attempt to make Australianism non-American whilst not specifically saying so. At the same time, it must encompass and thereby forestall potential criticisms for excluding the polyglot demographic nature of the local populace. When the US Embassy protested that this amounted to a quota on goods of trade, the reaction came back that 'the rule is not a trade barrier, but an integral part of domestic broadcasting policy designed to encourage not only the local film industry, but also an Australian cultural identity'.

But was that the actual point of reference? It is possible to trace a lineage from the Classical *epistêmê* as described by Foucault to the kinds of logic at play within TPS 14. The Classical *epistêmê* took resemblance or similitude to be the key to representation and exegesis. It operated through four assumptions. Firstly, that the adjacency of objects could be a sign of the type of relationship which they enjoyed. Secondly, that emulation was achieved via reflection, a form of imitation in which primacy accorded by origin was impossible. Thirdly, that a process of analogy incorporated elements of these first two moves. And fourthly, that taxonomies of Same and Other were constructed and organised around sympathies and antipathies engaged in a dialectical relationship.

Foucault discerns the disappearance of this *epistêmê* in the nineteenth century. But by the late 1980s, just such logics were being institutionalised in cultural policy to make for new selves. TPS 14 is a document with a lineage in much earlier doctrines of verisimilitude. It is quite immune to notions of the specificity of individual subjectivity or the formative influence of signification. In this sense, it has another home, in early writings on something called "the study of communication". There are clear links to the sender–message–receiver account in the presumption that laying down textual regulations of what is "Australian" can make for cultural maintenance. This is not to embark, with the likes of Heath and Skirrow, on an argument to the effect that the concept of 'communication' must be eschewed for its resolute anti–materialism. As
will be indicated below, rules like those of the ABT are material determinants of the profilmic text and its reception, and are amenable to a sender–message–receiver account, provided that this is not regarded as unequivocally and necessarily humanist.

In the collection he edited on Australia’s first Ten Years of Television, Mungo MacCallum argued that:

Drama is as much part of a community’s culture as its sport. In its range, from banality to brilliance, it reflects us to ourselves, helps us to know ourselves and passes on the information to the rest of the world. A community without drama is undeveloped, or maimed beneath the skin.\(^\text{161}\)

Similarly, just after the advent of Australian television, former radio and future screen drama producer Hector Crawford lobbied publicly for the protection of local TV drama as a means of constituting ‘a consciousness of national identity and pride in our nation, and a regard for our own cultural ideas and patterns.’\(^\text{162}\)

This is to go over the territory already established, but it is necessary in order to get a little closer to the theoretical mechanics that work through such arguments. It is important that lines being run thirty years ago are still current. Consider, for example, the oft-cited cultural nationalist journalism of Tom Weir, "No Daydreams of Our Own: The Film as National Self-Expression". In that piece, he spoke of the value of film as:

the most important means for heightening a people's feeling of communal personality, bringing them the shock of recognition that Herman Melville was concerned to give when his own America was a dependent culture...[Film] plants one's feet on the ground. The workaday world is integrated with the world of one's imagination...It is typical of the undeveloped personality of our [Australian] people that we have practically no indigenous films.\(^\text{163}\)
There is little doubt that this desire to form a national identity underlay much of the argument produced for state subvention of the screen\textsuperscript{164}. Similar rhetorical moves apply in, for example, Canada. Consider the following, from the President of Quebec's Régie du cinéma et de la vidéo in 1985: 'A given population should from time to time be able to see itself on the screen. That just seems fundamental and not even for nationalist reasons but because of questions of identity\textsuperscript{165}.

This could be related back to Aristotle's formulation concerning the pleasure of the audience in 'learning or inferring, and saying perhaps, "Ah, that is he"\textsuperscript{166}. It is well in keeping with much of the material covered in the Chapter Two. And reconsidering TPS 14, one could essay a still newer mode of reflectionism. This is a policy reflectionism. Its desired referent is not "Australia", but TPS 14 itself, albeit with prescribed notions of "Australia" and proscribed versions of "not-Australia" as indexical adjuncts. Here, the reality which precedes the profilmic moment is given by the rules laid down by the ABT. They become both authorising subject and zero signified, moving on through another transmogrification to provide a critical apparatus by offering an ultimate accounting of "Australianness". They thus are sender, message and receiver rolled into one. Their claim, like that of cultural nationalist bureaucrats, is to manage what Foucault identified as the principal raison d'être of the human sciences: 'to define the way in which individuals or groups represent words to themselves'\textsuperscript{167}.

To form and manage the means of cultural subjectivity in this way is to make the preconditions for a national public to recognise and conduct itself as such under the sign of textual analysis. Such is the logic of plaintiffs before the GATT that approach the bar with culture as their trouble.
NOTES


19. J. D. Reed, "Revolution in Euro-TV", Time Australia, 3 (31), 1988, p.54.


33. The Economist, 1989, op.cit., SURVEY 4-5.

34. Braman, op.cit., p.372.


44. Cynthia Schneider and Brian Wallis, "Introduction", in Schneider and Wallis, Global, 1988, op.cit., pp.7–8.


48. Wildman and Siwek, op.cit., p.150 n.46.

49. Industries Assistance Commission, International Initiatives to Liberalise Trade


55. Varis, op.cit., p.95.


64. Brimelow, op.cit., p.89.


86. Grover, loc.cit.


92. Ibid. p.7.

93. Ibid. pp.7–8, 10–11, 15 and 18.


113. Communications Update, loc.cit.


116. "GATT: The Fight that was Almost Lost before it Started", Filmnews, 20 (8), 1990, p.3.


118. Ibid.


122. Ibid. p.10.
123. Donald Horne, "We've Changed, and it's Time to Acknowledge It", The Australian, 18 October 1988, p.15.


135. Toby Miller, "Mission Impossible: How Do You Turn Indooroopilly into Africa?", in Jonathan Dawson and Bruce Molloy, (eds.), Queensland Images in Film and Television, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1990, p.129.


143. Murdock, op.cit., p.171.


148. Ibid. p.171.


151. Ibid. pp.35–36.


157. Davies, loc.cit.


160. Stephen Heath and Gillian Skirrow, "Television: A World in Action", Screen,


CHAPTER FOUR
THE UNMARKING OF ETHNICITY

I want to concentrate in this chapter on a special event in the history of association football (soccer) in Australia. The intention is to utilise a case study of the Bicentennial Gold Cup of Soccer to examine the interplay of discourses of policy in the areas of ethnicity, sport and nation. The chapter argues that the attempt to "unmark" soccer from its perceived condition as a non-Anglo-Saxon sport is an exemplary instance of the will to form a single national subjectivity. But this is to be done, at least paradoxically, in the context of a discourse of multiculturalism, itself the dispositif emerging from a huge first generation migrant population. This is a site at which conflicting technologies of the subjects concerned may be seen to operate, and in a sphere of culture seemingly far distant from textual theory. But it is a sphere of culture which is liable to many of the trends already identified towards inscribing ethical incompleteness as a means of binding subjects to projects of self-redress.

Soccer is chosen here because of its marked status in Australia as an ethnically differentiated practice that is "minority". It is also selected at this specific site because the Gold Cup occurred in 1988 as part of state-sanctioned festivities designed to celebrate two hundred years of white control of Australia. The chapter exhibits critical drives within a policy and media discourse of unity towards the silencing of difference; or rather, its redisposal. For difference is to be refigured here as a mnemonic of origins which must be redisposed in the interests of fealty to the Australian state. These origins may be recuperated and accentuated within particular semiotic locations that are outside the places that exhibit fealty. But the places selected as critical sites for a unified subjectivity must be cordoned off. And similarly, those culture industries that seek to
develop may find there are promotional advantages in presenting themselves as examples of such a unity.

What is interesting to note here is the unease with which the ideal type soccer follower and player – the soccer subject – is conceived within a range of discourses. Far from soccer being a *panes et circenses* domain, where difference may be permitted free play away from serious matters, a whole host of critics, policymakers and managers clearly ascribe a significance to the sport that calls for it to be reformed. The ideal type must be unmarked from appearing "other than Australian", a term from the discourse of immigration which in and of itself requires that the adopted subject be recast from its previous demographic underpinnings to be loving, loyal and industrious in a new locale.

It is easy for people operating in the domain of cultural studies to score points from harrased and cliché-laden working journalists and bureaucrats by picking out such topoi and identifying them as politically incorrect. Rather than measuring them against appropriately heterogeneous accounts of the split nature of nations – and the artificial nature of the assumption of there being such a thing in itself – there is greater margin in considering the actual work done by this discourse and the subjects whom it interpellates or constitutes versus those whose existence it abjures. The formation of the national type can be measured against the real in a demographic mode; but it can also be understood as a productive move in itself, one which manufactures meanings that help then to produce the organisation of a demographic base. It constructs as it describes, and not only within its own textual form. Readerships learn about themselves and may model themselves around or against the accounts of them which are created in such doctrines of policy.

Sport is particularly providential territory for the deployment of essentialist logics about persons and their abilities. Consider the tropes of "instinct" within the discourse of sporting commentary. The word has come to signify an unassailable explanation of team strategies and individual performances. *Inter alia*, this assumes that certain
successes on the field are attributable to a static and natural ability. Yet a project of content analysis comparing the utilisation of the term in the American media found that it was called on generically to describe differences in skill between players, with no consistency over the issue of whether instinct was learnt or innate\textsuperscript{1}. It is part of the standard and emerging vocabulary of international sporting description to invoke such essential categories, albeit in a non-linear and frequently contradictory way. But it does become a key site for on-the-run announcements about how people are people, in a mode that blends well with the immediacy of "live" sporting movement on film to make texts overburdened with referential possibilities within a realist aesthetic of proof through exemplification. This is a technology for producing subjects. It is much more than an "accurate" or "inaccurate" measurement. And so is the wider discourse of sport that informs this section of the thesis.

The chapter begins with an account of the Gold Cup's impact on soccer, turning back from the events of 1988 to consider the sport's genealogy and administrative politics. Consideration is given to its position as an ethnically marked form of subjectivity within an import culture that has its own genealogy of immigration and multicultural policies which animate public apprehension of it. I then turn to the Bicentenary itself, again working backwards from the specific site of the Cup to address how the Australian Bicentennial Authority (ABA) saw the prospects for national self-formation in: sport in general; state-enunciated nationalism; and local identity. The chapter concludes with a study of the discursive presentation of the Cup, with particular reference to doctrines of authenticity that relate back to discourses of appropriate national subjects.

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A GOLD CUP AND AUSTRALIAN SOCCER

The Bicentennial Gold Cup of Soccer, held in Sydney, Canberra and Melbourne in July 1988, offered a crucible for identifying the contours and parameters of these questions at a special conjuncture. The Cup provided both stresses and opportunities for marketing the code anew, a marketing which, as will be seen, involved an excoriating gaze at the self that sought to reform soccer as an "Australian" subject.

The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) ordains Gold Cups. Such tournaments are required to involve at least two countries which have won a World Cup. Because of the virtual coincidence of the European Nations' Championships in 1988, this perforce meant a very limited choice in the Australian instance. Of the Latin American states, Brazil and Argentina – the glamour teams – were available to join the host nation. The last choice was Saudi Arabia, selected because its oil wealth offered huge payments for television coverage.

The series itself saw Australia fare remarkably well in the context of its international footballing history, defeating the then world champion, Argentina, 4–1, and losing a close final 2–0 to Brazil. The print media gave the competition enormous coverage, although no commercial television network had been interested in live telecasts. Crowds were good for the final (if patchy at other moments) and headlines proclaimed a new sense of – or prospects for – unity that would forge additional opportunities to mould soccer as the dominant local brand of football. Two years later, critiques were still emerging organised around the failure to exploit this opportunity to remake and remodel the code under the sign of a nationalist transcendence of ethnic difference.

The Cup provided a moment within the Bicentennial celebration of the English conquest of the Aboriginal land and people that exemplified many aspects of the "Bicentennial party", as it was officially termed. These ranged from étatisme, internationalism and nationalism to a highly disposable ephemerality and a deliberate,
determinate showiness. Critically, the Cup did not derive its meanings from an account – selfreflexive, partial, partisan or otherwise – of the past. This marks it out as qualitatively different from the careful, diligent making of history that characterised most of the "party". Rather than being a remark on two hundred years, the Gold Cup was quite overtly an attempt to produce a new context, a context in which soccer could be transformed into a state of discursive and economic parity with or superiority over its competition. The Cup was part of a promotional strategy, not always coherently or cogently conceived and executed and itself the site of struggle, incompetence and discontinuity. It ran over with the formation of possibilities rather than memories, in keeping with the design of forming a new, Australianised sporting subject.

Before the first games of the competition, The Australian newspaper argued that 'Australia needs to make a strong showing to finally shrug off its country-cousin image'. Which constituency was in mind – the Australian populace or the world of international soccer administration – was left unstated. After the Cup, Brisbane's Sunday Mail announced that the 'sleeping giant of Australian soccer had finally stirred'. The Sydney Morning Herald also anthropomorphised the sport via a teleological, psychologistic metaphor of maturation. It pronounced an end to 'the inferiority complex which had plagued Australian soccer throughout its history' thanks to 'the enormous potential of our national soccer team' which had been worthily transformed into 'a promotable commodity'. Charlie Yankos, the captain of the side, announced after the victory over Argentina that: 'People are now starting to appreciate what we're doing for Australia'. And coach Frank Arok applauded the mainstream sporting media following the final in these terms:

You guys have put us on the map. The publicity we have had in the last few days has been unbelievable. I never thought it was possible. We are proud to be part of the Australian sporting community at last.

Arok proclaimed: 'A new era in soccer in this country...If the people of Australia do not accept the Socceroos [nickname of the national team] now as worthy of their support,
they never will. The Sydney *Daily Telegraph* consecrated the Argentinian result as 'a new era for the round ball code'. Once again, Arok and Yankos provided metonymic accounts of the relation pertaining to the sport, the national team and the public. They called for a subject to be formed that would consolidate the three levels, with the Socceroos standing as the vehicle articulating the connexion between ball and person, bladder and nation:

They've got a mission. They have to do something about the sport in this country and they are doing it.

[coach, speaking of team].

The Australian people understand what we're doing and they are supporting us and lifting us when we need it

[captain, speaking of public].

Looking back on the events of the whole year of Bicentennial sport, the Sydney *Sunday Telegraph* isolated the Cup as the moment when Australia 'shocked the world' on its way to being 'well and truly on the global soccer map'. The ABA itself favoured this metaphor. Martin Tyler was the British play-by-play commentator imported by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) for the telecast of the final. He prefaced the game thus: 'The reason it's so exciting is that Australia continues to break new ground in this most international of sports'. Colour commentator, Gold Cup consultant and former national team captain Johnny Warren referred to: 'the men on whose shoulders all our hopes are resting...The Socceroos are the opportunity now to do something special for the sleeping giant'. Again we see synecdochal and metonymic shifts of register, describing a complex connexion between elements of the soccer subject and its adjacency to Australia, a restless set of movements grasping at an authentic location from which the syntagm "Australian soccer" can be made to interpellate a national subject in a sovereign, non-sectarian way.

But there were other accounts, accounts that emerged as time went on and the metaphors failed to: grow up; find their place on the map; or awaken. Scott Ollerenshaw, a
Socceroo, stressed immediately afterwards that a win in the final would have seen the side 'looked upon the same way rugby league players are'. Now, there was a real risk that the team might 'just drift back into obscurity' failing a good performance in the forthcoming summer Olympics. And outposts of Federalism felt their exclusion from the Gold Cup itinerary very keenly as indicators of marginality within the sport's administration.

The Sydney Morning Herald's feature article at the end of the 1980s on the country's principal sporting moments of the decade dutifully paid obeisance to the spectrum of male spectator sports, but its soccer item concerned an individual expatriate's sporting success in the English club sector. And just two months after the Cup euphoria, Brisbane's Courier-Mail newspaper called the defeat of Yugoslavia at the Seoul Olympics 'Australian soccer's proudest moment', reasoning that: 'The 4–1 victory over world champions Argentina in the recent Gold Cup paled into insignificance by comparison with yesterday's victory. That was essentially a friendly international'. It quoted Arok as describing this match as yet another 'greatest moment ever'.

Within two years, Arok had resigned. His parting words were that: 'Things have to be restructured at the top, otherwise we will never get anywhere'. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Argentinian coach Carlos Bilardo had complained during the Cup that he was being spoken to by local officials in a way that 'will give Australia a bad image, not just here but all over the world'; or that prominent national sports columnist Jeff Wells held that 'Australian soccer, after blooming so splendidly,... may wither and die on the vine', its successes having come 'despite – not because of – the administration of the game in this country'. The next two sections will address these questions.
THE SPREAD OF SOCCER

Soccer styles itself "the world game". And it is probably watched and played by more people than any other sport. But in Australia, that status is problematic. In addition to soccer, Australia houses rugby league (league), rugby union (union) and Australian football (rules). Very clear social divisions inform this split. Soccer, league and rules are played professionally and semi-professionally as well as in recreational mode. All strive to have national competitions and all fight divisions between the six States and two Territories of Australia's federal structure. Union is the only exclusively amateur code, primarily for fee-paying schoolboys and graduates living in New South Wales and Queensland. League is based in Roman Catholic and government schools and working class and rural areas of New South Wales and Queensland. Rules is a cross-class indigenous code, strongest in Western Australia, Tasmania, South Australia and Victoria. Soccer is played all over, but is very much the province of ethnically differentiated clubs. Unlike league and union in particular, its organisational strength lies outside Anglo-Celts. Clubs are frequently known by titles derived from Macedonian, Serbian, Greek or Italian origins.

Despite the oft-repeated, semi-Biblical incantation that more people, particularly young people, play soccer than any other winter sport in Australia, the code has not achieved the preeminence as a spectatorial carrier of the health of the nation which it has attained in most of Europe and Latin America. The formation of the National Soccer League (NSL) in 1977 anticipated similar developments in other codes by almost a decade, but the League's history has been ruptured and non-linear. In particular, the NSL's relationship with the sport's ruling body, the Australian Soccer Federation (ASF), has often been poor. Sponsors have come and gone, commercial television has shown at best a cursory interest and the national team – a flagship for the game in the same way that news and current affairs function for many broadcast television (TV) channels – has stumbled since. Club bankruptcies, personal fiefdoms, aberrant patrimonial appointment procedures and arcane/archaic management practices have all
been pointed to as explanations for the failure of the code to move on. But, to repeat, the key significatory element – vital because of its location within a realm of wider discourses about the hetero/homogeneity of Australia – has been ethnicity.

Attempts to market the sport homogeneously – in other words, in a way that can unselfconsciously address Anglo–Celtic males – have floundered but continue remorselessly. (And this at a time when rugby league in particular has promoted itself very successfully to, for example, women across the social spectrum). Innovations of summer soccer, of team franchising in place of ethnically differentiated club names, of management audits and new planning, are secondary to this massively powerful sense that the signified of soccer is "new Australian". Internal to the soccer world, debates proceed ad nauseam between polarities emphasising, respectively, the need to maintain an existing base in ethnic identity and the desirability of integration into the mainstream norms of sporting businesses.

In this sense, then, soccer has a marked status as the only popular sport in Australia known by its association with a diffuse set of migrant cultures. The game is somehow transgressive because of this marking in a way that the vast array of American televsual texts on Australian television is not, transgressive perhaps because it stands in for a material human presence differentiated from the Anglo–Celt that problematises the power of a transplanted English language as an expression and constitution of unity. The fragility of any concept of a unitary national cultural subject is nowhere clearer than in such fractures.

This marking has led to allegations that the code's failure to achieve the status conferred on it elsewhere is attributable to a process of ghettoisation. This amounts to a failure to appeal to "Australian" culture, a concept that invokes such terms as dominant, male, white and Anglo. One could easily argue that this perception applies nowhere but in the offices of television sporting departments, whose "policies" on equitable coverage could best be described as unreconstructed (or, in another register, as dedicated to a remorse-
less Narcissism organised around presenting the brightest and best human subjects from
their own demographic and somatic cohort). The ramifications of the problem are, of
course, material, in that sponsorship becomes difficult to obtain in the absence of
significant commercial coverage. When Australia (unlike England) won a place in the
1974 World Cup finals, the expected domestic boom failed to occur. Explanations for
that failure and subsequent ones have gone to issues of management structure,
personality conflict, ethnic loyalty and so on. But the supposed lack of exemplary
nation-sentiment in the game – its ethnicity – has been recuperated as aetiology again
and again by critics, commentators and administrators in spite of its position as the most
popular participant football code and the only one that may be said to transcend Federal
boundaries. It is apparently insufficient to be numerically powerful as a participant
sport as a qualification to be properly local. Rather, a structure of feeling must be
invented that interpellates the game within the mythic universal Australian subject and

vice versa so that it can be deployed as an agent of nation-building/Bildung and sport-
building/Bildung. This can only be achieved through an appropriate symbolic cleansing
of its self-misrecognition as a legitimate memory of or commitment to countries that
are Other.

By the time of the Gold Cup, Australia had nearly half a million registered soccer
players, or one in thirty of the population. A local administration had been formed as
early as and twelve hundred clubs were in existence by 1939, following the
provision of a 'large cash grant' from the English Football Association. Many
Australian firms paid for their employees to form soccer teams in the 1920s and 1930s
in the hope that the state's labour relations apparatus would regard this as part of a social
wage. By the 1950s and 1960s, international games occasionally attracted crowds in
excess of fifty thousand. From 1974, soccer was the fastest growing school sport.

As has been noted, the NSL began three years later, with sides from all capitals bar
Hobart, Perth and Darwin. What had begun as a game played by expatriate labourers
and miners from the United Kingdom had by that time been strengthened and ordered
by the influx of Italians, Greeks and Yugoslavs after the Second War, to the point where
it became a sport marked by its subjectivity, by the composite migrant that came to stand for it. Women's soccer, meanwhile, had seen its first interstate game in 1921, with a crowd attendance figure of ten thousand. By 1988, it had twenty-one thousand registered players and was also evidencing a divisive internecine politics. It is to such difficulties that I shall now turn, because of the implications that they hold for the formation of a cultural technology of soccer as appropriate fare for the ideal Australian subject.

When Australia qualified for the 1974 World Cup finals:

It seemed there would be no stopping soccer from shedding its cinderella tag and becoming a major football force in this country...[but] the game slipped backwards for a while. Its European roots, its infighting and its administration threw up barriers too steep to hurdle.

Whereas crowds of over five thousand were common in 1980, the average NSL attendance in 1988 was half that. And the Australian Soccer Weekly (ASW) was arguing that the standard of professionalism at all levels -- play, administration and promotion -- was not commensurate with a century of history.

As Johnny Warren put it:

United, which we haven't been, football fans in this country form one of the most powerful political bases in this country...Yet we struggle for space, suffer the most blatant discrimination, yet do nothing about it...society is unaware of our popularity as a sport.

Over the previous decade, the code had garnered about A$30 million in sponsorship funds, which 'should have ensured soccer silvertail status within Australian sport'. Instead, it was known primarily for 'internal politicking and bickering. In place of a
harmonious rhetoric of togetherness and unity, this "bad rap" for Australian soccer emphasised all the characteristics of division as a route to failure that are routinely deployed to account for poor performances by sovereign-states at the levels of cultural capital, political maturity or economic development; viz.: 'Australia in soccer terms remains a Third World Country...[troubled by] the inferiority complex which had plagued Australian soccer throughout its history\[^{33}\].

Once more, collective political struggles are psychologised through their transformation into human subjects, subjects whose failings can be slotted home to underachieved interiorities. The sport has become a person when it is held to be in a 'self–induced coma'\[^{34}\]. This in turn encourages us to consider the awkward invocation of the *soma* associated with the nation (for instance, "the body politic" or "the health of the nation"). As Laponce notes in his study of ethnically marked soccer in Canada, there has long been a tendency to homologise, integrate and confuse the body and cosmology. Deploying bodily images can easily bring up questions of internal articulation between bits and the dominance of some parts over others, again with the united cultural subject as the whole person that justifies and totalises these components opposed to the sectionally interested subject\[^{35}\].

Such anthropomorphism, then, subjectifies the entire topic, which in turn encourages accounts of the status of the code which follow a maturational ethos akin to the discursive conventions of nations and their architecture and management, if with the overdetermining urgency of this developmental psychology. The whole field is now amenable to description, prescription and treatment after the fashion of the pastoral logic elaborated by Foucault and discussed in Chapter One.
ADMINISTRATION, POLITICS AND ETHNICITY

Being a nation or a person is, outside its romantic rhetoric, a question of administration: the regularised policing of discursive and material norms of unity. And so is being a sport. The following litany of quotations is common in its constitution of the need for and possibility of a depoliticised bureaucracy for the game in contradistinction to present – and long-established – politicised procedures. These statements also constitute themselves as outside this political domain:

Everyone outside Soccer who has the necessary perception to judge, knows that the game has been politics ridden for so many years past – ASW editorial, pre-Gold Cup36.

This is a political game, and politics is about getting the attainable – Arthur George, President of the ASF, pre-Gold Cup37.

Australian soccer is the greatest grounding a budding politician can obtain – Stefan Kamasz, Executive Director of the NSL38.

In-fighting and political friction has to be stamped out – John Constantine, New South Wales Soccer Federation President39.

The political backstabbing, which has become soccer's trademark, made us a laughing stock among other Australian football codes – John Kosmina, former national team captain40.

The possibility of an end to politics, the Canaan without ideology, is called for from a state of grace. The unseemly laundry titled "politics" is located in other subjects who fail to recognise the need for oneness. Even in George's acknowledgement of the need for a grounding in politics, this is always because it comes from elsewhere. Here, the speaking subject is not political. Those articulating the presence of politics are ipso facto themselves absent from it. To speak of its dire qualities is to defer any possibility that it might be positioned in the here and now. The health of the sport, like that of the subject or the nation, is held to be beyond politics; at least it should be.
These metacommentaries function as clearing houses that will sift the worthy from the unworthy in a non-patrimonial, non-sectarian manner that knows the right words and precepts for growth: streamlined, professional, corporate, apolitical, efficient. These are technical signifiers of instrumental rationality that absolve subjects acting as agents within them of any trace of committed meaning outside a means–ends bifurcation. The "good" of the nation or the code is paramount. Like distortions of the perfect knowledge available to the putative ideal consumer of *homo oeconomicus*, differences of interest and approach are inessential, discretely delineable and eradicable.

At a practical policy level, the game has seen continued points of significant organisational and material dissonance. Many people have long called for an end to national competition. This is in line with a mass club disaffiliation from central administration of thirty years ago and major disputes between the ASF, FIFA and the Australian Olympic Federation, disputes which saw Australian soccer excluded from the two major world sporting competitions for years. After the World Cup success of the mid-1970s, the ASF dismissed the national team coach because he spoke out about its administration.

Federalism is a key site for problematising the solid-state nation and conventional liberal–democratic shibboleths about "one vote, one value". Successive Australian Prime Ministers over the last two decades have announced "New Federalisms". Issues about the special, culturally sovereign status of objects called "Queensland" and "South Australia" have proven remarkably resilient. In terms of centre–periphery logics, the south–eastern corner of the country is conventionally ascribed with the power of the metropole. Half the seats on the ASF Executive were traditionally held by delegates representing New South Wales and Victoria, which led to perceptions of bias, self-interest and a lack of purchase on the national situation. In the wake of moves to reform the bureaucracy, the representatives of these States strove to hold onto their authority.
By the end of the Bicentennial year, the ASF was A$1 million in debt\textsuperscript{46}. And the NSL had been forced to re-schedule its fixture system in mid-decade, when it owed nearly A$500,000\textsuperscript{47}. The Cup itself offers a microcosm of ASF management. The Executive Director suddenly resigned in the lead-up, a timing which led to massive media criticism\textsuperscript{48}. At this time, the Federation routinely advised that no one was available to be interviewed because of the Gold Cup preparations. The lack of promotion of the event was described as 'staggering even by soccer's own lax standards'\textsuperscript{49}. One newspaper announced the failure to tell a national team member about a training camp in these terms: 'The Australian Soccer Federation has outdone itself once again'\textsuperscript{50}.

The formation of a committee to restructure the game's organisation led columnist Lou Gautier to argue that: 'If they fail, soccer fails'\textsuperscript{51}. As Tyler had said in the closing stages of the Gold Cup final telecast: 'The challenge is really now to the administrators'. On the same occasion, Warren had called on the code to evacuate something he called 'politics' and inhabit something he called 'management'\textsuperscript{52}. This is to rehearse the formation of the self as a technically skilled administrator and the code as unnecessarily and divisively ideological. Once more, politics comes from elsewhere – but is decidedly present – and can be understood expertly and exactly in contradistinction to efficiency and effectiveness, whose definition and attainment are produced as unproblematically desirable goals.

But whilst this question of administration underwrote the micropolitics of the sport, a broader social issue overdetermined the very demographic, fiscal and imaged existence of soccer: the question of ethnicity.

It has been suggested that the 1994 World Cup in the United States will see fixtures 'strategically placed in areas guaranteed to provide ethnic support; South Americans in southern California and Texas, for example, or Italians in New York'\textsuperscript{53}. Consider that
statement against plans advanced in 1989 by the company which had just been chosen to market the NSL:

The NSL must create a new image and change its name and logo so it can be identified as Australian, modern-go-ahead and exciting...CLUB names should be amended where necessary to prevent ethnic recognition.

Leaving aside the symptomatic association of Australia with modernity and titillation, we could turn to the presentation by the state-funded multicultural Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) of the 1988 Rothman's Medal for NSL Player-Of-The-Year and the comments of comic Vince Sorrenti: 'Who's ethnic here? I hope I wasn't invited here as the token ethnic...I'm no ethnic. Let's face it, I'm a wog. [Laughter] You wouldn't have said that ten years ago, would you?'.

Soccer in Australia is often called 'Wogball', for all the mutually British origins of the game and those who label it that. Unlike almost all other sports, the soccer subject is formed as multicultural as well as gendered: this becomes both its strength and its vulnerability. For some, the principal requirement for future growth of the code is 'Australianisation'. The soccer subject's self-image and status of perception by others are to be redisciplined.

This rehearses debates over the merits and demerits of ethnically organised and identified clubs, which activists within the sport see as related to a 'lack of professionalism and ability to address the Australian way of life'. For the ASW, the problem is summed up in the expression 'nationalistic clubs' and 'Nationalism must go'. This is a nationalism not of Australia, not of the imaginary integrated local subject, but of the state of origin of club officials, players and supporters, a sign of fractured subjectivity. The soccer citizen is a split citizen, divided not only in terms of sporting affiliation or affinity, but as a trace of difference from the ideal type migrant subject with cultural, political and economic fealty fully yoked onto the local.
The Australian Government's publication *Australian Sport: A Profile* contains an essay which specifically attributes soccer's problems to these, most externally identifiable and unruly points of signification. It argues that:

since those first waves of southern European migrants in the 1950s, soccer authorities have been talking of their game as Australia's sport of the future...Ethnic divisiveness lingered, making soccer the most politically tangled of Australian sports and keeping its potential for furthering national unity just that – potential. Soccer in the 1980s is still waiting for its future. 59.

This kind of argument is routinely deployed in sporting journalism and even by Arthur George, who on retirement spoke of the 'ethnic problem'. For Jeff Wells, it remains 'a disincentive to widespread community acceptance'. The game fails to meet the test of 'a truly accepted part of the Australian way of life'.

Whilst *littérature* seek to reify either the essence or the non-essence of "Australia", its certitudes are a matter of presupposition for soccer people. It is even alleged that 'the ethnic base of the game' has produced crowd violence. A survey of television executives, government officials and sports marketers found that terrace disturbances tied in with 'ethnic affiliations and "funny" names' to hold the code back. In short, the sport is being decried as "unAustralian".

But when a telephone caller is put on hold by the *ASW* she is comforted and reassured by the sound of Greek music. *ASW* might proselytise against the system of overt Continentalism that is club support, but the paper, like the code, is financially and culturally itself marked by that system. It is owned by an ethnic press. Shortly after his election to chair the ASF, Ian Brusasco publicly advised that he had been born 'Italo Trospero Brusasco', adding: 'I am proud of my Italian heritage and it was only after much heartache and consultation with my father that I 'Australianised' it'. This was said
to 'typify the identity crisis which has held back the code for years'. Much was made of
the fact that Brusasco himself had played rugby union. This fits into the same system
of knowing the soccer subject as the one which stresses that many second generation
Mediterranean migrants have mocked arrivals who continue to follow soccer.

But 1984 saw the commencement of a Sydney Ethnic Soccer World Cup, with teams
from sixteen countries, including Australia. And the argument remains that ethnicity
is a base for the sport. How realistic is it, for example, for the NSL to expect clubs to
make all public address announcements in English? This has been resisted at several
sites. Similarly, when SBS-TV commentator Andy Paschalidis says of an all-Greek
NSL game, 'I'll be there with about a thousand relatives', he is entering the auto-
humorous world of self-parodic ethnicity exemplified above by Sorrenti. But this is a
self-parody that asks the audience to deal with a very significant material base which
problematises shibboleths about Australia whilst insisting on the legitimacy of the
marked soccer subject. As former Aboriginal soccer official and senior civil servant
Charlie Perkins once argued: 'They call us wog ball, but don't they know that the whole
world is made up of so-called wogs and that they have made soccer the most popular
game in the world?' Many ethnic groups have given huge amounts of money to
"their" clubs because they 'see a soccer team as an essential vehicle for establishing a
community identity.

So whilst it continues to be argued that the mark of unAustralianism is upon soccer, this
is in many ways to deny the special meanings and strengths that this gives the game.
Such an argument assumes an essential local quality attached to other sports which are
just as fractured, but along lines that do not describe a topography of anxiety in the face
of non-Anglo origins. This anxiety is crucial to bureaucratically driven postmodern
nationalism, a striving that is about searching for ultimate signifieds of amity and
singularity. Soccer's process is a search that is easily identified as compromised because
its starting point is dispersed within geographical unity. It stands for the sorts of gaps in
need of suture that were formerly associated with Catholic-Protestant dissonances in
Australia but are here given the additional threatening contour of language. The unified national subject is under question in more obvious ways than could ever be the case with the less overt differences hinted at by divisions within other codes.

Before exploring sport and ethnicity in the broad, it is as well to establish precisely how we configure such questions of identity, via a consideration of ethnicity and multiculturalism and their relationship to Australian public policy and the Bicentenary.

**ETHNICITY AND MULTICULTURALISM**

Of course, the vast majority of states have populations which are comprised of varied ethnic groups. These groups may then proceed to be divided in terms of their distance from some dominant cultural order or, more positively, in relation to their own special memory of heritage. And this 'consciousness of kind' need not be articulated or discerned around a mutuality of material interest.

Most of the industrialised market economies confronted issues to do with the ethnic subject amongst their citizenry from about the mid-1960s. It is often argued that ethnicity is best understood as an organisational form which changes morphologically in response to prevailing conditions. It is not a fully formed external force of unchanging culture which has been transplanted into a new formation. The notion of an ethnic subject presumes a dialectic of unequal power in the relationship of Same and Other, but does so in a way that may obscure the proxemics of these power relations. It is useful to consider meanings both diachronically and synchronically here. The Greek language, for instance, distinguishes *ethnos* (folk) from *kratos* (state). The "Good Greek" can also be the "Good Australian Citizen" because of this split that is set up between fealty to culture of origin and fealty to state of arrival. We are dealing here with discrete formations of people operating within the system of the state, which has a
legitimacy that is prior to but not necessarily of the same domain as their preserved
customs. This reduces the potential for conflict\textsuperscript{79}. As the distinctions between ethnic
groups are superficially so apparent, they may have the effect of marking out alliances
and differences which are less significant than they are obvious\textsuperscript{80}. Factors to do with
relationships to processes of production, distribution and reproduction may be manifold
but less manifest. Questions around the division of labour, for example, may not be
discernible because they come to be posed at the level of ethnicity\textsuperscript{81}. Other grids
present themselves as sources of difference which overdetermine any sense that
ethnicity is either a straightforward category or a mystificatory cover for class (e.g. reli-
gion, language and gender)\textsuperscript{82}.

However we define and account for ethnicity, it has clearly been a concept which has
helped to form critiques of homogenising dominant cultures for their failure to allow
adequate expression of ethnic difference. And multiculturalism has become the
response of certain liberal–capitalist states to such pressures. The term was coined in
the United States half a century ago in opposition to notions of nationalism\textsuperscript{83}. As a
policy initiative it is drawn by Kalantzis as a reply to certain imperatives:

> The nation state of advanced industrial society can no longer draw its identity
> from a single homogeneous ethnic group. It does, as its rhetoric says, have to
> create cohesion out of diversity, but to do that it has to make the diverse groups
> appear equal\textsuperscript{84}.

So a recognition of difference and its enshrinement in...what? Chambers criticises a
position from which "otherness" is merely a corroboration, a point on the other side of
the circle that completes the logo–centrism of the discourse (colonial, imperialist, male,
hegemonic) in question\textsuperscript{85}. Outside theoreticism, it is said that ethnic minorities need
special assistance in the areas of the economy and the polity that are left unsatisfied
where attention is focused on culturalist, privatised "lifestyles"\textsuperscript{86}, an off–shoot of
which has been a concentration on celebrating the family as a site of unity, equity and

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equanimity\textsuperscript{87}. It has been argued that the 1975–83 Liberal–National Party Government in Australia embraced multiculturalism as a means of forestalling racial violence\textsuperscript{88}, a strategy which suited an ethnic labour aristocracy and petty–bourgeoisie keen to coopt migrant labour into the service of capital via an allegiance to the state prised from this promise of cultural maintenance\textsuperscript{89}.

These left critiques of mystification – where multiculturalism drags us away from examining the economic base – have homologies on the right. Here, it is held that the policy mystifies threats to a stable political system and its particular democratic heritage that are posed by disunity and fractured loyalties\textsuperscript{90}. This formulation identifies multiculturalism as a segment of 'The Guilt Industry', alongside support for land rights to indigenous peoples\textsuperscript{91}. It discerns a 'multicultural industry' of unrepresentative people whose profession is the garnering of public funds in the name of the oppressed but under the real sign of rent-seeking for themselves\textsuperscript{92}. Multiculturalism decries and denies the rich British heritage that writes history as a striving for the ultimate liberty of the market\textsuperscript{93}.

In May 1989, the Opposition Liberal Party's spokesperson on immigration appeared on SBS–TV's current affairs program \textit{Vox Populi} to announce that 'mainstream Australia' viewed multiculturalism as ill-defined, confused and irrelevant. This mythic subject's needs were to be appeased under the sign of a 'one Australia' regime of truth in which 'the term multiculturalism will not be used'. Presenter Vladimir Lusic closed the segment by suggesting that this held two clear implications: the abolition of SBS, a state–owned broadcaster dedicated to the promulgation of multiculturalism; and a consequent change in the title of the program from \textit{Vox Populi} to \textit{Wogs Out of Work}, the intertext being a popular stage entertainment put on by "ethnics" that engaged in the kind of self–parody to which I have alluded above. The Opposition's new policy became a major partisan issue in Federal politics. That same year, \textit{The Economist}'s annual survey of Australia referred to these debates. Its search for a stable local signified of multiculturalism ended with the suggestion that the Government deployed it
to mean 'tolerance'. That kind of disembodied idealist concept, a liberal sign adrift from a subject or a location with demographic or historical moorings, exemplifies the way of addressing ethnicity that dominates discussions of the soccer subject as well.

We might do better to consider multiculturalism as a technology that classifies. Its task is to categorise the old and the new, the retainable and the abject, the usable and the obsolete for the purposes of: government funding; tests of loyalty; and methods of distinguishing between: what needs to be assimilated; what can itself assimilate; and what should be left behind. Soccer is relatively safe terrain for the state, but the political economy of the game's relationship to other codes of football and to the commercial media draws it into a problematic relation to ethnic diversity. Multiculturalism, a technology dedicated to producing political and industrial harmony for the state, becomes a business liability for football.

Consider this against Nancy Fraser's critique of Habermas for supporting a single public sphere. She is concerned at its potential for silencing particular categories of person by imposing a uniform mode of expression and therefore a restricted performance of subjectivity which has major implications for women and ethnic minorities. But for the managers of soccer, the public arena to be occupied is about "Australian soccer", with each section of the syntagm to be equally forceful, but the adjective to connote the ultimate locus of singularity. A single sphere that is prepared to house soccer as adequately Australian is a desirable home. Minority status and minority definition are undesirable when contrasted with the opportunities presented by inclusion in homogenising discourses.

This technology of multiculturalism must be read in the context of the history of Australian immigration. For about 20% of Australians were born elsewhere, and an additional 10% are the children of migrants. Many came not only as the objects of government policy, but under the particular desiring sign of state subvention. This dated from the desire to bolster population numbers in the light of the threat indicated
by the Pacific theatre in the Second War and as a source of cheap labour for industrialisation. Now the initial aim in terms of the civic sphere was that 'migrants would become 'like us' and join the Anglo-Australian monoculture. A policy that institutionalised Narcissism required until 1976, for instance, that commercial broadcasters program no more than two and a half hours a week in languages other than English. The assimilable subject as a desirable telos of immigration policy eventually gave way, however, to the integratable one. This imagined a melding together of different features to form the alchemic, correct Australian. The fully achieved Australian subject was now to be a kind of world citizen, forged from a white heat application of Mediterraneanism. But this always had its underside, as Andrew Jakubowicz points out:

The public representation of 'the Australian public' has in part been fashioned by images of the immigrant. She has been in turn a new settler, a new citizen, a new Australian, a refugee, a migrant: the obverse image has also shadowed this formal public representation — refo, Balt, wog, dago, slope... an unresolved dichotomy, signalling at once threat, challenge, competition and a lesser form of life: deviant, underprivileged, bizarre, unnatural. Throughout there has been the fear of the enclave, so that every element of the public discourse of settlement has sought to fragment, isolate and scatter the immigrants.

The contradictions within the exemplary subject of this new world are as apparent synchronically, then, as they are diachronically. Riven with different leanings and histories, it must be recuperated to certain binding logics of the political and cultural origins of Australianism. Despite the arrival of three and a half million non-English speakers since 1945, Australia remains the most monolingual advanced industrial society in the world. The subcultural corollary is of disorganised, impoverished workers and an overconcentration of migrant women, in particular, in secondary labour markets. As part of the contradictions enacted across the bodies of women, they have become the locus of culpability both for low population growth on the part of
Anglo-Celtic Australians and the site of responsibility for the maintenance of ethnic homogeneity within donor cultures.

**BICENTENARY AND MULTICULTURALISM**

Having situated ethnicity and multiculturalism as discourses of soccer and of immigration, I want now to examine them under the moniker of the Bicentenary. What did the official cultural technology of celebration make of multiculturalism, this slippery sign of unity in disunity that functioned as an ordering logic for the enunciation of a disordered amalgam? In the (1979) public statement announcing the invention of the discursive unit, 'the Bicentennial', Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser advised that: 'It will be a time to reflect upon our developing and changing national identity, as a united community transformed in a remarkable way by the migration programs of the years since World War II.'

From its inception, the Bicentenary was overflowing with meanings to do with pluralism and its heterogeneous virtues, a pluralism postdating the halcyon days of its reign within political science and prefacing its adoption and elaboration under the sign of textual theory's endless deferral of meaning. Such a ship carries a diverse cargo, but it is effectively rendered singular by two moves. Firstly, all the goods are packaged singly via containerisation. And secondly, they achieve a unity of destination and position within commodity and state relations through their passage on a single item of infrastructure. In budgetary terms, a diversely supplied amount of money derived from different tax bases, and destined for (in real outlay terms) a plenitude of practices and publics, has its destination secreted through the device of a single line appropriation or global budget.

Amongst the ABA's five 'Aims and Objectives' were two that sought:
to encourage all Australians to understand and preserve their heritage, recognise
the multicultural nature of modern Australian society and look to the future with
certainty...[and] to project Australia to the world and invite international
participation with the aim of strengthening relationships with other nations107.

It was presumably under these heads of power that the Gold Cup could be the carrier of
Bicentenary logics. Such imperatives lead us to two comfortable sites of Bicentenary
discourse. Firstly, the ABA's choice of an *Encyclopaedia of the Australian People* to be
'tits priority publication for 1988...to make basic information on ethnic origins and the
Aboriginal people available in alphabetic form; and to look at historic and
contemporary interaction in a chronological and thematic way108. And secondly,
Johnny Warren's reply to Martin Tyler's pre-Gold Cup final introduction of: 'Johnny
Warren, you're such a good barometer of Australian feelings. What's going on at the
moment?', with the following: 'I've just been talking in Japanese on Japanese television,
and that just indicates our multicultural society'.

The first site shows the urgency for an ordering knowledge, coupled with a telling of the
past, that manages the administration of peoples through a hierarchy of alphabet rather
than, for example, a way of organising history that considers material equality. The
second site not only encourages a rather disrespectful reading that proposes thought-
disordered television commentators. It also bears witness to the immediacy of ethnicity
and soccer, their always already adjacency that must be spoken even though its absence
is so desired. We can encounter institutional sites that reveal counter-logics and disrup-
tions more in keeping with the divided multicultural subject, that historicise and prob-
lematise it.

A decade after Fraser's christening speech proclaiming the ABA's *mise-en-abyme*, the
High Court of Australia handed down a landmark decision over the power given to the
Authority to authorise use of its logo and certain prescribed expressions (for example,
'Bicentenary', 'Bicentennial', 'Australian' and '200 years') and to seize all goods
contravening this right. The case came up over anti-Bicentennial Aboriginal products organised under the theme of '200 years of Suppression and Depression'. The Court found that the relevant section was invalid. At the same time as this anti-appropriation was being essayed, the Authority was busily rejecting articles commissioned for its journal Bicentenary 1988 because they had made the mistake of gratuitously referring to an Australian history of racism.

From a different perspective, the ABA was criticised, along with multiculturalism, for its stress on difference, for denying the nation's collective debt to the unifying force of Britain and Christ. In the eyes of the Leader of the Opposition, this was 'guilt-inducing' at the expense of pride in achievement. It was argued that the "party" had been perverted by the influence of the left and its excoriating selfconsciousness (a selfconsciousness which was also misrecognition). Such accounts were given aetiological contour by writers like John Carroll, who argued that a significant number of Australian intellectuals opposed any glorification of their pioneering and integrative heritage because of a collective guilt derived from dissociation from the essences of purpose guaranteed by Christianity. Further evidence was adduced from "their" rejection of the mother culture of Britain, itself a sign of self-hate that was then projected onto their founding heritage. Neoconservatives saw this as crucial to the nature of "1988":

When historians look back on the Bicentenary, their most challenging task will be to explain the mood of cultural pessimism which, during this year, took hold of the intellectual class and cast its shadow across our celebrations.

The question of ethnicity – the representativeness of its demotics and the matter of their state subvention – was one of the principal foci for the right. For Geoffrey Blainey, the planning of the Bicentenary had been dominated by government fears 'of offending the vocal, richly subsidised but small multicultural lobby...the multicultural industry'. We are seeing the same kind of sign as the one that marks "soccer".

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The Authority replied by stressing the depth of community opposition expressed to earlier ideas that would have seen the Bicentenary subtitled 'The Australian Achievement' and pointing to the breadth of consultation with diverse ethnic groups which was informing ABA practice\textsuperscript{116}. This combination of listening and responding – the state as an innocent, naive inquirer – sets up the outcome as an inevitable and sovereign one. It is legitimised through challenge leading to reply. The human subject's mythic social compact from democratic theory, discussed in Chapter One, is actively expressed. The paradox here, as for Derrida /Jefferson in Virginia, is that it is only at such moments that the subject can be said to exist in relation to its civic responsibilities and access. For out of this legislation come initiatives such as the aforementioned Encyclopaedia, which reform those same subjects and produce new ones as knowing creatures of liberal democracy; what they have invested in and made probable through their affirmation is at the same time instructing them in what they have really been or may properly become. The same move was made by soccer authorities when they bought a management consultant to interview them and tell them that their ideas about themselves were right: that as presently constituted, they were wrong for the task before them and had to be transformed into appropriate, managerial subjects.

**BICENTENARY, SPORT AND NATIONALISM**

One could well query the relevance of the Bicentenary to the Cup beyond its initial legitimising function: "Bicentennial Soccer". But the Authority was ready to position the competition after the fact as a stellar event within the broader moniker of the Sport 88 Program. James Kirk, the ABA's Chair, summed up the year by listing his selection of seven 'spectaculars', markers of the celebration's success. The only sporting event was 'Socceroos thrashing Argentina'\textsuperscript{117}. The Cup was also highlighted in his letter of despatch to the Prime Minister attaching the Authority's final report to Government\textsuperscript{118}. 225
In the words of one ABA self-promotion, although the Gold Cup was 'one of the biggest events on the SPORT 88 calendar...it was successful beyond expectations'.

But in earlier despatches, before the public relations possibilities delivered by the national team's victories, the Cup had been left out of sporting highlights. And just prior to the competition, the Authority issued a splenetic press release complaining that whilst it was the only local monetary sponsor of the Cup, the ASF had denied it promised access to perimeter advertising boards at each venue because 'you are not a sponsor, you just gave us a government grant'. Apart from ontic and epistemic problems to do with signification (governments are public so they can't be sponsors, grants from governments are "just" (merely) grants) this is an expression of what had been a most significant struggle between the two organisations over the previous three years. It provides an account of the lived practice of such entities which, as will be seen below, positions the ABA in a way that is quite at odds with its own account of itself.

The ABA wrote to the ASF in March 1985 inviting the Federation to submit a proposal for Bicentennial event status and funding. In June, the ASF advised that the Gold Cup would be on and that it hoped to secure a grant. Repeated ABA attempts to obtain a budget figure and other information on the proposal that year were unsuccessful. An ABA minute commented: 'It was made clear to the ASF that without this information it would not be possible to present the event for funding to the assessment panel in August. Their attitude was totally uncooperative and very rude'.

Differences of position and enunciation between the two organisations became public when the Sydney Sun-Herald newspaper ran a column by Johnny Warren saying that the ABA had 'been delivering Australian soccer a 'kick in the teeth. This led the Authority's Director-Special Events to write to Arthur George. She complained that the ABA 'has already suffered a great deal from this type of ill-informed report', stressing its support for the principle of the Gold Cup. A minute details George's telephoned response:
Sir Arthur advised that the event would be self-funding (budget $3.5m) from TV rights (60 million viewers) and gate takings... He then went on to say that Brian [Emery] would submit an application for funding. Brian had been advised by the ABA that $200,000 would be available for funding the event!

I questioned why a grant would be necessary at all for any event that is self-funding. 

Despite these confusions, the ABA despatched its "National Sport and Recreation Program Conditions of Acceptance of Grant", which required the following: an audit of funds used by sponsoring organisations; sponsorship to be obtained by those bodies, with the proviso that they follow Authority guidelines on use of its logo; and, critically, that:

The Authority will promote the event in accordance with its policy relating to the Commonwealth Government funded National Program... [plus] The organisation is to acknowledge the Authority's support for the event in any brochure, program, advertising, publicity material or media contact associated with the event. 

In calling up these heads of power once a grant of A$100,000 had been approved, the ABA sought to determine the Gold Cup's itinerary. It wanted the final to be played in Melbourne, instead of the ASF's preference for Sydney. In late 1987, the Director-Special Events wrote to the Federation's Executive Director in these terms:

I have to ask you to please review the match schedule. It is extremely important to us that the final be played in Melbourne...

...Brian, I'm afraid the Authority is unable to release any grant funds until this situation is resolved.
The funding threat was repeated just before Christmas that year:

it is most important that the final be played in Melbourne, and I do not believe my Chairman and Board will waive that condition. Because of this I ask you to be aware that it is highly likely that the offer of the $100,000 may be withdrawn.

The threat was made in a fashion that was aware of the domino effect which any actual deployment would have: 'The ABA knows that the ASF is relying on the Authority's grant to meet contractual obligations'. The matter was resolved in favour of Sydney, as indicated by ABA Chair Kirk's internal memo of January 1988. It explains that the Authority will accept the Federation's itinerary because of problems in obtaining the Melbourne Cricket Ground as a site for the final and pressures on the ASF to conclude contracts with television stations. So the ABA finally handed over the money the following week, the accompanying letter a model of subdued yet unctuous humility in contradistinction to the bullying tone of earlier correspondence:

I am sure the Bicentennial World Gold Cup Soccer will be a tremendous event for Australian soccer fans and sports fans generally, in our Bicentenary. I am delighted it remains as one of the funded events of SPORT 88, and that the ABA is a sponsor, albeit a minor one perhaps.

I have devoted some considerable space to this site of dispute for what it reveals about the realpolitik of ABA practice. For the ABA consistently presented itself as providing a non-interventionist context in which others could find themselves and celebrate what was uncovered in their own way: 'the Authority's philosophy was constant – people in the field organised the events which the Authority supported'. But the practice of hands-off funding was clearly contingent on certain political wills from above. That further encourages some deliberation about: what the Bicentenary people thought they were doing with the sport; why such an event mattered; why sport in general mattered;
why, in fine, these areas were important for the production of the celebratory Australian subject.

The Authority's overall Sport and Recreation Program was designed with a set of objectives that might be called a late reformist litany of the "good and deserving" juxtaposed with the "real and essential", a similar split to Wallerstein's two cultural forms discussed in Chapter Three. On one side we find 'participation by all Australians...community based...and participation of disabled people'. On the other, 'exciting...special, innovative events designed to...reinforce bonds between International, National, State, Regional and local sport and recreation groups...and reflect the Authority's theme of 'Living Together'. Or put another way, this combined inclusive and meritocratic priorities, reflecting those familiar dualities of equity opposed to efficiency and the development of participation versus the development of elites. These sorts of binary opposition are evident in the mobilisation of terms such as 'marketability' and the requirement that activities 'should not conflict with current Government policies, for example compliance with the Gleneagles agreement'(that members of the Commonwealth of Nations avoid sporting engagement with South Africa). Similarly, the statutory Australian Sports Commission's weight was leant to the national group of activities as opposed to the categories of 'local' and 'disabled'.

This amounts to a fractured ideal subject, for ABA sport was clearly fissured. Its embodied categories bore the traces of a liberal ideology of access and quality uncomfortably adjacent to a welfarism admitting of the need for equity of outcome. The sporting citizen being hailed was the best of the best at the same time as it was the neediest of the needy. In a lot of ways, this is the same kind of move as that commonly made in the domain of literary studies. Here, the most achieved expression of the most achieved personality at its most visionary has the potential to uplift the stricken; who in turn must be exposed to the exemplary value of the output of the great and good. Again, the intention is to write over contradictions about quality and elitism with a cursor carrying amelioration and a future earthly unity.
In seeking private sector funding for the program, ABA Chair Kirk called up the moneyed in terms of their fealty to national essences, that strange double move of nationalist discourse that proclaims the necessity of restabilising what is allegedly always already there. The context here was the high production values magazine, Sport 88:

SPORT comes naturally to Australians. It is central to our whole way of life. This taste for sport reveals some basic characteristics of our national identity, such as relaxed lifestyle.

Sport is also an egalitarian pursuit in Australia. It's there for all to play and enjoy, in the spirit of giving everybody "a fair go"...

...Every bit of assistance from sponsors is an investment in the biggest celebration in Australia's history. The ball is in the business court now...to step forward and support Sport 88.

Elsewhere in the publication, a link was forged between the egalitarian and the excellent. It bridged the rhetorical divide between access and output operating under the sign of meritocracy:

IT'S SAID that sport is Australia's national religion, a relentless pursuit of competition and recreation by 16 million people.

Behind the standard-bearers will be millions of active, weekend-style sportsmen and women.

Advertisements claimed that SPORT 88 was: 'Making the Bicentenary Great...CELEBRATING AUSTRALIA'S PASSION FOR SPORT' because, it was held that 'SPORT 88 is for everyone – whether your passion is watching or winning'. At last, perhaps in the name of alliteration, competition is called into the register. Elsewhere a frequently adduced homology between the profit and loss discourse of the
economy, this element of sport was routinely excluded from ABA arguments about togetherness. Rather, the ABA juxtaposed its programs as:

a balance between...top class, national and international, funded events and those providing opportunities for mass participation, catering to all sectors of the community, including the aged, disabled, Aboriginal, ethnic minority groups, women, youth and the able-bodied135.

In other words, the Authority was there to remedy market failure, the failure of spectators to support forms of sport and sporting subjects which were native and natural to the Australian, but which could be denied an adequate expression of this birthright because of the competitive subjectivity of untrammelled commercialism. Put another way, the Authority prized national unity over other concerns.

At the end of 1988, though, what precisely could be claimed for the "celebrations" connectedness to an increase in something called "nationalism"? The Chair of the ABA's Queensland Council reflected on the period thus:

There has been a special magic over this past year. We have seen Australians working closely together to the one ideal - a better community spirit...Our national spirit has been rekindled, and we must never allow that to fade or pass away136.

Conversely, the coterie of neoconservatives associated with the private Institute of Public Affairs and the literary/cultural criticism magazine Quadrant explained the realisation of their own (non–ABA–authorised) event of bonfire beacons lit across Australia in June as 'the one occasion during 1988 on which the people spoke for themselves...[giving] notice of an indivisible spirit linking all Australians'137. And on the left, Wollongong University's sociology research team on multiculturalism regarded the Bicentenary as 'a planned, state–run exercise in the creation of a national idea'138.
From the ABA itself, Kirk reflected on the affair twelve months afterwards as a moment that had generated a spirit of nationalism as never before, but a moment that had not endured because the government had not acted to reinforce it. The nation here is within and without the subjects of the state. But the state is needed to imbue them with an appreciation of what they lack and could gain through additional fealty. It does the work of a central apparatus that is superstructural to, yet constitutive of, the nation.

**NATION, STATE AND SPORT**

Delannoi and Morin's account of such institutions references their logocentric indivisibility. For all the separateness of notions of state as obstacle versus state as articulator of nation, "its" interlocution of its own spirit—in—dwelling is an always already construct. There is, then, a necessary correspondence of direction between these two. The expansion of nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe encouraged writers to explain it and *vice versa*. They produced an edifice of ideal types, a componentry of the national machine that described even as it brought into being: 'L'histoire nationale fortifiait la nation et la nation encourageait l'histoire nationale' [National history strengthens the nation and the nation encourages national history].

Nationalism is an increasingly global phenomenon, always coterminous with systems of government. The demise of the sovereign—state and the emergence of international sovereignty have been routinely — and mistakenly — predicted over the past century. As more and more such entities appear even as their kind is said to be dying out, the discourse announcing their departure becomes more and more insistent. The internationalism of new communications technologies and patterns of ownership and control and increases in the variety and extent of global *diasporas* in fact extend the significance of the state as a regulatory and stimulatory entity. The corollary has been a developing need to create a national subjectivity from disparate identities. The spread of internationalisation is perhaps nowhere better exemplified than in the work done by
states to build belonging amongst their polyethnic populations; or the labour performed by those populations to seek new forms of state representation.

So this process of forming sovereign–states has involved the establishment of both order and authenticity. The order may be new in its type and operation, but it must invoke an older connexion to essences as part of its claim to be. The nation becomes a base for this claim. It is authentic. It cannot be superseded because it represents a one, true culture and is built on fealty to that culture. Yet the manifestation of this fealty is of course in the apparatus of the state. Any sense of the sovereign–state as a discrete entity selected by persons with a common ethnic and political heritage can be applied to half a dozen cases at most. As I indicated in Chapter Three, the rest of us are testimony to massive migration and/or the cartographic fancies of colonial powers. And when groups claim a national identity that is not expressed in existing political arrangements, this is necessarily phrased in terms of the desire to have their own state. Clearly, then, it is inside the sovereign–state that most nations are formed.

This encourages us towards the couplet, often hyphenated, of "nation" and "state". There is a tendency in the writings of social science to conflate the concept of nation with the service of a centralised bureaucratic or capitalist state, thereby denying the force of the local civility it carries as an item separable from, but produced by, state power. Yet as Benedict Anderson reminds us, 'nation–ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time'. The nation is defined here as 'an imagined community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. This gets around the debate about the diachronic and conceptual primacy of nation and state. You cannot have one without the other. One represents the other as it encodes it with meaning. Nations are distinct entities perforce the interlocution provided by the state between geopolitically delineated groups of peoples and defined duties. Because of this flattening out of the citizenry, whereby their unity is conceived in terms of suffrage, there is no room for division: 'regardless of the
actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.

This organicism is reflected in the Australian High Court's decision on the legitimacy of the Commonwealth Government celebrating the Bicentennary. The Court held that such practices fell within the domain of Federal jurisdiction without reference to specific Constitutional heads of power because of a general implied capacity to develop the Australian polity as a nation. If it were ever tested in court, that would presumably uphold, for example, the post-1983 statutory requirement for the ABC to make programs which 'contribute to a sense of national identity'. This is making bigger what is already there, a Leviathan engaging in gentle tumescence that cajoles itself and its constituent subjects into sentiment. Another example might be found in President Suharto's instruction to the Indonesian Minister for Youth and Sports to alter the music, spoken commands and title of Tai chi chuan calisthenics in 1987. The existing signifiers failed to fit the 'Indonesian sense of identity' because they referenced the Chinese influence on the economy and population too overtly.

Sabine Erika argues that alterity is necessarily produced by the further couplet of nation and sport, a couplet that works to exclude and denigrate. She emphasises the connexion of nationalism to militarism through a mutual reliance on hierarchy, violence, aggression and maleness, with sport a key site. That seems far distant from the ABA's "Aims and Objectives" referred to earlier, which invoke goodwill and inclusiveness. To give some account of these disparate readings, we need to historicise their objects and frame them within the formation of Australian sporting subjectivity.

As I indicated above, many accounts of sport in Australia situate it unproblematically as a central tenet of local culture, either in a welcoming or critical way. This is to reify the term 'sport', to deny the fissures – of gender, class, ethnicity, media coverage, public participation and region – which it sutures. Increasingly, though, the tensions that these fissures describe are finding expression. Debates about the value of government
assistance to elite sporting people versus mass participation sport and about media
coverage of male-dominated events and their presentation as carriers of national well-
being have proceeded at the levels of academic sociology, parliamentary committee and
the management of sporting organisations.

In 1985, Australia's Minister for Sport argued that sport had a 'dominant role in our
development as a nation' because it 'cuts across race, age, sex and class and is deeply
 ingrained in the fabric of our society'. It is instructive to put that statement against
an elaboration by a senior bureaucrat appearing in the same publication:

At present Australia has no national philosophy towards sport. Some nations use
sport ideologically to show that their style of government and their style of life
are superior to those of other nations; some use sport under the 'bread and
circuses' syndrome to keep the people's minds off other issues; some nations
have used it to overcome the effects of war; some Third World countries use
sport to show that they are catching up to the rest of the world; while other
national sports philosophies have racial overtones. Australia has no such
philosophy and hence, as a nation, we are not at all sure why we are so involved,
except that sport is a good thing – we love it – and we have to win at it.

Here, the state appears to be responsible for national philosophy by enunciating or
enforcing it. In the absence of such declarations, a more mystical – and inevitably
unarticulated – spirit-in-dwelling propels people into sport _amour_, a proper _amour–
propre_ that is quintessentially Australian. By contrast, sociological explanations have
attempted to historicise such positions, to give them an aetiology beyond a mystic _Geist_.

The amount of space and the congenial climate were critical to the formation of an
Australian colonial sporting habit. By the end of the nineteenth century, sport had been
identified as a critical crucible in the push towards establishing a local culture. Along
with warfare, sport assumed a metonymic status. It came to stand for the new nation.
For example, the first film shot in each Australian city covered the principal local horse race, in what doubled as the first decade of sovereignty and the twentieth century. Such films were the primary visual source of information for the new citizenry about their nation. They intercut footage of the event with shots of the host city, from transport infrastructure to the dress fashions of people in attendance. This provided the means to imagine a supra-local community of like subjects. International sporting events were also being organised for the first time during this period.

For Caldwell, sport in the new century was 'a supportive venue for attempts by colonial cultures to establish a different life-style and identity to that of the mother culture'. The contortedness of Australian para-Freudian-troopery also emerges in John Carroll's account. For him, an Australian rules grand final or a Melbourne Cup horse race assume great popular import because the putative youthfulness of Australia has allowed little time for a litany of great sites of elaborated tradition to be codified. A few compelling religious, military or political crises are needed to call up the 'transcendental yearnings and terrors that truly...characterise men'.

Small wonder then – in the eyes of a Carroll or an Erika – that, as I said before, The Australian should headline the defeat of Argentina in the Gold Cup thus: 'Socceroos meet their Gallipoli'. The intertext is the First World War and a failed invasion of Turkish territory by British, Australian and New Zealand troops, when the newly sovereign Australia was held to have erected itself as a masculine nation. Similarly, it comes as no surprise that promoters Pascoe Nally said of one Argentinian player whose participation was in doubt before the event: 'he has a moral obligation to serve his country'.

What has the academy made of this? Geographical research on bonding between place, person and state in the context of industrial anomie has produced some extraordinary correlations; viz., when the Sao Paolo soccer team wins, industrial output in the city increases by an average of 12%, while a loss sees the rate of workplace accidents go up
by over 15%. This is written as 'psychic income' which bifurcates the working class by mystifying its oppression and encouraging false allegiances such as 'place loyalty' over 'class loyalty'. It has been similarly suggested that Australia's 'puny variant' of nationalism sees sport picking up images for trivialised merchandising formats that implicate it with capitalism and neocolonialism.

Delannoi's survey of the terrain of sport and nation emphasises that it is part of a grand legend which sees:

L'étranger m'impose ma nationalité lorsqu'il me tient pour 'représenté' par les résultats de l'équipe de mon pays... Applaudissant ses héros, il s'applaudit lui-même, et cette vanité céleste finit par s'épanouir veut la mort, au moins cathexique, de l'adversaire, mais proclamé aussi que l'essence de la compétition est la joie de lutter ensemble dans la tolérance et le respect entre eux... Le sport sur le mode ludique la vérité miniature du drame joué, grandeur nature, par les nations [A foreigner imposes my nationality on me when he identifies me as represented by the achievements of my national side... In applauding his heroes, he is applauding himself, and this vanity is never satisfied until he's actually longing for the death of the opposition, at least at the immediate level of desire, whilst at the same time maintaining that the essence of the contest is the pleasure that comes with competing but doing so in a tolerant and law-governed way... Sport is a microcosm of the great drama that is enacted on a grander stage between nations].

And clearly, we need to distinguish between discourses of nationalism. For Tomlinson and Whannel:

Nationalist sentiments are not always the same thing as the longing for national identity. The expression of national identity – say through a romantic ideal of
the way Brazilian or Scottish football is played – is a very different phenomenon from the appropriation of the Union Jack as a symbol of the extreme right\textsuperscript{162}.

Out of adjacent discourses there emerge significant, more essentialist shibboleths about national sporting personalities. These views were mobilised routinely during the Gold Cup in revealing ways. The Gold Cup's viewing community was partly local and partly international. Depending on whom you believe, rights were bought by fifty-two, fifty-six, sixty or sixty-one countries, live in much of South America and the Middle East\textsuperscript{163}. The ASF spoke of sixty million viewers, including United States and European cable networks\textsuperscript{164}. For Arthur George, such exposure bespoke the ultimate significance of the event for the nation: a palimpsestial externality, with soccer and Australia enwrapped synecdochally\textsuperscript{165}. This overseas attention became a selling-point to domestic audiences, who were told to see their own importance in terms of its recognition by others, rather after the reverse marketing done in selling continued public subvention of the film industry to government\textsuperscript{166}. The Australian viewer was interpellated as identifying both with the national team and its fortunes and with the global interest in the contest itself. If pride in the local side was insufficient because of the nature of the sport's image, this could perhaps be countered by calling up an identification in Australia's interest in global image markets and the attention given a public event overseas, by others. But this could also be the source of self-interrogation. Consider Murray Hedgcock in \textit{The Australian}, reporting from Britain on the lack of attention paid to the Cup by the British press:

I'm still not quite sure whether the Australian approach to sport is totally suited to soccer: is it perhaps a bit too clever for us?... [S]occer really is still a graceful, complex game that is perhaps too sleek and slick and diffused for the native-born Aussie, looking for something a bit more direct, a bit more physical, a bit tougher.
He soberly quotes Australian Rules identity Ron Barassi on this: 'soccer was OK but of course "isn't a bodily-contact game"'\textsuperscript{167}. The male subject is denied its transcendent status as physically interconnected – under quite specific regimes of control – with its like.

When Frank Arok resigned as Socceroo coach nearly two years after the Cup, he talked about the unpalatable workerist fit between national identity and soccer performance:

> We have to break from this Australian way of life business which says the boys have to go out for a drink after a win. I was always against that. Look what happened after the game against Argentina in the Bicentennial Gold Cup. I was powerless to stop the hordes – the girlfriends, wives, friends and relatives – turning up at the hotel after the win. It was one big celebration encouraged by those who should know better. We had to play Brazil after that and, of course, it was impossible to recover\textsuperscript{168}.

Of course. Men's manifest destiny to go forth and build culture is constantly restrained by the female subject and its crass temporality and materiality, the insistent female body craving strength drained from the male; all this at the expense of the perpetuation and development of the spirit-in-dwelling that is the bountiful wonder of the nation.

SBS–TV commentator Les Murray typified the Gold Cup competitors this way: Australia had 'proven resoluteness', a 'wiley' coach and 'rugged competitiveness'; Saudi Arabia had 'carefree ambition' and 'unpredictability' in keeping with being 'Asia's aristocrats'; Argentina was 'talented', 'adulated', 'modern' and possessed of 'stunning versatility'; and Brazil was 'unique' with a 'freakish penchant for improvisation' amounting to 'manifest greatness'\textsuperscript{169}. Gold Cup publicist Warren told ABC–TV before the final that 'there is a culture gap between these two countries in the game, but the Australians shouldn't be too worried about skills'. The Sydney \textit{Daily Telegraph} had
juxtaposed the earlier contest between Australia and Brazil as one pitting 'heroic Aussie battlers' against 'the Samba dancers'.

This needs to be fed further into general lines of opinion about national identity and its "ism". Kapferer evaluated the Bicentenary as having the 'central theme of Australia as an egalitarian dreamland'. Such an account is in keeping with Carroll's story of Australia as bereft of heroes, grand visions and great art, a material place leavened in its hedonism by the cynicism that is held to accompany the absence of spiritual culture. Stuart Hall refers to 'a kind of hectic pluralism of Australians...everything is different, but the difference doesn't seem to make any difference'. Moving down the alphabet of cultural criticism, Max Harris has spent a little more time in the country. Here is his line:

I have been a student of the aspirations of Australians to find themselves a "national identity". It has been a long haul...this process of mastering an ingrained inferiority complex...We have got there only recently. You have achieved a national identity when you don't have to write, or talk, or debate the theme of national identity.

Such mystical psy–complex incorporation – a nativist glorification of the unthought and unstated – has a lengthy pedigree. Guinchard tropes Augustine on his times in just such a meditation: 'Qu'est-ce donc que la Nation? Si personne ne me le demande, je le sais, mais si on me demande de l'expliquer, je ne le sais pas' [What is a Nation? If noone interrogates me about it, I know what it is, but if I'm asked to articulate it, I can't].

Viewed in this light, self–anxious, centrally planned festivals are nothing more than markers of uncertainty. When the ABA hierarchy proclaims 'Australia is a sporting nation', this is because it doesn't know what Australia is. This sense of the necessary spontaneity, of an effusive rush – untrammelled – towards collective apoplectic fulfilment, disorganised but unstoppable, is equally present in The Australian's lament on the
quietude of local soccer crowds: "The thinking seems to be: "My God, I can't be caught singing the national anthem. What would the person next to me think?""177.

This desire is also to be found in Delannoi:

Le nationalisme, enfin, est l'escalation chaude qui, au-delà des moments d'ebullion collective, se durcit dans un narcissisme de groupe autosatisfait...Le besoin constant d'affirmer l'identité individuelle de la nation indique en fait que l'équilibre établi entre l'énergie et l'inertie nationales est précaire... The constant need to affirm that the nation has a unique, individual identity actually demonstrates the precariousness of the equilibrium that is set up between national dynamism and inertia]178.

Let us redraw the line momentarily and move to the local Enlightenment, via Eugene Kamenka and Murray Bail. Kamenka suggests that culture transcends time and place to take people beyond their material coordinates and 'into a continuing world-wide republic of art and letters, knowledge and imagination'. Culture is here opposed absolutely to nationalism. Where the former's task is an 'opening and widening of the human mind', the latter 'seeks to restrict it'179. For Bail, the baleful sentence meted out to the antipodean sophisticate is that '[a]nyone who desires a normal knowledge of the world...is a cultural cringer180.

Invisible or immeasurable as a psychological category, reifiable in the Raymond Williams way as "no nations, only ways of administering objects under the category of nation", imbued with Le Bon- and Dwight Macdonald-derived myths of the crowd, the dominant register as I have outlined it always struggles to be precise. It is in that imprecision that a specificity can be identified and followed which turns the category into categories. In Schlesinger's terms:
"cultural identity", "audiovisual space" "national culture" function as so many useful handles; they offer respectability and brand identification for a variety of contending politico–economic projects in the cultural domain181.

Thus and thus alone shall we know them. Governmental campaigns on literacy, compulsory education, public arts subvention justifications, media regulation logics of self–formation – the moment of encountering the mirror through interpellative screen drama – are the relevant categories. That idiosyncratic Weberian Ernest Gellner reworks nationalism as 'the transfer of the focus of man's identity to a culture which is mediated by literacy and an extensive, formal educational system'. These can be seen as training modes in forming a language community which are also technologies of affiliation to the sovereign–state182. Here, then, is a return to that indivisibility of the ideal and its speaker. For, as has been seen, the postmodern cultural subject is a polyglot that can no longer be expected to respond to calls on a single tradition as a means of developing a sense of the nation. An empty collective history (or perhaps, a plenitude of competing histories) produces the preconditions for what Anthony D. Smith calls the "Bureaucratic nationalisms" of countries such as Australia that must accommodate a migrant world and form a new (if always partial) subjectivity183. Such technologies are always open to the accusation that they are inauthentic. This next section explores such questions.

THE GOLD CUP AND AUTHENTICITY

Tradition works via an appeal to the truth of established practice and/or organic unity. It is a complex relationship with authenticity and nature, sometimes combining either or both, sometimes overriding or being overridden by them. One recalls here a note appearing in a famous French edition of Bach's oeuvre that characterises a nineteenth–century emendation to his text as 'mesure pas authentique, mais consacré par la tradition' [an
inauthentic cadence, sanctioned by tradition. These questions are developed further in Chapter Five under the rubric of authorship.

Anxieties over the authenticity of human and non-human subjects – anxieties over the originary basis of works – are in part arguments over experience. What follows is a creed, with responses, of commitment to recognition of the self through hearing recognition by the Other. It is an operation of desire functioning in terms of the real value or otherwise of the players selected to come to Australia for the tournament. The creed illustrates how the eventual imminence of the tournament led to a recuperation, not of the terms of trade of this dependency, but of its outcome, determined – one suspects – by the definite circumstances of soccer activists confronting the opportunity to proclaim or denounce the event as it stared at them. It exhibits the postmodern invocation of ontic stability in the sight/site of its own signifying instability that was outlined in Chapter One.

Early reports that few of its previous World Cup representatives would attend meant ‘Brazil devalues the price of ‘Gold’ . Rumours circulated to the effect that the Argentinian Maradona was being offered A$130,000 a game by the ASF to come. As ‘pessimism’ about the prospects of seeing him increased, the ASW argued that his absence would see ‘the entire series...fall in a heap. Confirmation that he would not play and that Brazil was not sending all its stars was held to have devalued the entire enterprise. And at the same time as it had been making threatening noises about funding, the ABA itself was writing to the ASF ‘to have confirmation from you of the standard of the teams you have contracted to compete. Is it the No 1 team from the 3 visitors? Is Maradona contracted to play?’ As if to answer such criticisms by positioning them as outside the realm of valuable knowledge, ASF President George appeared on television to hail right-thinking viewers by advising a press conference about the authenticity issue that the absence of Maradona would only affect the ‘non-soccer public’. Members of the cognoscenti ‘would know it’s a team game’.
The ASF hired former national team captain Warren to go to South America for a week to find out who was actually to be sent over for the tournament. This was seen as essentially a retort to media reports that mere reserve teams would appear, raising the spectre of what The Australian termed 'a worthless, unproductive competition'. The President of the Confederacao Brasileira de Futbo published an article in the ASW devoted to stilling selection/authenticity critiques. These anxieties were part of a history of what Warren called: 'The bad old days when overseas teams came out here to have a picnic...[which now were] well and truly over'. This was in turn intimately related to the ambassadorial capacities for Australia of the national team.

Opinions turned. Warren came to be invoked as a disinterested authority on the topic. His views that the eventual Argentinian squad was of great quality were quoted with reference to him as 'former Socceroo captain', not an employee of the tournament. He wrote articles saying that the sides named were 'serious'; considered (paid-for) opinion. The media discourse was transformed into that of Arthur George: to continue a critique of the competition was to be an identifiable simpleton. Viz.:

Anybody who believes Argentina and Brazil will be in Australia for a holiday during the Bicentennial Gold Cup had better think again.
Believe me, the South Americans mean business...I can assure you... It won't be a free holiday.
Soccer's much-maligned Bicentennial Gold Cup is to be an event of outstanding quality after all.
[Any suggestion of] taking the tournament less than seriously by either Brazil or Argentina is all but unthinkable.

The ASW, previously so sceptical, found the Argentinian squad to be 'of unbelievable quality'; '[t]he pedigree of the teams...cannot be questioned. It justified the status of the Cup in market terms, placing the exchange-value of the visiting Latin American sides at A$60 million. This utilitarian logic extended to a form of machismo.
reportage. At a press conference on arrival, the Argentinian coach said there was 'no' such thing as friendly games. In terms of the selection of unknowns, the "outsider" Warren could inform ABC-TV Sports Arena watchers that 'people have to realise teams change. Put another way, Australia was being privileged via exposure to future stars.

This sort of argument runs together lines to do with a real essential national type and its representation with doctrines of the inevitability and even desirability of transformation. This latter move belongs to the vigorous, self-transmogrifying nature of change in industrialised, competitive worlds, a logic well-aligned with the desires of conventional economic discourse about moving with the direction of comparative advantage/competitive edge, and not with history (which is aligned here with sentiment). The rational consuming subject is able to see the sense of sending new, young players to Australia, because this is a vital ingredient of renewal. (See the related material in Chapter Five). Offered perfect knowledge, the soccer-watching subject accepts change and embraces it. So on the one hand, the initial reaction is constituted as a faith in history, in origins both of value and representativeness that must be recreated in Australia if Australia, the Gold Cup, and soccer itself are to matter. And on the other hand, this comes to be supplanted by an understanding of the technical necessity of change. Whatever the proxemics of such a shift in argument – in other words, however one reconciles the media status of a Johnny Warren in the context of notions of disinterested journalistic values of practice – it certainly does mimic some of the important contradictions of the rhetorical formation of nationalism. The mix of appeals to innate and inexorable tradition/nature and altered states of rejuvenation is a tense dynamic. It finds its homology in psy-logics which call on people to find their core as persons whilst also transforming themselves, and all at one and the same time. It is a mix that is becoming increasingly familiar.
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5. Mike Cockerill, "Why 28,000 Fans Can't be Wrong about Soccer's Future", Sydney Morning Herald, 19 July 1988, p.45.


17. Quoted in Mike Cockerill, "Soccer Row 'will give Australia a bad image'", Sydney Morning Herald, 13 July 1988, p.71.


19. Department of Sport, Recreation and Tourism and Australian Sports Commis–


32. Stead, loc.cit.


38. Stefan Kamasz, "Public Misses Sir Arthur's Big Farewell", *The Australian*, 10
August 1989, p.22.


42. Cameron, op.cit., p.207.


44. Mike Cockerill, "Alan Bond to Revitalise Soccer?", Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May 1988, p.58.

45. Ray Gatt, "Clayton's Executive is not the Answer", The Australian, 8 May 1989, p.22.


49. Mike Cockerill, "Gold Cup Needs a Publicity Kick", Sydney Morning Herald, 4 June 1988, p.69.


53. Stan Hey, "World Cup 90", Marxism Today, June 1990, p.43.


58. Keith Gilmour, "Franchise the Clubs!", Australian Soccer Weekly, 9 (348), 1988, p.3.
59. Jenkinson, op.cit., p.27.


62. Jeff Wells, "Why Dr Bradley is Doing a Major Disservice", The Australian, 23 May 1990, p.36.

63. Ray Gatt, "Those Were the Days – But now, only Stagnation", The Australian, 5 July 1989, p.35.


65. Stefan Kamasz, "Australianising' the NSL is Imperative", Weekend Australian, 1–2 April 1989, p.42.


83. Inglis, op.cit., p.18.


87. Marie de Lepervanche, "Racism and Sexism in Australian National Life", in de Lepervanche and Bottomley, op.cit., p.84.


95. Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy", Social Text, 8 (3–9 (1), 1990, p.69.
96. Graetz and McAllister, op.cit., p.27.


101. Foster and Stockley, loc.cit.


103. Callan and Gallois, op.cit., p.49.


110. Castles et al., op.cit., p.6.


112. Quoted in Warhurst, op.cit., p.16.


120. A. B. A., Sport 88, 1988, op.cit., p.3.


134. Steve Warnock, "Big TV Audience for Roos Success?", in Bicentennial Gold Cup, Playbill, Sydney, 1988, p.50.


138. Castles et al., op.cit., p.5.

139. Marie Reiss, "Bicentenary Bows Out With $15m in the Coffers", The Australian, 18 December 1989, p.4.

140. Gil Delannoi and Edgar Morin, "Avant–Propos", Communications, 45, 1987,


146. Ibid. p.15.

147. Ibid. p.16.

148. Starke, loc.cit.

149. Inglis, op.cit., p.12.


153. Graham Dempster, "Challenges", in ibid., p.121.


157. John Warren, "That was the Week that Was for the Socceroos", Australian Soccer Weekly, 9 (346), 1988, p.11.


161. Gil Delannoi, "La Nation entre la Société et le Rêve", Communications, 45,


164. Adrienne Smith, Note for file on telephone conversation, loc.cit.

165. Arthur George, "Bicentennial Gold Cup", in Bicentennial Gold Cup, op.cit.

166. See, for instance, Special Broadcasting Service Television (S. B. S.–T. V.), Sport Report, 15 June and 1 July 1988.


169. Les Murray, "Brazil–Argentina Rivalry Ensures Gold Cup Success", in Bicentennial Gold Cup, op.cit., n.p.


183. Anthony D. Smith, op.cit., pp.9 and 11.


199. Mike Cockerill, "Gold Cup has a Cluster of Soccer Jewels", Sydney Morning Herald, 16 June 1988, p.52.

200. Murray, loc.cit.


I have already alluded to the complexity of the notion of the liberal subject. There is a clear potential for contradiction in the doctrines of subjects that seek a democratic society via free and equal participation in the interests of the public good versus subjects that maximise their own utility in the market, a mechanism which will supposedly counteract their selfishness with the competing selfishness of others. There is a superficial fit between these models, if one presumes that the sphere of government is the province of those areas that the market could never cover (for example, laws of private property and standing defence forces). But as I pointed out in Chapter Three, the purely laissez-faire economy is a myth. Most capitalist democracies have mixed economies, which often see not so much intervention into industries by the state, as action by the state to generate industries. But as this is always in the name of a preference for private sector initiative and management and a ruthlessly competitive world of Social Darwinism, it is necessary for the state to forge two kinds of subjectivity: the selfless, active citizen that cares for others and favours a political regime which compensates for losses in the financial domain; and the selfish, active consumer that favours a financial regime which compensates for losses in the political domain. This consumer is more than a rhetorical trope or a description of an already extant subjectivity. Because of the extraordinary extent of the permeation of marginalist or neoclassical economics throughout liberal discourse, it is also part of the principles of certain interventionist aspects of public policy, especially in the area of human capital called, variously, education or training. While it is the very plentitude of consuming possibilities that drives attempts to develop public policies on citizenship as correctives to such excess.
This chapter examines two sites at which these imperatives operate. It illustrates some of the contradictions inside and between them. The first part, "The 'Visible Scenario' of Politics", seeks to explain how moves to televise the Australian Parliament can be understood in terms of the formation and display of particular subjectivities. It argues for an assumed incompleteness on the part of the potential viewer that is to be rectified in the name of citizenship education via exposure to what is generally regarded as having been a source of this incompleteness, namely television. The actual texts of the broadcasts are found to generate a very different form of television from the routine continuity system, one that may not in fact achieve the desired outcome of audience respect. The chapter maintains that the particular mode of televisuality required by the Parliament indicates a further anxiety about the appropriate display/formation of politicians as ethical subjects, as exemplars of assiduous work and icons of liberal democracy.

The second part of the chapter, "Authorship and the Public Speech", has three tacks. At one level, it is a fairly straightforward analysis of speeches about industry training made by two businesspeople on behalf of the state. As such, it can be situated within a constellation of relations described by the following formations: relations between and within business and government; the role of non-statutory public advisory bodies; and the nexus of economy and training. At a second level, it may be read as an attempt to address the techniques of speechwriting within the civil service and how these resonate with "famous names" to produce authored – and authorised – documents, in a way that borrows from many of the traditional concerns of textual theory. And at a third level, what I am seeking to argue is that neoclassical economics is a structuring discourse determining the terms of truth and subject positions within the speeches. The speeches personify both the rational, consuming, maximising private subject on which a free market is based and the caring, sharing, disinterested public subject on which a democratic polity is based. The irony is that the speakers are articulating a market-oriented
discourse produced by elements of the state favouring a neoclassical model of educational development in opposition to other elements favouring one based on civics.

THE 'VISIBLE SCENARIO' OF POLITICS

Citizenship

1988 saw the establishment of an Australian Parliamentary Education Office (PEO). Its key function was to redress 'the low priority given to "active citizenship" education [in schools and to stress]...the important role of parliament and parliamentarians in educating young citizens for democracy'. The following year, the government's advisory body on curriculum, the Australian Education Council, adopted ten national goals. Amongst these was the aim of 'developing skills in students to enable them to participate in a democratic society'. The PEO followed up with a conference designed to devise strategies for 'incorporating parliamentary and citizenship education into courses for teachers in training'.

This in turn led to the formation, with the Senate's blessing, of an Australian Association of Parliamentary and Citizenship Educators and an affiliated journal. A 'citizenship visits program' was also introduced. It subsidised trips to Parliament by school students located more than a thousand kilometres from Canberra.

When Australia's Federal Parliament House was opened in 1988, it included A$50 million worth of television technology, initially deployed to send closed-circuit pictures from the House of Representatives and the Senate to the offices of Members of Parliament (MPs) and an edited service to the press gallery. When debate then commenced about the value of broadcasting proceedings, the President of the Senate suggested that the expense already gone to was an argument for public televising, although there had been stirrings towards this for some time. At Parliament's suggestion, 1990 saw the state-owned Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) commence live coverage of
Question Time in the Senate, proceeding on to the House the following year. The commercial stations did not show the same interest, perhaps because of a prohibition on edited highlights.

These are institutional responses to three related perceptions. The first of these is a putative lack of public familiarity with Parliament and its distinctness from the Executive. The second is a putative lack of public knowledge of citizenship, sovereignty, democratic participation and related concepts. These were imbricated with the additional problem of how to form channels of communication between the public and politicians that avoided the mediation/determinations of media owners and professionals. It was as though the instatement of a direct connexion between sender (parliamentarian) and receiver (citizen) would make for a magic elixir combining knowledge, responsiveness and respect. As the citizen came to understand what the parliamentarian did and said, so it could learn to speak its own needs and preferences in the correct pose and tongue. This understanding was to be manufactured through an intervention into the secondary curriculum and via a reassertion of Parliament's right to be seen and heard on terms and terrain that it controlled.

Such concerns are not confined to Australia. Rather, they are part of a common reaction within liberal–capitalist democracies against the discipline imposed by political parties, a reaction led – and in most cases barely sustained – by parliamentary officials and junior MPs who will never make the Ministry. In 1988, British backbenchers successfully pressed for a trial televising of proceedings as a method of reclaiming the public as an active constituency; in effect, a pressure group on all issues, formed through telesovereignty rather than any specific material interest or organisational form. So whilst the public is interpellated and – supposedly – empowered, hailing it in this way also provides a power base for MPs. This reaction produces the public as a subject that has hitherto been formed and ruled by a less desirable entity than its own sovereignty: by the mass media. The public is an audience which must be made into a citizen, and can be once civics has been instated as a pedagogic norm. Consider the position enun-
cated by Norman St. John-Stevas: 'To televise parliament would, at a stroke, restore any loss it has suffered to the new mass media as the political education of the nation. In 1944, the British War Cabinet argued that 'proceedings were in Parliament were too technical to be understood by the ordinary listener who would be liable to get a quite false impression of the business transacted'. It actually favoured professional journalists as expert mediators between public and politics. The faith in the power of the media is matched only by the mistrust of the people.

Quite apart from the question of who should be educating whom, there is a dependence on the media explicit in St. John Stevas' position which is oxymoronic. As Lesley Johnson has pointed out, live broadcasts of Parliament bring politics to the public but — crucially — thereby spell and define politics with a capital "P", perhaps impeding the development of a sense that equally important and equally political debates and struggles occur around and over the lathe, sink or word processor as the mace. In addition, much of the stuff of parliamentary talk is effortlessly and impenetrably procedural. It occurs in a decontextualised vacuum and alienates a listenership mired in arcana. Whatever substantive debates emerge, it has been argued, are ultimately flattened out by TV's norms, thereby robbing the event of any genuine capacity for public education. Politicians learn how to reform themselves as objects of the photo-gaze in the direction of the personable, even-handed and bland midday talkshow host.

This returns us to the Derrida/Jefferson dilemma of Chapter One, the quandary that political theory has been faced with since the invention of the idea that when we are born, we enter an implied social contract with the state. This contract — to cede a certain autonomy of action in return for a certain amount of protection, service and identity — is one that we are then said to be able to survey and utilise through the technologies of sovereignty: the parliamentary system and, latterly, pressure groups. The quest for origins is without end, so to speak, as fruitful as it is interminable in a realm where "what came first" is equally hard to establish in archival and conceptual senses. Did I exist before the country in which I was born honoured me with certification of the fact?
Is it then that I made the mature decision, after all due consideration, to agree to the
unwritten British Constitution? Or did that come later?

As was seen in Chapter Three, many countries ask broadcasting to fix up this
uncertainty. Publicly owned radio and television stations are routinely required by
legislation to encourage unity within the sovereign-states that fund them\textsuperscript{16}. They are
there to make a variety of simultaneous moves, many of which are at least paradoxical
in that they involve both responsiveness to taste and its formation. Public service
broadcasting is meant to shape as it tames as it delivers. It is expected to make the
citizen (a citizen that has contributed to its own creation) even as it attracts the audience
member. When allied to a fear that it is the very "massedness" of the media that has
made for an ignorant public, this can lead to a logocentrism that places all its faith for
renewal in homeopathy: TV is one of the villains, so TV must be made captain of the
school in order to use its abilities and make it responsible.

Walter Benjamin argued more than fifty years ago that the new mechanical forms of the
reproduction of information made for a reduction in the effectiveness of parliament\textsuperscript{17}. He
addressed squarely if epigrammatically the alienation of person from parliament
which the citizen felt in terms of its interaction with the state:

\begin{center}
I think of the modern citizen who knows that he is at the mercy of a vast
machinery of officialdom whose functioning is directed by authorities that
remain nebulous to the executive organs, let alone to the people they deal with\textsuperscript{18}.
\end{center}

The attempt to ameliorate this situation may be seen as the postmodern adjunct to
citizenship. As I noted in Chapter One, classical political theory accorded the citizen
representation through and by the state. The distinctively modern \textit{addendum} to this was
that the state guaranteed a minimum standard of living, provided that the citizen recog-
nised its debt to the great institutions of welfare. The decisive postmodern guarantee
falls in the area of providing access to the technologies of communication as crucial integers in the set of the polity. This promise derives its force from a sense that such institutions need to relearn what sovereignty is about in polymorphous sovereign-states that are diminishingly homogeneous in demographic terms and increasingly heteroglossic in their cultural competence. Contradictory accounts of this citizen emerge from the presumption that it is the work of a parliament to tell the people why they should be interested in and faithful to it, whilst at the same time claiming their considered acceptance and support as the grounds for its own existence.

The recent turn within social theory towards an interest in the idea of civil society can then be seen to run alongside the anxieties expressed from within the state apparatus. Opportunities for marginal groups to express themselves and fears for legitimacy on the part of the dominant become part of a double movement of renewal under the sign of the citizen. Hence Charles Taylor's contention that civil society can be said to be an entity that 'exists over against the state, in partial independence from it'. How practical is this distinction?

In 1979, Britain's Conservative Party made the free market a cornerstone of its manifesto by claiming that it would not only make people wealthy, but also make them better able to deal with public services and the private sector workplace through a combination of opening up the former to competition and the latter to employee shareholding. It is possible to see the Party's Citizen's Charter of 1991 as a delivery of part of this, not at all as a diversion away from the supposedly naked market of the preceding decade. 'Citizen' means something very special here; not 'the activist, the campaigner, the lobbyist - but...the consumer'. The delivery of services is given priority over questions of representation and participation to the point where The Times' editorial terms the process "Mimicking the Market" and The Independent announces the birth of 'citizen-consumers'. This is not a citizen that exists to act politically inside or outside the state. It is not a citizen concerned with questions of policy, of political
ideology. It is a user of public services that is being offered a limited power of redress when those services are delivered unsatisfactorily.

Further to the left, debates over the Charter 88 movement in Britain – an attempt, *inter alia*, to construct a scripted basis for being British, but in a way that claims a genesis in the *New Statesman and Society* – have occluded the question of the notion of the individualism of the citizen. Is this the "nice" side of the person who is also the utterly selfish utilitarian? Was Douglas Hurd's advocacy of 'active citizenship' a cipher for a Government that needed to appear caring and sharing (or perhaps needed its policing done at below cost?) Is there some kind of contradiction within the human subject if it is made to combine the communitarian togetherness of citizenship with the dynamic competitiveness of the participant in the market? This tension has been called 'The Duality of Publicness'. It troubles theorists from all parts of the political spectrum.

Christopher Lasch claims that the drive towards 'private satisfaction' via the material consumption of objects associated with fantasy in fact weakens both the private domain in its hold on personal relationships and the public domain in its hold on attention to matters of civic concern.

But at the site of parliamentary television, we are more directly returned to the ideal speech–act of communicative perfection. For it is fairly clear that parliament is being set up here as a model. It is not only important in itself as the site of fealty and access. More than that, it is being used to manufacture citizens as participants in a particular mode of discussion. Habermas argues that there are three critical elements to the formation of a public sphere under democracy. These elements provide a popular justification for political authority. Firstly, each participant in debate must have the charity to assume that the others involved are acting rationally. Secondly, this charity must be seen to apply to parliamentary rules and conduct. Such 'practical discourses' may then claim to offer a conduit to 'the universalizability of interests'. There is a nexus between high quality debate and the very ability to express particular interests. Thirdly, the formation of the 'public will' must involve compromise. This is a compromise whose
conditions of appearance can be evaluated by all the parties. In doing so, they can ascertain whether the discursive conditions under which the compromise was struck were conducive to open discussion. These elements collectively comprise the domain of 'public discussion guided by arguments'\textsuperscript{29}. The gift of modernity is the displacement of the 'substantive rationality' offered by religion and metaphysics in favour of this 'procedural rationality'\textsuperscript{30}.

In the conventions of parliamentary politics and much left critique, there is an evil that stands between the people and their representatives, that precludes the exercise of this rationality. This evil has a name. It is called television. The claim is made that television (TV) forwards image and emotion as opposed to sound and rationality\textsuperscript{31}. But the next move is often for television to become the source of power and the warrant/technology for training publics into a citizenry that is loyal to the state and loyal to a particular model of dialogue. Such a discourse is a critical concern of this chapter for its description of the culturally overdetermined public subject. It involves a conception of TV which amounts to a will to infantilise. John Hartley has neologised this will in another context as a regime of 'paedocracy'. The institutions of television construct an account of their audience that calls it up as a subject for training and protection\textsuperscript{32}. This will seems to be shared by MPs and parliamentary bureaucrats alike. The current issue in question is the potential for learning how to engage in rational debate that is offered by watching brief discussions of politics on TV news and current affairs programs. Fifty years ago, it was the degree of rationality encouraged by brief articles in the popular press\textsuperscript{33}.

A routine struggle is going on here. It balances out the sacred and the profane, the potent and the barren of the media. Consider the decision taken in July 1990 by a New South Wales Parliamentary Committee not to proceed with a proposal to televise the proceedings of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) on the grounds that 'visual images were "tremendously powerful"'\textsuperscript{34}. Even proponents of telecasting ICAC acknowledged problems with 'television's propensity to trivialise and merely
entertain', as the Sydney Morning Herald's editorial put it. At one and the same time, then, it was held that TV would wreak havoc to the orderly conduct of ICAC and yet have no real effects. It narcotises as it stimulates. Similarly, within a single report, the Brisbane Courier-Mail could advise that before the March 1990 Federal Election, the Opposition had refused coverage of the Lower House because it believed that this would give the Government an unfair advantage, and then go on to say that the Government believed no one would watch such TV. TV is an omniscient beast welling up and controlling everything; but its end-result is nothing.

Austin Mitchell, a British Labour MP, has labelled this the 'Fear of television'. Using the old hypodermic model of media effects, where TV enters the soma sometimes to drive to madness and other times to instil quietude, he refers to concerns that 'TV politics may even inoculate against understanding and build up antibodies against politics itself'. Consider the recent special issue of the Australasian Study of Parliament Group's Legislative Studies journal on "The Media and Parliamentary Education" (note, not education of the Parliament, but by it, in it). The contribution from a Senate official included the following observation about the threat to 'Australian democracy' posed by 'an impotent television-bound nation, trusting in politicians and parties that are as reliable as any other TV commodity that must be dressed up and pushed'. This patrician certainty of ignorance on the part of the Other is an article of faith in such a discourse about the TV audience. The ignoble savage that devours television does so in a way that is herein always already connected to its failure to know enough about parliamentary politics. Such baleful attitudes towards the popular have a distinguished lineage. Plutarch, for example, recounts the following story about Solon. Having enjoyed a performance of what later became known as a tragedy, Solon spoke with Thespis, who was developing this dramatic form into the shape that is now so familiar:

he went up to Thespis and asked him whether he was not ashamed to tell such lies in front of so many people. When Thespis replied that there was no harm in speaking or acting in this way in make-believe, Solon struck the ground angrily.
with his staff and exclaimed, 'Yes, but if we allow ourselves to praise and
honour make-believe like this, the next thing will be to find it creeping into our
serious business'.

The public space was an honoured location, not to be cheapened. The hold of reason
and truth on participation was tenuous, so the public was to be safeguarded from its own
frailties. These weaknesses could easily be brought out by the dangerous imaginings of
popular fictional culture and turned into a source of distraction from more important
matters.

It was a cognate move two and a half millennia later that saw the first day of the trial
telecast from the Australian Senate begin with ABC commentators explaining how
Parliament "worked". Vox-pops were used to prove the ignorance of the public: no one
interviewed on the street knew how many MPs there were. This is reminiscent of an
American survey reporting that children aged between eight and twelve could identify
more brands of beer than they could Presidents of the United States. But it would
have met with the approval of Australian Democrat Senator McLean, who is disturbed
by the 'great ignorance, indifference and apathy in the community about things
parliamentary'; or, indeed, with the views of the leading commercial network in
Australia, Channel Nine, which argued for ICACTV on the grounds of its 'educative
function'. The public is here an object to be worked on. Once it is shown the extent of
its own ignorance, it will take up the need for reformation by in turn working on itself.

This of course denies the "Sesame Street problem", where programs designed to uplift
the informationally underprivileged are lapped up by those more privileged, leaving
preexisting power relations of knowledge undisturbed. It also ignores the evidence
from Britain, which suggests that those most likely to watch Question Time Television
(QTTV) are the people who are already familiar with the parliamentary domain.

At a more theoretical level, there is no sense of the paradox of dependence on the
alleged source of the problem to remove that problem in a wave of homeopathic self-
transformation. The flatness of television, the fact that its physical form is relatively
stable, along with its physical positioning, is seen to override the actual content of ideas
raised in debate because this content can be processed in such a routine manner by the
mythic public\textsuperscript{46}. Television now is held not so much to destroy participation in public
life, but rather to be a revolutionary force unravelling established power within the
private domain\textsuperscript{47}. Alternatively, one might redispose these positions and suggest that a
culture of appreciation of televisual technology and communicative form, learnt in the
home, is critical for the development of direct citizen participation via the 'electronic
town meeting' in North America and new ideas about the dialogic and the plebiscitary
as sites of the technological experimentation and formation of spaces in which the
public can appear\textsuperscript{48}.

**Local Consumption**

It is important to consider what this public might be which was under construction and
what it had already shown of itself. For Australian surveys of TV audiences indicate
that their interest in 'Politics' within news bulletins is greater than their interest in
'Sport'. This is especially true of professional people over the age of twenty-five\textsuperscript{49}. So
perhaps this is not the same public which is being spoken of as in need of parliamentary
education. But it may be a public that is tired. For it is perhaps not insignificant that
although the 1987 Australian Federal Election saw a 137\% increase in expenditure on
television advertising on the 1984 figure\textsuperscript{50}, which indicates a developing reliance on
the medium, half the viewers watching TV in Sydney turned off their sets when all the
commercial stations screened the same campaign speech simultaneously\textsuperscript{51}. One could
argue that such partisan interruptions fail to constitute a litmus test. But three–year
parliamentary terms and a proliferation of State and local government elections mean
that the parties are, in one sense, always already campaigning. Citizens are over–
interpellated in their electoral mode.

In any case, just as there is a cosmic ambivalence about television, an oxymoronic
duality of it as danger and saviour matching the duality of the consumer–citizen as self–
ish and thoughtful, so the much longer history of interaction between radio and the
Australian Parliament has been full of disjunctures. When the Duchess and Duke of
York came to Australia in 1927 to open the then Parliament House, the Duke's speech
was broadcast. And for four weeks prior to the event, its promise was used as advertis­
ing material designed to encourage people to buy receivers as contributions to uniting
the nation. But a few years later, the ABC briefly banned the broadcast of all speeches
by politicians for the three month period prior to elections. A Labor Party
Government introduced legislation requiring the ABC to broadcast proceedings after the
Second World War in part because of the perception that the Party was being unfairly
treated in the press, although the official reasons were to do with: raising the
standards of debate; improving Parliament's image; and developing community aware­
ness of it as an institution. We shall return to these themes, which are startlingly
redolent of the reasons forwarded for televising the Chambers forty years on.

Whereas radio coverage had begun on a mainstream ABC network, it was shelved to a
special parliamentary network in 1988. This was, in part, recognition of forty–two years
of dwindling audiences and listeners increasingly dissatisfied by interruptions to other
programs. A survey undertaken for the Dix Committee of Review into the ABC in
1981 had found that only 26% of respondents were content with the amount of time
devoted to such broadcasts. Ratings have regularly been below 1%.

There is a striking similarity between the trajectories of parliamentary broadcast policy
on both radio and television. Each starts off with an inimical view of the media: in one
case, perhaps the outcome of a mistrust of privately owned newspapers; in the other, the
product of a much more general misgiving about the mass media in general, a more
profound mistrust that was social in the sense of being related to the audience, but unre­
related to any account of the ownership of the means of production. Secondly, both
had a brief to reform MPs themselves, of which more will be made below. Thirdly, both
sought to upgrade public knowledge and opinion of democratic institutions. Given all
the evidence of the radio experience, one might query what was likely to eventuate from
the implementation of televised proceedings. Prior to addressing that question, it is
germane to look further at relevant practice outside Australia.

**Overseas Consumption**

Germany, Japan, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland,
Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, Norway, Italy, Thailand, Costa Rica, Belgium, Egypt,
Greece, Israel, South Korea, Portugal, Switzerland, Malta, Singapore, the United States
(US) and Canada all televise parliament, with varying allocations of control of the
coverage between media entities and chamber officials\(^58\). In order to assist in getting a
sense of the rationales and operations of such systems, there is value in a brief,
schematic, comparative account.

Proceedings came to Netherlands television in 1962, via three types of coverage: live
for topical issues; summaries of less important debates; and "flashes" on magazine
programs. The first years of the system saw considerable public disaffection because of
MPs' on-camera proclivities towards dormancy, absence, novel-reading and jargon.
Over time, Members came to attend at the same time as producers, viewer familiarity
with procedural norms grew and ratings increased on occasions of moment\(^59\). In
France, it was two years after Pompidou resignedly intoned that: 'Whether one likes it
or not, television is regarded as the Voice of France', that a clutch of broadcasting
reforms required certain stations to cover the National Assembly\(^60\). Here was the Pres­
ident installing TV as sovereign, as Jefferson/Derrida did the act of writing. The people
watched and believed and created the people. It is no surprise, similarly, that during the
extraordinary events in Czechoslovakia at the end of 1989, the opposition Civic Forum
movement made the televising of Parliament one of its principal demands\(^61\).

Sometimes such moves have amounted to a defensive reaction, at others to a positive
innovation. One thinks here of the 'Video chariots' which go into the Indian countryside
with video recordings of political rallies and speeches to be shown on screens that can
be viewed by five thousand at a sitting. Millions of voters in the rural hinterlands who
are unable to receive state-run television thus gain electoral and ideological information. And the first live broadcast of the Soviet Union's new Congress of People's Deputies in 1989 attracted a record two hundred million viewers across a dozen time zones, a 25% increase on the previous figure. One might refer again to the cognate use made of new communications technologies, which are said to have broken down the extent of mediation between politicians and publics in North America. Direct contact between Congresspeople and their constituents has positioned them at the leading edge of applications of cable, satellite, video cassette recording and computer-aided interaction. Alaska, for example, has a Legislative Teleconferencing Network which permits committees to receive audio and computer messages from citizens. Political talk-back television in Italy has produced notable events such as the call from a viewer which persuaded the defence minister to admit that a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation missile had brought down a local DC-9 aircraft, with the loss of all on board.

This is not, however, to suggest that Australia has been unique in its caution in this field. Despite the introduction of a Bill in 1922 providing for electronic media coverage of Congress, with a trial the following year, the US had no regular radio broadcasts of proceedings until the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties of 1978. The opening of the Eightieth Congress in 1947 was carried on television, but this was mostly proscribed until 1971. The major drive for change stemmed from the results of public opinion polls from the early 1970s which suggested that politicians were held in low esteem. Regular trials were instituted in 1977, but only on closed circuit. Publicly available coverage was routine from 1979 in the Lower House. After extensive tests, the Senate agreed to the same in 1986. The service is available on cable, with fifteen million Senate subscribers and thirty-nine million with access to the House. Again, twin goals are claimed for all this: 'Most observers agree that television has improved the general quality of debate and has contributed to a more informed citizenry.'

Of course, Watergate had seen the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities gain high ratings through thirty-seven days of 'gavel-to-gavel coverage'. But
ratings for US Party Conventions, on all three networks, declined throughout the 1980s, with 1988 figures down 9% on the previous campaign. TV had 'adopted primaries as the political Olympics'. Winning primaries had never previously been a prerequisite for Presidential nomination; but TV made it seem as though it was, and reforms ultimately made it so, reforms motivated in part by that very perception. Once more, television is constructed as simultaneously formative and destructive of an active electorate.

In Britain, Channel Four screened a program called Their Lordships' House from 1985. The Lower House rejected a proposal for coverage that year, but trial Commons telecasts commenced in late 1989 – despite the then Prime Minister's opposition – and drew a domestic audience of ten million and thousands more via cable in the US. Television coverage was regarded both as an advance and as an acknowledgement that parliamentary politics had been overrun by the media as the major formative political influence on the people. For until 1956, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) had not even been allowed to broadcast discussion of any topic due to be debated in the Parliament over the coming fortnight. And the 1980s was a disjointed but disturbing period of frequent Conservative Party interventions into BBC programs on the Irish Republican Army, the South Atlantic War, American attacks on Libya and Spycatcher. This led to hopes from the left of a less fettered form of MP-to-citizen communication of public issues than had been the case. But there remained the question of the actual form of parliamentary television.

**Television Protocols**

We can gain a clearer idea of the subjectivities being produced within QTTV from a consideration of the protocols used to maintain control of parliamentary telegenics. I argue that this control is as crucially constitutive of the conditions of possibility for debate as are standing orders. Despite the intention behind them, these protocols are so at variance with the discourses of professionalism animating mainstream TV that they make for a new kind of program and viewing subject.
Parliament requires control of how information about it is presented. The rules of Australian radio coverage, for example, preclude ABC announcers from mentioning the presence or absence of MPs. They are 'confined to a straight description of procedure'. The putatively empty signifiers of "balance" and "value-free" talk mystify through their silences on crucial matters and valences on others; but they are at one with the process of constituting the electorate as needing a (carefully circumscribed) education–as-protection/protection–as-education.

Rules enunciated by the British Select Committee on Televising the Commons prohibit cut-away reaction shots, other than of those named in debate. Close-ups, shots of sleeping members and wide-angle shots of empty seats are also proscribed. Disruption must automatically lead to a cut-away to the Speaker. These restrictions persuaded Channel Four to abandon plans for live telecasts. How should one read instructions which insist that: 'Coverage should give an unvarnished account of the proceedings of the House, free of subjective commentary and editing techniques designed to produce entertainment rather than information?' This surely encourages a respectful, fearful distance on the part of the audience; a stately removal that is worlds distant from the participatory engagement of active citizenship. It stands in stark contrast to US network News President Roone Arledge's response to falling public interest in watching Convention politics: 'The two political parties should sit down on their own, or maybe with the networks, to come up with something more appealing to the American people.'

What this illustrates is the tension once more evident between different forms of subject. On the one hand, we have the citizen in need of training, who must be shown the grandeur of constitutionally endorsed debate. The processes of filming, editing and narration must not be anything "natural", in the sense of being ordered around action, display or commentary, but must follow very strict procedures for the creation of the appearance of orderly work. On the other hand, we are seeing the subject as a consumer to be wooed, who is a television watcher and sovereign for that. But emerging between
and behind these, there is a further subject, that has perhaps all along been the key entity in need of reformation: the politician.

Consider guidelines on the use of file footage of proceedings issued by Australia's Joint Committee on the Broadcasting of Parliamentary Proceedings. These guidelines are similarly concerned about the unruly gazes of directors and publics. They insist on: the maintenance of continuity; the avoidance of freeze frames; and a guarantee that material 'not be used for the purposes of satire or ridicule'. And when the then Acting Speaker explained the presence of a film crew in the House in 1989, making a film to be shown to visiting schoolchildren, he was quick to emphasise that shooting had occurred during a Division, and therefore only a full House had been revealed. This is part of a wider anxiety over the need to conceal any absence from duty that makes television a threat to MPs. The fear of a focus on reclining repose, or a neglect of the process and form of tradition or good governance in favour of visual style or investigative exposé, drives the debate over presentational protocols in a way that brings to the fore the figure of the professional politician as in need of cleansing and purging both from its own, presently flawed self and the distillation of that self by the media. A Senate bureaucrat's "Case for Television", made to a parliamentary seminar convened on the topic, included the promise that it would 'eliminate possible selectivity in the media and similarly affect interpretive TV journalists'.

One can see a striking and significant parallel in the Rules for Film Documentation in Ethnology and Folklore published by the West German Institute for the Scientific Film in 1959. The Rules require that:

- filmmaking be done by persons with sound anthropological training or supervision, and that an exact log be kept; that the events recorded be authentic (technical processes can be staged for the camera, but not ceremonies), filmed without dramatic camera angles or movement, and edited for representativeness.
The notion of "editing for representativeness" signals a fear of the camera as unrepresentative in its look. But more than that, there is a sense here that the gaze of the audience is powerful, minute and expressly judgemental; that viewers are quite excoriating in their evaluative processes. They are able to pick up the merest blemish. It is, perhaps, the citizen who is also an MP that is the subject in need of redress. I shall consider this in the next section.

The actual output from the Senate's QTTV has been quite different from the textbook ideal (not least in that it has attracted very low initial ratings). The story world of QTTV is conventional in narrative terms. An equilibrium is indicated, in which the President or Acting President of the Senate announces QT. A disequilibrium occurs as speakers dispute and engage with each other, often in unruly ways. At the end of an hour, the presiding officer calls a close, and equilibrium is restored. We are returned to the state of the story that applied at the beginning of the program. As a credits marker of this, a parallelism is established between the introduction and the conclusion, with a fully groomed boy and girl opening and then closing doors to welcome and farewell us.

In a lot of ways, then, this fits the description of 'paléo-télévision', a term coined to describe the era of institutionally defined TV. It was a project founded on cultural and popular education, with the audience the subject of lessons delivered and controlled by television professionals. Casetti and Odin identify three features characteristic of this form of pedagogic address. The first is the transmission of knowledge from savant to idiot. The second is that this is achieved in a way that is based on the separation and hierarchisation of roles. The third is that each program is a series of contracts offered to the spectator and a request to identify and be engaged in different ways according to the genre of the program and the age, interest and taste of the viewer. The project seeks to structure people's days by calling up their interests and organising them via flow (for example, Saturday is sport).

At first glance, the purposes underlying televising parliament would seem to sit well within such a regime. But QTTV also breaks many rules of the continuity system. Apart
from the usual oddities of outside broadcasts, the lack of fit between action and sound and disruption of shooting conventions make a case for QTTV to be acclaimed as an anti-realist text that questions the possibility of perfect knowledge on the part of the viewer. Cuts from speakers to interruptors frequently leave us with sound coming from off-screen while a truculent interjector is in-shot but silenced. When Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome activists protested very vocally during QTTV in June 1991, they could not be filmed, even though MPs stopped talking to watch the disturbance. This was followed by a sermon from the Speaker of the House about due process and the need to balance democratic access with proper form. To the viewer, who had no idea of the nature of the disturbance to the program until it was reported in other media, this amounted to censorship. Only those outside the text were denied access to the action engaging those within it.

Most routinely dislocating of all is the refusal to abide by the hundred and eighty degree rule of camera placement. The Australian Film, Television and Radio School's recently released Guide to Video Production advises users to envisage an imaginary line between aspects of the mise-en-scène so that their camera positions will not cause objects to move to opposite sides of the frame in alternating shots. Crossing the line – deploying the circumference of a circle – will appear to make the action occur in reverse direction. The myth of seamless editing/realism is generally held to be threatened unless, in Graeme Turner's phrase, 'the viewer is given a consistent representation of the spatial relations between the actors and their surroundings.

QTTV radically subverts such conventions. Like a film by Ozu or Tati, it uses three hundred and sixty degrees, which makes it very hard to be clear about: who is speaking; what their party position is; or, indeed, whom they are addressing. The viewer is encouraged to work with the text. Dialectic shot/reverse shot relations are deployed to set up a duel between questioner and Minister, but so are disruptive cut-aways to MPs talking on the phone, laughing boy-/girlishly and reading. Wide angle master shots dwarf the process. Shifting sound levels, graphics which identify speakers' affilia-
tions by an isolated map of their State of origin, and a complete dissonance between the
prearranged Narcissism of Government questions and the semi-spontaneous spleen of
Opposition ones, produce a quite hysterical program at a formal level, for all the
apparent pomp. This is actually television of people at work, with all the non-
Tayloristic chaos which that implies. So its directors' attempts to get away from the
tedium of talking heads make for disruption to the realist text (an apprehension doubly
engaged by our knowledge that robots operate the cameras in what Senator Vanstone
has termed 'the biggest television production studio in the country'\textsuperscript{90}). So much is
available to produce so little that the outcome is excess. It is of little surprise, then, that
QTTV has been attacked by the ABC's leading film reviewer for having 'more produc-
tion blunders than you'd really like to shake a stick at'\textsuperscript{91}. Such is its capacity to flaunt
the conventions of the continuity system.

In short, this is more in the realm of 'néo-télévision', an era in which the pedagogic
model is played with. Didacticism is displaced by interactive processes\textsuperscript{92}. QTTV is a
constant incitement for the spectator to interpret, because there is no commentary, no
practice of coordinating the direction of sound and image, no context given to
discordant discussion; and above all, there is no sense of anyone inside or outside the
text being in a position of perfect knowledge. Perspective is an author, and perspective
is clearly indicated as partial. This partiality goes beyond content. It goes to questions of
form. The set of debating rules valorised by Habermas and exemplified in parliamentary
law/lore is shown itself to have determining effects on what can be said, heard and seen.
The referent for debate is a complex combination of the history of the particular topic
and the rules of the chamber. A topic can never be fully explicated on its own terms
because of time constraints and the placement of Questions Without Notice as always
already in the midst of specific controversies. Question Time functions as a technology
that produces metacommentaries. These metacommentaries are set in the centre of the
controversies to which they allude, accusations and answers on the run to fetishised
subsections of well-established areas of disagreement. The publics they address are
confronted with disarray and the inevitability of a multiplicity of authorising perspec--
tives/constitutions of the problem under discussion. Unlike Lyotard's account of the ways in which science becomes narrativised in order to be presentable on television, the combination of parliamentary and screen conventions is quite chaotic. As debate frequently organises itself around the terms of debate themselves, and is always adjudicated by an office-holder, it is in authority, not process, that the form of communication finds its juridical ground. A recognition of this could see the spectator moving from being the subject of a technology and making a new self. The last chapter addresses such possibilities in another context.

Perhaps our referent here should be Lyotard's account of communication. Distanced from Habermas' valorisation of process, it specifies distinctions between the referent, signification, addressee and addresser of phrases. Each determines and is determined by its disposition alongside the others. No primacy is given to the purity of conditions for reasoning. Instead, like a political poster, the parliament becomes a model for a 'desired treatment of social space'; but not a model for "perfect" communication. Form is one more site of struggle rather than something that has an innate meaning and quality. The potential for a new treatment of space is also examined further in the final chapter to this thesis.

**Viewing The Self**

When QTTV began in Britain, there came with it an associated micropolitics of the body which provided a clue to the other subjectivity being produced here; for professional charm schools were hired to train MPs in deportment, debate and habiliments. After the first day, a Conservative Member stated that 'some of the men – I happen to know – are carrying powder-puffs in their pockets to beautify their sallow complexions'. The rule restricting cameras to shots of the head and shoulders encouraged a past Leader of the House to versify thus:

The shampoo approach to public affairs
Would not have us over the moon,
With members less worried by currency scares
Than comment from Vidal Sassoon\textsuperscript{99}.

It is easy to write this off as characteristic masculine and institutional vanity, pomposity and tightness. But the issue of manners and appearance is a critical one. Consider the following from an Australian Senator, spoken when the decision to commence the trial was taken:

It is a very common practice for the Ministers and people on the other side to stand in the way that men do and put their feet up on the furniture. I find it appalling. The furniture belongs to the Australian people and the Australian people will see those feet on the furniture, if parliament is televised\textsuperscript{100}.

It is just this element of concern that motivates others as well. In opposing the televising of proceedings, the Manager of Government Business in the Senate made telling parody of the Parliament's attempt to constrain reuse of file tape:

The producers cannot use an excerpt to satirise and ridicule anyone. Half the clowns who jump up here ridicule and satirise themselves. Does that mean half the senators are never going to get any television exposure?\textsuperscript{101}.

Conversely, the Opposition Whip argued that 'Senators normally hope to encounter television in the course of their work and they should be dressed for it'\textsuperscript{102}. This respectful attitude of obedience to the aesthetic of the medium – here, one senses that TV is the electorate, that it is metonymic for the voter – is in a constant state of tension with the view that televising Parliament will see it 'turned into a circus'\textsuperscript{103}. But more than that, there is a multifaceted ambivalence at play: TV is all-powerful as an instrument of apathy; TV is all-powerful as an instrument of education; TV is evil; TV is our salvation; and TV is the ultimate arbiter of the fitness and style of MPs. Such concerns have a long lineage. Theodore Roosevelt advised his successor, William Howard Taft,
to police mechanical reproductions of himself very carefully: 'photographs on horseback, yes; tennis, no. And golf is fatal'. This is particularly interesting, to return to my earlier point about the supposed lameness of Party politics, in the context of the Parliament's will to find its own significance. The counter-cyclical attempt to rein in Executive power which has been a recurring theme in the auto-panegyrics of parliamentary bureaucrats and romantic political scientists is as much about control of the image as anything else. But it is founded on contradictory understandings about the image. Consider a recent cover story of the American magazine *Business Week* on the problems associated with Congress as a democratic forum. It argued for the passion and commitment that come from ideological positions policed by strong party machines, lamenting the fact that 'in the television age, political organisations are withering'. This brings into question the idea of a necessary nexus between centralised party power and an ignorant TV electorate.

It is meet to think here about the Code of Ethics which has been promulgated for the producer of QTIV, the Sound and Vision Office. The Code advises that the Office operates in 'the special and sensitive context of serving the Parliament' and that its staff must conduct themselves at all times in ways that 'respect the institution of the Parliament'. The real subjects of television, the people genuinely "affected" by its gaze, are the politicians. They, after all, are the product.

In arguing that televising Parliament would increase the standard of debate, the Australian Lower House Opposition Leader maintained that: 'You would only oppose a decision like that if you had something to hide'. Similarly, it has been suggested that QTIV will have the long-term effect of rendering Question Time less vilificatory but also more cautious; a way of halting the decline in 'classic parliamentary principles and behaviour'. Research into the impact that televising the House of Lords has had since 1985 suggests that the practice has altered the people on-screen much more than those watching it.
The critical point is this: since the Parliament and its apparatchiks – along with the rest of us – are so divided about what television is, they need to concentrate on treating what they presumably can know; i.e. themselves. Max Harris saw in QTTV a 'sea of nonentities' without any 'sense of...self- absurdity'\textsuperscript{111}. And Blitz magazine's survey of the new Commons TV coverage found a 'hopeless dominance of custom over democratic function'\textsuperscript{112}. In a world where no one can decide whether TV is God, Beelzebub or AN Other, perhaps the real regime of education needs to be that between parliamentary institutions and themselves, their self-interrogatory auto-critique and reformation before the mythic public. This much may already be clear from the force of QTTV. For it stands as sturdy evidence for the need to reshape the viewed subject, not the viewing. It has already provided us with 'a visible scenario, that one can see, like proof in a court of law', as Godard might say\textsuperscript{113}. It is a scenario that offers hilarity through incomprehension and abnormality to the viewer; as Godard himself might once have wished, and as the unruly subjects of self-invention examined in my concluding chapter have sought to produce. But prior to moving onto the operation of a technology of the self, I want to look at the subject of cultural policy which has the most obvious already-extant claims to autonomy: the construction known as the desiring consumer, devouring and reconstituting the materials of supply and demand economics.

**AUTHORSHIP AND THE PUBLIC SPEECH**

**Macrosetting**

In 1985, three public speeches were given by Brian Pickett and Trevor Prescott, members of the now-defunct National Training Council (NTC). The Council existed to advise the Australian Federal Government on labour force training policies and programs via a tripartite structure which incorporated representatives of capital, labour and the state. Its charter required it to assist in the development, operation, promotion and funding of training, its claim to legitimacy residing in this three-way 'partnership'\textsuperscript{114}. The list of full and deputy members of the Council from 1982 to 1984
decomposes and informs this rhetoric: six representatives of small to medium-scale business enterprises, six business bureaucrats, four trade union bureaucrats, three State Government bureaucrats, six Federal bureaucrats and two Technical and Further Education (TAFE) bureaucrats. In terms of "grass-roots" experience of delivering, receiving and paying for training, such people are *prima facie* spectacularly unqualified. They perform, rather, representational functions, standing for aggregated groups and peak organisations. In any case, despite claims to being an 'independent, tripartite, national body', the Council effectively functioned to voice and sanction the free market philosophy of the then Department of Employment and Industrial Relations (DEIR), favouring 'competency-based training as opposed to time-serving' that would signal the needs of consumers to providers. (The NTC was succeeded by a more formalised and coordinated version of the same: the National Board of Employment, Education and Training was established on a statutory footing. The new body's inclusion of education is an important development, of which more later.) It is best to begin with some biographical and conceptual context to the authors of the speeches under review, because of the critical effect of their names and status as both determining and determined structures of the conditions within which "their" words were produced, circulated and consumed.

In addition to his role on the Council, Brian Pickett was a member of the Kirby Committee of Inquiry into Labour Market Programs. The Kirby Committee recommended that the Australian Government set up a new method of structured vocational preparation for jobs outside the trades, jobs not covered by the apprenticeship system or professional accreditation/credentialism. All of these duties were against Pickett's backdrop as a personnel manager with Email Australia, a "white goods" manufacturer. Trevor Prescott, deputy chair of the NTC and chair of the TAFE Research and Development Centre, ran a car fleet maintenance service. Both men exemplified the multi-faceted subject of latter-day capital, working as they did not only for their companies as executives (the particular self-good) but also for the reproduction of certain forms of social relations by expressing a "business perspective" as "industry persons" (the
general civic good). This perspective was presented in both consultative roles (advising government through the Council) and coopted neocorporatist ones (making public statements under the NTC's public banner of tripartism).

To give these speeches an economic location will help to indicate that they derive from somewhere quite other than the individual experience of "industry persons", whilst calling up and demonstrating that category of knowledgeable subject as their warrant. They should first be situated within an understanding of the lengthy historical interconnexion of business and government in Australia, via the granting of land, the early allocation of convict labour and the frequent stimulation of particular economic sectors. 'Interdependency has been present from the beginning', as Hogan puts it\textsuperscript{117}. Most recently, a series of international recessions and trade conflicts since 1974 has produced inflation and unemployment, rocky financial markets, unstable commodity prices and balance of payments deficits for the Australian economy, which have provided further stimulus towards cooperative links\textsuperscript{118}. Of course, these tendencies are far from unique to Australia. In Britain, for instance, Sir Alastair Pilkington and others formed Business in the Community to indicate how caring and sharing capital could be. The group developed what it called 'corporate community involvement policies' as part of 'enlightened self–interest' at a time of economic and social crisis\textsuperscript{119}. There was an equally clear trend in North America from the early 1970s towards bringing business closer and closer to the heart of policymaking\textsuperscript{120}.

Australia moved quite distinctly to the global margin during the 1980s because of its reliance on export commodities with small value–added components\textsuperscript{121}. Repeated economic crises saw a concentrated and continuing critique of the local education system that went hand–in–hand with an obsessive reliance on it. This was identical to public policy responses to the Depressions of the 1890s and 1930s\textsuperscript{122}. Doctrines of human capital, of a calculating economic subject that would respond to being given the skills of information to maximise its own potential, became crucial investments in an economy of policy discourse that presumed to train as it responded, to make that double
move between knowing what is best for others whilst doing so in the name of the rational consumer. This is another expression of the eighteenth-century rehabilitative project (in that case managed through a combination of work and isolation) which sought to 'rearrange not only the complex of interests proper to *homo oeconomicus*, but also the imperatives of the moral subject'\textsuperscript{123}. It also saw the formation of a singular subject that could express and in some sense unite the divided national self. One might point here to the way in which the independent entrepreneur was valorised in North America towards the close of the nineteenth century as a civil society exemplar of the success which every person could realistically aspire to emulate by virtue of their being a citizen of the United States\textsuperscript{124}. This supposed unity of civic and economic subjectivities was once chiefly symbolic. It is now also internal to the processes of policy.

Successive Australian Governments have sought the input of labour and capital into the development of programs of intervention into the economy. The aim is to organise the simultaneous advent of certain tendencies which might otherwise only occur sequentially under a pure market: a decline in unemployment and inflation; an orderly restructuring of industry under the sign of comparative advantage; and an increase in investment\textsuperscript{125}.

Prescott and Pickett stood for the reunification of the economic and civic subjects, subjects split along psychological, policy and disciplinary lines for all their mutual origin in Hobbes, Locke and Mill\textsuperscript{126}. Some confusion results from the consequent need to yoke together the rational citizen that thinks of the greater good of the greater number and the rational consumer that valorises itself. They are both called up by this set of policy desires inside the one subject, inside what has been called 'man's best nature' as opposed to 'tradition'\textsuperscript{127}. The subject must be taught to distinguish between public goods, where one person's consumption does not 'preclude that of another', and private goods, where 'uses compete'\textsuperscript{128}. This is to instate doctrines of civility as collective and doctrines of commodity as singular. It is a technology for dividing those areas which are
to be the objects of policy discussion (public goods) from those which are basically the province of inviolable, non-debatable protection via the law of property (private goods). One might rephrase the issue more prosaically by bringing into question the ahistorical nature of the free trade, free consumer, free business, free market logic for its fantasy of 'countries without societies and governments'. It has been pointed out that Hong Kong is the only exemplar of such an arrangement, the outcome of its unique colonial pattern. From the beginnings of laissez-faire as an analytic doctrine, it has always suffered from what Comte regarded as the substitution of the 'barren aphorism of absolute industrial liberty' for consideration of material practice and history.

This sphere of methodological self-legislation is classically epistemic, so much so that Weber made it a paradigm case of the problems connected with reasoning through ideal types, a process that selectively picks up on certain types of observed conduct and then repackages them as sealed systems of interlocking logic. Such systems are internally consistent, but they depend on bracketing like with like to the exclusion of other factors of conduct unsuitable to their purity of analytic synthesis, or Gedankenbild. For example, neoclassicism depends on the certainty that consuming decisions are made entirely outside the influence of producers and via an unalloyed, absolute rationality. So the need is there to run across each other two discourses of the subject which are conventionally left separate. They have enormous internal contradictions and may often be mutually exclusive. But they are presented, as Marx said of marginalist economics, as ideas 'independent of history...natural laws of society in abstracto. Both discourses are imaginary states of grace that must be exemplified in order to be replicated in lived history. The attempts to create popular interest in operating within markets and democracies that began in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s exemplify the need to manufacture the putatively natural in these domains. It was the work of the public speeches under review in this chapter to spread just such a process as widely as possible.
Prescott's speech to a Printing Industry Forum – Focus on the Future, like the others under discussion here, was produced in the period immediately following the release of the Kirby Committee's Report and – significantly – the Government's announcement of its intention to construct an Australian Traineeship System (ATS). The talk begins by praising the printing industry as one which 'has always adjusted effectively'. This is immediately linked to a preparedness to invest in training.

Whilst a different form of politics would not unify labour and capital as the one subject with one interest under the sign "industry", because of their differing practices and relationships to the means of production, this formation presumes an axiomatic and indisputable unity. Prescott proceeds to mount an at least paradoxical argument that endeavours to combine two positions which appear to be incommensurate: that training can only be entered into because of its return to capital via increased accumulation, but that capital must have a sense of corporate responsibility which transcends the drive towards profit and acknowledges the needs of the individual undergoing training.

He calls on employers to enunciate their requirements clearly to providers of training in order to ensure relevance, particularly in the developing areas outside the trades.

There is, in this sense, a recognition of the macroeconomic move away from a materially productive industrial structure and towards consumption capitalism, but of course this kind of language is not employed. In keeping with Prescott's function as enunciator/lobbyist of capital-inflected state policy, he provides the requisite advertisement for traineeships. They 'are not just another labour market program. Rather, they herald an entirely new training system. Of course, the new system must be constituted within the logic of oneness, of industrial unity, which was mentioned above: 'The responsibility for training and retraining must be shouldered jointly by all parties: governments, employers and employees should all play their part.'

A collaborative model of mutual interest and action (semi–planned and negotiated, semi–self–interested) is the implicit driving force of this logic. In particular, the claim
that employees will benefit from the ATS, and should therefore contribute towards its cost, is an implicit rejection or ignorance of the possibilities of a labour theory of value. The three parties are partners in training, locked in a cycle of mutual need. At the same time, Prescott acknowledges divisions within this industrial self. He sets up a fraction of the state – the TAFE system – as a vendor to capital: 'it is offering a service. That service must be attuned to what the marketplace decrees.

Pickett's speech, to a conference on the hardware industry, displays similar concerns. It describes the NTC as 'bringing the partners in industry together. Tripartism 'mirrors the responsibility for training that the social partners share. The emphasis is on the Council as a body that formalises what is already there. An implicit functionalist streak is already emerging from both these talks, premised on putatively mutual interests and desires. This mystifies the debates and material conflicts going on between and within the so-called "social partners". For despite their consanguinity, it remains the case that training must be developed and delivered in the direction dictated by capital. So training should be 'more relevant for the enterprise and the individual'; the 'private sector is the leading edge of technological innovation. It is best placed to address the training needs which it generates.

The meaning of 'industry', a term used throughout these speeches, becomes clearer at this point: at the level of the power and legitimacy to make and enunciate decisions, 'industry' means capital. But when it comes to funding the process, this responsibility lies with the now-familiar 'partners. Like Prescott in his printing address, Pickett proselytizes on behalf of traineeships, because they promise reduced youth wages and an 'adaptable workforce.

Prescott's second speech addresses a conference on The Changing Context of TAFE. Introducing himself as 'an industry person', he provides further clarification of the term, via an implicit differentiation of industry from labour; the latter is required to mould itself to 'the needs and realities of the marketplace. He proceeds to acknowledge
that equitable public policy outcomes are a national priority: 'But as an industry person, I have to place the greatest emphasis on efficiency.'\textsuperscript{149} Here there is some recognition of the division within the disinterested citizen who is also a business executive. But the stress on the knowledge of the workplace goes guarantor of other concerns as well. Prescott asserts that 'TAFE needs to see industry as a consumer to be wooed and satisfied, not a captive user'. He is critical of 'education moguls', arguing that:

Overly academic approaches, with the attendant luxuries of time and minimal consequent responsibility, are inappropriate...we must beware any attempt to pad out skills training courses with pseudo-relevant educational components.\textsuperscript{150}

The consumer must be all-powerful. This is the consumer of public education in the name of its own business efficiency as a corporate entity. Its operations are sharply distinguished from the notions of the "well-rounded person" imbued with "life-skills" (such as citizenship/civic conduct?) that the educating subject is held to desire to impart to others. The way to avoid this educationalism is through a system of 'consumer sovereignty...a fee-for-service method which would encourage greater responsiveness, putting TAFE more clearly in the marketplace.'\textsuperscript{151} TAFE is to be reformed, from educationalism to vocationalism, by the imposition of a new system of allocating resources to it, a system which rewards popularity rather than civic delivery under a sign of improving others. The new system redisposes TAFE from a disinterested subject that caters to broad social design into a semi-person, semi-business entity that is competitive. Such a system is opposed to automatic recurrent funding for TAFE from the state. Instead, it favours a structure driven by demand from the users of training. (DEIR was pushing this line at the time and giving grants to business with which to purchase TAFE courses of its choice; the significance of this conjuncture of Prescott and DEIR will be explicated below.) The clear implication is that civics, or person-building – the task of creating a socially responsible citizen – is either irrelevant to this domain or will occur naturally through learning to be a docile worker. Skills are
abilities tailored to jobs, and skills must be the basis of learning. The rigour of market economics requires the 'discharge of business according to calculable rules and 'without regard for persons'...in the pursuit of naked economic interest", to coin Weber's famous phrase152.

Authorship
In this next section, I want to consider the very concept of skills and their distribution by examining the conditions under which such doctrines of human capital were produced, authorised and disseminated: in short, by addressing the conditions of delivery of these speeches, with the assistance of cultural theory.

Within the domain of literary studies, it is a commonplace to problematise authorship. Everybody knows that the author might now be a "what" rather than a "who", and that it is far outnumbered and outsигnified by readers; or if they do not hold by this, "every-body" inside literary studies knows that a case has to be made against it. But the burden of decades spent institutionalising the category of the author as the creative, imagining – and responsible – heart of texts continues to be carried in much of the history of thought and, of course, in everyday logics of attribution. In opposition to this, factors such as genre, history, popular discourse, audiences, publishing/speaking conditions, institutions of interpretation and components of the very forms of texts are increasingly being deployed in the task of critical writing by a scholarship which abjures Romantic strategies that go looking for the origins of texts in the individual biographies of their authors. Such approaches contend that to read texts via the utilisation of orthodox critical procedures is to under-read. Privileging the category of personal experience as the lodestone of writing involves buying into a particular moment in textual history, specifically the emergence of authorial discourse as part of the rise of Romantic aesthetics in the nineteenth century and its later modification and professionalisation in the Leavisite search for the best novel by the best of souls at its personal best. In place of this, there is a certain tendency now towards an examination of how particular sites and practices in fact produce the author, via an apparatus of critique and pedagogy. This examination
frequently extends beyond a consideration of the formal characteristics of texts – the repeated, regular components that can be discerned across a range of compositions – and asks how texts circulate, the contexts in which they are known and the rules which govern their interpretation. Such an approach contends that technologies produce authorship, technologies of interview, criticism, publicity and curriculum, and that even purportedly personal inspirations must intersect with a set of conventions for telling stories. 

Yet it would be quite wrong to suggest that authorship as a category is ended or irretrievably problematised. The reinstatement of intentionality under the sign of Donald Davidson and doctrines of "the greats" has even been matched by structuralist recantations derived from the category of experience. Saunders and Hunter argue that authorship continues to be a 'magnetic topic for literary studies' because of its fecund play with the author as either an 'exemplary consciousness' or a point of articulation for 'unconscious determinations that bring this consciousness into being and speak through it'. Each of these modes is central to a cultural approach to accounting for subjectivity.

For the purposes of this chapter, there is great significance in the reasons for the intense anxiety induced by problematising authorship. David Lodge, for example, has attacked Foucault for discrediting the author because he believes that this also serves to discredit humanism and the Enlightenment and thereby the freedoms associated with them: freedoms to speak, worship and move about. Lodge instances the case of Milan Kundera, who lost his Czech citizenship because of his writings and then came to act as a symbol of resistance in a way that would not have been available to anonymous discourse. This case could, of course, be analysed from a Foucauldian perspective. Such an analysis would concentrate exactly on how "Milan Kundera" is made to circulate via certain institutions and forms of knowledge and recognise the political significance of that. But it is easy to see how the anti-subjectivity of the "new theory" is writ large in the responses of its opponents, because of the uses to which the human subject and its
attendant "instincts", "feelings" and "rights" have been put in liberal-democratic and populist discourse. The continuing impact of imbricated notions of originality, plagiarism and individual worth expressed in doctrines of authorship is evident in recent controversies surrounding the work and person of Martin Luther King, Jr.\textsuperscript{157}

To repeat, locating responsibility for a text in the name appearing on its cover tends to downgrade other forces shaping it, because of the associated tendency to decipher the place of its "real" meaning as contained in the author's imagination and experience and their distillation. The author is held to form a text individually. In the case of Prescott and Pickett, their pronouncements use a number of disparate legitimating forces. Contradictorily, as "industry people", they claim personal experience and enlightened self-interest/possessive individualism as generators of authenticity, while their positions within the Council establish them as concerned for the greater public good. As exemplars of successful selfishness, they can become exemplars of successful selflessness. This is a happy resolution of Rousseau's dilemma of how to make the consuming subject's 'profit in the misfortunes of his neighbour' mesh with broader community needs.\textsuperscript{158} And the technology for this resolution is one of authorship. Reconsidering Foucault on authorship illustrates that he had no problem with the argument that it 'is legitimate to ask whether a person whose work manifests a certain set of modifications was a genius'. But to research in such a way and only in that way is not adequate to the object of analysis because it disenfranchises discourse in the act of centring the subject, at the price of understanding: the field of possibilities confronting that subject; its constitution; and its practice of writing.\textsuperscript{159} Hence the need to locate authorship within concerns such as Rousseau's, when this practice of writing addresses civic issues.

In what sense did Pickett or Prescott "write" these texts? They were, of course, based on the product of the NTC's Secretariat, an arm of DEIR. As such, they represent a negotiated situation, a set of meanings born of the meeting between different forms of knowledge. The hands on the keys were those of middle-ranking bureaucrats, in their part-time mode as professional public sector writers. They were producing words.
which the private sector could speak in order to endorse what these fractions of the
public sector needed to have authorised as authentically private. Such bureaucrats were
borrowing from a departmental rhetoric which both informed and was derived from the
Council's logic on training matters. Neoclassical economics here functions as a
discursive tactic that is used variously, but never with the aim of a complete evocation
of its logic in material policy. In the case of the speeches under review, the tactic is a
balancing act between the very poles of public subject that bring its purism into doubt.
The backdrop in this case is of DEIR using its relationship with private sector
employers to articulate a market-oriented opposition to the civics curricula favoured
by the then Department of Education and academic educationalists.

The NTC Secretariat effectively published an "industry" person's "thoughts", following
a departmental approval process. Pickett and Prescott would certainly have read drafts
prior to accepting their speeches for verbal delivery, and may indeed have proposed
certain amendments. It would be misleading to imply that they were duped by civil
servants, that they either did not understand or did not concur with the positions which
they enunciated. But it is similarly misleading for them to be positioned as "authors", as
this denies the actual process of production. What little we know about how such
speeches are written suggests a multiple authorship\textsuperscript{160}.

Since the revelation that Larry Speakes invented "quotations" from Ronald Reagan,
there should be greater public awareness of the dangers inherent in denying this kind of
multiply constructed practice of writing and attribution of knowledge. \textit{The Washington
Post} was moved by that incident to editorialise thus: 'For years, speeches that were
never given were made to seem in the Congressional So-Called Record as if they had
been. Ghosts write reams of prose purported to have originated with someone else\textsuperscript{161}.
One is drawn here to Gerald Ford's splendid distinction between the acceptable and the
unacceptable in this area. Speaking at a conference on press-President relations, he
felt able to term it 'totally wrong' for a press secretary to attribute a statement to the
President he had never made. But 'the press secretary oftentimes has better phraseology

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than the President. And if that, in the mutual discussion, ends up in what the President says, there's nothing wrong with that. 162.

This matters. It matters both because, in the case of the DEIR-endorsed speeches, it distorts the role of bureaucracy in enunciating and creating a free market doctrine; and because it buys into authorising logics which may be quite inapplicable. A speechwriter for Ronald Reagan has argued that:

> speechwriting in the Reagan White House was where the philosophical, ideological and political [sic] tensions of the Administration got worked out...Speechwriting was where the Administration got invented every day. 163.

In reviewing her book on the subject, The Economist felt compelled to ask: 'should a speechwriter, however gifted, really make policy?' 164. The question received further attention following George Bush's 1991 speech denouncing the "Great Society". As controversy mounted, the "real author", a speechwriter, was interviewed to give the correct interpretation of it. He was able to advise that the Administration's view of innovations such as: Medicare; Medicaid; food stamps; consumer protection and auto safety legislation; voting rights; and Federal aid for schools, was 'more complex and nuanced than the speech suggested'. 165. Here, the unpacking of enthymemes within political oratory, recommended by Parkin, is made the task of their originator, not the demotic agent of their authorisation. 166.

The anti-educationalist, laissez-faire rhetoric appearing under the names of Pickett and Prescott needs to be seen both as the outcome of speechwriting and as part of a discursive system. This system is a network of power that has real material effects on education policies, programs and administrative arrangements, premised in part on incorporating a particular form of doxa in public statements as tools of circulation and naturalisation. Suffice it to say that Prescott's speech was well-received at the printing industry symposium ('it's realistic' and 'he knows about the real world of business' were

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representative comments). Conversely, a speech delivered at the same forum by a DEIR bureaucrat with a PhD was derogated ('not in the real world in Canberra'; 'he's too academic'). Both speeches were based on contributions by the same officer of DEIR/NTC, and written within a particular form of neoclassical discourse. The public response to their delivery is indicative of the propensity to accord statements the value of truth because of the category of person making them, a displacement of public function onto personal capacity that Sennett notes as characteristic of the times. It further indicates the importance of the authorising function provided by Pickett and Prescott and the complex nature of the circulation of economically rational subjectivity. This next section explores some of the history of that subjectivity.

**Economic Subjectivity**

Wages have traditionally been set within advanced industrial liberal–capitalist democracies through a *rapprochement* between the discourses of civics and consumption which I have indicated are typically in need of some separation, at least rhetorically. The sheer productive power and share of the market available to such countries once offered something of a license to set the price for labour in response to bargaining and questions of equity. This was part of a design to remove humanness from the factor costs of production, to render the exploitation of people external to the calculation of distribution and planning. But the swing towards neoclassicism that accompanied the downturn in the economic fortunes of these states introduced an internationalism to their calculus of labour which set this factor clearly superordinate to citizenship. Henceforth, 'productivity wages would align on what is now the world shadow price for labour, i.e. subsistence, given the enormous and growing global labour surplus.' Despite the marginalists' claim that this setback will only ever be temporary, it was, of course, something predicted as an enduring future crisis by Ricardo. Before Marx, before Trotsky, before Mandel, he saw the long–term propensity for wages to fall. (It is quite routine for the founding parents of free market economics to be cited and quoted on a selective basis that renders them Panglossian).
The apparently straightforward nature of neoclassicism makes it a desirable technology when compared with much social theory. It is founded on the congenially familiar unit of the person, the Benthamite utilitarian that operates from self-interest (in Mill's felicitous phrase, 'the self-regarding virtues'). The actions of this rational maximiser spread from the individual to all economic organisations, making for a long-term equilibrium between supply and demand that forms a perfect market. But even some of the ur-texts of non-intervention raise doubts about the desirability of an educational system driven by consumer sovereignty. For JS Mill:

utility does not consist in ministering to inclinations...This is peculiarly true of those things which are chiefly useful as tending to raise the character of human beings...any well-intentioned and tolerably civilized government may think without presumption that it does or ought to possess a degree of cultivation above the average of the community which it rules, and that it should therefore be capable of offering better education and better instruction to the people, than the greater number of them would spontaneously demand.

But the dominant model of consumer choice, the market metaphor, has become so pervasive that it is a convenient carriage for a host of aims. As Borins has noted in the Canadian context: 'the notion of self-interested, utility-maximising rational choice...has vigorously entered general discourse, even if it goes by other names'. Despite the relative recency of its appearance as technical orthodoxy and common sense, neoclassical dogma lays claim to a transcendental apprehension of the subject as a desiring and calculating machine. This assertion should be understood not by its claim to an absolute truth, but in the light of: the specific conditions which have led to its success as a mode of producing and circulating knowledge (paradigm shifts in economics faculties in conjunctural relationship to capitalist crises); and shifts in its internal rules of signification (specifically, what it does about the political subject).

What is needed here is an epistemic appreciation of 'technologies and techniques of representation'. Such an appreciation encourages investigation of the particular
truth--effect of particular axioms and practices; in other words, it drives us to see that the realism of a given form of knowledge will always be constituted within its own rules of evidence and method. Neoclassical economics now becomes a historicised system of narration, to be contemplated by reference to the conditions under which it arose and its own rules (i.e. the theoretical rigour of an imagined market) but also by other rules (e.g. rules which render the human subject a possible member of a class, a gender or an ethnic group before it is a consumer). Like utilitarianism itself, the model is rooted in the exercise of technologies of power that produce a particular type of subject. Its narrative is about a desiring subject that wants goods and services. Other desiring subjects seek to meet those desires and compete for the return promised. Rather than being a state of grace, this is a state of power. As a first step in unpacking the history of the use of this narrative within the making of public policy, we need to consider the reification and anthropomorphisation of "the economy".

Popular public references to "the economy" as a subject with needs and desires derive from the Great Depression. Attention was drawn away at that time from discussing relations between producers and consumers of goods (an industrial relations discourse of the popular newspapers which was in fact dissonant with conventional economics) and placed onto relations between different material products of labour, with a similar shift from use--value to exchange--value. The discursive commodities "the economy" and "the market", themselves now valorised signs, became transformed into agents with their own needs. With the crisis of the 1930s and the popularisation of Keynes, "the economy" entered popular knowledge.

Keynesianism was discredited in the 1970s by the anti-Phillips Curve Janus of simultaneous inflation and unemployment. It was supplanted as a dominant discourse first by monetarism and then by neoclassical economics. The latter:

asserts that market forces typically unleash growth, innovation and efficiency, whereas governmental regulations and expenditures impede growth, stifle
productivity and entrepreneurship and generate inefficiencies in both the private and public sectors.  

There are echoes here of the Pickett speech's insistence on the private sector as the epicentre of innovation, a product of competition. But Pickett and his "real writer" were following on from the conversion of a whole range of professional economists in colleges, governments, banks etc. (A study of the Australian Government's senior management has found that 42% favour less state provision and 'more individual initiative' and 52% support deregulation of the labour market.)

Now it is clearly the case that entering the logic of the imaginary market manufactures its own particular rules of what can and cannot be said, as per Weber's notion of the ideal type mentioned above. It is interesting to note the comments of the 1987 Nobel Laureate in Economics, Robert Solow, in response to criticism of his practice of parodying the neoclassical school instead of debating it on "technical" grounds:

Suppose someone sits down where you are sitting right now and announces that he is Napoleon Bonaparte. The last thing I want to do with him is to get involved in a discussion of cavalry tactics at the battle of Austerlitz...Now...[the neoclassicists] like nothing better than to get drawn into technical discussions because you have tacitly gone along with their fundamental assumptions.

In other words, a "respected" economist is simply not in the same world of language as these people; but their doctrine is nevertheless applied as a revealed truth, not a contested logic, both by most professional economists in Australia and in the discourse of the speeches under review. The dominance of market faith is such that speechwriters and journalists conventionally query trade union power, but not big business power; and that they propose reductions in government activity which neglect the positive role that might be played by increases in state services. Lee offers an important account of the internal inconsistencies of neoclassical economics, in addition to its absence of
referentiality in the realm of the real. The established rhetorical move is to provide assumptions about markets which have never existed, but which might in a good world. For if firms really do seek to maximise profits, as is conventionally asserted, then there would never be the equilibrium countenanced and desired by a disinterested, civic public policy, because such firms would never be satisfied by Paretian optimality (in which no other result than the one obtaining could occur without some participants in a transaction losing out)\textsuperscript{182}.

But there is a stolid determination within the discourse of neoclassicism. The executive director of the New Zealand Business Roundtable knows, for example, that Keynesianism is not a theory because it is tied to 'the circumstances of the 1930s' (i.e. it is anchored in material history). He also knows that unfettered markets lead to social equality and that 'the first duty of the economist–adviser is to be a seeker of truth' dedicated to 'increasing knowledge' and the correction of 'wrong ideas...errors... [and] mistakes\textsuperscript{183}. Similarly, official Australian Statistician and ex–Secretary of the Department of Finance, Ian Castles, fancies 'scientific economics\textsuperscript{184}. The warrant here is access to an absolute, transcendental, technical truth, with no history and no politics either to its object of study or to itself as a regime of knowledge, other than as a neo–Whiggish coming–into reality and the freedom to know.

The Australian Treasury has been a key point of policy advocacy for dogmas transmitted at college, ensuring a gradual growth of interest in relative prices as determinants in the allocation of resources: the consumer as sovereign\textsuperscript{185}. The Labor Government of the mid–1970s was a key moment in the spread of economists through other government departments and instrumentalities, a trend which has developed since\textsuperscript{186}. A new subject of policy, one that is called upon as a justification grounded in its desiring rationality, has emerged to stalk the needy, political and civic subject of other discourses. And this discourse has become pervasive through much of the Australian community\textsuperscript{187}.  

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Castles is very keen to indicate the disinterested practices of bureaucratic economists. He insists that the Treasury has never been run by people from ruling-class backgrounds. But the survey cited above demonstrates a close correlation between privilege of background and opposition to state participation in the economy (and *vice versa*). Senior officers of the Treasury were four times more likely to have attended expensive fee-paying schools than representatives of other departments analysed and were keenest on non-intervention. The spread of neoclassical economics is indicated by the fact that 54% of the group surveyed had degrees in economics, business or accounting. There is precious little room for alternative paradigms here, or indeed for narratives invested in other than the factor endowments and preferences of unified individuals. It is significant that the weekly magazine *Australian Business* reported the survey's findings about support for the market whilst ignoring its data on class.

Of course, significant differences exist within and between different departments. As representatives of fractions of capital with different interests (for example, farmers and manufacturers on the question of tariffs) it could hardly be otherwise. But the key point here is the overall rhetorical impact of a broad market logic on instruments for popularising the consuming subject, as in the talks under review.

This has been especially crucial in discursive distinctions between "education" and "training" and the struggles between their institutional bearers, who have set up a binary divide polarising the civic and the employable subject via the concept of human capital. I have already shown how the NTC fought a battle for other public sector training bodies to offer courses in line with the requirements of business, rather than any concentration on a core curriculum dedicated to such concepts as personal development; social responsibility; or generalised pedagogic notions of citizen-building. And the Kirby Committee on which Pickett served did not consider it useful to make a distinction between education and training. Such positions inform the entire shift in power relations between the Federal bureaucracy and actual providers of post-secondary and tertiary education. The demise of the "arms-length" source of advice on policy and
funding, the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (CTEC), was announced late in 1987. It resulted from the pressure exerted by DEIR and others via arguments founded on the same premise as Kirby's. Here, "really useful knowledge" finds the consuming subject to be specifiable and the civic subject less recognisable. Just as funds that DEIR gave to business to purchase courses from TAFE had increased from A$0.6 million in 1981 to A$12.1 million in 1984, so lines of force were being redrawn discursively and administratively. CTEC was effectively excluded from providing a broad social perspective to the development of traineeships. Person–building citizenship was to be a side–product of the needs of employers, presumably. DEIR became known for its successful promulgation of neoclassicism because it 'advocated a narrow job–specific approach and had a reputation for regarding students as 'units of labour'193.

DEIR may well have used NTC vocalists in just the same way, as units of labour enunciating the tropes of the sovereign consumer and the concerned citizen/experienced businessperson within a universalist discourse of economic "science"194. The precise significance of such speeches is twofold. In the first place, they illustrate broader theoretical and public policy trends to do with disciplinary fashion. And secondly, they are a means of popularising doxa without the attendant negativity of any association with the bureaucracy or academia. This does valuable service to populist notions of the market in general and the need for business–oriented training in particular. Clearly, the origins of these speeches lay in DEIR distillations of neoclassicism, not in the names that authorised them. But DEIR required private sector authorisation by virtue of its own rules of truthfulness.

The subject produced by these two narratives is split. It is divided between its selfish self and its public–spirited self. The peculiar task required of the civic subject is to know when it should throw off the logics of the consuming subject and vice versa. Consider the tenor of a letter sent by the Australian Minister for Administrative Services to The New York Times about the Government's decision to prohibit political advertising. He was responding to an article critical of the policy:
the Australian Government does not regard advertising as "free" speech, but very expensive purchased speech, available only to those who possess the financial means to buy it...Participation in the democratic process should not rely on the size of one's bank account\textsuperscript{195}.

In addition, he expressed a horror at any opportunity for 'wealthy interests to buy influence'\textsuperscript{196}. We can see a clear distinction being drawn here. On the one hand, the Government places great faith in the generic value of the capitalist system, a system which necessarily produces inequalities of income, which operates via the desiring machine of comparative advantage and the educational and policing functions of the state. But conversely, this same Government is critical of the specific advantage that might "unfairly" accrue to fractions of capital within the political process. The citizen is expected to understand these distinctions. It is to be a rational maximiser of its own utility within the marketplace and a disinterested supporter of equality of speech within the \textit{polis}. In general, advertising is valuable because it offers choice. It is a successful mechanism for the manifestation and allocation of rational desire. Advertising about politics (the site of the delineation of the overall public good) is bad because only some can afford it. Similarly, the consuming subject is a valuable model for training policy because it is a model of competition. The civic subject is a valuable model for politics because it is a model of cooperation. The spheres must be separated, the subject split by what Kelly calls the 'basic cleavage'\textsuperscript{197}. Of course, there are times when collective conduct assists the individual more than apparent self-interest, as for example in the prisoner's dilemma\textsuperscript{198}. But in terms of the cultural subject formed in a discourse of policy, this is uncommon. Whereas some future world might be able to unite the consumer and the citizen by saying that utility can emerge from the shared values of a collectivity, the burden of existing economic discourse is a reliance on individual preferences and satisfactions\textsuperscript{199}. This is to step into Marx and Engels' 'icy water of egotistical calculation'\textsuperscript{200}.
The actual data in support of notions of rational calculating actors and entities are thin on the ground. Milgate and Eatwell maintain that economic theory is frequently constitutive of political and popular discourses rather than the obverse, for all its claim to be determined by its own object, the individual in nature operating with perfect knowledge. Because neoclassical economics is essentially a normative, prescriptive doctrine, no amount of counter-indicative "evidence" about economic psychology works to undermine it, even though it is hard to isolate the development of preferences and harder still to trace the actual process of deciding how to satisfy them.

The neoclassical subject and its parent discipline are struck from a high modernist mould. It is a mould that will allow consumers an a priori and apolitical legitimacy that is denied to producers and to any act which can be termed "political". By contrast, citizenship has venerable antecedents in opposition to older notions of self-aggrandisement than the sovereign consumer. In Plato's Laws, Cleinias merges the two momentarily in the imperfect communicative form when he declares that 'not only is everyone an enemy of everyone else in the public sphere, but each man fights a private war against himself'. The self must defeat itself in the name of the general good, just as the state must defeat itself when it is tempted to make decisions in favour of enslavement. The skill to be learnt is how to articulate between these technologies: when to be consuming and when to be civic, how to move towards what Michels called the 'ideal sun' that such a transcendence of the consuming subject presumes. This is Bryan Turner's paradox of individualism, that 'while citizens are required to be individuals in order to exercise conscience and choice, the institutions which make citizenship possible promote equality and bureaucracy'. The new discipline of socioeconomics seeks to address this problem by defining a domain in which decisions are made for reasons other than individual utility. Is this the sole option? There may be another. To throw off this dichotomy and thereby refuse the paradox would be to seek a technology of the self in place of technologies of the subject presently on offer. Such is the burden of the last chapter to this thesis.
NOTES


2. Ibid.


4. Ibid.


28. For more on the concept of this type of charity and its philosophical underpinnings, see J. E. Malpas, "The Intertranslatability of Natural Languages", Synthèse, 78 (3), 1989, pp.239–241.


47. Saul Bellow in Saul Bellow and Martin Amis, "The Moronic Inferno", in Bill Bourne et al., 1987, op.cit., p.15.


55. Peter Dean, "Discerning Air Waves", Courier-Mail, 1 April 1989, Weekend 8.


57. Allan Fraser, "Fixing up the A. B. C.", Quadrant, 20 (11), 1976, p.17.


60. Quoted in Antoine de Tarlé, "The Monopoly that Won't Divide", in ibid., pp.44 and 60.


64. F. Christopher Arterton, "Political Participation and 'Teledemocracy'", PS, 21 (3), 1988, pp.620–621.


70. Norton, loc.cit.


72. Anthony Smith, "Britain: The Mysteries of a Modus Vivendi", in Smith,
Television, 1979, op.cit., p.27.


75. Mathias, loc.cit.

76. Dowling, loc.cit.


78. Quoted in "TV Comes to the Commons", Australian Financial Review, 14 June 1989, p.52.

79. Quoted in Perrett, loc.cit.


83. Hutchinson, loc.cit. Also see "Television and Democracy", loc.cit.


92. Casetti and Odin, op.cit., pp.11–12.

93. Jean-Francois Lyotard, La Condition Postmoderne: Rapport sur le Savoir, Les
94. Carpignano et al., op.cit., p.35.


97. Constable, loc.cit.


111. Max Harris, "It's Question Time: Who Are These Nonentities?", The Weekend Australian, 1–2 September 1990, REVIEW 2.


115. Ibid. pp.viii–x.

116. Ibid. pp.54, 57 and 58.


130. Auguste Comte, "The Positive Philosophy", trans. Harriet Martineau, in


137. Ibid. pp.4–5.

138. Ibid. p.8.

139. Ibid. p.10.

140. Ibid. p.11.


142. Ibid. p.12.


144. Ibid. p.9.

145. Ibid. pp.5–6.

146. Ibid. p.9.

147. Ibid. p.12.


149. Ibid. p.5.

150. Ibid. pp.6, 4, 6–7 and 11.

151. Ibid. p.21.


157. See the articles in "Becoming Martin Luther King, Jr. – Plagiarism and Originality: A Round Table", Journal of American History, 78 (1), 1991, pp.11-123.


177. Ibid. pp.144–145. For further development of these ideas, see Jo–Anne Pemberton, "The End' of Economic Rationalism", Australian Quarterly, 60 (2), 1988, pp.188–199.


186. John Warhurst, Jobs or Dogma? The Industries Assistance Commission and


189. Pusey, op.cit., p.22.


191. Martin Painter and Bernard Carey, Politics Between Departments: The Fragmentation of Executive Control in Australian Government, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1979, p.11.


196. Ibid.


205. Jack Amariglio et al., "Division and Difference in the "Discipline" of


208. Ibid. pp.48–49.


211. See the special issue of Challenge, 33 (1), 1990, particularly Amitai Etzioni, "A New Kind of Socioeconomics", pp.31–32.
CHAPTER SIX
NEW TECHNOLOGIES TO FORM NEW SELVES

Previous chapters have established how a disparately ordered network of relations of power operates through cultural policy to form civic subjects. The thesis has used the concept of the formation and deployment of cultural subjects as a technology of governance. In doing so, it has not yet looked at the actions of living persons in opposition, in resistance, to such protocols. By contrast, this chapter addresses the potential for contradiction when quite different accounts, accounts of a cultural self, are produced. It does so through a study of incivility. This is an incivility distinguished by a public conduct that breaks rules in the name of a technology of the self. This technology of the self operates against the technologies of power that form subjects which have been examined in earlier sections of the thesis. But it continues to be concerned with a formation of the person. After Foucault, this formation abjures an identity known 'through a system of signs denoting power over others', in favour of a 'sovereignty that one exercises over oneself'. Whilst it seems that this system cannot escape some reference in conventionally derived notions of the individual, if it operates in a way that evacuates the notion of disciplining others, it may be said to have avoided many of the pitfalls of cultural subjectivity outlined in the preceding chapters. Obviously, there can be no absolute independence from the categories of person enunciated by the powerful discourses already encountered. Attempts to resist dominance always implicate themselves with what they struggle against. But the notion of a technology of the self that questions a subjectivity of orderliness and of influence over others does instance the potential for a project of freedom that might seem implausible in the light of much of Foucault's work. It may also serve as an heuristic device that sets limits to the value of a
reformist politics which opts to work exclusively inside the exemplifications of a civic cultural subjectivity.

This is especially important in the light of two interrelated critiques of Foucault: that he fails to deal adequately with the human subject as an active, sentient being; and that he cannot distinguish between forms of domination and the extent of their effect, such that the Gulag and glasnost are elided. Anthony Giddens applauds Foucault's contribution to an understanding of 'administrative power', but finds him essentially lacking as a theorist because of his view that 'events that govern human social affairs are determined by forces of which those involved are wholly unaware'. This, Giddens asserts, is a wrongheaded and unnecessary rejection of the notion of 'knowledgeable human subjects'. This notion has been unproductively linked by French structuralism to the more legitimate - but essentially unconnected - disavowal of a Hegelian 'transcendental subject'. For Giddens, there is no need to dispense with the idea of history as 'the outcome of human projects' simply because one wishes to discard history 'as a human project'. People have agency, and a determining agency, in the circumstances of their lives, both as willing and resistive subjects. To place all notions of repression and freedom together as disciplines of power is, for example, to deny the significant differences between totalitarian and liberal regimes. It is also to deny that the successful struggles to win rights to free association and contractual law, and the significance accorded to such victories, have basically occurred through the acts of persons. One might connect this objection to certain feminist criticisms of the imperialism of anti-essentialist accounts of the body. Monique Plaza points out the regressive implications for an analysis of rape that may derive from Foucault's denial of the existence of sexuality outside discourse and his consequent assault on punishing crimes of sexuality. To unite all bodily invasion as a set of lesions is to deny sexual difference and the specificity of rape as an act complicit with male power, on this account. Not all acts of oppression are commutable, transferable.

For Michael Walzer, Foucault's failure to be a political scientist or 'scholarly' seems to be the means of defining his politics as 'infantile leftism' that simply seeks to be more
radical than the rest of the world. Foucault's account of dispersed relations and newtorks of power has 'conservative implications' that tie it to the pluralism of American social scientists, without even their leavening commitment to an ultimate centre of legitimate power in popular sovereignty. No centre means no object of critique, such as a ruling class or the state, and no subject of history, such as the public. Nevertheless, Walzer manages to make Foucault a subscriber to 'functionalist Marxism' in his account of power, and an ahistorical theorist for his reliance on site designs of discipline rather than 'practices and experiences'. This latter point is crucial. Foucault is brought to the bar for failing to distinguish between subjection to a form of discipline and actually 'being in prison'. This is said to be emblematic of what is wrong at 'the heart of his politics': a prison is a prison is a prison, and 'liberalism is nothing more than discipline concealed'. This makes it impossible for Foucault to differentiate totalitarianism from democracy. Here, Foucault's work is flawed both because it does not homogenise an absolute truth from manifold perspectives and because it fails to deal with the politics of the everyday.

Giddens, Plaza and Walzer were writing before the publication of the second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality, Foucault's principal writings on ethics and his major attempt to address the issue of the rule of the self and of others in a way that is very aware of the specific operation of, for example, male power within a given political system and the privileges it carries over the lives of women. But a stream of critics writing since that time have continued to level similar critiques. The lack of preparedness of these later critics to address the work on ethics, even as they accuse Foucault of failing to consider the subject as a space for action or resistance, leads Barry Smart to suggest that the new dictum on his work is 'rubbish it, don't read it'. As Frow points out, disciplinary power may be an endless category of effectivity in Foucault's work, but not always in a repressive way because of its contradictory and dispersed operation and effects. Social relations are never to be transcended, but that does not mean that there is no means of transforming them, if people know – which is also to set – their limitations. This is the achievement of the later writings. In addition, Foucault is quite
explicit that he understands a prevailing *epistêmê* to be 'a space of *dispersion*' that is discontinuous and relatively open. It is not a 'sovereign, unique and constraining form'. The *epistêmê* is instead to be seen as a 'complex relationship of successive displace­ments', not something moving towards a grand synthesis or 'syncopated transcendental'\(^\text{10}\). This is not functionalism, anarchy or a denial of the effectivity of subjects.

This does not, however, answer the second allegation, about forms of polity and power. When Larry Ray restates Habermas restating Nancy Fraser as an objection to Foucault, it is for failing to answer why domination should be resisted. He adds that the inevitability of power as part of resistance which Foucault insists upon only lends weight to the heraldic cry of theory 'to distinguish normatively between legitimate and non-legitimate power'\(^\text{11}\). Such a phrasing amounts to the pure and impressive pleas that can best be sustained in textbooks of political philosophy. It denies the fact that the primary sites of Foucault's extra-mural interventions and intra-mural research – carceral institutions and discourses of illness, insanity, villainy and sex – all saw his work informed by involvements with the subjects formed at those sites. This answers, in the case of Foucault, the questions one might ask of Ray's *nostrum*: why distinguish normatively?; on whose cognisance?; to please whom?; inside which totality?; deriving from which historically determined contingency?; and to what end? No warrant in material practice is offered to pose the critique in the way he has. Quite clearly, Foucault finds that the grand failing of alternative conceptions of politics has been their very location within a coming-into-consciousness of the subject in history, precisely because such tropes amount to a triumphalism that is forever mired in 'uncertain ideality' in preference to tackling 'the difficult problem of historical change'\(^\text{12}\).

Nevertheless, this latter issue about the legitimacy and effect of different forms of power continues to be particularly galling for a number of American critics, notably Richard Rorty: 'We liberals in the USA wish that Foucault could have managed, just once, what Walzer rightly says he always resisted: "some positive evaluation of the liberal state."' Rorty divides Foucault up between 'the Romantic intellectual' and the
'citizen of a democratic society'. Foucault's 'moral identity' existed inside 'democratic institutions', but he believed that his 'self-description' should be extended beyond that canopy, beyond the domain of intersubjectivity and into his 'rapport de soi', his private search for autonomy. For Rorty, this search becomes a yearning for what I shall call différends de soi. Rorty's problem with Foucault is the conflation of the two domains, the moment when his private person's pursuit of an autonomous self is projected onto his intellectual's right to speak that is granted by the public space that democracy alone can offer. When Foucault spoke self-consciously as a citizen, discussing such matters as prison reform and the classification of madness, he worked with a humanitarian liberalism that was caring and sharing. When he spoke as a Romantic, he abjured any involvement with others as part of his desire to manufacture an identity unfettered by tradition or contemporaneity. This latter Foucault used a different vocabulary from that of the former, replacing morality with a negation of the value of all données, including the institutions of the liberal-capitalist state. This vocabulary lacked the moral imperative required by Rorty to demonstrate its dependence for its own existence on liberalism as a discourse of high moment. Rorty is effectively speaking about creating networks of cultural civility when he pleads with an absent Romantic Foucault to see that there is nothing wrong 'with whatever networks of power are required to shape people into individuals with a sense of moral responsibility'13.

Charles Taylor's epic attempt in Sources of the Self to account for the modern sense of identity is most unsettled by the absence of any explanation of what it is to be good in the writings of Foucault. He finds a parallel failure in utilitarianism's refusal to value the 'ordinary life' of 'production and reproduction'. This refusal is indictable for its correlative lack of a map of dignity and decency with which to assemble an effective case for arguing 'just what makes human beings worthy of commanding our respect'. Foucault is to be commended for his weightiness of argument and for revealing that ethical ideals are interwoven with practices of exclusion and domination. But he is at fault in assuming that all moral orders are 'equally arbitrary'; overtaken by a 'neo-Nietzschean [sic] position', Foucault denies the truism that he can only be correcting others from a stance
of elevation that prefers itself to the alternatives on offer. The further problem is that Foucault has only accepted the segment of Nietzschean philosophy that abjures the Romantic self. He has neglected the epiphanic possibility of Dionysian transcendence that is equally critical to Nietzsche. Even the last studies of sexuality and ethics are derogated; for although they do essay an aesthetics of life, this is done without adequate reference to social responsibility. For Foucault to operate as a public intellectual in such a fashion is to hide a commitment to absolute liberty that must underwrite such conceptions. In short, Foucault is denying the underlying presence in his work of a sense of 'the good'.

Attempts to recuperate Foucault from within this type of reasoning tend to veer between two directions. The first is an intellectual trajectory. It sees Foucault slowly realising that his findings on the historical nature of truth and subjectivity are in fact reliant on an implicit account of the reading subject as capable of remaking itself by engaging with the revelations of a genealogical or archaeological method. He emerges at the end of his life as a child of the Enlightenment. The second trajectory is personal. Here, Foucault moves away from his early anti-humanism and towards a more open and even-handed account of subjectivity in accordance with his own private career as a sexed person. Reading for the 'hidden level of homosexual reference' in his writings permits us to see a shift away from the 'discretion sur lui-même' of the repressed days in Europe writing works of theory and studies of oppression and towards a self-revelation via the 'belonging and comfort' of summers in California writing works of ethical intersubjectivity and personal style.

Rather than embarking on a narrative of the tracery of influences on Foucault in an attempt to find either a solid-state authorial voice or a developing pattern of thought, it seems more useful to me to take of the texts what they say about subjectivity and institution and redeploy those insights where possible. That is the most practical move to be made if one's project is to use the works of Foucault as an author-function, rather than to add to the establishment of that function within the reams of exegetical
commentary. This is to go beyond histories of ideas and into histories of truths as tech­
nologies that locate those truths inside embodied, disciplinary regimes, to acknowledge
that the universe of freedom associated with the Enlightenment was itself historically
situated, whatever the claims made about its ontology17. Such a move works not to
deny either subject or polity, but rather to account for their conditions of operation and
mount a study of the feasibility of autoinvention within those conditions.

For the Rorty critique and others fail to heed a clear message in Foucault's account of
ruling class male ethics in pre–Christian Athens and Rome to the effect that the relative
autonomy within particular fractions of particular social formations to manufacture and
manage oneself is dependent on the institutions of those formations. When Foucault
spoke in his utopic mode, it was to find lessons from the past that might be applied in
the present in order to give voice to those whose conduct currently evaded the good
grace of conventional civil society, but not to deny the value of that society in making
the conditions of possibility for his own enunciative mode. There is, despite the debt
owed by the intellectual to liberal democracy, a clear limitation emerging here, and it is
to do with the notion of a citizen. For this notion not only requires constant active
obeisance from its subjects, but also a form of obeisance that allows no space outside
itself for such a subject to obtain or best be represented. And ultimately, that very
notion of representation and its running–mate of the public interest become a
homogenising force that incorporates many differences into a single, enunciable need
by conceiving of difference on the basis of equivalence18.

This equivalence serves to deny the prospect of différends de soi. That search for new
meanings which characterises Foucault's later work is not, it seems to me, part of a
thoroughgoing desire to unpack the social world and live out the anarchy which Walzer
and perhaps Taylor attribute to him. It is a limited, definite activity undertaken within
democracies. It needs no account of other forms of political regime and their compara­
tive worth. And it is clearly anchored in a series of human constituencies, as was indi­
cated above. Hence the narrative drive of this chapter, which seeks to examine an
instance of the problems that arise when *différends de soi* are so unruly as to be outside the norms of cultural civility available within liberal–capitalist states. It is not a totalising, systemic critique of the operation of those states; rather, it is an investigation of cultural resistance at a particular time and place that has implications for the politics of identity available inside such states.

The case study selected here is particularly notable for the category of unruly person it describes: the white male. For the most innovative politics of identity in liberal–capitalist democracies has generally come from the work of feminists and people of colour. The study is doubly significant because it presents persons operating on the edge of a very conventional notion of the cultural subject, a notion animated by "sexuality" as an all-encompassing way of typing personalities. Here, these persons are making a limited truth of themselves via public presentations connected to sexual practice, but in a way that rejects any necessary correspondence between such areas of practice and a valid means of categorising people as subjects of a wider discourse, even that of the citizen.

**THE ETHNOGRAPHY**

The chapter is concerned with the circumstances surrounding a public speech given on 26 November 1986, when Karol Wojtyla, also known as Pope John Paul II, addressed an audience of invited guests in the main quadrangle of Sydney University. As he rose to speak, two men stood up from their seats holding pink triangle flags and chanted:

\begin{verbatim}
ANTI-WOMAN
ANTI-GAY
FASCIST POPE
GO AWAY.
\end{verbatim}
They were immediately dragged by security men or police (versions vary) to the covered area of the quadrangle and beaten against a red brick wall. The men, identified as members of an order of gay male nuns known as the Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence, were later charged with 'offensive behaviour'. In May 1987 a Sydney magistrate found the charges proven, but dismissed them. This was, clearly, a case of incivility. After the removal of the two men from the quadrangle, about a hundred people in "Polish national costume", carrying pro–Solidarity banners, pushed past barricades towards Wojtyla and repeatedly interrupted him to cheer his speech and make statements of their own. None of these people were forcibly removed or charged. At one point, Wojtyla responded to their interruptions with 'I understand'. This was not a case of incivility.

The chapter provides an analysis of these events and certain knowledges of the subjectivities which form and surround them. A fairly standard ethnographic account sets the scene, based on participant observation. This is followed by a textual analysis of the speeches given on that day, and how the incident and the Papal tour in general were reported in the media. I then consider the Pope's position on the body and address various ecclesiastical formations of the homosexual subject. The chapter assesses the efforts by the Sisters to reform themselves outside the jurisdiction of these knowledges. In addition, it offers a case study of how the ideal public sphere of discourse operates and how quickly that complex imagining called a civil society can be rerendered as a space that is subordinate to the rule of the state and other institutions. Questions are also raised about its suitability as a model of communication when foundational principles of subjectivity divide participants and particular ways of exchange are marked by particular preferences about the living of a life.

There are two powerful critiques of ethnographic practice, with a third flowing from them. Anthropological method has long been delineated in a highly culturally specific (but allegedly universal) way. It has been something "done by" white people "to" non-white people, suffused with ethnocentric assumptions and reificatory operations. Industrialised democracies have been presented as a teleological referent against which other
cultures are to be measured. And claims on the part of practitioners to the dual
valorisers of experience and distance have objectified the lived *mores* of others. It has
been argued, often simultaneously, that participant observation can admit of both:
immersion in a foreign way of life, thereby acting as a guarantor of authenticity; and
also distance and objectivity, via the methodology of academic research. Statements are
generally not forthcoming on how, when, why and where the breaks are made between
the two statuses of knowledge, the experiential and the distanced. Their truth claims are
founded on diametrically opposed grounds of veridity.

Secondly, assertions of truth made in ethnographic accounts are based on a neglect of
the specificity of experience and the productivity of its inscription. To write about the
mythico-symbolic valency of particular rituals is already to perform an important – and
ethnocentric – operation upon them: namely, their removal from the realm of practice,
from a lived context. To argue for a *Weltanschauung* or unconscious based on myth or
ritual, for instance, is a new function. It introduces rules of knowledge which lay claim
to replicate practice, but in fact involve different, intellectualised, items of manufacture
and places of consumption. Bourdieu's recantation of his own anthropologising in
Algeria, combined with his attack on Lévi-Strauss' interpretism, provide a telling series
of statements against these approaches.

The third, and related, critique is the lack of political rigour in such treatments, best
evidenced by the absence of reflexivity. Homologies can be traced between the carving
out of academic careers through the intellectual colonisation of other cultures and the
carving out of empires through its physical equivalent. The stimulus to starting
university departments of anthropology in Britain during the Second War was a
response to the prospect of an uncontrolled decolonisation once hostilities had ceased,
whilst American Central Intelligence Agency funding is said to have animated a set of
research and espionage connexions via participant observation in Latin America, India
and Thailand over the years. And many researchers were involved in the forced
resettlement programs of the Vietnam War. It has also been argued that the breast-
beating self-revelations of the latest breed of male ethnographers are a very particular form of discovery and guilt, confessions tied to a post-colonial anxiety that does not apply to women. The new ethnography is said to have plagiarised technologies for becoming the Other from the work of feminisms without acknowledging that legacy23.

The application of field technologies on home ground may redefine the field, but suspicions remain about the alleged differentiation of student and studied. In addition, reliance on the category of the personal – "I was there and I know" – can be seen as specific to an ontic form of knowledge. Derrida argues that the ethnocentrism of this method 'is irreducible; it is not a historical contingency' because of the tradition of knowledge that constitutes it, a self-serving view that defines itself as a centre not subject to the determinations used to structure the lives of those being examined24.

Nevertheless, the lived experience of an event – not a claim to total comprehension of a culture – may offer important insights. This particular telling of such an event takes a set of moments and utterances from which to theorise some elements of the social. Rather than laying claim to authenticity, it offers a reading of this event which concentrates on the intersection of discursive knowledges about the extra-discursive and the types of subject called up.

The invitation to Wojtyla's address that day described its audience as 'representatives of those associated with tertiary education in Australia'. The document detailed a set of policing practices surrounding the event: entry would be by representation of the card itself; only certain roads on the campus could be used; and particular guests should appear at particular times. It was essential that spectators be clearly positioned as such prior to Wojtyla's arrival. Technologies for achieving this extended to a policy on what to do with chauffeurs25. The card provided a number of clues about the day, to do with exclusivity, wealth, technologies of control and the wide range of functions surrounding the academy (the governmental and industrial as well as the intellectual).

The audience was divided into two distinct groups: eight hundred and fifty invited guests and two thousand people who had gained places via a ballot in the university
newspaper. The list of academic invitees had been drawn up by a committee of the Vice-Chancellor and Registrar of Sydney University and two priests. Situated in a quadrangle and flanked by a bell tower and assorted gothic structures, the audience was facing upwards and towards a podium, with loudspeakers near jacaranda trees. Nature, technology, training, tradition and police thus intersected in a context of obedient reverence. Syntagms were made of apparently incommensurate items, as when a listener to the public address had her eye caught by a poster advertising the Papal Tour Guide attached to a semi-Doric column. Commodification of the spiritual was integral. Wojtyla, himself formally trained as a philosopher, was to speak from a spot directly between contending Departments of Philosophy at the University, bifurcated during the 1970s in a split over the place of Marxism and feminism in the curriculum. Behind the catafalque could be read a sign saying that 'notices will be removed immediately if placed on this board without authority'. The board was itself watched over by gargoyles. So many of the formal and informal institutional conflicts and authorities of the University were apparent without people to speak them.

The crowd itself was highly differentiated, a former social democrat Prime Minister in the front seats as an invited guest and people in "Polish national costume" in the balloted seats in back. Banners read Totus Tuus and Australia Semper Fidelis. A page from an afternoon newspaper headlining fears for Wojtyla's security acted as a sunshield for one person, the headline "Pope Power" for another. A priest sat during the wait reading an article entitled "Aspects of Feminist Theology". Four television cameras looked down and across, offering a gaze to that night's television viewers. Fresh-faced guides in academic gowns moved people to their seats. The police looked casual, leaning against columns and smiling. Compared to their demeanour at other public spectacles – not only political demonstrations, but also sporting events – they seemed relaxed and friendly. Press photographers were required by Vatican order to stand in a single group. They were given very poor angles to work from. People up the back – the balloted rather than the invited – chanted 'Papa We Love You' and 'John Paul Two, We Love You'. Announcements were made about the form of the afternoon. The University
choir's chant of the Gaudeamus Cogitut provided a sign that the Pope's arrival was imminent. The balloted crowd moved towards the wing of his entrance, offering hands when he appeared. Wojtyla waved. This contrast in response and positioning between the "cheap seats" and the front rows was dominant throughout. Those guests 'associated with tertiary education' sat quietly and still. The people behind were loud and peripatetic. The difference between them offered a metaphor for the myths surrounding the academy's combination of privilege and quiet removal within industrial society. Academicians were placed close to the seat of attention, but were withdrawn from the activity of adulation, the positive rendering of adherence, the physical work of positioning Wojtyla as charismatic even before the first official words were uttered.

TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

Having established a basic narrative of Wojtyla's appearance, I want now to investigate the specific discourses presented. The four officially sanctioned addresses given at the University neatly encapsulate the complex relations of nation, state and identity which have underpinned earlier chapters. They will be analysed in turn for what they tell us about the varieties of vocabulary available on that day.

Keith Jennings, the University Registrar, addressed the assembly before Wojtyla arrived, welcoming people 'to this great occasion'. The occasion was thereby rendered other to the crowd, separate from hoi polloi. Rather than being partially constitutive of the event, the "audience" was made the spectator to a spectacle. Speaking about the event constituted it. A Registrar in charge of invitation and administration – and himself a speaker – took his own work as referent, and did so from the position of commentator. One is reminded here of Lyotard's discussion of the endogamous proclamations of academic openness by university officials27. At the same time, Jennings established a system of obedience and reverence to Wojtyla as 'His Holiness', following this with a briefing on other speakers and a set of detailed instructions to the crowd. All were to
stand when 'he' appeared. The information was didactic, but delivered from a smiling
face, in the same spirit as school prizes. Jennings explained that the Vice-Chancellor
and Chancellor would greet Wojtyla at the front of the quadrangle's clock tower. The
fatherly authority of time-policing would provide a meeting point for religious and
university bureaucrats.

Jennings then introduced those further down in the podium's hierarchy: the Deputy
Vice-Chancellor; a student; and fifty or sixty members of the 'Pope's party', who would
enter before him and sit between dais and audience. The term 'party' unifies and jollifies
the range of technical functions performed by representatives from the Curia, Wojytla's
bureaucracy. Research, surveillance, speechwriting, education and security jobs were
subsumed by a signifier of ease and disinterested amity. In describing the speeches to
come, Chancellor Black was slated to thank Wojtyla on behalf of Sydney University
and the 'Australian academic community' in general. No representative structure existed
to give Black authority to speak for students, teachers, bureaucrats, manual labourers et
al.; the "right" was simply arrogated. (Similarly, Black's later statement that Sydney
University was 'honoured' at being 'chosen to host the Pope's address' indicated that he
had no appreciation of the important fractions working within the institution for gay and
women's rights28.) When Jennings finished, the Australian folk song Waltzing Matilda
was played. Although not the national anthem, it holds a special place in a series of
myths surrounding Australia's bush country, inscribing a set of outback practices
connected with pioneering, isolation, all-male company and work. The signified of a
white male bush subject operates via second-order meaning when Waltzing Matilda is
heard by Anglo-Celtic Australian audiences. It spreads meanings across the specifics of
the song's words to stand for Australia as a whole, in spite of the highly urbanised,
bureaucratised and ethnically differentiated character of its people.

After the main group arrived, Herman Black, the Chancellor, spoke. He termed the
'distinguished visitor' a: 'Man of faith, head of the Vatican state, poet and author, an
indefatigable traveller'. This presented a series of complex binary oppositions. Where
'Man' signifies corporeality and masculinity, 'faith' signifies ethereality; 'traveller' and 'head of...state' stand for movement and stasis respectively; 'head' and 'poet' juxtapose control and creativity. These opposites were kept apart, precluding any possible dialectical process by ensuring that they did not directly encounter one another. The ultimate configuration was one of compromise, producing Wojtyla as 'a Renaissance man', of sensibility and gentility in one subject position, authority and firmness in another. Within each of his 'professions', these characteristics were identified as absolutely appropriate, their combinations discrete and unproblematic. But there is an inversion between these binary opposites, not dissimilar to the potential contradictions encountered in the selfish consumer/selfless citizen dualism that has appeared elsewhere in this thesis.

Black then claimed that Wojtyla was 'speaking to the poor and lowly in developing countries and the more fortunate in the developed nations'. This essentialised the internal and interrelated aspects of First and Third World economies, ignoring poverty in the first, highlighting poverty in the second and denying any causal relationship between the relative prosperity of one sector compared to the other. Instead, this was the outcome of 'fortune', perhaps related to naturalised 'fate'. With this reading, there can be no definite conditions of production, circulation and exchange created from modes of production and prevailing relations within them.

Having performed these operations on Wojtyla and the international political economy to create a just and peaceful man using power to do good for the 'lowly', Black went on to associate this good with the institution of which he was titular head. Sydney was positioned as the 'oldest' university in Australia. The simple fact of longevity bestowed legitimacy and hence exchange-value. The University sought to offer a 'liberal education' to all classes, regardless of 'sex, race, creed or politics'. This apparently non-prejudicial accommodation in fact allowed for a particular type of cultural subject. It became clear later on that various forms of conduct designed to break away from the manners of civility were untenable within such a system.
Third year Arts student Thérèse Byzannes, convenor of the Sydney University Society for Welcoming the Pope, was introduced next, the one woman in the group. She continued the valorisation of 'a courageous defender of peace, human rights and the dignity of man...profound philosopher...outstanding scholar...a professor and a promoter of academic freedom'. Byzannes advised him that her Society had been conducting 'talks on your teachings', to a 'wonderful response', and then called on him to 'guide us in our pursuit of truth and justice'. This hagiographic treatment postulated a leader embodying the academic virtues associated with Sydney University by Black, but going beyond the academy to step into the realm of the real, to struggle for peace. These capacities were finally coupled in a request of the Pope that he direct a hunt for preexistent 'truth and justice', academic and "real world" objects respectively. The practice of writing 'truth' does not herein produce a truth-function on its own terms (within its own rules of speech). The effect of an utterance is to reveal reality, not to constitute it. We are clearly within an ontic frame of knowledge. Subjects, for instance, are not formed in discourse. They are real human entities whose activities are more or less accurately described in language.

Wojtyla spoke last, by now effectively identified with: Sydney University, equality, truth, tolerance and peace; and thereby also bestowing these qualities on his adherents. There was thus a symbiotic connexion between audience, visitor and institution. The audience created legitimacy because sovereign consumers provided a verification of value. The visitor bestowed quality because to listen to the blessed was to show sense. The institution provided both physical setting and intellectual validation. And these three elements were then unified and personified in the trinitarian guest. The carriage of peace and truth was made Wojtyla's responsibility, rather than the result of specific political tactics (in the first instance) and discursive formations (in the second).

His response was to act as a counter-donor. He returned this gift: 'Man...[is] the owner of truth'. God is at the centre of learning, and academic institutions exist in the pursuit
of this truth 'in order to embrace it and to live according to it in the context of Australia, and her needs and challenges'. So the relationship of deity and people to truth was intense and immovable. But this essentialism was mediated by the cultural-economic specificity of the sovereign-state. The needs of this entity were to be met – and defined by – the application of truths discovered by universities. The scientists and economists of the academy set tasks, which others should work to complete. Such a reasoning presented a series of always already constructs. 'God', 'man', 'academic institutions' and 'truth' were in a timeless relationship to worthiness.

Wojtyla proceeded to state his appreciation of 'a society that protects human rights'. This was, however, a profoundly contingent notion of human rights. Such things were in no sense absolute or inviolable; for the applause which met this statement was immediately succeeded by his eulogy to 'a society that encourages the family'. The category 'human rights' was thus dependent on holding a position within a definite domestic structure. To be outside a system of monogamous procreation was to be outside "right humanity". There was a strong implication that to deny the act of procreation – in particular to reverse it once underway – was to deny the most fundamental "human right" arrogated by Roman Catholicism: the requirement for a woman to carry a foetus and be responsible for it but to have no rights over the courier, her own body.

Wojtyla concluded by claiming a special connexion between church and academy because of their 'relationship to truth'. This relationship derived from a 'supply' of 'structures of dialogue'. These structures were clearly the province of civilised, polite conduct. One took one's turn and agreed not to question the domain of the ontic, here seen as the irreducible capacity of the Church to pronounce on the sexed body; but the secular salvation of the Enlightenment was an additional offering. Where 'Jesus told the gathered: "You shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free"', universities 'must recognise the right to freedom of study, inquiry and research, so that truth may be attained'. Finally, Wojtyla advised that the function of truth was 'uplifting and trans-
forming power'. Following and finding knowledge displaced and transmogrified power. Then he departed, content in the certainty that he had been 'at home, among friends, among my own': the truth-tellers.

THE TOUR

Having analysed the events and speeches of 26 November, I want now to look at the public circulation of knowledge about the tour and how it was interwoven with a narrative of the Pope's life that mapped out a path of virtue for the public to admire and measure itself against. Marvel Comics' official biography of Wojtyla, reissued in conjunction with his Australian visit, positions his life's work as a narrative being told by a hard-bitten New York newspaper reporter looking to explain the man's street significance. The reporter appears in the strip with a hat on the back of his head, the top button of his shirt undone and his hands in his pockets; a city credibility roughly hewn, echoing Phillip Marlowe and Carl Bernstein. Fifty pages on, having traced the Pope's life via flashback, the comic concludes with the testimony of 'street kids' at Yankee Stadium. They had come to one of his public addresses in order to jeer, but were made to listen. Their dramatic transformation is proof positive of 'WHY THE POPE IS GREAT'. The grail has been found. This textual system - constant cross-validation of Pope and people by each other, via a mix, respectively, of blessing and consumption – is emblematic of the general newspaper treatment of Wojtyla's Australian trip. He addressed the crowd, which made it significant. The crowd turned up to watch, which made him significant.

During the Brisbane phase of the visit, he called on the press to be 'the lens through which others focus on reality'. Systems of meaning were thereby produced as external to 'reality', rather than constitutive of it. Such a position was entirely congruent with the field described by private newspaper owners' defence of the concept of the sovereign consumer, the ratiocinative homo oeconomicus who acts within "perfect knowledge" to
choose preferred products. Even those newspapers which printed stories running approving lines about the then Nicaraguan government, or which took liberal attitudes to birth control, could rejoice at the advent of Wojtyla and regard his arrival as a sign of togetherness, despite his attitudes on these very issues. All the ruptures and lesions for which he stood, and which he helped to recreate, were put aside. This was done partly for the sake of the myth of constructing a unifier for spectatorship, the symbol of enclosure which encircles an audience and makes it what it is.

This draws us back to the question of postmodern knowledge. As Raymond Lémieux puts it in his essay on media coverage of a Wojtylan visit to Canada: 'Sont-ils [the media] producteurs des charismes qu'ils mettent en scène, ou simple reflets de réalités qui leur sont étrangères?' [Do the media manufacture personality or merely reflect something that exists independently of them?]32. The two are simply not separable in such a tidy, chronological fashion. In a sense, the forces of textual production situating the media as neutral "windows on the world" are identical to notions of consumer acceptance of Wojtyla as sage and holy. Each set of statements is founded on assumptions about the unity and rationality of the speaking subject, the legitimising function of choice when executed en masse. Yet any charisma attached to Wojtyla cannot exist prior to signification, any more than a research methodology can precede or complete the circulation of meanings. These media reports clearly set Wojtyla up as an exemplary cultural subject. He is not just an important institutional figure. More than that, he is properly serious, properly selfless, properly civil. He is, in short, dignified in a way that interruptors are not.

The official Papal Visit souvenir record decribed the Sydney University event as 'a meeting with representatives of the Australian academic world'. Thérèse Byzannes was said to have been 'speaking on behalf of students'33. No consideration was given to how a series of monologues constitutes a meeting or how Byzannes was authorised to speak for hundreds of thousands of others. The Australian, the country's only nationally circulating daily newspaper, acknowledged that: 'Not everyone loves John Paul II,
though the protests by gay groups or those opposed to him on religious grounds had little more than gimmick value. While the official record contrasted Byzannes with the gay interlopers: 'A welcome of a different and unfortunate kind took place as the Holy Father rose to speak, when two men confronted him. They were quickly removed from the quadrangle by police, while the Pope commenced his address without comment on the episode. Gays are rendered apolitical and asexual, their message unvoiced. Conversely, the Sydney Morning Herald was more specific:

so-called Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence [were] hauled off in short order by the blue-capped men of university security, handed over to the secular arm...The Pontiff, perhaps in the interests of freedom of speech, did not appear to find their action offensive. He observed them with a half smile.

This investiture of bemused even-handedness and tolerance from on-high raises again the question of the origin of Papal-popular relations. Does the blessing come first, or the consumption?

An advertisement appearing in Australian newspapers around this time comprised a photograph of Wojtyla and an invitation to non-Catholics wanting to 'know more' about the Church to send off a form in order to receive some booklets as information. Wojtyla signified both familiarity – a recognition factor in product differentiation – and allegiance. The advertisement emphasised that a response would not result in visits to private homes ('no one calls'), or any obligation. In fact, anyone deciding to write off for the booklets was gratuitously enrolled in a correspondence course of twenty lessons, sent out over time in batches, with periodic question sheets to be completed. This amounted to a form of enlistment, alongside a renewed investment in Catholicism; an invitation to become the credulous subject or to remain it.

Edmund Campion gives a context to this kind of practice in his book Australian Catholics, where he indicates that Wojtyla's visit was an important reinforcement of
Roman Catholicism in Australia. Quite clearly, the proselytising work of the Church is concerned with the appropriation of a (metaphoric) surplus mendicant value. A quarter of Australia's sixteen million people described themselves as Catholic in the 1980s, compared to 17.5% fifty years earlier. Large proportions of Italian and Irish settlers make the country a significant outpost, with potential for growth in numbers and strength of adherence. As I indicated above, the visit did not merely lodge its appeal to the captive. In its conception, the trip was 'a recognition by the Vatican that for a largely secular country, blatant evangelism will not work. Thus, a program in which the Pope met representatives of virtually every sector and age.'

Officially, this was 'yet another opportunity to preach his message of peace, justice and human dignity', to meet and speak with politicians and parish priests, young unemployed and homeless men. In this way, Wojtyla's munificence would 'help to make Australian Catholics better Catholics and better Australians'; a rendering to Caesar of what he is due, in a linguistic formation akin to the query: "Have you stopped beating your wife?". The bind is double and intradependent. Better Catholic practice and better Australian practice are syntagmatic. To be an anti-Catholic subject is to be anti-Australian, and vice versa. "Good" Australianness" is always already theological (an identical move to the identification of the proper way to be an Australian soccer subject discussed in Chapter Four).

Of course, the visit also acted as a commercial venture, through franchising. Recent estimates put the Vatican US$63 million in debt, an incentive towards commodification which resulted in the licensing of a hundred and twenty Official Papal Visit products in Australia for a six and a half day stay. Major sponsors included: a brewer; a sugar-drink maker; airlines, tobacco, communications, paint and oil companies; and a car firm, to the point where the National Papal Visit Office formally acknowledged 'the generous support of the corporate sector and the Australian community in planning the visit'. This may also have helped to pay for an entourage of thirty-one, which
included a butler, a doctor, a valet, security guards, a journalist and television camera operators, all costing A$40,000 an hour\textsuperscript{46}.

**THE BODY OF PAPAL THOUGHT**

This materiality should not be regarded as incommensurate with public accounts of Wojtyla's theological or philosophical positions. Much is made of the fact that he has completed two doctorates, one on St John of the Cross and the other on the thought of Max Scheler. The second doctorate is described as a phenomenological attempt to combine feeling with reason. We are told that he has published half a dozen books and over five hundred other works and formerly held a Chair in Ethics at the Catholic University of Lublin\textsuperscript{47}.

Rather than provide an exegesis on his \textit{oeuvre}, I want simply to consider here the popular accounts of his teachings. My referent is not "his philosophy", but its description and redisposal within another, journalistic mode as a model form of cultural subjectivity. Within this mode, the solid-state subject is a given for Wojtyla. This stable human is the basis for thought, the fundamental way in to reality via experience\textsuperscript{48}. Theologically, this sits easily with a materialistic theory of transubstantiation, in which the physicality of the sacrament goes guarantor of truth\textsuperscript{49}. Christ's body is an essence, not an idea. "It" is to be somatically experienced\textsuperscript{50}. This experience itself is a total, all–enveloping one. Touching and sensing become referents for perception and representation, rather than their constituents. Again, truth is rendered external to discourse; it is an entity which transcends terminology. Hence the reported direction of Wojtyla's desire: 'I want to meet all those who seek the Absolute and yearn for Peace'\textsuperscript{51}. The rules of this type of language exclude relativities, \textit{marginalia} and the subverted and subverting subject. Fixity of meaning is paramount. Destabilising self–formations (for example, polymorphous sexuality and its rhetoric) are external to "truth". They stand as sins based on false premises.
This approach is classically logocentric in its 'desire for a direct, given hold on mean-
ings, being and knowledge. It requires an assured access to, and mastery of, a presence
contceptual, significatory, sexual or ontological of identity52. It is a need to know which
functions from an oppositional, but non--dialectical, logic. Good and bad are
juxtaposed. There is no acknowledgement that the privileged end of this couplet is
dependent on its opposite for meaning. Nor is there any consideration of the silent
element, the mediating difference, which stands between them.

Much is made of the fact that Wojtyla argues that priests may not marry because they
must given themselves totally to Jesus Christ. It is not unreasonable to draw from this
interdiction that Christ receives, as a consequence, something which otherwise would
be reserved for wives. Clearly, a physical loving of Christ is part of this line. What,
then, are the implications for the Papal body?

Bryan Turner's survey text on the sociology of belief starts from the position that:
'Questions about religion cannot...ever be divorced from questions of the
body...[because of the] finitude of our corporeality53. This can rarely have been truer
than in the case of the Pope. Knowledge about Wojtyla's body as pontiff and person
circulates in contradictory and powerful ways that nevertheless permit him to be estab-
lished as an exemplary cultural subject. He is a man of civility, but not servility,
precisely because of his ability to be both a living, material human and a Geist in
himself. Public accounts of him are routinely dedicated to the production of Wojtyla as
the embodiment and the ideal of both virile Romantic and sage Enlightenment thinking.
It is perhaps not surprising that Weber regards the nineteenth century emergence of the
doctrine of papal infallibility as an indication of the drive to set up a careful
bureaucratic distinction between Pope as office–holder and Pope as individual man54.
Now, as part of an attempt to reconcile the public and private dichotomy in a
marketable way, Wojtyla's biography has been dedicated to the ancient priestly role of
exemplifying perfection and thus embarking on what Nietzsche referred to as 'the task

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of forming men in whom selfishness was dead'. I shall proceed to consider some further productions of Wojtyla that do this work.

The *Australian Women's Weekly* is a mass circulation magazine aimed at women working "at home", performing child and husband-minding duties. Its major article on Wojtyla's visit provides information about: the architecture of his home; his diet; his taste in music; his domestic servants and their gendered division of labour; his soldiers; his feelings towards children; and his propensity for undressing and dressing (rivalled, it seems, only by Rudolph Valentino). Three paragraphs dedicated to the types of clothes he wears are followed by the single-sentence paragraph: 'Pope John Paul II has never had much regard for clothes'.

This turn between a fetishisation of the everyday decorated body and its higher order eschewal typifies the uncomfortable intersection of Wojtyla's phenomenology and spirituality. Unease surrounding the body and desire parallels a fudging of conflict between the material and the non-material. An official visit program fetishises the precautions undertaken to protect Wojtyla - a boys' game about officialdom, importance, professionalism and gun toys - and concludes the section by stating that the Pope 'makes no demands for security himself'. The simple man, untrammeled by the obsessions of the corporeal, is to be rendered significant by attention to his security, and worthy by his own lack of concern about it. Readers are positioned as worried about his physical safety, whereas Wojtyla is above such tribulations.

But his biography is routinely written in terms of the Wojtylan body. He is the only former industrial worker to be made Pope, coming from 'unpretentious' surroundings ("Log Cabin to See"). As a young man, his hard work scholastically was balanced by a love of sport ('a natural athlete'): a series of self-disciplinings. 'Passion' for studies was matched by 'Zest for life' in sport. In what could otherwise be read as an aberrant statement of unreconstructed Maoism, Wojtyla is quoted as finding two years of labouring more valuable than two doctorates.
A constant involvement as a boy in association football, swimming, canoeing and acting can be constructed as signs of vitality. But it can also be read as a series of acts of sublimation, avenues for the safe expression of desire. During the visit, a former Australian Professor of Sociology recalled meeting Wojtyla at a summer camp for Polish Catholics in 1938, describing him as 'a ruggedly handsome and athletic boy'. This was highlighted in an official account of the Australian tour. At the same time, endorsed publications mystify Wojtyla's wartime point of entry into the priesthood: 'EXACTLY WHAT TRANSPRIES THAT DAY IN WAUVEL CASTLE MAY NEVER BE KNOWN'.

What happens if these accounts are put alongside what he said to the inmates of a Melbourne seminary, namely 'that their commitment to celibacy was a positive expression of a special capacity to love. It was a gift from God that was not given to everyone, and it was the priests' gift of their whole self to Christ and the Church'? As he put it, this capacity 'is a gift that is made over and over again...it must be continually renewed'. Here, nothingness is a gift, absence a donation. But if it is denial, how can it be regiven? It is simply a matter of continued abstention unless there is a psychosexual intercession with Jesus Christ (who is held to be both man and god, of course).

By putting the statements together in that way, I have set up a new cultural subject. This cultural subject is contradictory. It is false to itself, and necessarily so. In other words, a form of logic now holds sway that appears to designate the Pope as a "repressed homosexual". This is not my belief. I simply seek here to illustrate the contingency of cultural subjectivity, how quickly it can be altered by changing the intersection of certain statements. One could just as easily use the knowledges circulating about his youthful exuberance to parody his current institutional power, for example. Instead, I want now to address the actual ecclesiastical formation of sexed subjects and the Pope's part in that process.
'Patriarch of the West' is one of Wojtyla's titles of office. He is regularly positioned as deserving of that moniker in both its pejorative and positive senses. Costigan's hagiographic treatment uses referents of difference ('Anglican') and expertise ('psychiatrist') to valorise Wojtyla's speaking for others through the following formulation: 'An Anglican psychiatrist, Dr Frank Lake, has concluded that "both the Church and the world stand in ever greater need of Pope John Paul II as a physician of the corporate soul." This patriarchal vision is differently – and more specifically – exemplified in Wojtyla's statement of policy to Roman Catholic bishops during the Australian visit. He criticised a 'levelling out of Catholic life' in some places, to the point of an acceptance of abortion. And one of his acolytes has explained Wojtyla's line on surrogate motherhood in these terms: 'Do not expect a pope to call virtue what is sinful.'

These absolute moral imperatives of the body are constantly reproduced to define "unconventional" women as Other. Wojtyla's *Love and Responsibility* is cited as a classic statement in support of permanent marriage as the only proper forum for sex, and the home as the only proper forum for women. The book was 'said to have directly influenced' Pope Paul VI's *Humanae Vitae*, the archetypal modern Vatican statement on gender. Since Wojtyla's election in 1978, he has introduced a high level consultative/policymaking machine on these questions, via the creation of a Council on Family Matters.

It is also a conventional critical wisdom to derogate "religion" as an opponent of homosexuality, particularly the Catholic Church and its Pope. Dennis Altman's description of churchpeople as 'Ideologues of Oppression' is a classic statement of this formulation. And certainly Wojtyla in particular can be seen as 'rigid on problems of sex and personal morality.' But it is necessary to go behind such easy categorising to...
investigate Catholic formations of the homosexual subject, for their genealogy is a picture of epistemological ruptures; in other words, of changes in cultural policy.

A 1975 Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics from the Vatican advised that 'according to the objective moral order, homosexual relations are acts which lack an essential and indispensable finality'\textsuperscript{74}. (This finality referred to the impost that sexual relations always be conducted under the sign of procreation.) It was also held, however, that homosexuality may be innate to some people and therefore irrevocable. Such persons should be treated with understanding and tolerance in the interests of 'overcoming their personal difficulties and their inability to fit into society'\textsuperscript{75}. Similarly, the Archbishop of Westminster had argued in the 1950s that whilst homosexual acts were 'grievously sinful', it was up to individual Catholics to decide whether their prosecution would be more harmful than the acts themselves. It may be best to 'tolerate without approving'\textsuperscript{76}.

The well-springs of this duality are manifold, and their policy outcomes equally varied. In Biblical terms, the New Testament provides only minimal textual guidance. Jesus' teachings do not touch on the subject, whilst Paul's merely reiterate traditional Hebraic objections to the threat to social renewal of all non-procreative sexual practices\textsuperscript{77}. The argument is essentially a functionalist one; and in any case, it has been suggested that such a reading of Paul is based on a decidedly problematic translation. In fact, only Leviticus provides a really clear condemnation of gayness\textsuperscript{78}. But it remains the case that even radical parts of the Anglican Church continue to condemn 'homosexual practices of the genital kind' as 'a major blemish on a person's conduct'\textsuperscript{79}.

It is important to recognise the dependence of much theology on an extra-Biblical set of "natural" laws, beyond obsessive Scriptural exegesis and content analysis\textsuperscript{80}. Aquinas is a key figure in this. Writing in the thirteenth century, he warned that jouissance was a problem because it diverted the mind from more serious matters. The quest for it became a total one that would brook no interruption. Furthermore, since children were
original sinners because of their creation through sex, *jouissance* was a begetter of evil. Nevertheless, he acknowledged that gestation was, *ipso facto*, a good. The act could be redeemed and rendered 'without sin'. It was theoretically possible to counteract the egregious anti-cogitative force of *jouissance* by continuing to reason at all times during the deed. Specifically, the dispersal of semen must be managed 'in the way befitting the end for which it is needed ...[C]opulating with the wrong sex, male with male or female with female' was second only to bestiality in wickedness, as it did not act to sustain the species\(^8\).

It has also, of course, been argued that monotheism is marked by homophobia, whereas polytheism historically supported 'the ambiguous and the anomalous'\(^8\). This may be connected to a wider discursive shift during the Hellenistic and later Roman Empires towards a privileging of asceticism. Actual punishment of homosexual acts dates only from the Middle Ages and is connected to the Gregorian reforms, which marked a movement towards a centralised monarchy and class conflict within city-states. A growth in world trade saw the spread of monotheism and asceticism, and the emergence of the city disempowered polytheistic appeals to agricultural and fertility gods\(^8\). In any case, Aquinas' line has acquired the status of both law and nature in Catholic teachings. But it has been significantly problematised at a practical, extra-discursive level by the need to deal with a "problem" that is not removable. Gay sex has been rendered objectively a sin, but subjectively not a sin\(^8\). A structural theory of homosexuality, removing the notion of individual choice at the level of desire, informs the position that gays are normally not 'responsible' for their 'condition'\(^8\). And it is also important to draw a distinction between the church *qua* institution and the church *qua* community of believers\(^8\).

These contradictions are present in Wojtyla's positions on the topic. During his 1987 tour of North America, he told a gathering of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) patients, including two Catholic priests, that god loved them. But just a year
before, he had officially reiterated the turpitudinous nature of homosexuality\(^87\). Gays are, he can say, 'not outcasts...like all people who suffer, they are inside the Church'\(^88\); but he can also claim that the 'future of Australia and the Church' is 'in the family'\(^89\). Catholicism is thus positioned as an all-encompassing doctor and parent, combining technical competence to decree the health of a subject with ownership of that subject.

It therefore becomes enunciatively possible to align apparently incommensurate statements under the one speaker, if always at different times. The statements are not allowed to meet in a dialogic fashion. Their separateness provides the space for differing logics to operate independently of one another. The first set of statements, the logic of support for gays, permits some play to an accepting liberal humanism where this is necessary to provide a picture of tolerance. But the second set of statements, the set surrounding "nature", can be operationalised to legitimise control and surveillance. These positions also operate differentially at different sites of administrative power.

Raymond Hunthausen, a Seattle Archbishop, was stripped of many of his powers by the Vatican in 1987 for a variety of liberalisms, notably a relaxation of the disciplining of gays\(^90\). But a priest has had official pastoral responsibility for Adelaide gay people since 1985\(^91\) and 'Acceptance' is a successful Roman Catholic gay support group\(^92\). (This may also be seen as a response to a need expressed by gay religious believers, who have mounted a series of sophisticated arguments to be considered seriously by the Church\(^93\).)

The problematic issue of AIDS has clearly drawn these twin strands closer together, especially as the conventional pathologising of homosexuality now has a supposedly clinical corollary. In their May 1987 message, the Australian Catholic Bishops called on Roman Catholic people to respond to sufferers with 'love and practical assistance'. But this was coupled with its apparently paradigmatic counter-sentiment, that the 'only answer...lies in moral renewal and appropriate education' because the epidemic 'is one disastrous result of promiscuous sexual behaviour'. Significantly, the line is that 'what has always been sinful is now becoming suicidal'. A 'condom culture' is neither 'decent...
or effective'. Yet the disease should not be presented as 'divine judgement'. Homosexuality is, rather, contrary to the laws of nature. The laws of nature are clearly distinct from those of god; there is some let-out for gays, and a way in for Catholics to be compassionate. But this cannot be at the expense of Aquinas' insistence on the need for appropriate seminal finality. In a more positive, productive vein, this gives an epidemiological warrant to the promulgation of the civic cultural subject of sex.

Propagandists for Papal consistency simply deny that there are any inconsistencies here, because: 'It is not open to a Pope to practise the sort of deception that is postulated as diplomacy or said to be useful in the cause of building bridges. These totalising, absolutist, consistent narratives extend to what is constructed as an 'all-inclusive...concern for humanity' and respect for human rights and differences of opinion. The Melbourne *Age* newspaper lauded Wojtyla's capacity to 'promote the universal virtues with which all men and women can identify. (Even so, these global certainties are rapidly and suitably tinged with a necessary mystification: 'to listen to and absorb John Paul is a challenge. There is never confidence that the real message has been understood, even if it has been received. Not only does this allow for mystery and difference, but it precludes any certainty of logical contradiction in reading Wojtyla. The listener/reader is condemned to incompleteness because the texts of Wojtyla are assigned a never-ending indeterminacy.)

Italo Calvino's story "Desire in November" brings out this duality. A poor Italian man has been given a new vest and pants by a Catholic priest. But he steals into a clothes shop and passes a cold night wrapped in fine furs, emerging in the morning without the furs but with the donated underclothing. He is left feeling 'as comfortable as a Pope. At one level, the Church stands for a donor of untied aid that gives without requiring a particular return. But this unconditional giving is in a nexus with a glutinous appetite for control and luxury. The apparently antonymical sacerdotal subjects – priest as donor, priest as receiver – can be accommodated only within a vertically, horizontally
and historically differentiated institution. Western Catholicism acts as an umbrella of discursive piety over positions which are in fundamental conflict with one another. As Leech puts it, there is cover for those who could otherwise be characterised as 'Marxist and anarchist groups, movements of non-violent protests...and fighters for racial justice' alongside those devoted to 'the defence of established structures of oppression'. It is not always possible to keep the subjects apart, and their meeting can be disquieting. Bell satirises Wojtyla's semiacceptance of the former Pinochet regime in Chile by proposing that people render to Caesar and to god what they are due, and use whatever is left over to start a small business. This encourages a further consideration of the intersection of church and state, and the latter's formations of homosexuality.

**CHURCH AND STATE**

State policy on gays in Australia represents a set of disaggregated events. Recent decriminalisation in some parts of the country has had a variety of effects, not the least of which has been a greater public acceptance of homosexuality. But the story has not always been so harmonious. What follows is a very brief overview.

Prior to white invasion two hundred years ago, homosexuality in Australia had been deeply embedded via ritual. But under the first white governorship, the penalty for sodomy became death. A subculture of gays around religion is on record from the 1830s, but the state continued to pursue them vigorously for the next hundred and fifty years. The first public agitation for reform of the law stemmed from the 1930s, but received a major setback with the crackdown on "deviance" during the Cold War that characterised Britain and the United States as well. With the development of an identity-based politics in the 1960s, various parts of Sydney had effectively become gay from the late 1970s. Still, the first of what are now annual Gay Mardi Gras there, in 1978, saw over fifty arrests. Serious police violence marred the festivities. Yet the sheer weight of a formative culture, combined with a pervasive discourse of liberalism and
the politicisation of sufferers, made for change. This subculture was comprised of material objects of particular exchange- and use-value: gay papers, bars, restaurants, plumbers, clerics, pharmacists, undertakers and so on. It developed along the lines of a mini-civil society. By 1988, the Mardi Gras' official program was replete with messages of support from the Police Community Relations Bureau, Police-Gay Liaison and the Department of Community Services and Health. But in order to make sense of the various arms of the state and their operation on 26 November 1986, we need further theorisation and some examination of how the state responded to Wojtyla’s visit in general.

For all its internal differentiation, the state takes policing to be its fundamental mode and logic of operation. As Foucault puts it:

an entire series of utopias or projects for governing territory... developed on the premise that a state is like a large city; the capital is like its main square...At the outset, the notion of police applied only to the set of regulations, that were to assure the tranquillity of a city but at that moment the police became the very type of rationality for the government of the whole territory. The model of the city became the matrix for the regulations that apply to a whole state.

This view of the effect of regulation contrasts with knowledge of the state as responsive to its citizens. Such a sovereign view would make for a more sanguine set of statements about, as it were, the opportunity to make statements. So the Catholic Enquiry Centre takes as a given that in a:

democratic society, such as we have in Australia, laws are drawn up by the will of the people. Citizens have the right to express their views and to influence and form public opinion by demonstrations, or protests, provided these do not interfere with the freedom or rights of others, or promote unnecessary violence.
A classic liberal discourse on the rights of speech simply operates on another grid from policing practices. Yet official accounts of the Wojtylan trip place great importance on the repressive state apparatus as a guarantor of the civility of each event. Thus: 'The police and the hundreds of volunteer marshalls and supervisors were without complaint after the ceremony'106.

Of course, the Catholic Church is the most secular of all religious institutions. It sets its governing body up as an independent nation, complete with diplomatic presences. And this in part accounts for the unique status afforded Wojtyla by government officials across different sites: his capacity to mobilise a set of different discourses of the secular and the spiritual and give them an apparent unity in his person. He came to Australia technically 'as the guest of the Australian national government in his capacity as Head of State of the Holy See'107. An official welcome from the Australian Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, was in just these terms, although modified by the set of knowledges about Wojtyla as Pope. Thus: the 'Australian Government is delighted' by the visit, as Wojtyla 'has repeatedly affirmed the dignity of the individual and a belief in the principle of freedom'. Hawke found it noteworthy that the tourist would be spending 'the greater part of his time meeting people from all walks of life'108. 'Freedom' is here present as a fixed absolute, Wojtyla's catholic approach to greeting people its guarantee across sites. In a farewell speech in Perth, the Prime Minister decreed that the trip had been 'an inspiration and a cause for great joy', an event proving that 'this is a country prepared to support the cause of peace and justice'109.

The combination of Irish and Italian migration referred to earlier ensures an attentive audience for any Pope visiting Australia. The public aura surrounding such visits becomes akin to a Royal tour. So Hawke is a republican, but he welcomes Elizabeth Windsor. And he is an agnostic by way of Protestantism, but he welcomes Karol Wojtyla. Whilst eschewing the core political ideology of monarchy and religion, he pays complete obeisance to their travelling iconography. It is through such moves that it becomes possible for the Australian Government to act as the publisher for Wojtyla's
speech to Aboriginal people. Two messages are sent out by this: firstly, Hawke is following the Weberian ideal type of the distinterested public sector worker who fulfils duties of office regardless of personal belief. And secondly, he is following an electorally pragmatic line, seeking to avoid offending significant parts of the voting population. Once more, the incommensurate becomes acceptable. A syntagm is made of paradigmatic non-relations: the republican welcomes a reigning monarch, the non-believer welcomes the apotheosis of high faith. To bring these types of contradiction to the fore, in a way that does not necessarily seek to impose a synthesis on their junction, is to refuse both the orderliness and the mystification of the civic cultural subject. To do so in public, in a way designed to confront and to play, is to embark on a politics of parody.

PERFORMING THE UNRULY SUBJECT: PARODIC POLITICS

EVENT 1 'Every sperm is sacred
Every sperm is great
If a sperm is wasted
God gets quite irate'
is a chant sung by a massed family of hundreds outside the 'Papal Discount House' in the film Monty Python's Meaning of Life.

EVENT 2 The Sydney journal Gay Information utilised a picture of gay male nuns in its subscription drive in 1984.

EVENT 3 The company 'Tea Towels d'Art' marketed an A$10 'Come back to Catholicism' towel in 1986 depicting Wojtyla mounted on a horse in the Australian bush, clutching a boomerang.

EVENT 4 The comedian Pamela Stephenson advertised her tour of Australia in 1987 as 'Not A Papal Tour'. She was depicted in newspaper graphics clothed in priestly robes and wielding a chainsaw.
These four events are part of parodic politics, the playful satire of symbolic irreverency that sends messages of subversion as much through its mode of address as its substantive content. This is not to suggest that such parody has any status outside prevailing social relations, that it is in some sense sealed off and sanitised from them. A common element amongst these objects is that each is a commodity. It is worth noting that Stephenson's tour was sponsored by an airline and a commercial radio station. The secular interests of business can find such appropriation acceptable. There is nothing specifically anti-capitalist about unruly discourses of sex and gender that argue against dominant codes. But their very appeal is distinctively organised around making fun of religion, and particularly the Catholic Church, via three sacred icons: 'finality' (that euphemism for sexual practices which could theoretically result in procreation referred to earlier); the gender of nuns; and the peripatetic neocolonialism of Wojtyla.

Similarly, the soubriquet 'The Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence/an order of gay male nuns' makes syntagms of signifiers which are normally in paradigmatic relation to one another. Men are sisters, nuns are male, religion is indulgent, gay is ordered. Signs are scrambled, but in a way that borrows from a variety of grammars to bring together binary opposites which generally define each other through difference. To invert is to subvert when you are showing that doctrines of decency desperately need living examples of indecency. This forwards one of the critical confusions of postmodernity. The irony is that a sense of gender confusion sees the medical model of congenital maladjustment producing a subcultural corollary that plays with identity. The appearance of the homosexual as a category of person, as opposed to the description of particular sexual practices that offers no wholesale key to identity, is now said to be a nineteenth-century European invention, not a nineteenth-century European finding. It is an invention to be mocked.

Of course, there are controversies within gay and feminist politics about this mocking mode because of its uneasy adjacency to misogyny. In acknowledgement of this, the Sisters have rules about referring to each other as "he". The discourses of "effeminacy"
often applied to and by the gay subject are not accepted; so to refer to one another as "she" or "bitch" is infra dig. And yet such codes are hinted at in their linguistic formations and habiliments. It is just that the misogynistic meanings of "effeminacy" and cross-dressing are said to be eschewed. Cross-dressing clearly references a trope of the 1980s, what Elaine Showalter calls 'a fin-de-siècle ambiance in which sex-roles are under attack'. This also recalls practices from the nineteenth-century city. The ambivalent freedom of anonymity it provided, discussed in Chapter One, included the space for clandestine gay groups to form themselves. Transvestism was often a central component of this process. The idea behind such activities clearly involves parodying a version of femininity, but not merely imitating it in order to derogate and differentiate. Rather, the aim is to develop what Segal calls 'a positive aesthetic sensibility' that can bring pleasure and pain together in a new order of value that works with categories of perceived oppression of Self and Other rather than denying or negating them outright.

However unconsciously, this heeds Guattari's call to problematise the binary oppositions which are established in the course of categorising people sexually. He seeks to 'destroy notions which are far too inclusive, like woman, homosexual...When they're reduced to black-white, male-female categories, it's because there's an ulterior motive, a binary-reductionist operation to subjugate them'. For Richard Sennett, the most devastating legacy of the Victorian era's classifications of sexuality was the myth that 'sex is a revelation of the self'. Refusing such categorisations also breaches the older European cultural tradition that establishes hierarchies across four critical symbolic domains: psychic forms; the body; space; and the social order. Each is interconnected, such that disturbances within one sector have significant implications elsewhere.

This is part of the process of manufacturing différends de soi.

'Carnival', a new point of celebration in cultural studies, offers a means of organising our thinking about the Sisters. Stallybrass and White, after Rabelais and Bakhtin, define it as 'the repeated, periodic celebration of the grotesque body – fattening food,
intoxicating drink, sexual promiscuity, altered ego-identity, the inverse and the heteroglot. Britain's carnivals of the Industrial Revolution through to late in the nineteenth century involved courtship, dancing, eating and drinking in public; in short, they involved display in a way that frequently evoked official displeasure and repression. The Australian Sisters follow a carnival-like anti-program. Their activities are not to be part of a plan. That would buy into conventional structures and modes. Similarly, Foucault's advocacy of 'a gay culture' of 'polymorphous, varied and individually adjusted relationships' is based around rejection of 'a set of propositions', because '[a]s soon as a program is presented, it becomes law and stops people from being inventive'. Ultimately, he says, the task in forming the subject anew is to 'make the following question into an incontrovertible challenge: "What game could we play, and how do we make up the rules?"' Playfulness as a process is here raised to the status of policy, an end in itself because of its destabilising effect.

The Sisters, in operation in Australia since 1981, describe themselves as 'an order of gay male nuns dedicated to the promulgation of universal joy and the expiation of stigmatic guilt through public manifestation and habitual perpetration. The language is a combination of the (otherwise apparently distinct) sacred and profane. The combination works to indicate the logocentric interdependence of such binary oppositions: the 'oppressive effect of gender roles' is to be countered by an attempt 'to exorcise the gloom'. The medicalisation of sexuality is rejected. Negative internalising by gays is seen as a necessary response to 'centuries of systematic scapegoating'. The response to this internalisation is to embark on a process of 'public manifestations', a turning back out through the reclamation of public spaces. But again, highly formal language is coined punningly to signify satire. It is a fundamental precept that the Sisters should 'show forth their vocation wherever [sic] people gather but most of all in the marketplace. They do not always wait for an invitation. Foucault resuscitates this site as a critical space for redefining the division of private and public. He recounts the 'scandalous gesture of Diogenes...: when he needed to satisfy his sexual appetite, he would relieve himself in the marketplace. Like many of the Cynics' provocations, this
had a double meaning. This doubling expressed itself in the performance of a "private" act in the public domain. Diogenes was problematising the notion that a public manifestation of sexual pleasure necessarily implied an ignoble temperament, via what Foucault calls "performance" criticism.

The Sisters' notion of the marketplace is also akin to the unruliness of the early English fair, where the marketplace represented a disturbance to localism, a recognition of change and difference in its role as a source of fluidity, of coming and going. Identity is loosened from its official moorings and replaced by a disrespectful public modelled on the pleasure of commonality—with—differences. Space is to be contested, and special efforts made to move outside, to get away from the always already institutionalised nature of public buildings. What is set up in that space will be determined by the outcome of processes predicated on difference:

The Order is collective in it's [sic] decision making and anarchistic in it's [sic] practice... membership reflects the wide variety of beliefs, philosophies and ideologies that are present in the gay community and movement. There are radical faerie nuns who are Marxist, Haute Couture nuns, nuns who are Christian, atheist nuns who drink alcohol, gourmet nuns and nuns who won't listen.

They share a commitment to be 'specialist demonbusters'. Categories are rendered problematic in their taxonomic components, constituted as they are of supposed oxymorons or non sequiturs (Radical: faerie, nun: Marxist, Haute Couture: nun, nun: won't listen). Contradictions are exposed and then leavened (atheist: nuns who drink alcohol). Various different discourses are permitted intertextual meeting without resolution being a necessary telos. The seams of their habits have an overt weave. Contradictions are further exemplified in Sisterly titles: Mother Inferior, Sister Sit On My Face, Sister Mary Armageddon to be a Habit With You, Sister Monsterio Deliciosa Hysterica, Sister Avon Calling, Sister Airpsly Fair Billis, Sister Ophelia Dick, Sister Amyl Nitrate, Sister Maria Von Stoop 'entakit, Sister Mary Third Secret of Fatima and

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Sister Fellatio Obliviata, for example. A register of names and skills is kept at the Nun Speakers' Bureau, the titles in themselves counting as further signs of a deliberate fossicking out of 'tastelessness' and its eponymous glorification\textsuperscript{129}. The sacred and the profane are rendered as a couplet, a couplet that insists on the interdependence of the polite and the grotesque\textsuperscript{130}. Functioning in this way manufactures \textit{différends de soi}. It sees the subject making, to redeploy Marx, 'his own life...an object for him', an object beyond the alienation that is produced by defining the self in terms of the prevailing mode of governance and its categories of existence\textsuperscript{131}. A similar task is prescribed by GH Mead. He calls on the subject to treat the self 'as an object to itself' and thus to mix subject–object formulations in such a way that the self correctly identifies the communities to which it belongs via a process of matching ideal types from the social with its own self–view and developing a fully achieved capacity for intersubjective recognition and conduct\textsuperscript{132}.

Inside postmodernity, this can, at its best, be an overtly pluralised cultural self with a lineage that can be dated back to periods prior to the disciplining of theatrical spaces in the seventeenth century, before tight distinctions were drawn between performer and audience and the excision of collective grotesqueries from the site of the public sphere\textsuperscript{133}. With the Enlightenment, order and cleanliness arrived as tropes of culture, with everything accorded a proper, polite place\textsuperscript{134}. To move outside this is to conjure a reverse world (cross-dressing is another trope in such counter–spheres) in which transgression is quite literally achieved by being in the interstices between categories, in a life founded on undecidability\textsuperscript{135}. One thinks here of the North American rallying cry for gay rights in the 1970s: "Think we're lowdown and disgusting? Damn right we are". Such a logic is exemplified by Eric Michaels' decision to have his AIDS diaries illustrated by a photograph of himself in an advanced state of physical decay and distress\textsuperscript{136}. To speak in a collective way that problematises the categories of taste ('disgusting' as per Michaels) and methodological individualism ('behaviour' as per the terms of the charge against the Sisters) is to work towards a communal definition of homosexuality that begins to form a new account of the self\textsuperscript{137}. Hence the formation of
a lesbian and gay reading group called 'the Bad Object Choices' parodies the terms by which its members have been made into the subjects of psy-discourses\(^{138}\). Parody offers a new turn in what has been termed the 'career of the category of the homosexual\(^{139}\).

The Sisters' 1989 *White Paper* (complete with brown cover) seeks to promulgate some ideas of the Order that may have been 'lost' with an expansion of numbers. But it equally proclaims its partiality and conditionality:

> It is of concern that this paper does not hamper or direct the thinking and evolution of the Order. So this paper is to be seen as a guide to the thinking of some sisters at one point and not a piece of dogma to direct the thinking of the Order...it is not necessarily a piece of right thinking...it is not to be dragged out as proof or support for an argument or an idea\(^{140}\).

The *Paper* calls for a joyful life via an 'Expiation from self' of guilt. The Order's choice of title is significant here. It plays with two meanings of 'indulgence': the playfulness of consensual and enjoyable bodily pleasures; and the tradition of ecclesiastical payment for failure to be sufficiently moral. The 'perpetual' element is the timeless expiation of guilt\(^{141}\). Again, the marketplace is invoked for its publicness: 'it is there that we take on meaning'\(^{142}\).

The words spoken by the two Sisters at the November event were carefully chosen, selected because of the Vatican's opposition to homosexuals, to homosexual civil rights and to women, via the rejection of female ordination into the priesthood. The word 'Fascist' was applied in opposition to Wojtyla's repression of dissent. One of the men, Fabian Lo Schiavo, Mother Inferior in charge of the Convent, was on the Anglican Synod of Sydney for nine years until 1986. In December of that year, some three weeks after the arrest, he was sacked from his parish positions and formally required to worship elsewhere because of his other selves and practices. These included actions
taken under a variety of personae, such as: the Reverend Oral Richards, who preaches the 'Four Square Gospel of Socialism, Feminism, Gay Liberation and Ethnic Pride'; Dean Lance Sheraton-Hilton, a play on the name of a former senior Anglican official in New South Wales; and Monsignor Porca Madonna.143

These titles and associated practices do not signify levity alone; the levity is predicated on an automatic association with capacity to shock. Definite material effects may flow from them: arrest and rejection have already been noted. And when Porca Madonna appeared at a book launching by Don Dunstan (who as South Australian Premier in the 1970s had orchestrated decriminalisation in that State) the uproar was such that Dunstan was forced to resign from his then position as a senior bureaucrat in the Victorian tourism sector. But such costs may be offset by the gains made at the level of signification, and the possibilities for alliance. The San Francisco Chapter of the Sisters pulled a mock Wojtylan popemobile through the 1987 Gay Pride Parade, later joining in anti-Papal protest with the Whores of Babylon group of prostitutes, whose leader Scarlet Harlot sang Pope, Don't Preach, I'm Terminating My Pregnancy.144 Such actions mirrored the Sydney Sisters' 'special tribute to a megastar Pope' on his arrival there in 1986.145 These loose international links – links at the level of signifier and parodic practice – are fully appropriate to the "charterless character" of the Sisters. It is just this polymorphously perverse organisational anti-structure that destabilises a conventional secular and religious masculine subject.

So for Sydney Morning Herald investigative journalist Evan Whitton, they are the 'so-called Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence'.146 Of course, the title 'Sisters' is no more a self-investiture than is the title 'Sydney Morning Herald'. The appellation 'so-called' attests to the Sisters' value as irritants to conventional metadiscourses on naming. In his epistemic discussion of differing ways of writing about Mitterand's election in 1981, Pêcheux suggests that the struggle over discourse is more than one of paraphrase. Referentiality exists in the same event, whether in an article written from the left or the right. But signification in the reporting of the event is a site of struggle as much as
signification in the event itself\textsuperscript{147}. The Sisters are bringing into question even this structuralist notion of the mutual impact of signifying elements. Theirs is a more radically shifting system of meaning.

This capacity to disturb is not an unbridled license to shock. With some of the ideological mystification surrounding "casual sex" as a way of life rent asunder by the advent of AIDS, the Sisters perform dual functions of health education, via their distribution of male prophylactics, and ideologising, an acceptance of sexual difference that includes different modes and \textit{tempi} of sexualising. But critically, while their activities are heavily marked out through excess, there is no account of "the true homosexual" underpinning them. There is no "whole, true person" to emerge. The Sisters are using categories of outrage from the margins and blending them with categories of decency from the centre to break up the logic of a unified cultural subject. They desiccate Lyotard's formula for keeping sexual identity well-ordered, viz. 'virility claims to establish order and feminity \textsuperscript{[sic]} is the compulsion to deride order. There is chattering in the gynaecaeum and silence among the troops\textsuperscript{148}. To break up this bifurcation is to go back to some of the ancient reasons for criticising the love of boys by men. The critique was not connected to any essential condemnation of the morality of such relationships, but rather for what they indicated about the men's preparedness to be leaders in other spheres of life and to distinguish themselves from other categories of person, such as slaves, boys and women. Bringing such divisions into question was dangerous\textsuperscript{149}.

Of course, the Sisters are not autotelic. When they dress and speak as they do, their form of communication sets up a desire for recognition. The Pope is a particular target of those disturbing and disrupting the codes of religious orders precisely because of the closed-shop, gendered labour market that his bureaucracy produces and its correlation with a rejection of homosexuality. For Christians amongst the Sisters, this is a serious case of neglect by a wanted but tyrannical Other. For Lacan: 'desire finds its meaning in the desire of the other, not so much because the other holds the key to the object desired, as because the first object of desire is to be recognised by the other\textsuperscript{150}. And
Wojtyla simply denied their presence at Sydney. But the Other here is not necessarily a psychological category. It may become manifest in a public sphere. And that public sphere may be the preferred site to form contradictoriness. The act of prohibited persons dressing in a code sanctioned/enforced by the Papacy for others is something more than a conscious parody; it is almost a move calling for recognition of misrecognition, an inscription of self–incompleteness for which no resolution is required. One might consider here the account Ed Cohen gives of submitting an article from the field of gay literary studies to the *PMLA* and the terpsichories entered into between himself and the editorial board. That dance could be described by reference to the complexities of ambition, autonomy, defence of the realm and the breaking of *politesse*: Cohen wanted the credibility of a *PMLA* publication in order to assist his job prospects; he wanted to do this self–consciously as a gay scholar; the board wanted him to remove a political *coda* at the end of his essay and allow it to stand on the basis of its 'literary argument'; and he proceeded to rewrite the article\(^{151}\). He required recognition and approbation, but on his own terms of self. The relevant liberal institution could not agree and had to act to define gay literary studies as insufficiently literary. (Returning to the earlier critiques of Foucault, perhaps *PMLA* would not qualify as a liberal institution for Rorty).

To return to the ecclesiatical, it is clear that the regendering of religious codes problematises churches at a very profound level. Irigaray suggests that: 'Man can exist because God helps him to define his genre, to situate himself as a finite being in relation to the infinite (the regrowth of the religious can in fact be interpreted as man defending the notion of man)'. A male, neverending god has been a key referent for masculinity, justification for its certainty and guarantor of its eternity. The self–reproduction of god, his status as parthenogene, obviates the requirement for men to be biologically or discursively dependent on women\(^{152}\). Nuns are supposedly married to Christ, himself both son of god and god himself. The implications of Oedipal conflicts become more profound when a tribe of Jocastas is found to be all–male. (In the New Testament, Jesus remains unmarried. He has no real physical mother, and therefore no woman to contest possession with the father in an Oedipal sense\(^{153}\).) Again, one does not have to hold to
notions of subconscious interiorities to use this logic. For it is as an institutional force and a warrant for manners that the seemingly non-contradictory logics of the Church have operated. Simply to work to point out the mutual dependency of supposed antonyms is to problematise unifying notions of the subject and extant systems of individual categorisation.

**RITUALS OF DISTINCTION**

The last section of this chapter sums up by assessing the possible explanations of the events of 26 November, concluding that it was the profound incivility of the Sisters' conduct that made their appearance so troublesome. In that incivility we may find both a possible technology for forming new selves and the limits offered by the technology of power that is cultural citizenship.

In October 1978, Wojtyla drafted a letter from Polish Catholic bishops to their congregations. It read in part: 'Not allowing people with a different social and political ideology to speak, as is the practice of the State, is unjust'. But freedom to speak in public is always a conditional freedom. Everyone knows, at some level, about what Foucault calls the 'taboo on the object of speech' that makes certain statements unmakeable in certain places, most prominently at the points where politics and sex meet. This is achieved through three technologies: the rules of discourse that allow and prohibit discussion; the practices of division that distinguish between good and mad behaviour; and the clinical separation of truth from falsehood. Wojtyla knows about them, as my analysis of his speech has demonstrated. For they are also what Foucault identifies as the three axes which provide the available means of knowing oneself via the conventional subjectivity of discourses of "sexuality".

Eight years after the 1978 letter, Wojtyla watched on as organs of another state acted in just the way that he had once condemned. So did hundreds of academics and others
whose livelihoods might be said to bear testimony to liberalism as a discourse of
dominant moment within Australia. When the two men leapt to their feet and shouted
'Anti-woman/Anti-gay/Fascist pope/Go away', they were brutalised, arrested and
charged with offensive behaviour. They had stood up, interrupted and disagreed gratu­
itously. Conversely, when a much larger group, dressed in "Polish national costume",
broke through barriers and interrupted, they were greeted with grins by the officers of
the repressive state apparatus.

This could be interpreted as follows: resistance through the breaking of ritual is against
the law, but support through the breaking of ritual is legitimate. The act or behaviour of
interrupting, shouting or moving into spaces closed off for others is irrelevant. It is the
message contained or enunciated within that appropriated space which matters. Liber­
alism depends on the classification of the utterer and the utterance before it can admit of
tolerance. Or more specific to this site, the avowedly liberal state can be illiberal when
the particular discourse it is privileging is fundamentally illiberal.

Alternatively, one could concentrate on the incivility of the Sisters' address, its
haranguing, ugly, angry tone; its failure to be polite; and its association of public debate
with unruliness. The error of those two men was not to break the conventions of sitting
in silence for the speaker. Their sin was not to rise while others sat. Their mistake was
not to raise a placard or seek attention. For others were not penalised for so doing. Nor
was it to be public supporters of "homosexuality". Elsewhere, government-sanctioned
and salaried workers were writing and implementing critiques of anti-abortion, anti­
homosexual and generally discriminatory policies segregating women and people of
colour from various occupations. Or put another way, the same government which
arrested the two men for expressing these views was also providing more than an
awning for the expression of similar opinions (if not always stated at the designated
expense of Wojtyla). But one space was Sydney University on a Pope's day, and others
may have been: hospital wards; women's divisions within a range of bureaucracies;
other parts of the University; or other segments of the academy. And the mode of
expression would mostly have been a measured, considered, *decent* subjectivity of instrumental rationality.

The place to state dissonant opinions is vital in the formation of events called "the Pope's visit to Australia". Occupying a space reserved for others is legitimate when such an act serves to assist the interests of the discourse for which that space was originally marked out and is a "jolly" distraction. Occupying a reserved space against those interests in an unseemly manner is not permissible, although working against them from spaces sanctioned by the state is acceptable. In no sense could the Sisters' actions be seen to threaten: Papal physical security; the future of the Catholic Church; the Australian state; the University; the nexus between them; or in fact any thing or body. But a message had been given in a distasteful fashion in a space assigned by the state for messages of an opposing character. The interdicted message contradicted various points of view expressed by the sanctioned speakers in a way that forwarded a "new" politics of the self and its public performance. This is the problem that Habermas identifies as a central tenet of Foucault's investigations: 'those limit experiences in which Western logos sees itself, with extreme ambivalence, faced with something heterogeneous'. As Godard wryly said in explanation of his decision to remove *Hail Mary* from exhibition in Rome after an outburst from Wojtyla: 'It's the house of the church, and if the Pope didn't want a bad boy running around his house, the least I could do is respect his wishes. This Pope has a special relationship to Mary; he considers her a daughter'. Godard knows about how to keep things apart that some people want to bring together.

One could argue that the Sisters' sin was to interrupt ideologically, but they could not be charged in those terms, because of hegemonic knowledges about freedom of speech. So instead, their actions were personalised and pathologised as 'behaviour' which was 'offensive'. But it is just that mode of conduct, of (non-)civics, that really was their venality. The implicit inoffensiveness is not silence (*vide* the Polish supporters); it is a conduct that evidences respect. A systemic unruliness is the crime. Thus the
inconsistency in treatment of interruptors. The relative legitimacy of the actions taken that day by Sisters, Poles, security guards and police was set by the données of circum­spect authority159. Even Mill acknowledged that 'permission to differ' was only granted on an absolute basis by those in marginal positions. Its uptake by the dominant was always contingent160. But he saw this in terms of access to an object called power, rather than as an outcome of the need of that dominant group to form itself and its subjects by exclusion. This is the source of the difficulty experienced when, as Mother Inferior Lo Schiavo put it in 1989:

we are happy to poach church ritual and the aspects of religious tradition which we like and put them to good use...Straight society says, 'if you people were discreet to the point of invisibility we'd accept you.' The Sisters reject that completely. We're determined to be as visible as it's possible for a moustachioed male face in a wimple to be161.

It was of the essence for the Sisters' actions to be critical in an unruly way and unruly in a critical way that broke rituals of distinction between categories of person and conduct in order to produce what Durkheim calls 'illegitimate mixings'162. This was the nature of the Order's account of the resistive gay as a misbehaving public cultural subject working to form the means towards a technology of the self163.

The Sisters' rules of conduct may be positioned within what Habermas has called 'autonomous public spheres'. These spheres, unlike "the" public sphere discussed earlier in the thesis, arise from the generation of meanings within subcultures. Their meanings then enter 'public discourses and higher-level forms of intersubjectivity'; in this instance, with a shocking impact that has often been the modus operandi of marginal groups when they bring into question a politics ordered around the conventions of the economic, the spiritual, the sovereign or the psychological as means of knowing a society164. This new form of politics can be understood as the need for freedom not merely from the state or capital, but freedom from the doxa of what it is to be a person,
from a particular and limiting 'type of individualization'. The new freedom serves 'to promote new forms of subjectivity' away from the notions of individuality that currently obtain\textsuperscript{165}. This is the freedom to speak \textit{différends de soi}.
NOTES


9. See Frow, op.cit., p.149.


16. Jerrold Seigel, "Avoiding the Subject: A Foucaultian Itinerary", Journal of the


33. Ibid. p.31.

35. Clarke and Costigan, loc.cit.


43. George Pell, "The Pope comes to Australia", in Papal Visit, op.cit., p.48.


45. Papal Visit, op.cit., pp.64 and 30. Also see Clarke and Costigan, op.cit., p.103 and Michael Costigan, "Pope John Paul II: The Man and His Travels", in Papal Visit, op.cit., pp.10 and 14.


50. Mark Lane, "The Philosophy of a Pope", in Papal Visit, op.cit., p.31.

51. Papal Visit, ibid., p.62.


57. Papal Visit, op.cit., p.56.

58. Costigan, op.cit., pp.8 and 11.

59. Grant, op.cit., p.4.

60. Lane, op.cit., p.28.

61. Whitton, "The Road", loc.cit.


63. Grant, op.cit., p.21.

64. Quoted in Clarke and Costigan, op.cit., p.78.

65. Oram, op.cit., p.150.

66. Costigan, op.cit., p.16.


70. Oram, op.cit., p.85.

71. Grant, op.cit., p.59.


73. Whitton, "Road", 1986, loc.cit.


77. Gregory Baum, "Catholic Homosexuals", in Batchelor, ibid., p.21.


79. Bishop John Reid, quoted in Bruce Stannard and Kevin Murphy, "More than a
Million Australians – Still Glad to be Gay?", The Bulletin, 10 October 1989, p.54.


85. Curran, op.cit., p.94.


89. Quoted in Clarke and Costigan, op.cit., p.106.


91. Campion, op.cit., p.22.


93. See, for example, Seventh National Conference for Lesbians and Homosexual Men, "Resolutions", Gay Information, 7, 1981, p.23.


96. Clarke and Costigan, op.cit., pp.79 and 52.


98. Ibid. p.108.


100. Leech, op.cit., p.15.

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105. Catholic Enquiry Centre, op.cit.


109. Quoted in Clarke and Costigan, op.cit., p.112.

110. "Pope's Bill", Times on Sunday, 10 May 1987, p.36.


114. Segal, op.cit., p.135.


117. Segal, op.cit., pp.139–140 and 145.


121. Ibid. p.189.


125. Ibid.


130. Stallybrass and White, op.cit., pp.43 and 60.


133. Stallybrass and White, op.cit., pp.93–94.


136. I owe this reference to personal information provided by the late Eric Michaels. Also see the photograph in his *Unbecoming: An AIDS Diary*, E. M. Press, Sydney, 1990, p.8.


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141. Ibid. pp.5–6.

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143. Galbraith, loc.cit.


154. Quoted in Oram, op.cit., p.113.


161. Quoted in Stannard and Murphy, op.cit., p.57.


164. Jürgen Habermas, "The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and

CONCLUSION

I have sought to argue in this thesis that culture is a significant area in the daily organisation of fealty to the liberal–capitalist state. More specifically, it has been my contention that various technologies of subjectivity are the very stuff of cultural policy inside postmodernity; that the formation and functioning of citizenship is a central concern of the times. These are hardly findings; more a banal recitation of the obvious. The claim of the argument to innovation rests firstly in the primacy which it places on the protocols of textual theory, and secondly on the possibilities which it outlines for political action under the soubriquet of citizenship. These two elements are crucially interconnected.

Cultural critique principally operates via the interpretation of texts. This is as true of the anti–capitalist, anti–patriarchal and anti–racist stances of much tertiary level training in cultural studies as it is of the diurnal drills in how to read character of much secondary school training in literature. The overtly politicised and theorised domain of the first is connected to the overtly conserving and empiricist domain of the second in that they share a methodology that seeks to find ethical incompleteness in textual characters and transfer that incompleteness to textual readers. This methodology works to concentrate the subject of its demesne on self–improvement. It sets up a neverending dialectic between, on the one hand, an ideal adequacy of self–knowledge and service in the public purpose; and on the other, an already extant riddle of insufficiency and self–serving consumption in the individual purpose. Between these agonistic poles there are further tensions at work, between knowing oneself and knowing one's place in the social structure.
We can see a preoccupation with the playing out of these issues across a wide variety of sites. I have shown how, at a foundational level, textual analysis sets up a reflectionist protocol based on this process of inscribing incompleteness by forming a readership that must be subjected to continuous work on itself, and how this mode of subjection operates within cultural policy. This has then been elaborated with reference to the formation of national sovereignty via television drama and sport, the latter with particular attention to the putatively divided loyalty of the migrant. The argument has also been made with reference to the philosophical and pragmatic tension that exists between the notion of the selfless citizen and the selfish consumer, caught between maximising utility for the general and the particular interest. These chapters of the thesis have stressed the mutability of cultural subjectivity formed by the operation of ethical incompleteness.

They are chapters which sit alongside an account of social and cultural theory given earlier in "Civic Culture and the Postmodern Subject". That chapter's explanation of: the morphology of the citizen; the role of cultural policy; the concept of a social surface; and the operation of postmodern knowledge, both indicates the plasticity of citizenship and the limits within which it functions. It is these limits that I wish to stress in this Conclusion.

Citizenship is clearly a term whose time is here. After 1989 in Eastern and Central Europe, it is a popularly-conceived and applied technology that appears to transcend rhetoric. It describes, for at least one moment, a powerful civil society. And after the work of various social movements in the older liberal–capitalist democracies, it is a popularly-conceived and applied technology that appears to challenge both conventional party politics and critical theory, as broadly defined. No longer a reformist trope or the hidey-hole of institutionalist political science, citizenship is a new move, a revived idea of sovereignty that is itself always on the move. It appears to have made a shift away from Das Wohltemperierte of my title and towards the différends de soi of Chapter Six.
But there are very definite limits to what this move can achieve. For it continues to function as a technology of subjection. Citizenship is tied to doctrines of representativeness that define the public in very general terms. These terms may be contradictory (such as the citizen-consumer or national-migrant couplets) but their significatory home ultimately resides in this metaphor: citizen is public. And this unitary public – not a series of public spheres of dialogue and difference – will continue to have idealised general needs spread across it by the liberal-capitalist state inside very particular logics of appropriate individual and collective identity and conduct. These logics define the terms of subjectivity. They may not be harmonious amongst themselves, but the contradictions which they harbour will mostly be kept unseen. When Rousseau published his "Social Contract or Principles of Political Right" in 1762, he dealt with this issue in what remains a definitive manner. That document described the 'essence' of the 'social compact' forged between person and polity in the following language:

*Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.*

A 'corporate and collective body' henceforth displaces 'the individual personality of each contracting party' and problematises particular interests that fail to conform to the 'general will' as outside the tacitly agreed preconditions for the exercise of citizenship.1

I do not wish to say that this is always and everywhere undesirable. If nothing else, it ensures that policies are generated which can be put into operation and discourages purely expressive forms of politics that fail to attend to general collective needs. But even as such a position lends itself very well to the generation of cultural citizens that are civil in their subjection to the public good, it is not actionable as a technology for producing selves that are otherwise outside convention. These are selves which, inside
postmodernity, may become manifest on the terrain of cultural politics and therefore be, at least in part, in a condition of contestation with cultural policy.

There will always necessarily be a master command in the discourse of citizenship, that where we are constitutionally equal, we can suffer other forms of inequality with equilibrium, because in this ultimate court of personage, we are identical. The means of ensuring this equilibrium is a doctrine of equivalence that denies difference. Whilst such a doctrine can work very well at the point of distributing rights, because it refuses to distinguish between categories of person, it does less well at the point of forming those rights, the stage when rights and obligations are defined and divided. The tendency within this doctrine of equivalence is to delineate sectional from general interests very early on in such deliberations, in ways that typically function within the command metaphors of citizenship as we find it; which is to say, a white, male, heterosexual and polite capitalist norm projected out onto the world via the twin struts of private property as a model of the rights of the individual and fatherly property as a model of the rights of the state. To be branded with the term 'sectional interest' is utterly disabling under these circumstances.

Action inside the apparatus of the state is essential for subcultural groups if they are to achieve wide-ranging reform in a variety of important areas. But the means of self-definition, the politics of identity, will tend to serve an unsatisfactory set of protocols if they are thought through and practised within these terms. For the civic cultural subject – the citizen – is produced as a polite and obedient servant of etiquette, within limited definitions of acceptable behaviour. The indeterminacy inscribed onto subjects through cultural policy can be particularly disabling in the area of defining the self. For it tends to work via technologies of power inside a general model of ethical incompleteness and pedagogic dependence. The return of the desire to forge well-tempered subjects is inevitable inside citizenship.

Against this tendency we may pose the polysemic, polyvalent notions of postmodernity, a sign frequently denounced for its depoliticising effect but one that bears recuperation.
The valuable *idée fixe* of postmodernity is to manufacture identity, not to accept the existing technologies on offer. Hence the emphasis of my final chapter. It aims to explain a cultural politics that inscribes its own sense of indeterminacy, that not only refuses a logic of self-truth, but disavows any search for such a singular truth. In their acceptance of contradiction and rejection of *politesse*, the Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence are dedicated to expunging notions of self-definition through sexuality and even the search for any ultimate self. By accounting for homosexuality as a set of practices that should be divorced from an overarching account of the person, the Sisters abjure the reflexive engagement with one's ethical incompleteness that animates cultural subjects. They seek their own *différends de soi*.

For such marginal or resistive groups to function, it is clearly necessary for them to harness both a reformism that knows the subjectifying technologies of subjectivity of the liberal-capitalist state and a means of fashioning their own technologies of the self. The state will routinely use the concepts of the nation and the individual as tropes to engender fealty. And these categories may be usefully deployed by various subordinate groups, because the heterogeneous composition of populations necessitates a state tolerance of sorts. But to repeat, the *sine qua non* of citizenship that appears to guarantee status and service via sovereignty is tied to doctrines of nation, economy and person that do not develop the politics of identity that is a necessary prerequisite for participation in defining public spheres and their processes in broad terms that go beyond equivalence at the level of defining rights. Ultimately, liberal-capitalist states cannot enshrine differential accounts of the person in their doctrines of sovereignty, because that would require a revolution in the liberal, humanist, proprietorial subject which underpins their laws of property and methods of collecting and distributing revenue and service. This would, in its turn, imply a new economy and polity. The discourse of citizenship is therefore limited because its indeterminacy – the questioning it encourages – only goes to the spread of services within a given type of social organisation, not to the shape of that society or the means of defining and dividing it up. And the work of cultural policy inside this discourse, whilst relatively autonomous from
issues of capital accumulation and state security, does not finally encourage different, dissident cultures of conduct. Its need to form a singular public is too pressing to be that supple.
NOTE

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The endnotes and bibliography have been organised in accordance with the style used in the "Cultural Policy Studies" series published by the Institute for Cultural Policy Studies.

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