RECONCILIATION IN THE FOREST?

An Exploration of the Conflict Over the Logging of
Native Forests in the South-west of Western Australia

This thesis is presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

David Worth, AssDip Aero Eng (RMIT), MBA (UTS)

Murdoch University, WA Australia

2004
DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own account of my own, original research, that due acknowledgment of other sources has been made where used, and that it contains as its main content, work which has not been submitted for a degree at any tertiary education institution.

Signed:

_____________________________________________________

David John Worth
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to ensure that I acknowledge as many people as possible who have helped me over the past six years of my part-time study. I apologise to those I may inadvertently overlook. Firstly, I would like to thank all those who participate in social movements throughout Australia, as through their passion and commitment we get to know more about ourselves as Australians and gain a better understanding of our planet and the communities that inhabit it. In particular, I would like to sincerely thank the people from the pro- and anti-logging movements in Western Australia. Without their willingness to participate and assist my research I would have no dissertation. For many of them it was an important decision because I imposed on them at a time when their organisations were very active in the lead-up to the State election in early 2001.

I also need to gratefully acknowledge the two women in my research life. My wife, Fran, supported me over the whole journey by reading my drafts, correcting my grammar and suggesting changes. In the same vein, I need to thank my son, Daniel, for his patience. I now hope to reward him by locking away the computer and spending more time on his activities. Secondly, my supervisor, Emeritus Professor Cora Baldock, has made a large contribution to the final shape of my thesis. She became engaged with my project from our first discussions. Cora made valuable suggestions at critical times and provided consistent support along the way, with the odd ‘kick in the pants’ when I needed it.

My other ‘family’ has been the academics at Murdoch University and the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS), who offered me their support as well as part-time teaching over the past six years. Their friendship has allowed me to keep in touch with the academic community and developments in the disciplines
associated with my study. They and the other postgraduate students provided valuable sounding boards for my ideas. In particular, I would like to thank Associate Professor Mick Campion, Professor Trish Harris and Dr Dave Palmer for their support over my past four years at Murdoch University. Additionally, I would like to thank Jill Soderstrom and Georgina Wright for their professional administrative assistance and Leonie Stella for her accurate transcription of my interviews.

At the heart of any thesis is the knowledge that precedes the research. I would like to give a big ‘thanks’ to the Librarians at Murdoch University, University of WA, UTS, Sydney University (Fisher Library) as well as those at the State Library (Battye Collection) and the Department of Conservation and Land Management. In particular I would like to thank Niamh Corbert, Librarian at the Parliamentary Library and Information Services, Parliament of Western Australia and Helen Pecheniuk Oral History Reference Librarian at the National Library of Australia. Often I was unsure of what I was looking for and I appreciated the professionalism, knowledge and patience of the library staff I dealt with.

Finally, I would like to thank three people who encouraged my early steps in undertaking a research degree. Professor Mark Lyons, Associate Professor Jenny Onyx, and Dr Thekla Rura-Polley at UTS were important influences for me in the early stages and I appreciated their faith that an engineer with a business degree could make a contribution to the study of Australian social movements.
ABSTRACT

Over the past 30 years in Western Australia (WA), there has been a heated debate about the future use of the remaining temperate old-growth forests of karri and jarrah in the south-west of the State. This debate revolved around policy proposals from two social movements: one social movement wanted to preserve as much of the remaining old-growth forests as possible, and an opposing social movement supported a continued ‘sustainable’ logging of the forests for hardwood products. This research project undertook a comparative case study analysis of one WA organisation from each of these two social movements—Timber Communities Australia (TCA) on the pro-logging side and Liberals For Forests (LFF) on the anti-logging side. It drew on a macro-level European theoretical approach (New Social Movement theory) and a US organisational approach (Resource Mobilisation Theory). The study also investigated the extent to which these two social movement organisations (SMOs) had been effective in influencing the development of State forest policy. For this purpose Schumaker’s (1975) framework for judging the political effectiveness of social movements was used. The key research problem investigated in this thesis is why these two SMOs continued to debate the forest policy issue after more than 30 years of public controversy?

Interviews with a key range of stakeholders were the key research method of this study. Additionally, an investigation into important economic and social changes in the south west was undertaken using census and other data between 1971 and 2001 and this was supported by an historical analysis of the timber industry in WA’s south west. Finally, a 3-year study of the reporting of forest issues by two local and one national newspaper was completed. The 1998-2000
period was chosen for the newspaper analysis as this was when the new Regional Forest Agreement was being finalised.

This research shows that new values toward the old-growth forests developed among the WA public over the past 30 years and this has created an unbridgeable policy gap between those such as the TCA who wanted the past policies to continue and those such as the LFF who wanted to preserve the remaining native forests. ABS data confirm that the south-west region of WA changed dramatically between 1970 and 2000 as the wine and tourism industries developed and that these changes were different to those occurring in the other wine regions and non-city areas of Australia. As the population increased in this region, a key segment attracted by these new employment opportunities were middle class, well-educated people with new values toward the natural environment.

The interview and newspaper article data clearly showed that the debate in WA in the late 1990s over the proposed RFA provided a new political opportunity for the anti-logging movement to raise their concerns and to establish a renewed public debate about the appropriateness of the WA forest policies. This came at a time when the traditional policy power of the timber industry stakeholders and the government department in charge of the forests (Conservation And Land Management) had been dramatically diminished. The combination of these factors led to the election of the new ALP government and the introduction of a new, non-logging policy for WA’s old-growth native forests.
**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Declaration</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tables and Figures</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1- INTRODUCTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Aims of the Research</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 The Relevance of Social Movements</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 The Research Setting</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Outline of My Thesis</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2- LITERATURE SOURCES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Introduction</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Macro Level Interactions</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Organisational Effectiveness Approaches</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 An Intra-Organisation Approach- Resource Mobilisation</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 An Integrating Approach- Policy Networks</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Conclusion</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3- RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Introduction</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Operationalising the Research Question</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Research Period</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Data Collection</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Data Analysis</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6 Conclusion</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4- EARLY HISTORY OF THE FOREST INDUSTRY: from pre-colonial times to 1920</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Introduction</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Pre-Colonial Episteme (to 1829) - Aboriginal Use of the Forests</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Colonial Episteme (1829 to 1920) -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Establishment of Commercial Logging</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 The Growing Economic Value of WA’s Timber Industry</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 Conclusion</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5- SCIENTIFIC EPISTEME: from 1920 to 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Introduction</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Royal Commissions and their Effect</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 The Role of Science in Government Forest Policy</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 The National RFA Process</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5 The Forest Debate In Hansard</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6 The Declining Value of WA’s Timber Industry</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDICES

Appendix 1 - Focus Group Question Schedule 349
Appendix 2 - Letter to Proposed Interviewees 350
Appendix 3 - Individual Interview Question Guide 351
Appendix 4 - Annual Timber Export Value From WA (1845-1922) 352
Appendix 5 - Election Results for the District of Alfred Cove (State General) 353
Appendix 6 - WA State General Election- Party Results (1996 & 2001) 354
Appendix 9 - Terms Mentioned in Hansard (1970-1989) 358

BIBLIOGRAPHY 360
**TABLES AND FIGURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>A Summary of Forested Areas in Selected Countries (1971)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>A Summary of Forested Areas in Selected Countries (1990s)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Amount of Different Types of Forests in Australia (2000)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Interviews with Primary Stakeholders</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Interviews with Case Study Stakeholders</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Interviews with Secondary Sources</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Structure of the Editions of <em>The West Australian</em> (12-17 July 1999)</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Estimate of Non-Aboriginal Population of WA (1829-1900)</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Timber Exports in the Early Days of Colonisation</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Timber Exports in Comparison to Wool Exports</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Timber Exports from WA in the Period Before WW1</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Export Value of WA’s MajorExports Before WW1</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Mentions of ‘RFA’ and ‘Forest’ in Hansard by Party (1998-2000)</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>End of the Century WA Timber Export Data</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>End of the Century Comparison of WA Export Data</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Value and Size of Selected WA Resource Exports</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Australian &amp; WA Woodchip Data (1995-2000)</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Union Membership in WA and Australia (1986-2001)</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>WA Agriculture &amp; Forestry Union Membership (1986-2001)</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>WA Wine Grape Production and Wineries</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Australian &amp; WA Wine Exports (2000)</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>WA Grape Exports 1990-2000</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>South-West Wine Industry Employment (2000)</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Proportion of People Concerned About Environmental Problems (1992-2001)</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Proportion of State-owned Forests in WA</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Changes in Selected LGA Populations (1971-2001)</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>LGA Comparison of Population Cohorts (1971-2001)</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>Unemployment Rates (2001)</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>WA Forestry Employment by Gender (1971-1996)</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>University Qualifications (1971-2001)</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>University Enrolment (1971-1996)</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>1996 Median Weekly Earnings for Men and Women</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Stakeholders Judgement on Political Effectiveness</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>The Number of Forest Articles Published (1998-2000)</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>The Number of Forest Articles Published Each Month in WA Newspapers (1998-2000)</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>The Number of Forest Articles Published Each Day- <em>The Sunday Times &amp; The West Australian</em> (1998-2000)</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Editorials on Forests Issues (1998-99)</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8.5 - Coverage for Sourced Organisations in *The West Australian* (column cms) (1998-2000) 272
Table 8.6 - Journalists Writing on Forests Issues in *The West Australian* (1998-2000) 274
Table 8.7 - Stakeholder Articles in *The West Australian* (1998 - 2000) 277
Table 8.8 - Article Location in *The West Australian* (1998 to 2000) 278
Table 8.9 - Examples of Minor Changes in Metro Edition Headlines 283
Table 8.10 - Examples of Headlines Altered in Metro Edition 284
Table 8.11 - Articles Added to the Metro Edition of *The West Australian* 286

Table 9.1 - Forest Policy Network Stakeholders (1970-2000) 312

Figure 1A - Depiction of the founding of the new Swan River Colony 3
Figure 1B - Map of Western Australia 13
Figure 4A - Felling karri by axe and cross-cut saw 82
Figure 4B - Native Timber Exports from WA (1845 to 1890) 95
Figure 4C - Native Timber Exports from WA (1891 to 1922) 96
Figure 5A – 1923 Cartoon from the *Western Mail* 109
Figure 5B - Mentions of CALM in Hansard (1983-2000) 136
Figure 5C – Costs and Revenues of Australia’s Forest Services (1920-1980) 144
Figure 5D – CALM Forest Royalties (1988-1998) 145
Figure 5E - Changes in Sawmill Employees in Australia (1920-1983) 146
Figure 5F - Changes in Jarrah Timber Distribution (1829-2000) 148

Figure 6A- Comment on the apparent political power of timber workers and green supporters 159
Figure 6B - National Membership of ACF & TWS (1967- 1992) 169
Figure 6C - Map of LGAs in the South-west 178
Figure 6D - South-west Regional Population Growth (1971-1996) 180
Figure 6E - LGA Population Distribution (1996) 183
Figure 6F - Changes in Religious Affiliation (1971-2001) 192
Figure 6G - Selected 1996 Median Annual Earnings Distribution 196
Figure 6H - 1996 Median Annual Earnings Distribution- 3 South-west LGAs and Nedlands 197

Figure 8A - The Amount of Coverage of Forest Issues Each Month in WA Newspapers (1998-2000) 259
Figure 9A - Cartoon on the intervention of Archbishop Carnley 297
Figure 9B - Population Growth in Manjimup and Augusta-Margaret River LGAs (1971-2001) 306
Figure 10A - Even the cartoonist feels the pressure 333
ACRONYMS

Australian States-
NSW- New South Wales
VIC- Victoria
QLD- Queensland
WA- Western Australia
SA- South Australia
TAS- Tasmania
ACT- Australian Capital Territory
NT- Northern Territory

AAP Australian Associated Press
ABARE Australian Bureau of Agricultural Research Economics
ABC Australian Broadcasting Corporation
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics
AFFA Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry Australia Department
AFL- Australian Football League
ALP Australian Labor Party
CALM Department of Conservation and Land Management
CCWA Conservation Council of WA
COAG Coalition of Australian Governments
CTRC Conservation Through Reserves Committee
DLP- Democratic Labor Party
EPA Environment Protection Authority
FIFWA Forest Industries Federation of WA
FPS Forest Protection Society (now TCA)
MP Member of Parliament
RAC Resource Assessments Commission
RFA Regional Forest Agreement
LFF Liberals For Forests
NLA National Library of Australia
SW South-west
TCA Timber Communities Australia
TLC Trades and Labour Council (now Unions WA)
TWS The Wilderness Society
WA Western Australia
WAFA West Australian Forests Alliance
Chapter 1- INTRODUCTION

1.1 AIMS OF THE RESEARCH

The history of European settlement of Western Australia (WA) has been intimately intertwined with the area of eucalyptus hard wood forests of the south-west region. The founding of the Swan River colony and the naming of its capital Perth was signified by the felling of a jarrah tree near the location of the present Town Hall by the wife of the captain of “HMS Sulphur” on the 12th August, 1829 (www.celebratewa.com.au). The exploitation of these forests was to prove important to the colony’s initial survival and then prospering in the 20th Century. It would be nearly another 175 years after the conclusion of the speeches and rifle volleys before the relationship of the non-indigenous people of WA to their native forests changed to an approach based on conservation. This change is the focus of my research project.

The image of the eucalyptus tree permeates many parts of Australian culture- from tourist tea towels to the magnificent woven Arthur Boyd artwork.
hanging in the nation’s Parliament House; from the smell of its oil to its impact on literature (eg the recent award-winning book *Eucalyptus* by Murray Bail (1998)). This image constantly reminds us of Australia’s unique flora and associated landscapes. As an example of the early symbolic power of eucalyptus trees, over 200 avenues of honour were planted with these trees in regional Australian cities at the end of World War 1 in honour of young Australians who had lost their lives (Dargavel, 1999: 4). This image of the eucalyptus tree is an evocative one and has helped shape the attitude of Australians to their nation (Bolton, 1999: 29). This factor may well be of great significance in the policy conflict over whether to continue logging the remaining native eucalyptus forests in the south-west of WA.

My thesis explores the change in the approach to the forests by the government and people of WA from one of exploitation at the establishment of the colony to one of conservation with the election of the new Australian Labor Party (ALP) government in 2001. In particular, I focus on the period since 1970 when environmental groups first formed in WA to challenge the official policy approach to the logging of old-growth forests.¹ I have gathered a wide range of data that is particularly extensive in the three-year period between 1998-2000 when the WA Government was finalising its Regional Forest Agreement (RFA). The WA RFA was part of a national process to establish agreed logging levels for WA’s native forests for the next 20 years.

¹ Environmental concern has been expressed by Australians for more than 150 years. Hancock (1972: 57) unearthed an early report from the Polish explorer Strzelecki to Governor Gipps in 1841 that described the previously unreported environmental damage done by the squatters and other early European land clearers in NSW. A similar picture of early environmental spoilage was given by Henry Haygarth, an English squatter recounting his 8 years in the Monaro district (Hancock: 60).
Over the past 30 years there has been a heightened debate in WA about the future use of the remaining temperate old-growth forests of karri and jarrah\(^2\) in the south-west. This debate revolved around policy proposals from two social movements: one social movement wanted to preserve as much of the remaining old-growth forests as possible, and an opposing countermovement supported the continued ‘sustainable’ logging of the forests for timber products. Each of these social movements was composed of a number of different individual social movement organisations, some of which operated in the urban region around Perth, some in the forested areas south-west of Perth and some in both.

My research project involved a comparative case study analysis of one WA organisation from each of these two social movements- the Liberals for Forests (LFF) and Timber Communities Australia (TCA). The aim of my study was to investigate the extent to which these two WA social movement organisations (SMOs) have been effective in influencing the development of State forest policy, as judged by some of their members and individual and organisational stakeholders influential in the WA forest policy network. These two organisations were not only part of two social movements campaigning on this policy from an opposite perspective, but can also be seen as particular types of nonprofit organisations- ‘advocacy organisations’.

The key research problem I investigated is why these two SMOs on the opposite side of the logging policy conflict continued to debate the government

\(^2\) Both trees are part of the 600 species of Australian trees making up the *Eucalyptus* order- karri (*Eucalyptus diversicolor*) and jarrah (*Eucalyptus marginata*) (Lines, 1991: 8).
policy approach during more than 30 years of public controversy. Implicit in this research problem is the knowledge that other major Australian environmental debates between 1970 and 2000 were concluded in a much shorter period. The campaign to protect the internationally-known Great Barrier Reef from oil drilling took from 1963 to 1975 - a period of 12 years (Wright, 1996: 2) while the 1970s campaign to protect Fraser Island from sandmining took six years (Holzworth, 1999: 210). This is not to suggest that there is a ‘normal’ period of conflict for Australian social movements engaged in issues around the environment, but that the forest policy conflict in WA took a particularly long time to resolve. Why was the native forest debate in WA not resolved one way or the other before 2000? Why was one of these two SMOs not clearly seen as a ‘winner’ in policy terms in a shorter period? Could this lack of resolution of the conflict be explained in terms of the effectiveness of these organisations?

My research was inspired by a desire to understand social change in an important Australian policy setting. Struggling as an activist in peace and environment organisations in the 1970s and 1980s, I often reflected on whether or not we were effective in achieving our aims. How should a SMO assess or determine which tactics and strategies to use to achieve the desired impact? My interest in nonprofit organisations (NPOs) and their effectiveness grew from these years of working for social change in various Australian advocacy

---

3 The origin of the debate in Australia over the logging and woodchipping of native forests has been traced by Dargavel (1995: 163) to the seminal publication by Val and Richard Routley in 1973 of The Fight for the Forests: The Takeover of Australian Forests for Pines, Woodchips and Intensive Forestry.


5 As I explain in more detail below, while the research was being undertaken it looked as if the policy conflict would continue under a new Coalition government. However, in early 2001 the Australian Labor Party (ALP) won government and stopped the logging of most of the remaining old-growth forest in WA.

Page 6
organisations\(^7\) that were part of broader social movements.\(^8\) My inquiry is similar to that expressed at an earlier time by the well-known American political scientist Schattschneider (1975: v), “The great problem in American politics is: What makes things happen?” In my case I am concerned with what stopped ‘things’ from happening in the WA forest policy setting. What allowed the supporters of policies that supported the logging the native forests to maintain them, despite wide public support for an alternate policy approach based on the halting of logging?

1.2 THE RELEVANCE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The growth of the social movement literature since the 1960s reflects the theoretical importance of social movements, and their constituent movement organisations, which have impacted on various policy domains, particularly in developed (or western) countries such as Australia. This literature has crossed many academic discipline boundaries, such as sociology, political science, history, social psychology and organisational science. My research project extends research undertaken on social movements in other social contexts (mainly European and American). It also focuses on advocacy organisations- an important, but little-studied, social movement sub-sector. The overarching construct to be used in this project is organisational effectiveness; in this case the ability of the chosen case study organisations to affect government policy in relation to WA’s

---

\(^6\) Nonprofit organisations are allowed to make surpluses, but the key distinction between them and public companies is that any surpluses are not allowed to be distributed to their members or staff (Lyons, 2001: 5). NPOs include service-based organisations as well as advocacy ones such as environmental organisations.

\(^7\) US and European literature often use the term social movement organisation (SMO) in the same sense as I use advocacy organisation.
remaining native forests. Goodman and Pennings identified effectiveness as one of the primary theoretical approaches in organisational science:

Effectiveness is one of the strongest and most persistent themes in the literature on organisations. Most theories of organisations introduce effectiveness considerations, and many research reports comparing organisations claim to speak to effectiveness issues. Despite the considerable activity, there is little evidence of any cumulation of knowledge concerning the relationship of organisational characteristics to effectiveness (1981: 106).

Ian Marsh (1989b: 230) declared that in Australia ‘every major addition to the political agenda in the past decade was originally championed by an issue movement’. This suggested the importance of studying social movements in an Australian policy setting. Marsh described (p229) the activities of organisations opposed to the continuation of logging, such as those studied here, as ‘vanguard indicators’ of important changes in public opinion. The idea of a social movement is an elusive one and hard to define conceptually. Tarrow (1983: 5) suggested that the purpose of social movements can be inferred from the activities of organisations claiming to be part of it. Earlier, in his seminal work, Heberle (1951: 6) stressed that the main criterion of a social movement was that it aimed to bring about ‘fundamental changes in the social order’. Individual movement organisations that are part of important social movements range from those that seek dramatic change (eg an organisation campaigning for separate women’s refuges as part of the broader women’s movement) to those that may not have such dramatic goals as those indicated by Heberle (eg women’s business networks).

As an example, the Women’s Electoral Lobby (WEL) is a NPO and is one organisation in the broader Australian women’s movement.
The Typology of the Third Sector: Nonprofit, SMOs, and Advocacy

Organizations

There is a plethora of terms used to describe the organisations at the centre of this research project. At its broadest, the nonprofit sector can be defined as those non-government and non-business organisations which are unable to distribute any surplus or profit to their members (Hansmann 1987: 28). Generally, this ‘non-distribution’ criterion is a legislative requirement and is reflected in the written constitutions of these organisations that are commonly termed nonprofit organisations (NPOs) in the US. However, in Australia these organisations are generally described as nongovernment organisations (NGOs). This term does not clearly differentiate between organisations providing social services on behalf of government and those challenging government policies. This first group of organisations is often referred to as the charitable sector while the second group as advocacy, issue or lobby groups (Lyons, 2001: 7).

The concept of the ‘Third Sector’ is used in continental Europe instead of the term NGO or NPO to refer to organisations that are democratically controlled and are active in political and solidarity activities (Lyons, 2001: 8). In the US setting, a clear differentiation is made between nonprofit organisations seeking policy changes on behalf of the general public (social movement organisations) and those seeking changes on behalf of a discreet public group (interest group) such as business lobby groups, trade unions and religious organisations. Melucci (1980: 202) also made an important contribution in regard to clarifying the distinction of social movement organisations (SMOs) from other nonprofit organisations.

---

9 The Industry Commission (1995: 2) developed a new term to describe Australian charitable organisations as ‘Community Social Welfare Organisations’ but its use has not been widely adopted.
organisations. He proposed SMOs behave in ways that “…trangress the norms that have been institutionalised in social roles, which go beyond the rules of the political system…” In the later chapters of my thesis which look at the actions of anti-logging protestors, this use of illegal protest activities (Capp, 1998j: 10) will be seen as an important political resource.

In my dissertation I use the term SMO to describe the two organisations that are at the centre of my research. These SMOs are part of separate movements that in turn are one sector in the broader Australian nonprofit community. I define them as advocacy organisations using an amended version of Craig Jenkin’s widely cited definition:

An advocacy organisation is one that attempts to influence the social and political decisions of an institutional elite, the outcomes of which benefit a broader range of society than just its own members (1987: 297).

**The Australian Nonprofit Sector**

The Australian nonprofit sector ranges from small voluntary groups to large hospitals and universities, from sports clubs to unions and political parties. Lyons (2001: 17) estimated that in 1996 the Australian nonprofit sector comprised over 500,000 organisations of which 34,000 employed about 630,000 paid staff, or over 7% of Australia’s workforce. The rest were small groups that used volunteer workers rather than paid staff. During the 1995-96 period, it was estimated that the nonprofit sector of the Australian economy spent between Aus$27-43 billion (Lyons & Hocking, 1998: 1). This level of expenditure was equivalent to the combined annual expenditure of Australia’s two largest state governments—Victoria and New South Wales.
The study by Lyons and Hocking (1998: 3) also indicated that about 47,000 people were employed in the interest group sub-sector (which in their definition includes what I call ‘advocacy organisations’) and these organisations spent about Aus$3 billion during 1995-96. Additionally, Lyons and Hocking (p4) estimated that Australians over the age of 15 volunteered approximately 20 million hours to these interest groups.\textsuperscript{10} This statistic is equivalent to about one-tenth of the Australian public volunteering one hour per month to interest or advocacy groups to try and assist them achieve the social changes the groups were working towards.

Despite all of this activity by Australians aimed at changing important aspects of Australia’s political and social landscape, there has been no research undertaken as to the effectiveness of Australian advocacy organisations in achieving new policy proposals. Such a research ‘gap’ was identified earlier by Freeman (1978: 4) in her study of the US feminist movement and she commented, “The study of social movements and that of public policy are two fields that have heretofore been treated primarily as distinct and unrelated areas in the scholarly literature”. My thesis brings these two fields together in the setting of the WA forest policy network. I provide a bridge across this research ‘gap’ by viewing the operations of the two SMOs through the lens of organisational effectiveness.

1.3 THE RESEARCH SETTING

The area containing the native forests in the south-west of WA is banded by the 1000 mm rainfall line in the west and the 250mm line to the east (Green, 1987: 1). The Darling Range (just 700m in height) forms the spine of the area and

\textsuperscript{10} Lyons (2001: 17) estimated that in total, Australians volunteered over 370 million hours to the nonprofit sector in 1994-95.
serves as a watershed, with nearly 20 rivers running to the coast (see Figure 1B
below). The forest debate is over the future of the native jarrah and karri trees,
with the later species limited to a small area only 40km from the coast (White &
Underwood, 1988: 32). The total population in WA in 2000 was about 1.89
million people with most (1.39 million) residing in the capital city of Perth and its
surrounding suburbs (ABS, 2002). At that time, approximately 19,000 people
lived in the south-west region containing most of the remaining native old-growth
and regrowth forests. This is roughly the very small area bounded by the coast and
a line between Busselton on the Indian Ocean coastline and Albany on the
Southern Ocean.
Table 1.1 below outlines Australia’s position in comparison to the amount of forest cover enjoyed by other countries with large land areas in the early 1970s. This is about the time that criticism commenced by social movements of the WA State Government’s forest policy approach to the logging of its remaining native forests. The table dramatically shows the great disparity between the forest cover
of the Australian continent and other countries. Australia’s situation, with a small amount of forest coverage, is not due solely to the clearing of native forests since European colonisation but is also due to its unique geological structure and vast areas with very low levels of rainfall.

Table 1.1- A Summary of Forested Areas in Selected Countries (1971)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Area of Forest (mill. ha)</th>
<th>Total Area (mill. ha)</th>
<th>% Forest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>997</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(FAO, 1971 cited in Routley & Routley, 1973: 4)

Table 1.2 contains more recent information about forest cover for the selected countries. These later figures indicate that Australia’s proportion of forest cover has changed little since the heightened debate over forests began in the early 1970s. Canada’s forest resources have been dramatically reduced since the 1970s figures due to the actual measurement of forest resources in Canadian provinces that had previously only been estimated (ECE/FAO, 2000: 62).

11 In exploring the various reasons for the length of the conflict over the use of WA’s native forests, and the bitterness of the debate, some authors (Routley and Routley, 1973: 5) have suggested that it lay in the relatively small size of Australia’s remaining native forests.

12 The ECE/FAO publication actually lists Australia’s forest resources as 157 million ha but it included 112 million ha of woodlands (ECE/FAO, 2000: 71) not included by other sources of Australian forest statistics- such as ABARE (2001: 58).
Table 1.2- A Summary of Forested Areas in Selected Countries (1990s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Area of Forest (mill. ha)</th>
<th>Total Area (mill. ha)</th>
<th>% Forest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia¹</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil²</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada³</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>997</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India⁴</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA⁵</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1,3 & 5- ECE/FAO, 2000: 62; 2 & 4- FAO, 1994: 217)

Table 1.3 highlights the different types of forest and woodland cover for Australia’s 768 million ha at the end of the 20th Century. It shows that WA has a lower proportion than the Australian average for all types of forest cover and particularly for the closed forest types such as the jarrah and karri forest of the south-west of WA that are at the centre of the conflict between the countermovements (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996: 1628). Further information about WA’s forests and the economic impact of its logging industry is provided in Chapters 4 and 5. At this stage, this information is provided to highlight the unusually small amount of forest cover in Australia and specifically in WA.

Table 1.3- Amount of Different Types of Forests in Australia (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Forest/Woodland</th>
<th>Area (million ha)</th>
<th>% of Land (Aust)</th>
<th>% of Land (WA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closed forest</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open forest</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantation</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodland</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FOREST</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ABARE, 2001: 59)
The forests of WA and the economic and social activities of the south-west region since colonisation have been recognised as rich research sites by other authors (eg Bolton, 1972; Hasluck, 1942). There is also some, albeit little, written on the evolving timber industry and the impact of the growth of the environment movement since the early 1970s. The next section summarises some of these earlier efforts.

**Previous Research**

The debate over the logging of native forests in WA from 1970 to 2000 generated deep feelings and emotional language about the opposing policy positions of the SMOs. I had presumed the passionate positions taken by the countermovements in regard to the logging of WA’s native forests would have generated many research projects exploring the theoretical implications of the conflict. However, there seems to have been little research undertaken in WA in this period about the vigorous debate over logging policy and the alternate cultural and economic approaches proposed by the various SMOs in this policy network. I will now detail those publications that proved of value to my research.

Although not on the forest issue, Frawley’s BA (Hons) research project (1976) appears to be the earliest on conservation and environment issues in WA and the response of local communities affected by particular development proposals. His survey-based research originated in the Geography Department of the University of WA and focused on the response by local residents to a proposal to mine the Augusta River estuary in the south-west of WA. In a later publication, Frawley (1987: 4) provided an interesting insight in his historical exploration on the relationship between changing images of the environment held by Australians.
(and those published in the media) and subsequent environment management approaches. Frawley (1987: 1) believed that Australians respond differently to their environment than, say, Americans, and so developed a framework that classified public images of the environment into five ‘visions’: scientific, romantic, colonial, national and ecological. His framework was based on Australia’s particular history of Aboriginal use of nature and the great changes to the natural environment brought about by European colonisation since the late 18th Century. I have used his insight about the unique response of Australians and his five-vision framework to develop my research approach.

Another early effort, and the first on WA forest issues13, was the PhD research undertaken by Christine Sharp (1983) at Murdoch University. Her study is of interest to me because it utilised a similar interview-based methodology and involved a number of stakeholders also important to my study, eg the Trades and Labor Council (TLC), CALM (the government department responsible for the management of WA forests) and ALP members of parliament. An interesting aspect of Sharp’s research is that she found (p349) in 25 pages of debate in Hansard14 by various politicians over the proposed initial enabling legislation for woodchipping in 1969 not one mention of the words ‘conservation’ or ‘environment’. She proposed that this analysis of Hansard was one way of understanding the initial lack of policy responsiveness in WA to the emerging demands by environmentalists for a new policy approach to the forests. Her research indicated that parliamentarians used a different language to debate these issues to that used by the emerging social movements. The growth of public

13 Robertson (1956) thesis on the WA timber industry was a history of its early growth, particularly the period between 1829 and 1913.
interest in environmental issues in regard to the forest increased rapidly after the establishment of the Campaign to Save Native Forests (CSNF) in 1969, the same year that the woodchipping debate occurred in the WA State Parliament.

Sharp (1995) returned to the forest policy issue in a later report and proposed that after 25 years of conflict, the pro-logging and anti-logging proponents could be brought together around a compromise centred on a small amount of logging of old-growth forests and the conservation of the rest.\textsuperscript{15} She suggested (p1) “Full old-growth sustainability would be achieved by reducing the logging rate in the jarrah forest to one-third of current levels and that in the karri to one-fifth of the existing cut”. She also suggested that lower quality hard woods could be provided by plantation timber to replace native jarrah and karri timber.

The main anti-logging groups in the early 1980s (the Conservation Council of WA (CCWA), the CSNF and the SW Forests Defence Foundation) produced an early Report that responded to the Forests Department’s General Working Plan No. 87. They argued that Working Plan No. 87 provided for ‘a continuing over-cutting of karri’ (1982: 1). The CCWA \textit{et al.} report instead proposed a substantial drop in karri logging rates and the reservation of 34\% of the karri forests (point 5.1). The CSNF followed in 1985 with a report that summarised the history of the forest industry in WA and proposed a detailed range of alternative use of the native forests based on tourism and timber plantations.

Thompson and Tracy (1995) in a more recent research paper undertook an economic analysis of the woodchipping operations in WA. They made interesting

\textsuperscript{14} Hansard is the public record of debate in the State and federal parliaments.
\textsuperscript{15} This is a similar policy approach to that taken to the 2001 State election by the ALP but Sharp’s proposed reductions in 1995 were substantially less than proposed by the ALP’s forest policy six years later.
sociological comments (similar to Sharp’s) on the need for the environmental
groups to reach a compromise with the pro-logging proponents and not to ignore
class and other social inequalities that would be created by the sudden cessation of
logging of old-growth forests. Thompson and Tracy (1995: 18) argued for the
need for political parties to ensure that any dislocations due to new pro-
conservationist policies are ameliorated for loggers, their families and their local
communities. They argued for ‘empathetic’ communication between each side,
saying that:

Timber workers and those dependent on timber communities will not be argued
out of or converted from their position of fear and loathing. They can only be

In an Honours thesis Cherrie (1998) undertook a case study of two south-
west timber towns, Pemberton and Northcliffe, and explored the social and
economic impacts of changes in forest policy. The controversy over the national
Regional Forest Agreement process around Australia, and especially in WA
(discussed in Chapter 5 below), was explored both by Bigler Cole (1998) and
Carosone (1999) in theses. The social impact of forest policy in rural WA was
further explored in the most recent university research project- a PhD thesis
written by Kelly (2000). In her research, Kelly undertook survey research of four
local rural communities in the south-west of WA that would be affected by the
lower forest logging limits proposed by the new RFA in 1999. Kelly was
particularly interested in the psychological aspects of rural communities dealing
with rapid policy change. Her results indicated (2000: xvi) that “a community’s
mobilisation of collective strategies appears to be dependent on the assessment of
the change event, the nature of the event and the characteristics of the
community”. The critical factor seemed to Kelly to be the perceived rate of change felt by the affected communities.16

1.4 OUTLINE OF MY THESIS

Following this Introductory Chapter, there will be two chapters that outline the core theoretical approaches underpinning this project and the research methodology I utilised. As described in Chapter 2, this project combines two theoretical approaches that explore the policy conflict over native forests. Rather than just provide an historical description of an Australian environment movement such as that written by Hutton and Connors (1999) or describe an important policy advance obtained by an environment organisation (Walker, 1989) I use these theories to understand the forest conflict in a variety of ways. In terms of my project, the development of the modern environment movement in Australia has paralleled that of the US and Western European ones (Papadakis, 1993: 2) and literature on these similar overseas advocacy organisations proved useful to my project. My research draws on a macro-level European theoretical approach (New Social Movement theory) and a US organisational approach (Resource Mobilization Theory). The results of my research were enriched by comparing these two approaches, especially as the study of social movements by researchers in Europe and the US has taken such different directions even though the movements they study are similar (Klandermans, 1994: 19).

16 This outcome would seem to support the demand by Thompson and Tracey (above) for careful negotiation with the communities in the south-west that are to be affected by any lower logging limits.
Chapter 2 also provides a short summary of the study of organisational effectiveness over the past 50 years. I have used the current understanding of how stakeholders judge the effectiveness of organisations to provide a way of bringing together the RMT and NSM literatures so that I can study the interaction of my selected organisations at three levels: the macro level, the inter-organisational level and the intra-organisational one.

In Chapter 3 I describe the primary methodology of a series of interviews that I undertook with selected stakeholders in the WA forest policy network. Further data to support the interview material were gathered from a national newspaper and the two local WA newspapers for the period 1998-2000. I analysed these paper data to investigate various claims made by the interviewees in regard to the power of the media to hinder or assist advocacy campaigns such as those undertaken by my two SMOs. To make sense of events in the late 1990s in regard to the debate over the RFA, I gathered some historical material and undertook a number of secondary interviews with people who had written about aspects of the controversy over the WA logging industry.

This chapter also describes my use of Census data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) for the period 1970-2000 and research on the importance of timber exports to the WA economy since the 1840s (eg Appleyard, 1987; Woods and Forests Department, 1901). These data were used to try and make sense of economic and demographic changes that had occurred in the south-west region that could help explain my research question on why the conflict had endured for so long. I also collected additional ABS data relating to the timber industry and other south-west industries such as wine and tourism. Finally, I
report on my use of material from Hansard records of the parliamentary debates in WA’s two houses of parliament.

Following these chapters will be three chapters that use mostly secondary sources to provide a historical setting for the research. Following Frawley (1987: 1), I propose that the relationship of the WA public and government to native forests can be separated into four periods or epistemes: pre-colonial (before 1829), colonial (1829-1920), scientific (1920-2000) and ecological (post-2001). In Chapters 4 to 6 I provide material to support my thesis about framing these periods in this way. The historical data I collected for these periods help me understand the reasons that delayed the move from the scientific to ecological episteme.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide a brief summary of the history of the WA forest industry since its establishment in the early 1840s. They provide evidence for an exploitative approach to WA native forests by both the public and policy makers and outline the different management approaches used by the Lands and Forest Departments. Chapter 5 also highlights the decline in economic importance of the timber exports to the State’s income since the 1950s and the growth of alternate industries in the south-west region. In this chapter I draw attention to the limited role played by the main political parties in parliamentary debate about the changing public attitude to the environment and the continued logging of old-growth forests recommended by the Regional Forest Agreement (RFA).

Chapter 6 provides evidence for the development of a new ecological episteme. I also provide in Chapter 6 a range of demographic and economic factors for selected Local Government Areas (LGAs) in the south-west region WA over the period 1970-2000 sourced from the national Census. I argue that the
changes I uncover from these data contributed to new public values toward the logging of native forests in WA at the end of the 1990s. The chapter concludes with a brief outline of the outcome of the 2001 State election. This election brought the ALP unexpectedly to power and the Gallop Government introduced policies that brought to an end the logging of old-growth forests.

The next section of my thesis consists of two chapters relating to my own findings for the period between 1998-2000. It was during this time that the RFA was finalised. Chapter 7 reports data I obtained from interviews with more than 30 people active in the forest policy network in WA during 1998-2000. This chapter reports the evaluations given by the interviewees on the effectiveness of both the LFF and the TCA. It also explores the interviewees’ responses to what resources were important to their campaigns, in particular what role the media played in the debate about the development of the new RFA.

Chapter 8 explores the role of the media as an important resource for SMOs campaigning in WA on forest policy. It analyses the articles published on forest issues during 1998-2000 in the local newspapers, The West Australian and The Sunday Times, and the national newspaper, The Australian. I develop a number of means to analyse these newspaper data to explore allegations of bias made by some interviewees about the role of The West Australian in the debate over the RFA. My analysis also assisted me in understanding the changing public attitude to the logging of native forests that led to the election of the ALP in 2001.

In Chapter 9 I draw together the data I collected for my project and synthesise them. I identify factors at the macro, inter-organisational and intra-organisational levels that I believe have been important in concluding this 30-year debate. Finally, in Chapter 10 I conclude with the main theoretical issues.
emerging from my research and I suggest several further areas for fruitful research. My research outcomes are particularly important to the future strategies of similar SMOs operating within Australia and how effective they judge their campaigns to be.
Chapter 2- LITERATURE SOURCES

2.1 INTRODUCTION

My research project took place within a complex social setting. WA social movements opposed one another over a long period and public attitudes towards the logging of native forests shifted dramatically over the last 30 years (see Chapter 5). This complexity called for the use of a number of different theoretical perspectives to provide insights and answers to the research question. This chapter introduces the key theoretical approaches utilised in my research. I chose these approaches to assist me to understand the core research questions of how effective had the two opposed social movements been in making an impact on government forest policies and why the debate over logging continued for so long?

The research problem outlined in Chapter 1 is in essence one of organisational effectiveness. It involves trying to understand the twin, but related, questions of “Why have the social movement organisations (SMOs) campaigning to ban the logging of native forests in WA taken so long to have their policies adopted by the State Government?” and “Why have those SMOs who supported the continuation of logging been unable to convince the majority of the public of their position?”. These questions require theorising in three different ways as they relate to the interaction of the two SMOs at three different levels within WA society:

i) At the macro societal level, are there factors that have delayed policy change that can be uncovered by literature associated with either the traditional class-based sociological approach or the New Social Movement approach?
ii) At the inter-organisational level, how have the two organisations interrelated within the forest policy network and how have their activities impacted on the judgements of their own members and others about their effectiveness? This will require an understanding of the literature providing the latest approaches to the concept of organisational effectiveness.

iii) At the intra-organisational level, are there key resources managed by either of the two case study groups that have proven to be critical to advancing or retarding the forest policy process? The literature associated with the Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) will prove to be of value in analysing this question.

The general study of nonprofit organisations and social movement organisations in countries such as Australia is undertaken in a wide range of social science disciplines such as sociology, political science, history, social psychology, economics and organisational science. Meyer (2002: pp4-5) proposed that the development of the study of social movements would be enhanced by research that utilised different levels of analysis, was based on a cross-discipline approach and studied multiple movements. The methodology I developed reflects these criteria. Staggenborg (2002: 124) also suggested that a better insight into the complex workings of a SMO was provided by looking at their operations and interactions at the macro-organisational and organisational-micro boundaries.¹ I have limited my study to the macro and organisational level interactions given the difficulty of including micro or social psychological insights into the forest debate

¹ Staggenborg (2002: 124) proposed the term ‘meso’ for the organisational level of society and suggested that research at this level of activity had been an important focus for research into SMOs in the last decade.
as well. This chapter provides an introduction to the literature from the disciplines I used in my research to analyse the activities of the SMOs at the three different levels of interaction.

The literatures described below helped me frame the questions I used in the interview phase of my research. They also provided an understanding of the richness of data that could be gathered about the conflict over WA’s forest policy and the contested nature of the approaches to environmental policies used in similar research settings in other countries. This range of literature on the study of SMOs outlined below also helped me decide at an early stage of the research on a qualitative approach, rather than a more quantitative one. This decision will be further explained in the next Chapter when I describe my research methodology.

In addition to the organisational effectiveness literature, I chose the Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) and New Social Movement (NSM) theoretical approaches, as I identified that they were the main frameworks associated with the study of SMOs over the past 30 years in the US and Europe respectively. These two regions have had different historical developments in their approach to the study of SMOs. Klandermans (1994: p19) was ‘amazed’ that the social movement literature in the US and Europe diverged so dramatically in its analysis of similar movements (eg the 1960s student movement) operating at the same time in both continents. He also (p29) noted how each theoretical approach was the opposite of the other and “the weakness of one appeared to be the other’s strength.”

Klandermans quoted Melucci as one of the European authors who thought that RMT focused too much on the ‘how’ of SMOs and too little on the ‘why’. Klandermans saw as the weakness of the NSM literature that it did not easily
explain why people are mobilised to join SMOs by particular grievances. The resource approach of the RMT helps understand this phenomenon. Whittier in a more recent paper (2002: 290) suggested that many US and European researchers are combining both approaches to gain a richer insight into the activities of SMOs. I followed Klandermans’ insight (1994: 29) that the two approaches complement each other by utilising both in my research.

2.2 MACRO LEVEL INTERACTIONS

While some authors contested the nomenclature of ‘new’ (Cohen, 1985: 663), most agreed that there was something worth studying about the range of social movements (such as peace, anti-nuclear, gender and environmental ones\(^2\)) that have proliferated in the developed, Western societies since the mid-1970s. What is worth studying, according to Cohen, is the rapidity of their formation, their replication in many Western countries and their impact on political systems. For my research project, the New Social Movement (NSM) literature assisted me in understanding that changes in public values affected the external political and social environment that both the anti- and pro-logging organisations operated within in WA.

The case for movements and organisations involved in campaigning on issues such as the environment being ‘new’ is often argued against the approach that ‘older’ movements were seen as movements of the working class opposed to the power of ‘capital’ (Burgmann, 1993: 5). Hence, the NSM approach defied earlier class-based understandings, such as Burgmann’s, of social movements. In

---

\(^2\) Kitschelt (1986: 82) provided an analysis of why SMOs in western democracies generally focused on one particular sector or issue.
her analysis of five Australian social movements, Burgmann (p5) stressed that the older movements were “movements by and for the working class” and that they were in stark contrast to later social movements. She later claimed (2003: 18) that NSMs maintained that oppression and domination were not just restricted to the workplace, that they had a middle class support base and their activists and intellectual core supporters were often derived from public sector employees such as teachers. Burgmann (1993: pp1-6) claimed that in their movement disputes this class of people were immune from the commercial and economic pressures that were a characteristic of the older movements. This then made NSMs a different type of organisation campaigning in different ways to the older class-based ones.

The generally middle class background of participants in the NSMs was seen as an important factor by a number of other writers, but disputed by Pakulski (1991: 26) who claims that there were important differences in NSM membership between different countries. Pakulski’s claims reflected those of Berger et al. (1973: 170) who highlighted the importance of “intellectuals” as being the social class that acted as a ‘carrier group’ for new ideologies and values in western societies. Likewise, Scott (1990: 138), while recognising that the new politics appeal to more than class interests, stated that NSMs “are typically either predominantly movements of the educated middle classes, especially the ‘new middle class’, or of the most educated/privileged section of the less privileged groups.” The involvement of middle class and intellectual sectors of WA society is an important point for my research to explore.

The NSM theoretical paradigm argues that conflictual collective action by individuals acting together in organisations against the State is ‘normal’, and that members and participants of SMOs are rational, well-integrated members of the
society they live in (Cohen, 1985: 673). This is a different perspective to that of the earlier collective behaviour theorists, in the main US sociologists (eg Gurr, 1970; Smelser, 1963; Turner & Killian, 1972). These had proposed that shared individual grievances were an important precondition for people to join together and to form a SMO (Burgmann, 1993: 8; Klandermans, 1994: 24; McCarthy and Zald, 1976: 1214). Much of their focus was on irrational behaviour such as the activities of crowds or mass protests. More recent research (Inglehart, 1977) into the formation of European social movements indicated the importance of public mobilisation as being normal and often involved the development of new values in an influential sector (often the well-educated middle classes).

Inglehart’s (p28) empirical analysis of surveys in the early 1970s in six European Community countries led him to propose that individuals brought up in western countries under conditions of peace and relative prosperity since World War 2 (such as Australia) would be most likely to have ‘postmaterial’ values. According to Inglehart (p5), this shift in values away from ‘materialist’ concerns about economics and physical security had the consequence of leading to “the decline of elite-directed political mobilisation and the rise of elite-challenging issue orientated groups”. In Inglehart’s view, policy formation on many issues (such as the environment) had moved from that led by mainstream political parties with their traditional allegiance to labour (in Australia the ALP) or capital (the Liberal Party/National Party Coalition) to a situation whereby SMOs constructed new policy ideas and approaches. In other words, Inglehart suggested that

---

3 According to Pakulski and Crook (1998: 5), Inglehart’s major theoretical source for his post-material values proposition was Maslow’s ‘hierarchy of needs’ applied at the general societal level.

4 Kitschelt (1990: 10) from his studies of SMOs in Belgium and Germany proposed that the formation of social movements actually led to the decline of traditional party organisations in western democracies as they are based on a neo-corporate policy formation approach.
changing values within a society lead to the emergence of new social advocacy organisations which would in turn shape new government policies, as the policy elite responded to these new pressures. In WA, examples of such groups active in creating new policies toward the logging of native forests were the Campaign to Save Native Forests in the early 1970s and the Liberals For Forests in the late 1990s.

In Australia, Crook and Pakulski (1995: 45) identified a “major shift in public opinion on environment issues” during the 1980s. They call ‘the environment’, “the hot political issue of the late 1980s and very early 1990s, in Australia...” (p39). As an example of the political power of the public interest in the environment at that time, Graham Richardson (1994: 276), then an ALP Federal Minister, claimed the environment as an election issue and the preferences flowing from The Greens Party to the ALP were the major factors that allowed the ALP to win the 1990 Federal election. Crook and Pakulski’s study (p44) suggested that the issue of the environment had faded from the Australian political agenda by about 1993, replaced by rising concern for unemployment levels. However, they (p47) reported that 1993 public opinion polls showed that the logging of Australia’s native forests was the second highest environmental concern after pollution. The debate in WA over forest policy and opinion polls taken in the mid- to late-1990s (see Chapter 5) suggested that the issue of the environment had not faded as far from the political agenda as Crook and Pakulski suggested.

______________________________

5 This flow of preferences allowed the ALP to win the election with just 39.4% of the primary votes (Richardson 1994: 276).
In a later debate over Inglehart’s theory, Brechin and Kempton (1997) disputed the results that can be obtained by studying multi-nation surveys (as Inglehart did) and questioned whether there is any clear indication that postmaterial values held by the public lead to greater support for a policy issue such as the environment. They (p19) argued that there is, if any, only a very weak relationship and suggested the need for alternative explanatory frameworks. Pakulski and Crook (1998: 5) cited the concerns of other researchers with Inglehart’s reliance on value categories as well as his inability to explain how new individual values translated into a coherent environment movement. However, Gundelach (1984: 1049) supported Inglehart’s ideas of postmaterial values and developed them further by arguing that ‘new’ movements had common features and were related to the transition from a capitalist society to a post-industrial one. He proposed such a new economic system was based on new technologies, such as computers and the Internet, as well as new service industries such as tourism. I explore further in Chapter 5 this link between new public values toward the environment and the new tourism industries in the south-west of WA.

Inglehart and Abramson (1995: 3) reported on numerous later studies on postmaterial values from non-European countries as well as European ones. They made what seem to an Australian reader extravagant claims that the shift to postmaterial values was a global phenomenon linked to the mass participation that brought down authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe. These authors also concluded that the major long-term force driving the increase in postmaterial values was generational replacement. Younger cohorts of people with higher

———

6 Gundelach’s insights into economic changes at that time corresponded with the introduction of the term ‘post-Fordism’ to describe the technological and economic changes taking place. See, for example, Roobeck (1987) for a more detailed description of the new economic paradigm.
levels of postmaterial values replaced older generations with more heavily materialist values (p140). They reported (p4) that about 40% of the adult European population was replaced between 1970 and 1990 and argued that these older people were replaced with younger people with more postmaterial values. This conclusion is similar to an earlier attempt by Heberle (1951: 118) to understand what caused changes in social values within societies. He described such changes as being due to differences between ‘political generations’. I utilised these ideas of new social values being related to aspects of difference between generations and socio-demographic factors such as education (as suggested by the NSM literature) in the design of my research methodology.

My framework for investigating organisational political influence within the forest policy network was also informed by an important insight provided by Melucci (1989: 206). He suggested that while social movement organisations were engaged politically with the ‘elite’ and powerful state bureaucracies, they also created new cultural values within the general population. At first glance this proposal seems to be the opposite of Inglehart’s view that changes in the population have led to the formation of new SMOs. It is possible to reconcile the two approaches as to the source of new cultural attitudes and value changes within society by recognising that the two processes operate concurrently. That is, it is possible for socio-economic factors to create a generation of younger, middle class people with new values who form new SMOs rather than participate in older political parties (Inglehart’s approach) while at the same time their work within these SMOs is creating new cultural values in the broader population who may not be active supporters of the SMOs (Melucci’s approach).
Eder (1993: 134) built on Melucci’s view that SMOs were creating new values by linking the older social movements to the main projects of modernity, but classified NSMs as cultural movements. In his view, environmental SMOs proposed new policy approaches that were based on harmony with nature while older social movements were based on exploiting it. The importance of these new cultural and social values developed by SMOs, in an Australian context, is reinforced by Kellow and Moon (1993: 226). They argued that the new values posed special problems in policy terms because they were not characteristic of the embedded political values within existing policy networks. Kellow and Moon asserted that proposals made by SMOs were not based on ‘the way things have always been done’ but were based on transforming existing practises and policies. The time it takes to develop new cultural values throughout the general population (or to a critical mass, whatever that might be) through generational replacement could be one reason why it has taken so long for new values toward the forests to become politically mainstream in Western Australia.

Wallace and Jenkins (1995: 32) proposed that people in the ‘new classes’ had new values and undertook new types of actions within SMOs. They suggested that “protest [against the elite or policy makers in a society] has become an accepted tool among groups that already have political standing”. However, there are divergent views as to the direction of this process. Some NSM authors argued these movements and organisations created new social institutions and social orders within the present society (Touraine, 1995: 771). Other writers (eg Melucci, 1980: 200; Abramson & Inglehart, 1995: 145) also utilised the NSM paradigm and suggested that these social movements were actually creating a new society holding new social values. In my research I support the view that SMOs in
the WA context have assisted the creation of new social institutions, such as political parties and government departments, within the existing society. However, I believe that the overall core social values are driven by the acceptance of a capitalist economic system that has been able to absorb the new environmental values generated by younger people active in the environment movement. This acceptance of new environmental values by the overarching economic system is similar to the way in which it has accepted new values in regard to the participation of women in Australian society.

In researching social movements, Gamson (1990) focused on a number of organisations from various movements while many later writers studied just one movement. Kitschelt (1986) researched European anti-nuclear movements; Bernstein (1997) focused on the ‘gay’ movement; while Freeman (1978) was one of many to have studied the US women’s movement. The New Social Movement literature identified above indicates that the researching of a single policy issue, such as the environment in an Australian social context, will allow an assessment of the claim that new values are being developed and that they are important in a policy sense.

The political and historic importance of Australian advocacy organisations initiating new political issues was also mentioned in a study by Ian Marsh (1989: 230). He claimed that “every major addition to the political agenda in the past decade was originally championed by an issue movement…” Marsh further advocated the importance of studying the political impact of Australian advocacy organisations. Marsh identified a series of important causes championed by social movements that were ultimately taken up by one or both of the major Australian political parties, including the change in social attitudes to the environment that
has occurred since the late 1980s. His views reflect those of other NSM authors as well as those of Lindsay more than half a century earlier in the United Kingdom. Lindsay outlined the critical nature of the work of advocacy organisations within modern democracies:

Some of the most creative political proposals in modern democracy originate, not with government nor with the permanent Civil Service, but with public minded voluntary groups who have a public concern for this or that problem and who have together thought out a remedy for it (1929: 39).

Data I collected in my research (see Chapters 5 and 6) indeed support the notion that new environmental values have been created in WA since the 1970s and form a new approach to the forests by the WA Government since 2001. SMOs can act at different levels of society. Considine (1998: 9) identified the importance of researching, in particular, environment policy-making in an Australian State government context. His research in the State of Victoria showed that environmental policy was the only area on the political agenda where a clear majority of the issues were sponsored by non-government organisations. All of the other state policy sectors he studied had their agenda setting process dominated by business interests or government bureaucrats. Interestingly, Considine also found that the environment policy sector was one of only two where government bureaucrats “appear to have a crucial significance” (p9). His research suggested that environment organisations active at a state level in WA will be a productive setting for my research.

This section has summarised a wide range of literature that takes a NSM approach to understanding social change. It has also identified environmental policy as an area where SMOs have made large and important changes to both government policy and the attitudes held by a majority of the Australian public.
over the past 30 years. I have found this literature helpful in that it identified a number of key socio-demographic factors that I explored during the data collection phase of my research. This literature also provided me with insights into how complex the relationship is between environmental values held by individuals active in SMOs and the extent to which similar values are held by the public.

2.3 ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS APPROACHES

Many of the past and present theories of organisations speak to effectiveness. To help me develop a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of WA social advocacy organisations in the forest policy network I had to understand the research ‘journey’ that organisational researchers had undertaken over the past four decades into effectiveness. The short history presented below not only summarises the major studies undertaken, but also allowed me to understand why there had been an accumulation of knowledge about organisational effectiveness but no agreement on a standard definition or approach to organisational effectiveness. The literature on organisational effectiveness also introduces the question as to whether organisations can just be measured in terms of their goal achievement or whether their effectiveness is a more complex social construction.

Barnard (1938) carefully distinguished effectiveness from efficiency and proposed one of the earliest (and broadest) definitions of organisational effectiveness as “the ability of an organisation to bring about some objective state of affairs.” Thorndike (1949) was one of the earliest authors to note a general trend among organisational researchers to try and measure effectiveness,
especially in terms of the attainment of some ultimate criterion or goal. In terms of my research, the goal-approach to organisational effectiveness would define the goal of one of the case study organisations to ‘halt the logging of all old-growth native forests in WA by changing the State’s forest policy’. The goal of the other organisation would be to ‘seek to maintain the status quo of sustainable logging of these forests’.

Campbell (1977: 49) is one of a number of authors who refined this goal-approach definition further by defining organisational effectiveness as “the degree to which the task objectives (or goals) judged to be ‘ends’ should be accomplished, given the prevailing conditions in which the organisation must work.” In this way Campbell tried to acknowledge the prevailing external environment in which the organisation operates, or in my case, the public and political attitudes to logging in which the two SMOs operated over the past 30 years. By the late 1960s to the early 1970s, after 30 years of study of the goals of organisations, there were still some researchers who did not acknowledge that there were limits to organisations achieving their goals. An example would be Price (1968: 3) who stated bluntly “…effectiveness is defined as the degree of goal-achievement.”

While goal attainment was the major measure of effectiveness in these early studies, later writers posed questions in regard to “whose goals?”. These questions reflect the evidence gathered during many decades of research into organisational effectiveness and goal attainment. That research found that within organisations there was often disagreement in relation to the organisation’s goals. Robbins (1990: 49) posed the question as to whether studies should focus on the organisation’s officially stated goals, or use the actual (or operative) goals, or the
informal goals often uncovered by research into organisations. Writers during this later period also questioned whether the goals should be those of the senior management or sub-units such as the marketing departments and found that many organisations have multiple goals.

Hannan and Freeman (1977: 959) tried to resolve this confusion over goals by arguing that *survival* is the organisation’s most critical goal. This means in a broad sense that an organisation is effective if it survives over time in a complex and changing environment, no matter what specific goals are stated for its operations.\(^7\) From a business organisation’s point of view, Weick (1981: 194) described a closely related concept of *adaptability* as the critical organisational goal, when he introduced what he calls “garrulous, clumsy, grouchy, wandering” organisations. He stated that organisations needed to not only survive but to adapt to the changing and uncertain external environment.

These are very important theoretical questions for evaluating the work of advocacy organisations. All advocacy organisations have stated goals but within the policy environment in which they work they may actually be trying to achieve some other short or medium-term goals. For example, the original forest advocacy group in WA (the Campaign to Save Native Forests) was established to protect the native forests from bauxite mining by ALCOA, not from logging (CSNF, 1985: 1). Also, some advocacy organisations may have what could be termed ‘impossible goals’ such as the abolition of slavery or global nuclear disarmament. This would make the evaluation of their effectiveness very difficult if it were based on analysing their goal attainment over the short and medium terms.

\(^7\) This is reflected in the fact that over the first 5 years, nearly 85% of new small businesses in Australia will fail.
A confounding aspect of some early research into organisational effectiveness was that many researchers tried to move from the definition of effectiveness relating to goal achievement to try to produce a single effectiveness statement or criterion (eg on managerial effectiveness) (Cammock et al., 1995). Other authors went further and tried to apply an effectiveness criterion across a whole industry or sector (Connolly et al., 1980). For example, Price (1968) reviewed 50 previous research studies on organisational effectiveness and compiled an inventory of 62 propositions that he believed could be applied to all types of organisations, whether they were businesses, public or nonprofit organisations.8

In response to the difficulty of clearly defining effectiveness in terms of goal achievement or a single criterion, researchers then proposed an alternate organisational effectiveness model based on defining an organisation as an open system (Webb, 1974: 665). Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum proposed this model as early as 1957 but it was not taken up until later when the goal-attainment model was shown to be not useful theoretically, given the range of formal and informal goals found in most organisations. Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum (1957: 535) believed that trying to establish univariate measures was inconsistent with the broad meaning attached to the construction of organisational effectiveness in the literature at that time.

8 An example of one of his broad effectiveness propositions is (p16):
“2.1 Organisations which have a high degree of division of labour are more likely to have a high degree of effectiveness than organisations which have a low degree of division of labour.”
Another early convert to this new approach was Etzioni (1960) who also criticised the then-prevailing goal-centred approach. His systems view emphasised factors that increased the long-term success or effectiveness of an organisation. Examples of his factors included an organisation’s ability to acquire resources, its ability to maintain itself as an on-going entity as well as its ability to successfully attain its goals. He saw organisations as sub-units of the enveloping environment that needed to draw essential resources from this environment to survive and prosper, as well as to work towards their goals. An important aspect of Etzioni’s theoretical approach (p264) was to assess what is the optimum distribution of these resources? This systems approach to organisational effectiveness is known in the nonprofit research sector as the resource mobilisation theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1976). I describe it separately in more detail below because of its distinctive theoretical approach and usefulness in studying SMOs.

The latest insight in ‘the grail-like search for a unified framework’ (Goodman, et al., 1983: 163) was provided by Connolly et al. (1980: 212) who argued that the answer to the question of how well an organisation is performing is inevitably contingent on whom one is asking. They (p214) proposed that effectiveness is a multi-constituency social construction and that the goal and system approaches are only partial insights into organisational effectiveness. Connolly’s et al. approach is an important theoretical development and it provides the approach to organisational effectiveness I used in my research.

A further development of this insight into effectiveness relevant to this research is that of Herman and Renz (1997; 1999) who argued that effectiveness is a social construction with different judgements offered by different
organisational stakeholders. Their most recent publication (2002) confirmed this approach to effectiveness. It discussed research into US organisations in the nonprofit health and welfare sector over eight years. Smith’s (1986: 24) research into US nonprofit organisations also used a peer-rated effectiveness methodology to separate his groups into effective and less effective groups in his search for distinguishing characteristics of effectiveness. Robbins (1990: 62) identified another refinement of this constructivist approach as the ‘strategic constituencies model’. These are the constituencies in the organisation’s environment that are critical to its survival (which Hannan and Freeman identified above as the most important goal of organisations). This view was reinforced by Zammuto’s (1984: 613) proposal that there are multiple constituency models of effectiveness with both direct and indirect constituencies that need to be considered when the overall effectiveness of an organisation is being judged.

Drucker (1997: 97) defined the difference between efficiency and effectiveness as “efficiency is doing the thing right and effectiveness is doing the right thing.”9 The research into organisational effectiveness over the past 50 years suggests that different organisational stakeholders will have different views of what is the right ‘thing’ an organisation should do, especially if it is an advocacy organisation trying to build new social values and change government policy. Meyer (2000) reinforced this idea that in a democracy all versions of causality and responsibility for particular policy changes can be contested. He stated that those nonprofit organisations that survived and flourished were best placed to claim credit for particular policy changes.

9 McDonald (1993: 1) is another that explored the difference between efficiency and effectiveness and provided possible nonprofit programs that are effective but may not be efficient.
The insight that organisational effectiveness is a social construction and Connolly’s *et al.* notion that organisations exist within an environment that contains many other organisations will be combined in this research with a model developed by Schumaker (1975). The use of Schumaker’s model in my study is described in the following Chapter. It allows the latest organisational effectiveness literature to be applied in a practical way to my study of two countermovements and their ability to affect the WA forest policy process.

2.4 AN INTRA-ORGANISATION APPROACH—RESOURCE MOBILISATION

The Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) proposed by McCarthy and Zald (1976) utilised an organisational-level approach to the study of social change. Their approach to the effectiveness of nonprofit organisations was predicated on constructing social movement organisations (SMOs) as systems, similar to Etzioni (1960) and Webb’s (1974) earlier system theories. It assumed that a nonprofit organisation or SMO is an ‘open system’ that needs to attract various types of external resources to achieve success and to be constructed as effective.¹⁰ Cohen (1985: 674) stressed that the RMT approach and its systems orientation was based on a multi-disciplinary analysis, and drew on the work of economists, historians and political scientists. It is a dramatically different theoretical paradigm from the social psychological theory of collective behaviour that preceded it. As mentioned above, this approach focused on explaining the creation of SMOs as due to the

---

¹⁰ Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) proposed a similar ‘resource dependence model’ as a way of describing how businesses relate to their external environment.
frustration and grievances of individuals. In contrast, RMT helps explain the success and effectiveness, or otherwise, of both new and existing SMOs.

The RMT approach framed the success of an SMO in terms of its ability to achieve its desired political or policy change within a society from which it draws essential resources (McCarthy and Zald, 1976: 1213). It dealt in general terms with the growth, change and decline of social movements and emphasised the variety of resources available to SMOs. It detailed the relationships of SMOs to the media, political parties and other organisations within its organisational environment. This approach has similarities to the policy network approach, discussed below, in the way it placed the organisation being studied in a relationship with other important individuals and organisations. The RMT literature helped me to identify what were the important organisational resources utilised in the WA setting by the anti- and pro-logging SMOs.

RMT is a theoretical approach to the study of SMOs that is heavily based on the experience of SMOs in the USA, the US capitalist economic system and the US-style democratic system of government. US researchers seem to prefer the more empirical and quantitative RMT approach to studying SMOs as compared with European researchers who often use the NSM approach. An example of such US research would be Gamson’s famous historical study that identified particular resources separating successful from unsuccessful US social movements (Amenta and Young, 1999: 23). The RMT literature also included references that use an economic model to try to understand the costs and benefits of individuals joining and participating in social movements. Klandermans (1994: 24) identified its chief source as the 1965 work by Mancur Olsen titled *The Logic of Collective Action*. Another important insight provided by RMT theory is that participants join SMOs
based on their expectations of the group being successful. This resource factor is related to that of ‘political opportunity’ and its association to key SMO mobilisation strategies, such as joining with allies, noted by several authors (eg Tilly, 1979; Oberschall, 1980; Tarrow, 1983).

There have been various case studies of SMOs that utilised the RMT theoretical approach, including unions (Klandermans, 1984), non profit organisations for the homeless in the US (Cress & Snow, 1996) as well as advocacy organisations such as ‘Mothers Against Drunk Driving’ (MADD) (McCarthy & Wolfson, 1996). These studies catalogued a wide range of organisational resources seen as critical to the success of agenda-setting SMOs, including the importance of members, donations, media campaigns and organisational identity. Cress and Snow (1996: 1089) highlighted the importance of the RMT approach to understanding the effectiveness of SMOs by commenting that “…resources are a sine qua non determinant of the course and character of SMOs”. McCarthy and Wolfson (p1071) grouped the wide range of resources important to the activities of SMOs under three headings: agency, strategy and organisation. The need to develop a more complex understanding of the link between specific types and combination of organizational resources and the resultant mobilisation outcomes was suggested by Cress and Snow (1196: 1090) and will be discussed further in Chapter 9.

As an example of the RMT approach to the environment movement, Dale (1996: 105) identified the strategic use of the international media as the critical resource mobilised by the international advocacy organisation Greenpeace in its worldwide campaigns. Klandermans (1994:31) suggested Gamson as someone who recognised the importance of mass media in allowing SMOs to mobilise the
public. In this way Klandermans linked the RMT approach to the NSM theory as the media is identified as a key resource as it allowed SMOs to struggle with their opponents over the meaning and interpretation of new values. In an Australian context, Seddon (1997: 189) proposed that rhetoric is a major resource utilised by environmental organisations. My research project will focus in part on organisational resources and in particular on the important role played by the media in reporting the efforts of SMOs trying to affect forest policy by framing their language in a specific fashion.

Finally, in addition to the ‘rational’ organisational resources identified above, a critical resource to be mobilised by advocacy organisations is their ability in ‘aligning’ or ‘coupling’ the cultural and emotional values of their membership (so-called ‘affective’ resources) (Melucci, 1996: 490). Bush (1992: 399) argued in a similar way to Melucci that the future impact of SMOs lay in their ideas and ideals more than in their ability to gain immediate political favours from the political elite. For my study, these cultural or political values could be the way younger generations of Australians now perceive the value of the natural environment as being greater than the economic value of timber cut down and processed as lumber or woodchips. Also, seeing these new emotional or cultural values as an organisational resource is a way once again of linking the RMT approach to that of the NSM literature outlined above.

The critical task of an advocacy organisation, if it is to successfully set or amend the political agenda for a particular policy, may be to mobilise its members or in Lipsky’s terms (1968: 1146) to ‘activate reference publics’. Given that the activities of the advocacy organisations at the centre of my research are aimed at affecting WA forest policy, an approach that includes political and policy aspects
needs to be incorporated into the study’s methodology in addition to the effectiveness, NSM and RMT theoretical approaches outlined so far. The next section will outline such an approach.

2.5 AN INTEGRATING APPROACH- POLICY NETWORKS

My research also utilised a political science approach to integrate the three levels of insights provided by the NSM, RMT and effectiveness literature outlined above. I chose the policy network approach to develop an appropriate framing for interpreting the personal interviews gathered for my research. The policy network literature placed organisations being studied into a broader policy network (or constituencies) consisting of other organisations and influential individuals. This approach will place the activities of the two case study organisations among a range of other stakeholders operating in WA on government policies towards the logging of the remaining native forests.

One of the central themes in the study of social change is trying to locate the source of an important policy change by government. Researchers tried to unpack whether specific social changes are the outcomes of people working together within social movements and SMOs (a pluralist approach), or are the efforts of powerful individuals (an elite approach). Wright Mills (1956: 3) first defined the ‘power elite’ as being composed of “men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences.” Wright Mills used this term to describe the inner circle of power-holders in US society in the 1950s and 1960s. These people were seen by Mills as an elite, rather than a ruling class, as their power arose from shared social and cultural origins and psychological
orientations rather than from their economic power or capital ownership. Wright Mills and others taking the elite approach attributed social change to these small groups of powerful men who held leadership positions within small communities, such as town councillors, businessmen and media owners.¹¹

Later studies (eg Schumaker, 1975: 95) suggested that the critical weakness of the political elite approach is the lack of empirical data to show that “elites are cohesive, conscious and ‘conspiratorial’.” Schumaker (p491) contended that elite theorists had collected data which described political systems as unresponsive to demands from social movements. Such findings contradict the views of many sociologists studying the impact of social movements (eg Heberle, 1951; Gamson, 1992; and McCarthy & Wolfson, 1996). Schumaker (p491) also argued that empirical data in support of the elite theory were grounded in only a few case studies and has “met only primitive standards of verification.”

The original elite approach to how political decisions are influenced and developed within a community lost support due to this lack of verifiable case studies showing a coherent elite with a harmonious solidary.¹² This study will not delve any deeper into the pluralist/elitist controversy other than to note its existence and that over the past 10 years a new understanding of policy formation has arisen. Currently the study of political influence within society is described in terms of ‘policy actors’ and ‘policy institutions’ being part of a broader ‘policy system’ (Considine, 1994: 9) or a ‘policy network’ (Marsh, 1998: 6; Smith, 1993: 

¹¹ The study of elites within society has been traced back to two Italian sociologists Pareto (1848-1923) and Mosca (1858-1941).

¹² Lindblom (1965: 26) proposed an alternate framework to decision-making in democracies by developing a descriptive model of the policy process called ‘Complex Decision Making through Mutual Adjustment’ in opposition to the elite model. This had similar assumptions about the attainment of political power as that held by the later policy network researchers.
7). Policy actors (or stakeholders\textsuperscript{13}) can be either individuals or organisations. Howlett and Ramesh (1995: 470) further developed this theoretical approach by identifying the importance of policy sub-systems and argued that the critical factors in the behaviour of these sub-systems are the number and type of their membership and whether state or societal members dominate policy interactions in this policy system. From this insight they developed a taxonomy of policy networks and policy sub-systems (1995: 5) that controlled the policy formation stage of the policy lifecycle. Their conclusion that government bureaucratic stakeholders were important network members is similar to Considine’s findings (1998: 9) in an Australian State policy setting described above. In a Canadian forest policy context, Howlett and Rayner’s (1995: 386) taxonomy of policy networks was usefully extended by considering the autonomy of the state to make policy free from non-state stakeholders such as SMOs and business. They classed the Canadian forest policy networks as ‘captured’ (p392) due to the overwhelming policy influence of the timber industry. This issue of policy influence in the WA forest policy network will be considered further in Chapter 6.

In the context of policy network theory, powerful individuals may still be active in assisting in the creation of social change, but they are now seen as one of the policy actors or stakeholders in a particular policy network rather than as an elite. British researcher David Marsh commented (1998: 21) that the use of policy networks as a means of conceptualising the relationship between state and society “is now pervasive in the European and North American political science literature”. In analysing their effectiveness, SMOs can be seen as important

\textsuperscript{13} Friedman and Miles (2002: 1) suggested that stakeholder theory had ‘burgeoned’ in recent years in both academic and common parlance.
stakeholders in complex policy networks that generally include a range of other SMOs, government departments, politicians, the media, business representatives and influential individuals. Friedman and Miles (2002: 2) raised the important theoretical point of what distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate stakeholders. Mitchell et al. (1997: 853) had previously raised the same issue when they reported that some managers perceive particular stakeholders as possessing power and legitimacy within a policy network while others don’t.

In an Australian national policy context, an early study by Higley et al. (1979: 224), identified media owners, directors of financial institutions and trade union officials as important strategic policy stakeholders.\(^{14}\) At the time of that study, the policy impact of SMOs and other non-government organisations was not well understood and this could explain their non-appearance on this list of policy actors. In a later publication, Ian Marsh (1991: 22) included leaders from SMOs among his policy stakeholders and described the policy impact of these constituencies on the national policy networks in Australia as a ‘bargained consensus’. The importance of this type of bargaining for SMO success or for groups undertaking political challenges was emphasised by a number of other authors (eg Burstein et al., 1995; Lipsky, 1968; and Wilson, 1961).

In a counter-point to this description of the sharing of power and the development of a policy consensus, ex-government Cabinet member Peter Walsh (1999: 21), in a review of the relationship of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) to environment groups, identified environment organisations as having real power at a national policy level to impose their own preferences to delay or stop proposed

\(^{14}\) Higley et al. (p223) also included a small number of additional groupings such as religious leaders and academics.
resource projects. His view reinforced the NSM literature (outlined above) that environment SMOs are worthwhile research sites for studying the construction of organisational effectiveness in terms of their power to impact specific government policies such as the WA forest policy.

In considering the policy influence of Australian SMOs at a State government level, Yeatman (1998: 7) reported that policy activists often overturn aspects of the established policy agenda by two strategies: networking and building relationships with policy ‘insiders’ working within government, and mobilising stakeholders outside of government (‘outsiders’). Similarly, Hoefer’s (1998: 16) comparative study of the political advocacy of human service nonprofit organisations in four US states considered the effectiveness of both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ strategies. His results suggested that advocacy organisations are more effective with ‘inside’ tactics (such as lobbying members of the legislature) than ‘outside’ tactics (such as public protests).

In a similar fashion to Howlett and Ramesh (1995) and Considine (1998), Yeatman (1998: 20) also raised the important role of the State apparatus, or bureaucrats, to administer or manage policy outcomes separate from the role of elected parliamentarians. Additionally, she highlighted the lack of accountability of this administrative state to the public that government policies and actions are meant to reflect. I utilised this insight into the important role of bureaucrats within a policy network when I framed my research methodology.

In addition to Australian studies on the role played by various policy stakeholders there is overseas evidence that support the importance of SMOs as
stakeholders within policy networks. In a US study of policy networks and the origins of government policy initiatives, interviews of Congressional staff and committee staff reported advocacy groups as either very important (33%) or somewhat important (51%) to policy formation (Kingdon, 1984: 49). The 84% total for respondents rating interest groups as important compared favourably to the figure of 91% that rated members of Congress as important. Kingdon (p174) suggested that this policy influence by advocacy groups may only be temporary (and short term) and termed these opportunities as ‘policy windows’. Alternatively, in the context of British environment movements, Grant (1995: 130) identified the features of proximate environment (or policy competitors) as an important factor in his typology for measuring the effectiveness of British nonprofit organisations. The importance of political opportunities and the impact of opponents to the policy effectiveness of advocacy groups are key insights and I also incorporated them into my research methodology, described in the following chapter.

Howlett and Ramesh (1995: 57) suggested that the power of nonprofit organisations to influence policy development lay in the fact that they have knowledge about issues that is unavailable or less available to other policy actors in the policy network. In my case, theorising further from Howlett and Ramesh’s insight, I suggest that a new cultural or ethical approach to the environment commenced in Australia in the late 1960s or early 1970s. This was evidenced by the formation of such groups as the CSNF in WA in 1969. This new approach to the environment by SMOs might be seen to reflect new values toward the

---

15 Dugdale (1998: 115) outlined one of the main power tools of ‘insiders’ was their ability to frame policy statements so that they have a positive impact on the policy debate. He also stated that it is one of the most difficult and prized arts of government.
environment supported by the broader public. Information about these new attitudes may not have been available to other policy network members (such as the mainstream political parties and government departments). On the other hand these new attitudes may have been actively opposed by state institutions (such as the Forests Department) that had a preference for the existing values and policy settings.

In this way, the policy network literature is useful to my research because it theorises policy debate in a way that involves a range of individual and organisational policy actors. It allows for an integration of the RMT, NSM and the recent theoretical approaches to organisational effectiveness. The policy network approach also seems of more use in analysing the impact of SMOs on policy formation than the similar neo-institutional theory (eg Coleman et al., 1997; Skocpol et al., 1985). The neo-institutional theory suggested a more rational, incremental and economic basis to policy change and does not easily explain the impact of SMOs on the WA forest policy process and the impact of new public values toward the natural environment (Coleman et al.: 274).

2.6 CONCLUSION

I have suggested in this chapter that a theoretical approach based on a range of different literatures was most helpful in trying to understand both the research setting and my research questions. My research focused on two organisations with opposite policy approaches to the logging of native forests in WA. The organisational effectiveness approach allows the research to focus on the two organisations and not stray into the social psychology of why individual West Australians (along with people in many other western democracies) since the
1970s have become active in SMOs trying to bring into effect new environmental policies.\textsuperscript{16} In particular, the policy network approach helped me understand why different individuals and organisations in the forest network may construct different judgements as to the organisational effectiveness of my chosen advocacy groups. The policy network literature suggested that different stakeholders will make different demands on the policy being debated because of factors such as their power and legitimacy and whether they are ‘insiders’ or outsiders’. The RMT approach is a predominantly US-based literature that will allow me to study the effectiveness of SMOs in terms of the resources that proved of value to them in the forest policy conflict.

The final theoretical approach, NSM, allowed me to gain an understanding of the socio-demographic changes that took place in WA since the early 1970s and the possible link of these changes to the development of new postmaterial values toward the remaining native forests. It also helped me identify what were the reasons that the forest policy conflict between the two SMOs endured for over 30 years. Klandermans (1994: 19) supported the value of such an approach to social research when he suggests that RMT and NSM theories are two sides of a coin, but each of them taken alone was inadequate in explaining the rise of social movements since the 1970s.

\textsuperscript{16} See Klandermans (1984) for research that combines both social psychological and RMT theories.
Chapter 3- RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the methodology I used to gather the data for this research. Initially I began with a positivistic approach to ‘measuring’ the effectiveness of nonprofit advocacy organisations with plans to utilise a survey approach to gathering data. Reading the latest approaches to organisational effectiveness, particularly Connolly et al (1980: 212), led me to re-evaluate my proposed methodological approach. I also benefited from the reading of similar research by Herman and Renz (1997; 1999; 2002) completed in the US over a number of years on nonprofit effectiveness and its components (e.g. the importance of organisational board performance as a measure of organisational effectiveness).

The core methodology of the research is based on a comparative case study of two opposed social movement organisations (SMOs) campaigning on the native forest logging policy in the south-west of WA. I chose these organisations from the wide range of organisations actively working on this issue and trying to influence State public forest policy in 2000. As mentioned and further discussed in Chapter 5 below, this complex social and policy debate over whether to continue the logging of the remaining old-growth native forests has been a high profile one for at least the past 30 years. The research approach I finally adopted is essentially an interview-based (or qualitative) approach with additional data collection components, such as an analysis of newspaper reports and Hansard parliamentary debates, and a review of historical material. The use of multiple sources of data is recognised as a particularly useful approach to undertaking case study research (Yin, 1994: 90). I describe below these other data sources in a more detailed way.
3.2 OPERATIONALISING THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The conundrum at the centre of this research is: **why has the debate and conflict over the usage of the native forests in the south-west of WA continued for more than 30 years?** I chose this period of 30 years, from 1970-2000, as the beginning date coincided with the formation in 1969 of the SMO ‘The Campaign to Save Native Forests’ (CSNF) which challenged the continued logging of native forests in WA (Mills, 1986: 229). In most other Australian campaigns on environmental policy undertaken toward the end of the twentieth century (eg opposition to whaling, the damming of the Franklin River, mining on Fraser Island, mining in Kakadu National Park) the conflict was resolved over a period of about 5-10 years. These conflicts over environmental policy usually resulted in the State or Federal government implementing some form of a negotiated consensus outcome (Marsh, 1991) with the largest policy actors. The conflict over those policy issues then cooled or the debate moved to other issues.¹

In my research setting, if the SMOs campaigning to ban the logging of native forests in WA were effective, why has it taken so long for their policies to be adopted by the State Government? On the other hand, if the pro-logging SMOs were effective why have they been unable to convince the majority of the WA public of their position after such a lengthy debate?

The conundrum over the effectiveness of the selected advocacy organisations leads immediately to other specific questions about their activities and how these organisations are constructed as effective. These questions flow from the

¹ For example, the Australian Conservation Foundation listed more than 10 different local, state and national campaigns in its list of priority campaigns for 2000 (www.acfonline.org.au/campaigns.htm).
effectiveness literature referred to in the previous chapter and recognise that the
forest policy network in WA contains a complex network of actors external to the
two organisations who may judge their effectiveness in different ways. I then
needed to find a way to determine how these other policy actors and stakeholders
in the forest policy network judge whether particular advocacy organizations are
effective in their campaigning.

Baumgartner and Leech (1998: 37) raised a key question in trying to
understand the political impact of organisations, particularly social movement
organisations. Their concern is also a core one for both the RMT and NSM
literatures- what is organisational political influence? My study needed to find a
way to assess how political influence can be judged by the relevant policy actors
that operated within the WA forest policy network. The methodology I adopted
was to have selected policy actors describe (or rate) what political influence had
been achieved by the two SMOs on forest policy in WA. In a similar complex
research setting involving SMOs in the United Kingdom, Perri 6 and Forder
(1996: 225) decided to evaluate a SMO’s strategy by applying game theory to the
problem. Schumaker (1975: 494) offered a far more elegant framework for
addressing the difficulty of judging the campaigning success of a SMO; his
approach was used in my research.

I found Schumaker’s analytical framework very helpful in operationalising
how an advocacy organisation can be judged for its policy success or outcomes
(or in other words, ‘effectiveness’) at a macro political level. In my case, the two
SMOs are trying to influence policy that is developed or amended by government
as nearly all of WA’s remaining forests are owned by the Crown (see Chapter 5
below). I used Schumaker’s framework to analyse the effectiveness of these two
SMOs on government policy while other sections of my research analysed other aspects of their campaigns (eg their impact on public opinion). Schumaker proposed that policy-making success can be defined in terms of a five-stage hierarchy\(^2\) describing the political system’s responsiveness to a challenging SMO:

i) **access responsiveness** or the willingness of a government to hear the SMO’s concerns.

ii) **agenda responsiveness** or the willingness of a government to place the SMO’s concerns on the policy agenda.

iii) **policy responsiveness** or the willingness of a government to adopt the SMO’s concerns.

iv) **output responsiveness** or the willingness of a government to implement the SMO’s concerns.

v) **impact responsiveness** or the degree that the actions of the government succeed in alleviating the grievances of the SMO.

Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994: 176) traced this use of a public policy approach utilising a stages heuristic, such as Schumaker’s, to the early 1970s.\(^3\) Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier believed that such a framework provided an important alternative to the traditional institutional approach of political science used in the US. Nelson (1984: 22) used a similar stages framework to Schumaker’s in her study of how child abuse issues developed as policy issues at both a state and national level in the US. Nelson’s framework of “issue recognition, issue

\(^2\) This scale is not meant to be an ordered one.

\(^3\) Osborne (1997: 130) had an even simpler model of government response to environmental policy-making. His ‘state, pressure, response’ model fitted an entrenched science-based and rational approach to environmental issues by many government departments in Europe that address environment problems one by one.
adoption, setting priorities and issue maintenance” is slightly different to Schumaker’s in that it lacks a stage that tries to measuring the social impact of any newly adopted policy that had been successfully campaigned for by a SMO. Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (p177) believed that this was also a serious shortcoming of the earlier institutional approaches.

In terms of the successive stages of the policy process, both Kingdon (1984: 115) and Dery (1984: 2) placed most importance on Schumaker’s stage 1, the identification by government that an ‘issue’ was a ‘problem’ and needed to be addressed in policy terms. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the important roles played by SMOs is in their development of new values toward the environment. Schumaker’s model helped me analyse whether the various forest policy stakeholders thought that the two SMOs had achieved stage 1 of the framework and had their concerns heard by the WA Government. Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994: 177) believed that the most serious limitation of the policy stages framework is its lack of causal links between the stages that limits its ability to be used in hypothesis-testing research. My research is of a different nature and I used the Schumaker framework as a qualitative tool to gather the judgements of the stakeholders on the effectiveness of the two SMOs.

Reich (1988: 72) made an important contribution to the consideration of policy effectiveness and the use of a policy stage framework when he stated that public ideas and values had different kinds of influence at different stages of the policy process. I will explore this idea in more depth in Chapter 9. In an Australian context, Stewart and Jones (1999: 169) argued differently to Reich and downplayed the importance of public concern and its impact on government policy formation. Instead they found that State capacity, such as the ability to
monitor solutions to issues, was positively associated with environmental outcomes. In my research I found that the Schumaker framework provided useful insights into stakeholder views on the power of the two SMOs to make an impact on government policy.

3.3 RESEARCH PERIOD

The debate over the appropriateness of WA’s forest policy intensified after the formation of the Campaign to Save Native Forests (CSNF) in 1969. The recognition of this important turning point in the forest debate led to my key research question as to why the conflict had lasted for more than 30 years. However, the research period for my study focused mainly on the forest policy debate during the years 1998-2000. This period was used for the daily collection of newspaper articles and the analysis of interview data. The interviews I undertook also focused on this more recent period as it coincided with an heightened period of debate and public campaigning over the new logging levels to be contained in WA’s first Regional Forest Agreement (RFA). Many of those I interviewed were important policy actors in the RFA debate. However, I continued gathering additional ad-hoc newspaper data until the State election held on Saturday 11th February, 2001. Some additional newspaper material has also been collected since the election to gauge the outcomes of the new forest policy of the Gallop Labor Government. This material is included in Chapter 6.

In essence my study is a cross-sectional one and focused on a specific political event- the completion of the RFA process. I have tried to gather data from as many sources as possible for the three-year period 1998 to 2000. However, given the length of the debate and level of conflict over the ‘correct’
policy approach to the logging of old-growth forest, I have also gathered some historical data going back to the early days of the forest industry in the 1840s. Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994: 178) reinforced the importance of including data from a period of more than a decade if policy change processes are to be better understood. These historical data will be introduced in the following two chapters and have helped my understanding of the forces which delayed the introduction of a new approach to forests in WA and why the change of government in the 2001 election led to such a dramatic change in policy.

3.4 DATA COLLECTION

Case Study Methodology

My research was based on a case study approach. Yin (1994: 9) has argued that the case study methodology is an excellent one when, as here, the research site was "...a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control." He also suggested that the research questions flowing from this methodology are of the 'why' or 'how' (explanatory) type rather than the 'what' or exploratory type. Also, Eisenhardt (1989: 532) claimed that an iterative case study methodology, as used in this project, is appropriate for new topic areas and is capable of producing good middle-range theory.

While there have been no similar studies in Australia undertaken into the effectiveness of advocacy SMOs, there have been a range of overseas research studies on social movement organizations that made use of a similar comparative case study research methodology using two or more organisations:

* Tilly’s (1963: 62) historical comparison of various aspects of the French counter-revolutionary district of Southern Ajou (Cholet) and the most
revolutionary district (Saumur) as a way of examining the counter-revolution in the Vendee in the French Revolution period from 1793 to 1799;

* Rucht (1988) compared two different SMOs operating at the same time in West Germany in his comparison of the women’s movement and the environment movement;

* Herman and Heimovics (1994) undertook a cross-national comparison of US and UK-based housing associations;

* Ohlemacher (1996) studied two different community groups opposed to low-flying military jets located in different parts of West Germany; and

* McCarthy and Wolfson (1996) compared the strategies of two organisations campaigning on the same social issue in the US- the RID (Remove Intoxicated Drivers) and MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Driving) organisations.

**Initial Newspaper Analysis**

I conducted initial research on the forest debate in 2000 and this involved the analysis of articles on the forest conflict that appeared daily in WA’s sole daily newspaper *The West Australian*. This initial study indicated a wide range of organisations from both the anti-logging and pro-logging social movements that had some involvement in the policy debate at that time. These organisations included the more obvious high profile ones, such as environment groups and political parties, but also less obvious policy stakeholders such as tourism organisations and small food producer industry associations, such as the Beekeepers Association of WA.
However, it became clear that there were only a few organisations that had a regular and sustained focus on this particular policy issue and were regularly reported in *The West Australian* and could be called the key SMO policy actors in the WA forest policy community. For example, the forest issue was just one of a number of active environmental campaigns that the WA Conservation Council (CCWA) was involved in at that time and I did not consider it a key policy actor. The CCWA was an important member of the WA Forest Alliance (WAFA) which I considered to be the central anti-logging stakeholder due to its high media profile.

**Focus Group**

To test my findings from the initial newspaper analysis, I conducted a focus group meeting with second-year environmental science students from Murdoch University. Given the nature of their studies, I expected that they would have a good understanding of the recent history of the forest conflict. These eight students volunteered 90 minutes of their time in August 2000 to discuss open-ended questions that explored topics such as:

i) what groups they thought were active within the forest policy network in WA;

ii) what groups they thought were the most influential in policy terms on this issue; and

iii) other semi-structured questions derived from the RMT and NSM literature discussed in the previous chapter.
A copy of the interview schedule for the focus group is included in Appendix 1.

The focus group questions provided many answers that I expected after my initial newspaper analysis (such as the most influential organisations in the forest policy network) but also provided valuable and unexpected ideas to be included in my research. One such issue concerned the change in values toward the logging of the forests in the south-west by people who lived in that region. Three of the students came from families in the south-west who had derived a living from the logging of forests, or associated support activities, but these students opposed the continued logging of these old-growth forests. Another important finding was the important role attributed to the Federal Minister for Forestry (2000-2002), Wilson Tuckey, in WA’s forest policy network.

After I had analysed this initial focus group research, the countermovement organisations I chose for my case study were the WA branches of two national SMOs. The Wilderness Society (TWS), an organisation with a long history of opposition to logging in a number of Australian States, and the Timber Communities Association (TCA), an organisation supportive of the continued logging of old-growth forest. I sent both organisations a letter on University letterhead requesting their participation in this research and outlining the University’s research ethics guidelines (see Appendix 2). The TWS Campaigns Coordinator agreed to their organisation participating in this research project. However, the State election campaign was looming and the TWS Coordinating Committee later withdrew their agreement to participate. The TWS was concerned that they were an organisation with limited resources and they wanted all of their resources to be focused on their intervention in the forthcoming election.
campaign. I then approached the Liberals For Forests (LFF), a SMO established to oppose the continued logging of old-growth forest in the south-west of WA, to participate in my research. The LFF later applied for registration as a political party for the purposes of the State election.

Both the LFF and the TCA finally agreed to participate in my research. As part of this agreement, both organisations consented to allow interviews with their main coordinator and several other supporters and board members. Herman and Renz (1997: 186) suggested the importance of the views of organisational members to the overall judgement of the effectiveness (or success) of SMOs. Additionally, research access to the organisation’s board minutes for the period 1998-2000 was agreed to at this stage of my research. However, I had difficulty during the post-election period, after the interviews had been conducted, to gain access to both of the organisations’ board minutes. The LFF did not at that time have a formal board or management committee structure and the organisation was unwilling to provide access to minutes of the organisation’s pre-election planning meetings. It did agree to provide access to the organisation’s press releases for the research period, but it was unable to find copies of these releases. It would seem that no copies were retained by the organisation and the main media outlets (The West Australian, The Fremantle Herald and the Melville Community Times) did not retain their copies of the LFF media releases.

The forest issue was seen by many of those I interviewed to be a sensitive one, especially after the election when the new ALP Government immediately stopped the logging of old-growth forests. During this post-election period the TCA also removed their permission to access board minutes as this organisation was a branch of the national TCA organisation and the national body was
unwilling to give me permission to access their minutes. However, in June 2001, access was provided by the TCA to their regular (sometimes weekly, sometimes fortnightly) internal newsletter that went to their eight local member organisations.

My inability to obtain the organisations’ minutes and key communications such as press releases hindered my research in several ways. For example, it limited my analysis of the claims made by members from both sides of the debate that the media was biased. I had hoped to be able to track the release of media statements and analyse their publication success rates to see if they differed for each side. Additionally, I had hoped to use the internal board minutes to try and understand the role played by each organisation’s board. I had hoped to explore the tactics they chose during the RFA debate, their analysis of the tactics of their opposition, and the boards’ understanding of the values held by the WA public toward their preferred policy position. In response to these decisions to not allow access to organisational documents I developed alternate ways of analysing the newspaper and interview data that I had collected to make meaningful comparisons on the impact of both the TCA and LFF.

**Interviews**

The chief data source for my research were semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from the two case study organisations as well as with individual policy actors and organisations from the wider State forest policy network. Overall, I conducted interviews with 24 people selected from the case study
organisations and other primary stakeholders from the forest policy network. A further nine secondary interviews were conducted on specific research issues of interest that arose during the primary interviews. This ‘snowball’ sample consisted of individuals who could provide information in regard to particular historical details or specific forest policy information. I conducted these secondary interviews to gather more information about important events that had not been reported in the media as well as to improve my overall knowledge about the history of logging in WA.

The questions I asked during each primary interview were based on the main theoretical approaches described in the last chapter and were grouped together by these approaches (see Appendix 3 for the full list of questions). The questions were, in the main, targeted ones beginning with ‘why’ and ‘how’, as suggested by Yin (1994: 9). Given the uncertain relationship between the activities of SMOs and the public views on issues such as the environment, the question in relation to the change in values toward the forests in WA over the past 30 years was an open-ended one. An opportunity for interviewees to raise other issues not covered during the interview was also provided at the end of the interview. The questions I used during the secondary interviews did not follow the standard list of questions used for the primary ones but focused on specific research issues. An outline of the types and background of the interviewees as well as the acronyms I have used for them in my thesis is provided in the three tables below.

I don't think that this lack of access to documents of a SMO is unusual if the issue being studied is a salient one. Rohlinger (2001: 4) reported similar problems in gathering data from US countermovements campaigning on the abortion issue when it was prominent in the media.


Table 3.1 - Interviews with Primary Stakeholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY ACTOR</th>
<th>ORGANISATION/POSITION</th>
<th>ACRONYM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>Liberal/National Party Coalition</td>
<td>LNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(State)- Minister</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALP- Shadow Minister</td>
<td>ALP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greens Party- MLC</td>
<td>GP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal/National Party Coalition</td>
<td>FLNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Federal)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td>Department of CALM- Executive</td>
<td>CALM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>Shire of Manjimup- Councillor</td>
<td>MANJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Journalist (newspaper)</td>
<td>JOURN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Journalist (radio station)</td>
<td>RAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>Unions WA - Executive</td>
<td>TLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Australian Workers Union- Organisor</td>
<td>AWU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Wesfarmers Pty Ltd⁵- Executive</td>
<td>WES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>Institute of Foresters- Member</td>
<td>IOF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>The Wilderness Society- Activist</td>
<td>TWS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WA Forests Alliance- Activist</td>
<td>WAFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservation Council of WA- Executive</td>
<td>CCWA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁵ Wesfarmers Pty Ltd were the majority shareholders of the main WA logging company- Bunnings Forest Products Pty Ltd (now known as Sotico Pty Ltd).
### Table 3.2- Interviews with Case Study Stakeholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANISATION</th>
<th>ACRONYM OF PERSON INTERVIEWED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberals For Forests⁶</td>
<td>LFF1 - Election Candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LFF2 - Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LFF3 - Volunteer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LFF4 - Election Candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LFF5 - Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber Communities Australia</td>
<td>TCA1 - Group Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TCA2 - Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TCA3 - Group Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TCA4 - Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁶ The organisational name LFF was not used by candidates for this organisation in the 2001 WA State election as registration of this name was refused by the WA Electoral Commissioner after an official complaint from the Liberal Party (Mallabone, 2000: 28).

### Table 3.3- Interviews with Secondary Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANISATION</th>
<th>ACRONYM OF PERSON INTERVIEWED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>ACAD1 (Economist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACAD2 (Historian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACAD3 (Biologist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACAD4 (Forester)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historian</td>
<td>HIST- Historian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-politician</td>
<td>MP- ex-ALP State Cabinet Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>ALP-ENV (ex-ALP Environment Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIB- long-standing Liberal member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LAW- Lawyer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Page 69
My research into the effectiveness of these two SMOs during late 2000 created a number of problems that I had to address during the interview phase. The political sensitivity of this topic immediately prior to the State election caused some important policy stakeholders to decline to be interviewed. Many of those who did agree to be interviewed were wary of the reason for my research and its timing. This sensitivity to my research topic is highlighted by the fact that some of those I interviewed only signed the University ethics clearance form at the conclusion of their interview.

The difficulties I faced in my research in encouraging key stakeholders to speak openly about the forest debate in WA during the late 1990s were very different to those Sharp faced twenty years earlier. Her research (1983) was undertaken after just a decade of campaigning by anti-logging groups and when the proposal from the Conservation Through Reserves Committee (CTRC) for a Shannon River national park had been rejected by the Government of Sir Charles Court. She was able to have key stakeholders openly admit to activities in a fashion that after a further two decades of conflict I was not. Several important examples of admissions that Sharp gained from her interviews that provide useful insights for me were:

i) The Director of the Environment Protection Authority admitted that he ‘stacked’ the review of the Shannon River proposal with foresters and officers from the Department of Agriculture (Sharp: 56).

ii) The Secretary of the WA Timber Workers’ Union recounted his move from being a shop steward with the right-wing Clerk’s Union to winning election as the Timber Workers Union Secretary and then fighting the plans by the TLC to oppose the establishment of a
woodchipping industry. He did this by planning on setting up another union peak body in opposition to the TLC (Sharp, 1983: pp160-165).

iii) The Director of CALM (four years before his appointment) described his role in overturning the ALP State Executive’s support for the proposed Shannon River national park at the 1976 State Conference. This policy reversal allowed clearfelling of the area and helped the local ALP member retain his seat at the 1976 State election (Sharp: 176).

iv) The Coordinator of the Save Our South-west Campaign admitted that the local pro-logging group was established at the suggestion of timber millers and operated with their on-going support (Sharp: 232).

Recognising the current sensitivity of forests as a policy issue, I initially wrote to each interviewee and then rang them to confirm their participation in my research and to confirm the interview meeting details. The telephone call also allowed me to explain my interest in this project and to discuss the interview process and the University’s ethics framework. The interviews took between 40 to 80 minutes to complete and were held in either the interviewee’s place of employment or their homes. All interviews were taped on a tape recorder used for oral histories and all participants signed the University ethics clearance release. The tapes from all interviews were transcribed by an oral historian. I later checked each transcript against the original tape recording.

I then coded the interviews and uploaded them into the NUD*ist research software by using a command file that automatically separated sections of the
interviews into pre-coded areas. The interviews were initially analysed according to the responses provided to each question. I then compared the answers to each question from each interviewee to responses for that question from the other interviewees. I have included some of the more important insights and comments from the interviews in Chapter 7. Later, the interview data were analysed for a second time using the NUD*ist software in terms of exploring it for new themes that emerged from the interviewees’ comments and the language they used.

In light of the tension that existed among some forest policy actors at that time I took steps to gather data from other stakeholders I thought were important for my research. For example, I obtained from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation the complete transcript of an interview given by then-Premier, Mr Richard Court, for their national current affairs TV program *Four Corners* in November 2000. Two key stakeholders did not agree to an interview but did agree to answer a small number of questions I put to them by email about their role in the forest policy debate.

3.5 DATA ANALYSIS

**Document and Media Sources**

As mentioned in Chapter 1, my research project commenced with a document and media analysis of articles on forest issues contained in the local daily newspaper of record (*The West Australian*), the only local paper published on Sundays (*The Sunday Times*) and a national daily newspaper (*The Australian*). My strategy recognised that a majority of Australians obtained their news and information mainly from newspapers rather than TV (Mendez: 2003: 13). All articles on the forest topic were clipped daily from these newspapers over the
three year period between 1998-2000. I hoped that by including a national newspaper into my sample I would be able to obtain different insights into the WA forest campaign given that two newspapers provided a regional news focus and the other a national one. I also maintained a collection of selected articles on the forest issue from these three newspapers during 2001 and analysed them to monitor the forest policy debate after the election of the new Gallop Government. I coded each newspaper article between 1998-2000 in terms of key information such as its author, date, title, page number and size in column centimetres. Additionally, I documented other information such as the article’s key theme, its likely source and whether it contained a photograph. The articles were analysed to assess the influence of each policy actor and trends in the reporting of the forest policy debate, including the progress of the RFA process.

The anti-logging groups were challenging government policies so I conducted an analysis of the debates and questions from the WA Parliament in regard to the native forest issue from official Hansard records for the period 1998-2000. I commenced this analysis for records from 1970 following Sharp’s comment (1983: 349) that there was no mention in that year of the term ‘environment’ during debates about the proposed development of a woodchipping industry. I recorded the number of times that the term environment and timber were mentioned in either the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council from 1970-1990. The index records for parliamentary forest debates were sometimes listed under different headings such as timber, forest industry and sawlogs. I collected all of these records in Appendix 9. It was not possible to continue this analysis of the annual use of the terms ‘environment’ and ‘forests’ past the 1990 Hansard records as the indexing system that had been used since the 1970s was
changed several times during the 1990s. The earlier system used top-level indexes with sub-indexes for specific topics. In the 1990s this was changed so almost every topic debated in parliament was indexed separately. Instead I summarised the records for debates about the government department CALM from its establishment in 1984 as this index was not altered during the 1990s.

Another important data source for my thesis, in terms of historical information, was a review of the outcomes and recommendations of the four Royal Commissions on the WA forests conducted in 1901, 1922, 1954 and 1984.\(^7\) I found the forest issue to be one of four or five policy issues that has been most investigated by Royal Commissions in WA over the last 100 years. I also obtained a number of transcripts prepared for the National Library of Australia’s *People’s Forest Oral History Collection* by Gregg Borschmann during 1994 and 1995. These transcripts provided a compelling picture of the early days of the WA forest industry and some of their insights are incorporated in Chapters 4 and 5.

**The WA Media**

I will now summarise the various news sources available to the Western Australian public to highlight the importance of *The West Australian* newspaper as a source of news and information on the forest conflict. Perth is served, like other Australian state capitals, by a full range of AM and FM radio stations; it has 3 commercial TV stations (7, 9 and 10) as well as 2 TV stations funded by the Commonwealth government (ABC and SBS) and a community TV station (Access 31). *The West Australian* has been published since 1833, soon after the

\(^7\) The 1984 one was a short-term Honorary Royal Commission undertaken by a Select Committee made up of members of the Legislative Council (WA’s Upper House of Parliament).
The Sunday Times is owned by News Limited, a multinational media organisation with substantial media holdings in Australia whose major shareholder and Managing Director is Mr Rupert Murdoch. It has been published on Sundays in WA since 1897 and has a claimed weekly readership of 892,000 (personal telephone communication with sales staff, 25/7/2003). The Australian is a national newspaper published Monday to Saturday. It is also owned by News Limited. Its WA edition contains a half to a full page of local WA news each day. The claimed local WA readership in 2003 for the various editions of this newspaper are: Monday to Friday- 43,000 (453,000 nationally), and Saturday-
Analysis of Articles for Suggested Bias

The chief reason for the media analysis was to see whether the reporting of the conflict by newspapers was an important resource for the SMO’s campaigns. One of my findings from the interviews was a suggestion made by a number of interviewees from both countermovements that *The West Australian* was biased in favour of the opposite movement. To try and make an objective assessment of this claim I developed a number of empirical analyses of the articles published in *The West Australian* between 1998 and 2000. I coded and analysed each article where the source of the article was clear. These articles were included in a sub-set of all of the articles for that year if a spokesperson for a particular stakeholder organisation was named within the first two sentences of the article.

I chose this approach based on Beder’s description (2000: 202) of an objective journalistic process that included “…the presentation of information must be structured pyramidically, with the most important bits coming first, at the ‘top’ of the story”. This sorting process gave me a sample of 82 articles in 1998, 311 in 1999 and 102 articles in 2000- a total of 495 articles or 60% of those published on forest topics in *The West Australian* over these 3 years.

The remaining articles left out of this subset had no clear source and they often included comments from two or more different stakeholders, providing alternate viewpoints from different sides of the forest debate, early in the story’s introduction.
The results of this analysis are included in Table 8.5 and provide a clear view of the shift in the reporting of the forest debate over the 3-year period, particularly in relation to different stakeholders. I was not able to establish a coding framework for the ‘tone’ of each article as *The West Australian* used neutral words for its headings (see Chapter 8 for a comparison to headings published in *The Sunday Times*).

Another method I developed to explore the suggestion of bias in the reporting of the forest debate by *The West Australian* was to analyse the location of those articles that had been included in the sub-set with a clear source. This involved an analysis of each article in this sub-set published in *The West Australian* between 1998-2000 in relation to:

1) the page number on which it was published (ie how close it was to the front of the paper);
2) the day of the week on which it was published; and
3) whether it was published on the left or right hand side of the paper.

An additional exploratory process I developed was to prepare an average page location for articles in this sub-set for each major stakeholder in the forest policy network. I developed this location value by using the median value of the total page numbers of the articles for each stakeholder for each year. I have included in Table 3.4 below information about the location of the different sections and the full-page advertisements\(^8\) carried in each issue of *The West Australian* for a week of papers in mid-1999 when the Regional Forest Agreement

\(^8\) This table does not include a summary of the total space given over to advertisements between each news section, just the full-page ones.
debate was at its height. This analysis helped me to understand the importance of the page location value.

### Table 3.4- Structure of Editions of The West Australian (12-17 July 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Monday (12/7)</th>
<th>Tuesday (13/7)</th>
<th>Wednesday (14/7)</th>
<th>Thursday (15/7)</th>
<th>Friday (16/7)</th>
<th>Saturday (17/7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Pages</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full pages of adverts before Editorial page</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full pages of adverts before World News</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full pages of adverts before Business</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Section</td>
<td>pp 56-68</td>
<td>pp 53-64</td>
<td>pp 146-156</td>
<td>pp 60-68</td>
<td>pp 56-72</td>
<td>pp 95-112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lift Outs (eg TAB, Football, Today, Travel)</td>
<td>64pp</td>
<td>24pp</td>
<td>60pp</td>
<td>28pp</td>
<td>80pp</td>
<td>126pp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table clearly shows the importance of having articles placed closer to the front of the paper, earlier in the week, for any SMO wanting to obtain the best coverage of its activities. The amount of advertisements (especially the larger quarter-page, half-page and full-page ones) increased sharply after the 2 pages containing the ‘Editorial’ and the ‘Letters to the Editor’ sections of each edition. The structure of the paper was such that major local news items are placed before the pages containing the ‘Editorial’ and ‘Letters to the Editor’ sections. After these pages the international news was reported and the number of full-page advertisements increased dramatically. In the following ‘Local News’ section,
local articles contained on a two-page spread can be reduced to only about 15% of
the total page space with the remainder used for advertisements. This made these
news articles difficult to locate and would reduce their impact over articles
published earlier in the newspaper. *The West Australian* recognised the increased
awareness by its readers of material printed on pages closer to the front of the
paper than toward the rear by charging an increased advertising loading for these
pages (thewest.com.au/AboutUs/pdf-files/rate-card.pdf). For example,
advertisements on page two (a left-hand page) were priced 20% higher than those
placed on left-hand pages before page eight, 34% higher than those placed before
page 12 and 42% before page 18. A similarly higher loading applied to right-hand
pages.

Articles published in the middle of *The West Australian* in the ‘Local News’
section also tended to be smaller in size. Fewer of the stories located in this part of
the newspaper were accompanied by a photograph. Photographs tended to only
accompany the articles contained in the first 12 to 14 pages of each edition of the
newspaper and were likely to create greater interest in the accompanying news
story. Also, I developed a further analysis to see whether there was a bias in the
location of articles from different stakeholders toward either the left or right
pages. A total average score of where the articles for each stakeholder was located
was calculated by giving a score of 0 for articles on the newspaper’s left-hand
page (or even-numbered pages) of an issue and 1 for articles on the right-hand
pages (or odd-numbered pages).

I developed this methodology for analysing stakeholder articles following
the acknowledgment that readers take more notice of material published on right-
hand (or odd-numbered pages). This insight allowed newspapers to charge higher
advertising rates for advertisements on these pages. *The West Australian* charged an additional 75% loading for advertisements placed on page 3 (right-hand page), for example, compared to if it had been located on page 2 (left-hand page). This loading reduces further from the front of the paper and for pages 18 and 19 the loading for the right-hand page is only 12% higher than for the left-hand one (thewest.com.au/AboutUs/pdf-files/rate-card.pdf).9

**Economic and Demographic Data**

I also collected additional data to help analyse economic and socio-demographic changes in three Local Government Areas in the south-west region of WA for the period 1970-2000. These data originated from the national Census collected by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) every 5 years and were reported in their census publications, web site and other specialist publications. My analysis commenced with the results of the 1971 Census. The starting year was selected as it is the census closest to the date when the Campaign to Save Native Forests was established in WA. The most recent data were those provided by the 2000 Census and published in late 2002. I have also used economic information obtained from specialist publications published by government departments such as ABS and ABARE on forest, tourism, wine and other resource issues pertaining to the south-west.

9 *The Australian* newspaper has similar loadings between left and right pages and for pages closer to the front of the paper (Complete Ratecard 2003-04 A4.PDF).
3.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has reviewed the methodology that I used to carry through my research project. The interview data were collected in a short period before the 2001 State election and the pressures and tensions created by the high profile nature of the pre-election debate on forest policy required changes to my original data collection plan. I completed the interviews before the election to ensure that the stakeholders were not distracted by any election debate on the forests but focused on the RFA process that concluded in 1999. While most interviewees provided considerable support that allowed the research to proceed at my desired speed, there were times when it was obvious that there were limits as to what information interviewees were willing to impart. Sources such as the four Royal Commissions and the NLA Peoples Forest Project interviews have added an historical dimension that allowed me to develop a better understanding of the events around the debate on the RFA. The interview data were rich enough to have supported a research project on their own but my analysis has been greatly assisted by the additional data sources such as newspaper articles, economic and demographic data and an analysis of Hansard records.
Chapter 4- EARLY HISTORY OF THE FOREST INDUSTRY:
from pre-colonial times to 1920

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The focus of most of my research activities were the events surrounding the RFA debate in WA during the period 1998-2000. I aim to make sense of the policy developments, network and stakeholder relationships, and the public claims made during this time. In order to do so, I consider it of value to see such debates in historical context by analysing them in light of the debates relating to the logging of native forests in WA since the 19th Century. This chapter then will outline various aspects of the history of logging in WA for the period since pre-colonial times to 1920. The following chapter will take this history through to 2001 when new public attitudes towards the native forests of WA became a prime electoral issue in the State election. Together, in these chapters I propose a series of epistemes based on the attitudes of people towards the forest and Western
Australia’s natural environment. My construction of these four epistemes to describe the debate in WA over the use of its native forest needs to be considered in the light of my reliance on non-primary sources for the period prior to 1998. The picture painted below thus draws heavily on secondary sources.

I develop a thesis in this and the next chapter that over time the people of WA and their governments changed their attitudes to the forest. The material presented below is used to claim that policies on the use of native forests have moved through four identifiable historic periods that involve different hegemonic policy approaches at a government level. These periods commence with the ‘pre-colonial’ one (up to 1829) when the indigenous Aboriginal people lived in and managed the forests of south-west WA. I have termed the later ones ‘colonial’ (1840-1920), ‘scientific’ (1920-2001) and ‘ecological’ (2001 onwards). I have used Foucault’s term, *episteme*, (1995:27)\(^1\) for these periods because he developed this notion to describe historic periods that do not have clear beginnings and endings.\(^2\) As an example, I show below that during the colonial period there were a number of commentators and some timber workers who questioned the logging policy at that time in language similar to that used a century later by those claiming to be ‘environmentalists’.

As an example, soon after the settlement of the Swan River colony a member of an expedition into the forests described them in the following terms:

---

\(^1\) Foucault called the dominant perception of order in a given age an “*épistème*” — the foundation of knowledge, analogous in its relationship with science to the gene. This episteme is directly related to power, as Foucault said “[P]ower and knowledge directly imply one another; . . . there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.” (1995: 27).

\(^2\) Another way of describing the transitions in the discourse on the forests in WA would be to use Kuhn’s ‘paradigm shift’. Such a dramatic shift could be seen in the forest policy shift made by the ALP after the 2001 State election. Additionally, Tilly’s ‘framing’ of policy discourse would be another way of describing the changing discourses and identity politics being carried through the WA debate about forest policies (Trigger, 1999: 163).
The grandeur of the scene among the valleys surrounded by increasingly tall white gums and the solemn silence of the bush, totally unaccompanied by any signs of civilisation, imparts ideas that it is impossible to reflect on without awe and reverence and which those who have not experienced it can scarcely appreciate (Bassett cited in Bolton & Hutchinson, 1973: 57).

Much later, the ‘scientific’ period occurred when there was a transformation of the industry with the introduction of new forms of technology and mechanisation for logging and transport. This period also saw the introduction of the ‘scientific’ study of the forest by the WA Forests Department and new utilisation regimes based on plantations of new non-indigenous tree species (eg *pinus radiata*) and the introduction of clearfelling of large coupes of native forests from about 1950 onwards. During this episteme the number of people employed in the industry in the south-west of WA fell from a high of 5,200 to 2,600 people (Sharp, 1983: 80).

With the unforeseen election of the ALP in the February 2001 State election, a new policy approach to the use of native forests has been established in WA- the fourth period - the *ecological* episteme. The essential elements of this new episteme are that lumber is primarily produced from plantation timber and regrowth native forest timbers, while the old-growth forests are completely protected from logging. Enlarged old-growth forest reserves are now to be utilised for environmental friendly purposes such as eco-tourist businesses.

In this chapter I will firstly look at the uses of the forest made by the indigenous Aboriginal populations living in or near the forest. I will then examine the *colonial* episteme and the initial efforts to log timber in the south-west of WA. It was during this time in the 19th Century that a large and politically powerful timber lobby based on family companies developed in the State. Also, this period included the first Royal Commission that looked at claims of mismanagement and
overcutting of the State’s native forests. The early importance of timber to the struggling WA economy will be examined as a factor that led to the timber industry having the political power to delay the Government from moving forest policy approaches from the *scientific* to the *ecological* episteme earlier in the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century.

4.2 PRE-COLONIAL EPISTEME (to 1829) -

Aboriginal use of the forests

The Nyungar or Noongar\textsuperscript{3} people have occupied the whole of the south-west region of Western Australia for over 30,000 years before its colonisation by the British in 1829 (Green, 1987: 1; Merrilees *et al.*, 1973: 44). In this section I briefly outline the little that is known of the traditional use of the forests by the indigenous Aboriginal people in the south-west of WA and the impact of British colonisation on Aborigines in this region.

The area in which the Noongar have traditionally lived runs 1,600 km from Geraldton in the north to Esperance in the south and covers nearly 3 million hectares (Green, 1987: 1). The views of the first European settlers in the new colony about the indigenous people were probably based on the widely-published accounts of the English buccaneer William Dampier that “the inhabitants of this country are the miserablest people in the world…and setting aside their human shape, they differ but little from brutes” (cited in Crawford, 1987: 4). Merrilees *et al.* (1973: 50) reported that due to poor record keeping and lack of access to all areas of the colony by the early settlers, the number of Noongar in the south-west
of WA at the time of colonisation was uncertain. They estimated the number of Noongars at about 6,000 people. The Noongars were said to live in ‘bands’ that were defined by various ecological boundaries and these bands formed loose alliances that were named ‘tribes’ by the settlers. Noongars saw themselves as separate from the indigenous people to the north and east and they defined themselves as Noongars by their non-use of circumcision (Howard, 1981: pp2-4).

This lack of information about the indigenous people in the south-west soon after colonisation probably also contributed to there being few records as to how Noongars utilised the forest areas. Boutland (1988: 149) reported that several authors remarked that the Noongar people were always on the move between the coastal areas and in-land forested areas following seasonal abundances of food. They seem to have moved into the forests in winter living in scattered groups, and back to the coast in late spring, where family groups reassembled around the more abundant water supplies. During summer the forests were also ‘fired’ to assist in the capture of native game that fed on the grass regrowth (Green, 1979: 25). Christensen (1992: 39) believed that the heavy rain and thick forests meant that the the south-west were more sparsely populated by the Noongar than around the coastal plain. Boutland (1988: 149) noted that the inhospitable karri region was almost devoid of game and the Noongars managed the less dense woodlands and jarrah regions by burning them every three to five years. This systematic use of fire led to “near-cultivation of grasses, yams and typha roots in the south-west” (Boutland: 150).

---

3 In my thesis I will use the spelling ‘Noongar’ as it is used by the local Aboriginal Land Council (www.noongar.org.au) although many others use ‘Nyungar’ (see Green, 1979; Merrilees et al., 1973) or ‘Nyoongah’ (Howard, 1981).
The Noongar people suffered badly from diseases introduced by the Europeans and many died due to their active resistance against the southern advancement from Perth of the European settlers. Merrilees et al. (p50) noted that 10 years after settlement there were still about 3,000 Aborigines living in the south-west around the rapidly growing Perth settlement. Green (1987: 41) reported that Major Lockyer received a friendly greeting from two Aborigines after his initial landing at King George Sound in December 1826 (three years before settlement of the Swan River colony at Perth). Green says that a friendly liaison between the two cultures existed until the movement of settlers into the southern pastoral lands brought competition for the region’s natural resources. Later, Green (1987: 75) recounted stories that the tension between the Europeans and indigenous Noongar around Perth was due to a series of sporadic clashes as well as the general practise of the Aborigines to burn their lands in late Spring to flush out game. Unfortunately, the fires tended to burn the new crops planted by the settlers as well as their thatch-roofed dwellings!

The momentum of these attacks and counter attacks in the south-west seemed to have grown through the years 1831-32. The culmination of this tension was the Pinjarra massacre on 28 October 1834. An attack by a group of armed soldiers on a camp of 60-70 Aborigines left more than 20 Aborigines dead, with the soldiers killing all of the males (Green: 104). Green (p201) also listed 30 settlers killed by Aborigines in the years between 1826 and 1852, while 121 Aborigines were reported as being killed by settlers.

Green (p235) also gathered details of the major epidemics occurring in the 1800s in the new settlement and found many reports such as “1843: unspecified epidemics- great numbers of Aborigines dead; 1851: Great mortality amongst
Aborigines at Busselton”. The major diseases seem to have been influenza, whooping cough, venereal disease, tuberculosis and measles.\(^4\) By the time the new timber industry started to rapidly expand in the south-west and exports of timber to Britain and India had commenced, the traditional Noongar had been decimated by disease and their spirit broken by killings at the hands of settlers and troops. Green (1987: 120) reported that the measles epidemics of 1861 and 1883 “all but obliterated the traditional Noongar of the South-West.” While there are many reports of the devastating impact of colonisation on the Noongar there are few on their use of the forests prior to colonisation. This is because the initial development of pastoral lands by the settlers was into the Avon Valley to the east of Perth (Bolton & Hutchison, 1973: 56). By the time a number of small settlements had been established in the south-west the Noongar’s traditional life had not survived in a coherent way, with surviving Aborigines moved into settled areas and ‘intermixing’ with the colonists (Merrilees et al., 1973: pp50-53). Toward the end of the 19th Century (and coinciding with the commencement of widespread logging in the south-west) various writers have asserted that few ‘full blood’ Noongars remained- maybe as few as 700 (Neville, 1926 and Hammond, 1933 cited in Merrilees et al. 53).\(^5\) It is therefore difficult to estimate how the growth of the timber industry in WA after the 1840s disrupted the traditional use of the forest by the few Noongar who remained in the south-west. Colonisation had caused the disintegration of the Aboriginal communities in the south-west and

\(^4\) The severity of these epidemics on the Noongars is suggested by Hasluck (1942: 104) who noted that more than 200 died around Albany in 1860 from measles. At this time the Noongar population had already been reduced to a very small level.

\(^5\) Howard (1981: 9) suggested a lower number of only 85 ‘full blood’ Noongars in 1901 out of a total surviving population of 1,419.
destroyed the knowledge of how the Noongar had used the forests before settlement (Bolton, 1981b: 4).

4.3 COLONIAL EPISTEME (1829 to 1920) -

The establishment of commercial logging

The ‘colonial’ episteme commenced with European colonisation of WA in 1829. Early exploration of so-called New Holland by Dutch seafarers (eg Hartog - 1616, Peerebroom - 1658, Vlamingh - 1697) and later the British (Dixon -1800), Australian (Flinders - 1802) and French explorers (firstly Hamelin in 1801, and de Freycinet in 1818) led to considerable concern in Britain about the possibility of non-British European ownership of this vast piece of land beyond 135° E Longitude. The then-Governor of NSW, Sir Ralph Darling, sent Major Lockyer and a detachment of troops and some convicts to set up the first European settlement at King George Sound (Albany) in November 1826. A survey of the Swan River was carried out by Captain Stirling in January 1827 and a very favourable report to Governor Darling was made by the Colonial Botanist of NSW, Charles Fraser. He reported that in comparison to the colony of NSW, the soil was superior, the trees not as numerous and the evidence of good quality freshwater led him to say glowingly “I hesitate not in pronouncing it superior to any [land] I have seen in NSW, Eastward of the Blue Mountains…” (Bartlett, 1979: pp8-10). Upon such misinformation the small Swan River colony was founded by the British Government.

Captain Stirling personally conveyed Governor Darling’s recommendation for a permanent settlement at the Swan River back to Britain in 1828. The colony was established as a province for British gentry and was to be underwritten solely
by private capital. Stirling’s promotion of this investment proposal sparked a “Swan River Mania” in Britain (Lines, 1991: 57). On 2 June, 1829, the now-Lieutenant Governor Stirling arrived back at the Swan River, a month after what is now WA (and the rest of the then-unclaimed New Holland⁶) had been claimed formally for Britain by Captain Fremantle. In June 1829 the new colony numbered less than 150 people (Bartlett, 1979: pp11-12). These early Swan River settlers had to struggle for their survival as a lack of labourers and artisans held back the development of the new colony. In desperation, the colony became the last in Australia to accept convicts. The first convicts arrived in June 1850 and the last in 1868. Robertson (1956: 4) credited the transport of convicts as the stimulus to a rapid expansion of timber exports from the Swan River colony as the ships needed return cargoes after they had unloaded their human cargo from Britain. The ending of the transportation of convicts to WA led to a further period of economic recession and near stagnation (Bolton and Hutchison, 1973: 58). In 1890, the Swan River colony gained representative government with the approval of the British Government, 20 years after the other Australian states had gained self-government (Mills, 1986: pp4-5).

The population growth of colonialists in WA from the establishment of the colony to the beginning of the 20th Century is indicated in Table 4.1. This table clearly shows that the size of the non-Aboriginal population did not exceed that of the original Noongar people until nearly 20 years after settlement. It also shows the impact on the growth in the European population of the arrival of convicts, the slow-down when WA stopped accepting them and the dramatic growth when gold was discovered about 1885. At this time people streamed to the new goldfields

---

⁶ This new colony totalled a massive area of 2.5 million sq km and 8,000 km of coastline (Lines, 1991: 57).
(such as Coolgardie and Kalgoorlie) about 300km east of Perth from around Australia and the world to make their fortunes (Bolton and Hutchison, 1973: 60).

Table 4.1- Estimate of Non-Aboriginal Population of WA (1829-1900)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total People</th>
<th>Increase over Decade (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>1,172</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>1,434</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>2,311</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>3,576</td>
<td>2,310</td>
<td>5,886</td>
<td>155%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>9,597</td>
<td>5,749</td>
<td>15,346</td>
<td>161%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>15,511</td>
<td>9,624</td>
<td>25,135</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>16,985</td>
<td>12,576</td>
<td>29,561</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>28,854</td>
<td>19,648</td>
<td>48,502</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>110,088</td>
<td>69,879</td>
<td>179,967</td>
<td>271%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Bartlett, 1974: 139)

The early attitude of the colonialists to their new landscape was described by Frawley (1987: 7) as one of ‘domination and exploitation’ in which the landscape was only improved by clearing it. Throughout Australia settlers were reported as ‘hating trees’ and saw them as a nuisance to be cleared to allow new settlements and farms (Bolton, 1981b: 37). Perlin (1989: 25) traced a similar attack on the forest by other developing civilisations over five thousand years to their need for essential fuel and building material. In the first 40 years of settlement the struggling Swan River colony looked to the surrounding jarrah forest to meet these basic human needs.

During the colonial episteme the utilisation of the native forest was primarily by loggers using axes to selectively fell trees and low-grade transport methods (ie. bullock drays) to carry logs to temporary mills or saw pits. Trees
were essential for shelter, tools and transport in the growth of the new colony. Mills (1986: 6) suggested that the first sawmill equipment arrived in Perth within its first year of establishment and the logging of jarrah (or Swan River mahogany as it was then known) for export commenced in 1831 with the supply of 200 tons to the Royal Navy. Robertson (1956: 2) suggested that this contract was due to the repair of HMS Success with local timber in the Colony in 1830. Most timber was initially harvested within an easy transport distance of Perth in the Darling Ranges about 20km away. McCaw and Burrows (1989: 317) highlighted the importance of the vast expanses of forest suitable for shipbuilding by the Royal Navy as an important factor in the founding of the Swan River Colony and reported that about 10,000 tonnes of jarrah were sent to English naval dockyards in 1836 alone.

The first steam-powered sawmill began operation close to Perth in 1844. The first timber operations outside of the near-Perth region began in the south-west near Bunbury also in the early 1840s. Timber was initially bartered for food and other luxuries from visiting sailing ships. It was not until 1874 that exports of jarrah would outstrip local consumption (Robertson: 4). The major value for the Colony of timber exports was initially from the sale of sandalwood to South and Southeast Asia. A formal export industry using the port of Bunbury began by 1844 with a large order of jarrah being exported in 1848 for the Indian railways (Mills, 1986: 7). Timber was not only being used for the export of sleepers to other countries and Australian colonies, but also for the development of new railways outside of Perth (often with labour provided by convicts). New markets allowed the timber industry to extend its reach deeper into the forests and to spread further south from Perth (Mills: 8).
From the earliest days of the colony, there was a view that the timber in the southern corner of WA was inexhaustable and the early timber cutting methods reflected this view (see below for the findings of the 1903 Royal Commission that also made this point). Early reports from settlers confirmed the beauty of the heavily timbered shores of the Swan River leading from Fremantle to Perth:

The appearance of the country from the ship was really magnificent; it seemed to be one complete map of verdure, but thickly wooded with trees of the most beautiful foliage (cited in Hasluck, 1933: 40).

We were quite astonished at the splendid scenery on both sides of the river, although the soil is nothing but white sand. The foliage of the trees was exquisite, and together with the many beautiful turnings in the river, one might fancy themselves in fairyland (cited in Hasluck: 41).

During the early colonial period, little impact was made on the forest resources distant from Perth due to the lack of suitable ports to load the cut logs into boats and the lack of transport to the ports (Lines, 1991: 145). In 1890 during the parliamentary debates in Britain on the proposal that the Colony of WA be given representative government, Governor Broome reported that:

The fact is that the whole of the south-west division is so thickly covered with forests and the great desire of everybody is to get rid of as many trees as they possible can (cited in Rundle, 1996: 227).

During the same year, the then-Surveyor General Sir John Forrest, noted that only 63,000 sq km of land in the south-west land division had at that time been alienated for pastoral purposes, from a total of 194,000 sq km (Forrest, 1889 cited in Rundle: 227). Even at this stage of the development of the forest industry a WA parliamentarian suggested that timber should be conserved but he received

---

7 It should be noted that the settlers making these positive reports arrived in March, at the conclusion of the often-overwhelming heat of summer.
little support from his colleagues and a Perth newspaper suggested that “jarrah and karri forests were sufficient for many centuries” (Bolton, 1981b: 40).

The Colony’s native timbers were its first export and provided a steady and growing export income for the floundering settlement. In the initial period of logging in the south-west (to about 1890) sandalwood provided either more or about the same level of export income as all the other native timbers combined. The majority of these other timbers were jarrah with about two-thirds being sent to England and the remained to the other Australian colonies (Robertson, 1956: 4). By about 1890 sandalwood timber supplies were depleted and the other timbers became more important for the Colony’s export income. Figure 4B uses information provided by the annual report of the WA Woods and Forests Department (1901) and shows the rise in export income due to the logging of WA’s timber from the commencement of logging through until 1890 when the value of jarrah and karri exports exceeded £100,000. The drop in timber exports between 1885-1888 was probably due to a flight of workers from the south-west forests to the goldfields.
Figure 4B- Native Timber Exports from WA (1845 to 1890)

£1 (1900) = $60 (2000)

(Forests Department, 1922: 33)

Figure 4C indicates the dramatic and steady increase in income from jarrah and karri exports after 1890. The value of these timber exports at that time can be seen in the Colony’s debt levels. In 1891 when the Colony numbered about 50,000 people, the government debt was £1.4 million, or about £27 per head of population. With the infrastructure needs of the rapidly expanding goldfield’s population, the debt had grown dramatically to £11.4 million by 1900- or £73 per head. Moran suggested this was the highest debt level of any of the Australian colonies (Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, 5/9/1900: 258). Taxes and royalties from timber exports allowed the government to service this debt as well.
as liaise with credit providers in London who were financing new timber companies in WA. By the beginning of First World War timber exports were at a level nearly 10-times that of the 1890’s. This rise in the value of timber exports through the colonial episteme was only interrupted by the loss of markets during the First World War. The data used in these figures are from the Forest Department’s Annual Reports and the actual export values for each year are listed in Appendix 4.

**Figure 4C- Native Timber Exports from WA (1891 to 1922)**

£1 (1900) = $60 (2000)

(Forests Department, 1922: 33)

The major reason for the growing level of timber exports from the forests in the south-west toward the end of the 19th Century was that railways were extended
into the region. The first locomotive was used in a mill in the south-west in 1871
and the new railways assisted the transport of timber to coastal ports as well as
providing the region’s initial inland settlements at stations (Robertson, 1956: 11).
By 1891 there were over 800 miles of railways built in the south-west by timber
companies and those companies with land grants (Robertson: 26).

The great value of the timber export industry to WA can be seen by
comparing its value to timber exports at the end of the 20th Century. Robertson
(p37) classified the period 1893-1900s as ‘boom years’ for the timber export
industry as the Forrest government encouraged new private railway construction.
The Forrest Government released nearly 270,000 ha of forested land in 1893
alone with lease fees amounting to over £27,000 in 1898 (or equivalent to $1.6
million in 2000 prices). The annual export income from WA native timber before
and after the First World War is roughly equivalent to about $60 million (in 2000
prices) - about four times the actual value for timber exports in 1996 (see the next
chapter). During this episteme, when the forests seemed endless and there were
ready overseas markets for their produce, there were also early warnings in regard
to the likely limited productive life of this natural resource:

But as nowhere, not even in the most extensive woodlands, can the supply of
timber from natural forests be considered inexhaustible, a rational far-seeing
provision for the maintenance of its forest treasure is needful for Western
Australia, however indiminishable these may appear to be at present (Von

Early attempts to control wastage in the timber industry included the first
Crown regulations in 1842 which required a license for timber cutting. These
were followed in 1878 with regulations introducing large fees aimed at those cutting timber for export (Robertson, 1956: 12, 16). These tougher regulations flowed from the recommendations of a Colonial Royal Commission in 1877 when the colony was considering steps to regulate and develop the timber export trade and reduce waste (Robertson: 32).10

**The 1903 Royal Commission**

Controversy over the policies for the logging of native forests in WA is not a recent event. Since the State gained representative government in 1890 there have been four Royal Commissions and an Honorary Royal Commission.11 The first Royal Commission after WA joined the Australian Federation was held in 190312 and it was established after eight British-based timber companies came together to form ‘The Combine’ in 1902 (Robertson, 1956: 52). This new company had a virtual monopoly on timber exports and the growing local market. A number of small timber companies had campaigned against The Combine after the Lands Department in 1902 had refused to issue any timber leases to them and they had no forest areas to cut for local timber needs (Mills, 1986: 33). By this time The Combine provided 75% of the State’s timber exports (Robertson: 90) and held over 335,000 ha of forest leases, or about 25% of WA’s forested area.

---

8 Bolton (1999: 29) suggested that many of the first Australian voices for the conservation of forests were from German migrants as at that time German forestry was the most advanced in Europe.

9 Hall (1988: 447) credited von Mueller as being particularly influential in the 1890s in creating a political climate in WA conducive to preservation.

10 There seems to have been a similar colonial experience with New Zealand’s native forests. Within 40 years of colonisation nearly half of NZ’s 8 million ha of forest had been logged leading to the withdrawal of timber cutting licences by the Auckland Provincial Government. Shingle splitters were criticised for causing “frightful waste and destruction” (Star, 1999: 88).

11 A Parliamentary Select Committee established by the Bourke Labor Government in 1984 but presided over by members of the Upper House and not a judge.

12 Similar Commissions of inquiry into forestry practises were held earlier in Tasmania and Victoria in 1898 (Bolton, 1981: 105).
Bill that proposed to restrict the size of leases held by ‘foreign’ timber companies was passed in the Legislative Assembly but blocked in the Legislative Council. This led to the Royal Commission (Robertson: 53). It was asked to report on:

a) The world’s supplies of timber, particularly the hardwood timbers of the Eastern States;

b) Supplies of each WA timber variety;

c) The rate at which the WA forests were being depleted;

d) Whether the frequent reports of enormous waste were correct; and

e) Whether the planting of softwoods should be undertaken.

In its first progress report (1903), the Commission recommended to the Governor, Sir Frederick Bedford, that the Forest Department be reorganised and managed by an Inspector General with suitable experience and scientific training in forestry. The other significant recommendation (piv) was that Crown forests should not be leased for timber cutting purposes but that timber should be disposed of by the payment of a royalty by timber companies. The Commission found (p10) that about 43% of the timber cut from trees for the purpose of hewing railway sleepers in the forest was wasted, compared to a wastage level of 28% arising from the milling of timber for lumber. The Commission did find (pv) that wastage levels had declined from earlier years when timber was primarily cut for 9” x 3” paving blocks for roads around Perth and in London, with wasted timber being burnt in the local mills.

In its final report (1904: 7) the Commission reported that the karri country measured about 1,200,000 acres, of which about 150,000 acres had already been logged in the clearing of land for agriculture. The second session of the Royal Commission sat to consider the world’s supplies of timber, particularly those in the Eastern States of Australia (Mills, 1986: 37). It highlighted, in the language of
the time, the importance of bringing the WA logging industry under government control while excusing past colonial governments by comparing their poor forest administration to that used in other countries:

The task of inaugurating a system of forest conservation in this State is one of a great magnitude, in consequence of the timber industry having been permitted to grow into its present dimensions uncontrolled by effective administration. This neglect of an important industry has been the rule, apparently, at some stage or other, in the history of most countries (Royal Commission, 1904: 11).

Great as the subject [the establishment of a satisfactory forest administration] seemed at the opening of the Commission’s work, every step in the inquiry brought fresh problems into view; for at whichever phase of forestry we, as a community, may look- whether it be at the export, or at the internal trade; at conservation or sylviculture; at the interspersed, locked-up, cultivable land; at the future interests of mining, or at the present fettered enterprise of mill-owners outside the “Combine” - the same dark shadow of the Nemesis of neglect threatens. From this situation relief can only come by immediate legislation (Royal Commission: 13).

The Royal Commission acknowledged the work of J. Ednie-Brown, the first Conservator of the Forests, who had died in 1898 and had not been replaced by the Government. During his short time he had initiated restrictions on the minimum size of trees that could be cut, established a royalty system and set up a system of forest rangers to supervise the use of the State’s forests (Richards, 1993: 201). One of the Commission’s statements on the logging practices of the day resonates 100 years later in its use of language similar to that used by anti-logging groups encouraging WA into the ecological episteme:

13 There are many similarities between the history of WA’s forest development and those of the other Australian States. Ednie-Brown had previously worked as Conservator of Forests in South Australia and then as Director General of Forests in NSW. Just as WA left his position unfilled on his death, so Victoria left unfilled the role of Conservator for 7 years when George Perrin died in 1900 (Rundle, 1996: 228).
State acquiescence in the destruction of good timber only because the trade demands it, is a crime against coming generations; and any attempts to increase the export in the interest of foreign companies, or with the object of inducing more men to join in timber getting at the expense of posterity, needs wise resistance (Royal Commission, 1904: iv).

Not all WA settlers saw the forests as just being for clearing or logging. The first reserve established in WA in the forests was in response to a proposal from the curator of the WA Museum, Bernard Woodward (de Garis, 1993: 121) and was gazetted in 1894 (Rundle, 1996: 228). Woodward was also the secretary of the WA Natural History Society. This organisation received support from the elite of the time. Its president was the Premier, John Forrest, and its patron the Governor of the Colony, Sir William Robinson. This first reserve in the colony consisted of 65,000 hectares of unexplored and unlogged jarrah forest in the Darling escarpment near Pinjarra (about 100km south of Perth). The Governor approved the native flora and fauna reserve here in early 1894 but later battles to secure the reserve from logging were not successful. It was logged in 1911 after submissions, supported by the Anglican Bishop and Governor, to turn the reserve into a national park failed (Richards, 1993: 128). The Government had previously set aside 200 hectares of logged jarrah to establish the Perth Park in 1872, also at the suggestion of the Governor. The importance of this decision by the small Colony (numbering just over 25,000 people) can be seen in that it was made in the same year that the US Congress established the Yellowstone National Park (Rundle: pp227-228). The Perth Park on the city’s western edge was enlarged in 1890 (with the Premier Sir John Forrest as the President of its management committee) and in 1901 was renamed Kings Park (Bolton, 1981b: 105).
This early involvement of the societal elite of Perth (including the Anglican Bishop, Governor and Premier) in policies affected WA’s forests and natural environment is similarly reflected in the debate over old-growth logging nearly a century later that I will describe more fully in later chapters. There were also some settlers who at this early stage of development could see the potential for the south-west to develop a tourism industry around its natural resources. A Busselton land agent in 1900 suggested such an idea for an industry based on ‘country residences and seaside resorts’ (Richards, 1993: 114). By the end of the 20th century, as we will see in Chapter 5, the tourist industry played an important role in assisting the move of WA’s forest policy to the ecological episteme.

4.4 THE GROWING ECONOMIC VALUE OF WA’s TIMBER INDUSTRY

In this section of the chapter I explore the economic value to WA of the growing timber industry, primarily based in the south-west region, in the period to 1920. I analyse the value of the timber industry to the Colony’s (and then State) economy during the first two epistemes by comparing its export value to other important export commodities using data adapted from Appleyard (1987). Table 4.2 shows that the export of timber products was of major importance in the early days of the Swan River Colony when the European population was less than 5,000 people and the colony was struggling to survive financially. Toward the end of the 1840s timber annually provided between 10-40% of the colony’s exports.

---

14 Cotgrove (1982: 2) traced the first influential US environmental group to the Sierra Club (founded in 1892) and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds in the UK (founded in 1889) to a similar time as the establishment of this first reserve in WA.
Baxter (1980: 8) provided another reason as to the financial importance of this industry. He noted that at this time over 75% of Government income was generated by pastoral rents. As the land was cleared of its timber, the Government gained financially in two ways - first from the export income and secondly from the rent of the cleared land for pastoral and agricultural purposes.

Table 4.2- Timber Exports in the Early Days of Colonisation

£1 (1900)= $60 (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total WA Exports (£)</th>
<th>Timber Exports (£)</th>
<th>Timber as % of Total Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>13,363</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>13,354</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>20,223</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>24,535</td>
<td>5,984</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>34,324</td>
<td>13,845</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>31,558</td>
<td>11,211</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>29,857</td>
<td>2,905</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Appleyard, 1987: 204)

In Table 4.3 I have provided comparative export data for both timber and wool for the early years of the timber industry. I compare timber to wool in this and the next chapter as a way of exploring the link between the value of timber exports and the power of the timber industry to influence government forest policy. This influence was suggested in the Royal Commission Report (1904) above. As I show below, timber grew in importance as a major West Australian export toward the end of the 19th Century and into the early decades of the 20th Century. This industry was also important in employment terms and by 1891 there were 41 timber mills operating and employing 2,500 men (Zafer, 1957: 3).
I have used the wool industry to compare the timber industry to as it has also grown dramatically in value since the mid-nineteenth century to where “Australia rode on the sheep’s back” (Horne, 1971: 141). Table 4.3 shows that within the first decade of felling of timber, exports had quickly grown to where they were still smaller than, but were of the same order of magnitude as the value of wool exports.

Table 4.3- Timber Exports in Comparison to Wool Exports in the Early Days of Colonisation

£1 (1900)= $60 (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Timber Products (£)</th>
<th>Wool Exports (£)</th>
<th>Ratio Wool/Timber</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>7,008</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>7,757</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>13,363</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>5,984</td>
<td>11,464</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>13,845</td>
<td>15,098</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>11,211</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>2,905</td>
<td>15,482</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Appleyard, 1987: 204)

Table 4.4 provides more export data for WA timber exports, this time for the later period after WA joined the new Australian Federation in 1901. During this period timber exports grew rapidly to over £8-10 million per year (approximately $480-600 million in equivalent value in 2000). However, other industries (especially gold) were also expanding in value to the State and the timber exports remained at about 5-10% of WA’s total export income for the decade 1900-1910.
Table 4.4- Timber Exports from WA in the Period Before WW1

£1 (1900) = $60 (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total WA Exports (£)</th>
<th>Timber Exports (£)</th>
<th>Timber as % of Total Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>6,852,054</td>
<td>458,036</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>8,515,623</td>
<td>572,047</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>9,051,358</td>
<td>500,533</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>10,324,732</td>
<td>638,867</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>10,271,489</td>
<td>654,120</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>9,871,019</td>
<td>689,011</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>9,832,679</td>
<td>707,789</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>9,904,860</td>
<td>504,985</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>9,518,020</td>
<td>813,618</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>8,860,494</td>
<td>866,758</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>8,299,781</td>
<td>972,325</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Appleyard, 1987: 236)

As we move to the end of the colonial episteme, timber was still an important export for WA, but its value to the State was far less than the value of WA’s first major mineral export, gold (see Table 4.5 below).\(^{15}\)

---

\(^{15}\) The WA goldrush in the 1890s led to the depletion of timber in the goldfields as the salmon gum was used in great amounts to provide structural supports for the mines and to provide the fuel for the mills and steam powered trains in the region (Bolton, 1981: 45).
### Table 4.5- Export Value of WA’s Major Exports Before WW1

£1 (1900) = $60 (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Timber Exports (£)</th>
<th>Wool Exports (£)</th>
<th>Wool/Timber</th>
<th>Wheat+Flour (£)</th>
<th>Gold (£)</th>
<th>Gold as % of WA Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>458,036</td>
<td>270,718</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>5,549,879</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>572,047</td>
<td>378,135</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>6,749,683</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>500,533</td>
<td>458,078</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,468,827</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>638,867</td>
<td>443,743</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8,617,959</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>654,120</td>
<td>419,395</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1,621</td>
<td>8,502,870</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>689,011</td>
<td>594,872</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>8,850</td>
<td>7,538,051</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>707,789</td>
<td>603,080</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>7,344,050</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>504,985</td>
<td>812,088</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>131,240</td>
<td>7,146,629</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>813,618</td>
<td>637,008</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>50,071</td>
<td>6,990,134</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>866,758</td>
<td>1,012,640</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>139,705</td>
<td>5,649,479</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>972,325</td>
<td>966,870</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>431,753</td>
<td>4,568,868</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Appleyard, 1987: pp 229-236)

The importance of the gold discoveries meant that there had been a Minister for Mines in the WA Parliament since 1894 but it would be another 25 years before a Minister for Forests was established (Bolton and Mozley, 1961: 213 & 223). This period also saw the emergence of wheat and flour as important export commodities for WA and by 1910 the value of wheat exports had already rapidly grown to be about 50% of the value of timber exports. Despite the rapid growth in value of these other commodities during the decade 1900-1910, the importance to WA of exports of timber products also increased. This is shown by the increase in their value to a similar level to wool exports during the decade 1900-10. Fifty years earlier timber exports from WA were substantially less than those of wool.

The early 20th Century was a period where the major technological advance in the timber industry was the utilisation of steam engines in the timber mills and...
the use of steam trains to replace bullock drays for the transport of logs and lumber. This allowed the opening up of new timber areas in the south-west for logging and there was still a general feeling that the State’s timber resources were limitless. The first Royal Commission had raised concerns about the wastage in timber operations and the lack of control of the government over the industry. By 1910 the State had seen a dramatic fall in the availability of sandalwood trees for export and the area around Kalgoorlie gold field had been completely stripped of salmon gums (Bolton, 1981b: 45).

McCaw and Burrows reported (1989: 317) that by 1918 some 500,000 hectares of jarrah forest in the south-west had been selectively logged and 17 million tonnes of logs removed. They estimate that this had resulted in a 50% reduction in the forest canopy. The growing economic value of timber exports from WA over the period 1890-1920 assisted in the establishment of the political power of The Combine and the family-based timber firms (Royal Commission, 1904: 13). This aspect will be explored further in the next chapter.

4.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented the first two stages of a four-stage framework describing how the people and government of WA have related to their native forests. From the time of the arrival of Aborigines to the south-west of WA to about 1920 there was a feeling that the forests were abundant and plentiful. In the first few decades of the new British colony the exports of timber had kept it solvent. During the same time, the indigenous Noongar people had been decimated and little is now known of their use of the forest before colonisation. WA lagged SA and Victoria in its management of the forests by several decades.
These two other states had established government forest management systems by the mid-1870s and had employed professional Conservators by the mid-1880s (Bolton, 1981b: 48). By the end of the colonial episteme, timber remained an important export industry for WA despite the exciting discovery and development of the new gold fields.

Until the 1920s, the export of timber from WA grew until it was providing as much export income as wool and twice as much as wheat and flour. The next chapter will continue this historical summary of the WA forest industries from the 1920s and will explore the political power of the family timber companies flowing from the industry they controlled. As I showed above, this power was due to the usefulness of the timber industry in opening up the south-west region of WA as well as helping attract capital to the struggling colony. Bolton and Mozley (1961: ppvi-ix) provided another reason for this political power. They showed that, except for the party formed around the first Premier Sir John Forrest between 1890-1901, there was no settled political party system in WA up until the late 1920s. The average time in parliament for the 400 members was only 8 years. This allowed the timber companies to exert influence over government decisions as members would have little allegiance to party policies16 and would have little long-term knowledge of the industry and its impact on WA’s forest environment.

16 Bolton and Mozley (pvii) described WA’s parliamentary alignments as the most fluid in Australia.
Chapter 5- SCIENTIFIC EPISTEME:
from 1920 to 2000

5.1 INTRODUCTION

During the colonial episteme, as the export value and size of the local timber industry grew, there was an accompanying development of political power for the men who controlled it. This power existed in both the Forests Department and the many businesses operating in the timber industry. This chapter provides information on the third period, the scientific episteme, during which the timber industry utilised more scientific production methods in its management practices as well as new logging technologies. As the timber industry used these new technologies, direct employment in these industries plummeted, and more importantly, new export industries began to outstrip the economic value to WA of the timber industry. There were an increasing number of people raising questions about the sustainability of the local timber industry, as exemplified by the cartoon

Figure 5A– 1923 Cartoon from the Western Mail. Father Time says: “Take a leaf from my book! I create before I destroy” (1999c: 8).
above (Figure 5A). Bolton (1972: xxi) described WA at the beginning of this episteme as “a conservative community, isolated, with a strong sense of regional identity” and that most West Australians were comfortable with a myth that there was a communal consensus toward policies such as the State’s logging policy.

During this period the south-west forest region came under pressure from soldier and group settlement schemes whose aim was to clear the forests for pastoral and agricultural pursuits. By the early-1980s a growing number of environmentalists and forest-based conservation groups had challenged for a decade the power of the timber companies and the Forests Department. A new philosophy towards forests, and nature generally, was being established within the public that was based on the use of old growth native forests for non-timber production purposes. Gestures towards these new values were made in the three Royal Commissions into the WA timber industry during the period 1920-2000. The scientific episteme concluded with any existing consensus on forest policy destroyed by a heated debate over the new Regional Forest Agreement. This chapter chronicles these changes and the declining political power of the diminishing number of local timber companies.

5.2 ROYAL COMMISSIONS AND THEIR EFFECT

As mentioned in the previous chapter, professional forestry in WA was given a boost by the report of the 1903 Royal Commission. The first Australian Interstate Forestry Conference was held in 1911. This was followed in 1914 by a special Australian conference convened by the British Association for the Advancement of Science and one of the speakers on international forestry practises was forester David Hutchins. Hutchins’ experience in forestry matters in
India and South Africa impressed the audience and he was invited to report on the forestry practises of each State. He presented his study to the WA Government in 1916.

These events at the beginning of the 20th Century indicated a desire of the WA Government to come to grips with development issues in the south-west generally and forest management specifically (Rundle, 1996: 231). In the same year as Hutchins’ report, the Government took a further step toward a scientific approach to forest management with the appointment of a graduate of an European forest training centre, Charles Lane Poole, to manage the forests contained on WA Crown lands (Rundle: 231). The local timber industry at this time was facing economic hardship and relied on the growing post-World War 1 export markets to survive. Things looked so bleak for the industry that the State Government concluded a contract with the Federal Government to build six wooden ships as a way of boosting local timber consumption (Mills, 1986: 62).1

As the new Conservator of the Forests, Lane Poole made great changes to the WA Forest Department in five short years. He convinced the Parliament to put through ‘The Forest Act’ in 1918. This Act formed the new Forest Department that until then had been a division of the Lands Department (Rundle, 1996: 231). The Sawmillers Association was worried that the new Act would give too much power to the Forests Department, and to Lane Poole as the Conservator. They preferred that the Department be managed by a Board with industry representation and were also worried about Lane Poole’s plans to raise timber royalties substantially. Lane Poole also put in place a new system of licences for hewers

1 Mills reported that the ships were not completed due to industrial troubles.
that saw them phased out of the logging industry. The aim of this new system was to try and cut the wastage due to their practices that had been identified as a major issue by the 1903 Royal Commission. Some of the other provisions in the new Act were to limit saw-milling permits to a period of 10 years, the dedication of State Forests and the creation of new forest reserves (Mills, 1986: 65). Lane Poole convinced the Government to agree that two-fifths of the net timber revenues were to stay with the Forest Department to build a ‘Reafforestation Fund’. This figure was later raised to nine-tenths, thereby making the Department nearly self-funding (Sharp, 1983: 73).²

The influence of Lane Poole on introducing a more ‘scientific’ approach to forest management³, and hence shifting the policy approach to forests to the third episteme, can be seen in this reminiscence by a young apprentice forester, Dick Perry:

And I came away thinking he [Lane Poole] was a very nice man. He always took a very keen interest in us, whenever he was visiting Hamel Nursery or any other place that we might happen to be, he'd always dig us up and find out where we were, and come and see us and ask how we were getting on, and were we pleased with what we were doing and so forth, and we always were. We had to work terribly hard of course, the boys, we were only fourteen years old, and the main problem of course was the study at night, there was no way we could cope with this. Mr Lane Poole had given us a whole series of lectures and some books to help us, and got us pointed in the right direction. And then he wrote a lot of lectures for us, he did that personally and distributed them to us (National Library of Australia Interview, People’s Forest Project⁴).

² The retention of timber royalties by the Forest Department’s successor, CALM, is an important point of debate during the discussion below over the Regional Forest Agreement in the late 1990s.
³ Lane Poole’s interest in forest education can be seen in his decision to manage the Commonwealth’s School of Forestry in Canberra in 1926 (Bolton, 1981: 106).
The Royal Commission of 1922

The scientific episteme commenced with healthy post-World War 1 timber exports although the industry was in financial trouble. The new changes introduced by the Government were driven by the earlier recommendations of the Royal Commission of 1903 to control the exploitation of the forest resources and to make the use of the WA timber resources more ‘scientific’. This approach to forests during this period has been described by Frawley (1987: 33) as a ‘wise use’ utilitarian one where natural resources would be used but government departments also planned on conserving some areas and regenerating others for future use. The commencement of the third episteme coincided with a further Royal Commission into the WA native forests.

This Commission was established by the Premier in November 1921 (Mills, 1986: 71). Initially a Parliamentary Select Committee had been requested by Mr Pickering (Hansard, WA Legislative Assembly, 28 September 1921: 1010). The Commission was chaired by Pickering and was unusual in that its inquiry was very widespread, even though its official charter from the Governor was narrow. The Royal Commission was established because of conflict between the Forest Department, and especially the Conservator Lane Poole, and the timber industry represented by the larger companies. These companies (such as Bunnings, Millars, Whittakers) had great political power and actively lobbied parliamentarians for better timber leases and lower royalties. Poole was also in conflict with the Mitchell Government that wanted to clear forest areas in the south-west for dairy farms as the State was a substantial importer of dairy products (Bolton, 1972: 33; Bolton, 1981: 105). Sanders (1997: 60) reported that Premier Mitchell had no time for trees and saw them as little more than obstacles
to development. This was a view in stark contrast to that of the emerging professional foresters.

Lane Poole had a vision for a scientific and sustained forest industry and this was reflected in his language where “The object of the forester … is to find out how fast the forest is growing and allow the sawmillers to cut that forest no faster than the rate at which it is growing.” In a letter to Lord Novar, a friend and former Australian Governor General, he wrote of his constant battles with the timber industry “Their [Millars’] influence is so great that they have always been able to dictate the Forest policy to the Government of the day” (cited in Mills, 1986: 69). This influence was due to the earlier importance of the timber industry during periods when the Colony’s economic fortunes faltered. Well into the 20th Century the WA State Government had difficulties meeting the costs of paying for new infrastructure, such as railways, over such a large geographic area with the State’s small population base. At the time of the 1922 Royal Commission, the political influence of the timber industry was heightened as the Government wanted to raise additional funds for State development by floating a loan on the London stock market. The Government felt that the Millars timber company could influence the loan’s success because of their commercial contacts in London (Mills: 70).

The charter of the 1922 Royal Commission into forests in WA was brief. It was required to inquire and report upon:

i) the financial provisions of ‘The Forest Act 1918’, and

ii) the administration of the Act.

The Commission took great note of the evidence given by the Ex-Conservator of Forests, Lane Poole, who had fallen out of favour with the Premier
over the extensive clearing of forests for the new Group Settlement agricultural schemes, and had resigned his position in October 1921 (Mills: 71). The Commissioners reported that the evidence from Poole on what was essential for forest conservation was often contradicted by the witnesses from the timber industry, and the Commissioners therefore attended a Forestry Conference in Queensland to gain first-hand forest information from sources outside of the State (Royal Commission, 1922: 3).

In many ways the core findings of this Royal Commission closely reflected those of the Royal Commission 19 years earlier. The Commission found that sandalwood timber, despite a very wide area of habitat in WA, “has become practically extinct” and “the cutting of this timber for marketing purposes has been practically uncontrolled” (1922: 11). It also expressed concern (p12) that at the present rate of cutting, the State’s total timber resources would only last another 25 years.

In regard to timber royalties (an issue that reverberated throughout the history of debate on forests in WA) the Commission (p16) reported that “…then surely the price charged is a very low one; compared to the charges in the Eastern States it is much too low.” It directly blamed the political power of the timber industry, and in particular one company for this situation:

The stumbling-block to the fixing of an equitable price is Millars’ Timber and Trading Co., Ltd., which, owing to its favourable position, makes it almost impossible to fix a really just price (Royal Commission: 17).

The Commission suggested a new royalty scale based on distance from a port and the price of rail freight and, in an aside, (p17) noted that the Ex-Conservator of Forests had made a similar suggestion for a royalty increase in 1921. Lane Poole’s recommendation had not been agreed to by the Government.
In other comments, the Royal Commission noted for the first time since the commencement of the logging of WA’s native forests that Australia’s (and hence WA’s) forest area was quite small as a percentage of the total land area compared to other countries. It reported (p17) that forests in Australia covered just 5.3% of the surface area compared to other countries such as Norway (21.5%) and Sweden (52.2%). The small size of the forests in WA was raised as an important point in anti-logging campaigns from about 1970 onwards. The report of the 1922 Royal Commission was the first time that the previous view of the forests as ‘limitless’ was officially challenged. In its conclusion, the Commission brought to light the small size of State forests reserves- a total of only 45,000 acres in 1922- and a prior warning nine years earlier from the Acting Inspector General of Forests, C. Richardson:

> Western Australia has now arrived at the stage when it is sheer folly to sacrifice the forests of the State even in the interests of land settlement, and it is to be hoped that in the future a more vigorous policy of reserving permanently large areas of forest country will be possible. The people of to-day hold the forests in trust for the generations to come after them, and if we are to profit by the lessons of the past, it is for us to look beyond the present to the future (cited in Royal Commission, 1922: 18).

This perception that the forests were in danger of being exploited was not limited to WA. The famous Australian explorer Sir Douglas Mawson warned in 1925 of the imminent depletion of Australia’s timber resources in an address to the University of Adelaide (Lines, 1991: 235).

WA’s second Royal Commission provided backing for the new powers of the Forestry Department and the rapid development of a scientific-based timber industry. The changes flowing from its recommendations were carried through by Stephen ‘Kim’ Kessell who succeeded Lane Poole as Conservator of Forests in
1923. Kessell was a graduate of forestry from Adelaide University with a diploma of forestry from Oxford University. His stated aim was to “educate the industry to a policy of forests in perpetuity” (Mills, 1986: 72). Mills stressed that one of the main goals of Kessell was to see that “the axe of industry became the silviculture tool of the forester” (p73). By this, Mills meant that Kessell strove to change the practises of the timber companies to ones that reduced waste and treated the forests with a new respect. The waste created by the falling methods utilised during the colonial episteme were graphically described by Lord, who worked in the timber industry at this time:

I feel a tremendous lot of mismanagement, but nobody is really to blame — ignorance, I would think. And there's been a terrible wastage, terrible wastage. When those men were in the bush, cutting sleepers with the axe, they cut a tree down and it wouldn't split, so they left it there — a whole tree. Things like that (National Library of Australia Interview, People's Forest Project5).

Changes that Kessell introduced as Conservator included the use of fire as a silviculture process, the use of clearfelling among karri (leaving seed trees) and the introduction of minimum girth restrictions (Mills, 1986: 73). While the timber industry developed new technologies to harvest the forests, this required social changes as well. This period saw the development of larger general purpose mills in towns such as Pemberton, Manjimup and Nannup. Important contracts, for example the timber sleepers required for the new Australian transcontinental railway, were the major factor behind these towns becoming permanent forest communities. Prior to this, smaller towns utilised portable smaller steam mills and closed when the timber had been cleared from adjacent leases and the mill was

moved to another location (Mills: 51). With the timber workers living in established townships, this allowed their union, the WA Timber Workers, to mobilise them more easily. The union’s sophistication can be seen in its majority shareholding in the newspaper *The Westralian Worker* which in the early 1920s was edited by John Curtin (Mills: 63), later an ALP Prime Minister. Mill owners such as Charles Bunning wanted their new timber towns to be different to the previous temporary communities and he ensured that they included new company-owned houses for workers to rent (Mills: 125).

Another important challenge that the Forest Department faced at that time was from the government-sponsored settlement schemes. All State governments after World War 1 participated in schemes to settle returned soldiers on land that they were required to clear for farms. Premier Mitchell was keen to repeat his earlier success as Minister for Agriculture in having the wheatbelt area of WA cleared of forest and scrub for farms.6 He firstly gave areas in the south-west to unemployed gold miners in March 1921 and later went to Britain to participate in a British Empire scheme to settle British people in ex-colonies such as Australia (Bolton, 1972: pp33-50). The migrants were offered government loans and forest areas they had to clear. They faced deep hardship clearing the land and trying to find crops that would grow in the soil of the south-west. Elizabeth Wellburn described the image prospective immigrants were presented with in Britain:

---

6 Lines (p148) reports that over 600,000 ha of forest was ringbarked to establish the WA wheatbelt and due to the clearing between 1890-1950 less than 25% of the forest and woodland remained. This large-scale clearing has also created a massive salinity problem with over 2,000,000 ha in WA affected by salt poisoning (Barton, 2001c: 8).
Yes, they had a beautiful picture of a farm, with everything on it, and on the bottom it said, "This could be yours within two years." I've always been sorry I did not keep that poster, you know. It was a beautiful farm with cows, chooks, pigs ... everything on it. And on the bottom, in big letters, "This could be yours within two years."

She then graphically described the difficulties faced by these unsuspecting migrants at Group 65 (south of Busselton) when they arrived in early 1924:

There was a little place cleared, and a few shacks on it and all forest right round — big trees. Oh dear, dear. And we met the foreman and he showed us to this shack. He said, "That shack's empty, you can occupy that." No doors, no windows, and an earth floor. Oh dear!

**Interviewer:** How did you feel?

Very depressed. Very depressed (National Library of Australia Interview, *People's Forest Project*).

By the mid-1930s rising indebtedness and inexperience had forced most off the land (Lines, 1991: 181). Elizabeth and her family walked off their block in 1934 carrying what they could in a horse-drawn cart and still owing the WA Government the cost of their original fares (National Library of Australia Interview, *People's Forest Project*). The Group Settlement Scheme cost the WA Government about £10.5 million (Bolton, 1972: 36) and led the State into debt as about 80% of the funds owed by the new settlers were written off (Lines: 170). The collapse of the Group Settlement Scheme coincided with the onset of the Great Depression and made the State Government’s financial predicament harder to manage. By the end of the Group Settlement Scheme over 5,000 ex-servicemen had cleared 40,000 ha of virgin karri forest in the south-west (Lines: 170, 178)

---


and most of the trees had not been utilised but had been destroyed by ringbarking or burning.

**The 1952 Royal Commission**

The power of timber companies in lobbying political parties was exemplified during this episteme by an episode centred on the tendering in 1950 of 33,000 ha of new jarrah forests near Nannup to the New Zealand-based Kauri Timber Company. This was achieved with the assistance of their auditor Charles Court (later Sir Charles and State Liberal Premier from 1974-82) who lobbied the government for a lower royalty level (Bolton, 1981: 39). The decision by the Forest Minister Gerry Wild to allow this tender ignored the Woods Act of 1918 and seemed to be aimed at undermining the power of the local timber companies, who he said in colourful language “…have not played the game by the people of the State and the industry and had the Government by the short hair” (Mills, 1986: pp159-161). This successful lobbying by a NZ company led to an angry response from the WA-owned timber companies, five of whom had offered higher rates of royalties than offered by the successful Kauri Timber Co.

WA companies, in particular Bunnings, lobbied the Premier and the Leader of the Opposition (Frank Wise). Wise called for a Select Committee made up of members from each House of Parliament. This Select Committee recommended the establishment of a Royal Commission into every phase of the forest industry in WA (Mills: pp161-162). Royal Commissions are aimed at resolving critical issues and there have been only 104 held in WA since the first in 1899 (Zalums &
This new Royal Commission was to be the third one on forest policy in a period of less than 50 years since WA’s statehood.

After a wide-ranging inquiry, Commissioner Rodger did not advocate any drastic changes to the existing Forestry Act and no company was awarded the new contract for jarrah near Nannup. Rodger spent considerable time questioning the Conservator of Forests, Stoate, about wastage in the milling process. His question “You know that some people maintain that sawmilling is an antiquated, cumbersome and wasteful method of converting forest products to human use?” (cited in Mills, 1986: 165) foresaw the arguments to be used 20 years later by those opposing the logging of old growth forests. Evidence to this Commission by the Associated Sawmillers and Timber Merchants of WA predicted further immediate stress on the State’s dwindling forest resources due to the rapidly expanding post-World War 2 housing market in WA. This Royal Commission was also notable as it seems to be the first official source in which the newly emerging demands for the use of forests for non-timber uses, such as recreational and aesthetic uses, became apparent (de Garis, 1993: 150).

Flowing from the debate at this time over the use of the remaining forests was the Government’s decision to add another 200,000 ha of forest to State reserves in the south-west in 1958 and another 100,000 the following year. State forests and timber reserves in the south-west totalled over 1.8 million ha by 1969 (Rundle, 1996: 234). The Australian Academy of Science recognised the need in

---

9 This figure does not include Honorary Royal Commissions (parliamentary select committees). The key topics for Royal Commissions in WA over the period 1899-2000 were railways (8), Aboriginal issues (6), coal (6) and gambling (6). There were more than 20 Royal Commissions on specific industries such as the WA milk industry etc (Zalums & Stafford, 1980; Phillips et al., 1998).
1958 to investigate in a more systematic way the development of Australia’s conservation reserves and the WA sub-study was chaired by the Director of the WA Museum, Dr Ride. Ride’s work was to lead to the establishment of a WA Government Reserves Advisory Council in 1969. This Council was successful in having established the large Karijini National Park of 630,000 ha in the Kimberley region over the opposition of the Mines Department (Rundle: 235). The WA Government established the Conservation Through Reserves Committee (CTRC) in 1972 but its 1974 proposal to have the Shannon Reserve established in the south-west karri region was not successful at that time (White & Underwood, 1988: 37).

This period of involvement by scientists in land use policy coincided with the formal establishment of environment groups in both WA and nationally. The Australian Conservation Foundation was established in 1965 (Bolton, 1981: 159) and in WA the Conservation Council was established in 1967 (Rundle, 1996: 235).\(^\text{10}\) The debate over the management and use of WA’s native forests further heated up in the early 1970s over proposals for a woodchip mill in the south-west to supposedly utilise the waste produced by clearfelling operations that was not suitable for timber milling (Sharp, 1983: 33). The Act to establish the woodchipping industry was passed by a Liberal-controlled Parliament in 1969 and the Environmental Impact Statement to allow the first mill to be constructed was hurriedly completed by an ALP-controlled Parliament in 1974 just prior to a State election (Dargavel, 1995: 102).

\(^{10}\) The period at the end of the 1960s seems to have been an important one for the Australian environment movement as it also saw the establishment of the Save Lake Pedder Committee in Tasmania in 1967 and the establishment of Australia’s first environmental political party in 1972 (Lines, 1991:223).
This new industry had bipartisan support from the main political parties at that time and the first shipment was exported to Japan in mid-1976 (Sharp, 1983: 33). The mill was built by Bunnings and continued to create conflict, with a local environmentalist, Johnny Chester, being imprisoned after blowing up part of the mill at Bunbury in July 1976 in protest over the woodchipping operations in the south-west (Sharp: 36). After decades of controlling forest policy, and especially in having success in forcing the State to open up new forest areas, the WA timber companies were about to face new opposition from the growing success of environmentalists in raising public awareness of forest issues. Some of these passionate environmentalists were willing to undertake illegal protests but Chester’s violent action had been the only case of environmental terrorism so far.

The Campaign to Save Native Forests (CSNF) was established in 1969 to try and force the government to preserve the remaining jarrah forest in the south-west of WA, although Rundle (1996: 235) suggested that it was the work of the Conservation Council that stimulated government action on this issue. In just over five years, and just after the first shipment of woodchips, the new antilogging groups in WA were able to present to parliament a petition of 14,500 signatures calling on the Government to set aside the Shannon River Basin from woodchipping (Carr, Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 24 August 1976: 2056).

An early response by the WA Government to these new movements was to enact a new section 54B of the Police Act that stopped people gathering in groups of more than three people in public places without a Police permit. In 1977 the Police Commissioner warned Parliament against radical groups who “fomented
unrest” (Lines, 1991: 249). By the beginning of the 1980s the Government recognised the great difficulty it had in trying to reconcile the demands of both the environmentalists and the forest industry. The ALP Minister for Conservation and Land Management (Hodge, cited in CALM, 1988: i) said that “…one of the most difficult tasks facing the Labor Government when it took office in 1983 was the political controversy over forests and the economic future of the timber industry”. The Government (Hodge cited in CALM, 1988: 1) tried to straddle the middle ground by establishing new parks in the forests as well as developing a strategy aimed at providing timber on a sustained yield basis by the development of new value-added craft industries. Shea and Underwood (1990: 43) claimed that the timber strategy (CALM: 1988) developed by the WA ALP Government to address the community conflict over forest policy was the first long-term plan developed in Australia. Organisations on both sides of the emerging conflict relied on scientists to support their arguments as to whether the new strategy was indeed sustainable or not.

5.3 THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN GOVERNMENT FOREST POLICY

Lane Poole and Kessell had to struggle against the wasteful logging practises established during the colonial episteme. Their new professional approach to forestry as a science-based industry took some time to gain acceptance. Fifty years later there was a second wave of controversy over the role of science within the timber industry. The debate at the end of the 20th Century over the use of native forests in Australia and the move to an ecological episteme

---

11 The Queensland Premier banned street marches at this time and these State bans were aimed at a range of social movements including Aboriginal land rights, anti-uranium mining and union campaigns (Lines: 250).
was traced by Dargavel (1995: 163) to the seminal publication of *The Fight for the Forests* by Val and Richard Routley (1973) which he claimed “marked the start of the forests contests”.

Not only did the Routleys propose the first Australian scientific arguments against a ‘wood production ideology’ (1973: 1), and specifically woodchipping, but they also raised concerns over the replacement of native forests by plantation forests. Florence (1987: 157) located the extensive use of clearfelling in Australia’s native forests to the early 1960s and described it as a “logical response” to the changing technology and the increased demand for timber during the post-war housing boom of the late-1950s. This new silvicultural system was highly attractive to the forest services due to its economies of scale and use of new technologies. It quickly became the dominant logging technique in the karri forests of WA (Florence: 157).

In a detailed rebuttal of forest department projections and arguments for an increase in the use of intensive forestry practices such as clearfelling, the Routleys suggested (1973: 49) that estimates of future wood demand were over-estimates based on simple straight-line demand projections. They characterised the new scientific forest production practises then in vogue across Australia as creating ‘tree farms’ that were regularly ‘cropped’, similar to modern agricultural practices. In a detailed economic critique, the Routleys (p7) argued that intensive forestry practices in all Australian states were unprofitable if all public input costs and subsidies were considered. They also proposed that if forests were to be genuinely managed for multiple uses, then Australia would put wood production last. They claimed (p1) that timber products could be imported from much wetter
and more heavily timbered overseas regions, while the creation of recreational and wildlife environmental preservation areas could not be so imported.

The fierce response to their book from forest industry stakeholders anticipated the pitched level of emotions between pro-and anti-logging supporters in WA during the RFA debate two decades later. Working as a consultant investigating new logging proposals in NSW in the 1980s, Val Routley (then Plumwood) reported that her research team received personal death threats by telephone and that the Director of the NSW Forestry Commission sought her dismissal from the Australian National University (Plumwood, 1999: 55). In their book the Routleys also addressed arguments proposed by the forestry industry to support the further expansion of their industry. One of these arguments appeared in a number of the interviews carried out in my research. This was the argument that native forests have to be managed or interfered with (for example by fire) to ensure that they survive in a healthy state. The Routleys quoted Jacobs (1973: 82):

…a forest must be interfered with by something, either fire, storms, or man, if it is going to be regenerated properly. I can forecast…you have either got to treat it sooner or later in some way, or it is going to become just a standing cemetery, and one very dead.

Probably more importantly, the Routleys identified (p19) that the policy approaches to forests proposed by the forest industry and conservationists were based on very different values:

---

12 The publication of this book provoked such outrage from their academic colleagues in the ANU Forest Department that the ANU Vice Chancellor tried to stop its printing. Eventually the Routleys were required to include a disclaimer in the foreword to the book acknowledging that their views on forest policy differed substantially from their forestry colleagues (Routley and Plumwood, 1986: 71).

13 Plumwood (1999: 64) felt so strongly about the environmental dangers posed by intensive forestry practises that she took the name of the plumwood tree that grew on her property in NSW.
These forestry ideals and goals inevitably lead to a clash with other values. The ensuing disagreement is ultimately a disagreement as to values, as to whether utilisation for wood production or some other forest value should rank more highly; it is not just a dispute as to the facts. Because the underlying conflict is a conflict of values, not as to facts about forests, foresters’ claims to expertise are undermined. For while foresters may be experts on some aspects of forest management, almost exclusively wood production aspects, they are not experts on values.

The different values of the anti- and pro-logging sides will be explored in greater depth below. The issue is raised at this stage to illustrate that a key component of the pro-logging stakeholders’ discourse is that they posed their arguments in scientific and rational terms, while they accused their opponents of using emotional and value-laden language. Plumwood (1999: 65) proposed that scientific forestry had been distorted by a rationalistic view that saw native trees as cellulose reservoirs that could be cropped and replaced by more productive vegetation. Her sceptical view toward the scientific and rational approach to forest management was also reflected in national polls of Australians’ view of science. In the 1994 National Social Science Survey more than 40% of respondents believed that we relied ‘too often on science, and not enough on feelings and faith’ (http://assda.anu.edu.au/codebooks/d0966/about.html: page 56, question 4a.). Bigler Cole (1998: 1) undertook a more recent review on the public’s perception of science and found many people expressed distrust of the science used during the WA Regional Forest Agreement (RFA) process. This negative view toward science would be an important factor in the debate over the RFA.

5.4 THE NATIONAL RFA PROCESS

The WA Government developed a Regional Forest Agreement (RFA) over the period 1996-1999. Debates around the logging limits that the RFA would
contain indicated the importance of the role of science to the arguments of the pro-logging organisations. The debate over the RFA and the role of science in determining future logging levels was at its most intense during the period 1998-1999 after the release by CALM (1998b: 5) in May 1998 of a public consultation paper titled ‘Toward a RFA’. The RFA was part of a national forest policy prepared under the aegis of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in the early 1990s (Stewart and McColl, 1994: 18). This national policy was one of the recommendations of an extensive inquiry undertaken by the Resource Assessment Commission (RAC) in 1991 to identify and evaluate the options for the use of Australia’s forest and timber resources, with a particular focus on ensuring the existence of a permanent forest estate in Australia (Stewart & McColl: 17). The National Forest Policy Agreement was signed by all State Governments (with the exception of Tasmania) in December 1992 (p19).

Originally, environmental planning was left to the States as these types of policies were not included in the original 1901 Australian Constitution’s outline of the powers of the Federal Government. Since the mid-1980s, specifically since the Commonwealth’s role in protecting the Franklin River in Tasmania from damming, the Commonwealth had acquired quite extensive powers in the environmental policy sphere through judicial interpretation of the Constitution by the High Court (Harding, 1988: 227).

The RFA process was established after the RAC lost the support of the Hawke Government and was defunded in the 1993-94 Budget after only three enquiries (Stewart & McColl, 1994: 12). The RAC had been established in 1989

---

14 This document and the subsequent public debate also spurred the reporting of the conflict by The West Australian newspaper- see Chapter 8.
as a way of providing advice to the Commonwealth government on trade-offs between environmental and economic priorities on complex resource issues, such as the logging of native forests. Its role was to allow a range of stakeholders to have their views heard and taken into account by the Commonwealth before major land use decisions were made (Stewart & McColl: 14). The new RFA process was seen as an alternative science-based process to the failed RAC enquiry system (Harding, 1998: 232). One of the two major recommendations from the RAC was incorporated into the RFA process. This was the recommendation for State agencies to prepare comprehensive management plans identifying the remaining areas of old growth forests that mapped the full range of values contained in these forests (Stewart & McColl: 19).

Debate and bitter conflict over logging policies for old-growth forests was a common situation at the end of the 20th Century in Australian States that continued to allow the logging of old-growth trees. During the debate over new woodchipping licences between 1994-1995 as many as 6,000 angry timber workers blockaded the nation’s Parliament House in Canberra (Peace, 1996: 43). Cato (1995: 34) reported that between 1990-93 the Federal Government produced six major reports on the forest issue as a way of trying to manage the conflict between the two sides of the debate. The RFA process does not seem to have lessened the degree of conflict in the States that had woodchipping industries. In Queensland a RFA was never completed but industry and environmental groups completed a Comprehensive Regional Assessment that gave the industry some certainty about production levels while giving the green groups many new forest reserves (ABS, 2003: 87). The most bitter disputes seem to have been in Gippsland, Victoria (Lunn, 2000: 28) and in Tasmania over very old stands of
mountain ash (Altmann, 2002b: 9). While a similar political deal to that done in Queensland was tried by the NSW Premier Bob Carr, it seemed to actually have left all stakeholders unhappy with the final agreement. The government proposed to increase by 380,000 ha the amount of forests protected from logging while the environmentalists wanted a figure between 500-870,000 ha (Harris, 1998: 6).

The RFA process in WA commenced with the signing of an agreement between the Australian Labor Party (ALP) Prime Minister (Paul Keating) and an ALP State Premier (Carmen Lawrence) in 1996. It was signed into existence on 5 May 1999 by a Liberal Prime Minister (John Howard) and a Liberal Premier (Richard Court) (Edwardes, Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 22 June 1999: 9390). The RFA was to investigate all classes of forests in WA. Under the COAG policy a set of 'Nationally Agreed Criteria for the Establishment of a Comprehensive, Adequate and Representative Reserve System for Forests in Australia' was jointly developed and agreed to by all governments (Edwardes, Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 25 March 1997: 874). Curran (2000: 324) recognised that inclusion of key stakeholders in the RFA decision-making process was vital and at an early stage of the RFA, the then-ALP Opposition Leader raised criticism of the way the process was being undertaken in WA:

… I have correspondence from a member of the stakeholder reference group, … which says that the group has been unable properly to address its point of reference because it has been cut out of the process. In fact, only once has the steering committee sought advice from that group. What sorts of opportunities for input have those people had?
The feeling of the member who wrote to me is that the advice they have given has been regarded as irrelevant. I was surprised last night to hear that the Noongar Land Council has withdrawn from the process, describing it as a sham; yet the Noongar action group, including the Noongar Land Council, is in this document as one of those agencies that has had ready access to information and a valuable input. When we have groups saying that the process is a sham, it should ring alarm bells for the Government. How on earth can we use that process to have 20 years of stability and security and 20 years of protection of the conservation estate, if its whole basis is so flawed? (Gallop, Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 10 June 1998: 3648)

After the signing of the RFA in May 1999, the ALP proposed a Bill to Parliament that would have required the Government to table the RFA for Parliament’s consideration and debate (Gallop, Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 16 June 1999: 9147). One of the key issues canvassed during debate over the ALP’s Bill was the role of scientists in the RFA process. The conflict over the forests in the south-west of WA had seen the emergence of a vigorous debate among scientists who either supported the continued logging of native forests or who opposed it. This debate became particularly intense during the WA RFA process as the Minister for Local Government used an argument that:

More than 500 experts from a range of disciplines, including forest ecology, soil science, geomorphology, hydrology, archaeology, botany, zoology, geography, economics, social science and geology have been involved in the Western Australian RFA process to date (Omodei, Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 10 June 1998: 3649).

This argument that the RFA had used a wide range of scientific input was also used in newspaper articles and advertisements at this time (eg Capp, 1998b: 6). The Opposition could not obtain the names of these scientists:

When we asked the minister to provide us with the names of all her scientists, she went away and hid. She would not give them to us. She ran a million miles when we asked for the names of all the scientists that she said had contributed (Kobelke, Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 14 March 2000: 4683).
The Opposition also countered the Government’s reliance on scientific support for the RFA with their criticism that:

They [the government] must open their eyes, listen to the community and see what is really going on. During the RFA process, scientists came out of the woodwork to tell us [the ALP] what was wrong with the process and how science was being misused in it (Edwards, Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 16 June 1999: 9147).

Collingridge and Reeve (1986) and Clark (1985) are two of many authors who have considered the general role of scientists in public controversies, such as the forest debate in WA. Collingridge and Reeve in their report on air pollution in the UK proposed that there are two myths about the role of scientists and the development of public policy. First, they noted a myth of rationality whereby the evidence of scientists was given greater credence because of its empirical nature. Secondly, they suggested there was a myth that “science is capable of providing all the information which policy may demand of it” (p3). They made the point (p13) that politicians often try to use scientific opinion to bolster political arguments, but this strategy can backfire as different scientists propose different analysis or solutions to the problem and deepen the controversy (p9). They suggested (p145) that scientists should be expected to disagree whenever science attempts to influence policy and that situation certainly occurred in WA during the public debate over the RFA.

WA anti-logging organisations countered the scientific input to the RFA with their own scientists and even the local branch of the normally apolitical Royal Society entered the political debate with criticism of the RFA process. Some of the scientists opposed to the continued logging of old growth forests published an article in the chief journal of the foresters (Calver et al., 1999: 263). They argued that existing government policies were not appropriate given the
level of long-term uncertainty and knowledge gaps associated with current logging practices, such as clearfelling. They also proposed several ways in which the scientific disagreements between those opposing and those supporting logging could be resolved, in particular the publication of more scientific material in refereed journals rather than in popular magazines such as the Department of Conservation and Land Management’s (CALM) Landscape. Professor Harry Recher, Ecologist at Edith Cowan University expressed his strongly held view that:

… we have over-harvested our forests almost from the day that Europeans arrived here. So for more than 200 years, we've been mining forests. We haven't been practising forestry in Australia. We've been mining forests. We've been mining the resources of the nation. And we've been losing forest bio-diversity and forest diversity as a consequence. The timber industry has had 200 years of open slather (Four Corners, 2000).

A key scientific source for the anti-logging groups during the RFA process was Dr Judy Clark, a forest economist at ANU. Her main claim was that the pine plantations in WA had matured to such a stage that their harvesting could produce enough timber to allow the cessation of the logging of old-growth forests. She also called for the ending of government subsidies to the native timber industry to allow the pine plantation to compete on an even footing (Capp, 1998d: 6). A month later, CALM responded to her claims by saying that the timber industry couldn’t access enough pine timber (Rechichi, 1998d: 42). In February 2000, the WA government released a report from Melbourne consultants Forestry Pacific that seemed to rebut her arguments (Butler, J., 2000: 38). The West Australian later reviewed the actual report after it was released by the Government under a Freedom of Information request. The newspaper found that, while the report did not agree with Dr Clark’s accusations of substantial unused pine timber log piles,
it did substantiate her claim that present pine cutting rates could be doubled from the mature timber in WA pine plantations (Quekett, 2000c: 6).

A widely-cited scientist supporting the Court Government’s claim to a balanced forest policy was Peter Attiwill, Professor of Botany from Melbourne University. He wrote (2000: 12) that clearfelling was good for old growth karri forests and “the science of forest ecology is relatively well understood and from this science it is clear that timber harvesting has not had profound, deleterious effects on diversity”. He attended a pro-logging rally in Pemberton organised by the TCA (then-Forest Protection Society) to put his views in support of the continuation of logging (1997: 1). Also, his views that supported the regular burning of forests (Attiwill, 1994) were mentioned by a number of those I interviewed for my research. The Wilderness Society (TWS) tried to undermine Professor Attiwill’s assertions that at the end of the 20th Century the science of forest ecology was well developed by pointing to the fact that Attiwill’s group, ‘Scientists for Sustainability’, was funded by the timber industry organisation National Association of Forests Industry (McKenzie, 2000: 15).

The battle over the role of science in affecting public debate over forest policy was a key feature toward the end of the scientific episteme. Those who opposed the continued logging of WA’s native forests have often been typecast as emotional and irrational by their opponents. Those stakeholders wanting to retain the pro-logging policy approach of the government sought to associate themselves with a wide range of scientific opinions supporting their position. After the conclusion of the RFA the WA Government denigrated the views of those scientists opposed to the RFA’s conclusions by labelling them as “research commentary rather than research outcomes or scientific fact” (Foss, Hansard WA
Legislative Assembly, 30 May 2000: 7376). This claim was undermined by an admission from the Government, after an earlier refusal to do so (Armstrong, 1999: 4), that most of the 500 scientists who had had an input into WA’s RFA were employees of CALM (Quekett, 1999: 48).

These heated debates over native forests were also occurring in other States and the Federal Keating Government had sought a new, ‘rational’, approach to solving them. They negotiated with the State Governments for a common Regional Forestry Agreement process as a way of reducing the conflict between the two sides. The WA Government painted the picture that the RFA process was a scientific one based on wide consultation, while the Opposition raised the issue that a number of important stakeholders were not being consulted. This controversy was fuelled by the different value systems of the anti-logging and pro-logging supporters. The political power of the anti-logging organisations reflected significant value changes that had occurred in Australia since the early 1970s when the first disputes over the logging of jarrah in WA had occurred.

5.5 THE FOREST DEBATE IN HANSARD

I analysed the debate over timber and forest issues in the record of parliamentary debates published in the Hansard records from 1970, when the CSNF was established. The indexing system for the Hansard records was changed several times during the 1990s so it was not possible to track the use of the terms ‘forests’ and ‘timber’ for the whole period. Appendix 9 shows the number of times the term ‘environment’ or ‘timber’ was mentioned in either the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council from 1970-1990. Peaks in debate reflect particular legislative initiatives, such as the creation of CALM by the Burke
Government in 1983 and public debates about forest issues revolved around the renewal of Forest Management Plans (FMPs) every 10 years. New FMPs were developed in 1983 and 1993 with the 2003 one dependent on the completion of the RFA. Here I have summarised the records for debates about the government department CALM (Figure 5B) from its establishment in 1984 as this index title entry was not altered during the 1990s.

**Figure 5B- Mentions of CALM in Hansard (1983-2000)**

Of interest from Figure 5B is the growing debate in the upper house, the Legislative Council. Up until 1993 the record index for mentions of ‘CALM’ in the upper house was only 10-30% of that for the Legislative Assembly (the lower house). However, from 1993 there were as many or more mentions of CALM in the Council. This change coincided with the election of Hon. Jim Scott to the Council as a representative of The Greens party. From this time onwards about half the records for Hansard mentions of CALM and other topics (eg the EPA,
forests) for both houses of parliament could be sourced to Mr Scott and the
Greens representatives who joined him in the Council after later elections.

Table 5.1 further explores the impact of the upper house representatives of
the smaller political parties (the Australian Democrats and The Greens) over the
period 1998-2000. This figure also includes references to the ALP’s Shadow
Minister for the Environment, Dr Judy Edwards, and highlights the role played by
Dr Christine Sharp after her election to the Legislative Council. She seemed to
have taken over responsibility for raising forest issues on behalf of the Greens
from Jim Scott, probably in recognition of her long involvement in this policy
area (1983; 1995).  

Table 5.1 – Mentions of ‘RFA’ and ‘Forest’ in Hansard by Party (1998-
2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sharp (G)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott (G)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watson (G)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelly (AD)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hodgson (AD)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwards (ALP)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(G- The Greens, AD- Australian Democrats, ALP- Australian Labor Party)

15 Sharp also chaired the Council’s Ecologically Sustainable Development Committee from 1997-2000. This
Committee published a report in 1999 titled ‘Ecologically Sustainable Development Committee Report on
Logging” that was critical of the role played by CALM and the RFA process (Churches, 2000: 142).
Table 5.1 clearly shows the important role played by the Greens and the Australian Democrats in the period leading up to 1998. It was only later that year that the records for Dr Edwards in raising forest and RFA issues reached a level similar to the combined ones for Dr Sharp and Mr Kelly. This period when the ALP seemed to take more interest in the forest issue coincided with the formation of the LFF during the 1998 debate over the RFA. The twelve month period between late-1998 and late-1999 when the level of debate in parliament was at its height coincided with the increased reporting of the forest issue in *The West Australian* (see Chapter 8).

The smaller parties used their parliamentary representatives to unearth details about the RFA process, the release of information about the harvest of native timbers and to criticise CALM’s Director, Dr Syd Shea. Mr Kelly asked a number of questions about Dr Shea’s role at CALM, including accusing him of misleading the Council on the logging of an ‘icon’ block (Hansard WA Legislative Council, 11 June 1999: 3830). He was also concerned that the RFA process was selective in its use of science to support proposed logging levels (Hansard WA Legislative Council, 30 May 2000: 7376), an issue also raised as important by many of the stakeholders I interviewed. Although it was not directly mentioned by interviewees, I think the material provided by government answers to the parliamentary questions from the minor parties in the Legislative Council would have assisted the anti-logging movement. Information about logging levels, royalty rates and the logging of specific forest blocks would be information that these groups would be unable to obtain directly from CALM.

Scott had raised forest issues in parliament since his election in 1993 and recognised the lateness with which the major parties moved to reflect new public
values toward WA’s remaining forests. At the conclusion of the RFA process he described these policy shifts by the ALP and Coalition parties as “…there has been cathartic shift in the positions of various parties in this Parliament” and described the new RFA as “…we are looking at a vast improvement in forest management in this State” (Hansard WA Legislative Council, 19 August 1999: 490).

5.6 THE DECLINING VALUE OF WA’s TIMBER INDUSTRY

At the end of the 20th Century as the RFA was being debated, the export value of timber products (excluding woodchips) had fallen dramatically to only $19 million, or less than 0.1% of WA’s total exports (see Table 5.2 below). At the beginning of the scientific episteme timber exports had represented about 10-12% of WA’s annual exports and in 1910 were worth about $500 million in value in today’s terms.
### Table 5.2- End of the Century WA Timber Export Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total WA Exports ($,000)</th>
<th>Timber Products ($,000)</th>
<th>Timber as % of WA’s Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>6,911,427</td>
<td>4,199</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>8,856,643</td>
<td>5,497</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>10,227,858</td>
<td>7,556</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>12,426,818</td>
<td>6,670</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>14,039,464</td>
<td>10,307</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>15,659,551</td>
<td>10,096</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>15,611,000</td>
<td>13,249</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>16,434,600</td>
<td>15,497</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>18,925,900</td>
<td>15,521</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>19,328,500</td>
<td>22,064</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from ABS, 1998b: pp 306-309)

The value of timber exports doubled between 1985-1996 but they remained insignificant compared to the other major exports from WA (eg wool, wheat and gold) that I compared them to in the previous chapter. Table 5.3 highlights how, from being on an even par with wool exports at the beginning of the scientific episteme, by the end of the century timber exports were only about 2% of their value. Similarly, wheat exports at the beginning of the episteme were about half those of timber but at the end were over 100 times greater. New export commodities were developed in the later part of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, such as iron ore ($3,800 million per annum), petroleum products ($3,800 million per annum) and liquified natural gas ($2,800 million per annum).

\[16\text{ CALM stopped publishing a breakdown of timber revenues and expenditure beginning with its 1998 Annual Report.}\]
Even the export of lobsters caught during a four-month season ($302 million per annum) had annual export values far greater than that of $15.5 million for timber exports (ABS, 2000: 13). Two recent contracts with China to supply natural gas over 30 years were worth $55 billion (Weir, 2003: 77) and will mean that future timber exports will be of insignificant economic value to WA.

**Table 5.3- End of the Century Comparison of WA Export Data**

(Aus$000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Timber Products</th>
<th>Wool</th>
<th>Wool/Timber</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
<th>Gold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>4,199</td>
<td>731,352</td>
<td>174.2</td>
<td>697,557</td>
<td>479,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>5,497</td>
<td>1,167,056</td>
<td>212.3</td>
<td>1,009,103</td>
<td>414,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>7,556</td>
<td>779,639</td>
<td>103.2</td>
<td>946,683</td>
<td>331,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>6,670</td>
<td>462,849</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>708,217</td>
<td>1,519,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>10,307</td>
<td>660,221</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>276,779</td>
<td>2,465,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>10,096</td>
<td>605,676</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>1,143,428</td>
<td>2,706,741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>13,249</td>
<td>653,592</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>1,122,434</td>
<td>3,266,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>15,497</td>
<td>732,881</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>1,121,487</td>
<td>2,930,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>15,521</td>
<td>693,092</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>1,825,813</td>
<td>3,342,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>22,064</td>
<td>644,069</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>1,616,329</td>
<td>2,936,116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from ABS, 1998b: pp306-308)

Table 5.4 clearly shows the impact of four decades of government focus on developing extractive industries such as the mineral resource sector. Bolton (1981: 169) characterised this period of resource development from the mid-1970s by states such as WA as being one where the Government had “grasped at every opportunity to develop natural resources on a large scale, brushing aside the objections of environmental lobbies.” This table highlights that after this ‘mineral
boom’ WA is now a major source for a number of mineral commodities and exports more than 20% of the world’s supply of six minerals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>WA Prop. Of World Production ¹</th>
<th>Export Value ($A million) ²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alumina</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>3,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilmenite</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron ore</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>4,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickel</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>2,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutile</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tantalum</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zircon</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the export of timber as lumber reduced in value to WA over the past 150 years a new timber export product, woodchips, was established in the early 1970s. However, the export value of this product too has been dropping during the late 1990s, from $81.7 million in 1995 to $64.5 million in 2000. Table 5.5 outlines the dramatic growth in Australian exports during the 1990s. However, it also shows a 20% drop in value of WA woodchips over the period 1996-2000 while other Australian states had a 15% growth in the value of woodchip exports over the same period.
Table 5.5 - Australian & WA Woodchip Export Data (1995-2000)

(Aus$000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Australia Export Income</th>
<th>Total tonnes</th>
<th>WA Export Income</th>
<th>Total tonnes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>377,348</td>
<td>2,595</td>
<td>na</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>543,450</td>
<td>3,351</td>
<td>81,041</td>
<td>506.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>518,300</td>
<td>3,323</td>
<td>79,217</td>
<td>501.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>646,275</td>
<td>4,315</td>
<td>72,979</td>
<td>487.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>585,934</td>
<td>3,885</td>
<td>65,660</td>
<td>421.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>646,099</td>
<td>4,628</td>
<td>64,505</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ABARE, 1992; ABARE, 2001)

While the value of WA timber exports during this episteme was dropping the cost of managing the Crown forests was increasing. The issue of what was the appropriate level of royalties to charge timber companies for access to State timber resources had been a constant concern during the colonial and scientific epistemes. The three Royal Commissions, and later the anti-logging groups, believed that governments applied royalties that were too low. There are no figures specifically for WA’s forests but Figure 5C highlights the growing gap between revenue that Australian states received for their timber resources and the cost of managing them. It is likely that a similar gap existed in WA over the period 1920-1980 as its income and expenditure levels are likely to have been similar to other states.\textsuperscript{17} The WA Government recognised the problem of low

\textsuperscript{17} Repetto (1988: 357) found a similar gap between income and expenses by the US Forest Service with an under-reporting of costs due to the non-inclusion of interest charges on its expenses over the many decades that it takes to grow and harvest forests.
royalties and in 1988 doubled them as well as applying different rates for first, second and third grade sawlogs (CALM, 1988: 4).

**Figure 5C – Costs and Revenues of Australia's Forest Services (1920-1980)**

![Figure 5C – Costs and Revenues of Australia's Forest Services (1920-1980)](image)

(Dargavel and Sheldon, 1987: 302)

The decline of the export value of WA timber and woodchip products has been associated with other changes in the industry as well. There has been a continual consolidation of the timber industry. Between 1920 and 1980 the multi-company timber sector became a Bunnings monopoly as the industry consolidated. In 1983, Bunnings purchased its last remaining large local competitor, the 99-year old Millars company, for $25 million (Mills, 1986: 255). While the number of timber companies declined, the power of CALM in the policy process continued as it increased the royalties from the logging of WA’s
native timber (see Figure 5D below). This was achieved by a large increase in logging levels during the decade 1985-1995 as a way of nearly tripling its revenue to fund its internal environmental programs such as ‘Western Shield’. CALM was able to retain revenue generated by royalties, a system established by Lane Poole in the 1920s (see Chapter 4 above) and use the funds to nearly double its employee numbers over the same period from 43,000 to 72,000. The royalty figure for 1997/98 included $76 million for native forest logs, $31 million for softwood plantation logs and $1 million for hardwood plantation logs. The majority of the harvested timber was used in the local market (Edwardes, Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 15 October 1998: 2226). CALM’s approach led to criticism about overcutting from the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) in 1998 (Irving, 1998b: 1) that I argue in Chapter 8 gave the anti-logging organisations an unique political opportunity to challenge the Government’s logging policy.

*Figure 5D – CALM Forest Royalties (1988-1998)*

(Adapted from Edwardes, Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 15 October 1998: 2226)
Also, during the scientific episteme there had been a rapid fall in the number of timber workers employed in the south-west, with the high point being over 5,000 employed prior to World War 1 (Mills, 1986: 53). By the late 1980s there were only about 1,200 people directly employed in the WA timber industry. This substantial decrease mirrored a similar decrease in the number of sawmill employees in the Australian timber workforce. Figure 5E below shows the fall in WA employees and that the number of employees nationwide dropped by two-thirds over the 25 years between 1956 and 1983 as new technologies were introduced into the timber industry. This figure also draws attention to the greater importance of timber employment in WA at the commencement of the scientific episteme. In the early 1920s WA timber employees totalled 25% of Australia’s timber workforce compared to about 12% toward the end of the episteme.

*Figure 5E - Changes in Sawmill Employees in Australia (1920-1983)*

The revolution in timber technology was traced by Robertson (1956: 111) to the introduction in 1934 of the petrol-driven caterpillar tractor to replace bullocks and horses. The substantial drop off in timber employees during this episteme had another consequence: it led to a reduction in union membership in the WA timber industry and hence the power of the timber unions within the ALP (see below).

Dargavel (1987: 36) noted that by the mid-1980s the Australian timber industry faced major challenges. These included the rise in environment groups challenging forest policies, the need for state governments to spend more on forestry processes than was generated by revenues from timber companies and regional decline in traditional timber areas such as the south-west of WA. Dargavel (p39) provided information that showed that the State forest services had been running their operations at a deficit for more than two decades. Also, he suggested that the timber industry responded to the growing environmental challenge during the 1980s by “whipping up fears of job or resource losses” (p45) despite the enormous losses since the late 1950s. I will return to this in Chapter 9.

Associated with the decrease in value of timber exports and decline in timber workforce in the south-west was an associated drop in the actual availability of native timber resources. This point was a key part of the language of the anti-logging groups during the period 1998-2000 as I show in Chapter 8.
Figure 5F illustrates the dramatic decrease in the WA jarrah timber reserves between the pre-colonial episteme and the end of the scientific one.

*Figure 5F- Changes in Jarrah Timber Distribution (1829-2000)*

![Figure 5F- Changes in Jarrah Timber Distribution (1829-2000)](image)

(Bradshaw *et al.*, 1991: 2)

5.7 TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP

Between 1986 and 2001 union membership in WA declined from 210,600 to only 150,800 (ABS, 2001c: 35) or from a union density of just over 41% of the work force to under 20%. Peetz (1997: 31) traced a similar decline across Australia to a policy shift by both major political parties to “decollectivist” policies that no longer supported or allowed compulsory unionism. Peetz used ABS figures to show that Australian union density dropped from 49.5% in 1982 to just 30.3% by 1997 (1998: 6). These figures for the decline in Australian union membership numbers are similar to those found by Galenson’s (1994: 2) international study of union membership. That study found a similar decline over
the period 1980-1994 for all industrial countries except for Sweden. Table 5.6 compares the drop in union membership in WA with that for Australia over the 15-year period 1986-2001.

Table 5.6 - Union Membership in WA and Australia (1986-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>WA Union Membership (.000s)</th>
<th>WA Union Membership (% of labour force)</th>
<th>Aust. Union Membership (% of labour force)</th>
<th>Difference in WA-Australian Union Memb. %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>210.6</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>205.1</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>218.6</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>226.3</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>177.8</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>-7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>174.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>158.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>150.8</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ABS, 2001c: 35; ABS, 1992: 129)

Of interest when considering the decline in union membership in terms of the forest debate in WA is that Table 5.6 shows the clear impact of Richard Court Government’s industrial relations package in 1993. This new legislation supported individual employee contracts with their employers and did away with the arbitration model (Bailey, 2001: 108). It had an immediate impact on lowering union numbers as well as increasing by 5% the gap between Australian union density numbers and those for WA. Figures from the ABS Census for the total Agriculture and Forestry sector in WA show that this sector was never as unionised as others and there was an even greater decline in union membership.
over the period 1986-2001 - from under 15% in 1986 to just 6% in 2001 (Table 5.7). However, the Australian forestry sector union density was closer to the national average with 24.5% union membership in 2001 (ABS, 2002b: 35).

Table 5.7 - WA Agriculture & Forestry Union Membership (1986-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Union Membership</th>
<th>Total Workforce</th>
<th>Union Density (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986¹</td>
<td>16,900</td>
<td>115,753</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001²</td>
<td>11,800</td>
<td>200,500</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1-ABS, 1991, 126  
2-ABS, 2002b, 38)

With the reduction in overall employment in the WA timber industry as well as a drop in union membership I expect that this would impact on the influence wielded by the WA union representing timber workers, the Australian Workers Union (AWU). This would be particularly so within ALP decision-making forums as representation is based on actual union membership figures. The power of the timber workers union in the early 1980s was highlighted by a debate within the Trades and Labour Council in 1980 that nearly led to its split. The TLC Secretary opposed plans to establish a woodchipping industry in the south-west forests. The timber workers union supported these plans for a new industry and threatened to establish a rival peak union body if the TLC maintained their position of opposition to it (Sharp, 1983: 145). The TLC finally dropped its opposition to the new industry and the timber workers’ union stayed within the TLC.

However, with the drop in timber workers employed in the WA industry between 1980 and 2000 their influence as a single stakeholder within the forest policy network decreased. McNaughton (2000: 27) outlined how in Victoria the
timber workers and the timber companies joined forces to oppose the growing political influence of the anti-logging movement. The paper-making company AMCOR used 35 unionists to communicate the benefits to the community and the environment movement of the company’s logging operations. In a similar fashion in WA through the 1990s, the AWU and the remaining timber companies had a very close relationship through the Forest Industry Federation of WA (FIFWA) and timber companies in the south-west. They used a common communication strategy focused on the loss of jobs and the flow-on impact on timber communities. The dwindling influence of the AWU within the WA policy network was one of the factors that allowed the development of a new policy toward the logging of old growth forests by the ALP before the 2001 election, as will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

5.8 NEW INDUSTRIES IN THE SOUTHWEST

While the value of timber industry exports from the south-west declined rapidly during the scientific episteme over the period 1970-2000 there was a growth of new industries in this region such as tourism, vineyards and mining. An overview of the value of these new industries in the south-west region (and the employment they generated) was given by the then-Premier, Richard Court in his introduction of the 1999 RFA bill to the WA Parliament:

Already tourism provides more than 7,000 jobs in the region and the tourists who make nearly 2.4 million visits there spend about $250 million a year. The Government is keen to see this figure grow. The RFA will help create other opportunities for expansion of tourism in areas including forest blocks near Margaret River, Bridgetown, Walpole, Denmark, Blackwood River Valley, Hawke Block, Dombakup and Northcliffe.
Other industries: The mining industry makes a major contribution to the regional economy. In 1995-96, it employed more than 8,000 people directly and generated nearly $2.7 billion. Through consultation with the mining industry, RFA reserves have been chosen to minimise direct conflict with known mineral deposits and existing mining leases and tenements. This should give the industry confidence to invest in new mineral exploration and mining. All other small industries, including beekeeping, floriculture, biotechnology and basic raw materials such as sand, limestone and gravel, have also been taken into account in the RFA (Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 4 May 1999, 7756).

A report by the WA Tourism Commission (2001: 1) provided similar figures to the Premier for tourism in the south-west and indicated that in the calendar year 2000 the value of domestic visitors to the south-west region might have been as high as $422 million, with over 1.5 million domestic visitors staying overnight.¹⁸ This is a substantial increase on an estimate in 1981 that suggested about 345,000 tourist visitor days were spent in the karri region. This report twenty years ago by conservationists was one of the first to highlight the growing economic potential of tourism associated with WA’s native forests (CCWA, 1982: 12).

Importantly, in terms of my research into the forest conflict, in 2000 more than 76% of the visitors to the south-west were from the Perth region with 90% of them travelling to the region by car (WATC: 3). Nearly 50% of these domestic visitors to the region had an annual household income of more than $52,000 per annum- substantially higher than the average annual income for WA (WATC: 5). These figures indicate the easy access and use of the south-west region for

¹⁸ Some people made more than one visit to the south-west during 2000. The region was visited by about 72,000 international visitors.
holidays and recreation by middle class and wealthy people from Perth.\textsuperscript{19} Some of the top activities enjoyed by these domestic visitors to the south-west region were visiting parks and the forest (23\%), visiting wineries (21\%) and going to the beach (37\%). These figures highlight the strength of attachment between urban residents in Perth and the natural attractions of the south-west region.

A number of the anti-logging supporters I interviewed spoke of their experiences in enjoying south-west holidays and how this impacted on their stand toward the logging of native forests in the region (see the following chapter). A survey conducted as research for the RFA indicated that 81\% of people surveyed in the south-west acknowledged that tourism was very important to the economic future of the region (DPIE, 1997: 34). That the wider WA community was attached to the south-west was already apparent in the earlier debate about the establishment of the woodchipping industry in WA in the late-1970s. It was mentioned by Peter Cook (then Secretary of the WA Trades and Labour Council) when recounting his opposition to the establishment of this industry:

I have been there that many bloody times camping … just enjoying it, so I probably knew as much about it as anyone. The only relaxation I ever had was going camping in the bush and just getting away from everything (Sharp, 1983: 147).

This closeness to Perth and their regular tourism experiences may also have encouraged Perth residents to move to the region and seek jobs in the new industries there.

\textsuperscript{19} The rapid development of tourism in the south-west also led to campaigns to stop particular developments close to the beach that were thought to pose an environmental threat (Butler, 2000c: 8).
5.9 WA’S GROWING WINE INDUSTRY

I will provide evidence in the next chapter that the growth of the wine industry in the south-west of WA over the past 30 years has contributed to important demographic and economic changes in that region. Table 5.8 shows that the distribution of this industry (in terms of wineries and grape production) is now clearly focused on the south-west rather than the earlier location of vineyards around Perth (eg the Swan Valley). In 2001 nearly 80% of wine grape production came from the south-west vineyards although these numbered just over 50% of the State’s vineyards.

Table 5.8 - WA Wine Grape Production and Wineries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2001 tonnes</th>
<th>% of Prod.</th>
<th>2000 Wineries</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Margaret River</td>
<td>25,033</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Southern</td>
<td>13,565</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manjimup Shire</td>
<td>7,602</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swan Valley</td>
<td>7,669</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perth Hills</td>
<td>1,036</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5,570</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>60,475</strong></td>
<td><strong>9%</strong></td>
<td><strong>129</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(DLGRD, 2002: 7)

Table 5.9 draws attention to the economic importance of this rapidly growing industry for WA. The figures clearly show that the wines produced in this region are premium drinking wines that return more than twice the value per litre of the overall Australian wine exports (ABS, 2000b: 3). The export value of
$31.1 million for 2000 (DLGRD: 13) was twice that reported for timber exports in the same period (CALM, 2000: 95).

### Table 5.9 - Australian & WA Wine Exports (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>WA</th>
<th>WA %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Litres (000s)</td>
<td>284,933</td>
<td>1,893</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value ($millions)</td>
<td>1,372.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value/1,000 litres</td>
<td>$4.82</td>
<td>$9.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ABS, 2000b: 3)

The dramatic growth of grape production in WA over the period between 1990-2000 is shown by Table 5.10. In this decade many years had annual growth rates of 20-40%. By 2000, overseas grape exports from WA had risen to where they were more than 20 times that of a decade earlier (ABS, 2001b: 3). The economic value to WA, though, is not limited to its overseas exports: interstate wine exports in 2000 were valued at $72.3 million (DLGRD: 13) and the wine industry also contributed to the growth of the south-west tourism industry outlined above.
Table 5.10 - WA Grape Exports 1990-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Wine Exports (000 litres)</th>
<th>Annual Growth Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>118%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1,269</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,893</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ABS, 2001b: 3)

The value of the rapidly growing wine industry to the regional economies in the south-west is also important in terms of the employment it generated. Table 5.11 indicates that of the 2,674 people employed in the south-west wine industry in 2000, about 60% were casual employees. The employment in this industry was centred on Margaret River that had nearly 50% of the south-west wine employees. Of interest in these figures are the 73 full-time and the 350 non-full-time jobs in the traditional timber area of the Shire of Manjimup. These figures indicate that the fledging wine industry in the forest region of WA already employed about 10% of the full-time and part-time employment offered by the timber industry centred on Manjimup.
**Table 5.11 - South-West Wine Industry Employment (2000)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SW Region</th>
<th>Full-time</th>
<th>Part-time</th>
<th>Casual</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of wine labour force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Margaret River</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>1275</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Southern</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manjimup Shire</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackwood Valley</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographe</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>694</strong></td>
<td><strong>342</strong></td>
<td><strong>1639</strong></td>
<td><strong>2675</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(DLGRD, 2002: 14)

5.10 CONCLUSION

This chapter has described the scientific episteme and the important changes to the management of the timber industry encompassed over this 80-year period. From the time of the arrival of Aborigines to the south-west of WA until 1920 there was a feeling that the forests were abundant and plentiful. The Royal Commission of 1922 at the beginning of the scientific episteme clearly identified the view that the forests of south-west WA were small in size compared to overseas countries, had been overcut and the Government had received little in royalties for them. By the 1990s, the entrenched power of the timber companies and the Forest Department (restructured as CALM) had been challenged by a growing number of WA environmentalists and forest-based conservation groups who had similar views to the 1922 Royal Commission about the limits of exploitation possible of the State’s forests. The national conflict between the two movements was to be managed by a series of RFAs in each State. Such agreements were to be based on scientific principles but the scientific episteme
showed great disagreement among scientists as to the way in which forests were being managed, and should be managed in the coming decades. My analysis clearly shows that parliament was largely irrelevant to the RFA debate, particularly as the Court government did not bring either the RFA or a draft to parliament for debate before it was signed by the Premier and the Prime Minister. I show in a later chapter that the debate over the correct forest policy for WA was largely conducted between the anti- and pro-logging movements rather than in parliament. The local media increased their reporting of RFA issues once well-known individuals intervened in the debate. At this time the debate in parliament also substantially increased as these individuals formed the LFF.

A new philosophy was being established within the WA community that was based on the use of old growth native forests for non-timber related purposes such as tourism. The first set-back to the hegemony of the timber companies and the Forest Department in WA was the reservation of the Shannon River National Park by the Burke Government in 1984. This decision was taken after a decade of State policies of development of mineral resources at any cost, arguably to generate jobs, material prosperity and ‘progress’ (Arthur Tonkin cited in Sharp, 1983: 198).20 As the economic value of the timber industry declined toward the end of the episteme there was a growth in employment offered by the new wine and tourist industries in the south-west. The declining economic value of timber-related exports from WA and important changes in the way the WA public viewed their environment from the early 1980s, and particularly the forests, prepared the way for the move to the fourth episteme - the ecological episteme.

20 The Premier Sir Charles Court was reported as responding to a question from an ABC journalist about the beauty of the south-west as saying “Well it’s good for the production of the State” (Sharp: 244).
In this chapter I discuss changes in values toward the environment in Western Australia during the period 1970-2000 that indicate the beginning of a new episteme. I also introduce data from national polls on environmental attitudes over a similar period and investigate demographic changes in the south-west region associated with the economic changes identified in the previous chapter. As shown in Chapter 5, new industries developed in the south-west around tourism and wine as the timber industry declined. Census data show that this attracted new people to the south-west who were better educated and had different religious values to those who lived there before the 1980s. I explore these changes between 1971 and 2001 for three south-west Local Government Areas as a way of showing the great changes in demographic factors that were linked by Inglehart...
(1977) to changes in community values. I conclude with a report on the impact of the 2001 Western Australian State election. The outcome of this election provided a resolution to the 30-year period of conflict about the logging of native forests in WA.

I collected most of my data for this chapter on the period 1998-2000 and the events surrounding the Regional Forest Agreement (RFA). However, I have included information on the election result\(^1\) of 2001 as it represented a significant, and unexpected, shift in WA State policies regarding the logging of old-growth forests. The election of an ALP government and the introduction of policies that prohibit the logging of old-growth forests brought to a conclusion the policy conflict but not the struggle over the sustainable management of the WA timber industry. The election results also suggest some answers to my research question; I will return to this in the Analysis chapter.

6.2 GROWING ENVIRONMENTAL INSIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Quekett (2000: 20) argued that at the end of the scientific episteme WA people were “the most environmentally-aware people in Australia”. This may be so, but it does not mean that ideas reflecting environmental and conservationist values were not held by some forest policy stakeholders in earlier epistemes. I have already mentioned comments made by Von Mueller in 1879 warning WA people on the dangers of treating their forests as if they were inexhaustible (Mills, 1986: 6). It had not been just since the formation of modern Australian

\(^1\) Appendix 6 contains a summary of the full 2001 election results for both houses of parliament.
environmental groups in the 1970s that people in WA had been concerned about the rate of logging of its native timber. Similar comments to Von Mueller’s were made two decades later in the context of the first Royal Commission into WA forests:

State acquiescence in the destruction of good timber only because the trade demands it, is a crime against coming generations; and any attempts to increase the export in the interest of foreign companies, or with the object of inducing more men to join in timber getting at the expense of posterity, needs wise resistance… (Royal Commission, 1902: iv).

Comments about new environmental values were also found during the scientific episteme from within the Forests Department. An official Forestry Bulletin from 1953 outlined definite but intangible values for the recreational use of forests in WA. The benefits included spiritual ones (cited in de Garis, 1993: 150). In 1992 a CALM document summarised the new values, including spiritual ones, held by the WA community about the environment in terms similar to those proposed by Inglehart to explain how such changes developed:

A community conservation ethic re-emerged during the 1960s, no doubt partially due to the excesses of the post-war economic boom and the rising affluence of the community which resulted from it (1992: 66).

Young (1996: 186) traced these new spiritual attitudes back to a revaluation of people’s impact on the environment going back 300 years. Young suggested that in western countries more recently the rise of ‘Nature’ or environment as a central concept for policy debate, was part of a broader move away from mainstream Christian religions, and associated with a change from an ‘anthropocentric’ view of nature to a more ‘biocentric’ one. American political philosopher John Rodman provided the term ‘ecological sensibility’ (cited in Hay, 2002: 32) to describe the new and radical critique emerging from scientists
opposed to the destructive effects of technology and pollution on the environment. Rodman’s term was developed a decade after Rachel Carson’s book *Silent Spring* (1965) made a powerful argument for the connectedness of humans and nature and against the destructive impact of human-generated pollution on the environment. The main difference between earlier examples of environmental awareness and the ecological sensibilities developed in the last decade of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century was the development of social movement organisations (SMOs) campaigning for new policy approaches.

Changes in attitude in the West Australian public toward the environment in general, and forest in particular, are shown below to be similar to those occurring across Australia. As a practical example of how these new values encouraged State governments to respond at about the time Rodman framed his term ‘ecological sensibility’, Table 6.1 below shows the expansion of conservation areas in the various states of Australia over the period 1968-1988. Governments began to recognise the need to conserve existing pristine areas while also trying to develop their resource industries. They did not put all of their remaining undeveloped areas into conservation areas or national parks and their move to conserve some areas while maintaining other uses such as logging or mining indicated the overlapping of scientific and ecological values during this period.

Table 6.1 shows that there were major increases in conservation areas set aside by all of the Australian States and territories in the decade between 1968 and 1978. This period in the early 1970s seems to have been an important one in fostering new values toward native forests (and the broader environment as I will show below) by SMOs as well as governments throughout Australia. Lohrey (2002: 9) has suggested that the flooding of Lake Pedder by the Tasmanian
Government in 1972 was to Australian environmentalists what the great shearer’s strike in the 1890s was to the ALP. Lohrey (p16) also described how the establishment of The Wilderness Society in 1976 at the end of the Lake Pedder campaign, and the development of the Franklin River blockade five years later (TWS, 1983), helped to generate the national scope of the Australian environment movement during the 1980s.

Table 6.1- Expansion of Conservation Areas in Australia (1968-1988)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/Territory</th>
<th>1968 (000 ha)</th>
<th>1978 (000 ha)</th>
<th>Change (%) 1968-78</th>
<th>1988 (000 ha)</th>
<th>Change (%) 1978-88</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>12.65</td>
<td>1,099</td>
<td>15.25</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>2,240</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vic.</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qld</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>11.12</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tas</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Young, 1996: 185)

Most Australian governments continued to respond to public pressure (such as the formation of the Conservation Council in WA in 1969) and increased their conservation areas in the following decade (1978-1988). However, the increases in this decade in all but one State were not as great as those in the previous decade. WA had the greatest change in conservation areas set aside by State governments between 1968-1978 but the further increases it made between 1978-1988 were

---

2 This strike led to the formation of the Australian Labor Party to represent the interests of the shearsers in the Queensland parliament against those of the pastoralists.
1988 were not as large as the increases in most other States. This is explained in part by the small size of its conservation areas in 1968.

Young (1996: 185) listed changes in other Australian attitudes to environmental issues that also date from the early 1970s such as new laws to control pollution, to ban or restrict chemicals and to save endangered species (e.g., whales). In his interview MP, a Cabinet member in WA in 1983, linked the growing environmental consciousness of that time to international events such as the Club of Rome reports in the late 1960s and also highlighted the importance of the environment as a policy area gaining a place in parliamentary Cabinets, and WA’s leading role in this regard:

... I was a very young back bencher and I remember well when the [ALP] Tonkin government appointed the first Minister for the Environment in 1971 and that was avant garde stuff – I think, the first Minister for the Environment in Australia. And I distinctly remember that environmental concerns in the fair State of Western Australia were in the very, very embryonic stage of evolution. So there had been the Club of Rome in the sixties, the word 'environment' in public policy – concerns for important environmental issues really only started to surface.

The WA Government also established the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) in 1971. The EPA soon showed the possibility of bureaucratic control of the impact of new developments by recommending against the construction of an alumina refinery in the Swan Valley vineyards near Perth (Bolton, 1981b: 159). As I have mentioned before, the early 1970s saw Australian governments at a Federal and State level respond to some of the new environmental concerns expressed by SMOs and the public. They did so with the appointment of government ministers to oversee the environment and with the increased preservation of conservation areas. The Federal Government followed the lead of the WA Government with the appointment of the first Federal Cabinet
Minister for Environment in 1971 (Bolton, 1981b: 159). In general, these major changes were introduced by ALP governments and were supported by the Coalition ones that followed.

One of the frustrating aspects of trying to understand the changing attitudes to the environment by Australians is the lack of consistent polling data on the issue. Lothian (1994: 78) tracked the public polls on Australian environmental attitudes from various public sources between 1974 and 1994. He found that a majority of Australians had a strong pro-environmental attitude during this period. He also found that there was a growing interest in measuring public attitudes toward the environment, especially around elections, but that there was a frustrating lack of consistency in the questions and polling methods used. Lothian cited a poll conducted by *The Age* from 1971 to 1974 that showed a clear shift of opinion in favour of greater concern for the environment. As a political issue of concern, it moved from ninth position in 1971 to second in 1974. However, the results of a later annual poll by *The Bulletin* suggested that Australians were less concerned about the environment in the late 1980s than in the 1970s. It reported that the percentage of those concerned about the environment dropped from 39% in 1975 to only 25% in 1986. Lothian (pp81, 82 and 95) was critical of the inconsistent questions used for the different polls but concluded that much of the environmental concern in the 1970s and 1980s was toward issues of pollution and waste followed by flora and fauna issues such as the logging of forests.

In a national poll conducted in the early 1990s during its inquiry into the Australian forest industry, the Resource Assessment Committee (RAC) (1991: 1)

3 The previous McMahon (Liberal) Government had appointed a non-Cabinet junior Minister for the Environment in the previous year.
found that the majority of Australians were in favour of the halting of logging in National Estate forests, even if it caused economic hardship. The RAC also found that at that time, the environment was the most frequently mentioned national problem, surpassing economic issues such as unemployment and interest rates. A multivariate analysis of their survey data indicated that involvement in social movements and personality values were the strongest predictors of attitudes towards the forests. The RAC also included questions used by Inglehart to explore the “postmaterial” preferences of different Australian age groups. They found that, from a cross-national perspective, Australia ranked in the middle range of nine Western nations in terms of their concern for postmaterial or non-economic issues. The proportion of Australians with postmaterial values puts the country behind Germany and the Netherlands but above the French, Danes and Belgians (RAC: 19). The RAC results (p18) also confirmed Inglehart’s earlier findings that people aged over 55 years have a far less postmaterial orientation than younger age groups.

The RAC research is unique in that it is the only Australian government research that has utilised Inglehart’s framework. One critical outcome of the RAC’s research in relation to attitudes to environmental issues was that it found (p44) opposition to the use of native forests for economic purposes (eg logging and woodchipping) to be strongly related to socio-economic factors such as having a university degree, being female and having visited a native forest in the previous year. These were important factors I considered in my own research project and report on below.

The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) seems to have taken up the criticism of Lothian in regard to the need for regular polling using consistent
questions. It has been tracking Australian environmental attitudes every two years since 1992 with similarly worded questions. Its latest report (2001: 20) provided data over a range of issues and found that Australians with a higher weekly household income generally have a greater concern for environmental problems. It reported that 60% of households with less than $159 per week gross income had environmental concerns compared to 80% of households with over $1,500 gross income per week. Similarly to the RAC poll, it found that concern for environmental problems increased with an increase in education level, 70% of people with skilled vocational training had environmental concerns rising to 90% for people with postgraduate university degrees. Both of these outcomes from the ABS support Inglehart’s findings from his studies of European and US populations in regard to the importance of income and education levels for predicting postmaterial attitudes toward the environment.

In terms of my research, the ABS data (p12) give the impression that the forests dispute may have led to WA having a consistently higher than average concern about environmental problems during the 1990s (although this percentage declined for both Australia and WA over the course of the decade). It must be noted that there were a range of other social campaigns under way in WA during the 1990s at the same time that the forest policy was being debated. These campaigns may have helped mobilise people into also being aware of the forest dispute. People protesting about these other issues, eg the legalisation of abortion, the Third Wave industrial campaign, Smith’s Beach and the ‘Save Leighton Beach’ campaign, may have mixed with anti-logging supporters. Also, anti-logging supporters may have copied ideas for campaign actions from these other issues, eg utilising high profile people in their campaigns.
Table 6.2 provides the results of a large national survey by the ABS with more than 14.2 million Australians being polled. It was these results that led Quekett (2000: 20) to label WA people as ‘the most environmentally aware people in Australia’.

**Table 6.2- Proportion of People Concerned About Environmental Problems (1992- 2001)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Australia %</th>
<th>WA %</th>
<th>States with Higher Proportions than WA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>SA (69.7), ACT (70.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>NSW (73.0), ACT (76.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>SA (72.6), ACT (75.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>SA (73.0), ACT (74.2),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>SA (77.0), NT (79.6),</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ABS, 2001: 12)

Other data indicated a growing environmental attitude among Australians. In a public opinion poll in 1990 over 70% of people thought that the preservation of forests was more important than the protection of timber workers’ jobs (http://assda.anu.edu.au/polls/D0711.html, question 18). The 1994 National Social Science Survey found that 50% of Australians said that they were willing to pay more to protect the environment with only 20% of respondents saying that they were not. The proportion dropped to about one-third willing to pay higher taxes or have a lower standard of living to protect the environment (http://assda.anu.edu.au/codebooks/d0966/about.html). A poll of candidates standing for election at the 2001 Federal election found that 38% of them saw the environment as the main problem facing Australia with another 22% rating it as
the second most important (http://ausstar.anu.edu.au/nesstarlight/index.jsp, variable C1). In another poll in the same year, the 2001 Australian Election Study, 72% of electors thought that the issue of the logging of native forest was either fairly urgent or very urgent (http://assda.anu.edu.au/codebooks/aes2001/description.html, variable E5.3).

There are no figures for the membership of environmental groups by West Australians, but Figure 6B highlights the dramatic growth in national membership of the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) and The Wilderness Society (TWS) from the late 1970s (when both were founded) to the early 1990s. TWS membership grew rapidly in the early 1980s during the Franklin campaign and the membership of both groups seems to have levelled in the early 1990s.

**Figure 6B- National Membership of ACF & TWS (1967-1992)**

These figures confirm results from the surveys reported above that a growing number of Australians had a more supportive attitude to the environment and were joining SMOs that were campaigning for policy changes, especially in regard to the logging of native forests. The depth of these public changes toward forests impacted also on WA companies. Wesfarmers, WA’s largest company, has had an annual program since 1997 that selected some of its employees to participate in programs run by the Earthwatch Institute as a way for “employees to increase their environmental awareness” (2002: 13). Also, its CEO, Michael Chaney, constructed a boardroom table from WA native timbers for a Perth child health foundation (Ashworth, 2000: 31). There are not separate figures for membership of WA SMOs for this period but a senior bureaucrat credited the growing size and power of the WA environment movement during the late 1970s with improving the ability of Forest Department employees to tackle the demands of timber milling companies for greater access to native forests (Sharp, 1983: 189).

6.3 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT SCENE

Since the early 1970s there have been a number of global movements with an environmental focus that could be described as examples of new social movements. The campaigns to stop whaling and to stop the construction of nuclear energy plants are just two examples of such movements. The movement to stop logging of old-growth forests in WA is part of a similar international campaign. A characteristic of such international movements is the links between the SMOs in various developed or Western countries. Australian anti-logging groups such as ACF and TWS maintain links to overseas organisations.
campaigning on the same issue. The Rainforest Action Network (RAN) maintains a web site that provides information on native forest campaigns around the globe. While there seems to be little information about the Australian campaigns on this web site, there are a number of examples of campaign strategies and actions used by overseas anti-logging groups (such as the ‘don’t buy old-growth’ campaign) which are similar to campaigns run in WA during the 1990s by anti-logging SMOs such as TWS, eg the ‘Buy-pass Bunnings’ campaign (www.ran.org).

One such campaign that threatened to impact on Wesfarmers4, and is an example of the international nature of these campaigns and their underlying values, was the move to use the timber market and global timber trade system to economically affect Australian companies logging old-growth forests. Barker (2002) cited a case of Canadian hardware companies putting in place new buying preferences for non-old-growth forest timber based on campaigns from environmental groups such as RAN. In a similar fashion, in 2000 Bunnings timber exports to UK worth more than $2 million were placed in peril because the Forest Stewardship Council (an international forest monitoring group) were concerned about WA’s management of its karri native forests (Quekett, 2000b: 5).

While the international links between specific WA anti-logging groups and international campaign organisations are not clear cut (and it is not the function of this chapter to go into this issue in any more depth), there is no doubt that activities and tactics of overseas groups do have an impact locally. One side-effect of this international focus evident in the forest campaigns is that during the late 1990s The West Australian regularly published articles on forest issues

4 Owner of the Bunnings hardware stores and operator the last remaining locally-owned milling operation.
countries, ranging from the Amazon, Cambodia, China, Indonesia and the US (e.g., Gerstenzang, 1998: T9; Astor, 1998: T9; 2000: 22).

A number of authors have written about anti-logging campaigns in individual countries (Booth, 1994; Kalland & Persoon, 1998) and an interesting aspect of these international campaigns is that they now extend into developing countries such as Thailand and Taiwan. These countries are not normally associated within the literature on new social movements as being sites for groups campaigning on values-type campaigns such as the environment.

An important thread of the international forest debate is the concept of ‘old-growth’ forests. Booth (p115) briefly touched on the question of what is ‘old’ about old-growth forests in a US setting when he defined them as trees older than 200 years. This issue has also been quite an important aspect of the forest conflict in WA (and other Australian states) as it is an important point of difference between pro- and anti-logging groups. The definition used by the Resources Assessment Commission in its 1991 inquiry into the Australian timber industry was “forests that are both little disturbed and ecologically mature and have high conservation values” (Stewart and McColl, 1994: 18). In the WA RFA process, the definition used was "Old-growth forest is ecologically mature forest where the effects of disturbance are now negligible" (Kobelke, Hansard WA Legislative Council, 14 March 2000: 4458).

Booth (1994: 182), in his study of submissions over a period of 20 years to US Congressional committees on wildlife matters, showed an interesting trend from submissions highlighting ‘natural beauty’ to ones focusing on ‘preserving wildlife’ and ‘preserving ecosystems’. At its core, these new arguments for valuing ‘oldness’ seemed to have some anthropomorphic overtones, and certainly
accorded with Christian values of showing respect for mature people. Trigger (1999: 165) described such language used by environmentalists as a ‘powerful romantic discourse’ that conceived the Australian native bush as unspoiled. In some way it may also touch on the fleeting nature of human life, in contrast to these long-lived trees. The argument is very much based on an emotional approach to the conflict that can stimulate intense personal reactions. An example of such an attitude to the forest provided by an anti-logging supporter is:

…the forest is the embodiment of nature: of birth and death; of relationship in the ecology, of life and survival- the very biological functions of womanhood. Many women experience the logging industry from a different perspective …they appreciate the organics, life and dynamics within the forest. And old-growth forests have, like women, generations of wisdom within themselves (Jan, 1995: 21).

Finally, in the Australian context, old-growth forests have been associated by environment groups with centres of life for other species, especially fauna. In some environmental language trees are described as providing ‘homes’ for a wide range of birds in particular (WAFA, 2003: 4). So in some sense they are engines of life that when destroyed, place at risk a wide range of fauna. A CALM scientist (Christensen, 1992: 34) described the use of ‘old-growth’ in the WA conflict by anti-logging groups as ‘marketing’ that created “a fairytale image of the forests” that hindered rational debate between the two sides.

**Comparison of Levels of Protest Violence**

While there are important similarities between the tactics of local and overseas anti-logging groups and their approach to the definition of ‘old-growth’
there is an important difference between the WA forest campaign and the one in North America. This difference between the Australian and US settings for the conflict between pro-logging and anti-logging groups is that in the US a larger percentage of the forests are privately owned and is therefore out of the control of government environmental legislation. In Australia, a large proportion of forests is owned by the Crown (State Government) and managed by State instrumentalities such as the department CALM in WA. Table 6.3 summarises the Crown’s ownership of these forests around the time that anti-logging groups were established and around the time of the debate over the RFA. It shows a dramatic reduction in privately-owned forests in WA and an increased reliance of the timber industry on forests that are publicly-owned.

Table 6.3- Proportion of State-owned Forests in WA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Publicly-owned (‘000 ha)</th>
<th>Privately-owned (‘000 ha)</th>
<th>Total Forest (‘000 ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>29,010 (76%)</td>
<td>8,959</td>
<td>37,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>33,200 (95%)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>34,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. (ABS, 1972: 879)
2. (ABARE, 2001: 60)

One outcome of this different ownership structure of the forests is the limited level of violence between protagonists on either side of the policy conflict in Australia compared to North America. In WA, the violence has been isolated and generally located in logging coupes where anti-logging activists undertake actions designed to halt logging (AAP, 2002). While this has led to great

---

5 A CALM report acknowledged that its logging activities in the south-west were pushing endangered plants and animals closer to extinction (Amalfi, 2002: 4).
frustration for the workers affected, and for the police trying to come between the two sides (Butler, 2000: 1), the violence has been limited to an occasional assault. There was also an instance in August 1999 of arson when the Environment Centre in Northcliffe was set on fire by two timber workers from Manjimup (Rechichi, 2000: 42) but there have been no incidents of violence on the part of timber industry owners.

The tenor of these actions is at great variance to the well-organised violence (including reports of killings) orchestrated by pro-industry groups in the US, such as the Wise Use Movement, Alliance for America and Centre for the Defense of Free Enterprise (Rowell, 1996: 24). Beder (2000: 44) suggested that the use of front groups and violence was an orchestrated strategy developed by Ron Arnold who through the 1980s advised the US timber industry on ways of obtaining media access to counter that gained by the anti-logging groups. Dowie (1995: 85) suggested that during 1990 over $500 million was spent on corporate anti-environmental public relations in the US. Similarly, Canadian industry groups picked up on the tactics of Wise Use; and established Share groups throughout regional Canada and enlisted workers with real and legitimate worries about their forest-dependent jobs as members to intimidate and threaten anti-logging groups and their members (Rowell: 188). The closest that Australian conflict has come to the level of violence described by Rowell and Beder was the attack on the Federal Minister for the Environment by pro-logging supporters in Ravenshoe, Queensland, in 1987. Graham Richardson had gone to the timber town to explain the decision of the Hawke Government to nominate the rainforest around that area for World Heritage listing and he and his party were physically assaulted by pro-logging supporters as he made his way from the meeting. He (1994: 224)
described this experience as “I was about as terrified as it is possible to get … I really began to fear for my safety”.

One novel aspect of the WA forest conflict violence was the use of electronic ‘espionage’ by TWS. In what they called the world's first cyber blockade, the TWS registered the internet domain name www.sotico.com just before Bunnings Forest Products changed its name to Sotico in 2000. In a series of similar moves by local and international forest supporters they targeted the WA old-growth logging industry by also registering the web sites: www.fifwa.com, www.simcoa.com and www.waforeststoday.com (TWS, 2000b).

By the end of the scientific episteme the great changes to the WA public’s attitude to the environment and the logging of native forests had been documented by different opinion polls for nearly 20 years. The setting for the WA logging conflict was different to others in terms of who owned the resource but the tactics utilised by local anti-logging groups were similar to those used in overseas settings (see the description above of groups such as RAN). Despite the high level of public concern, the forest policy as reflected in the new WA RFA in 1999 did not match the expectations of the 80% of the community who wanted the logging of old-growth forests to cease. Only a change of government would see the introduction of the new episteme to WA.

6.4 DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN THE SOUTH-WEST REGION

This section examines some of the changes that occurred in the south-west region of WA during the period 1970-2000. The data focus primarily on demographic and economic changes and place them in the context of similar changes at State and national level over the same period. These data have been
chosen following the insights of Inglehart (1977) and later Knutsen (1991) that value changes and other postmaterial perspectives are linked to economic and demographic factors such as education level and age. For example, Knutsen’s research (p98) showed a clear correlation across all of the five Nordic countries he studied between age and education levels and the holding of postmaterial values. In particular, he found that education levels had a 50% higher correlation than age and had a far greater one than income levels.

My focus was on changes in local government areas (LGAs) containing the majority of WA’s native forest reserves (Manjimup) and LGAs on either side of the forests (Denmark to the east and Augusta-Margaret River to the west). A map of these regions is included below (Figure 6C).

Comparative demographic and economic data are also provided for Australia and WA’s populations so the changes I identify can be placed in perspective to those at these other aggregated levels. Additionally, further comparative data have been collected for the inner-Perth LGA of Nedlands. This LGA external to the south-west region was selected as the conflict between pro-logging supporters and those opposed to logging was often described by those interviewed in this research (and in media articles) as a conflict between “poor country workers” and the “wealthy city elite”. A common view expressed in many of my interviews was that many of the city people who benefit from the new industries in the south-west live in wealthy western suburbs of Perth, with Nedlands a good example. A number of the high profile forest policy stakeholders (eg then-Premier Richard Court, LFF4, LIB and LAW) reside in this LGA.

---

6 The Nannup LGA lies between the Manjimup and Margaret River LGAs and has a very small population with similar socio-economic characteristics as the Manjimup one.
I argue that the demographic and economic changes I identify have assisted in the growth of the political power of WA anti-logging groups such as the LFF over the past 30 years and in the shift in the WA public’s attitude toward the State’s remaining old growth forests. The claim that the essence of the conflict is a class-like conflict will be discussed in a later chapter.
Population

Table 6.4 clearly identifies the limited population growth within the Manjimup LGA (the centre of WA’s forest industry) over the period being studied compared with the LGAs on either side of it, and the State and nation as a whole. The smaller population growth rate for Manjimup can be explained by the greater use of technology in lieu of labour in the logging of the forests during this period and the overall declining value of WA timber industry production, described in the previous chapter. The greater growth rate of the Augusta-Margaret River LGA to the west of the Manjimup LGA can be explained by the dramatic growth of new industries in that region, eg the tourist, mining and vineyard industries, also described above. Both the Denmark and Augusta-Margaret River LGAs had greater growth than did WA and Australia over the 30-year period.7

Table 6.4- Changes in Selected LGA Populations (1971-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1971 Population</th>
<th>2001 Population</th>
<th>Growth (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manjimup</td>
<td>8,748</td>
<td>10,030</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1,780</td>
<td>4,358</td>
<td>245%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-Margaret River</td>
<td>3,106</td>
<td>9,851</td>
<td>317%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nedlands8</td>
<td>22,878</td>
<td>21,338</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>1,030,469</td>
<td>1,851,252</td>
<td>180%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>9,085,586</td>
<td>18,972,350</td>
<td>209%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ABS, 1976; ABS, 2002)

---

7 Australia’s growth rate was higher than that of WA because the majority of migrants during this period chose to live in NSW and Victoria.

8 Nedlands population decreased over the period being studied probably due to a lack of sites for new housing developments and the ‘greying’ of the population.
Figure 6D indicates that all three south-west LGAs suffered a slight population slump in the early 1970s and their later population growth seems to coincide with the time that the first vineyards were established in the region. The Augusta-Margaret River LGA has had a dramatic growth in population. In 1971 its population was less than half that of Manjimup’s but 30 years later it was about the same. It had another boost during the mid- to late-1990s when the wine industry exports rapidly increased (see previous chapter).

*Figure 6D- South-west Regional Population Growth (1971-2001)*

![Graph showing population growth for Manjimup, A-Margaret River, and Denmark from 1971 to 2001.](image)


The larger growth in the populations of the Denmark and Augusta-Margaret River LGAs over the period being studied seems to be due to migration of people to these regions rather than from just internal population growth. This is clearly

---

9 The first commercial plantings in the south-west occurred in 1968 near Mt Barker. Tony Smith who planted them and developed his company into one of WA’s leading labels (Plantagenet Wines) has now turned his attention to a newer industry, aquaculture, ‘farming’ rainbow trout in the same region (Zekulich, 2002: 12).
shown in Table 6.5 which compares the number of people born in each LGA in 1971 and the number in the corresponding 30-34 age group in that LGA in 2001 (ABS, 1971; ABS, 2002). The table shows that in 2001 there were fewer people in this age group in Manjimup than were born in 1971, while the same cohort has nearly tripled from those born in 1971 in the adjoining Augusta-Margaret River LGA, clearly due to migration from outside of the LGA. These figures also show a considerable increase in the size of the 30-34 age group in the Denmark LGA over the corresponding 30 year period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manjimup</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>187%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-Margaret River</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>281%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Migration to these areas can be explained by a number of factors, including the greater number of Perth people seeking retirement destinations in the south-west of WA, a region that is close to both the coast and the remaining native forests. A second reason would be that younger people are looking for employment opportunities in the new industries in the region. Economic growth in the coastal region between Bunbury and Augusta over the period 1971-2001 has attracted a new range of industries, services and employment opportunities. This migration of people to Margaret River and other coastal areas in the south-west of WA has had another effect. Demand for property in this region, especially by
retirees, has caused real estate prices to rise to where they are similar to those of Perth’s wealthy riverside and coastal properties (Casella, 2002b: 9).

Figure 6E compares the population distribution for all three south-west LGAs and shows that in 1996 there was a higher percentage of people in the prime employment age cohort (30-50 years) in the Augusta-Margaret River LGA. Migration to the Margaret River and Denmark LGAs, especially intra-state migration from Perth, will have brought people with higher education levels (see below) and different social and cultural values to the region. This intra-state migration brought workers for the new employment opportunities as well as professional support service staff such as doctors, teachers, government staff and managers. Casella (2002: 13) reported that “city slickers’ were arriving in droves” in Denmark and included baby-boomers and urban professionals looking for a change of pace. Such middle class people have been shown (Burgmann, 2003; Pakulski, 1991) to be more supportive of new social movements in other historic and geographic settings.
Labour Force

The proportion of the population in the labour force in all three LGAs (Table 6.6) rose significantly over the 30-year period being studied, indicating the greater employment opportunities in the region, especially part-time opportunities for women. The rise for the Augusta-Margaret River LGA was twice that for the other LGAs and for WA as a whole. The healthy economic environment in the Augusta-Margaret River LGA is also indicated by its lower unemployment rate (Table 6.7) in 2001 compared to the State and for Australia. The low unemployment figure for Manjimup is surprising given the demise in the timber industry outlined in the previous chapter and the declarations of the pro-logging groups. Since the emergence of the anti-logging movement in the early 1970s the timber communities had argued any success by the anti-logging groups in saving old-growth forests from logging would cause a commensurate rise in unemployment in the timber region. The low figure for Manjimup is probably
explained by the slower overall growth rate for the Manjimup LGA (it grew by just 10 people between the 1996 and 2001 Census) and it is likely that when people in this LGA become unemployed they move to other LGAs.

**Table 6.6- Labour Force Employment (1971-2001)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>% of Pop.</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>% of Pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manjimup</td>
<td>3,509</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>4,953</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>1,853</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-Margaret River</td>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>5,008</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nedlands</td>
<td>8,724</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>9,337</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>430,382</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>896,226</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5,330,488</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>8,959,315</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ABS, 1971; ABS, 2002)

**Table 6.7- Unemployment Rates (2001)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manjimup</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-Margaret River</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nedlands</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ABS, 2002)

In terms of the labour force figures, the important differences between the south-west LGAs is that these have been lower for the whole 30-year period being
studied in the Denmark LGA compared to those of Manjimup and Margaret River. In 2001, Denmark’s labour force was only 43% of the population compared to 49% for Manjimup and 51% for Augusta-Margaret River. This result and the higher unemployment rate for the Denmark LGA could be seen to support the argument of some people interviewed that since the 1980s the Denmark region has attracted unemployed young people (eg. “hippies”, “drop-outs”) wanting to protest about logging. However, Figure 6E above showed that in 1996 the Denmark LGA had nearly half as many young people in the 15-30 age groups as the other LGAs in the south-west. The lower labour force and higher unemployment figures for this LGA seem to be due to it having a higher number of more mature people (over 50) than the other two LGAs. In other words, the influx of people to the Denmark LGA over the past 30 years was more likely to be retirees than young unemployed people while the influx to the Augusta-Margaret River LGA were people in the 25-45 age groups looking for work.

Table 6.8 below shows that the proportion of the labour force employed in the Agricultural/Forests sector in the Manjimup LGA has remained relatively stable over the period being studied, in contrast to those employed in this sector in the two LGAs on either side of it. Employment has shifted in the Denmark and Margaret River LGAs away from agriculture and forestry toward tourism and other types of industries (eg sand mining). The then-Premier Richard Court claimed that by the late 1990s the tourism industry employed 7,000 people in the south-west region of WA while the mining industry employed 8,000 and the forestry industry just over 1,000 (Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 4 May 1999: 7756). In 2001, the proportion of people employed in the agriculture and forestry sector in the Denmark LGA was less than half that for the year 1971, and
only a third for the Margaret River LGA compared to 1971 while the Manjimup figure has not altered much in 30 years.

**Table 6.8- Labour Force Employment- Forestry and Agricultural Sectors (1971-2001)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1971 No.</th>
<th>% of LF</th>
<th>2001 No.</th>
<th>% of LF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manjimup</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-Margaret River</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-Margaret River</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nedlands</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>na</td>
<td></td>
<td>36,674</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>na</td>
<td></td>
<td>330,782</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ABS, 1971; ABS, 2002)

Table 6.9 tracks the employment in WA of people working in the forestry and logging industries across the State. It indicates a substantial growth in employment from the mid-1980s due to the growth of the woodchipping export industry. However, there was a subsequent dramatic decline in total employment in this sector since the early 1990s, down to about 1,000 workers. As mentioned in Chapter 5, this was probably due to the greater use of technology and logging equipment in this sector as the timber and woodchip output grew quite strongly in the 1990s. The forestry labour sector had halved to only about 0.1% of WA’s total labour force by 1996. Generally manual labour has been attracted to higher paying jobs in the north-west and south-west as mineral and resource-based developments expanded in the 1980s and 1990s.
Table 6.9 - WA Forestry Employment (1971-1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>WA Labour Force</th>
<th>Forestry &amp; Logging</th>
<th>% of WA Labour Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>430,382</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>590,981</td>
<td>1,365</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>657,800</td>
<td>1,701</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>760,340</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>830,037</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Of special interest is the increase in female workers in this sector. From 1971 to 1996 an additional 200 women found employment in this sector. In 1996 they constituted about 25% of WA’s forestry workers.

Table 6.10 - WA Forestry Employment by Gender (1971-1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Forestry &amp; Logging</th>
<th>Males in Forestry</th>
<th>Women in Forestry</th>
<th>Women in Forestry Sector (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,365</td>
<td>1,214</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1,701</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Education

As mentioned above, authors writing on new social movements in various western countries have found an association between education levels and attitudes supportive of these organisations’ campaigns. Tables 6.11 and 6.12
clearly identify an increase over the last 30 years in people who are enrolled at university or have received qualifications\textsuperscript{10} for all three south-west LGAs (as well as for WA and Australia). Manjimup had a similar level of residents with university qualifications in 1971 to the Margaret River LGA and twice that of the Denmark LGA, but over the period being studied it slipped behind these two LGAs. In 2001 just over 5% of its residents held university qualifications while the two LGAs on either side (and WA and Australia) had nearly twice that rate. By 2001 the Denmark and Margaret River LGAs had a similar proportion of residents with university qualifications as for WA and Australia as a whole. The figure for the Nedlands LGA in 2001 is substantially higher from not only the whole south-west region, but for WA and Australia as well. This result has been affected slightly by the shrinking population of Nedlands over the period being studied and because it contains WA’s first university, with many staff and students living within the LGA.

\textit{Table 6.11 - University Qualifications (1971-2001)}

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Region & 1971 Qualifications & & 2001 Qualifications & \\
 & No. & \% & No. & \% \\
\hline
Manjimup & 56 & 0.6 & 572 & 5.7 \\
Denmark & 6 & 0.3 & 402 & 9.2 \\
A-Margaret River & 24 & 0.8 & 911 & 9.2 \\
\hline
Nedlands & 1,252 & 5.5 & 5,766 & 27 \\
WA & 12,728 & 1.2 & 174,001 & 9.4 \\
Australia & 177,639 & 2.0 & 1,918,913 & 10.1 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

(ABS, 1971; ABS, 2002)

\textsuperscript{10} These ABS education totals include people who reported that they had completed bachelor degrees, postgraduate diplomas and higher degrees (eg PhDs).
Table 6.12 - University Enrolment (1971-1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1971 Enrolment</th>
<th>1996 Enrolment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manjimup</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-Margaret River</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nedlands</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>12,728</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>177,639</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ABS, 1971; ABS, 2002)

The population data for each of the three south-west LGAs support my contention that many people with university qualifications have migrated to the region since the early 1980s, hence swelling the proportions for the three LGAs. Despite these general increases in university qualifications over the past 30 years, all three south-west LGAs still have a slightly lower proportion of the population with university qualifications than for WA and Australia. In 1996\(^{11}\) the number of people who were enrolled at university for all three south-west LGAs (Table 6.12) remained at about one-third of that for WA and Australia. This is due to the fact that all of WA’s universities are based in Perth and people who wish to attend university need to live outside of the south-west LGAs.\(^{12}\)

---

\(^{11}\) The ABS does not report this statistic in its 2001 Census information made available free to the public.

\(^{12}\) Some WA universities have small satellite campuses in regional centres such as Albany and Bunbury and all offer external studies units.
Religion

One important demographic change over the past 30 years I have uncovered during my research concerns the reported religious affiliation of those living in the three south-west LGAs. In 1971 the south-west LGAs and the Nedlands LGA had a similar proportion of Christians and those reporting no religious attachment to the figures for WA and Australia as a whole. However, by 2001 all 3 south-west LGAs had fewer Christians and more people with no religious attachment than either WA or Australia while the figures for Nedlands remained similar to those for WA and Australia. In 2001, of the south-west LGAs, Manjimup was the closest to the national and State averages, but the Nedlands LGA was even more representative of the national and State averages. Table 6.13 provides the figures for 1971 and 2001 while Figure 6F tracks the changes in religious affiliation for the three south-west LGAs over the 30 year period. The number of residents in these LGAs who reported no religious affiliation seemed to peak in 1996.
Table 6.13 - Reported Religious Orientation (1971-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christian % of Pop.</td>
<td>Other Religion % of Pop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manjimup</td>
<td>7,685 88%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1,518 85%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-Margaret River</td>
<td>2,650 85%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nedlands</td>
<td>19,797 87%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>869,878 84%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>10,990,379 86%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ABS, 1971; ABS, 2002)

The percentages don’t add to 100% due to those people who don’t complete this question in the Census or who inadequately describe their religious beliefs.
It is not clear why these south-west LGAs have a higher level of their population with no reported religious affiliation, or how the data relate to employment, educational qualifications or other demographic factors. The publicly available ABS statistics don’t allow the cross-tabulation of results to enable this type of investigation. However, this aspect of demographic change can be related to the new environmental values the majority of the WA public have regarding their native forests. It might also have a relationship to the spiritual values some see in nature (Roszak, 1992). The 1994 National Social Science Survey found that 13% of Australians thought that ‘Nature is sacred because it is created by God’ with another 24% who thought ‘Nature is spiritual or sacred in itself’ (http://assda.anu.edu.au/codebooks/d0966/about.html, p57, question 7). This might be especially relevant in the Denmark and Augusta-Margaret River
LGAs which have about twice the national average of people reporting no religious affiliation and which are regions with a large nature-based tourism industry as well as a number of local anti-logging groups.

The importance of the high proportion of the Denmark and Margaret River LGAs with no religious affiliation can be seen in Table 6.14 which presents the averages for each Australian state and territory alongside their respective population proportion with a university qualification.

### Table 6.14 – State Religious Affiliation and Education Values (2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/Territory</th>
<th>No Religious Affiliation (%)</th>
<th>University Qualification (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIC</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAS</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ABS 2002)

If there was a link between a person’s education level and their religious affiliation then it is most clearly shown by the figures for the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). However, Australia’s two most populous states have a similarly high level of university education but very different values for religious affiliation. There seems to be no clear trend across the states and the correlation value ($r^2$) for these two factors is only 0.2.

---

14 Listed in terms of population size with the largest state (NSW) listed first.
**Income**

The 1996 figures for individual weekly income (Table 6.15) appear to provide an unexpected result, and refute the argument alluded to above that the conflict over native forest logging was one between “wealthy city people” and “poorer timber workers”. The census data only show income ranges and not the actual average income (nor the assets) but they do indicate that the Manjimup LGA median\(^{15}\) weekly income is on a par with that for the “wealthy” Nedlands LGA and for WA as a whole and higher than that of the two south-west LGAs.

Table 6.14 also provides a 1976 median weekly income figure - adjusted into 1996 dollars - for each of the south-west LGAs and for WA and Australia. Figures were not available from the 1971 census, nor were they available by gender. Income data for the 1976 census are grouped into slightly different income ranges than those used for the 1996 census, but the data do provide clear evidence that people in the Manjimup LGA have had a greater real increase in weekly income than the other two south-west LGAs over the past 30 years. The Augusta-Margaret River LGA has had an increase over its 1976 figures, but its median income is still below that of the WA median income range in 1996. This probably reflects the greater number of part-time jobs in the tourist and wine industries in this LGA than in more traditional industries such as timber, mining and agriculture. Both the Denmark and the Margaret River LGAs have the same 1996 median weekly earnings as the Australian average.

\(^{15}\)An important point is made by Anderson et al. (1993: 52) who recommend that when the data set is not normally distributed or when there are extreme outliers, then the median should be used as a better descriptor of the central tendency than the mean. A positive skewness of distributions would indicate that the median values will be lower than the mean ones. All of the income distributions for this study are positively skewed and hence the median value was used in my analysis.
Table 6.15 - Median Weekly Earnings (1976-1996)

(1996$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1976- All people</th>
<th>1996- All people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manjimup</td>
<td>215-285</td>
<td>300-399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>215-285</td>
<td>200-299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A- Margaret River</td>
<td>145-215</td>
<td>200-299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nedlands</td>
<td>285-355</td>
<td>300-399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>285-355</td>
<td>300-399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>200-299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from ABS, 1976; ABS, 1996)

Table 6.16 indicates that in 1996 women in the selected LGAs (and in WA and Australia) have lower median weekly earnings than men. However, women in the Denmark LGA had a substantially lower figure than all the other regions. This was probably due to the population age distribution discussed above, where Denmark LGA had more people aged above 50 and less in the prime employment age groups. It probably also indicated the lack of employment opportunities for women in well-paid industries, such as forestry and mining, offered in the other two south-west LGAs. These figures also show that men in the Manjimup LGA received a higher average wage than in the other two south-west LGAs. This combined with the LGA’s lower unemployment rate provided real reasons for them to oppose any further reduction in the logging levels for the forests in the south-west during the RFA debate.
Table 6.16 - 1996 Median Weekly Earnings for Men and Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manjimup</td>
<td>400-499</td>
<td>200-299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>200-299</td>
<td>160-199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-Margaret River</td>
<td>300-399</td>
<td>200-299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nedlands</td>
<td>500-599</td>
<td>200-299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>400-499</td>
<td>200-299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>400-499</td>
<td>200-299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from ABS, 1996)

Following on from the data presented in Table 6.16, an examination of the income distribution for WA, Australia and Manjimup LGA (which all had the same average income level) in Figure 6G shows that the Manjimup LGA’s distribution was different to that of the others, which are very similar. The Manjimup LGA had more people earning between $15-34,000 per annum but less earning over $34,000.

*Figure 6G- Selected 1996 Median Annual Earnings Distribution*

(Adapted from ABS, 1996)
However, Figure 6H provides the income distribution for the 1996 annual earnings data for the three south-west LGAs and shows that the Denmark LGA had a greater number of people earning less than $18,000 than all other regions. On the other hand, the Manjimup LGA had a greater proportion of people earning between $18-34,000 per annum ($300-399 to $600-699 per week) than all other regions, including the average for WA and Australia.

**Figure 6H- 1996 Median Annual Earnings Distribution- 3 South-west LGAs and Nedlands**

![Graph showing income distribution for 3 south-west LGAs and Nedlands.]

(Adapted from ABS, 1996)

Despite the Manjimup and Nedlands LGAs having the same median value of $300-399 per week they had very different distributions around this average figure. All of the south-west LGAs had less than average number of people with high earning incomes above $39,000 per annum ($700-799 per week) compared to WA and Australia, while the Nedlands LGA had substantially more people.
earning over $39,000 per annum than any other region. This was expected because Nedlands and other urban LGAs to the west of Perth are the home to many of Perth’s elite and wealthy. However, Figure 6H shows the higher annual salaries for the full-time timber workers provided better salaries than for the workers in the adjacent Denmark and Margaret River LGAs, many of whom were employed on a casual or part-time basis in the tourist and wine industries.

6.5 2001 STATE ELECTION OUTCOME

At the end of 2000, the WA Coalition Government had in place a revised RFA for the forests in the south-west that would see the logging of karri phased out by 2003. Anti-logging groups such as the WAFA had moved their focus from protests within the forests to campaigns in support of the ALP’s new policy of ending the logging of all old-growth forests if it won the 2001 state election. While opinion polls predicted that the ALP would not win the election (MacKinnon, 2001: 6), anti-logging groups were keen to support the ALP in forming government (probably in a minority government with support from LFF and Greens members) as this would allow the implementation of its new anti-logging policy.

The ALP went into the 10th February 2001 State election having to win an additional 12 seats in the Legislative Assembly (the Parliament’s lower house) to gain government. Most commentators thought that this level of swing away from the Coalition government was unlikely. Such a reaction to the incumbent government had not been achieved by any State political party in the 100 years since WA joined other colonies in the new Australian Federation in 1901 (Walsh, 2001: 8). There were, however, some observers who thought such a swing
possible, given the small percentage gains needed by the ALP, and some independent candidates (e.g., Janet Woollard from the LFF) suggested that they would hold the balance of power and determine which party formed government (Burns, 2000b: 10).

Sunday 11th February saw the ALP leader Dr Geoff Gallop as the new Premier-elect of WA. Additionally, approximately two weeks later after a close result, it was confirmed that the LFF had gained one seat in the Legislative Assembly with Dr Janet Woollard having beaten a sitting Liberal Cabinet Minister in the upper-class seat of Alfred Cove (Hampson, 2001: 3). Woollard won 56% of the vote after distribution of preferences, compared to the Liberal candidate’s 43%. In reality, Dr Woollard won the seat with just 20% of the primary vote. Appendix 5 provides the declared voting outcome for the seat of Alfred Cove. Another important outcome of this election, especially in terms of the forests as a policy issue, was the success of the Green Party candidates in the WA Legislative Council. In the 2001 election, this party increased its seats from three to five and held the balance of power. Appendix 6 provides a complete description of the vote achieved by all parties at the 2001 election.

The forest policy the ALP took to the electorate included promises to radically change the existing policy. These included plans to:

---

16 The LFF contested six Liberal-held lower house seats in the WA State election (Ruse, 2000: 11). Dr Keith Woollard later won 10% of the vote at the Federal election in November 2001 in the seat of Brand (2001d: 8).

17 An interesting post-election development was that the LFF were successful in an appeal against a ruling by the Australian Electoral Commission that disallowed the LFF to use its name on ballot papers. While this was too late for the State election, Keith Woollard suggested that the decision cleared the way for the LFF to have its name on ballots at the forthcoming Federal election where it hoped to run candidates in both the Senate and the House of Representatives (2001b: 11).

18 Her success was achieved because of two critical earlier decisions: first, the ALP decided not to run a candidate in the seat and second, another high-profile independent candidate, Denise Brailey, agreed to a preference swap with Dr Woollard.

19 The Legislative Council is the Parliament’s Upper House and the traditional house of review.
• End logging in 99% of WA's old-growth forests, with a moratorium on logging the remaining 1% until it was confirmed that existing contracts could be met from other forests;

• Create 30 new national parks;

• Protect 200,000 hectares of forest and associated ecosystems in addition to the 150,000 hectares protected under the Regional Forest Agreement; and

• Help timber workers through the implementation of a promised $57 million industry assistance package.

The network of various WA environmental groups responded to the unexpected election results by having a joint celebration on 9th March. They placed an advertisement in the West Australian to thank the public for its support (WAFA, 2001: 14) and at the celebration David McKenzie detailed some of the communication efforts of the WAFA during the election. He reported that the WAFA web site had received 60,000 hits during the election. Also, during the election campaign, various anti-logging groups had distributed over 250,000 4-colour posters urging West Australians to vote for a political party that opposed logging in native forests (ie the LFF, the ALP or the Greens) (McKenzie personal communication).

The sweeping election result for the ALP seemed to take most media representatives by surprise. Post-election media reports indicated that it shocked some timber–related community members in south-west towns. They moved quickly to seek a meeting with the new Environment Minister Dr Judy Edwards to overcome their anxiety about the likely impact of the new Government’s policies
on employment levels in the timber industry and on their small communities. Timber companies were also part of this post-election campaign to pressure the new ALP government. Their concerns were to try and receive assurances from the Government as to the amount of timber the ALP would release to the industry in the remaining years (2002-2003) of the existing Forest Management Plan (Butler, S., 2001b: 4).

The anxiety of the south-west timber communities was triggered by the speed with which the new Government moved to put in place its pre-election promise to protect 99% of the remaining old-growth forests in the south-west (or about 346,000 ha).20 The Forest Products Commission (FPC) ordered contractors out of the old-growth areas of State forests and into regrowth and two-tier (jarrah-marri) forests in the week after the election. This new policy direction was undertaken even before Dr Edwards had been formally sworn in as the Minister for this portfolio by the Governor. A WAFA post-election celebration in Northcliffe was attended by police concerned that it would exacerbate tensions in what police still described as ‘divided communities’ (Welham, 2001: 8).

The main factor which disturbed the forest communities was the spectre of unemployment. As an example, *The Sunday Times* ran a sympathetic article on Graham Smith, a fourth-generation timber worker at Pemberton. His mother, father and brother all worked at Sotico’s mill in Pemberton and the mill manager reported that some of his staff required the support of counsellors to handle the possible sudden change in their work situation. Against this community fear, Dr Edwards reminded the communities of the proposed $57 million industry

20 The substantial size of these new reserves can be seen by comparing them to overseas ones. The coastal reserves of old-growth redwood trees in western USA are only 39,000 ha in size (Spriggins, 2001: 18).
restructure assistance fund (announced as part of the RFA in 2000) and also promised to visit all timber communities over the following month. Dr Edwards was not very reassuring to the workers in regard to the likelihood of unemployment for some timber workers. She was quoted (Welham, 2001: 8) as saying “I honestly don’t know. We’re going to do everything to try and prevent that happening. When one door shuts, another door opens.”

The ALP’s forest industry assistance fund was increased to $123 million\textsuperscript{21} in the later September 2001 budget (Cook, 2003: 14). This initiative by the new government was nearly three times the budget proposed by the Court Government in 1999 (Edwardes, Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 29 June 1999: 9726) but was criticised by Bob Pearce from the Forest Industries Federation of WA (FIFWA) as a waste of public funds. He suggested the figure could have been lowered by increasing the allocation of logs to the timber industry to ensure the continuation of employment for timber workers (Butler, S., 2001c: 56). Toward the end of 2001, unemployment was still of concern to the WA timber industry. FIFWA predicted that the reduction in timber quotas after 2003 in the new Forest Management Plan would lead to the immediate loss of an estimated 1,000 timber industry jobs, about half of the timber workforce (Ruse, 2001: 33). They also suggested that this would lead to the loss of another 3,000 jobs in associated industries (Clery, 2001: 1) - a figure hotly disputed by the TWS (Clery, 2001b: 4). Sotico reported that it planned to reduce its workforce in Perth and the south-west by 400 out of a total of 700 jobs with the first 94 to be made redundant by the end of 2001 (Butler, S., 2001d: 39).

\textsuperscript{21} A similar forest industry restructure package to support 500 workers who lost their jobs on Fraser Island in Queensland cost the Queensland Government only $38 million in 1991 (Holzworth, 1999: 212).
In early March 2001, the Premier promised to protect not 99% but 100% of the old-growth forests while meeting all existing logging contracts through to 2003. This was to be achieved by increasing the logging of regrowth forest areas and the announcement was seen as a gesture to reassure the south-west communities. Ironically, two people from opposite sides of the conflict, the Federal Minister for Forests Wilson Tuckey (who supported the logging of old-growth forests), and the Green’s MLC Christine Sharp (who opposed the logging of old-growth forests), both expressed concern that the regrowth forests might be logged in an unsustainable way to supply the contracted timber volumes (Butler, J., 2001: 4). The FPC quickly published a revised 2001 harvest plan that identified the new forest coups to be logged, mainly adding to blocks already approved for harvesting in 2001 (Butler, S., 2001b: 4).

In a move that seemed to sideline the pro-logging organisations, the Government announced that Forest Industries Federation of WA would not be represented on a committee that would recommend the allocation of $5 million in Federal Government grants. Bob Pearce from FIFWA was reported in the press as saying that job-creation in tourism and associated industries was the wrong priority, and that the government should focus on creating jobs in forest processing and manufacturing industries (Barton, 2001b: 14). The former Minister for Forests, Bernie Omodei, went on the attack and claimed that the new ALP forest policies were destroying south-west timber communities:

> It is with some sadness that I participate in this debate because right now I am seeing my communities disintegrate around me. People who have been in the timber industry for generations - mums and dads and sons who have been working in the south-west ever since settling in this State - are losing their jobs. What concerns me is that not one cent has been spent in the Manjimup and Pemberton communities since the election. … So far 115 people have lost their jobs and more than 22 businesses have been affected, either by people exiting the
business or agreeing to cease operations. By Christmas time, if the Pemberton mill goes down to one shift, a third of the breadwinners will be out of work (Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 9 August 2001: 2343).

Mr Omodei also claimed that the job losses in the timber industry had created a rise in substance abuse, domestic violence and the demand for counselling (Dortch, 2002: 13).

**Further Debates On the New Forest Policy**

The term ‘old-growth’ was examined above in the debate of the various stakeholders around possible future forest policy options for WA. Questions over the definition were raised again in the post-election period by environmentalists who claimed that the ALP’s definition of ‘old-growth’ was limited, thus allowing the logging of vast tracts of forest with a high conservation value. While proclaiming the protection of old-growth forests, the environmentalists were concerned that the new ALP policy would allow unsustainable logging practices to continue (Callaghan, 2001c: 13). While the WA Forest Alliance (WAFA) threatened to renew physical protests in the forests in the coming summer and organise international boycotts (Harvey, 2002: 31), local residents in the forest region were also complaining. They thought plans by the Forests Products Commission (FPC) to log karri trees alongside roads in the south-west while planning to leave a 50m barrier of uncut trees beside the roads, were a continuation of past discredited practices.

The LFF used this issue as a chance to criticise the ALP Government given that the new Government anti-logging policies narrowed the areas with which the LFF could gain media attention. The Minister for Forests accused both the LFF...
and WAFA of ‘trying it on’ and that the dispute over the definition of old-growth forests would ‘jeopardise the whole logging policy’ (Callaghan, 2001c: 13).

The Federal Minister for Forests, Mr Tuckey was involved in a long-running forest-based dispute with the new ALP Government. The WA Government was planning on obtaining $20 million for its $54 million forest industry support plan from the Federal Government. Tuckey, the Minister responsible for the nation-wide RFA process, said he “would not hand it over until WA put its $37 million on the table in a tangible form” (Butler, J., 2001: 4). Delaying even further, he changed his stance to one that required the WA Government to have actually spent its $37 million on supporting forest industry restructuring before he would make his contribution available (Barton, 2001b: 14). By September 2001, the Minister was reported at a Timber Communities Australia (TCA) function to have proposed that he might make the funds directly available to the forest industry stakeholders rather than reaching an agreement with the WA Government for its distribution. It was also reported that he was concerned that there were no clear details on how the reduced quotas of logs after 2003 would be allocated to industry (Stevens, 2001: 42). The Federal Government later removed from its 2003-04 Budget any provision for support for the WA timber industry and the workers who had been made redundant (Cook, 2003b: 15).

In late September 2001 the Federal Government removed the RFA legislation from the last group of bills passed through the Senate before it retired

---

22 A post-election complaint of deliberate bias was made against The West Australian by Tuckey after the State election. In his complaint to the Press Council, he accused the newspaper of printing extensive Statewide coverage favourable to environmental and anti-logging groups while printing an article submitted by him in only the country editions of the newspaper. This complaint was later dismissed by the Press Council (2001c: 19).
for the upcoming Federal election. The RFA Bill’s main focus was to provide certainty to the logging industry and the TCA said that it was alarmed at the dropping of the Bill while the Greens claimed the result as a victory for the protection of old-growth forests (Barton, 2001d: 40). The press reported that the Government had struck a deal with the Australian Democrats to delay the Bill until after the election, but the November 2001 Federal election provided the Greens and the ALP with the balance of power in the Senate. The Federal Government appointed in early 2002 a new Forestry Minister, Mr Ian MacDonald, who proposed to reintroduce the Bill with the support of the ALP in the Senate in exchange for four minor amendments (Barton, 2002: 38). So a year after the State election and more than 2 years after the passing of the RFA by Parliament, the overarching Federal RFA enabling legislation had yet to be passed.

Another example during the post-election period of opposition to the new environmentally-sensitive ALP policies was provided by a section of the WA business community. The previous Court Government had banned the State-run Westrail from using jarrah timber for railway sleepers in WA. However, in October 2000 it privatised the freight division by selling it to the Australian Railroad Group (ARG) for $585 million (www1.wesfarmers.com.au/pdf/wes223.pdf). Within a month of the election of the new Gallop Government the ARG called for tenders for the supply of 8,000 native hardwood sleepers24 to be used on a line between Kalgoorlie and Esperance. Beth Schultz from the Conservation Council responded to this initiative by commenting that “We don’t

---

23 Jarrah logs are to be reduced from 320,000 m³ to 140,000 m³ and karri from 150,000 cu m to 40,000 cu m after 2003 (Butler, 2003b: 1).

24 Concrete sleepers last about 50 years compared to 25 years for timber, however timber sleepers cost about half that of concrete ones (Callaghan, 2001b: 36).
want sleepers made from our native hardwoods - that is a shameless use of an irreplaceable resource” (Callaghan, 2001: 6).

**New Planning Processes**

One of the main priorities of the new ALP Government in relation to its forest policies was to commence the drafting of a new Forest Management Plan (FMP) for the five year period after 2003. This planning was undertaken using a new bureaucratic framework established by the previous Court Government in 2000 that separated CALM into two bodies, a Conservation Commission protecting forest areas and a Forest Products Commission (FPC) overseeing timber production from Crown Lands. This new framework was summarised by Mr Kobleke during debate as:

This Bill seeks to split up CALM and establish a Conservation Commission, which will be a small body playing a key role in the management of our conservation estate and our native forests. It will receive much of its support from the Department of Conservation, which will retain the larger workforce and perform the management and administrative work required, whether in our state forests, which are used for timber, or in our conservation reserves and national parks. The Forest Products Commission will have the key role of working out harvesting arrangements for the timber (Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 14 March 2000, page 4683).

The process used by the ALP Government to develop a new FMP involved a series of public seminars to gain input from a wide range of stakeholders and the preparation of a draft FMP by the Conservation Commission for further public discussion and comment (www.conservation.wa.gov.au/news.htm). One of the key legislative changes proposed by the government was to allow the Minister for Environment to sign off on the new FMP, whereas under the previous legislation
it was the CALM Director who signed off on these plans. These changes were summarised by the Minister for Environment, Dr Edwards:

> We wanted to put the new forest management plan in place quickly in order to bring some certainty to the communities in the south-west, and also to implement the national parks part of our policy. Therefore, it has been initiated by the Forest Products Commission and the Department of Conservation and Land Management, acting jointly, as required under the Conservation and Land Management Act. It will then be put out for public discussion and evaluation. Part of that process will be an assessment by the Environmental Protection Authority, as also required by law. We intend to introduce an amendment to the CALM Act to give the Minister for the Environment and Heritage the final say in the signing off of that forest management plan, and we anticipate that will be in the Parliament shortly (Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 25 September 2001: 48).

The extent of the changes wrought by the election of the ALP government can be seen in the level of the proposed jarrah cut in the new FMP. It is proposing an annual logging level of 130,000 m$^3$ while the earlier Meagher Report of 1993 had considered a harvest of 300,000 m$^3$ to be a conservative estimate of a sustainable yield (Royal Society, undated: 2).

The post-election parliamentary debate on WA’s forest policy confirmed that the election of the ALP to government in 2001 represented a move to a new ecologically-based approach in the relationship between the people of WA and their native forests. A model based on ‘sustainable cropping’ using advanced technologies and a science-based management approach during the scientific episteme had been replaced by a relationship based on new environmental values towards forests, especially the old-growth native forests. It was almost with a sense of sadness that the new Liberal leader, Colin Barnett, acknowledged the passing of a bipartisan policy approach that saw all major parties agree with the logging of old-growth forests up until 2000:
Over the past 25 or so years, there has been significant debate about the forest industry and the forests. Until the mid-1970s, most of that debate centred on whether forest should be conserved or whether it could be cleared, essentially for agricultural purposes. In more recent times, the debate has veered more to the use of forest areas. … That has been a public and sometimes divisive and emotional debate.

The policy approach that has served this State since the 1970s has generally been bipartisan in nature. That bipartisan approach has been reflected in successive forest management plans, including the more recent development of the Regional Forest Agreement. … In May 1999, the Labor Party state conference adopted a policy of stopping the logging of old-growth forest from 2004. That signified a break in what had been a bipartisan position on forests.

…..

It is probable that our forest has been overcut over the past 100 years. Foresters probably would not agree with me. People want to know that the forest will be preserved for future generations. We are starting to regrow and rebuild the forests. That cannot be done overnight. Trees take a long time to grow. ….. If the forests have been overcut - have been placed under too much stress and have had too much timber removed from them - over the past 100 years, we should aim to reverse that over the next 100 years.

…..

In a press release from the Minister for the Environment, it is indicated that the Labor Government intends that from 2003 the karri cut will be 40,000 cubic metres and the jarrah cut will be 140,000 cubic metres. That is a substantial reduction. The Liberal Party will support the preservation of old-growth forests (Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 9 August 2001: 2341).

His speech admitted (for the first time by a Liberal leader) that the forests had been overcut and that his party would support the Government’s substantial proposed cuts in logging levels. I have included this long quote from Barnett’s speech as it is an important summary of recent logging history as well as an admission of a new bipartisan policy towards the logging of old-growth policy that represented the commencement of an ecological episteme.
6.6 CONCLUSION

The outcome of the February 2001 State General Election indicated that forests were a key issue allowing the ALP to achieve an historical swing in the number of seats gained and to form government. This result reflected the substantial shift in public values toward the general environment over the previous 30 years throughout Australia but particularly WA. The election also resulted in an important Australian first - the representation of the Liberals For Forests in the Legislative Assembly. This was the first time that a ‘green’ political party has been elected to a lower house of parliament in Australia. However, the LFF had a reduced legislative influence on forest policy after the election as the ALP was able to form government in its own right.

This chapter provided evidence of the changes in public attitude from various national survey data and also explored specific demographic and economic factors in the south-west region that have been important indicators of an ecological episteme. One outcome of these findings has been the clear identification of major demographic changes, both in the forest region around Manjimup and Pemberton, but more particularly in the south-west regions to either side of it. Intra-state migration to the south-west has included a large number of professional and middle class people from the Perth region with a greater degree of university education, lower levels of religious affiliation and higher average wages. I have uncovered evidence that the changes in the Augusta-Margaret River LGA have been different to the others and these factors, such as a lower level of religious affiliation, presumably may be linked to an increased environmental awareness and new attitudes to the remaining native old-growth forests.
The defeat of the Coalition Government also saw the election of a new Leader of the Liberal Party. In his parliamentary speech on forests, Colin Barnett publicly admitted for the first time that there had been a major change in public attitudes in WA to the forests over a number of decades and that these changes required his party to support a reduction in the native timber logging levels. This was a Liberal Party policy change the LFF had specifically called for before the election. In the following two chapters I provide information from the interviews I undertook and an analysis of newspaper articles that helps me to understand the unlikely election of the ALP in 2001 and the move to an ecological episteme.
Chapter 7- INTERVIEW FINDINGS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

I present in this chapter my analysis of the interviews I conducted for this research project. The interviewees provided important insights and helped answer the question why this conflict had endured in WA over several decades. This chapter is structured around the questions asked during the interviews and in the order in which they were discussed. Quotes have been included where I think they draw attention to important insights from the interviewees. These insights add flesh to the facts provided by the ABS statistics (1976; 1986; 1996; 2001) in the previous chapter. I discuss the newspaper data in the next chapter and Chapter 9 synthesises interview data and non-interview data reported in previous chapters.

The interview questions were developed with two goals in mind: first to confirm or rebut theoretical propositions regarding social movements and secondly to help theoretically frame the answers that emerged from the interviews as to why the forest debate had gone on for so long. I expected that the interviews would confirm the importance of the two case study organisations within the forest network. I also expected to find that views on the effectiveness of these advocacy organisations would help answer my research question because the long history of conflict since the formation of the Campaign to Save Native Forests in WA suggested that the pro-logging movement was effective and the anti-logging one was not. Open-ended questions were included to assist in gaining an insight into the power that different stakeholders had in determining forest policy in WA. QSR N5 software (previously known as NUD*IST) was used to code the answers given as well as to allow a deeper analysis of them. This chapter includes both
empirical results as well as my analysis of particular terms and concepts used by the interviewees.

The initial group of questions allowed the interviewees to recount the whole range of organisations that were active in the forest debate, and to provide a subjective rating as to the power of particular stakeholders to influence government policy formation. These broadly focused questions also helped the interviewees feel more comfortable before more controversial issues were discussed. The interviews were conducted during the period leading up to the 2001 State election and I realised at an early stage that the topic was controversial. At the time of first contact (to establish interview times etc) many of the potential interviewees asked questions indicating an unease about the project. Hence the first few questions were included to help establish a relaxed tone for the whole interview.

7.2 ROLES AND STAKEHOLDERS

The interviewees were initially asked to describe what they saw as the key role played by their organisation in the forest debate. This question also allowed the interviewee to talk broadly about the history of the forest conflict, its present state and the other organisations active in the policy network. Then, a question was asked about the role of the public debate over the RFA to allow the interviewees to discuss the RFA and their organisation’s role in developing and amending it. At the time of the interviews this process had recently concluded. The revised RFA logging limits had left both sides of the debate unhappy.

The responses to the initial question about the role of each organisation provided little surprise. The major difference between pro- and anti-logging
organisations was the degree of emphasis placed on the future of the logging of native forests. All of the pro-logging interviewees replied as if the debate would continue at a public and government level and any future changes to government policy would ensure that the logging would continue and the levels would be sustainable. This emphasis can be seen in the following excerpt from TCA1:

> Well, in a nutshell, basically our organisation exists to give the people, ahh businesses and communities that depend on the native forests and plantation resource a voice in this debate, in the hope that it will be powerful enough to influence governments in their decision making.

A key part of this answer are the words “in the hope…” This expression implies that TCA1 recognises that the anti-logging movement had gained the upper hand in the policy debate with the backdown by the Court Government over its original RFA proposal for logging levels. Half of the pro-logging stakeholders made some mention of their ‘side’ having lost and this view is exemplified by IOF who said “Yeah. I think it is the urban [areas] where the battle was fought and lost.” In their answers, pro-logging supporters put the ‘official’ position that the conflict would continue and their organisations would continue to support the logging of old-growth forests. However, their answers meant a recognition that this policy position was now not supported by either side of politics.

On the other hand, all of those interviewed from the anti-logging side were clear and confident that there was going to be an end to the debate and that the policy change would result in the end of logging of old-growth native forests in WA, as expressed by LFF4:

> …our organisation was formed to stop logging the old growth forests in WA. That is, our constitution is based on- the old-growth forests, that is the reason that we now have candidates standing in the next election, and if we can get just two of us across the line we believe we can stop the logging of the old growth forests.
A common theme from the anti-logging interviewees was that their organisation was working to save the forests and there was no direct mention of class issues or the human impact of the end of logging, such as the need to conserve jobs in the timber industry. Mention about reductions in employment in the timber industry was made by some anti-logging representatives later in the interview when discussing the rise of the tourism industry in the south-west. However, when talking about their organisation’s role it was clear that the anti-logging groups saw themselves as working on behalf of the forests and that they constituted the environment as a powerless social actor in a similar way that some groups campaign for the homeless, children and animals. As CCWA said:

*I guess we see ourselves as an advocate for the environment um...making factual information available to the community, to decision-makers and working to, or lobbying on behalf of the environment with decision-makers in the community.*

The interview question about the various stakeholders that constituted the WA forest policy network provided a wide range of names of organisations active within the anti-logging movement. These included well-known groups that were regularly mentioned, such as TWS, LFF and WAFA, but also many smaller and regional organisations such as Doctors for Preservation of Old Growth Forests, Men and Women in Suits, Wesfarmers Investors and Shareholders for the Environment (WISE) and the South Coast Environmental Group (SCEG). LFF1 highlighted the significant role played in the anti-logging movements by ‘ferals’. She said:

*my hat goes off, number one - to what I call the guardians of the forest, if it was not for the dreadlocked people that are prepared to stand between the chain saw*

---

1 Burgmann (2003: 167) defined ‘ferals’ as environmental activists who are knowledgable and mobile individuals who choose to live outside cities where they can practise their alternate lifestyles. She also claimed that these people (often young) developed new and innovative protest tactics.
and the trees, if it was not for them creating waves, the [anti-logging] awareness would not be happening.

This group of, mostly, young activists undertaking protest activities and living in the forest reserves was also mentioned as an important stakeholder during the focus group but not by any other interviewees.

These responses would indicate that for the anti-logging movement, a broad network of groups acting in their own local communities was of vital importance to their campaign strategies. Many of the smaller, less-formal, groups were not mentioned during the focus group process but seemed to have played an important role at various stages of the campaign, as highlighted by CCWA:

... all these groups through the south-west - most of which depend on one or two key people, they're right across the south-west- virtually every town has got one and sometimes two such groups, and they have worked cooperatively um...and also independently [from WAFA] and its been absolutely brilliant - and that’s been the success of the thing.

This diversity in organisations within the anti-logging movement was also reflected in the responses to the question about the highest profile groups from each side. While 80% of those interviewed identified the TCA as the highest profile pro-logging organisation, only 25% suggested the LFF with another 25% mentioning The Wilderness Society (TWS). These responses corresponded closely with those provided to a later question using the 5-step Schumaker (1975) framework for political effectiveness discussed in detail below. Responses to this question confirmed the TCA as the key pro-logging organisation at that time and the LFF as an important organisation but just one of many active on the anti-logging side of the debate.

As already mentioned, responses in regard to the anti-logging groups gave a
range of organisations, but they also prompted the names of individuals. This was unusual because the question specifically requested a response in relation to groups. FLNP, for example, was convinced that the highest profile anti-logging “organisation” was a well-known Perth QC active in the Liberal Party “… I believe that LAW [original emphasis] and his wife, individually were the principal reason that Richard Court changed his position after signing the RFA.” LAW confirmed that the Premier did indeed consult him over the revised RFA, and called him while he was on holidays in Europe to discuss his proposed revised logging limits. These individuals named by interviewees corresponded with the members of Perth’s elite who were reported in The West Australian to have supported the establishment of the LFF. The next chapter provides more details on the media reporting of the role these people played in the anti-logging campaign during 1998-2000.

One important finding was that there were some organisations that I would have expected to be named as important stakeholders but were missing from the responses. None of those interviewed (even those from the three political parties2) nominated the political parties as being key stakeholders in the development of forest policy in WA. The Greens had been nominated during the focus group as an important stakeholder in this policy network but even this party, with the environment as its core platform issue, did not gain a single mention. TWS offered an opinion as to why the political parties were not seen as major stakeholders, especially in terms of developing new policy approaches that would bring an end to the long years of conflict:

________________________

2 At this time the LFF had yet to be accepted by the WA Electoral Commissioner as a political party.
This campaign has been a classic case of the community leading politicians for so long. For years we have had an overwhelming community set of community values, which says that logging of old growth forests is abhorrent, it just cannot continue and it is unfortunate that so much effort, so much time has actually had to go into the campaign to make, to change community opinion into government policy.

MLC explained The Greens’ lack of profile in terms of the power of the forest industry to maintain the historic pro-logging policy:

...at the moment [the Greens role] has been somewhat hampered by the entrenched nature of the status quo, the forest logging industry, it is actually quite remarkable how entrenched that is.

Given the small representation of The Greens in the pre-2001 Parliament and that all of their seats were in the Upper House, reducing their ability to initiate legislation, this response could be seen as a reasonable one. However, I would have expected some mention of their linking up with the anti-logging movement’s extra-parliamentary campaigns to overcome their restricted parliamentary role. In general, these responses provided an unusual picture of Parliament and its constituent parties as being removed from the heated public debate being carried out over WA’s forest policy. The National Party was the only established political party before the RFA was concluded to change its forest policy position in response to the public support for the ending of logging. My analysis of Hansard records in Chapter 5 reinforced these findings from interviews that most of the public debate on forest policy and the RFA occurred outside of parliament. This finding confirms the view (Marsh, 1989b; Melucci, 1980) that a critical role of social movements was to develop new values within society.

The other organisation that was missing from the active stakeholders list was the TLC, or Unions WA as it is now known, the peak organisation for WA unions. Sharpe (1983: 145) highlighted the important role played by the TLC and
its Secretary Peter Cook in the earlier public debate (and within the ALP) over the establishment of the Shannon River National Park. During the present debate over forest policy and RFA Unions WA had not been very active, as explained by TLC:

...the [Unions WA] protocols are that we have no right to intervene. Um, so that’s why, there is good reason why the protocol needs to exist in terms of the cohesion of the organisation but it can be used to stifle discussion. So the reality is that’s the problem, the [AWU’s] timber division refused to allow it to be on the agenda and therefore it had to be played out elsewhere.

TLC’s comments reinforce a common perception among the anti-logging stakeholders of the power of the timber industry to control the debate on WA’s forest policy, and hence prolong it. This claim was also made by MLC above and while 75% of those interviewed named the TCA as the highest profile pro-logging organisation, 25% did so by joining the TCA together with the forest industry association FIFWA. This power of the forest industry was explained by CCWA as due to its donations to the Liberal and ALP parties. TWS also highlighted the importance of funding for the power of the pro-logging stakeholders “…Wesfarmers in that they fund Timber Communities Australia, they fund FIFWA and they have very close relations with the AWU” and WAFA extended this linkage to within government:

...crucially dependant on its networks within Government, within the Department of Conservation and Land Management, and within the offices of various Ministers, so you couldn’t take the Forest Industry Federation on its own for example, and say this is a powerful group - it is only powerful because it has got such an enormous influence within the Department of Conservation and Land Management, the Ministers offices and various other departments as well.

While the timber industry was proposed by many interviewees as a key organisation controlling the forest debate in WA, the majority of those interviewed also commented on the recent rise of the LFF and the power that wealthy people living in Perth’s western suburbs (between the CBD and the coast)
were able to wield during the debate on the final logging levels contained in the RFA. At the time of the interviews the LFF were gaining substantial media reporting (see the next chapter), particularly in relation to their plans to nominate for several lower House seats in the coming State election. Newspaper journalist "ENV" caricatured these new stakeholders:

as rich people with consciences ... [laughs] They have got a lot of civic mindedness and environmental mindedness that often gets lost in the Liberal Party.

While the LFF was established to pressure the Liberal/National Party Coalition Government from the outside, some of these new anti-logging supporters stayed inside the Liberal Party. "LIB" explains her decision as:

Oh, yes, I agree with it, all they [Liberals For Forests] are doing- I think is wonderful. But I mean I am a member of the Liberal Party ... and I feel if you want to do anything about it then you stay inside, not outside.

The development of the LFF and their connection to important and high profile individuals within the Liberal Party meant that the Government was being pressured by anti-logging concerns from both within and without. This is an important issue to consider in any discussion of the speed with which the RFA’s proposed logging levels were lowered.

This initial group of questions about the forest policy network stakeholders and their power within it also allowed an opportunity for the interviewee to make comments about other stakeholders in the policy process. In particular, it allowed them to express their feelings in a way that they probably could not do in public. "TLC" expressed his view that the AWU timber division in WA was “…corrupted by its relation with the timber industry”, a claim supported by "CCWA" who labelled it as “...purporting to represent the workers but basically looking after its
own interests, the timber workers union has notoriously been a ‘bosses’ union’, 

\( DLP \) bosses’ union.” \( CCWA \) went on to brand the TCA in a similar fashion:

\[ \text{...dishonestly named Forest Protection Society, renamed Timber Communities} \]
\[ \text{Australia, ahh...that is industry funded group, the classic industry lobby group -} \]
\[ \text{it is very successful because it purports to represent the interests of the workers} \]
\[ \text{and it does not.} \]

These emotive responses were not limited to anti-logging stakeholders. \( TCA3 \) comments on the intervention of Mick Malthouse into the forest debate reflected a common thread of anger by all TCA stakeholders directed at those high profile individuals who were campaigning for a ban to logging:

\[ \text{Well people would just simply say there must have been something in it for Mick,} \]
\[ \text{they’d just say ‘wonder what he got for that?’ You know, and they will probably} \]
\[ \text{say ‘3 nights at the Hyatt with 5 blondes’...} \]

Similarly, \( TCA3 \)’s comments toward key WAFA stakeholders had a very personal and acerbic tone:

\[ \text{...like no one has an atom of respect for [name removed] because ... we do not} \]
\[ \text{even think she is for real you know, and people so she is bloody ... she’s got a} \]
\[ \text{degree in romantic poetry - what the hell would she know, so she is a total} \]
\[ \text{nonsense. [name removed] is a piece of wet string, he dresses from Vinnies, so} \]
\[ \text{these people ... like I am not saying they are not good people, but this is the} \]
\[ \text{perception people have of them.} \]

This level of anger directed at other stakeholders with an opposite viewpoint is not evident in the media reports analysed in the next chapter. However, it seems to be a key reason why these stakeholders remained committed to their SMO and may be a key organisational resource factor for maintaining their SMO in the conflict for so long. The passion of the stakeholders for their particular viewpoint also explained why these two countermovements have not become bureaucratic and transformed into hierarchies over the past 30 years of campaigning, as Weber (1962) and Michels (1915) suggested would occur. While the anti-logging
movement was important to the formation of The Greens in Tasmania (Gabriel, 1998: 91) and saw Bob Brown become active in the formal parliamentary process, it was not an important factor in WA. Here the anti-logging organisations have maintained their role as advocacy organisations over the whole period of the conflict. In WA, The Greens were formed in 1990 from a coalition of peace, environment and other social organisations (http://wa.greens.org.au/about/) and this seems to have resulted in key long-term activists, such as Wafa and CCWA, continuing to work with their anti-logging groups.

7.3 IMPORTANCE OF THE RFA PROCESS

The interviews were conducted soon after the completion of the formal RFA process in WA, which as journalist RAD suggested “…was actually a process set up to enshrine logging”. As we have seen above, the RFA process was a national one established by the Keating ALP Government to bring a science-based end to the conflict between anti- and pro-logging groups in a number of States, especially those with woodchip export industries. The WA process was initiated by the Lawrence ALP Government in the early 1990s and the final proposal concluded by the Court Coalition Government in mid-1999. RAD was not the only stakeholder I interviewed who thought that the process had a pre-determined outcome and that it was put in place by the State Government as a way of resolving the forest conflict and aimed at producing recommendations in favour of the continued logging of WA native forests. This is a common perception, especially by those on the anti-logging side of the debate, as exemplified also by MLC:
...because the RFA - I have very strong views about this - the RFA was in fact designed to protect the status quo and it needed to protect the status quo not only because, as we know, a lot of people make a lot of money out of logging forests - in particular woodchipping ...

The debate over the RFA, especially once WAFA decided to withdraw from the process, created a great deal of media interest that is reported in the next chapter. TWS suggested that initially the anti-logging groups were interested in participating in the process but decided to withdraw once they saw how CALM proposed to managed it:

We certainly approached it as a means by which we could resolve the conflict. So we attended the first meeting at CALM over in Como to see what potential there was to actually use the process to resolve conflict. It became very obvious very quickly that it was a process that was captured by CALM that was going to have very little community input and that our best role was going to be to step outside the process and play a, I guess, a community watch dog role.

CALM was also mentioned by half of the anti-logging stakeholders as a powerful factor in the forest policy network in WA. On the other hand, LNP denies the importance of CALM’s management of the RFA as “.. a furphy, CALM became the whipping, bad boy of the whole scenario...”. The debate around the RFA clearly split the stakeholders in their opinion of CALM, with anti-logging stakeholders seeing this organisation as a major factor as to why the logging of native forests was continuing while pro-logging stakeholders such as TCA3 saw CALM in very positive terms “… I do not feel that there is any other reliable source [for forest policy] than the Department of CALM.”

Stakeholders were asked for their opinion on what role the RFA process had in helping to resolve the differences between the two sides of the conflict. The overwhelming response from all of the stakeholders interviewed was that it had done nothing to resolve the differences. In fact, WES suggests that the alteration to
the RFA in June 1999 by Premier Court actually widened the gap between the two sides:

... the original RFA I think was a fair and reasonable outcome, ... the revised RFA is very disappointing um....because it is just a response to political pressure based on, not based on any science at all.

The depth of disappointment from the pro-logging side toward the Government was reinforced by MANJ “…the backflip just took us so much by surprise. It completely floored us” and can also be seen by TCAI comments:

... the actual RFA principles were totally abandoned by the Government as far as karri was concerned and the Government capitulated to the high profile campaign and just abandoned the karri industry, so in terms of achieving outcomes for us... that was a total failure on that side of it, and of course has added to the angst and the frustration on the ground of the people that we represent....

The revised RFA also left the anti-logging sides opposed to it as it still continued to allow logging in the old-growth jarrah forest, while removing logging from the karri and karri-tingle forests. WAFA admitted the movement of government policy towards their preferred policy position but “…they adopted the minimalist, or most minimal position that they could in terms of protecting about one tenth of the old growth forests that they had previously approved for logging.” Significantly, he also admitted that this was the first indication that the Government was responding to public pressure from the anti-logging movement. LFF3 stated that the original RFA proposal was the reason that he became active in assisting with the development and launch of the LFF as a political party. While the stakeholders agreed that the revised RFA satisfied neither side, this view was not supported by Premier Court (Four Corners, 2000), who tried to explain the situation as a balance between both sides:
No, I do not accept that it has not satisfied anyone. I mean it's all about a balance and when you try and get a balance of course you're going to have people not happy.

The responses to this question about the role of the RFA in the forest debate clearly show that both the anti- and pro-logging stakeholders thought that the rapidly revised RFA would not resolve the conflict. This view was also supported by other policy stakeholders, such as journalists. The perception that the RFA was rapidly revised in an ad hoc way by the Premier seems to have deeply troubled the pro-logging stakeholders and led to their belief that they had finally lost the forest policy debate.

7.4 EFFECTIVENESS OF STAKEHOLDER ORGANISATIONS

This group of questions was based on Schumaker’s (1975) framework as described in Chapter 3 above. To reiterate, his policy stages heuristic is based on the following 5-level description of a social movement organisation’s impact on government policy development:

i) **access responsiveness** or the willingness of a government to hear the SMO’s concerns.

ii) **agenda responsiveness** or the willingness of a government to place the SMO’s concerns on the policy agenda.

iii) **policy responsiveness** or the willingness of a government to adopt the SMO’s concerns.

iv) **output responsiveness** or the willingness of a government to implement the SMO’s concerns.
v) impact responsiveness or the degree that the actions of the government succeed in alleviating the grievances of the SMO.

Stakeholders were asked to use Schumaker’s framework to evaluate the two case study organisations. Responses to this question produced three clear results. Firstly, all interviewees found the framework easy to understand and helpful as a way of evaluating the effectiveness of the groups. In fact, their responses imply that the Schumaker model was a more useful framework for evaluating specific policy proposals, rather than an overall measure of the organisation’s efforts to change government policy over a lengthy period. In the assessment of SMO campaigns, however, the Schumaker model could easily be applied to a short-term project with well-defined goals. TCA1 provided an example of the model’s usefulness:

*I mean we did have a little success last week, for example, we put just over a particular local issue... we put to the Government that the town of Pemberton is likely to be a casualty after the year 2003 with the karri cut back, was... after 18 months nothing had happened with the promised plan for Pemberton ...it was not forthcoming, we put a 4-point action plan to the Premier. Well, on that particular instance we are at level 5, but overall....*

The second finding was that it was very difficult to get a rating or response for the political effectiveness of the TCA and LFF from the politicians interviewed. They talked around the question rather than giving a direct view of the level of political influence for each of the case study groups. LNP’s response was “…so you'd have to ask them not me. From my point of view, there was always access, ready access.” This response was common across all three major political parties and would suggest that they aren’t willing to give any considered response as to what they think are successful tactics or effective advocacy organisations. In not answering the questions directly, the politicians avoided...
indicating what they considered to be successful tactics or what strategies would make more effective advocacy organisations. It might be suspected that the politicians wanted to diminish the role of social advocacy or interest groups in forming policy because it would show up that parliament was lagging public opinion, as represented by the SMOs.

Just such an assessment of the relationship between parliament and advocacy organisations had been proposed by Melucci (see Chapter 2 above). A similar finding has been provided by recent research into the effectiveness of a South Australian service-based NPO (Talbot and Saj, 2003: pp 137-153). They found that stakeholders within the public service were unwilling to provide a judgement on the effectiveness and the tactics of nonprofit organisations. Maloney et al. (1994: 22) suggested a possible reason for this lack of comment by these stakeholders, namely that it was based on ‘insiders’ to government being accepted as such because their views corresponded with those of the State. The SMOs were seen as less legitimate ‘outsiders’ to the policy process. Further research is needed on this interesting issue to understand why political stakeholders declined to provide effectiveness judgements. There could be a number of reasons: they did not wish to provide useful feedback to advocacy organisations; or they did not want to provide a formal role for SMOs acting as intermediaries between the public and parliament; or they were worried about the confidentiality of their comments.

Finally, the results confirmed the approach to effectiveness of Connolly et al. (1980) that an organisation’s effectiveness is constructed differently by different stakeholders in the policy network. Generally, interviewees from a particular organisation down-played the impact of their own organisation on the
policy process but exaggerated the impact of their opposition group. However, even within the same organisation there were different levels suggested for their own organisation’s effectiveness.

An example of how stakeholders from the same organisation can have a very different view of their effectiveness can be seen in the following quotes about the two organisations:

Comments on LFF effectiveness by LFF stakeholders:

**LFF2:** Certainly if you are looking at the influence that we had on government policy, while access [level 1] certainly was not a problem anything past putting the forests on the policy agenda I’m afraid did not appear too successful.

**LFF5:** Um (long pause) well having... whether we just take ah Liberals for Forests as by itself or whether you include all the other green groups having forced the change in the RFA, um I’d say somewhere between [level] 3 and 4.

Comments on TCA effectiveness by TCA stakeholders:

**TCA3:** Well yeah, TCA would have to be at level 1, now you say a willingness of government to hear an organisation's concerns.

**TCA1:** I know, but it is difficult for me to say, I do not ... we are not at 5 overall, 'output responsiveness' .... well we are certainly at [level] 2, we have got agenda responsiveness - to adopt the organisation’s concerns - well, you know, I’d put us at about 2 and a half, to be honest with you.

On the other hand, the following quotes provide examples of how stakeholders from the same organisation have a consistently strong view of the effectiveness of their opposing SMO:
Comments on TCA effectiveness by LFF stakeholders:

LFF4: Well because they work hand in glove with industry and ministries working hand in glove with Michael Chaney [Wesfarmers Pty Ltd] and Dennis Cullity [Sotico Pty Ltd], they work in concert so that it is all coordinated, or that is the way it certainly appears. ...I mean they have got the ear of government...at the highest level.

LFF4: I think they went right through to impact responsiveness [level 5].

Comments on TCA effectiveness by LFF stakeholders:

TCA2: ... but you would have to say that they [LFF] have won every round and that at this stage the government is listening totally to them ... it has been admitted to us by some senior government ministers that they acted before they understood.

TCA3: ...and well the Liberals for Forests are right up to number five within a few months.

Table 7.1 outlines the average effectiveness scores for the LFF and TCA, as seen by the interviewees grouped into 3 sub-groups: those working for LFF, those for TCA and the other stakeholders from the forest policy network. The external stakeholders seem to have a wide range of views on each organisation’s ability to affect WA forest policy. TLC thought they were at a similar level “... I reckon they are both at 2, both at 2, I do not think either of them has won resoundingly the higher level of responsiveness.” while WES had a view that both groups had a different level of impact on the policy level, but at a higher level than TLC “I'd say about [level] three [for TCA] and the LFF about [level] four.”
Table 7.1 Stakeholders Judgement on Political Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Effectiveness Rating for TCA</th>
<th>Mean Effectiveness Rating for LFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TCA Stakeholders’ Judgement</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFF Stakeholders’ Judgement</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Stakeholders’ Judgement</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results confirm the approach of Connolly et al. (1980) that there is no one common construct of the organisational or political effectiveness of social advocacy organisations. In this research setting, stakeholders had different views of what was the right ‘thing’ (Drucker, 1997: 97) to be done and how effective the LFF and the TCA were in their operations. This is probably due to each stakeholder only having a partial view of the overall campaign of each organisation as well as each stakeholder having a very different view on whether the logging of old-growth forests was the right ‘thing’ to be done. The Schumaker framework proved a useful one for exploring the impact on the forest policy process by the LFF and the TCA. The framework would seem to be even more useful in evaluating the impact of particular policy proposals made over a short time period rather than, as in this case, where it was used to give an overall impression of an organisation’s effectiveness over many years.

7.5 RESOURCES

Studies undertaken, primarily in the US, under the rubric of Resource Mobilisation Theory proposed that a NPO’s effectiveness was correlated to the use of particular resources they attracted and utilised. These resources ranged from money to media access. Most of these overseas studies were based on
service-delivery types of NPOs so my questions to the interviewees were aimed at identifying resources of importance to the campaigns of advocacy organisations.

**Network of Supporters**

Stakeholders from both sides of the conflict clearly recognised the importance to the anti-logging campaign’s success of having a wide network of supporters and activists. *TWS* commentated that “The number of the activists and the commitment of the activists is absolutely crucial.” More than 60% of those interviewed mentioned this issue. Of particular interest was that the network supporting the anti-logging campaign and the activities of the LFF extended into the Manjimup forest areas and was not just limited to Perth’s suburbs. The importance of this network to the LFF was both their location and the number of supporters. Both SMOs were loath to place a figure on their membership numbers but *LFF1* put the figure at over 2,000 and suggested that “We probably have more members in Liberals for Forests as a political party than the Liberal Party.”

While the LFF and TCA stakeholders recognised the importance of their supporter networks, *LNP* was at pains to undermine any influence on the parliamentary policy process that the high-profile supporters of the anti-logging movement may have had:

> To the community obviously their [LFF] ability to be able to engage high profile people in the emotional sort of logging debate irrespective of the truth or otherwise of the particular data that they were putting forward. To the government, right, that does not sway the decision. OK and so therefore you have to keep in mind that there is a very strong groundswell of emotion here which is gaining momentum OK and I think that would be true to say but in terms of its resources to influence government decision-making the best input is actually in proper, well founded, well-drafted submissions or presentations.
The network of supporters described in the interviews seemed to be of two kinds, those in the south-west undertaking actual protests and other associated activities, and the supporters in the urban areas who provided monetary support and access to policy power in existing organisations (such as the Liberal Party).

*CCWA* outlined the way in which the WAFA operated:

> ..the Forest Alliance mobilises the affiliated groups, and WAFA has been absolutely brilliant, all these groups through the south-west - most of which depend on one or two key people, they're right across the south-west- virtually every town has got one and sometimes two such groups, and they have worked cooperatively ... With the WAFA groups, the doctors gave us the money, and said you organise it - it took far longer than we thought, because some people have other things to do in their lives, but the success of that depended on the reliability, the skill, the willingness of all these different people to contribute.

Associated with these responses about the critical value of supporter networks is the recognition of the important role played by the volunteers who assisted the SMOs by staffing their offices etc. *TCA1* was clear that this was another area where the anti-logging movement had an advantage over her own:

> ... what we lack, what we lack most certainly is the number of volunteers, the wide range of well skilled people with a lot of time, see most of our members are working people who work in the bush

*TCA1* also described the broad support they had in the forest region but said that the efforts of the TCA volunteers was limited to just the south-west region, unlike the broader geographical spread of the anti-logging groups and their supporters:

> ... the [TCA] branch at Walpole was about 70 or 80 people of whom maybe 2 would be associated with the timber industry, and they do not even work generally in it, they are a community, they have seen the values of TCA as representing the values of their community as a whole and they want to get behind ... now if we could translate that a little wider ...

While access to a wide range of supporters and volunteers seems to be a
common need for both sides of the forest debate, another commonly reported characteristic was the lack of paid staff to coordinate and manage such voluntary support. *IOF* described the limitations of his organisation:

> You will probably find that most volunteer groups these days that it is a real struggle to actually find time to put it in and to run effective campaigns you need a lot of people who have got a lot of time.

We have seen above that stakeholders have very different views of the organisational effectiveness of their organisations. Stakeholders also seemed to have very different views on the actual resources available to their opponents. *WAFA* did not agree with the view expressed by some pro-logging stakeholders that the anti-logging movement had a broad range of resources available to them. Instead *WAFA* proposed the opposite view that the pro-logging movement had the greater number of staff:

> Well out of the 20 organisations that make up the WA Forests Alliance ... there are about 4 people employed compared to about 50 or 60 that are employed by the timber industry to run their campaign for them.³

The responses to this question identified the importance of the need for a wide range of supporters to the advocacy activities of both SMOs. Additionally, there was acceptance on the part of stakeholders on both sides of the debate that the anti-logging network of supporters extended from Perth to the forests of Manjimup while that of the pro-logging organisations was concentrated around the south-west forest region.

---

³ In this total, *WAFA* was probably including AWU union organisers and the paid staff of FIFWA.
Media

The other key resource identified by the majority of those interviewed concerned the power of the media to influence the public debate and RFA policy process. This result confirms findings of a number of research projects undertaken under the RMT rubric (eg McCarthy & Zald, 1976). A general question on resources as well as a separate question on the importance of access to the media was used in the interviews, given the prominence of this resource in the RMT literature. The two key findings were that the media acted as a very important resource in the forest campaign and that the media had taken a renewed interest in the forest issue during the RFA process. When stakeholders were asked to nominate the most important resource for SMOs, TLC was unequivocal in his view “Oh, access to the media...”. TCA4 supported this view and was also sure of the emphasis that the media took on the forest issue “It's media, the media is definitely on the side of conservationists”. TLC disagreed with TCA4 and instead suggested that the role of the media was important in reporting the debates and actions of the two SMOs but not in developing a particular policy position of its own:

No, I do not think they played a particularly important role in the development of policy, ... oh, occasionally editorials, but I did not see much that was in anyway a serious or mature attempt to analyse the issues or debate...

The next chapter clearly shows the importance of the RFA debate during 1999 and its correlation to the level of media reporting of forest issues. WAFA, as an important stakeholder in the debate, is clear about the link between the RFA process and the amount of media coverage of forest issues:

Yeah, the media is never monolithic of course, but certainly in recent times I think the media increasingly cotton on to the fact that the RFA was a scam, and
more and more stories emerged about the extent of that scam, and so it became a bit of a feeding frenzy I suppose…

The other commonality between stakeholders from both SMOs was that the media were biased against them. Interviewees from both sides also agreed that the media were part of Perth’s establishment and that this power was used against their organisation. This is firstly shown by CCWA comments:

... because the media, ... is part of the establishment because they depend on the establishment for their survival... in The West, [name removed] is an award-winning journalist, it [his article] was about the police and the stubby [holder] ..greenies in the headlines.... so we are back to calling conservationists Greenies which is insulting and derogative and intended to be so ...

TCAI had a similarly strongly held view as to the media being opposed to her organisation, particularly The West Australian:

...they do have a manipulative role, in the outcome of the forest debate, and I do think they go far beyond reflecting community views into shaping the direction that the debate will take and I think that's exacerbated in Western Australia because there is only one major daily newspaper, and some of the people involved in support for the environment movement are people who also have large ownership of the ... have some stake of ownership in the media, for example, Janet Homes a Court, a very powerful figure in the media in Western Australia and a very strong green supporter.

The responses to these two questions have identified the importance of access to the media as a resource by both anti- and pro-logging organisations. They have also provided examples of stakeholders from both sides of the debate thinking that the media, especially The West Australian newspaper, took a policy position opposed to their own position. This perception will be explored in more detail in the next chapter.
Funds

While there was a great deal of agreement on the value of the supporter and volunteer network, the issue of funds as an important resource was hardly raised. 

*LFF4* was one of few interviewees who discussed the importance of fundraising activities to the success of their campaign and highlighted the fact that such a public campaign needed large amounts of funds:

> Well I think the anti-logging have failed miserably in their resources area, because I personally have tried very, very hard to get a forest fund implemented and I have gotten it up to the point where the [organisation name removed] would put it under their umbrella as a forest fund, a separate fund, with their sanction but it is then collecting the resources of all of the groups to work together to get them ...to go to a major fund raising campaign. I believe that up to a million dollars could be raised with a call to the public.

On the other hand, *CCWA* saw this lack of funds as a more positive influence to the anti-logging campaign than if it had plentiful funds:

> Oh I suppose if you had unlimited funds you’d run one of these mega media campaigns, but I think that the fact that we are doing it on a shoestring lends... gives us credibility ...

Certainly *FLNP* had no doubts that the anti-logging campaign was well-financed and their success was due to their appeal to the WA public that they were not as well-funded as the pro-logging side of the debate:

> ...you go and chain yourself to a tree and literally the cheques start flowing in: Yes, that’s why I call them rent-seekers ... they either ... their rent is paid in notoriety, or money and the money of course keeps them going ...

*TWS*’s view of his ability to seek funds as a ‘rent seeker’ do not coincide with those of *FLNP*’s:

> ... as a conservationist I am living on the smell of an oily rag. I certainly see myself as, well I might have a middle class background but the working conditions I am under at the moment is one of virtually zero job security and living from week to week.
Thus, the responses to this question did not identify funds as being an important resource in the forest debate but did highlight that both sides have different views on how well-funded their opponents were. The fact that such individuals from a middle class background as TWS would fully commit themselves to a poorly paid position in the anti-logging movement is one indication of a new set of public values toward the forest that included protecting the natural environment from human activities such as logging.

7.6 VALUES

My final series of questions related to the changes that interviewees believed had occurred over the previous 30 years in social values and public attitudes toward the forest. It also sought the stakeholder’s view on possible factors that may have led to these changes. These questions reflect propositions made in the NSM literature (eg Inglehart, 1977). Just over a quarter of those interviewed linked the changes to events occurring in the late 1960s and early 1970s. They saw this period as one where a greater recognition of environmental problems emerged. TCA1 is one of those who located the beginning of the value changes to that time:

Well my assessment is that it began back in the 70s, late 60s, 70s when this environmental awareness sort of swept the world, you know, the flower power and the whole thing, and I think the materialistic values which society had held so dear was seen to be not as fulfilling as society would have hoped...

TCA1 also made an interesting observation on how great the changes had been from the original attitude to the forest during the colonial episteme:

...in WA the founding of the colony was symbolised by the wife of the Governor taking an axe and cutting down a tree and people saw the forests then as a
resource to be used to build a new State, a new town, to establish farms, to build houses and it was endless..

Other particular references to the 1960s were made by MP (the Club of Rome reports), TWS (Rachel Carson’s book *Silent Spring*), and LFF4 (the general student ‘hippie’ rebellion). TWS’s response to this question mirrored the views of Inglehart:

*People are better educated and so they realise the significance of the impacts. I guess also perhaps we are more an affluent society in the developed nations and so it is only when your economy is really good that you can start to worry about other factors such as the environment.*

*IOF* is another (from the opposite side of the debate to *TWS*) whose comments reflect Inglehart’s postmaterial theory that equates the rise in environmentalism to the:

*...establishment of a fairly affluent middle class society that is able to sit back. You know has more than it needs to survive and it’s got time to start thinking in a broader area about quality of life issues rather than survival issues.*

Chapter 6 outlined some important demographic and economic changes in WA over the past 30 years, and in the south-west in particular. Stakeholder responses to the question on values provided a number of personal anecdotes that gave a more human feel to the changes identified from the ABS statistics in Chapter 6. A number of interviewees talked of their own particular ‘conversions’ to the anti-logging movement. *LFF2* spoke of his earlier and dramatically different views towards environmentalists “*I was one of those people who thought the greenies were all freaks and silly...*”. *ALP* spoke of the change of views by her older parents on this issue as a way of indicating the substantial nature of the shift in public values toward the forests in WA over the past 30 years:

*I think the shift has been fairly dramatic, I mean I have got very conservative parents who live in the country - it took them a long time to get... actually voice*
that old-growth forests should be saved, once they did I knew our [new ALP forest] policy was ok, [laughs] we were ahead of them...

These stories of conversions to an anti-logging viewpoint ranged across the social (and class) backgrounds of those interviewed. LAW recounted how he used to take his young children on regular camping trips to the forests and was moved by their beauty while LFF3 also was affected by visits there after his retirement from a job that involved using jarrah products. Importantly he identified what it was about the forest logging process that so upset him that he became a volunteer for the LFF:

..I used to be in the Railway Controller of Stores back in ’75 and I used to buy millions of first grade jarrah sleepers, every year, because I was in charge of railway procurement. And I never thought about it, as far as what's happening to the forest - it was only when I went down - because when I was at school 60 years ago, we were taught that they would just drop a tree here and a tree there - and they were always careful where they dropped it so the rest of the natural forest was not disturbed - what upsets me is this clear felling! They just go through and they clear everything out. And of course all the wildlife disappears, and then they burn off what they do not take, they do not pick up everything they cut down, it's a disgrace.

LFF3’s comments not only help identify what issues impacted on him but also reflect the visual and emotional impact made by the changes in timber practises from selective logging in the colonial episteme to clearfelling during the scientific one. His bitter comments about clearfelling are supported by those of a pro-logging stakeholder, AWU:

- and it’s an emotional issue. At the end of the day, if you go into a logging coupe it looks bloody awful, I had a friend here this morning whose father was in fact a sawmiller who said he was out in the bush and it looked awful - no argument, we all agree that a logging coupe looks awful, but we are obliged to think a whole lot more longer term, ...
RAD also made a link between the involvement of suburban adults, particularly women, in recent environmental protests (such as the forest debate) to the events of their youth in the 1960s. RAD suggested that their involvement was based on their relationship with their children and the adults’ feelings of guilt:

... and that's guilt, guilt, I think guilt is a big issue, over ... I think it works through a whole lot of ways, I think even hardworking western suburbs parents who do not think they've given enough back to their kids and this is one thing they can share with their kids, and the kids say "your generation fucked up this planet" and you have got to get green and start being serious about this, and so not just guilt about the forest but guilt generally about parental associations with kids etc. ... I sorta see very rednecked fathers sorta rolling their eyes but going along with it because the mothers got involved with the kid's concerns and sort of so, working its way through a family like that...

A more recent link between new ways of valuing the environment and the decision to actively support the anti-logging movement was provided by LFF4:

...ah I guess the final influence on my decision to help was actually a newspaper article in The West. Ah where it was pointed out that the south-west of Western Australia ah is one of the, certainly top ten, possibly top 5 hot spots in terms of a native species that are being eradicated.

Using ABS data, in Chapter 6 I suggested the change in religious affiliation as an important social and demographic change that occurred over the past 30 years. An example of how the forests have possibly now become spiritually important for those who are better educated and in a higher income bracket was provided by RAD who commented on his time at The West Australian:

... and I just sent these writers out to write something serious about the forest debate and Norman Aisbett came up with... he came up with the most cerebral idea, and that was that the forests had become our new cathedrals, and it really resonated, this idea really resonated with me, .... in a time when we are sort of...have become less religious in terms of our old style religions, our church-going religions, maybe this is an explanation for it, that we do need something to hold on to, you know in uncertain times, when the forest was a...is a pristine,
natural and you’d have to say while you are in it, um … you know you can
certainly get a feeling that there is a sort of a religiosity about it…

Similarly, CCWA believes that there has been a great change in environmental values, not in terms of a replacement of spiritual values, but in a century-long progression or evolution of human values toward the natural environment. Bob Brown and other environmentalists have also spoken of a similar evolution, including the Gaia hypothesis of the world being one living being. CCWA said:

I think it is an evolution of the human spirit, when I was in boarding school I actually heard Julian Huxley talk, … he said that the human spirit has as much growth or evolution to go through as the human body has come since we were… you know … primeval ancestors. And I see this attitude to the environment as simply…a natural progression of ethics, moral, spirituality call it what you like, from a completely anthropocentric, an almost completely anthropocentric view – to… respecting other inhabitants of the planet and not seeing the rest of creation as being here for our benefit.

In an unexpected way these interviews also provided an indication of the importance of considering religious values to the prolonging of the forest conflict. TCA3 reports that many of the TCA supporters in the south-west had a link to the Anglican Church:

..., but all that holds [TCA1] together is her … she is a devout, a devout Christian and strangely enough [names removed] and myself and some of the [Timber Community Australia] brass are devout Christians, devout.

It would be too simple to propose that the anti-logging supporters are non-religious and their pro-logging supporters are all devout Christians but Christian values would seem to be an important factor that mobilised the pro-logging supporters in the south-west. ABS data I reported in Chapter 6 confirmed the Manjimup LGA had a higher proportion of Christians than the two LGAs on
either side of it. TCA3 provided a disparagingly link between new environmental values and people’s lack of religious affiliation:

Now, people feel totally helpless, they can not deal with this [environmental degradation]- it is too big, but... and they do not practice their religion any more - they have let... all of their spiritual values have all collapsed, and they have got no string to get hold off; that sitting in Perth and saying 'Save the Old Growth', that is pretty easy - they do not actually have to do anything ...

New Values and New Employment Opportunities

The value changes in attitudes by the WA public toward their native forests occurred at the same time as important changes to the economic foundations of the south-west region over the past 30 years. However the growing number of tourism-based jobs that have been developed in the south-west are not totally acceptable as an alternate source of employment to people presently employed in the timber industry. AWU criticised the nature of these new jobs in a similar way to many authors writing on the emergence of post-Fordist industries (eg Hampson et al., 1994; Roobeek, 1987):

Look… the tourism industry is a lowest common denominator industry from a… and I am a trade unionist, from my point of view, the tourism industry creates some jobs, they are casual, they are not secure, they are at the service end of things, and there…I am not saying there is not a role for tourism I think, tourism is a very important adjunct to whatever else society can do with it [the environment]. ... one of the things that for timber workers becomes fairly clear, is that they want permanent, full time employment and you are not going to get that in tourism simple as that..

LFF4 reiterated this view that many workers remain in the forest industry because they see few alternatives to their present employment:

...they have made anonymous phone calls, or they have written letters or they have spoken to me personally, and they have said -we do not want to do it
[logging], we have no alternative. They do it because they do not have alternative employment.

The forest policy taken to the 2001 election by both major political parties included job retraining packages of more than $50 million for unemployed timber workers. These funds were to be supplemented by Federal government funds. Such packages recognised the difficulty of timber workers finding new full time employment in the region with their existing skill sets. However, the proposed packages do not seem to take into account the disdain with which timber workers look upon alternate employment in the south-west. This fear of change and the need to replace full-time jobs with part-time ones explained the focus of TCA’s pro-logging publicity campaign on how the loss of jobs in the timber industry would undermine the existence of timber towns and their associated communities (Butler, S., 2001c: 56). A comparison of this language of community used by pro-logging organisations such as TCA with the language used by anti-logging groups is made in the next chapter.

7.7 OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES RAISED BY THE INTERVIEWS

Aboriginal Non-Involvement in RFA Process

Given the history of Aboriginal occupation of WA and their involvement in other environmental issues such as the Franklin Dam (Sanders, 1991: 69), I would have expected some formal involvement of Aborigines and their organisations in the RFA process and the debate over logging policies. The RFA did establish an Aboriginal reference group but the Noongar Land Council formally withdrew from the RFA process in June 1998 due to their opposition to the way that it was being coordinated and structured (Capp, 1998e: 53). Those interviewed seemed to
be at a loss as to why the native title issue was not an important factor during the RFA process. Reasons given by interviewees included other government policy debates being undertaken concurrently in 1998 on native title rights in WA (including the lodging of a native title claim over a large area in the south-west by the Noongar Land Council) and cultural issues associated with their decimation as a people in the south-west by the early colonialists. This was suggested by WAFA:

Well of course ever since white settlement every possible effort has been made to remove the Noongar people from the south-west, either by relocating them or killing them off. And as a result of that the Noongar people that are still left in the south-west tend to be quite shy about organising and speaking out publicly against things like logging.

While Aboriginal groups do not seem to have been active stakeholders in the RFA and forest debates, that does not mean to say that their voice was not raised at some points. WAFA mentioned his organisation working with various Aboriginal groups on forest issues, and the presence of Aboriginal representatives at a WAFA rally was mentioned in news reports in March 2000 (Capp, 2000: 10). WES acknowledged Wesfarmers involvement with Aboriginal youth in the forest region, but only in terms of youth employment programs. The absence of Aboriginal stakeholders during the RFA debate may have simplified the policy debate, for both countermovements. I was not able to obtain an interview with an Aboriginal representative, but their decision to remove themselves from the forest debate in 1998 probably was to ensure that their energies were focused on the native title case in regard to the south-west land claimed by the Noongar communities.

---

4 Dargavel (1998: 29) noted the absence of consideration of indigenous rights in the RFA processes in other states undertaken before WA’s RFA and considered that they had been excluded so as to speed up the completion of the required comprehensive assessments.
Extra-parliamentary Dispute Resolution Processes

During the interviews, I uncovered that the complexity of the debate and the intransigent positions held by pro- and anti-logging organisations had led to at least two extra-parliamentary dispute resolution processes that have not been previously reported. The first was a ‘Round Table’ process chaired by ACAD2. The second was a Canadian economic modelling process utilising inputs provided by SMOs from the two sides to the debate. This section summarises for the first time these behind-the-scenes activities undertaken to try and resolve in a less public, and in a calm and rational way, the policy impasse between both sides.

ACAD2 reported that the process he assisted in organising was based on Chatham House rules⁵ that he became aware of when he spent 3 years at the University of London. He suggested that he became involved because the forest stakeholders:

… were shouting at each other in the media a good deal, the Government did not seem to be taking much of a lead in terms of trying to resolve the issue at that stage…

ACAD2 initial action was to consult MLC because he had known her since the early 1970s. He also had contacts at Wesfarmers and found that they were also willing to sit around the table and talk. The first session was chaired by Brian Brand (the son of a past-Liberal Premier, Sir David Brand) who had a lot of experience as a facilitator. ACAD2 reported that the 20 people at the first meeting included:
... three from CALM, three from Wesfarmers, we had a number of other people like Jenson and Bertolini representing the smaller parts of the industry, we had Beth Schultz and Peter Robinson, and a pretty good cross section of what the broad Green as you like call it, and we started on... I think it was the 3rd of August 1998.

The experience of actually sitting down with those opposed to each other did not immediately produce any substantial outcomes but ACAD2 commented that “..the euphoria of the night was such that people were prepared to spend all the next day, the Monday and possibly a little bit on Tuesday, sitting down together…” A key question dividing the opposite sides was what constituted 'old-growth forest'- did it mean forests that had regrown over the past 50 years, or unlogged forest of up to 500 years old, for example? ACAD2 reported that this debate extended to other issues such as:

.. about old regrowth like the 'hundred year forest' or are we talking about pristine forest that has never been logged. And there was also the historical importance - to what extent had burning taken place before the coming of European settlements?

ACAD2 did not attend the second meeting (nor did some other key stakeholders such as the CALM Director who was overseas) but heard that:

... this was much more of a confrontation, ... the conservationists side of it came with a fairly specific list of blocks which they thought should be exempt from clearing, they wanted to get down to specifics, others from the industry and CALM were not ready to get to that degree of specificity, and that ended up with an impasse.

There was supposed to be a third meeting but it was not organised as there never seemed to be a time where the original participants could meet with the

---

5 ACAD2 summarised these rules as "...nothing gets quoted without the permission of the participants, and it is often a good way to get people who are fairly strongly opposed about an issue to sit around a table together and at least identify precisely what are the points about which they are disagreeing, what are the points about which there is some prospect for them to come together...".
same good will as they had shown in the first meeting. *ACAD2* suggested that this attempt at reconciliation ended because “…the RFA came into the picture and that became the catalyst around which any future agreement was going to be hammered out.”

*ACAD2* was disappointed that more did not come of his Roundtable initiative. The WA Government might have profited if it had sought to listen to *ACAD2*’s reflections on forest processes held in other States:

> I had seen two models about forest debate being resolved. I had seen Tasmania where it embittered communities, it caused enmities, the atmosphere in Tasmania struck me at the time, quite poisonous and I did not want to see Western Australia go down the same way. On the other hand, Queensland … on the forest debate they seemed to have done rather well in getting the various parties engaged in forming a kind of on-going, there was a body on which each of the major stakeholders were represented and they could sit down and while it did not resolve all the issues of conflict, it did seem to have soothed the temperature and made it possible to... for civilised discourse to take place.

As an indicator of how even recent historical events such as the RFA process can be blurred in the memories of stakeholders, a central actor in this process, *MLC*, had a slightly different view on how this mediation process was established:

> … WES had brought [name removed- Queensland Timber Board] over to speak to a Bunnings annual dinner or some event, and he had met him and was impressed by him, and WES himself was looking at putting out feelers for some kind of reconciliation - a third party [*ACAD2*] put the two of us in touch, and we then organised a Roundtable which was in the middle of the year in 1997.

*MLC* also has a different view as to why the participants had such a heated debate at the second meeting, which led to the process being unsuccessful:

> …of course this led then to discussions about the RFA process, because that was the ‘official’ strategy that was meant to be delivering all this, and then it led to criticism of the way that the RFA was being controlled by CALM, and [name
removed] on behalf of CALM was at that meeting, completely rigid about any changes to the RFA process, so he basically ran with the line that CALM were not prepared to change the RFA process, but the RFA process had to be the process whereby something was mediated [between the two sides].

The third important actor in this event, WES, also claimed during his interview responsibility for initiating the Roundtable process. WES, as did ACAD2, attributed the end to the process to an attack by anti-logging groups on CALM and recognised the deep-seated feelings each side had about each other “...[there] was a high level of poison in the atmosphere and so we, which I regret, because as I say that was something that I personally initiated because I thought it was a good thing.”

The importance of trying to resolve the forest debate between both sides without creating violence is a key theme for many of those interviewed. TCAI thought that reconciliation would happen but it needed local initiatives rather than centralised ones such as the Roundtable:

*If it [reconciliation between the two sides] happens, it will have to happen locally - I've been part of the grand round table thing that we had ...with the other side well it is not going to be achieved at that level, in my view, we should get the community ... and it has to come just from the people themselves, so they can work it out in their own way.*

During the late 1990s there was a second behind-the-scenes reconciliation process involving the main policy stakeholders. This was a Canadian economic modelling process that required inputs from various forest policy stakeholders. In the WA setting, it was hosted by the Manjimup Chamber of Commerce during 2000. TWS reported that the process was initiated by an ex-WA state bureaucrat who got in contact with various stake holders and that his organisation’s involvement in this process required substantial resources in that “...we visited Manjimup and Bridgetown at least half a dozen times to try and get it off the
ground.” He went on that the process was:

...based on a computer-based modelling conflict resolution process called AEAM®- which is a Canadian academic, it’s Canadian and academic of its origin but basically it is a computer-based modelling system where you can model into the future various economic, social and environmental scenarios but effectively the idea behind it is that you sit down with your so-called opposition and you pump in two sets of facts, especially the land use disputes, you have got two sets of so called ‘facts’ and this allows you to project into the future with both sets of facts exactly where you are going to go and quite often what they have found is that you’ll actually end up meeting in the same point anyway.

TWS description of the process suggested a keenness on the behalf of this important anti-logging organisation at finding a non-conflictual end to the forest debate and that:

... with the logging industry, they would have found out, even with their sets of facts, that they would have run out of old growth resource in ten years time and that is what we have been saying for a long time and so once you actually agree that there is a problem then you can find a way to resolving it.

TWS reported that with the 2001 election looming, his organisation “... decided that really the election was the only way that we were going to get an outcome so we put our heads down and worked towards a political outcome.”

Use of Fire in the Forests

One unexpected issue that was raised during the interviews was the conflict over the use of regular fire burns by CALM as a way of managing the risk of uncontrolled bush fire in the south-west forests. It was also seen as an emotional issue that created further divisions between city and country people as country
people saw the need for the burns while city people were worried about the health effects of haze the burns often created over the city. This issue may have been important for the interviewees as it coincided with a large bushfire in the US in mid-2000 that destroyed a substantial number of houses and large areas of forest reserves. FLNP tied this international event into the local forest debate and his preference for continuing the logging of old growth forests:

... my argument is that both Presidential candidates in America have promised to cut down trees in National Parks, that rings a bell - fire - I mean probably the next big fire in WA, would be the catalyst for people to say have we got it right? .. you see there is a dual campaign [by environmentalists] – one: stopping the cutting down of trees, and the other even [stopping] burning the undergrowth - they say there are too many particulates ... I mean the arguments again from the botanists is that you are much better cutting the tree down and removing it than just having these prescribed burns because they [logging] tend to be very selective in the trees they kill...

This argument about the need to undertake regular burns in forest reserves was also raised by others who support the logging of native forests, including LNP:

The other aspect we have to very much look at is of course the whole issue of proper forest management and there is a lot of debate that goes on that by leaving a forest as such you are potentially putting them at risk of fire and also disease.

At its core, this argument is based on the proposition that forest ecosystems need regular disturbances, such as fires, wind storms, insect attacks and landslides, to remain healthy. This was an argument made by Professor Attiwill (1994: 1) who accused the environmentalists of wanting to lock up forests and

---

6 Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management (AEAM) developed by Holling and Walters. See Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and Institutions (Gunderson, Holling and Light, 1995) for an application of AEAM principles. Also, this process was used in an Australian setting and were applied by the Sydney Water Corporation and the New South Wales National Parks and Wildlife Service (http://www.gse.mq.edu.au/Research/adaptive/sydney.htm accessed 22 June 2003).
turn them into museums. Attiwill (p3) said that the dominant role of fire in maintaining ecosystems is more important in Australia than elsewhere and that the frequency of fires increased with the coming of Aborigines. Despite little knowledge of the actual use of WA’s forests by Aboriginals before colonisation (see Chapter 4) this is a claim also made by senior CALM staff (Shea and Underwood, 1990: 36).

Comments in favour of logging to assist in preventing large uncontrollable fires in the south-west forests were commonly made by stakeholders I interviewed. They reflect an emotional argument (the fear of a fire catastrophe) from pro-logging stakeholders who wished that the debate on forest policy was limited to logical and scientific grounds. The extent of this belief in the need for regular burning of the forests can be seen in its use by the Premier, Richard Court, in a TV interview (Four Corners, 2000):

*The biggest challenge we’re got is to make sure that all of that timber that is being going into reserves, we’ve got to, got to make sure it’s properly managed. I mean I met the Western Australian firefighters that have just come back from fighting those fires in the US. Wilderness areas that were locked up, you couldn’t put firebreaks, couldn’t put any roads in, you couldn’t control, you couldn’t do any control burns to bring the, the undergrowth and as a result they have wiped out huge areas of wilderness forest in the United States. So it’s one thing to have it put into reserve, but you’ve also got to have effective and good forest management plans in place to protect those reserves.*

Finally, the other tension that this issue created was to reinforce the perception of pro-logging stakeholders that the forest debate is one between city people and country people. CALM claimed (Butler, 2003: 3) that it had to cut back on its prescribed forest burns to control the growth of undergrowth because of the complaints from Perth residents when the smoke from these fires blanketed Perth. A community action group was established during 2002 in the forest town
of Manjimup to campaign on the perceived reduction of wildfire hazards in south-west forests by greater use of prescribed burns (Butler, 2002: 5). Meeting co-convenor Tom Muir was reported as saying “…country people were sick of hearing metropolitan people whingeing about smoke levels.” The tension between city and country stakeholders over prescribed burns in State forests provided a new focus for the protests of country people once the ALP Government stopped the logging of old-growth forests in early 2001.

7.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter has reported key findings from the responses of the forest policy stakeholders interviewed for my research. I use this information and combine it with data from previous chapters to develop an overarching analysis in Chapter 9 that proposes reasons as to why this policy conflict has endured for so long. My analysis in particular builds on my research evidence that stakeholders made very different judgements about the effectiveness of advocacy organisations. My study also confirmed the importance to social movements of a broad network of supporters. A key factor of the WA forest debate seems to be the development by the anti-logging movement of a network of supporters that extended into the south-west LGAs surrounding the remaining native forests. This movement made significant ground in its campaign when many well-known sports people and members of Perth’s elite provided their support to it. In particular, their intervention from late 1998 provided an opportunity for the WA printed media to take a renewed interest in the conflict and to increase its reporting of the RFA process.
The stakeholder interviews confirmed the importance of the media as an important resource for social movements and I further explore this topic in the next chapter. Finally, the interviews provided insights into new values toward the forest held by the WA public that developed over the past 30 years. This was clear in the comments from the interviewees in regard to the weight of scientific versus arguments labelled as ‘emotional’. I return to this topic in Chapter 9 when I discuss the tactics of both countermovements.
8.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will look at various aspects of the role of the printed media and their impact on the public debate on forest policy in WA. The literature on the role of advocacy groups (e.g., Dale, 1996; McCarthy and Wolfson, 1996) indicates that the use of media is a key resource for these types of nonprofit organisations. Advocacy organisations, such as my case study groups, often have few financial resources to fund other types of activities (e.g., TV advertisements) to get their message to the public and to policy makers. Reich (1988: 206) also proposed that “the media is the vehicle for much of the discussion that now takes place around public ideas”. Thus this analysis would be expected to show that groups such as the Liberals For Forests (LFF) and the Timber Communities Australia (TCA) would make extensive use of the WA newspapers to get their messages to the WA public. The previous chapter reported that most interviewees recognised the key role played by The West Australian during the forest debate over the period 1998-2000. One finding from the interviews was that many from both the LFF and the TCA felt this newspaper showed a bias to their opposition’s arguments. A content analysis methodology was developed to test these perceptions. This issue was chosen to be explored in more depth as it might be a key explanation as to why the forest debate has gone on for so long in WA.

As outlined in Chapter 3, I set out to compare the range of articles published over a three-year period (1998-2000) in WA newspapers The West Australian and The Sunday Times; and the national daily newspaper The Australian. Based on the reporting of the Franklin River protests (Sanders, 1991: 73) I expected to find that
all papers carried a similar number of reports on the debate with an even amount of space given to both the anti and pro-logging sides. However, I found that there were a far greater number of articles published in *The West Australian* during this period (see Table 8.1 below). Therefore in the main the various means of analysing the articles published during 1998-2000 focus on articles in *The West Australian*. Other printed material, such as local papers and group newsletters, were not studied given the difficulty in obtaining complete collections over the 3-year period.

The articles for this section of the research were obtained from the Library of the Conservation Council of WA. This Library collects newspaper articles on a range of environmental topics and their forest articles go back to 1990. The State Library of WA’s Battye Library has a complete collection of all editions of the three papers studied, including all of the different editions of *The West Australian* (ie Metro First edition, State edition and Metropolitan edition). I used this collection in checking the material held by the Conservation Council’s Library. This checking process also led to an interesting insight into possible editorial bias or manipulation of the discourse of the forest debate by *The West Australian* through changes to headlines and the addition of new articles to different editions of the paper.

After providing the data from the content analysis, this chapter will identify three incidents that seem to have generated a substantial amount of reportage and which seem to have been critical incidents during the forest debate, particularly during 1999. These are: the intervention of Mick Malthouse (an AFL football coach) into the debate in 1998 that sparked the establishment of the Liberals for Forests (LFF) organisation; the criticism by the Environmental Protection
Authority of the logging practices of CALM; and the inclusion of non-forest areas into the proposed RFA forest reserves. These incidents and their impact on the forest debate during 1998-2000 are analysed in more detail below. They are raised here as examples supporting the claims made by many of those interviewed (eg FLNP and RAD) of the importance of the role of Perth’s elite in the forest debate, the importance of scientific arguments to both sides and the key role played by CALM in framing the forest debate in WA. I then investigate claims that The West Australian was biased in its reporting of the forest debate towards the arguments and propositions provided by the anti-logging movement.

8.2 NEWSPAPER CONTENT ANALYSIS

Analysis of all of the newspaper articles clipped from the 3 papers being studied for the years 1998-2000 indicated that the reporting of forest issues in WA was an overwhelmingly local issue. Very few articles were published in the national paper, The Australian, except during 1999 when the RFA was announced and later revised (See Table 8.1). The analysis shows clearly that 1999 was a key year for debate on forest issues in WA and provided some important changes to the policy positions of some of the stakeholders. There were nearly four times as many articles published during this year on the forest policy issue than in either the preceding or proceeding years. The articles carried by The West Australian on forests between 1998-2000 would be the main channel for printed news and opinion for the WA public as they amounted to around 90% of the newspaper coverage in the three newspapers.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{For example, the ALP moved to a position of opposing the logging of old-growth forests at its May 1999 State Conference (Burns, 1999: 7).}\]
Table 8.1- The Number of Forest Articles Published (1998-2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAPER</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The West Australian</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sunday Times</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Australian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>157</strong></td>
<td><strong>621</strong></td>
<td><strong>168</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The critical issue to be considered here is that *The West Australian* is the only daily paper published in WA. Therefore access to it is a vital resource for any advocacy organisation (whether pro- or anti-logging) wanting to get its message to the wider WA public audience spread over the great geographical distances of the State. In WA, *The West Australian* could be seen as a ‘gatekeeper’ or political filter of important news items. This was certainly the view of many of those who were interviewed for this project. In most other Australian States there are at least two and often three daily newspapers.

Tables 8.2 and Figure 8A show the coverage (in number of articles published and column-centimetres) each month of the debate on the forest issue within the two WA-based newspapers. This summary is helpful in identifying the emergence of three key events to be addressed in greater detail below: the intervention of Mick Malthouse in June 1998 (Miller, 1998: 1), the EPA criticism of CALM in December 1998 (Irving, 1998b: 1) and the debate in mid-1999 over what constituted ‘forests’ in the proposed RFA reserves (Burns, 1999b: 6). The coverage of forest-related issues grew strongly from mid-1998 with the intervention of Mr Malthouse into the debate and subsided by mid-2000 when the revised RFA had been debated for some months and the ALP had decided on a new approach to its forest policy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8A shows in more graphic terms the changes in the coverage given to the forest topic by *The West Australian* and the *Sunday Times*. It also shows the great difference in coverage in 1999 and in the years on either side of it. Coverage grew again toward the end of 2000 as the political parties, particularly the LFF, began promoting their campaigns for the 2001 State elections. It is likely that one of the reasons for this renewed interest in forest issues was that it became more likely around this time that the election result would be closer than previously thought.²

² Such a result would have given the LFF substantial parliamentary leverage to gain the changes to the WA forest policy it had campaigned for.
Days of Publication

A review of the days of publication of articles (Table 8.3) for the two WA-based newspapers indicated two patterns. Firstly, for the years on either side of the main RFA debate (1998 and 2000), the analysis showed a higher number of articles on the forests published on Monday, Wednesday and Saturday. Secondly, during 1999 the forest debate, in particular over the proposed RFA, seemed to be a constant topic covered by *The West Australian* on a regular basis each day.
Table 8.3- The Number of Forest Articles Published Each Day- The Sunday Times & The West Australian (1998-2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAY OF WEEK</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Saturday edition of *The West Australian* carried nearly 20% of all articles published each year over the period 1998-2000 and appeared to be a key day for all forest stakeholders to have their articles published. It had the largest circulation of any edition of *The West Australian* (due to the classified advertisements it carried) and so therefore would be an important outlet for groups who wanted to get their message to the largest possible WA readership. This focus on having items published in the Saturday edition is evidence that the forest stakeholders recognised the important resource provided by the printed media.

Stakeholders who wanted to respond to articles on the forest issue printed in the Saturday edition would issue a press release on the weekend and have their responses published in the Monday edition. Another reason for the larger number of articles appearing in the Monday edition for 1998 and 2000 is that groups knew that little of news importance happened on Sunday (other than sporting events) and it was a ‘slow news day’ because community organisations, business and institutions such as the stock exchange or Parliament were closed (Oliver & Maney, 2000: 485). Hence the TCA and LFF appeared to put out media releases
on Sundays as they had a greater chance of getting their material published in the Monday edition and on a page closer to the front of the paper (due to its smaller size) than if they were to publish them later in the week. This meant that the articles generated by their press release or protest activity would have had a greater chance of being read by the WA public than if they were printed further back in a larger sized mid-week edition of the paper. If this pattern of publication and a response from an opposition group was repeated, responses to articles carried in the Monday edition would most likely appear in the Wednesday edition.

**Editorials**

Besides analysing the number of articles and the coverage given to forest issues on a daily or monthly basis, another way I gauged the impact of the forest debate in terms of its “newsworthiness” was to investigate the number of editorials published on this topic between 1998-2000. Newspaper editorials are reserved for what the Editor sees as the key or most controversial public issue of the day. The importance to the forest debate of the release of the Court Government’s proposed RFA agreement in May 1999 can be seen in the number of editorials published during 1999 (see Table 8.4 below) and the language used in their headlines. There were no editorials about forest issues in any of the newspapers during 2000 and for most of 1998, but during the 12 months between November 1998 and November 1999 there were 20- a rate of nearly one per fortnight. During 1998-2000 *The Australian* published one editorial, the *Sunday Times* six and *The West Australian* 13. Of interest is that the *Sunday Times* published only 4% of the forest articles between 1998-2000 but 30% of the
editorials, indicating a greater editorial interest in this policy debate than shown in the other two papers.

**Table 8.4- Editorials on Forests Issues (1998-99)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunday Times</td>
<td>29 November</td>
<td>Cutting down our heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The West Australian</td>
<td>9 December</td>
<td>Judicial inquiry into CALM needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The West Australian</td>
<td>4 February</td>
<td>Political pain forces Court's hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The West Australian</td>
<td>16 March</td>
<td>Tuckey's tactics are out of order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday Times</td>
<td>21 March</td>
<td>Gallop talks sense in forest row</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The West Australian</td>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>Premier's challenge is to sell RFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The West Australian</td>
<td>9 June</td>
<td>Police must be seen as non-partisan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The West Australian</td>
<td>10 June</td>
<td>No public good in trivial charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The West Australian</td>
<td>25 June</td>
<td>Court must heed alert on forests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday Times</td>
<td>27 June</td>
<td>End the killing of our rare forests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The West Australian</td>
<td>17 July</td>
<td>Court must take over forest issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday Times</td>
<td>18 July</td>
<td>Forest fiasco gets worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The West Australian</td>
<td>28 July</td>
<td>Court stranded on forest policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The West Australian</td>
<td>29 July</td>
<td>Salinity the real crisis in the bush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday Times</td>
<td>1 August</td>
<td>Court reaps a bitter harvest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Australian</td>
<td>2 August</td>
<td>Timber row erodes Court poll hopes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The West Australian</td>
<td>5 August</td>
<td>Timber deals must be questioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday Times</td>
<td>8 August</td>
<td>Forests row reaches flashpoint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The West Australian</td>
<td>24 August</td>
<td>Many hands primed forest violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The West Australian</td>
<td>27 November</td>
<td>Changing times seal Shea's fate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number and timing of the editorials during 1999 indicated the importance of the RFA release to the Government’s plans to gain public approval for its new forest policy and to the anti-logging groups’ plans to mobilise the WA public in opposition to it. Both The Sunday Times and The Australian published
editorials in early August 1999 on the rising amount of conflict between pro- and anti-logging supporters over the Government’s amended RFA. Of interest, especially in exploring a possible anti-logging bias in the reporting of forest issues by The West Australian, is the language used in the editorial headlines of all three newspapers in early August 1999. Both the Sunday Times and The Australian use the Premier’s name but not The West Australian. This suggested that The West Australian was taking a more neutral and less personal stance on the controversy while the other two papers suggested that the Premier had created it. The Sunday Times’ use of words such as ‘reaps’ and ‘bitter’ in the headline text at this time is another indication of that paper’s stand on the debate and was in contrast to the more neutral language of the other two newspapers.

The West Australian published 12 editorials during 1999 on forest issues with nine of these published between the release of the RFA in May and the outbreak of violence in the forests in August- a rate of more than 1 a fortnight. The most emotive language in the editorials of all three papers was that used by The Sunday Times. Its first editorial on 29 November 1998 set its editorial position by equating old-growth forests with heritage. This placed it clearly on the side of the anti-logging movement as it used similar language to describe the forests as the movement did. Later editorials in 1999 continued this theme when they described the logging of old-growth forests as ‘killing’ (27 June), called the RFA process a ‘fiasco’ (18 July) and viewed the threatened violence from pro-logging timber workers as a ‘bitter harvest’ (1 August). This editorial language was quite different in tone to that used in editorials published by The West Australian. This evidence from the editorial language used by the two WA
newspapers over a similar period would not support claims (see below) of an anti-logging bias on the part of *The West Australian* but would for *The Sunday Times*.

### 8.3 MAJOR EVENTS GENERATING NEWSPAPER REPORTS

My analysis of the newspaper articles for the period 1998-2000 on the WA forest conflict helped identify that there were times during the three years that media coverage increased around specific events. Writing about the forest debate in Queensland, Johnston (1987: 276) suggested that it was only the broad exposure of forest issues in the mass media that stimulated the periodic emergence of community interest in the topic. A range of authors have investigated the importance of ‘critical discourse moments’ (eg Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gamson, 1990; Ryan, 1991; and Rojecki, 1999) in allowing social movements to make salient their issues to the public. I have identified three specific events that could be labelled critical discourse moments during 1998-2000 that had a significant impact on the number of articles published and on the overall direction of the forest debate in WA. The first event was the decision by a high profile football coach to enter the forest debate.

**Mick Malthouse ‘Affair’**

The intervention by Mick Malthouse into the forest debate completely changed the tenor of the reporting of the conflict by WA newspapers. On 4th June 1998 a large colour photo of Mr Malthouse beside a large karri stump appeared on the front page of *The West Australian* with a story announcing his opposition to
the logging of old-growth forests in WA (Miller, 1998: 1). The next day *The West Australian* carried responses from pro-logging groups to his call for the cessation of the logging, but further back in the paper (Miller, 1998b: 9). Mr Malthouse was the Coach of the first Australian Football League team in WA, the West Coast Eagles. He had taken the team to the AFL finals in all of his years coaching them, including two Grand Finals in 1992 and 1994. He was seen as a hero in WA for this and he was also seen by many as above politics. His intervention in the debate in opposition to the logging of old-growth forests led in the next few days to a large number of highly emotive letters-to-the-editor from those in favour and opposed to his intervention into the forest debate.

Within a day of this article, further articles appeared with photos of pro-logging supporters in the south-west, who were also Eagles supporters, burning West Coast memorabilia (Rechichi, 1998b: 9). The power of this personal intervention into the forest debate is reflected in comments made by *AWU*, a timber union organiser, giving his view of its impact on the policies of the WA Premier, Richard Court:

... and the other person who was in my judgement hugely influential was Mick Malthouse. Now when Richard Court did his [RFA] back flip on the karri, Tim Daly [AWU Branch Secretary] and myself went and spoke to Richard Court, you know, I was going somewhere and Tim said you better come to Perth and see Richard Court.

And he [Richard Court] said, he had spoken to a number of people, but he continued to talk about his discussions with Mick Malthouse, so I believe that Richard Court was significantly influenced by one [emphasis in original] individual- Mick Malthouse.

---

3 This photograph was an example of Reich’s proposal that new public attitudes could be influenced and altered by images rather than by reasoning and the statement of facts (1988: 79).

4 Malthouse continued to provide support to the anti-logging campaign and appeared at a public rally against the RFA a year later (Armstrong, 1999b: 12).
The power of this intervention was also confirmed from the other side of the logging debate by LFF1 who also focused on the timing of the intervention in terms of the history of the forest debate:

*We can never ever, ever forget the influence of Mick Malthouse, he stepped in there at a time when it was... if he had stepped in to that debate 12 months before it might not have had the same effect. He stepped in there at a time when the whole thing was on the boil and he caused it to boil over and his... the injustice of the way that he was lambasted by so many people in influential ... that that injustice was what caused me to step into it [forest debate]. The injustice of the treatment of somebody for having an opinion is just not Australian, that is not democracy, every one can have an opinion in this Nation, he voiced an opinion and he was really chastised for it.*

Contacted for this research, Mr Malthouse declined to be formally interviewed but offered this short email as the reason for his intervention in 1998:

*I am simply a passionate conservationist with no allegiance to any political party or conservation group. What came from my actions was far beyond my expectations. It is simply my personal opinion, thinking of future generations. I also have very strong personal views about whaling (email 19 May 2001).*

In response to a follow-up email to try to ascertain why he intervened at that particular time in the controversy, he replied “No reason for the timing” (email 22 May 2001). Price (2003: 32) suggested that Mr Malthouse was persuaded to become involved in the logging debate by a journalist at the Channel 9 television station. Despite his reluctance to discuss his involvement into the forest debate, of particular interest in regard to Mr Malthouse’s action was that within four days of his intervention *The West Australian* reported the formation of the Liberals for Forests. This story mentioned other prominent West Australians opposed to logging: such as Liz Davenport (fashion designer), Dr Keith Woolard (heart surgeon) and Dame Rachel Cleland, who was described as the ‘matriach of the
Liberal Party’.\(^5\) This article indicates that the public plea for the end of logging made by Mr Malthouse was the spark that saw the establishment of the LFF in WA (Malpeli, 1998: 6).\(^6\) I explore in more detail in the next chapter the important role played by the LFF in ending the forest conflict in WA and their use of celebrities and high profile people in their campaign.

**The EPA’s Criticism of CALM**

On 8\(^{th}\) December 1998 the debate over forest policy was fuelled by a front page article in *The West Australian* reporting the findings of an Environment Protection Authority (EPA) review of CALM’s compliance with its own logging regulations (Irving, 1998b: 1). The EPA’s report claimed that CALM was overcutting the native forests in the south-west of WA. The article also suggested that the Government had had the report for a month and was allowing CALM to prepare a response before releasing it for broader public comment. The next day *The West Australian* tried to help the public understand the issue by publishing a two-page article with comment from a wide range of stakeholders (Irving, 1998: 10). *FIFWA* is convinced that this intervention into the debate by the EPA was a key event in turning public opinion against the logging of old-growth forests and the RFA as it seemed to be associated with an anti-RFA focus within the articles published by *The West Australian*:

---

\(^5\) During the campaign to save the Shannon River area from woodchipping there was also a challenge to a Liberal Premier from within the Liberal Party. Neil Bartholomaeus was a member of the Nedlands branch of the Liberal Party (as was the Premier Charles Court) who appeared on national TV to show film of the damage from logging in the south-west (Sharp, 1983: 290).

\(^6\) The article and accompanying photo of Mr Malthouse’s intervention in the forest debate appeared on the front page of *The West Australian* while the article detailing the establishment of the LFF appeared further back in the paper on page 6. This would indicate that the involvement of this well-known football coach in the forest debate was seen as more newsworthy by *The West Australian* than the establishment of a new political party that was backed by well-known Liberal supporters.
...one of the most damaging things that happened was the report the EPA put out which basically said the government was overcutting [the WA forests]... got the press going, The West particularly, and that led to a very sustained campaign by The West... they ran a campaign for 4 or 5 months on the RFA and it was significant in changing public perception ...


The Codd report was delivered in just over a month (Mallabone, 1999: 8) but kept secret. The RFA debate in the media then turned to likely employment losses if the suggested lowering of logging limits was implemented (Mallabone, 1999b: 6). However, the importance of this criticism of CALM by the EPA was that it allowed non-WAFA stakeholders such as Federal ALP Shadow Minister Carmen Lawrence to commence criticising the management of the RFA process by CALM (Rose, 1999: 8). High-profile media commentator, Liam Bartlett, supported the EPA’s criticism (1998: 47) as it had no vested interest in the RFA process. The EPA report was also of importance in that it generated the first articles in *The West Australian* suggesting that the Liberal and Labor parties were lagging far behind public opinion on forest policy and that other political parties could see an electoral advantage in an anti-logging stance (Burns, 1998: 15). Malan (1998: 15) also sensed a change in the mood of the electorate after the EPA report and suggested that the “campaign against logging is starting to look like an unstoppable force”. This first attack on CALM’s credibility was followed later in
1999 by an even more serious attack triggered by its own scientific input to the RFA.

**CALM and its Proposed New RFA Reserves**

One of the important claims made during 1998 by the central anti-logging stakeholders (eg LFF and WAFA) was that CALM could not be trusted to manage the RFA process in an even-handed and unbiased fashion. The EPA report in December 1998 was the first dent in CALM’s credibility as a manager of the RFA process and the forests from a policy ‘insider’. Six months later an even more serious attack was generated by a report on the maps used by CALM during the RFA process. These maps outlined the vegetation types in the south-west and defined the limits of the proposed new forest areas to be protected from future logging. Two months after the Premier announced the RFA with a number of new forest reserves, CALM had to admit that some of the maps it used during the RFA process were wrong and that a number of RFA reserves that they claimed to be forest reserves were in fact gravel pits, a rubbish tip, 7,000ha of cleared farm lands and coastal shrub regions (Burns, 1999b: 6). The article reporting these claims suggested that up to a third of the new RFA forest reserves were not, in fact, forests (Burns, 1999c: 3).

More crucial to the credibility of CALM was the charge in *The West Australian*’s Editorial on 17 July that the compilation of the maps by CALM scientists was "a result of an attempt to deceive or incompetence- or both" (1999: 14). Within two weeks of this controversy the Premier announced a revised RFA
(Burns, 1999d: 1) and a new CALM CEO to replace Dr Syd Shea, who had been its Director for 16 years (Burns, 1999e: 7). This latest revelation about CALM’s actions severely undermined the RFA process in the public’s eye. It also created a further heated confrontation between stakeholders in the forest network, such as Wilson Tuckey, who threatened to withhold $20 million in federal forest reconstruction funds from the State Government (Rose, 1999b: 7).

Another response to the controversy over the RFA and CALM was for some Liberals to turn their attention to the role of the media in the forest debate and to call for Liberal Party members to boycott *The West Australian* (1999b: 5). This proposal illustrated that many stakeholders thought that the local newspapers played an important role in covering the RFA debate, especially during 1999. Similarly, Johnston (1987: 276) suggested that the coverage of the forest debate in Queensland was “subject to manipulation or bias” and that the mass media had rejected balanced reporting in order to be economically competitive. The call to boycott *The West Australian* also reinforced the impression that it was biased toward the anti-logging stakeholders - a claim I explore below.

### 8.4 COVERAGE IN *THE WEST AUSTRALIAN*

As we have seen above, some members of the Liberal Party believed that media reporting of the forest issue was biased toward the anti-logging side. This is a feeling common to those stakeholders wanting to preserve the existing logging policy and proposed logging levels of the original RFA, as evidenced by *WES*.

---

7 The WA agreement is the only RFA to have been amended after its signing (Carosone, 1999: 63).
The West Australian was a particular, you know, ...they crusaded on it. They
gave it undue prominence, in my opinion. Yeah... around the RFA period. What
the trigger for them was the report by the EPA you know, around 1998
[December 1998] said that it may, there may be over cutting of the jarrah forests.

To try to make an objective assessment of these claims I undertook a
number of empirical analyses on the articles published in The West Australian
between 1998 and 2000. Articles where the source (in terms of a stakeholder) of
the article was clear were coded and analysed for each year. This gave a sample of
82 articles in 1998, 311 in 1999 and 102 articles in 2000- a total of 495 articles or
60% of those published in The West Australian over these 3 years. The results of
this analysis are included in Table 8.5 and indicate that the groups that gained the
most coverage over the period 1998-2000 were the Government, CALM and the
WAFA. The LFF also received wide coverage once it had launched its election
program in mid-2000. The ALP seemed to suffer from being in Opposition in its
ability to gain access to The West Australian to publicise its alternate forest
policies. It received better access in mid-1999 when it changed its forest policy to
one where old-growth forest would be protected from logging.

From these figures it can be seen that the many groups constituting the
WAFA were able to secure very good coverage for their stories in 1998 and 2000
while the TCA/FIFWA were not as successful in gaining a similar level of
coverage for their stories. Many of the stories sourced to the WAFA related to the
WAFA opinion on significant issues emerging during the forest debate at that
time, such as the EPA criticism of CALM described above. In 1999 the majority
of forest articles in The West Australian were sourced from pro-logging
organisations but many were in response to controversies surrounding CALM and
the new RFA. My analysis does not support claims for bias in the reporting of the
forest conflict by either side. The coverage reflects the rhythm of the debate around the RFA over the three years and peaks in reporting the three events identified above. The LFF was able to achieve a significant boost in its coverage after it registered as a political party and in the lead up to the 2001 election where forests were a major issue. TCA achieved a lower level of coverage over the three years compared to WAFA organisations but greater than for the LFF in 1998 and 1999. WAFA had an advantage in securing media coverage as it was a coalition of more than 30 groups all of which were undertaking different activities throughout the south-west region.

Table 8.5- Coverage for Sourced Organisations in The West

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lib/National Party Coalition</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>1,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALM</td>
<td>1,466</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>2529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCA/FIFWA^8</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-logging sub-total</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFF</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAFA/CCWA</td>
<td>3,657</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>7,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-logging sub-total</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total coverage</td>
<td>7,781</td>
<td>37,115</td>
<td>14,150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^8 In early December 1999, the Forest Protection Society (FPS) changed its name to Timber Communities Australia (TCA) (Quekett, 1999b: 36).
Number of journalists

Another place to look for any bias in the reporting of the forest issue is to look at the number of authors of articles on forest issues for each year. If a small number of authors wrote most of the articles then it might be possible to support a claim for bias in forest reporting. In 1998 more than 50% of The West Australian’s articles were written by just two journalists (see Table 8.6). Most articles were written by Geraldine Capp, the newspaper’s environmental reporter. This might be thought to indicate a possibility of bias, but during that year a total of 30 journalists wrote articles about the forest issue in The West Australian. In 1999, the majority of forest articles were written by a larger number of journalists, with half of them written by the 5 most-published journalists. During this year, more than 71 journalists had articles published on the forest conflict in The West Australian. The two most published journalists were Anne Burns, the paper’s chief political writer, and Vittorio Rechichi. Rechichi’s articles mainly reported the human side of the RFA debate and its impact on individuals and families in the timber towns (eg “Forced into a future away from the family”, Rechichi, 1999: 5). His articles could be considered ‘colour’ pieces to go alongside the more political ones by reporters such as Burns and the environmental ones by Capp.

After the RFA was revised in the middle of 2000 there seemed to be fewer articles related to forest topics published in The West Australian. With the reduction in forest articles it could be expected that fewer journalists would cover this story but during 2000 there were 38 journalists who wrote articles on the forest debate. In contrast to 1998, the first year of my analysis, the articles were spread more widely among the journalists from The West Australian. The four most-published journalists in 2000 wrote nearly 50% of the articles compared to
just 2 journalists in 1998. The most published author in 2000 was Malcolm Quekett, the chief political reporter. This indicates that the newspaper saw the debate as primarily a political one in both 1999 and 2000, although Ruth Callaghan, the environmental reporter, had the second largest number of articles in 2000.

Table 8.6- Journalists Writing on Forests Issues in The West Australian (1998-2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Journalists</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Journalist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geraldine Capp</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vittorio Rechichi</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anne Burns</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malcolm Quekett</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other well-published</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>journalists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vittorio Rechichi</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Mallabone</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Irving</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Armstrong</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judy Grove</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendy Pryer</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malcolm Quekett</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Mallabone</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geraldine Capp</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruth Callaghan</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve Butler</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vittorio Rechichi</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In each of the 3 years studied, different journalists had the most articles published. In 1999, the year with most reportage on events related to the forest debate, the largest number of articles were published by the paper’s chief political reporter as the political events unfolded surrounding the release of the RFA and its later amendment. Reporters responsible for environmental issues had fewer articles published under their by-line after 1998. Once again, it would seem that
the data from the newspaper articles on the author of the articles does not provide evidence for an anti-logging bias by *The West Australian*. The increase in the number of journalists writing forest articles in 1999 and 2000 reflected the greater coverage of this issue by *The West Australian*. For an editorial-driven process to succeed and ensure the skewing of forest articles toward the anti-logging side (as suggested by some pro-logging stakeholders) it would require the participation of a large number of these journalists.

Such ‘advocacy journalism’ (Cooke, 2003: 25) is not indicated by my analysis of journalists who authored forest articles between 1998-2000, except for those of Rechichi. An analysis of his articles during 1999 indicated that his role was to write about human interest articles and the impact of the RFA. The majority of his articles focused on the timber communities in the south-west and the individual timber workers adversely affected by the RFA’s proposed new limits on the logging of old-growth forests. Rechichi’s articles comprised a large proportion of those published in each of the three years on the forest debate and his output and focus on individuals suffering under the RFA is another indication that there was no clear anti-logging bias in the *West Australian* over this period.

**Location of articles**

Another method I used to see if there was any bias in the reporting of the forest debate by *The West Australian* was to analyse the location of those articles with a clear source within each issue of the paper. This involved an analysis of each article in relation to:

1. the page number on which it was published (ie how close it was to the front of the paper),
ii) the day of the week on which it was published, and

iii) whether it was published on the left or right hand side of the paper.

An average page location for each major stakeholder in the forest policy network was developed by using the median value of the total page numbers of its articles for that year. Chapter 3 highlighted the changes in the number of pages and the amount of advertisements carried by the different daily editions of *The West Australian* during a week in July 1999 when the forest debate was prominent. As was shown in Chapter 3, the further back in an issue of *The West Australian* an article is placed, the smaller the article becomes and the harder it is for it to stand out among the increasing amount of advertisements.

Also, I developed another analysis to see whether there was a bias in the location of articles from different stakeholders toward the left or right pages. This methodology for analysing stakeholder articles was developed following the acknowledgment that readers take more notice of material published on right hand (or odd-numbered pages). The results of this analysis of article location in terms of page number and page location indicates a clear shift in media interest in reporting forest issues between 1998 and 2000 but provides no evidence of any bias. All of the major stakeholders, except TCA/FIFWA, had a greater number of articles about their activities and views published in 2000 than 1998 as the forest policy issue had a higher prominence after the launch of the RFA in 1999 (see Table 8.7 below). The emergence of the logging of native forests as an election issue for the upcoming 2001 State election also sparked more interest on this issue.

---

9 In Chapter 3 I showed that this allowed newspapers to charge higher advertising rates for advertisements on these pages.
from the media. The Liberal and National Parties\textsuperscript{10} had a higher number of articles published about them in all years compared to other political parties due to their being in government. However, articles about them tended to be placed further back in the paper (except for 1999) (see Table 8.8), probably because the government is often reported when responding to claims made by other stakeholders.

\textbf{Table 8.7- Stakeholder Articles in The West Australian (1998 - 2000)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>Total Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-Logging Stakeholders</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAFA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC of WA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pro-Logging Stakeholders</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFWA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALM</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{10} The LFF started as a SMO and it was not until mid-2000 that it decided to register as a political party. Hence, their article data are included in the non-party category.
### Table 8.8 - Article Location in The West Australian (1998 to 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-Logging Stakeholders</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWS</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFF</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAFA</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC of WA</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pro-Logging Stakeholders</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFWA</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALM</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Generally, the anti-logging groups had a bigger shift toward the front of the paper over the three years, with the ALP’s on average moving from page 19 to 10 and the Conservation Council of WA moving from page 26 to 7. Over the whole three-year period, the combined anti-logging articles published in *The West Australian* from non-political party stakeholders (including the LFF) numbered about 50% more than those of the pro-logging groups. This was offset by the large number of pro-logging articles sourced to the Coalition government parties.

The analysis for 1998 in Table 8.8 indicates that nearly all groups had their average location well back in the paper (except for the two LFF articles) and most were placed on the left hand page (except for a small number of LFF, TCA and National Party articles). This location toward left hand pages would reduce the attention that the articles received from readers. In 1999 there was a renewal of
interest in the issue by *The West Australian* and most organisations had an average location far closer to the front of the newspaper. The biggest changes seem to be with articles from the National Party (a change on average of 16 pages) and The Greens (a change on average of 18 pages), although articles from the TCA and FIFWA were on average published further back in the paper than in 1998. This is an indication of the gains made by anti-logging groups in opposing the RFA (see below).

By 2000, all groups except for the Liberal Party saw their average page number location move forward in the paper compared to 1998. This gained a greater prominence for their articles. The articles from the ALP and the CCWA moved further forward in 2000 to have a median value near those for articles from the WAFA and FIFWA. The articles about the Liberal Party were on average well back in the paper compared to the other forest policy stakeholders.

Of interest in this analysis is the physical location of the articles in *The West Australian*. In 1998 most of the articles were placed on left hand pages (ie a location score close to 0). During 1999 most stakeholders had an average closer to the left hand side while in 2000 CALM (0.75), Greens (0.71) and Timber Communities Australia (0.83) had most of their articles published on the more preferable right hand pages. The biggest changes in page location values were between 1999 and 2000 with The Greens and CALM having the biggest shift in values. Their averages indicated that most of their articles were placed on the right hand pages in 2000. The Liberals for Forests had as many articles published in 2000 as all of the other non-Liberal political parties together. This was due to the publicity they obtained toward the end of that year for their policies for the upcoming 2001 election.
8.5 PERCEPTIONS OF BIAS

The above analysis of the articles for the period 1998-2000 by various means does not show any clear bias on the part of The West Australian. However, supporters of the continuing logging of native timber cited particular examples of reporting that convinced them of such a bias. One such example was the year-long debate over claims made by Dr Judy Clark in support of her call for the ending of logging of old-growth forests noted in Chapter 6. Her original statement was carried in The West Australian on page 6 (Capp, 1998d) while CALM’s rebuttal six months later (Quekett, 1999c) was printed on page 42. The report by the Government providing support for CALM’s rebuttal was printed on page 38 while an analysis of the report which supported Dr Clark’s original claim was carried the following year on page 6 (Quekett, 2000c). An analysis of the page location of this example would imply that the paper was biased toward the anti-logging side of the forest conflict as the pro-logging articles were further back in the paper.

However, over the three-year period it would also be possible to highlight unusual locations of particular articles or the non-reporting of events and media releases as a way of creating a claim of bias from the anti-logging stakeholders. The way in which I interpret this example is that a reputable WA forest network outsider challenged government policy and her report was well-placed in the paper on a slow news day (Monday). The response from policy insiders supported their existing position and was released on a busy news day (Friday). It was therefore not seen as news and was placed further back in the large Saturday edition of the paper. Darnovsky (1995: pp225-227) proposed that some stakeholders believe the role of the media to be providers of unbiased
information-the ‘information model’. Her other model was the ‘manipulation model’ which she believed co-exists with the informational one and credits the media with a power to “dupe or stupify” the public. The actions of both the anti-logging and pro-logging groups reflect these two models. Media releases and briefings were prepared by SMOs to provide facts about particular issues ('information model’) and when a media outlet chose to not print them, or to not give them prominence at the front of the paper, then the media were accused of bias (‘manipulation model’).

Another factor to consider in terms of bias of reporting is access to journalists. In her study of US women countermovements Rohlinger (2001: 2) claimed that journalists rely heavily on policy insiders such as politicians and government officials because of tight deadlines, space limitations and a lack of resources. She proposed that the ‘homogenizing’ of news coverage meant that it focused on episodic events and on ‘expert’ opinion. Her analysis places policy outsiders such as the LFF and WAFA at a disadvantage to insiders such as TCA and FIFWA, and hence provides support for a claim that if there was to be any bias, it would have been toward the existing (pro-logging) policy setting.

My analysis above of the total articles published during 1998-2000 shows no clear indication of bias by The West Australian. An analysis of the language used in newspaper editorials published by The Sunday Times and The West Australian was made above and is another indicator that this newspaper took a more even-handed approach to the forest debate than did The Sunday Times. It is likely that stakeholders held different views on bias in the media dependent on their view of the role of the media in reporting the forest conflict.
This perception of bias by both sides of the forest debate made me reflect on whether they were both reading the same articles. The Metro Edition of The West Australian is prepared later in the evening after the State Edition and has on average changes to about 5-10% of its pages. I undertook an analysis of the State and Metro Editions and this revealed that many forest articles carried in these two editions had different headlines, although in almost all cases the actual articles had the same text. Appendix 7 highlights those alterations that were found in a one-third sample of the forest articles between 1998-2000 from The West Australian. An analysis of this sample would indicate that about 30-40% of forest articles had changes to their headlines- a rate substantially higher than the 5-10% page changes made between editions for the whole paper.

RAD, an ex-editor of The West Australian, was approached to see if there was an editorial policy at the paper towards having different headlines for the different audiences in the city and the country. His response indicated that there was not:

> State edition final deadline was 8.30 pm to get it to the regions. Small circulation in nightspots of the city and late night delis etc. Metro editions started around 11 pm and are changed through until 1.30am. After State edition the paper is pulled apart and remade. Many headlines are rewritten to improve them. Nothing to do with different audience interests/values (email 23 January 2003).

Some of the changes I identified between editions are minor ones and would be examples of the type to improve the headline, as suggested by RAD above. Examples of such changes are included in Table 8.9.
Table 8.9- Examples of Minor Changes in Metro Edition Headlines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>State Edition</th>
<th>Metro Edition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27/01/98</td>
<td>SW forests face push into ocean</td>
<td>SW forests may be pushed into ocean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/03/99</td>
<td>Logging risk at blocks</td>
<td>Forest blocks at risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/06/99</td>
<td>Tots enrolled in logging fight</td>
<td>Tots enrolled in forest fight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/08/00</td>
<td>Vineyard cashes in on wine tourism</td>
<td>Vineyard cashes in on wine and tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/11/00</td>
<td>Stockpile logs for charcoal welcomed</td>
<td>Charcoal firm looks to stockpiled wood</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the majority of the changes to headlines in the Metro Edition I identified seemed to totally change the focus of the original headline. I have included some of the more obvious examples of these changes in Table 8.10. For example, the article on 7 March 1998 in regard to CALM’s operations in the State Edition seemed to provide a balanced view of them while the Metro Edition had a very negative connotation and classed their operations as ‘forest blunders’. In Table 8.10 I have also highlighted what I think are the implications of the different headlines for each of the city and rural audiences.
Table 8.10- Examples of Headlines Altered in Metro Edition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>State Edition</th>
<th>Metro Edition</th>
<th>Different Meanings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/03/98</td>
<td>Brickbats, bouquets for State, CALM</td>
<td>Tangled laws blamed for forest blunders</td>
<td>In State ed. CALM gets both positive and negative reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/12/98</td>
<td>Farmer backs CALM’s forest handling</td>
<td>Voice of support for troubled CALM</td>
<td>Farmer identified in State ed. But in Metro one CALM is ‘troubled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/12/98</td>
<td>Timber sleeper row</td>
<td>Greens stroke log row</td>
<td>Greens given credit for raising issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/12/98</td>
<td>Sustainable logging level unknown: EPA</td>
<td>Level of SW logging still unknown: EPA</td>
<td>Logging levels are unknown is city ed. but just sustainable one for rural ed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/01/99</td>
<td>Five held as forest protest heats up</td>
<td>Five arrests as war restarts in forests</td>
<td>Protest becomes a war in city ed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/01/99</td>
<td>Labor plans brake on forest plan approval</td>
<td>Labor drives wedge through forest deal</td>
<td>ALP’s plans become a wedge in city ed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/03/99</td>
<td>Truckies make a big impression at rally</td>
<td>An early start to last stand for a life’s work</td>
<td>Positive slant for timber readers who support the truckies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/06/99</td>
<td>Call for RFA to be changed</td>
<td>Logging ban for a new era</td>
<td>Emphasis in metro ed. Is on logging ban.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/07/99</td>
<td>Liberals tense over backlash</td>
<td>Liberals boil over backlash</td>
<td>Liberals are tense in the bush but boil over in the city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/07/99</td>
<td>Court to unveil new forest plan</td>
<td>Court to unveil revised strategy</td>
<td>Revised RFA is sold as new for the bush and revised in the city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/08/99</td>
<td>Inquiry call on State funds for doomed mill</td>
<td>State blamed for mill closure and lost jobs</td>
<td>Closed mill becomes doomed for rural readers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/08/99</td>
<td>SW job losses will cut deep</td>
<td>Government faces RFA climbdown</td>
<td>Job loss focus for rural readers and Govt. focus for city ones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/08/99</td>
<td>Whittaker’s log supply probed</td>
<td>CALM faces log probe</td>
<td>CALM named in city ed. But company in the rural one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/08/99</td>
<td>Protest punches in CALM office claim</td>
<td>Punches thrown in CALM office protest</td>
<td>Punches identified with protesters in rural edition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/1/00</td>
<td>Greens lock on to gear to stop forest workers</td>
<td>Greens use chains to stop forest tree cut</td>
<td>Forest workers are being stopped in rural ed. but focus on trees in city one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/1/00</td>
<td>CALM to seize protesters property under new rules</td>
<td>CALM to seize gear in protests</td>
<td>CALM to focus on protesters in the rural ed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/04/00</td>
<td>Ousted co-guardian fears for WA’s green integrity</td>
<td>Ousted green guardian fears for EPA integrity</td>
<td>City focus is on EPA while rural one on overall green issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/05/00</td>
<td>CALM cuts its dieback losses</td>
<td>CALM gives up dieback losses</td>
<td>CALM gives up in city ed. but is only cutting its losses in rural ed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/11/00</td>
<td>Floods linked to salinity</td>
<td>Land clearing linked with SW flood</td>
<td>Rural focus is on salinity but on logging in city ed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My analysis of the changes between the State and Metro editions of The West Australian between 1998-2000 showed that, on average, there were three
times as many changes made to article headlines that dealt with the forest debate than for the overall newspaper. This suggests to me the editorial team believed that different audiences might take different positions on the forest debate. It appears they altered many of the headlines to ensure that the different audiences of the State and Metro editions had headlines sympathetic to their likely political stance on logging. In almost all of the cases where I have identified that the headline had been changed the actual text of the articles and most of the photos were the same. This information does not provide any empirical evidence for an anti-logging bias by the newspaper but does create a topic for further study by those interested in the way in which mass media construct their stories for different audiences and why newspaper sub-editors create different headlines.

**Articles Added to the Metro Edition**

In addition to the changes in headlines between newspaper editions, my analysis of articles from *The West Australian* uncovered another way in which different perceptions about the newspaper coverage of the forest conflict could be developed between city and rural readers. Table 8.11 indicates that from late 1998 a number of articles not printed in the State Edition of *The West Australian* were added to the Metro Edition. In general, they replaced national stories from other States on issues such as IVF programs and sailors lost at sea. A common element of these additional forest articles is that they clearly identify CALM in their title (often in a negative way) and report on the policy differences between important stakeholders such as the major political parties. The new articles added to the Metro Edition could be seen to be of more interest to anti-logging city readers who might provide greater support to the anti-logging policies of the Greens and
The addition of these articles to the Metro Edition also implies that The West Australian assumed that country readers are more pro-logging in their orientation toward the forest issue and would not want to read these negative articles.

**Table 8.11- Articles Added to the Metro Edition of The West Australian**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Headline of Article Added</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21/01/98</td>
<td>Travel guide has CALM in its sights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/10/98</td>
<td>Nationals in funding plea for CALM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/10/98</td>
<td>Logging jam fixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/10/98</td>
<td>Labor attacks felling in block</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/11/98</td>
<td>Coalition rift on forests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/01/99</td>
<td>CALM felled saplings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/01/99</td>
<td>Forest pledge ‘will be broken’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/06/99</td>
<td>Edwardes rejects Greens move for RFA changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/08/99</td>
<td>Unions clash over payouts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/08/99</td>
<td>Showdown looms for rally**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/08/99</td>
<td>Divert cash to bush, advice (ALP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/08/99</td>
<td>Tuckey blasts forests panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/04/00</td>
<td>Axe-wielding loggers attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/06/00</td>
<td>Old-growth forest cut set to rise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/08/00</td>
<td>EPA rejects clearing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/08/00</td>
<td>Elders: land ceremony an insult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/10/00</td>
<td>Job loss fears for timber mill workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/10/00</td>
<td>CALM drops clearing case</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.6 ANTI- AND PRO-LOGGING MESSAGES

There are a number of commonalities but also significant differences between the messages in media statements by the key stakeholders from both sides of the forest debate over the period 1998-2000. The great majority of the forest articles in The West Australian in 1998 were on the Regional Forest Agreement and various policy proposals toward it. While it would be expected
that political organisations such as The Greens and the ALP would focus on the RFA and criticise the Government’s handling of this process, all of the articles attributed to the pro-logging SMO Timber Communities Australia were about the RFA as well. This was not the case for the articles by the anti-logging WAFA and the Conservation Council. About half the articles sourced to them were on the RFA but there were also a wider range of other issues their comments dealt with.

One common theme from both sides of the debate during 1998 was the threat to withdraw from the RFA process. Anti-logging groups such as WAFA and CCWA did carry through on their threat and spent considerable effort in trying to undermine the legitimacy of the RFA over the following 18 months (Betti, 1998: 27). However, after also initially threatening to withdraw (Jacobson, 1998: 14), the TCA (then known as the Forest Protection Society) continued to participate in the RFA and a month later claimed success in having new criteria added to it (Jacobson, 1998b: 8). These two items in regard to the actions of the FPS were only printed in *The Sunday Times* and not *The West Australian*.

While the case for an anti-logging bias in *The West Australian* was not supported by my analysis above, the decision not to publish these two stories about the role of the TCA in the RFA might suggest a different bias on the part of *The West Australian*. Stories about the withdrawal of the TCA from the RFA or that the TCA had an impact on the direction of the RFA process could have suggested to the newspaper’s readers that the RFA process was indeed flawed, as claimed by the anti-logging groups. The decision not to publish them could be constructed as a pro-logging bias by the newspaper.

A common thread in the media items between 1998-2000 I sourced to the pro-logging groups was a focus on the number of jobs that would be lost if any
further limits were placed on the logging of old-growth forests. This strategy seemed to follow the successful use of a focus on employment issues in earlier epistemes during the growth of the WA timber industry, as mentioned in Chapter 5. Such claims for a large loss of jobs were made by the TCA (Jacobson, 1998c: 8), the timber industry peak body FIFWA (Capp, 1998c: 8) and the company SIMCOA (Rechichi, 1998c: 57). FIFWA also took two major publicity initiatives on forest job issues in 1998, first to run a $500,000 advertising campaign to be paid for by the timber industry (Capp, 1998: 36; WES interview) and then to employ as its CEO Bob Pearce, an ex-ALP Minister for Environment in the Burke Government (Capp, 1998f: 5).

By 2000, Bob Pearce was still with the FIFWA, and the pro-logging groups had maintained their focus on arguing that limits to logging would destroy employment in the logging towns and therefore undermine their community (Burns, 2000: 6). A full-page advertisement in March in The West Australian pictured a mother and her children and was titled “Please give my children a future” (2000b: 17). WES, who helped develop the pro-logging media campaign, said that this was very much an emotional appeal and differed from the scientific and teacher-based TV advertising campaign used by the TCA in 1998.

On the other hand, the articles reporting the activities of anti-logging actors indicated that WAFA coordinated numerous protest activities outside of the RFA process and that members of WA’s political and cultural elites (eg Dame Rachel Cleland, Shane Gould) supported the protests. Protest continued in the forests as well as outside the Premier’s office and offices of companies such as SIMCOA. At the same time, articles from the LFF focused on the forthcoming election, their organisational building activities and the possibility that they would hold the
balance of power after the 2001 election (Rechichi, 2000b: 35; Burns, 2000b: 10). CCWA articles drew attention to actions of government and indicated that they were trying to find various ways to undermine its authority, eg by pursuing the Minister for Forests for illegal tree clearing on his property and claiming that the Government protected a wealthy wine grower in the south-west for a similar activity (Southwell, 2000: 29). They gained prominent publicity for their rating of the Government’s overall environmental performance and judged them as having only achieved 30% of the promises they made before the 1997 election (Quekett, 2000c: 6).

A common campaign tactic for all anti-logging groups was investigating whether or not there were a large number of log stockpiles left unused on the forest floor by CALM (Butler, J., 2000: 38). This campaign followed on from the Forestry Pacific report in 1998 that found that these piles did not exist. In October 2000, the LFF scored a coup when it was able to provide the WA media with a list of forest stockpiles and photos of each. Dramatic photos appeared on the front page of The West Australian of the valuable timber left to rot and many radio and TV stories and interviews followed up this story (Butler, J., 2000b: 1). The Government was forced to defend CALM’s activities and claims from small loggers that they could utilise the rotting logs (Butler, S., 2000b: 32). An unexpected outcome of this story was the decision of SIMCOA no longer to use old-growth timber in its charcoal smelter but to utilise the timber from the stockpiles (Callaghan, 2000b: 6). This was a major victory for the anti-logging movement as just two years earlier SIMCOA had threatened a large loss of jobs if it was forced to utilise stockpiled logs rather than old-growth ones (Rechichi, 1998c: 57).
During the 1998-2000 period the traditional anti-logging SMOs focused on opposing the Government’s plans to split CALM and in not providing greater legislative strength to the EPA. Throughout 2000 the ALP also pursued the Government in the courts to access files in relation to the use of old-growth jarrah timber in railway sleepers, a practise that in 1999 the Government had promised to stop (Pryer, 2000: 6; Gibson, 2000: 8).

As already indicated in Chapter 3, few articles on the forest debate between 1998-2000 made reference to Aboriginal issues. In 1998 there were only three, one announcing that the Noongar Land Council (NLC) was to pull out of the RFA process (Capp, 1998e: 53), the second that CALM had bulldozed a sacred site in the forests (Lampathakis, 1998: 36); and finally that the NLC had called for the RFA process to be altered (Lampathakis, 1998b: 45). In all three cases these articles were published toward the back of the paper where they would have fewer readers. In the same issue as Capp’s article, she had two others on forest topics published on page 6, confirming that The West Australian did not think Aboriginal involvement in the forest debate very newsworthy. In 1999 and 2000 there was only one other article relating to Aboriginal involvement in forest issues and that was to report that the NLC would participate in the WAFA annual anti-logging protest outside parliament (Capp, 2000: 10). Other researchers may find this lack of Aboriginal involvement in forest issues as reported in the WA media an interesting research topic in the debate over forest policy in other States (such as Victoria and Tasmania) where conflict over logging remains.

In the lead up to the 2001 election an important change in direction for the anti-logging stakeholders was its ‘humanising’ or ‘personalising’ of the forests, with advertisements calling for the people of WA to ‘Vote for the Forests’
(Callaghan, 2000: 3) and to ‘Stop the Rape’ of the forests. An earlier indicator of this strategy by the anti-logging groups was an half-page advertisement that followed a large anti-logging protest in Perth in July 1998. The advertisement was placed by the Conservation Council and thanked the public who attended the rally. It was headed “Thank You from the Old-growth Forests” (CCWA, 1998: 30). So while the pro-logging movement were emphasising employment and community cohesiveness, the anti-logging groups’ main message was a portrayal of trees as extensions of the human community. It is likely that some of the success of parties supporting an anti-logging policy in the 2001 election was due to the decision of the pro-logging groups not to move away from their focus on jobs. FIFWA described the power of the anti-logging message to resonate in an emotional way with the WA public as one of the reasons for the focus by the TCA and FIFWA organisations on jobs and the forest communities in the south-west:

…it is all emotional stuff. ... we stopped trying to describe forest management [scientifically] to people and just said "look, what you are doing here is killing the communities"...pointed to Nannup and pointed to Pemberton and abandoned our preferred approach and just try and explain to people that going through a thing [reduced timber cut] had an emotional impact as well.

During the 1990s there were many stories of large Australian corporations ‘downsizing’ and sacking tens of thousands of workers. The largest telecommunication company, Telstra, had cut its workforce by 50,000 between 1997 and 2002 and planned to cut a further 3,000 in the near future (Ruse, 2003: 36). In the case of the collapse in 2002 of Ansett, Australia’s second-largest airline, it was estimated that over 60,000 people lost their jobs (Doherty, 2002). However, estimates of job losses from the WA timber industry due to the revised RFA proposals or the new ALP policy was only about 1,000. It is likely that these dramatic employment losses undermined the legitimacy of TCA and the FIFWA organisations.
message about the loss of timber jobs and weakened its impact within the broader WA public. During 2000 the success of groups such as LFF, WAFA and CCWA in obtaining good access to the WA newspapers and in building public opposition to logging was due to its use of elites and well-known WA personalities. The main message these people communicated was to give a human aspect to old-growth forests.

I collected data about the most commonly used words in headlines of *The West Australian* (in Appendix 8) as a way of trying to see if the headlines reflected these different messages of the two SMO’s campaigns. I could not find any link between the focus of these organisations and the words used in the headlines. The most commonly used words in the headlines over these three years were descriptive ones to do with the actual issue: forests, timber, trees, logging and RFA or the surname of individual stakeholders. This finding reinforces my conclusion above that there was no evidence in *The West Australian* of an anti-logging bias. My analysis did show though, that pro-logging stakeholders were mentioned in the headlines by name twice as often as the anti-logging stakeholders.

8.7 IMPORTANCE OF TV

I did not have the resources to analyse the role of TV in the debate on forest policy in WA, but it is worth mentioning there were two stories carried on a national TV network during the period 1998-2000 that impacted on the debate in WA. These two stories were aired on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, the publicly-funded national network. The first was a documentary in 1999 from the high-rating *Australian Story* series on the support by Dame Rachel Cleland for the
anti-logging movement. In her own words, the documentary on her going into the forests at the age of 93 to protest had a positive and ‘electric response’ on the WA public. Within 2 hours, the ABC’s Internet chat room had received over 700 hits (Cleland, 2000: pp10-11).

The second story was a *Four Corners* current affairs investigation into the WA forest debate aired in November 2000. This story was a wide review of the various arguments on forest policy, the differences between the Federal and State governments over the RFA and the possible impact of the LFF on the 2001 election. In the program the Premier, Richard Court, gave some insight into how difficult it was for his government to reconcile the competing demands of both sides of the argument:

> I would have to say of all the issues I’ve had to address in eight years in government, this has been the most sensitive, and it has been difficult finding a balance where we are able to meet the needs of most of the community and people have said that you should have gone further with the original Regional Forest Agreement but we reached that after many years of work and a lot of, a huge amount of scientific assessment that had taken place. But I don’t have any difficulty at all in revising that particular agreement because we were getting a very strong message from the community that we had not gone far enough (*Four Corners* transcript).

While the analysis above of the forest conflict as reported in newspapers indicated that it was predominantly of interest to a WA audience, these two stories suggested that at least some elements of them were seen to be interesting enough to be developed for high-rating national TV programs. The elements that were seen to be of interest for the national audience were the role played by a high profile member of the elite and the role of the RFA process in bringing the forest conflict to an end. These are two of the three events highlighted above that I
identified as having boosted the number of articles on the forest conflict carried in WA newspapers between 1998-2000.

8.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter has analysed various aspects of the reporting by State and national newspapers between 1998-2000 of the WA debate over the logging of native forests. I undertook this analysis to investigate how important the media was as a resource for the SMOs and how their access to *The West Australian* was used to frame their different policy proposals to the WA public. This period was selected because of its importance to the whole forest debate in WA. The WA Coalition government expected that the RFA would bring a close to the debate over forest policy. The results of this analysis confirm the importance of *The West Australian* newspaper to this debate. They also confirm the different approach to forest policy topics taken by the *Sunday Times* in its editorials and headlines. The analysis has shown further that, as the debate accelerated over the RFA during 1999, articles reporting comments by stakeholders in the debate moved toward the front of the paper and onto the more prominent right hand pages. The debate over the new RFA focused on a number of key issues such as the role of CALM, the importance of scientific evidence and the actions of members of the political elite in the forest debate. This focus was not only in terms of the number of articles printed in 1999 but in the impact it had on many of the forest policy network stakeholders when the RFA was speedily revised. The increase in the coverage of the forest debate during 1999 was also generated by internal conflict between the two government departments CALM and the EPA and, especially, the revelation
that the maps used by CALM in developing the new RFA forest reserves were flawed.

In terms of articles reporting the activities and demands made by anti-logging stakeholders, this chapter has shown the important role played by the formation of the LFF and the role played by WA’s political and cultural elite in assisting the publicity efforts of anti-logging groups. The analysis confirmed that *The West Australian*, in particular, took a greater interest in the forest issue after the intervention of football coach Mick Malthouse. This may indicate the existence of an “issue-attention cycle” (Nelson, 1984: 51) whereby many in the media were not interested in the forest issue until Mr Malthouse’s intervention. His action and the subsequent formation of the LFF created a new cycle of interest by the media, especially *The West Australian*.

My analysis shows no evidence for the claims made by some pro-logging stakeholders that the media were biased against their articles by pushing them further back in the paper or publishing them mainly on the left hand page of the newspaper. Government and pro-logging groups had more access to the printed media (in terms of the number of articles published) over the period 1998-2000 as they controlled the RFA process. Another factor that mitigates against an anti-logging bias were the large number of journalists who reported on the forest debate over this period. Also, the involvement of Mr Eastwood from the timber company Wesfarmers as Chair of the Board of West Australian Newspapers (see Chapter 3) would suggest such claims for a broad anti-logging conspiracy at this newspaper were unlikely. Jackson (2003: Media3) reported that Australian media interests made larger donations during 2002-2003 to the pro-business Liberal
Party than the ALP and my analysis does not support the accusation that Perth’s sole daily newspaper took an anti-business editorial approach to the forests issue.

On the other hand, this analysis has uncovered information that *The West Australian* altered article headlines, mentioned pro-logging groups and individuals by name more often in headlines and removed particular anti-logging articles from the State edition of the paper that is read in rural areas of WA. This could not be claimed as a pro-logging bias but probably was done for economic reasons to ensure that the reporting of the forest debate did not reduce its sales in either its metropolitan or country markets.

The chapter also looked at the different messages developed by the TCA and anti-logging groups such as the LFF. The TCA maintained as core a message over the period 1998-2000 that any further moves to cut the logging of old-growth forests would undermine the economic foundations of the logging towns and their communities. In this context the TCA changed its name in 1999 from the Forest Protection Society to one that included its key message- ‘communities’. The message of the anti-logging groups was not as consistent over the three years and changed in character after the release of the RFA and the subsequent formation of the LFF; articles and advertisements for the 2001 election gave a personal or human character to the old-growth forest. I return to this issue in the next chapter.
This chapter provides an analysis of the material contained in the previous chapters with an emphasis on the first-hand material provided by my interviews. I have structured this chapter around the framework I used to describe the literature my research was based on, identifying factors at the macro, inter-organisational and intra-organisational levels that I believe have been important in concluding this long drawn-out debate. Some factors such as the socio-economic changes that have occurred in the south-west of WA have impacted on both the macro and inter-organisational levels. I have selected factors that I think have been the most important in prolonging the forest debate and delaying the move to the ecological episteme. Material provided in Chapter 6 indicated that by the end of the 1980s a large majority of the WA community supported the end of old-growth logging although forest policies reflecting these values were not implemented until 2001.
9.2 FACTORS OPERATING AT THE MACRO-SOCIETAL LEVEL

I now explore important factors at a societal level that assisted the anti-logging movement overcome the forest policy persistence (Coate & Morris, 1999: 1327) in WA. After more than 150 years of logging of WA’s native forests the policies of the Gallop Government reflected the public’s new attitude to old-growth forests and represent what I call the ecological episteme. The main factor that allowed the anti-logging movement to overcome the power of the traditional insider stakeholders were these new public values. Chapter 6 showed that there was an increase in pro-environmental feelings in WA during the 1980s and the proportion of the WA population in favour of environmental issues was higher than the national average through the 1990s. With the election of the ALP Gallop Government in February 2001, the ending of logging of old growth forests seemed to be ‘an idea whose time as come’. The question may be asked why these pro-environmental attitudes were not powerful enough to bring about the ecological episteme earlier?

Prior environmental success at the Federal and State levels

The changes in public attitudes to logging in WA forests over the period 1970-2000 to some extent reflect changes to the national forest policy that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These changes commenced under the Hawke Labor Government and continued under the Keating Labor Government, which initiated the national RFA process (see Chapter 5 above). A key policy actor within government at the Federal level during this period was Graham Richardson, the Federal Environment Minister from 1987-1992. His first success was in 1987 where he achieved the seemingly impossible by his wholesale
abandonment of the recommendations of a government-initiated report on Tasmanian forests and the subsequent nomination for World Heritage listing of virtually the whole area being studied. The 1987 Helsham Enquiry had been established by the Labor Government to report on logging proposals in a bitterly contested forest area in Tasmania and the Minister graphically described the report’s outcome:

It came down saying the wrong thing, we had to knock it over- which was not a very palatable thing for the government to do. And ahh…we had a Cabinet meeting that went for days on that …that question. Days (Labor in Power, 1998).

This quote highlights two important issues for my study: first that the Minister was determined that the Government would take a more pro-environmental approach to the forests of Tasmania and second, that there were great divisions within the ALP Cabinet over forest policy. Ministers with economic portfolios, such as Finance Minister Peter Walsh (1984-90), believed that with this decision the Government had been ‘hijacked’ by environmentalists.\(^1\) Walsh highlighted a dichotomy occurring at the national level within the ALP similar to the RFA debate that occurred in WA.

This dichotomy was between ALP members of parliament who wished to take a more pro-environment policy approach reflecting new public values and those members who supported the workers employed within the timber industry. The logging debate took on a bitter tone within the ALP because, as a political party, it needed policies that could be presented as supported by the whole party,

\(^1\) Walsh (2002) later claimed the electoral success of green political groups in Australia as dangerous and a threat to Australia’s high living standards. He is now the President of an Australian anti-environmental think tank- the Lavoisier Group.
including those sections representing trade unions. This bitterness within the ALP over forest policy was indicated by Peter Walsh’s (Labor in Power, 1998) comments in regard to the Government’s response to the Helsham Enquiry report:

It was opportunistic, if one was to adopt a more principled, or consider principle, which is probably something which does not bother Graham [Richardson] very much, but a Labor Government knowingly put out of work blue collar workers in Tasmania, poorly educated blue collar workers in an area where the unemployment rate was already 24%. A Labor Government knowingly put extra people out of work in that area- at the behest of middle class trendoids from the eastern suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne. That is something which I believe a Labor Government ought to be ashamed of.

On the other hand, a key supporter of Richardson’s stance was Paul Keating who later as Prime Minister (1993-96) would introduce the national RFA process. At the time (Labor in Power, 1998) he defined his support for Richardson in opposition to logging as a conservative stance:

Now some of the trees were very old there [Tasmania] and were reaching a point where they were going to die naturally, after so many hundred years and there was an argument ‘look log them now, they will go anyway’, but log which ones? So I came down, if you would like, on the conservative side of that argument. That was to preserve them, because they are, I think, part of the world heritage.

This debate within the Federal ALP over environmental policy in the late 1980s has similarities to a debate a decade earlier within the WA Branch over the proposal for the creation of the Shannon River National Park. In his interview, MP well remembers this debate:

So the Shannon debate blew up inside the Labor Party in the 1970s. I ... remember the impact of the Shannon debate ... a couple of times I had to walk David Evans, the member for Warren, back into the Labor Party. He was at the point of resigning several times, wrote out his resignation because the Labor Party at a Conference – made – bit the bullet with regard to the Shannon

---

2 Up until 2003, ALP processes such as National and State Conferences had their representation weighted 60:40 to union representatives.
....Because the Labor Party held the seat of Warren, ever so narrowly, it was not a safe seat, it was a really marginal seat with a lot of farming communities as well as the timber towns of Pemberton and Manjimup, a lot of people felt that that was compromising Labor governments in their ability to take the strong stand.

The difference between the debate in the early 1980s and that over the RFA in 1999 was that there were no rural-based ALP members in 1999 willing to support the stance taken by the timber unions to continue logging. The opposition of ALP member David Evans from the south-west had been a key factor in the ALP initially not supporting the proposed Shannon River park in the late 1970s.

The change in ALP policy towards forests at a State level in 1999 was also not easy. In her interview, ALP placed the emphasis for the shift in policy on a pro-forests rally in the winter of 1999. To her, the size of the rally in very wet conditions indicated the depth of support by the public for the issue. However, there was still some strong union support for the continued logging of old growth forests. To achieve a formal change in forest policy at the 1999 ALP State Conference required the intervention of the ALP State Opposition Leader, Dr Geoff Gallop, (interview ALP-ENV). The strong feeling from both sides of the debate at the Conference led to the demand for the use of a ‘show’ voting process, the first time that this had been used at a State Conference for over 20 years. The final vote was 235 (60%) in favour of the change and 155 opposed (Burns, 1999: 7).

The division within the ALP between those supporting the end of logging and those supporting its continuation was also felt within the union movement. The Trades and Labour Council played almost no role in the debate being carried out within the forest policy network in WA between 1998-2000 due to the influence of unions representing timber workers. This was a similar response to
that which occurred in the early 1980s over the proposal for a park in the Shannon River basin (Sharp, 1983: 145). In his interview, TLC outlined the limitations on the role of the Trades and Labour Council in regard to the RFA in 1999:

> And in the absence of that referral or willingness for the affiliated union to be prepared to refer the matter, ... the protocols are that we have no right to intervene. Um, just as any other union would not want us to be able to spontaneously put their business on the agenda for other unions. Um, so that’s why, there is good reason why the protocol needs to exist in terms of the cohesion of the organisation but it can be used to stifle discussion. So the reality is that’s the problem, the timber division refused to allow it to be on the agenda and therefore it had to be played out elsewhere.

As a further example of the deep divisions that existed within the ALP, the Minister for the Environment in 1988 in the Burke Labor Government, Bob Pearce, took up the role as Director of the Forest Industry Federation (FIFWA) in 1997 after leaving parliament. ALP-ENV attributed the division within the Burke Government over forest policy to the affiliation of various senior Cabinet Ministers to either the Miscellaneous Workers Union (MWU) or the Australian Workers Union (AWU). The MWU covered employees working in the State’s national parks while the AWU covered those employed in the timber industry.

Major factors in the decline of pro-logging union influence on ALP forest policy would be the growth in party membership of those who supported a new environmental approach to the forests as well as the overall decline of union membership since the early 1980s. As union membership declined in WA, so did the voting influence of the ALP union affiliates, especially the AWU which represented the rapidly declining number of workers employed within the WA timber industry identified in Chapter 5.

In terms of changing public attitudes toward the environment, this debate within the ALP and its union affiliates would have been watched closely by the
WA community. The public then had seen the national ALP government take a very strong stand on the logging of forests in Tasmania and Queensland and rely on the ‘green’ vote to retain office in the 1990 election. This decade of debate within the ALP and attempts to protect forest areas would have had two effects on people in WA: the first would have been to show that pro-environment supporters were enthusiastic and committed to their new vision for the forests. Zald and Useem (1987: 255) suggested that this is an important part of the mobilisation impact of SMOs as well as a factor in affecting the timing of the mobilisation of any countermovement.

Second, these earlier policy actions by ALP governments at both a national and state level could be construed as reference models for the resolution of the WA RFA conflict based on a complete logging ban. Freeman (1979: 177) suggested that such reference groups, or lack of them, are important resource constraints on the success of SMOs. In this way Freeman suggested a resource using the RMT approach that helped provide a bridge with the NSM theorists. The WA community could see that SMOs calling for changes to the forest policy based on new values might be successful because similar policy approaches had been adopted before by the ALP.

**Socio-economic changes in the south-west of WA**

At the commencement of the campaign against the logging of old growth forests in the early 1970s there seemed little public support for the proposals developed by new organisations such as the Campaign to Save Native Forests. However, during the debate over the RFA in WA in the late 1990s, opinion polls indicated that public support for the anti-logging campaign was over 80%.
Explaining why these changes occurred is difficult but it may be suggested that it is in part due to factors identified by Inglehart (1977) to do with higher education levels within the WA population. Associated with this is the increased knowledge of world environmental disasters over the past 30 years, as outlined in Chapter 6, that has been included in high school and university curricula. As I noted in Chapter 8, local media also gave prominence to global forest issues in Indonesia and Brazil. An awareness has developed among the WA public that environmental pressures are not just an overseas issue but that the south-west of WA is facing a number of environmental challenges from the loss of its native forests, loss of animal species and the threat of salinity. This resulted in the south-west region of WA being nominated as one of 25 global biodiversity 'hot spots' by TIME magazine (Rosenblatt, 1999: 49). The changes in public attitudes over the period 1970-2000 are not just restricted to forests but reflect profound changes in attitudes to general environmental issues as well. Some of these changes are reflected in the ABS data reported in Chapter 6.

A dramatic example of these general value changes toward the natural environment during the period of the RFA debate in WA was provided by public response to a shark attack in November 2000. At that time a swimmer was killed by a great white shark near the shores of a popular Perth swimming beach. While the authorities tracked the shark with the intention of gaining approval to kill it, members of the public responded to this horrific event by telephoning radio stations supporting the proposal that the shark should not be harmed. This unexpected response was confirmed by a report in The Australian (Keenan, 2000: 5) and a national poll on this issue the following day by the Sydney Morning Herald web site (http://smh.com.au/polls/world/results.html) that indicated a
similar trend nationally with over 66% agreeing that the shark should not be harmed. In his interview, RAD was surprised by this response from the Perth public and indicated that he met a similar level of support for the shark not to be harmed by his listeners: “…*and I’ve got probably 80% [in support of the shark] and my audience is a lot more redkneck than Liam’s [presenter on the public radio station].”*

It has not been the purpose of this study to theorise on why these changes have occurred within WA at an individual level, but public opinion data provided in Chapter 6 above confirm that major changes in environmental attitudes had occurred in the past 30 years. What this study has shown is that by the end of the 1990s there had been a dramatic influx of people to the south-west of WA from a socio-economic background that is linked to a higher support for the environment (eg younger people, people with a university degree and those on higher incomes). These changes have been most dramatic in the Local Government Areas LGAs surrounding the forests (eg Augusta-Margaret River to the West and Denmark to the East) but not within the timber region centred on Manjimup. Figure 9B highlights the different population outcomes for these two LGAs over the past 30 years with Augusta-Margaret River LGA’s growth coming from intra-state migration from the Perth region. Chapter 6 showed that this migration to the south-west of people employed in new industries such as tourism that make use of the natural beauty of the old growth forests included many with NSM attributes linked to post-material values.
Pro-logging movement’s failed framing of its arguments

While the environment movement had been successful in building a new approach and vision for using the forests, and there had been initial success locally and nationally in protecting some forest areas, the pro-logging countermovement has campaigned unsuccessfully against these value changes. In Chapter 8 I proposed this was due to their use of language that framed the conflict in their advertisements and media releases in terms of a ‘deprivation’. As I mentioned there, the TCA and its supporters proposed that their communities would lose jobs by any new policy that further restricted logging levels. Their approach to this conflict utilised a theme common to debates over development in Australia since Federation, suggesting a gap between the city and regional populations’ access to key resources and funds.
Historian Geoffrey Blainey (2001) dedicated one of his Boyer lectures to what he called ‘the great divide’. He claimed that the ‘rift between regional and outback Australia on the one hand and the big cities on the other… was present even in 1900 but it has grown.’ He also claimed (p1) that it is wider than at any time in the last 150 years. However, in the case of the south-west of WA, socio-demographic changes in the period between 1970 and 2000 would not support a thesis of the deepening of the “city-country divide”, but a bridging of it. This period has seen a large number of city people move to the south-west to establish new businesses taking with them their so-called ‘city’ values towards the environment.

Blainey recognised that the divide between city and country is not just about economics but that it is also about values and culture. In reference to hard-core environmentalists, he is quoted as saying that “The effects of a green ban on a potential project in a sparsely-populated region, where job opportunities are few, are dramatic compared with such a ban in a capital city” (Lane, 2001: 11). His view is typical of the hegemonic use of this ‘taken for granted’ divide identified by Kapferer (1990: 104) that has proven useful in the ‘mythologising of Australianness as the embodiment of rural virtue’.

The data provided in Chapter 6 would indicate that the south-west region may be different to other regional areas of Australia in terms of this proposed “city-country divide” and the recent economic fortunes associated with the broader Australian rural decline. This is confirmed by a study undertaken by AFFA on Australia’s national wine industry (2001). This study showed that the south-west region of WA now has the second largest number of wineries (64) after the Hunter region in NSW (with 126) despite the first vine plantings
occurring about 25 years ago (www.affa.gov.au/corporate_docs/publications/pdf/rural_science/social_science/wine_statm2.pdf). Other AFFA data indicated that the wine-producing areas of WA were the only ones to have a population where more than 10% held higher education qualifications (www.affa.gov.au/corporate_docs/publications/pdf/rural_science/social_science/inc_housem25.pdf). Also, the AFFA report found that the south-west of WA had a higher rate of decrease in unemployment between 1991 and 1996 than other wine-producing regions in Australia. Even more dramatically, AFFA found that the Margaret River region was the only wine-producing region that had a net increase in population between 1991 and 1996 of about 20% while all other wine regions suffered decreases of around 10% (www.affa.gov.au/corporate_docs/publications/pdf/rural_science/social_science/pop_demom20.pdf).

These national industry data confirm my suggestion developed from the ABS Census data that the south-west region of WA changed dramatically between 1971 and 2001 as the wine and tourism industries developed and that these changes were different to those occurring in other wine regions and country areas of Australia. As the population increased in the south-west, a key group that migrated there in association with the new wine industry were professionals. The interview data confirmed that a key section of the population in the south-west who opposed the logging of the old growth forests were professionals such as doctors and teachers. Nearly half of those interviewed mentioned the important role played by the group ‘Doctors for Old Growth Forest’. This group was identified by members of WAFA as key supporters in the south-west and provided
WAFA with support in terms of funds and volunteers to undertake research within the forest region. This was a task that could not be undertaken from Perth.³

The political strategy developed by the TCA and other pro-logging stakeholders did not reflect these dramatic changes in the south-west of WA. The TCA is a branch of a national organisation and the strategy chosen to take on the anti-logging movements may have been appropriate in other states that had suffered higher unemployment and no new industries to replace timber-based ones. However, in WA the strategy did not resonate with a public that visited the region often for holidays. The closeness to Perth of the Margaret River region is also different from other states (except for Tasmania) with conflict over forest policy. In these states the timber areas are much further from the capital cities. This means that WA urban residents could take a weekend trip to the south-west and see a booming region with new industries that relied on the natural beauty of the forest and coastal environment, something not possible in other states.

But the question remains- if there have been big socio-economic changes in the south-west since the early 1980s, why had this not been reflected in changes in forest policy before 2001?

³ Medical practitioners also played important roles in previous Australian environmental campaigns. Sinclair (1994: 33) suggested that Dr Arthur Harrold saved the Cooloola forest in Queensland from sandmining in the 1960s and Dr Bob Brown was a key organiser of the successful Franklin Dam campaign in Tasmania in the early 1980s (Hutton & Connors, 1999: 159).
A new political opportunity

When I reviewed the interview data and the newspaper article data from 1998-2000 it became clear the debate in WA over the proposed RFA provided a new political opportunity for the anti-logging organisations. Marks and McAdam (1999: 98) believe that the concept of ‘political opportunity’ has become a staple of social movement scholarship in explaining the rise and success of SMOs. I have already noted above that RAD thought that up to 1998 the debate was ‘old’ and that the two sides were rehearsing unchanged arguments. What caused the situation to alter, especially for the local WA media, were two events: first the decision by the anti-logging groups to stay outside of the RFA process and not to participate in its debates and discussion of proposed policy options. This strategy of criticising CALM and the RFA process also led to the intervention of some of Perth’s elite to form the Liberals for Forests (LFF).\(^4\) Second, new media interest was created by the criticism of CALM’s logging operations by the EPA (EPA, 1998). Both of these instances resolved around the key role played by CALM in managing the RFA process, controlling information about WA forests as well as managing the timber resources of the State.\(^5\)

After the publication in November 1998 of the EPA report, the forest debate moved from a discussion of sustainable logging levels to the credibility of the RFA process and its management by CALM. Media comments, especially by members of the WA elite (such as Dame Rachel Clelland) after the formation of the LFF, seemed to support previous criticisms of the RFA process made by anti-

\(^4\) The LFF was formed by Dr Keith Woollard, an ex-Federal President of the Australian Medical Association (Irving, 1999: 7).

\(^5\) CALM’s then-Director Dr Syd Shea had also been a key actor in the Shannon River debate. As a member of the ALP’s environment committee he opposed a motion at the 1978 State Conference that would have seen the ALP support the establishment of the Shannon River national park (Sharp, 1983: 176).
logging groups, hence giving credibility to these criticisms. Not only did movement organisations such as the LFF and WAFA develop criticisms but they could point to a different, more inclusive and consultative RFA process being undertaken in Queensland at the same time as the one in WA. CCWA suggested in her interview that the Queensland process was one that led to an outcome with tripartite agreement from government, conservationists and forest industry organisations.

It is likely that if the Court Government had placed the RFA process in the control of a different department (eg the EPA) that allowed the anti-logging organisations to participate in what they thought of as a worthwhile way, then the RFA may have produced a similar tripartite agreement to Queensland’s. It would seem that the ALP has learnt from this policy failure of the RFA process and the controversy that flowed from the original RFA proposals for new policy options. Since it formed government in 2001, it has undertaken a number of policy reviews on similar controversial issues (eg sustainable development, water use, freight transport planning, drugs policy) where it has utilised processes that bring together the diverse policy network stakeholders to prepare a range of options for the Government to consider. This has been codified into a formal document titled *Consulting Citizens: A Resource Guide* (CCU, 2002). The Government Citizenship unit also maintains a web site of all current consultation processes being undertaken by State government departments (www.ccu.dpc.wa.gov.au/index.cfm?fuseaction=concat).

The criticism of CALM, and its conflict of interest in being both conservation regulator of the State’s forests as well as vendor of the timber logged in them (Churches, 2000: 142), by other stakeholders created a new angle for the
local media. By the late 1990s the anti-logging movement included a wide range of groups with different tactics to gain media reportage. I comment further on this diverse range of groups below but it is important to consider here the change between the 1970s and the late 1990s in the grouping of stakeholders within the forest policy network able to take up this new political opportunity (see Table 9.1).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Early-1970s Stakeholders</th>
<th>Insiders</th>
<th>Outsiders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-logging</td>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal/National parties</td>
<td>Public viewpoint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forest Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unions (most)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Timber companies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-logging</td>
<td></td>
<td>Academics (few)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conservation Council (WA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CSNF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No position</td>
<td>TLC</td>
<td>Tourism industry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Late-1990s Stakeholders</th>
<th>Insiders</th>
<th>Outsiders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-logging</td>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>Institute of Foresters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CALM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unions (AWU only)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Timber companies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-logging</td>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Academics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>LFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Greens</td>
<td>WAFA affiliates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Australian Democrats</td>
<td>(&gt;30 groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Unions (eg MWU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tourism industry</td>
<td>Public viewpoint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No position</td>
<td>TLC</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Page 312
My analysis in Chapter 8 indicated the greater media coverage given to the forest debate from 1999. It was clear that in 1970 the media supported existing logging policies while my analysis of the coverage for 1998-2000 shows that at that time *The West Australian* did not have a clear stance on the issue but seems to have altered its reporting for Perth and country readers. Due to this uncertainty over whether the media had a clear position on the logging issue I haven’t included them in Table 9.1 in my list of stakeholders with a known position in the late 1990s. But the reporting of the issue by the WA media played a crucial role in giving the issue wide coverage in 1999 and in helping to sway the public toward an anti-logging position.

In terms of the construction of the organisational effectiveness of the LFF and the TCA, it is clear that the TCA was in the position of having to defend a policy approach that had been in place for more than 150 years. The LFF was one of a number of organisations undertaking an ‘outsider’ strategy to overturn the policy. As the forest policy changed away from exploitation, first with the Shannon River Park being established in the early 1980s, it was not possible to blame the TCA directly for the policy backdown and hence frame it as ineffective. On the other hand, it was also not possible to link the changing public values toward the forest directly to the campaigns of the anti-logging movement. During the 1980s and 1990s there were a series of other movements that helped build these new values.

For example, an anti-nuclear movement was established in 1978 to block the construction of WA's first nuclear power plant. This movement was successful in 1983 with the election of the Burke ALP government. Also, during the late-1990s there was a successful inner-city campaign to stop houses being built on
public land at Leighton Beach. In his interview LAW recalled that this later campaign involved many high profile people who also supported the anti-logging campaign of the LFF in the late 1990s.

9.3 INTER-ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS

In this section I identify what I see as the two most important factors operating within the WA forest policy network that have affected the debate over logging. The first is the role played by the bureaucrats and scientists employed by the State to manage the State forests which lengthened the debate to the advantage of pro-logging stakeholders. The other factor I think was important at this level was the use by the anti-logging movement of high profile members of WA’s elite. Their involvement in the forest campaign was a counterbalance to the role of the public servants who had controlled the forest policy settings for over 80 years since the formation of the Forests Department in the early 1920s and probably helped overturn the existing logging policy.

The role of bureaucrats - from forests to CALM

The public servants overseeing the State’s forests were originally employed in the Forests Department and then from 1984, in the Department of Conservation and Land Management (CALM). This group of stakeholders is associated with a ‘scientific’ rather than an emotional approach to the forests. An early forest bureaucrat, Kim Kessell, used an interesting strategy to maximise the powers of the Forests Department- he ensured that the Premier of the day was also the Minister for Forests (Mills, 1986: 74). The downfall of the department and its reshaping into CALM seemed to be due to its actions during the debate over the
Shannon River National Park. The debate over the Shannon and the changes implemented by the Burke Labor Government proved to be a mid-way point to the final stopping of the logging of old-growth forests in WA. The insights of ACADI of his experiences 20 years ago in regard to the Shannon River Park proposal are useful when considering later events around the RFA:

Now that has great relevance, I think, to the [forestry] issue in the south-west. The point you raised about the fact that it still goes on, there is still the argument, does not surprise me in many ways because the people that were involved in the forests department in particular were really immovable. Really immovable. [emphasis in original]

I found that when the National Park, the Shannon National Park, was recommended, ... the Government asked a new committee to be established to look into it. ..... and I don’t know what role O’Brien [Departmental Head] played in this, but certainly he was under enormous pressure from the Forestry people. Their recommendation was that this was - they poo-pooed the Shannon River - they said it’s a kind of park that has been cut over, it’s not got the best forests in it, and so forth. ... Shannon is not worth keeping - and they were the words they used, “Shannon is not worth keeping” - ..... and that was a very compelling kind of an argument they put forward.

The committee organised to look at the System Six Committee Shannon proposal (see Chapter 5 above) was stacked with people in favour of logging who recommended that the park not proceed (Sharp, 1983: 56). The Liberal Coalition Government did not proceed with the park and the ALP was having its own troubles, as many of their members supported the park proposal, including the Secretary of the TLC Peter Cook (Sharp: 143).

The election of the Burke Labor Government in 1983 saw the creation of the new Shannon River National Park as originally proposed by the System Six Committee. In a strange twist that reflected earlier historical practises, the Premier, Brian Burke, made himself the Minister for Forests and commenced planning for the amalgamation of the Forests Department with several other
government departments, such as National Park and Wildlife, to create the new department of CALM in late 1984. *ALP-ENV* said in his interview he believed that sections of the ALP hoped that this strategy would enable the Government to better control the Forest Department staff and their approach to forest management. *MP* reported that the Premier placated the Member for Warren (which contained the major timber centres of such as Manjimup), Dave Evans, by making him the Minister Assisting the Minister for Forests. In the second reading on the new CALM Bill, the Attorney General acknowledged the difficulty experienced by the Government in trying to deliver policy that placated the wide range of forest policy stakeholders (as Premier Court found out a decade later with his own RFA proposals):

…the Government has freely acknowledged that it does not have universal support for its proposals. ….In the area in which we are now dealing, land resource management, it is even more difficult to achieve a consensus on the direction of necessary change. By its very nature, land resource management involves complex technical issues on which even experts cannot agree, and it affects a broad range of different interest groups….the Government has attempted to logically and objectively determine the direction in which land resource management should go in this State (Berinson, Hansard WA Legislative Council 11 December 1984: 4958).

Given the controversial nature of its proposal to form CALM, the Government proposed that the Select Committee that was examining the new CALM Bill be transformed into an Honorary Royal Commission. It was asked to review the legislation within 12 months of its enactment and proclamation by Parliament (Berinson, Hansard WA Legislative Council 11 December: 4959). This was to be the fourth Royal Commission on forests in WA during the 20th century, making forests one of the most controversial policy issues for politicians.
The Head of the new Department for CALM was Dr Syd Shea, who had been a Department of Forests employee and had then been seconded to the Premier’s office as a scientific adviser to help with forest policy issues. MP remembered Dr Shea as an active ALP member and the Chair of its Environment Committee:

\[\text{Syd Shea was one of the most effective bureaucrats in the WA Government in the '80s and '90s. Even though he was a young departmental head, ... The guy that understood everything there was to know about the WA forests, the Department of Forests, and the forest policy, becomes Head of the Department of Premier and Cabinet. And then the guy that succeeds him just happens to be one of the brightest and most effective ..., in policy terms. ...Syd had been an activist in the Labor Party. Many a conference I have referred to, ... when the Shannon River thing, ...Syd was the voice of significant information, quality data and reason, never regarded as a red neck, who just basically wanted to bowl over the forests, respected as the young scientist who had worked on die back, eradication and things, and he played a significant role in that [ALP Environment] policy committee.}\]

Several of those interviewed confirm that Dr Shea was a good friend of the ALP Premier. For example, LIB said:

\[\text{And they put Syd Shea, a friend of Brian Burke - and Brian Burke mentality, he was an absolute horror - he was the one that did most damage [to the forests] although they [Court Liberal Government] finally gave him the sack,...}\]

An ALP Environment Committee member who served with Shea at that time, ALP-ENV, commented:

\[\text{...to keep a bit of a shackle on those [forest] people, yeah. However, Syd Shea came in with all his credentials, because of his dieback credentials, etc etc. he was on all those things [ALP Environment Committee], and um he arrh, because of his friendship with Burkie, was appointed the head, the inaugural head [of CALM], and ever since then he just became more of a forest type person, a logging type person than a conservation, environmental type person. ...but no, Shea just built his own fiefdom, and um that was the end of it as far as we [ALP members] were concerned,...}\]
Opposition parties at the time were worried by the appropriateness of the appointment given Shea’s ALP connections. They asked a series of questions in Parliament about his suitability and the background to the appointment process (eg the number of applicants and who was on the selection panel) (Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 20 February 1985: 138-140; Hansard WA Legislative Assembly, 21 February 1985: 193).

Over the next 14 years under his leadership, CALM became an increasingly controversial department. By 1987, the ALP Environment Committee was calling on its own Burke Government for CALM to be split into two again (ALP-ENV), a process that would finally occur in 2000 under the Court Coalition government. There seemed to be two main areas of concern with the operations of CALM under Dr Shea’s leadership. Firstly, major environmental initiatives (eg ‘Western Shield’ which reintroduced endangered species back into the wild) were undertaken with internal department resources provided by increased royalties from the logging of native forests. On this point MP said:

…. but Syd Shea was a consumate politician, with regard to this issue, and I think Syd's leadership in that area almost convinced Cabinets and the arms of the media very, very effectively over a very long time, that they were conserving the forests. ... I frankly think the reason that he has hung on for so long is that it was never appreciated the extent to which over-cutting was occurring. ... it was, something suddenly clicked in these last few years that all of a sudden the notion that we were overcutting, not just logging but overcutting at a rate that couldn’t be sustained.

The Liberal Party’s coalition partners, the National Party, were also worried about the level of logging and during the RFA process in 1998 called for the logging of jarrah to be cut by 57% (Capp, 1998i: 28). The National Party had also recognised how internal revenue transfers were distorting CALM’s dual roles of managing environmental and conservation issues in WA while also managing the
logging of WA’s native timbers. They called for CALM to be given a specific budget of $168 million for its conservation measures rather than having to rely on logging royalties to fund them (Capp, 1998h: 9).

Secondly, CALM gained a reputation for a lack of openness about its operations and its forest management approaches. While finding ways of controlling the forest debate in WA seemed to serve the Forest Department well up until the Shannon River proposal, this organisational culture would reflect badly on the Court government during the RFA process. By this time the public was far more aware of background details to the forest issue and the new options for preserving them developed by the anti-logging movement. This claim of a forest department controlling the debate over policy had been made two decades earlier (see ACAD1 above) and was one made not only by environmentalists. ACAD4 also expressed concerns over CALM’s control of debate on the forests:

Well I think you have to obviously pay attention to what CALM were doing, and the personalities within CALM because after all they were in a position of managing the forest on behalf of the State and the people of Western Australia. They were also providing information to government ... State Government ministers and Federal Government ministers ... and so they controlled all the information flows. So, what actually came out of CALM is what CALM wanted to come out, rather than what perhaps might have come out. Well where else would you see the policy debate around forests? Who else would have the information that they could usefully contribute to that debate, that makes it very, very hard when all the figures for example in terms of growth rates and yields and potential logging areas and so on are managed by CALM and that information is not publicly available.

CALM was viewed by many of those interviewed as an organisation that controlled the forest debate by controlling information flows about forestry issues. This was also a criticism during the RFA debate as most of the scientific advisers that provided input to the process were CALM employees (Quekett, 1999: 48).
CALM also did not seem to be concerned to win over the WA public to its preferred forest policy approach by fostering a broader debate and flow of information on WA’s forests. IOF suggested that other organisations that had large impacts on the jarrah forest such as multinational company ALCOA (a subsidiary of Aluminium Company of America) developed an alternate approach to managing the discourse over their impact on the forests. He claimed that ALCOA worked strenuously to mould a public perception in WA that their mining operations had a minimal effect on the jarrah forests:

*I think the classic comparison is Alcoa when they started up in the 1960’s and early 1970’s, there was an absolute outrage. The fact that they were clearing the jarrah forests, but that was the number one environmental campaign by all of the greens all over the State. They were locking onto all the Alcoa gates and equipment and that, but Alcoa have completely turned that around by good public relations: they run tours through their place all the time, they tell their story flat out. … and one of the other things they did was they, say crudely, they bought them [their critics] off but, they were a very strong promoters of the local communities you know giving money for different things and for Landcare groups around the place and most importantly I think in the tertiary institutions, they provided a lot of money for research and, in doing all those things, they got people on side and you know CALM has suffered badly from academic people in universities who criticise what they are doing, whereas that completely disappeared for Alcoa because they were putting a lot of money into the universities. You never hear a squeak about Alcoa’s operations yet they’re clearing six or seven hundred hectares of jarrah forest each year.*

All anti-logging people interviewed for my study suggested that historically CALM, and the Forest Department that preceded it, tried to limit debate on forest policy in WA and had captured both major political parties’ forest policy up until 1998. CALM’s culture of secrecy may be a common feature in bureaucracies and this topic deserves further studies. Similar public furores have been blamed on medical professionals acting in a paternalistic and secretive way (AAP, 2001: 39) and being worried about the public’s negative response to government decisions.
However, it was not an approach to policy setting common to all WA resource departments. ACAD4 suggested that another department dealing with rural issues took a different approach to managing information flows and informing their policy stakeholders:

_I worked part-time in the Department of Agriculture and in comparing that agency with CALM is quite interesting because the Department of Agriculture is always responding to small businesses, which are the farmers, whereas CALM were managing the business of timber production and logging in the native forests as well as conservation and then managed all the information flows as well. So whereas the Ag. Dept. are keen to get their extension material out as much as possible, in CALM it has always been very much ...ah a filter, a very determined filter as to what exactly could go to the media._

Based on this information from interviewees and the historic record of the Forest Department over 80 years, I suggest that the attempt to control forest policy in WA by CALM was bound to fail as the number of anti-logging stakeholders and their knowledge of logging issues increased (see Table 9.1 above). Its policy approach was based on an economic surplus model that did not allow for a different approach that recognised the environmental value of native forests. The forest policy capture by CALM was also doomed to fail as it did not seem to recognise the public's increasing environmental awareness. The criticism by the EPA during the RFA process triggered the end for CALM as a department that would try to both exploit the WA forest resources while also protecting its endangered natural flora and fauna.

The RFA debate and the criticism of CALM led to a dramatic change whereby insiders lost control of the forest policy debate in WA after a period of over 150 years. The proposals of the outsider stakeholder groups were finally accepted by first the ALP in its new forest policy in 1999 and then implemented by the ALP Government in 2001. There are two other important aspects of this
development at an inter-organisational level. First, the credibility of the pro-logging scientists was challenged for the first time in an organised way by scientists opposed to the exploitation of native forests for timber. The scientific debates moved from academic journals and into the public arena during the RFA process and received wide media coverage during the furore over the EPA’s report. This report undermined the creditability of CALM and its scientist employees who supported logging. This was probably the first time since the Routleys published their book in 1973 that anti-logging scientists gained a wide public airing for their views via the public media. Second, this challenge to the pro-logging scientists was also a challenge to their rational approach to forest policy. I quoted Berinson (1984) above as saying that during the early-1980s the government was looking to a policy compromise based on a rational and scientific approach to policy development. But the election of the ALP in 2001 indicates that there was no way that the opposing demands of the two movements could be accommodated, and that the anti-logging’s appeal to the important emotive values of nature and forests held sway in public debate. The new non-logging policies put in place in 2001 meant that in the view of eight of the 10 pro-logging interviewees emotional arguments had triumphed over scientific ones. An example of this response from pro-logging interviewees about the use of emotional arguments was provided by TCA2:

...around that sort of middle class of people who have popped up to ...in the forest argument...people who in many cases knew nothing about the forests read from their words, Archbishop Carnley sprung by the Nannup people lies about old growth jarrah ....and he has come back with a farago of bullshit, basically, the forest he knows nothing about anything with regard to the details, but all he has got is his views...without the information, and that is a bit like people popping up with a moral view and with no facts...factually correct stuff.
In similar political settings Marcus (1991: 196) believed that “human endeavours may well be governed more by emotional processes than by rational or cognitive processes”. The WA forests campaign in the late 1990s was a good example of the undermining of the policy power of CALM by the new public attitudes to the forests. These new values also limited the ability of bureaucrats and politicians to find science-based compromises that were agreeable to both countermovements. The first anti-logging campaign in the 1970s was established by a science-based analysis of the timber industry (Routley & Routley, 1973) but three decades later the public seemed to respond to the new framing of the anti-logging arguments in an “emotional” approach that described trees and forests in human-like ways.

**The Use of High Profile People in the Media**

Another finding of my analysis of the forest campaign at an inter-organisational level was that high profile or prominent WA people were used by the anti-logging movement to gain publicity for their demands. These well-known West Australians were used as ‘carriers’ for the new emotional descriptions of the threats faced by the forests through the continuation of logging. The most obvious example of the use of such people was the intervention by the West Coast Eagles AFL Coach, Mick Malthouse discussed in Chapter 8 above. The impact on the public debate that he and other high profile people made was recognised by *LNP*:

*To the community obviously their ability to be able to engage high profile people in the emotional sort of logging debate irrespective of the truth or otherwise of the particular data that they were putting forward. To the government, right, that does not sway the decision.*
One of the high profile people mentioned in interviews as an important stakeholder, and a founding member of the group, was LFF4. She said it was a conscious decision on her part to use her personal influence within business and conservative circles in support of the anti-logging campaign:

*My other role is an awareness project, to constantly work on people to raise awareness and to constantly work where I have influence, not just in public awareness, but where I have influence, political influence or business influence to ... get other people to make a conscious effort in the same way that I do.*

Well-known fashion designer Liz Davenport’s public stand on the issue of native forests was credited with bringing other high-profile people into the anti-logging campaign (Davenport, 2000: 9). RAD suggested that these high-profile individuals were important, not so much in terms of gaining access, but in helping to bring the issue back on the ‘front burner’ of public debate in the period 1999-2000:

*Well the real breakthrough in the whole issue came when the protagonists changed, and it moved away from the Conservation Council and the Campaign to Save Native Forests, and those sort of groups, and some new players came into it. And this were the people like Dame Rachel Cleland, and the Woollards, the Doctors for Forests, and Guy Grant and the few people who were associated with that group - who were the Western Suburbs push, and they - they are the ones who changed the landscape.*

When Liz Davenport’s was inducted into the WA Business Hall of Fame, she dedicated six of her new creations to the wool industry and six to the native forests. This was the beginning of the fundraising campaign called ‘Fashion for the Forests Collection’ (Davenport: 10).6 Famous West Australians who opposed the continuation of logging included 16 of the State’s sporting elite and Olympic

---

6 Davenport later involved herself in the anti-logging campaign in Tasmania and conducted a photo-shoot of some of her clothes among the trees in the Styx Valley (TWS, 2000).
champions (Martin, 1999: 13). One of the highest-profile sports people who gave her name (and a later photo-opportunity of herself joining the anti-logging protestors in the Boorara block near Northcliffe) was the Australian swimming champion, Shane Gould (Rechichi, 2000c: 13). Her story probably had a greater impact on the public as she had lived in the south-west of WA for more than 20 years and understood the impact of both the arguments for and against continued logging of the forests.

ALP put into context the power of such high-profile individuals to the organisations using them saying that it was their ability to get the core anti-logging message of the movement into the media:

My hunch is that is probably where they [anti-logging groups] do best, in terms of the media or whether they’re successful in getting some stuff in the media, often it was the uh....I mean Mick Malthouse got the ...a disproportionate amount of publicity, and I think from their [the environment organisations] point of view it has been a bit annoying ...in that they have said and done the same things for years, and not got the publicity.

In other words, while the message given by these high profile people may have been the same as that of the anti-logging movement’s previous comments over a number of years, having it annunciated by a high-profile person gave it an air of authority and made it more ‘newsworthy’. This was especially so in WA where the small size of the community means that personalities such as sports stars may also be part of the local ‘political elite’. The use of these high profile individuals was opportune for the anti-logging groups in that it coincided with the

7 The support from high profile West Australians for the LFF has echoes of the earlier Shannon River campaign. Sharp (1983: 133) reported that many prospective CSNF members were put off by ‘heavy political types’ and decided to establish the SFDF (South-west Forests Defence Foundation). This new group was consciously apolitical and respectable and undertook legal challenges to the State's logging decisions.
criticism of CALM and provided another reason for the media to have a renewed interest in the forest debate.

9.4 INTRA-ORGANISATIONAL RESOURCES

I will now conclude with an analysis of two key factors at an intra-organisational level- the network of supporters for both case study groups and the importance of leadership to the success of the countermovements.

**Supporter Networks**

Chapter 7 clearly identified that both sides of the forest policy debate recognised the value of their networks of supporters. On the one hand, the urban-based LFF and other anti-logging groups had a wide range of supporters in the south-west as well as in the urban area of Perth. However, the TCA could only draw upon a dwindling number of traditional industry-based supporters in urban areas in addition to their supporters in traditional timber towns such as Pemberton and Manjimup. The spread of anti-logging supporters to the south-west of WA over the past 30 years was linked to the macro social changes noted above. This has meant that the LFF and other organisations within the WAFA had highly committed individuals living and working in the communities that surrounded the forest region, and often within it. So while they were providing support to the anti-logging organisations they were also helping to mobilise the communities in which they lived toward a more anti-logging stance.

An active network of supporters is a key organisational resource identified by a number of RMT writers (eg McCarthy & Zald, 1976). Numerous studies have shown that one of the most effective channels for the dissemination of information within an organisation is its network of supporters and collaborators.
(Wasserman & Galaskiewicz, 1994; Castells, 1996). The major difference between the 1970s and the 1990s was that the development of new industries in the south-west led many people with a more pro-environment view to move to the region to live and work. These people then were able to support the anti-logging movement by their own involvement or by providing other resources such as funds. Also, the 30-year period would have seen older generations with lower levels of pro-environmental attitude pass away and be replaced by younger people with more post-material values. A good example of this generational replacement was provided by the focus group members I interviewed who had been raised in the south-west but now supported the end of logging and were studying environmental science. Their experience is also some indication of the change in attitudes as young people attend universities. The other key impact of this factor in the late 1990s was that these anti-logging supporters were members of a wider range of SMOs rather than a smaller number, as was the case in the 1970s (see Table 9.1 above). Depending on their preference, people could involve themselves in a broad spectrum of activities: from joining business people opposed to logging ('Men and Women in Suits' group) or living with the ‘ferals’ within the forest areas about to be logged.

The importance to the anti-logging campaign of different groups appealing to different sectors of the public was suggested by TWS:

... once they started up Liberals for Forests, I saw it as the last jigsaw piece that you actually needed to make it a winnable campaign. ... once they were in place, we had every element that you really need I think to win a campaign- ah the only extra thing that you could have got if the Labor Party had continued to run the line that they had two years ago of not protecting old growth forests is to start a 'Labor for Forests' group ...
On the other hand, Timber Communities Australia seemed to have had real organisational problems in resourcing a publicity drive to alter the attitudes of people living in the urban areas of Perth. Their supporters were limited to the small number of timber-related workers in Perth and industry organisations such as FIFWA that were located there. Up until the ALP State Conference of 1998, the pro-logging unions (such as the AWU) were able to retain some level of organisational power over the ALP’s forest policy. But with the new ALP Leader, Dr Gallop, taking a different position on forests to his predecessor, this power was substantially reduced. One remaining positive factor of the influence of these pro-logging supporters within the ALP has been the $123 million commitment by the Gallop government to support displaced forest workers to find new jobs. These funds have been provided for training and publicity measures such as the establishment of a web site to help find new jobs for the workers who had lost their jobs (www.tlcwa.org.au/cases/index.html). The Civil Service Association (CSA) was another union associated with the ALP that suffered a substantial loss of members when the Court government between 1993-97 reduced public servant numbers during three ‘waves’ of legislative reform (Bailey, 2001: 125). The CSA was critical of the preference given to providing support to the hundreds of timber workers that lost their jobs compared to the lack of resources given to the 20,000 public servants who had lost theirs (Pryer, 1999: 33). In this case, the TCA could be seen to have been effective in its campaigns as it was able to secure far greater financial resources for its members than unions who had faced similar industry-restructures.

Over the three decades of public lobbying for an end to logging the anti-logging movement broadened its organisational base to one with a wide range of
groups operating under the umbrella of the WA Forests Alliance. This alliance-structure has been so successful that the anti-logging groups in Tasmania have modelled their strategy to save 7,000 ha of internationally recognised forests by establishing the Tasmania Community Alliance as a new structure to further their anti-logging activities (Altmann, 2002: 5). Over the same period the pro-logging movement shrunk in influence in both public support and support within the trade union and ALP sectors. Additionally, as I showed in Chapters 3 through 6, the political influence of the timber industry in the policy network waned and was not offset by greater support from the WA public.

Leadership

One matter that I found did not receive much emphasis during the interviews was the importance of leadership to the two case study organisations. Both movements were led during the RFA debate by influential individuals. The TCA (Trish Townsend), CCWA (Beth Schultz) and WAFA (Peter Robertson) had leaders who had a long commitment to their different campaigns. This meant that they had a deep level of knowledge of the history of the forestry debate and various policy options ranging back to the 1970s. These leaders also had substantial experience in dealing with the media and had a useful knowledge of the other stakeholders in this policy network.

Of interest is that both Townsend and Schultz had suffered setbacks in campaigns they had led over the past 20 years. Beth Schultz was a key activist for the South-West Forests Defence Foundation that lost a court challenge to halt the effect on the jarrah forests from woodchipping in the early 1980s (Schultz, 1999: 232). Trish Townsend was an organiser for the Forest Protection Society in
Queensland fighting unsuccessfully against the new ALP State Government’s plans to halt logging on Fraser Island in 1991 (Holsworth, 1999: pp210-212) before moving to Perth. Also, both were women in what was traditionally a male policy domain. The timber debate had involved men as the chief policy actors up until the time that Cheryl Edwardes was made Minister for the Environment by Premier Court in 1997. *LNP* recognised the importance of Beth Schultz’s long-term commitment:

*Is that because of individual’s own particular passions and they have never given up? For instance Beth Schultz has been a vehement and constant driver of this and been at the forefront of it [anti-logging movement] for a long time. Is that the key?*

Schultz (1999: 233) admitted that her long-term involvement in the WA anti-logging campaign had come at great personal cost to her family but that she was driven by a belief that the logging of old-growth forests was morally wrong. The leadership abilities of women such as Beth Schultz and Trish Townsend had also been an important asset for their organisations in terms of ‘institutional knowledge’ of the history of the forest policy network in WA. Gender may have been a factor for the labelling of some of the anti-logging arguments as ‘emotional’ (see above). The WA Forests Alliance made use of various arguments to support their anti-logging position, including ones provided by scientists such as Calver and Recher (see Chapter 5). However, only the value-laden arguments of the anti-logging movement were mentioned by pro-logging interviewees as having had power to sway the public via media articles.

---

8 Robertson traced his involvement in forest campaigns back to the early CSNF actions in 1979 and has worked for WAFA since 1992 (McDonald, 2000: Today9).
It is at this level of analysis that I could see some linkage between intra-organisational factors and the construction of effectiveness of the LFF and TCA. The LFF and other anti-logging groups followed a clear strategy of building networks of supporters throughout the south-west and of using high profile people in their campaign. In this way they were far more effective than the TCA in recognising the socio-economic changes in the south-west since the early 1980s and the foundation this gave for developing public support for their anti-logging campaign. They probably also built on the Leighton Beach campaign’s successful use of WA’s high profile elite to help their own actions. In his interview, LAW mentioned his involvement and that of his wife in the Leighton Beach campaign. Meyer (2002: 11) suggested that this involvement by individuals working in networks on several issues over time is an important and under-studied aspect of social movements.

Timber Communities Australia chose to remain with their national tactic of trying to develop sympathy for their affected communities and timber workforce. In some ways this approach was similar to that used by other older-style SMOs who based their tactics on a class analysis of society. It was apparent that TCA and their supporters were aware their strategy was ineffective but were unable to develop a new one that reflected the changed public values toward the environment. This despair can be seen in the comments of TCA4:

... we have already forced ourselves in that position where we are about half way through that campaign, we stopped trying to describe forest management to people and just said "look, what you are doing here is killing the community...pointed to Nannup and pointed to Pemberton and looked at people informed....we want to save the trees and we want to save the people I mean we had to abandon our preferred approach and just try and explain to people that going through a thing that had an emotional impact as well.
9.5 CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have proposed some factors at the societal, intra-organisational and network levels that have affected the forest policy debate in WA. There is not one factor at work but a complex interplay of several important ones at different levels of interaction between the anti- and pro-logging movements. A key issue is the new way in which the majority of the WA community now value their native forests. As well, at the societal level there have been important changes in the type of people living in the south-west and the industries operating in this region. The policy network power of pro-logging stakeholders such as organised labour has decreased as union membership in WA has fallen to historically low levels. This chapter has also identified important factors at the intra-organisational level. The importance of leadership and networks of supporters is not new in RMT literature, but these factors have certainly not received the recognition they deserve in Australian SMO literature.

The different factors I identified above allowed me to understand the extent to which different stakeholders in the WA forest policy network could develop different judgements about the effectiveness of the LFF and the TCA. Many of the important changes, especially the changes to public values toward the environment, are not clearly linked to specific actions of the two movements. However, organisational factors such as the use of supporter networks and the importance of group leaders are ones that make it easier to see how LFF could be constructed as the more effective organisation during 1998-2000.
Chapter 10 – CONCLUSION

10.1 MY FINDINGS

The election of the Gallop government during my data collection phase was a defining moment. It clearly signalled a different approach to the logging of old-growth forests and a victory for the anti-logging movement over those groups wanting to maintain the old policy approach. But how relevant to this change were the two social movements at the centre of my research?

The best way for me to start answering this question is by acknowledging that the WA government was not making a choice between two different approaches that were of equal strength. The pro-logging movement was the protector of a policy approach that had been in place for over 150 years and had a range of powerful insider stakeholders that worked to maintain this policy. In Chapters 4 and 5 I provided evidence that Royal Commissions, forestry workers...
and government officials recognised the huge power of the timber industry to achieve policy approaches that suited their commercial needs.

However, the anti-logging movement seeking to protect old-growth forests from logging eventually overpowered the pro-logging movement. The pro-logging movement was challenged for the first time in the 1980s when the Burke ALP government reversed its policy and established the Shannon River national park. This was the first indication of a change in public attitudes that impacted on forest policy and was the first success for the local anti-logging groups. It had come after 15 years of campaigning and further success was to be delayed by the power of the new department, Conservation And Land Management, and the institutional arrangements of five-year forest management plans. If the Liberal Party/National party Coalition had been returned to government in 2001 the new Regional Forest Agreement would have locked the existing forest policy in place for a further 20 years. It is clear from the comments in Chapter 7 by those I interviewed that the ALP had responded in its new forest policy to what the anti-logging social movement had called for.

This outcome confirms Marsh’s thesis (1989b: 230) about the importance of Australian social movements in developing new policy approaches and the proposition of Melucci (1989: 206) that such movements are important in developing new values within a society. There is no doubt that the ideas proposed by WAFA and its member organisations were the key to the ALP amending its forest policy in 1999 and that support provided by WAFA volunteers during the election was vital in assisting the ALP to win government two years later. The policy change in 2001 confirms that the anti-logging movement was more effective in the policy debate from 1998 when the RFA was being developed than
their countermovement. However, as I described in Chapter 8, without the key political opportunities provided by the criticisms of CALM from the Environment Protection Agency and the emergence of celebrities and political elites in support of the anti-logging movement, Timber Communities Australia and the other pro-logging movement stakeholders might have maintained their power over the WA forest policy.

The role and decline in power of the TCA is very interesting. They supported a forest policy that had existed for more than a century and were an important insider stakeholder in the policy network. They could be seen as a classic example of an interest group as their actions in working with timber company owners as well as timber workers ensured that the outcomes they gained clearly benefited these two groups. However, the interviews showed that the pro-logging movement also had a clear set of values underpinning their campaign. The interviewees expressed a love for the forest in similar terms to the anti-logging stakeholders but had a strong belief that a scientific approach would allow the forests to be harvested in a sustainable way over a long period of time. The TCA and the other pro-logging stakeholders were very effective in maintaining a forest policy based on these beliefs long after the Shannon River national park was established. This was despite strong public support for the end to logging, declining timber employment and the rapid rise of new industries in the southwest supplementing the economic importance of timber exports. Additionally, the large industry restructure package of $123 million that the Gallop Government provided to the small number of timber workers made redundant (compared to other industries affected by economic change around that time) also indicated the
effectiveness of the pro-logging groups in playing the insider role. But was it a social movement?

I maintain that the pro-logging movement was certainly not an ‘old’ social movement in the sense used by Burgmann (2003). Its alliance with the timber ‘bosses’ and its attack on other trade unions that opposed the logging of old-growth forests (or earlier the establishment of a woodchipping industry) would not allow it to be so labelled. In fact, it has aspects of a new social movement in that those I interviewed from TCA and the broader forest industry keenly believed that they were fighting to maintain their small communities against other groups they thought were motivated by emotional and irrational reasons. I found through my interviews that many of the TCA staff and volunteers shared deep Christian beliefs, in particular about the importance of community and the need to support those who lose their jobs through government policy changes. However, the TCA may not have appeared to the public as a new social movement because they put so much emphasis on protecting the jobs of workers. This gave them the appearance of an ‘old’ social movement. This was possibly also the reason why Unions WA did not maintain a high profile during the RFA campaign- it did not want to be seen as undermining workers.

The question could be asked whether the TCA could have done anything different in the late-1990s to maintain the effectiveness they had prior to the development of the new RFA? The change in name from the Forest Protection Society to TCA took place at a national level but in WA it was indicative that many TCA supporters did not realise how deep the changes in public attitude had been since the early 1970s. The actions of the public in supporting the Shannon River national park and later the anti-logging campaign showed that they placed a
higher priority on saving trees than on saving jobs in the small timber communities. The media campaigns of Australian environment organisations had made successful use of images of how beautiful the threatened environment was. In the earlier Tasmanian Franklin River campaign spectacular photographs by Peter Dombrovskis were especially useful to TWS’s campaign as it was not easy to actually visit the natural wilderness areas. In WA, many people regularly visited the south-west forest areas for family holidays. Many of those I interviewed clearly expressed that their first hand experiences in the forest were important for their support of the anti-logging movement. They did not need photographs of the forest’s beauty to inspire them to support groups such as the Liberals for Forests (LFF), but were clearly motivated to action by pictures of the destruction caused by the clearfelling techniques used in the WA native forests.

Unfortunately for the TCA, many of those inspired by the beauty of the forests had moved to the south-west to participate in new economic opportunities offered by the viticulture and tourist industries. These people did not believe that their communities were under threat from the proposed halting of logging but were actually developing successfully. I discussed in Chapter 9 the importance of anti-logging supporters in the south-west communities to the success of the anti-logging movement. TCA staff seemed to be aware of these demographic and economic changes but was not willing to alter their strategy of painting south-west communities as relying on the logging of timber. They probably were also limited in what changes they could make to their strategies and tactics as they were the branch of a national organisation. As I showed in Chapter 5, tactics useful to TCA in other States did not apply to WA given the social and economic changes in the LGAs surrounding forest areas in the south-west.
On the other hand, it is also very interesting to review what factors assisted
the anti-logging movement to gain power over the pro-logging one. The most
intriguing finding here was the use by WAFA of celebrities and political elites in
support of their campaign. In the forest campaign these celebrities were mainly
sportspeople (such as football coach Malthouse), whereas the later protests in WA
to protect the Ningaloo Reef used well-known artists and writers. The use of
celebrities from late-1998 greatly increased access to the media by the anti-
logging movement. What was unique about the intervention of these elite Perth
people was their decision to establish their own political party (the LFF) rather
than campaign on behalf of one of the other anti-logging groups. In part this
reflected the limited role played by parliament in debating what the appropriate
forest policy should be. It particularly reflected the impatience by many members
and supporters of the conservative Liberal Party, such as Dr Keith Woollard and
Liz Davenport, with how slowly this party was moving to amend its policies to
reflect the new public values. They established the LFF after lobbying for change
within the Liberal and National parties. It appears that the Liberal Party continued
to support the logging of native forests due to the influence of the large home-
grown timber companies (eg Millars, Bunnings and Wesfarmers). As I showed in
Chapters 4 and 5, these family-based companies- political elites in their own
rights- had links back to the early days of the Swan River colony and the
development of the State based on the exploitation of its vast mineral and natural
resources (Bolton, 1982: 27). That other political elites intervened in such a
powerful way against the logging of old-growth forests highlights the need to
consider the role of different political elites when researching social movements.
So how important were the two social movements? Clearly one, the TCA, was powerful for a long time in resisting any change to forest policy. However, the other social movement was able to capitalise on changes in community values due to a considerable extent by the political opportunities offered by the demise of CALM, the intervention of local elites and the subsequent interest of the media. In this entire process, the government did not take initiatives and was reactive rather than proactive to developments in the public debate on forests. Had the Liberal/National Coalition stayed in power there would have been little change, as there has been no reconciliation between the pro- and anti-logging movements. The draft Forest Management Plan (FMP) proposed in 2003 was based on logging levels close to those sought by the anti-logging movement but left both sides unhappy (Rule, 2003: 10). I had assumed, and implied in the title of my thesis, that after this prolonged debate a new forest policy approach would emerge based on common ground between both the anti- and pro-logging movements. However, change was brought about because the anti-logging groups were more effective in influencing the outcome of the 2001 election. There has not been reconciliation in the forests of WA but rather a shift in policy closer to that campaigned for by the anti-logging movement since 1969.

10.2 USEFULNESS OF THEORETICAL APPROACHES

Given the complex research setting I used a number of theoretical approaches to explore the role of social movements in the WA debate over forest policy. I found the Schumaker framework of political effectiveness very useful in exploring stakeholder judgements on the effectiveness of the LFF and TCA. My findings regarding the WA forest network confirm earlier research into
organisational effectiveness of business and government organisations. It clearly shows that effectiveness was constructed differently by different forest network stakeholders. My research provides for the first time clear evidence that even board members of the same SMO have a different understanding of the effectiveness of their organisation. It adds to the recent important work undertaken by Herman and Renz (2002) in the US that found organisational effectiveness is judged differently by different stakeholders.

**Resources**

My use of the RMT literature helped me understand the key role played by the development of a broad network of anti-logging supporters. This network (especially in the south-west communities) was seen by many I interviewed as having been the critical resource mobilised by the anti-logging groups in this long campaign. The importance of my research has been in showing that this network stretched from Perth to the forests and its surrounding regions. The network allowed the anti-logging groups to gain up to date knowledge, photographs and intelligence to plan their campaigns and to undermine the arguments of groups, like the TCA, who claimed that only people living in the city were against the logging of native forests.

During 1999 these local anti-logging activists were able to help gather evidence for claims made about over cutting and the wastage of fallen timber that were key factors in gaining higher levels of media coverage. As well, they provided support for the young activists (‘ferals’) who undertook protest actions within the forest areas. Additionally, these anti-logging supporters were able to publicly highlight the importance of new industries that had developed in the
south-west over the past 30 years, such as tourism, furniture making and viticulture.

My research confirmed the importance of the media as a key resource for SMOs active in the battle over forest policy. Chapter 9 highlighted the importance of the printed media, particularly in 1999, to the campaigns of anti-logging groups such as LFF. The graphic images of fallen old-growth trees provided the anti-logging groups with a valuable political resource in their campaigns. Interviewees confirmed that these resources were only used successfully because the development of the RFA provided a political opportunity\(^1\) for new developments, such as the formation of the LFF, that renewed the interest of the media in this issue. While the RMT framework assisted me in identifying what tactics helped the anti-logging campaigns during this time, it did not help in understanding why the anti-logging proposals had such deep support in the WA community. For that I turned to the New Social Movement approach.

**Value changes**

Although the media focused on high-profile Liberals supporting the new political party, it would seem that the message of the LFF and the broader anti-logging movement drew support (in both monetary terms and assistance from voluntary labour) from a wide range of the WA population. The NSM literature, and its identification of changing values in western countries since the 1960s, gave me a stronger understanding of the forest conflict since the establishment of the Campaign to save Native Forests in 1969. Social factors identified by

---

\(^1\) The 18 month delay in the production of the RFA report meant that it also allowed this issue to be a high profile election issue during the 2001 State election and assured the success of the LFF candidate, Janet Woollard, to being elected as the first anti-logging representative in any Australian parliament.
Inglehart (1977) such as education and income levels assisted me in framing my research, leading to my finding of a substantial change in attitude to forests and the broader environment by many in the WA community.

It appears that these new values of seeing old-growth native forests not just in terms of timber production was initially elite-driven, especially from people working in academia (eg the Rowleys). But, as I discussed in Chapter 6, over the course of more than two decades it became a normative approach for many in WA. These new values toward forests and the environment seem to be similar to those found in other wealthy western countries.

Australia prides itself on having a long history of introducing new government-led reforms (such as giving women the vote, introducing unemployment benefits and providing pensions) well before other, larger, western democracies. However, in terms of the new environmental values developed since the 1970s all levels of government seem to have lagged well behind the public. Bolton (1982: 35) suggested that in WA there is a political culture of a “consensus view of WA society”. He claimed further that both sides of politics in the early 20th Century “deliberately encouraged the view of politics as being like two cricket teams who took turns to bat and to bowl”. In the case of forest policy, the pro-logging SMOs had been able to use their various stakeholders to gain a hold over the policy-making of both the ALP and the Coalition that was very hard to shift even though a large percentage of the public supported anti-logging policies proposed by groups such as LFF.

While I found the NSM literature very useful, it too had limitations. It helped me understand the value changes due to levels of university qualifications and income levels over the past 30 years but it did not provide any insights into
the social context in which value changes occur. For the question as to why people in WA in the late-1990s translated their different attitudes to the forests into actions in support of the anti-logging movement I had to look elsewhere to find out what it was about the karri and jarrah forests that made people join groups, write letters to the newspapers, make submissions to the RFA and finally vote in the ALP in 2001.

The NSM approach also does not include an analysis of the power of the different policy stakeholders in the forest network as does the policy network approach. Table 9.1 clearly demonstrates the growing range of outsiders in this network challenging the embedded power of insider stakeholders such as CALM, TCA and FIFWA to affect forest policy. Also, the NSM approach does not clearly provide answers as to why some unions supported the new environmental awareness shown by the WA public while others did not (eg the Miscellaneous Workers Union (Sharp, 1983: 162)).

It has been important to my understanding of why this conflict has persisted for so long to combine these different theoretical approaches. Each approach gave a partial answer to the research problem and allowed me to view the data I collected in a different light. For example, my analysis of the media access gained by TCA and LFF between 1998-2000 (a focus of attention for theorists in the RMT approach) was assisted by my knowledge of how much the WA public’s attitude to the environment had changed over the past 30 years (an issue highlighted in NSM literature).
10.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

The major limitation of my research, as identified in Chapter 1, was that it was undertaken in the lead-up to the 2001 State election. I proposed in Chapter 9 that the politicisation of the issue by the formation of the LFF in late-1998 led to greater coverage by the printed media during 1999. As I reported in Chapter 8, both sides of the conflict were worried that their opposition was given preferential treatment by the media and by the government. Many of those interviewed were wary of the purpose of the research and seemed to couch their answers carefully. Some important stakeholders refused to be interviewed. More information on the logging conflict and the role of individuals within it could have been obtained if the research had been undertaken at some later stage, especially if it had been undertaken post-election. However, at the time I undertook my research there was no expectation that the ALP would be elected and the conflict would end so soon.

Another issue in my research was the need to limit the number of people to be interviewed due to time restraints. The interviews had to be completed well before the actual State election as I knew that few stakeholders would agree to participate during the election campaign. This factor, along with the refusal of some stakeholders to be interviewed, meant that a few important stakeholders were not included.

10.4 FURTHER RESEARCH

My findings have raised a number of interesting points that could benefit from further research, especially in an Australian setting. There are other conflicts being fought over environmental issues. These include the old-growth forests of Tasmania as well as the protection of the Ningaloo Reef area in north-western
WA. The Tasmanian forest conflict would have a very different social and industry history but there may be aspects of the conflict that could be compared with the WA experience, such as the impact of the RFA process on the conflict between anti- and pro-logging groups.

Similarly, the Ningaloo campaign was recently concluded after a period of 10 years. It would be of interest to undertake research on this issue in regard to the demographic and economic changes, if any, that have occurred in the north-west region during the campaign. The economic driving forces of this region are different to the south-west of WA and are based on mining and pastoral activities. However, in the past 10 years a substantial tourist industry has developed based on the natural wonders of the coral reefs close to shore. This region is also further from Perth (over 1000km distant) than the south-west region and a research program based on this environmental campaign could assess the impact of the arrival of new participants into the tourist industry in the north-west.

The role of changes in religious affiliation in WA, and particularly the south-west, has been raised in Chapter 6, but I have been unable to undertake a more detailed analysis of its importance. Certainly, the literature of nonprofit organisations more generally has shown the importance of mainstream churches in various social campaigns (eg Hall, 1994). In the same vein, their Christian orientation was an important factor for many of the TCA supporters interviewed for this project. This project was not structured to study in greater detail how important religion was to these pro-logging activists and their campaign. But there may be interesting sociological findings for other researchers wanting to study this further. Given the extensive ABS Census data, a quantitative research program could investigate the link between religious affiliation and environmental
attitudes and cross-tabulate changes in demographic variables such as university education, income levels and religious affiliation for a specific community or a larger region (e.g., the State of WA). It would also be interesting to undertake comparative research into other SMOs campaigning on issues where religious orientation is important to group solidarity (e.g., pro-life SMOs). Similarly, an interesting study would be to look at the religious values of working class communities such as Manjimup compared to a middle class or upper class community in terms of their attitude to social issues such as the environment.

Finally, an issue that could be researched in a more quantitative way is the role of the media in either supporting or opposing environmental campaigns specifically, but also more generally, in relation to new emerging values-based campaigns. The variations in different editions of *The West Australian* could be studied in greater depth and with a focus on understanding how journalists and editors decide what is ‘news worthy’ and why they place articles on different pages of the newspaper. While this research has identified a correlation between the important role played by celebrities and local elites and increased media access for anti-logging groups, it is still unclear why this process operated in the way it did inside *The West Australian*. Is it an aspect peculiar to WA with its focus on sports ‘heroes’ such as Malthouse or is it a general factor operating in other communities and cultures as well?

Bolton (1972: xxi) described WA before World War 2 as “a conservative community, isolated, with a strong sense of regional identity”. While 80 years later WA is a larger and more cosmopolitan state, its isolation from other large Australian and Asian cities probably means that local elites and sports heroes become community icons, and thereby have an opportunity to influence
community values. It is in this sense that local celebrities who gave support to the anti-logging movement played a role in heralding in the ecological episteme as an era in which important events are celebrated with the planting of trees rather than their falling.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

(undated), Submission on the Stage One Review of Sustained Yield Within the Context of Ecologically Sustainable Forest Management, Perth: Royal Society of WA


ABARE (2001), Australia’s Forest and Wood Products Statistics- March & June Quarters (1516.0), Canberra: Australian Bureau of Agricultural Research Economics

ABARE (1992), Forest Products Statistics- March Quarter (1516.0), Canberra: Australian Bureau of Agricultural Research Economics


ABS (2002b), Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership (6310.0), 28 February, Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics


ABS (2000), *Western Australian Statistical Indicators (1367.5)*, September, Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics


ABS (1996), *Census of Population and Housing, CLib96*


ABS (1986), *Census: Profile of Legal Local Government Areas- Usual Residents Counts, WA (2473.0)*, Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics

ABS (1976), *Census: Characteristics of the Population and Dwellings in Local Government Areas, WA (2427.0-2434.0)*, Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics

ABS (1972), *Australian Year Book No. 58 (1301.0)*, Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics

ABS (1971), *Census: Characteristics of the Population and Dwellings in Local Government Areas- Part 5 WA (2.89.5)*, Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics


Blainey, G. (2001), *This Land is all Horizons: Australian Fears and Visions*, Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Corporation


Burgmann, V. (1993), Movements for Change in Australian Society, Sydney: Allen & Unwin


CALM (1998b), Toward a RFA, Perth: Department of Conservation and Land Management
CALM (1992), Management Strategies for the South-West Forests of Western Australia- A Review, Perth: Department of Conservation and Land Management


Capp, G. (1998j), “Police About to Arrest Protestors Camped in Forest at High-Conservation Value Forest Coup”, *The West Australian*, 28 October: 10


Dargavel, J., Johnston, T. & Boutland, A. (2003),


DLGRD (2002), *Western Australian Wine Industry in 2002*, 2nd Ed, Perth: Department of Local Government and Regional Development


DPIE (1997), *Social and Forest Values of the Community within the West Australian RFA Region*, Canberra: Social Assessment Unit, Forest Assessment Branch, Department of Primary Industries and Energy


Forestry Department (1969), 50 Years of Forestry in Western Australia, Perth: WA Government Printer


Freeman, J. (1978), The Politics of Women's Liberation, New York: Longman


Green, N. (1984), Broken Spears: Aborigines and Europeans in the Southwest of Australia, Perth: Focus Education Services

Green, N. (1979), Nyungar-The People, Perth: Creative Research Publishers


Hansard Western Australia (2001), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 25 September: 48 (J. Edwards, Minister for Environment)

Hansard Western Australia (2001), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 9 August: 2343 (B. Omodei, Member for Warren-Blackwood)

Hansard Western Australia (2001), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 9 August: 2341 (C. Barnett, Opposition Leader)

Hansard Western Australia (2000), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Council, 30 May: 7376 (P. Foss, Attorney General)

Hansard Western Australia (2000), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Council, 30 May: 7376 (Hon. N. Kelly, East Metropolitan)

Hansard Western Australia (2000), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 14 March: 4683 (J. Kobelke, Member for Nollamara)

Hansard Western Australia (2000b), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 14 March: 4458 (J. Kobelke, Member for Nollamara)

Hansard Western Australia (1999), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Council, 19 August: 490 (Hon. N. Kelly, East Metropolitan)

Hansard Western Australia (1999b), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Council, 11 June: 3830 (Hon. N. Kelly, East Metropolitan)

Hansard Western Australia (1999), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 29 June: 9726 (C. Edwardes, Minister for Environment)

Hansard Western Australia (1999b), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 22 June: 9390 (C. Edwardes, Minister for Environment)
Hansard Western Australia (1999), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 16 June: 9147 (G. Gallop, Opposition Leader)

Hansard Western Australia (1999), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 16 June: 9147 (J. Edwards, Shadow Minister for Environment)

Hansard Western Australia (1999), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 4 May: 7756 (R. Court, Premier)

Hansard Western Australia (1998), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 15 October: 2226 (C. Edwardes, Minister for Environment)

Hansard Western Australia (1998), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 10 June: 3648 (G. Gallop, Leader of the Opposition)

Hansard Western Australia (1998), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 10 June: 3649 (P. Omodei, Minister for Local Government)

Hansard Western Australia (1997), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Council, 11 June: 3830 (Hon. N. Kelly, East Metropolitan)

Hansard Western Australia (1997), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 25 March: 874 (C. Edwardes, Minister for Environment)

Hansard Western Australia (1985), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Council, 21 February: 193 (J. Berinson, Attorney General)

Hansard Western Australia (1985), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Council, 20 February: 138 (J. Berinson, Attorney General)


Hansard Western Australia (1976), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 24 August: 2056 (J.Carr, Member for Geraldton)

Hansard Western Australia (1921), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 28 September: 1010 (W. Pickering, Member for Sussex)

Hansard Western Australia (1900), *Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 5 September, 258 (C. Moran, Member for East Coolgardie)


Marsh, I. (1991), Strategies for Governing: Bargained Consensus, ‘King Hits’ and Coalition Building, Kensington: Australian Graduate School of Management, University of NSW


www.democ.uci.edu/democ/papers/meyer.htm accessed 17 January


Michels, R. (1915), *Political Parties*, London: Jarrold & Sons


RAC (1991), Community Attitudes to the Environment, Forests and Forest Management in Australia, Forest and Timber Inquiry Report 91/09, Canberra: Resource Assessment Commission


Richards, R. (1993), Murray and Mandurah: A Sequel History of the Old Murray District of WA, Mandurah: City of Mandurah


Robertson, J. (1956), A History of the Timber Industry of Western Australia, Unpublished BA (Hons.) thesis, Nedlands: University of WA


http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/01-06/ accessed 10 January 2003


Skocpol, T. et al. (1985), Bringing The State Back In, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press


The Wilderness Society (1983), Franklin Blockade, Hobart: The Wilderness Society


WAFA (2003), “Ten Serious Problems (Still) Facing WA’s Forests”, *Greener Times*, April: 4


www.diggerhistory.info/pages-conflicts-periods/other/army_in_wa.htm accessed 30 June 2003

www.ran.org accessed 2 October 2002


Appendix 1-
*Focus Group Question Schedule*

**Introductions** (5 minutes)
* Researcher
* Each Group member

**Opening Question (broad)** (15 minutes)
Mentioning the term ‘conflict over native forests’ - what images come to mind for you?

**Transition Questions** (20 minutes)
What previous involvement with native forest issues (eg group membership, participation in rallies) have you had?
What knowledge do you have of native forest issues in WA, proposals by both pro- and anti-logging groups, how long the conflict has been going on?

**Key Questions (narrow)** (40 minutes)
What do you think are the two key anti- & pro-logging groups in WA?
How effective do you think these two groups have been in the forest debate?
How do you personally judge or measure the effectiveness of these two groups?
What are some important resources for the political activities of these 2 groups?
What other groups or individuals would you consider are important to forest policy determination in WA?

**Closing Questions** (10 minutes)
Any there any other issues you want to raise about the forest issue or my research?
In the remainder of my research, I will proceed by using the information you have provided to prepare an interview schedule for about 30 stakeholders I will interview from the WA forest policy network. I will also conduct other research into the forest conflict in WA, such as newspaper analysis and historical research.

**THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS GROUP SESSION.**
Dear «Title» «LastName»,

**Project Title: Reconciliation in the Forest?**
I am a PhD student at Murdoch University investigating the extent to which two WA social movements organisations (The Wilderness Society and Timber Communities Australia) have been effective in influencing the State forest policy process, as judged by some of the SMO's members, influential individuals and representatives of other organisations.

I would like to invite you to help in this study by consenting to participate in an individual interview. The time to complete the interview will vary, however, it is anticipated that no more than 60 minutes of your time will be needed. Contained in the interview are questions which may be seen as personal and private. Therefore, participants in this research can decide to withdraw their consent at any time. All information given during the interview is confidential and no names or other information that might identify you will be used in any publication arising from this research.

I am keen to undertake these interviews in October or November this year to ensure that they don’t overlap with any preparations you may be involved with for the upcoming State elections. I am happy to attend your office and schedule the interview to suit your other commitments. If you are willing to participate in this study, could you please complete the details below and ring me with an appropriate time. If you have any questions about this project please feel free to contact either myself, David Worth, on XX or my supervisor, Professor Cora Baldock, on XX.

I have enclosed a research consent form that you will need to be complete if you agree to participate in this interview. My supervisor and I are happy to discuss with you any concerns you may have on how this study has been conducted, or alternatively you can contact Murdoch University's Human Research Ethics Committee on 9360 6677.

Sincerely,
Appendix 3-
Individual Interview Question Guide

INTRODUCTION
Provide background to research, Murdoch ethics clearance to be signed.

Opening Questions
1. What role do you see you/your organisation has in the process of resolving any conflict over native forests and in forest policy determination in WA?
2. What other organisations or individuals have a key role in the process of forest policy determination in WA?
3. How would you rank these organisations or individuals power to influence forest policy determination in WA (from low to high)?
4. What organisations do you believe are the highest profile anti- & pro-logging groups in WA?
5. What role will the recent WA Regional Forest Agreement have in helping to resolve the conflict over native forest policy in WA?

- Effectiveness
6. How effective do you think the high profile anti- & pro-logging groups have been in the forest policy determination process in WA?
7. How do you personally judge or measure these groups’ effectiveness in this policy process?
8. How would you rate the effectiveness of these groups using the following typology [provide card with Schumaker framework explained on it]:
   i) access responsiveness or the willingness of a government to hear the SMO’s concerns.
   ii) agenda responsiveness or the willingness of a government to place the SMO’s concerns on the policy agenda.
   iii) policy responsiveness or the willingness of a government to adopt the SMO’s concerns.
   iv) output responsiveness or the willingness of a government to implement the SMO’s concerns.
   v) impact responsiveness or the degree that the actions of the government succeed in alleviating the grievances of the SMO

- Resources
9. What are key or important resources for the political activities of these two groups to be seen as successful?
10. How important is the role of the media in affecting public opinion on the issue of forests and other environment issues?

- Values
11. Over the past 30 years, there seems to have been a major change in public values and approach to the forest and its use- what comments do you have in regard to this apparent change?

CLOSING QUESTIONS
12. Do you have any other issues or comments you want to make about this issue?
13. (If time- What do you think has been the role of ‘science’ in forest policy?)

Closing Remarks
How my research project will proceed from here.
### Appendix 4-

**Annual Timber Export Value From WA (1845-1922)**

Forests Department (1922: 33)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Timber (£)</th>
<th>Sandalwood (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>4,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>13,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>1,048</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>1,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>806</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>5,220</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td>7,023</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>12,076</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>9,671</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>9,449</td>
<td>2,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>2,340</td>
<td>7,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>6,051</td>
<td>17,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>4,932</td>
<td>16,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>2,497</td>
<td>24,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>7,151</td>
<td>21,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>2,963</td>
<td>25,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>5,508</td>
<td>24,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>15,693</td>
<td>13,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>6,849</td>
<td>23,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>4,541</td>
<td>18,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>26,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>14,273</td>
<td>32,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>17,551</td>
<td>48,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>14,304</td>
<td>28,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>2,590</td>
<td>31,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>4,771</td>
<td>62,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>24,192</td>
<td>70,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>23,965</td>
<td>66,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>23,743</td>
<td>65,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>36,979</td>
<td>31,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>63,902</td>
<td>35,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>69,742</td>
<td>35,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>66,252</td>
<td>51,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>79,277</td>
<td>77,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>93,650</td>
<td>96,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>79,760</td>
<td>56,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>68,936</td>
<td>20,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>67,850</td>
<td>36,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>50,092</td>
<td>27,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>28,384</td>
<td>34,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>42,060</td>
<td>33,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>63,080</td>
<td>57,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>82,052</td>
<td>51,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>89,179</td>
<td>37,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>78,419</td>
<td>42,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>33,888</td>
<td>32,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>74,804</td>
<td>23,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>88,146</td>
<td>30,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>116,420</td>
<td>65,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>192,451</td>
<td>49,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>326,195</td>
<td>31,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>553,198</td>
<td>29,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>458,461</td>
<td>39,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>572,354</td>
<td>73,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>500,533</td>
<td>61,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>619,705</td>
<td>37,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>654,949</td>
<td>25,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>689,943</td>
<td>38,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>708,993</td>
<td>70,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>511,923</td>
<td>65,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>813,591</td>
<td>77,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>867,419</td>
<td>37,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>972,698</td>
<td>70,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>986,341</td>
<td>65,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>903,396</td>
<td>27,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>1,089,481</td>
<td>47,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>502,153</td>
<td>39,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>808,392</td>
<td>78,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>441,991</td>
<td>61,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>310,893</td>
<td>72,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>274,141</td>
<td>81,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>344,119</td>
<td>117,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>487,666</td>
<td>233,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1,162,735</td>
<td>181,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1,063,475</td>
<td>54,769</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 5

**Election Results for the District of Alfred Cove (State General)**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate &amp; Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>% Valid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHAVE – Liberal</td>
<td>7,150</td>
<td>32.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOOLLARD – Liberals for Forests</td>
<td>4,425</td>
<td>20.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAYDEN - IND</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>4.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEAK - Greens</td>
<td>1,471</td>
<td>6.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAILEY - IND</td>
<td>4,390</td>
<td>20.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATERSON – Australian Democrats</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>2.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARKHAM – Community Democratic Party</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>1.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORBETT – One Nation</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>5.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEESHAM - IND</td>
<td>1,222</td>
<td>5.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Valid Votes</strong></td>
<td>21,799</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informal</strong></td>
<td>758</td>
<td>3.36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 6

### WA State General Election - Party Results (1996 & 2001)


### LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1996 -Seats</th>
<th>% vote</th>
<th>2001 -Seats</th>
<th>% vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens (WA)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Nation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Independents</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1996 -Seats</th>
<th>% vote</th>
<th>2001 -Seats</th>
<th>% vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens (WA)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.9²</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Nation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-¹</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Independents</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹- No separate figures for Pauline Hansen’s One Nation
²- The Liberal Party and National Party ran joint tickets in 2 Legislative Council seats
## Appendix 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>State Edition</th>
<th>Metro Edition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22/01/98</td>
<td>'Chainsaw' label backed</td>
<td>'Chainsaw' criticism supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/01/98</td>
<td>SW Forests face push into ocean</td>
<td>SW forests may be pushed into ocean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/03/98</td>
<td>Brickbats, bouquets for State, CALM</td>
<td>Tangled laws blamed for forest blunders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/10/98</td>
<td>Tuckey calls timber</td>
<td>Plantation timber call by Tuckey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/12/98</td>
<td>Farmer backs CALM’s forest handling</td>
<td>Voice of support for troubled CALM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/12/98</td>
<td>Timber sleeper row</td>
<td>Greens stroke log row</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/12/98</td>
<td>Sustainable logging level unknown: EPA</td>
<td>Level of SW logging still unknown: EPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/01/99</td>
<td>Five held as forest protest heats up</td>
<td>Five arrests as war restarts in forests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/01/99</td>
<td>Inquiry raises truth fear</td>
<td>Lobby has probe doubts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/01/99</td>
<td>Labor plans brake on forest plan approval</td>
<td>Labor drives wedge through forest deal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/01/99</td>
<td>Codd inquiry finishes</td>
<td>Forests inquiry finishes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/01/99</td>
<td>Forest dispute resolved: Minister</td>
<td>Forests dispute is resolved: minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/02/99</td>
<td>Minson urges forest ban</td>
<td>Minson urges log ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/03/99</td>
<td>Tuckey chipped over attack</td>
<td>Tuckey under fire over attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/03/99</td>
<td>Matriarch takes to the trees</td>
<td>This is an old-growth protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/03/99</td>
<td>Furniture makers log RFA concern</td>
<td>Furniture maker logs his concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/03/99</td>
<td>Truckies make a big impression at rally</td>
<td>An early start to last stand for a life’s work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/03/99</td>
<td>Logging risk at blocks</td>
<td>Forest blocks at risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/03/99</td>
<td>Native forest jobs could be tripled anti-loggers claim</td>
<td>Native timber jobs could be trebled, anti-loggers claim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/05/99</td>
<td>Greens seek House showdown on RFA</td>
<td>Greens to test RFA deal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/06/99</td>
<td>Call for RFA to be changed</td>
<td>Logging ban for a new era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/06/99</td>
<td>Tots enrolled in logging fight</td>
<td>Tots enrolled in forest fight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/06/99</td>
<td>Nationals fight Cabinet on forests</td>
<td>Nationals to fight cabinet on forests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/06/99</td>
<td>Further arrest at Walpole</td>
<td>Another Walpole forest arrest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/07/99</td>
<td>MR’s marchers halt town for old forests</td>
<td>Margaret River’s marchers stop town for old growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/07/99</td>
<td>Liberals tense over backlash</td>
<td>Liberals boil over backlash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/07/99</td>
<td>Protesters storm coupe</td>
<td>Coupe protesters dig in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/07/99</td>
<td>Court to unveil new forest plan</td>
<td>Court to unveil revised strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/07/99</td>
<td>WorkSafe dodges row over forest safety clashes</td>
<td>Worksafe dodges row over logging clashes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/08/99</td>
<td>Inquiry call on State funds for doomed mill</td>
<td>State blamed for mill closure and lost jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/08/99</td>
<td>Tuckey accuses Court of starting timber war</td>
<td>Tuckey to workers: keep up the fight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/08/99</td>
<td>SW job losses will cut deep: analysts</td>
<td>Government faces RFA climbdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/08/99</td>
<td>Brighter outlook for mill workers</td>
<td>Outlook brighter for mill workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/08/99</td>
<td>Union plan for logging vetoed</td>
<td>Union’s logging proposal vetoed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/08/99</td>
<td>Whittaker’s log supply probed</td>
<td>Calm faces log probe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/08/99</td>
<td>More clashes to come: shire chief</td>
<td>More violence tipped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/08/99</td>
<td>Forestry's experts miss the point</td>
<td>Family heirloom tells forest story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/08/99</td>
<td>Protest punches in CALM office claim</td>
<td>Punches thrown in calm office protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Source/Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/08/99</td>
<td>Vigilantes face jail</td>
<td>Forest riot showdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/08/99</td>
<td>Mill rescue move backed</td>
<td>New job hopes in mill plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/03/00</td>
<td>Greens lock on to gear to stop forest workers</td>
<td>Greens use chains to stop forest tree cut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/03/00</td>
<td>CALM to seize protesters property under new rules</td>
<td>CALM to seize gear in protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/03/00</td>
<td>Omodei rejects chainsaw tag</td>
<td>Omodei raps chainsaw tag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/03/00</td>
<td>Tough talk by Minister on camping protesters</td>
<td>Tough talk by minister on protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/04/00</td>
<td>Ousted co-guardian fears for WA’s green integrity</td>
<td>Ousted green guardian fears for EPA integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/05/00</td>
<td>Green protesters “vandalised” forest</td>
<td>Green vandals strike: Omodei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/05/00</td>
<td>CALM cuts its dieback losses</td>
<td>CALM gives up dieback losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/06/00</td>
<td>State’s forest logging plans grow</td>
<td>Old-growth forest cut set to rise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/08/00</td>
<td>House calls for timber harvest</td>
<td>Tree farms find support in house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/08/00</td>
<td>Vineyard Cashes in on Wine Tourism</td>
<td>Vineyard-cashes in on wine and tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/08/00</td>
<td>Plan won’t end rows: CALM</td>
<td>Forest row to go on: CALM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/08/00</td>
<td>Millions in precious logs left to rot</td>
<td>Thousands of logs just left to rot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/10/00</td>
<td>Loggers attack Carnley</td>
<td>Loggers have wood on Carnley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/11/00</td>
<td>Ministers “in cover-up”</td>
<td>Greens claim cover-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/11/00</td>
<td>Stockpile logs for charcoal welcomed</td>
<td>Charcoal firm looks to stockpiled wood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/11/00</td>
<td>Value-adding PR faces challenge</td>
<td>Timber newsletter misleads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/11/00</td>
<td>Greens stole top log: Omodei</td>
<td>Theft claim in row over log (moved from p6 to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/11/00</td>
<td>Floods linked to salinity</td>
<td>Land clearing linked with SW flood fears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/12/00</td>
<td>State investigators grab SW documents</td>
<td>Sandalwood papers seized</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GENERAL WORDS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forest/s</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>timber</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logs/ging</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protest/ers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trees</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plans/ned</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mill/er</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut/s</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jobs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deal/s</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fight/s</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>old/-growth</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clears/ing/</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>row</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fire/s</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attack/s</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chips</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>workers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>PRO-LOGGING NAMES</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CALM</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuckey</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwardes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal/s</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omodei</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationals</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard/PM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premier</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>ANTI-LOGGING NAMES</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G/green/s</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP/Labor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallop</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davenport/LFF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 9

*Terms Mentioned in Hansard (1970-1989)*

![Graph showing the number of references to "Environment" and "Forests" over years 1970 to 1988. The graph indicates fluctuations in the number of references with peaks and troughs.]