THE PRODUCTION OF THE INCEST OFFENDER

AS A

MODERN SUBJECT

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This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy for Murdoch University 2001
STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains as its main content work which has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary education institution

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[Signature]
ABSTRACT

In this thesis the reader is offered two perspectives in relation to the incest offender: the one as deviant individual and the other as invented self. The first perspective is rendered visible in the question invariably asked by each incest offender when he first enters treatment, namely, 'why did I do it?' This is a psychological question in which the Truth of the offender's deviance is sought in psychological explanations based upon a Western concept of the person. However, in this thesis it is how the incest offender has come to be situated within the Field of Sex Offender Treatment as a deviant individual that is the subject of investigation. Hence, it is behavioral and cognitive-behavioral psychology's intellectual technologies, such as its ways of seeing and diagnosing, and its inscription devices that enable norms to be established, evaluations to be carried out and judgements to be made in the Field of Sex Offender Treatment that are the subject of investigation. This thesis is also concerned with regimes of self-governance. This domain of ethics is also rendered visible in the above question in which the incest offender is seeking to know the Truth of his self by both judging himself and seeking to know how he should have regulated his behavior and how he should behave. Here this thesis both investigates the regimes of self-governance invented by behavioral and cognitive-behavioral psychology in order for the offender as deviant individual to gain mastery over himself, and also offers the perspective of an invented self through an investigation of the incest offender's regime of subjectification. That is, an investigation of the diversity of ways in which the incest offender has acted upon himself, evaluated his existence and given his life meaning, as well as the diversity of ways in which he has been opened up to interventions conducted in the name of subjectivity. These investigations of how the incest offender has produced a particular relation with himself as an invented self, and how the incest offender has come to be situated within the Field of Sex Offender Treatment as a deviant individual open up different possibilities. First, the possibility for different questions to be asked regarding cognitive-behavioral treatment techniques. Secondly, the possibility that as an invented self, the incest offender can choose to invent himself differently.
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I dedicate this thesis to the memory of Dr Alan Mansfield
PREFACE

1. ACCIDENTAL BEGINNINGS

You are more plural than you think. (Rose 1996:170)

This thesis had its accidental beginnings in 1987, when I had moved to Adelaide, South Australia, shortly after my second marriage. Prior to this move, I had commenced a psychology degree at Murdoch University in Perth, Western Australia, as a 'mother of four', mature age student. But 'life' had intervened in these studies, and I still had approximately eighteen months to go before completion of my degree. After moving to Adelaide, I wanted to pursue a career in counseling, and had already completed numerous counseling courses. However, since I had not completed my psychology degree, I had positioned myself as outside of a complex 'know-how' and expertise awarded to those who have successfully participated in the pedagogic practice of courses, professional qualifying examinations and award of credentials.

It was therefore with great relief and delight, that I read in an Adelaide newspaper that the advertised job of co-counselor/administrator of a 'soon to be opened' refuge required applicants with some 'counseling experience', but not necessarily an academic qualification. The refuge was called Judith House and it had been funded specifically for adolescent, female child sexual abuse survivors. I subsequently learnt that this was the result of the work of a group of feminist, professional women who had formed a Collective, and had then been successful in gaining government funding to provide the first refuge of its kind in Australia for this specific client group.

The identification of adolescent female child sexual abuse survivors, and their need for a specialized refuge, was in part made possible in the late 1980s through knowledge claims based upon statistical documentation that had been collected by women's refuges/shelters and rape crisis centers since the mid-1970s (Breckenridge 1992). It had been in the late 1960s that the Australian
Child Protection Lobby had first established *child abuse* as a public concern. However, the notion that child *sexual* abuse be understood and included as a category of 'child abuse', had first been publicly stated in the United States by Sgroi (1975) in her paper *Sexual Molestation of Children: The Last Frontier in Child Abuse*. It was, however, feminism and the women's movement in the 1970s that had established child sexual abuse as a category of child abuse in Australia. The incidence of the number of young women entering refuges due to incest was then documented, once women's groups throughout the States had opened up refuges and rape crisis centers for female survivors of domestic violence and rape.

The women of the Collective, through their own work practices as lawyers, psychologists and social workers, had become aware that female adolescents were being periodically shifted by staff from refuge to refuge in Adelaide. This was in cases where the behaviors of the young women had been classified as 'disruptive', insofar as they were said to impact adversely upon other clients and staff. It was through the deployment of a feminist analysis and understanding of the *effects* of child sexual abuse upon survivors that the women of the Collective identified these young women as child sexual abuse survivors, thereby rendering their behaviors intelligible within a feminist way of thought. The women then transformed regulatory practices in relation to the (dis)placement of adolescent, female child sexual abuse survivors through the deployment of technical devices such as data collection, report writing, lobbying and application for funding.

However, my own previous studies had not provided me with a knowledge background of feminist analysis of rape or child sexual abuse. As a consequence, after my first interview and prior to my second interview and subsequent employment, one of the members of the interview panel sent me some articles to read written from a feminist position, a key text being Emetchi and Summerfield's (1986) paper on 'Power Theory'. This active intervention subsequently conferred visibility upon certain features of the texts that I had previously consumed in order to produce my knowledges of the 'psychological dynamics' of child sexual abuse. After reading the texts, I
became critically aware that my understanding of the issues of child sexual abuse had been produced *exclusively* by articles that I had read in journals from within the discipline of psychology, an approach that had its beginnings in my psychology studies at University. I subsequently felt embarrassed by my previous lack of understanding of the issues raised in the feminist texts.

I now argue, from my present position, that the above intervention, and the truth claims within the feminist texts, set up the conditions of possibility that enabled me to effect, so to speak, certain operations on my thoughts. For example, I *transformed* my understanding of the domain of psychology, represented in the feminist texts as having rendered the 'incest victims' into objects of a certain *diagnostic gaze* that was authorized by certain *claims* to *Truth*. My emotional response of embarrassment, or so I now argue, was incited by this reading of the texts. This transformation of my capacities was made possible through my new connections with feminists and feminism in the particular place of Adelaide and space of Judith House. This intellectual labor on my part resulted in my understanding that to work towards a feminist knowledge of child sexual abuse was *desirable*. This constitution of myself thus necessarily involved the play of power and resistance - where power is conceived as a series of strategic relations characterized by their reversibility - and my (transforming into) feminist self emerged from that strategic relation. It was this (intellectual) work that I performed on myself that subsequently enabled me to enter into a coalition with the members of the Collective as well as the other two refuge workers and to then engage in the practices of enabling young women to effect their own self-empowerment.

At the time that I was employed at Judith House, feminist analysis was based upon 'power theory', which was understood as being both institutionalized and internalized power relationships, which formed a cornerstone of patriarchal hegemony. Emetchi and Summerfield's (1986) paper was the key text (to be) read by workers in the fields of domestic violence and child sexual abuse in Adelaide in the late 1980s. It gave a coherent critique of the psychiatric, family dysfunctional (sociological) and psychological literature, all of which were regarded as maintaining the status quo of Patriarchy, with a capital P.
The authors argued that Patriarchy was a world view that sought to create and maintain male control over females, being a system of male supremacy wherein men as a class dominated women as a class (Emetchi and Summerfield 1986).

Having read the above paper, I was so committed to working towards a feminist knowledge, to being recognized as a feminist, that I undertook additional training with the Adelaide Rape Crisis Center. However, according to my younger, radical separatist co-worker, I was still not entitled to take up the position of feminist subject, for my material reality also included 'sleeping with the enemy'. My separatist co-worker appeared, therefore, to consider me to be a politically incorrect liability for feminism. At that time in Australia in the 1980s, whilst radical feminists disparaged personal solutions to Patriarchy, expecting rather that all women would band together to protect each other from the power held over them, they none the less believed that one's sexuality should mirror one's politics. As Echols (1992:58) later observed, this was a conviction that 'promoted prescriptivism'.

Within radical feminist analyses, male sexuality was presented as being violent. Penetration, by the very nature of the act, was perceived as 'a violation of the woman's body' (Hollway 1984:65). Radical separatist feminists asserted that women could and should retrieve an authentically female sexuality by arguing that women were completely excluded from (dominant) culture and were therefore 'innocent of and uncontaminated by its values and signifying practices' (Braidotti 1994:224). The liberation of such an authentically female sexuality was then presented as the principle of legitimation for separatist feminist politics. Thus feminism was the question and lesbianism was the practice (Braidotti 1994).

It was hardly surprising therefore that I felt positioned by my separatist co-worker as having 'sold out' to the enemy, based upon having chosen to maintain my (hetero)sexual identity. But in fairness to my co-worker, and on reflection from my current position, I also think that our differences in age,
class and lifestyle were implicated in her resistance to my continuing attempts
to produce myself as a female feminist subject (Braidotti 1994).

At the beginning of 1988, I made a long-term commitment to working in the
field of child sexual abuse and resumed my academic studies whilst still
employed full-time at Judith House. At that historical moment, I chose to
complete a Sociology Major within a Communications degree, rather than
continue my studies in psychology. This was a pragmatic decision, based
upon tight time scheduling and geographic location, facilitated by the inter-
disciplinary approach taken at Murdoch University, where I had undertaken
several electives in Communication Studies whilst initially pursuing my
psychology degree. Half way through the year, my husband and I decided that
we would return to Western Australia the following December. This
necessitated a second semester that involved my undertaking seven units in
order to complete my BA, and after sad farewells to the young residents, my
family and I returned to Perth. The following year, in December 1989, I was
invited to participate on a committee that had been formed to submit an
application for funding to the Child Sexual Abuse Treatment Service Scheme
(CSATSS). The funding was planned for a community-based program that
would be working with both statutory and non-statutory, self-referred incest
perpetrators. Based upon my work with child sexual abuse survivors at Judith
House, I had been invited by the cognitive-behavioral clinical psychologist on
the committee to write a Victim Empathy module for the proposed 'multi-
modal' program. The funding application was subsequently successful, and in
1990 the Sexual Assault in Families (SAIF) Program opened its doors to the
community. The cognitive-behavioral 'multi-modal' program structure of the
SAIF Program was similar to that in programs working with sex offenders in
Canada and the United States, although the institutional and funding histories
were quite different. By the early 1990s, there were 1,500 treatment programs
of similar design for sex offenders in the USA and an undetermined number in
Canada and other countries (Marshall 1993). In most 'multi-modal' programs,
as with SAIF, there was a Victim Empathy, Relapse Prevention and Healthy
Sexuality module and an Introduction module that dealt with issues of 'denial'
and 'minimization' and acceptance of responsibility for the sexual assault.
Many such programs overseas also had a module that specifically addressed the enhancement of social skills, and such a module was planned for SAIF, but not executed during the period that I was a volunteer with the program.

CSATSS, the body that funded SAIF, provided funding to non-government agencies and service providers to deliver treatment services to children, individuals and families who had experienced intra-familial child sexual abuse. The Western Australian Government had allocated money for the establishment of CSATSS in response to recommendations made in the Western Australian Child Sexual Abuse Task Force Report (1987)\(^1\). The SAIF Program thus competed for limited funding that would not have been made available had it not been for WA Task Force recommendations. Child sexual abuse task forces had been established in New South Wales, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania from the mid-1980s. As a political strategy, task forces were situated within rape law reform, increased media coverage of child sexual abuse, government reports and the establishment of women's services as alternatives to health and welfare agencies. This was also a time when a feminist form of thought entered into already existing systems of authority in 'tertiary institutions where professionals such as social workers trained' (Franzway et al. 1989:115). Social workers were becoming increasingly involved in the protection and prevention of child sexual abuse as workers were faced with 'new information, conflicting theoretical perspectives, legislative reform and a changeable political/economic focus' (Quinn 1992:86). Amidst these battles for Truth, feminists demanded state intervention in sexual and familial violence as the inadequacies of existing welfare services and the criminal justice system and their respective competencies in dealing with the issues were identified and challenged\(^2\). The brief of the task forces was:

\[\text{References}\]

1 For a comprehensive table of the establishment throughout Australia of task forces and terms of reference and service development and provision in the area of child sexual abuse, see Breckenridge, 1992 pp.28-31.

to identify problems associated with the existing law and current method of service delivery, and to recommend on ways of integrating and co-ordinating policies and services (and thus reduce both conflict and costs). (Franzway et al. 1989:119)

In being successful in its bid for funding to provide therapeutic intervention with incest offenders, the SAIF Program had thus received funding from CSATSS that might otherwise have gone to WA community-based organizations wanting to develop and provide services for survivors. Some child protection agencies in Western Australia, for example the National Association for Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect (NAPCAN), situated SAIF as being in opposition to child protection services, since SAIF would be working primarily with incest offenders (whilst also providing support services to survivors and family members). A number of child protection professionals in Western Australia also situated SAIF as a diversion program (Department of Community Development 1993), presupposing that the program diverted men from the legal system. In New South Wales, the recommendation in its Task Force (1985) for the adoption of a pre-trial diversion program for offenders was 'perhaps the most hotly contested' (Breckenridge 1992:34). Breckenridge (1992) outlines the feminist argument against this recommended option of therapeutic intervention (that only existed for offenders who had committed sexual assault within the family, that is, incest or intra-familial child sexual abuse) as follows:

[n]ot only does this appear to contradict the alleged criminal nature of the offence outlined earlier in the report but [it] also appears to support the maintenance of the family by assuming incestuous acts are a matter of 'deviance' able to be 'treated'.  
(Breckenridge 1992:34)

From the late 1980s, a similar resistance towards offender treatment options circulated within the discourse of child protection in Perth, as evidenced in a convergence of events instigated by Tony Morrison's visit to Perth in 1993. Morrison was a visiting (expert) child protection trainer and consultant from
the United Kingdom, invited as Keynote Speaker to the *Children at Risk: The Politics of Practice* (March 1993) conference sponsored by the Advisory and Consultative Committee on Child Abuse (ACCA). During the course of the conference Morrison, who was staying with a senior executive from ACCA whilst in Perth, was invited to visit the SAIF Program. He accepted the invitation and an appointment was set for the following week. On the morning of the planned visit, a message was left on the SAIF answering machine by the aforementioned senior executive from ACCA, saying that Morrison would be unable to keep the appointment as he had been 'overbooked' during his stay in Perth. Morrison subsequently wrote a letter to Kath French, Chair of ACCA, in which he 'outlined some concerns he had in relation to the SAIF Programme' (DCD 1993:2). The letter was forwarded to the then Department for Community Development (DCD) that decided that 'as a matter of urgency, it would set up a committee to review the operations of SAIF' (DCD 1993:2). As part of the review of the SAIF Program, submissions were received by the DCD from ACCA, NAPCAN, Outcare, the Social Work Department of Princess Margaret Hospital, the Department of Corrective Services and DCD offices in Mirrabooka, Midland and Busselton (DCD 1993). I suggest that it was connections between Morrison's cancelled appointment, the senior executive from ACCA, Morrison's letter of 'concern' and the politics of child protection in WA at that time that occasioned the Review.

During the course of the Review, SAIF successfully established that child protection was its first priority and clarified its response to concerns made by other agencies about its duties of disclosure. SAIF clarified that in providing men with 'limited confidentiality', this meant that it reported to the DCD or Police any clients who breached their SAIF contract or where a child was seen to be at risk of harm. As the Review Committee's Report subsequently stated, this clarification was in response to 'the mistaken belief that SAIF will not disclose information that an offender is abusing a child to DCD or the Police' (DCD 1993:8). It was also in response to the mistaken notion that 'if you are treating offenders [it] means that you cannot also be child protective' (DCD:8). However, the Review Committee subsequently made recommendations that SAIF undertake more frequent home visits (fortnightly) to 'victims'.

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With regard to the issue of 'diversion', the Review Committee clarified that SAIF did not divert people who had been apprehended by the Police from the legal system. This was because, as well as offering its treatment service to statutory referred clients, SAIF offered its service to self-referred men who had not been detected by the justice system. Hence, SAIF did not fit into the current criminal justice system as a diversion program. Which is not to say that this would have been much consolation to many feminists/child protection workers, who may well have considered that this was merely 'splitting straws'. In order to address the concerns of its critics, SAIF spokespersons also clarified that SAIF encouraged men in the program to face up to the legal consequences of their actions. SAIF personnel played an active role in advising survivors of their rights and assisted them if they wished to seek compensation. In the case of a survivor or family member subsequently wishing to press charges, SAIF gave them full support whilst supporting the offender to plead guilty. In cases where survivors and family members (in most cases mothers) chose to get support from SAIF, charges were frequently laid against the offender.

SAIF spokespersons further addressed the issue of the program being a non-statutory, community-based program by arguing that they considered this to be a real strength of the program. This was because it enabled the program to draw into treatment men that had not been convicted for child sexual abuse, and hence might otherwise have gone undetected within the community. The Review Committee supported this position, stating that:

\[
\text{[t]he potential for SAIF to draw into treatment offenders or potential offenders who may otherwise continue (or start) offending was seen as a major strength of the program. (DCD 1993:15)}
\]

Indeed, in 1984 the sociologist David Finkelhor had stated that he and others working in the Field of Child Sexual Abuse were particularly uncomfortable with the fact that so much of what they knew about sexual abusers came from men in prison and in treatment. He stated that '[w]hen information is gathered
about undetected molesters, the picture [regarding molesters] may change drastically' (Finkelhor 1984:52).

The SAIF Program had emerged out of the decision of the instigating co-founder Jackie Vince-Wyatt - who subsequently became the SAIF Coordinator - that it was desirable to set up a community-based program that would attract undetected incest offenders into treatment. Vince-Wyatt had been caught up within the discourse of child sexual abuse through a situation involving extended family members. After witnessing the inadequacies of those authorized to intervene, and after transforming her previous understanding that incest offenders were 'sick', suffering from a psychiatric disorder\(^3\), Vince-Wyatt was left with a new set of problemizations arising from her question 'why did they do it?'\(^4\) She therefore sought to mobilize expertise that would assist her in the formulation of a community-based program that would be an alliance between professionals claiming to provide an answer to her question and self-referred incest offenders incited to seek help within a therapeutics of autonomy and normalcy.

Jackie Vince-Wyatt eventually made the connection with Les Harrison, a white, male, middle class, mature age clinical psychologist working in the Department of Community Development. Harrison supported Vince-Wyatt's idea of a 'crisis line' for incest perpetrators as an intervention strategy and his subsequent involvement in the project positioned him as co-founder of the program. Harrison had the requisite qualifications and forms of expertise concerning the internal characteristics of the domain to be governed (i.e. the SAIF Program). As Rose (1996:28) states, domains are not 'dominated' by rule, but must be 'known, understood, and related to in such a way that events within them...support, and do not oppose, political objectives'. Harrison - who worked in a voluntary capacity at SAIF whilst continuing to work in the DCD - had this 'know-how'. I argue that it was Harrison's knowledge and understanding of what supported and did not oppose political objectives both within SAIF and within the DCD that contributed to the positive outcome for

\(^3\) Personal communication 9/2/2001
\(^4\) Personal communication 9/2/2001
SAIF from the Review. This key dual positioning was also raised as an issue of concern with the Review Committee. First, because of the perception of others that this had a potential for 'conflict of interest' and secondly, because there was also a perception by some that because of this linkage, SAIF was a Department service (DCD 1993). As a consequence, the Review Committee recommended that 'DCD staff should withdraw as soon as possible from providing client services to SAIF' (DCD 1993:7). However, Administrative Instructions were not binding on staff outside of working hours, if staff were not engaged on official duties, so Harrison was able to continue to work at SAIF in a voluntary capacity that did not involve providing client services. Harrison subsequently assumed a particular significance in relation to the SAIF Program, through presenting papers on SAIF at conferences and conducting other activities in the public domain. Over a period of time, he came to function as the (patriarchal) head of SAIF that subsequently became know as 'Les's' program. Within these power relations Vince-Wyatt, the Coordinator and instigating co-founder, was marginalized. Some years later, Vince-Wyatt left the program and constructed her resistance by gaining the requisite 'know-how' through the successful completion of a psychology degree, majoring in ethics.

After initially accepting the invitation to write Victim Empathy, I commenced co-facilitating the module in 1990, and continued to do so for the next four years, that is, until 1994. I was therefore situated within the above political struggles and battles over truth claims waged between different forces as evidenced in the Review. As Foucault (1984a) argues, humanity does not gradually 'progress' from combat to combat, arriving ultimately at universal reciprocity where the rule of law replaces warfare. Rather, 'humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination' (Foucault 1984a:85). Finally, it was also my involvement in the SAIF Program that gave me access to the men who subsequently accepted my invitation to participate in the 'collaborative inquiry' research component of this thesis.
I have two aims in presenting the above analysis that includes the assemblage of my being as 'body-thought' (Rose 1996:183) - rather than a storying forth of my 'self' as an autonomous individual - within the context of Judith House and the SAIF Program. The first is to dislodge the latter reading and the second is to alert the reader to the critical analytic position that I take up within this thesis. It is an analytics that shifts our understanding from that of the self as an autonomous self inhabited by an inner psychology, to that of an invented self, whereby that very invention constitutes our truth. This difference in the understanding of what it is to be human separates my analysis of the incest offender from that of cognitive-behavioral psychology, the discourse within which the incest offender is positioned as a deviant individual, possessing deviant cognitions. It is this latter position that the men were incited to take up when they entered the SAIF Program, a positioning I discuss in the Introduction that follows.
INTRODUCTION

1. QUESTION MARK

1:1 Tell me why?

...psychology as a technology...concerns the capacity of psychological language and judgments to graft themselves into the ethical practices of individuals. By this I mean their ways of evaluating themselves in relation to what is true or false, good or bad, permitted or forbidden. (Rose 1996:95)

The purpose of this initial section of the Introduction is to familiarize the reader with the practices that were implicated in the Victim Empathy package that I wrote for SAIF. In this thesis, I revisit these practices from the position briefly outlined in the Preface, a position that challenges the notion of the autonomous individual. But before discussing the practices of Victim Empathy, let me first situate the module within the context of the SAIF Program. It was the second module in the program, following on from the Introduction module. Prior to commencing the first module the men had also undergone psychological testing\(^1\), completed an Autobiographical Outline to assess their communication and interpersonal skills and had each signed a contract with the 'limited confidentiality' clause.

Invariably, by the time each group of men entered the Victim Empathy module, they were asking the same question, namely: why did I do it? What the men were asking was: what caused me to sexually abuse my child (daughter, step-daughter, granddaughter\(^2\))? Now this is a psychological

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\(^1\) CAQ (Clinical Analysis Questionnaire); MSI (Multiphasic Sex Inventory); Davis Empathy Scale; Abel & Becker Cognitive Scale; Wilson Fantasy Questionnaire.

\(^2\) Whilst I worked at the SAIF Program we did not have an incest offender participating in the program who had sexually abused a male child.
question and reasonable to ask. That is, given that the 'psy' disciplines (i.e. psychiatry, psychology, psychoanalysis, psychotherapy) claim to tell the 'Truth about human beings in any social 'territory' (Foucault 1980f) where human conduct is problematized in relation to individual pathology, social judgements or ethical standards (Rose 1996). Indeed, as Rose (1996) observes, psychological ways of seeing and calculating have rendered problematic precisely the kinds of issues for which psychological 'know-how' has come to appear as the solution. Here, following Foucault (1980f), I use the term 'territory' not as a geographical metaphor, but in the sense of it being a juridico-political notion. As such, a territory is conceived as an area controlled by a certain kind of power. Within the therapeutic space of the SAIF Program, therefore, the men's question made perfect sense, for a promise was offered of self-knowledge that would enable the men to establish power over their (deviant) sexuality. At the same time, practices of administration and examination rendered the men into knowledge as objects of a hierarchical and normative gaze.

In order to gain entry into the program, each man had to complete the required psychological tests and the autobiographical outline, such tasks necessitating that each man constitute himself as a unified, individualized psychological self. The latter task required a (psychoanalytic) sense of self shaped by powerful precedents out of the past. The taking up of such a positioning would also have included a sense of an interior reality, a psyche, a personality, manifested in the ways in which each man reacted to experience and expressed his feelings as a free agent of choice and self-realization (Rose 1996).

Whilst facilitating the Victim Empathy module, I played a key role in establishing the kinds of possibilities that psychological truths claim to open up. For example, I provided the opportunity for each incest perpetrator to interrogate and narrate himself in terms of the above internal universe of the
self, based upon a presumption of the continuity of human beings as the 
*subjects* of history, *essentially* equipped with the capacity for endowing 
meaning (Rose 1996). We shared the belief that if we analyzed together the 
'narrativization' of the men's lives, to which they would each accord meaning, 
the cause of their deviancy, the Truth of their flawed individuality would be 
'revealed'.

When I first wrote the Victim Empathy package, I resisted the discourse of 
cognitive-behavioral psychology, or so I thought, preferring the way of 
seeing, way of thought of existential psychology. I had engaged with the 
discourse of behavior modification, as well as existential psychology, at 
University and had been particularly resistant to the 'reward and punishment' 
strategies deployed in the disciplinary technology of the *Token Economy*, a 
strategy I discuss in more detail in Chapter Three. Rather, it was the discourse 
of existentialism, with its concern with personal values and concrete 
experience that at that time appeared to reflect my own beliefs and values. 
Hence, my feminist way of thought can be seen here to be an 'aspect' within a 
multiplicity of ways that I employed in order to render reality thinkable. I 
therefore incorporated many experiential exercises into the design of Victim 
Empathy in order to facilitate the 'narrativization' of the men's experience, 
undertaken in their 'search for meaning'. This procedure was supported by my 
formulation of the appropriate existential question. I suggested to the men 
that rather than ask *why did I do it?* it might be more helpful to ask *what 
meaning does this have in my life?* I therefore encouraged the men to 
continue to probe for the secrets and give up hidden knowledge that would 
reveal to us all the Truth of who they were. I then employed a feminist way of 
thought to inscribe the men's truth claims with certain explanations, made 
thinkable through certain theories and concepts, thereby rendering their world 
amendable to certain descriptions.
As mentioned above, Victim Empathy was the second module in the SAIF Program. In the Introduction module, as was customary in multi-modal programs, the men had been confronted with 'denials' and 'minimizations' and had been introduced to Finkelhor's (1984) *Four Preconditions Model*. This model, devised as an explanation of child sexual abuse, consisted of four stages: motivation; overcoming internal inhibitors; overcoming external inhibitors; overcoming the resistance of the victim. Finkelhor (1984) suggested that in order to commit an offence, an offender had to pass through all four stages. The men had also been introduced to the notion of 'grooming' their victims, where grooming was identified as a strategy of entrapment (Howitt 1995).

Consequently, when the men entered Victim Empathy, it was already clear to them that their behavior (sexual abuse) was neither implicitly nor explicitly condoned. Building upon this position in Victim Empathy, I designed a session in the module where the men watched a video entitled The Secret (Child Sexual Abuse)\(^3\), a video generally used to train professionals working in child protection. It is in the deployment of this video as an educational strategy that my feminist knowledges and truth claims are rendered visible. In the video, the narrative of Uncle Andrew's sexual abuse of his niece and nephew whilst 'babysitting' for his brother and sister-in-law, and the subsequent disclosure of the sexual abuse, is performed by actors. Within this narrative, the choice of Uncle Andrew to give 'special presents' to his nephew is rendered visible as one of a diversity of strategies of 'entrapment', and the subsequent behaviors of his niece and nephew are rendered thinkable as the *effects* of the sexual abuse. However, at the same time, Uncle Andrew, especially within the context of the SAIF Program, is constituted as a 'deviant' within the discourse of everyday life, although I did not conceive of it in exactly those terms at the time.

\(^3\) A 23-minute video produced by the South Australian Film Corporation (1988), Short Film Marketing Division, 113 Tapleys Hill Road, Hendou. SA 5014
My first purpose in employing this educational strategy was to have the men make connections between their own and Uncle Andrew's strategies of entrapment. The second purpose was to provide the men with the opportunity to empathize with the two victims as a result of the video highlighting the effects that the sexual abuse had upon the two children in psychological, emotional and behavioral terms. I then followed the video with a guided imagery. I had written this to assist the men to identify the feelings that they had experienced whilst watching the video, based upon a presupposition that the men had difficulty in relating to both their own feelings and emotions as well as those of others. I had made linkages between the men's lack of skill in identifying their own feelings and their (presumed) failure to empathize with those of their victim/survivors. I wrote the 'guided imagery' after the first group of men spoke 'about' the video after watching it, rather than about their feelings in response to the video. I now argue that the guided imagery exercise was therefore a psychotherapeutic technique employed for the purpose of examining and evaluating the self, requiring the men's introspection to be rendered into a vocabulary of feelings and values. Within this mode of self-inspection the men spoke of being 'weighed down' with guilt, of having an 'ever present knot' of fear in the stomach, a 'constant pain' in the neck and so forth. I am in agreement with Rose (1996:10) that corporealities are 'diverse, nonunified, and operate in relation to particular regimes of knowledge'. Here, the men have linked up outside, historically situated judgements, sights and words with inside organs, dreads and fears thus constituting themselves as 'bodies-thought'.

Whilst facilitating Victim Empathy (with a co-facilitator), I also believed that it would be a pointless exercise to invite the men to empathize with their victims, if the co-facilitators were not willing to 'role-model' empathy, where appropriate, towards the men participating in the module. The use of the concept of the 'role' in the social sciences dates from the 1930s. The main foundation of a coherent theory of social roles was laid down at this time by
the sociologist George Herbert Mead and the anthropologist Ralph Linton (Edley and Wetherell 1995). I discuss this notion in more detail in Chapter One. In facilitating Victim Empathy, in order to foreground the productive characteristics of power, I now argue that I was 'doing empathy' (as opposed to 'having empathy' - conceived in terms of an internal emotional response and thence attitude towards the other) and that this was also a psychotherapeutic strategy. This strategy, in which the doing of empathy was role-modeled, administered a particular relation between the co-facilitators and the group participants assembled within the therapeutic group space. Within this space, the participants were incited to become ethical beings establishing precepts for conducting and judging their lives. In this instance, 'to be empathic' towards their victims was the specific precept enjoined.

I also incorporated an exercise loosely based upon one that had originated out of the Gracewell Clinic, which is part of the Gracewell Institute in Birmingham, United Kingdom. This was a 'confessional' exercise that I recognized as such, but in a religious rather than a Foucauldian sense at that time. Each participant was required to write on a whiteboard exactly what he had done to his victim, without resorting to minimizing, descriptive terms such as 'then I "fondled" her'. I now adopt a Foucauldian sense of 'confession' as a particular form of power, where the men were required to speak the truth of what they had done within a power relation. Within this confessional exercise truth and sex were joined (Foucault 1979a). Here the men became the subject of their own narrative and in that very act became attached to the work of constructing their own identity, to include that of deviant individual.

The purpose of this exercise at the time, apart from it being a technology that enabled the co-facilitators to be recognized as being tough on the men, was for the men to tell the Truth, the whole Truth and nothing but the Truth of their acts of sexual abuse. This Truth then had to 'pass through' the co-facilitators in order for it to be validated. It was the function of the co-facilitators not only
to hear the revelations, but to also decipher what was being said in order to
verify whether or not what the men were saying was complete or incomplete.
After the exercise, the men spoke of the sense of 'freedom' they experienced
having, in most cases for the first time, finally 'told it how it was' to the co-
facilitators and other group members. However, as Foucault (1979a:60)
oberves, truth is not by nature free, for its production is 'thoroughly imbued
with relations of power'. Thus, at this moment of transformation, the men
became even more identified with their deviant selves. Indeed, within the
psychotherapeutic space of the SAIF Program, it was impossible not to
understand the men as deviant psychological individuals.

It was from within this space and place that I invited the men from one of the
groups to participate in my research project once they had completed the SAIF
Program. By the time the men completed the program they would have been
working together as a group for twelve months. In addition, I had worked
with the men in this particular group for twenty weeks, since I had also
participated with them in Relapse Prevention, the module that followed
Victim Empathy. Because the men who accepted my invitation were willing
to join the research project in order to contribute towards knowledge claims
that might help stop other men sexually abusing children, I therefore
considered us to be 'co-researchers' (Kirby and McKenna 1989) with a shared
goal. My choice of research method was therefore (initially conceptualized
as) 'collaborative inquiry'. I believed at that time that this method would both
enable us to redress the imbalance in power relations (I discuss relations of
power in depth in the following two chapters) between researcher and
researched and to acknowledge the shift from SAIF 'Counsellor' and 'group
participants' to 'co-researchers'.

I had first encountered collaborative, or co-operative, inquiry in the work of
Peter Reason and John Rowan in their text Human Inquiry (1981). This text
was put together from existing and new articles representing 'the emerging
paradigm of co-operative experiential inquiry' (Reason 1988:1). This new approach to research undertaken with and for people rather than on people had emerged through 'systems thinking, ecological concerns and awareness, feminism, education, as well as in the philosophy of human inquiry' (Reason 1988:3). I agreed with Kirby and McKenna (1989:104) that research that 'could contribute to maintaining or extending current relations of exploitation and domination should be viewed with utmost suspicion'. Whilst I had chosen a feminist participant/observation research method for my Honors program undertaken in Communication Studies at Murdoch University\footnote{I undertook my Honors program and, subsequently, this Ph.D. program in Communication Studies, Division of Social Science, Humanities and Education. It was this institutional locale that provided me with the intellectual milieu and support for taking such a radical, interdisciplinary approach to child sexual abuse and incest offending.} after my return to Perth, Western Australia. - the notion of working with participants and against exploitation and oppression had been critical to the research methodology.

1:2 Doing Research

Six men from the SAIF Program accepted my invitation to participate in my research project, which commenced with two meetings in October 1992 at Murdoch University. There was a third meeting in November and two further meetings in December.

When first inviting the men to participate in the research, I told them that it would be a collaborative inquiry and I also flagged the idea that they might like to consider writing a book as part of their participation in the project. In my Honors research with women who were the mothers of children who had been sexually abused (Slaney 1991), we had incorporated the production of a video into the research methodology, thereby enabling us to 'anchor' the project. The production of a video was also a political strategy insofar as it would enable the women's voices to be heard by other women and
professionals working in the Field of Child Sexual Abuse. The successful outcome of this strategy in both methodological and political terms encouraged me to suggest the book idea to the men with the same aims in view. During one of the subsequent research sessions one of the men stated that he thought a book about their experiences was a good idea. This was because it would 'let other people know that there is light at the end of the bloody tunnel', thereby encouraging other men to take action to disclose and stop the sexual abuse. As Kirby and McKenna (1989:164) state, it is important to consider how the research information can be released in ways that can 'contribute to increasing public awareness about, and action on, specific social issues'.

Whilst my choice of research method was mediated by my desire to negotiate power relations and not position the men as the 'researched', it also required that I negotiate my own position within institutional constraints that demanded rigorous research methodology. The tensions within this positioning between the aims of collaborative inquiry research and institutional constraints are visible in one of the clauses in the Consent Form (to be signed by each research participant) that I had negotiated with the Murdoch University Ethics Committee, namely:

\[\text{[given that child protection is the fundamental premise underpinning this research, I understand that should any instance/s of child sexual abuse be disclosed, as having been perpetrated by any member of this research group - during the period of this present research programme - that such perpetrator will be reported to the appropriate statutory authority. (Murdoch University Consent Form)]}\]

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5 The video is attached to my Honors thesis at Murdoch University, and is entitled 'Mum's the Word'.
6 ('Phil' 20/10/92 p58)
The power relations became visible in the action of asking the men to read and sign the Consent Form that included the above clause. As Foucault (1982:788) states, power exists 'only when it is put into action'.

Since all of the men had completed SAIF by the time the research program commenced I invited 'Jack'\(^7\) to take on the responsibility of coordinating the men, undertaking the task of telephoning the participants at home to remind them of the dates of each of the sessions. I had anticipated that five men would be attending the first session on October 6, 1992. However, we ended up with three participants at session one, since two of the men had other commitments. Introductions were, of course, not necessary and after the issue of confidentiality, tape recording and the signing of the consent forms had been discussed and completed, the three men immediately launched into discussion about their own thoughts and feelings as they related to the sexual abuse of their victims. Because of the spontaneous start to the evening's discussion, I did not introduce the men to the collaborative inquiry method at that stage.

At the second session on October 20, two of the men from the first session attended plus two other men. I also invited Geoff Wyatt, one of the volunteers from the SAIF Program who had an excellent rapport with the men, to participate in this session as co-convenor. I thought that Geoff's in-depth knowledge of the Introduction module (in which I had not participated) would be an advantage, since the men would be giving feedback in this session on what for them had been the most useful aspects of the different modules at SAIF.

On this evening, I outlined the collaborative inquiry process and gave each participant a copy of the transcript of session one, inviting the men to give

\(^7\) The names of all research participants have been changed in this thesis, signified initially by inverted commas.
their comments at the next session. The men then gave their critical feedback on each of the four SAIF modules and the session ended with the men discussing the book concept. 'Phil,' who had been jailed for his sexual offences, outlined his understanding of what the book might achieve as follows:

people can pick it up and read it and say 'that sounds like me, I've done those things'. And, you know, like me for instance. You know, I've...I'm coming the full circle around. Like when I believed I'd never see my kids again, and how could they ever want to see me and, and now I've got one living back with me, and I've got two that I've seen since, you know...So people can say 'look, I'm doing this to my kids, and there's a bloke, right, that's done it to his kids and yet things are starting to work out'. It's not all let's string ourselves up, or let's shoot ourselves, or, or we're all arse-holes, you know. What we've done is a terrible, terrible thing, but every guy I've met seems to be a decent sort of a bloke, and, I mean, what he's done is not good .... ^8

We clarified that the book would be quite separate from my Ph.D. dissertation and that the men would have ownership of it. However, despite initial enthusiasm for the idea, the project never got off the ground. One of the key issues was the men's concern in regard to confidentiality. 'Mike' was concerned that both he and his family might be identified and how that might impact on his position at work. He had a fellow supervisor working with him who had been jailed for the sexual abuse of his daughter and this was known at work. Mike explained that:

blokes at work...I've got some pretty wild blokes that work with me and I can handle them no trouble...but, they'll often say 'where's that bloody P..., the dirty bastard? What the bloody

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^8 (Phil 20/10/92 p58)
hell...I've always thought he was weird with his stick pictures on the wall', you know, and all this sort of thing.9 Mike had also been 'terrified'10 that somebody from work would identify his car when he was attending the SAIF Program. On reflection I very much doubt if the men would have thought of the idea of a book had the suggestion not come from me first. Nevertheless, they did endorse other men knowing about their stories.

Two men attended the November 10 session and we quickly became engrossed in conversations about issues of violence, feelings of powerlessness, sexuality and attitudes of men in response to media images of young, adolescent females. However, by the December 8 session we were down to one participant, resulting in an in-depth interview with Jack. 'Dan' had not been available for any of the previous sessions, so I had an in-depth interview with him on December 15, 1992. I draw upon both these interviews in the investigation that follows in Chapter One. Further, had it not been for the accidental beginnings (a notion discussed in Chapter Two) that led to these interviews, this research might not have been as it is, for they indicated possibilities for research not evident in the data gathered in the group sessions.

After completing the interviews and reflecting on the process, I decided that I had chosen a research method that was far too complex11 and therefore ill suited for the purpose. In retrospect, I thought it would have been more appropriate to have simply interviewed each man individually, invited him to give feedback on the transcript of his own interview if he so wished, and then possibly have suggested one final group session. I also thought that the notion

9 (Mike 20/10/92 p.13)
10 (Mike 20/10/92 p.13)
11 I gave each research participant a copy of the transcript of the first two sessions so that they could in turn give their feedback. I also gave participants copies of Williams and Pinkelhor's (1990) chapter entitled 'The Characteristics of Incestuous Fathers: A Review of Recent Studies' for their comments.
of writing a book was intimidating for at least two of the men and its execution would have involved far more commitment than the men were prepared to make. In session two (20/10/92), the men discussed what had prevented their participation in a free, follow-up support group offered to them once they had completed the SAIF Program. During the same conversation, Mike also expressed his thoughts on 'doing research':

but I think that coming here you'd be able to have just an ordinary talk about anything, about what we've been through and have done. It would be beneficial, I reckon. I reckon you'd get more people to come to it than to say you're going to do a study or a course, or get some facts together for a program or a thesis or a book out, you know. A lot of blokes would come here excluding that I reckon, I really do. Come and have a talk, what we did.  

There were also, I suggest, relationships with emotions that had a bearing on the dropping off in attendance. During the above discussion in session two (20/10/92), 'Peter' described how he experienced similar emotions when coming to the research project at Murdoch University that he had experienced when attending SAIF sessions. As a result he:

Peter: almost turned off the freeway, half way here and went home, to invent some reason for not coming
Kisane: right
Peter: and I thought, well, I'll get here and then in the car park, I'll wait three minutes [to see if anyone else turns up] and then I'll go home...
... laughter
Peter: then I spotted Phil, and that's it, I was here!
... more laughter

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12 (Mike 20/10/92 p12)
13 (Peter and Kisane 20/10/92 p11)
Having set the transcripts of the men's interviews aside whilst drafting other parts of the text, I subsequently reshaped my understanding of the space in which I had conducted the research, shifting from a notion of a collaborative, 'free' space to one of a 'psy space' (Rose 1996). I made further linkages between the notion of collaborative research and the so-called 'direct experience' of individuals and the notion of 'interiority' as a psychological system (Rose 1996). I discuss this shift in understanding in more depth at the beginning of Chapter One. As a result of this intellectual labor, I subsequently understood that I had invited the research participants to again imagine themselves as the subjects of their own biographies (Rose 1996). I had invited the men to narrate their 'life' stories and that of the sexual abuse of their victims within the Murdoch University research 'psy' space, just as they had been invited to do in the SAIF cognitive-behavioral 'psy' space in which they were identified with their deviant selves. I wish to express my appreciation of the fact that the men were willing to do this a second time, particularly as it meant that they were again confronted with the reality and consequences of their choices to sexually abuse. They were willing to do so in order to encourage other men to stop their sexually abusive behavior. I trust that this thesis honors their intent. For my own part, my aim has been to work with the men and with others to ensure that certain phrases can no longer be spoken ('I thought she was asleep'), and certain acts no longer performed. I now turn to a discussion of my writing process.

1:3 Stoppings and Startings

After the research project was completed, I set the transcripts aside to concentrate on 'theoretical' aspects of the thesis. During this period I suffered two losses that affected me so deeply that for a considerable interval of time around each death I was incapable of working on the thesis at all. The first death was my twenty-year old niece Rebecca and the second was my (first)
supervisor, Dr Alan Mansfield, and for many months their absence was a constant presence to me. In writing of his own grief experienced in regard to two losses, Pfeil (1995) states that such facts hardly matter to anyone, and certainly not intellectually or politically. Nevertheless, I agree with his statement that they do matter a great deal to the writing of the text.

I also took a six-month break to complete a Tertiary Teaching unit at Murdoch University. This 'know-how' enabled me to meet economic necessities following a subsequent invitation to write two units for the School of Social Work, Curtin University of Technology, one on domestic violence and one on feminist research inquiry. Also stitched within my imbricated lifestyle was my voluntary work at SAIF, a second divorce, loving and caring for/from my four children and other family members, tutoring, lecturing, researching, full-time and contract work and a ceaseless engagement with the author known as 'Foucault'. It included endless drafts of this thesis, that entailed making connections and practices of exclusion (Foucault 1984d) and many conversations with my first, and then second, supervisor. All of the above, in their diversity and complexity, contributed toward the production of this text.

Now, so many years on, as I am about to finish the text, I argue that I relate to myself through the relations I have established with myself, relations that are both historical and constituted. Critical here is Foucault's (1991a) notion of government as a style of political reasoning concerned with the conduct of conduct. I also draw upon Rose's (1996) observation that our existence as human being has in part assumed the form it has through the way it has been the object of a whole variety of more or less rationalized programs and schemes. These shape our way of understanding and enacting our existence, organizing and regulating time, space and movements of our daily lives. Our bodies are 'disciplined', that is, 'trained, shaped, and impressed with the stamp of prevailing historical forms of selfhood, desire, masculinity, femininity' (Bordo 1993:166). I have, for example, deployed 'self-steering' mechanisms
in order to conduct myself through the disciplinary practice of producing/writing up a thesis and at times these could be described as 'despotiC'. As Rose (1996:25) argues, it is practices that locate human beings in 'particular "regimes of the person"'.

Within such an analytics, the individualized, psychologized understanding of what it is to be human is taken as the site of a historical problem, not as the basis for a historical narrative (Rose 1996). Such a genealogy of subjectification, to borrow Rose's (1996) term, does not write a continuous history of the self. Rather..it accounts for the diversity of languages of 'personhood' that have taken shape, such as:

character, personality, identity, reputation, honor, citizen, individual, normal, lunatic, patient, client, husband, mother, daughter - and norms, techniques, and relations of authority within which these have circulated in legal, domestic, industrial, and other practices for acting upon the conduct of persons.
(Rose 1996:25)

Subjectification is not therefore a matter of the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves, located within a universe of meaning or an interactional context of narratives, a position articulated within the social constructionist argument (see Shotter and Gergen 1989; Shotter 1993a; Shotter 1993b). Within this argument, there is a focus upon the ways in which the world is constructed through talk or emphasis is placed upon the ways in which 'discourses "talk through" and shape the subject' (Nightingale 1999:421). However, in this thesis I argue, following Rose (1996), that human being has been fabricated within a complex of apparatuses, practices and assemblages that presuppose and enjoin particular relations with ourselves. Hence, I strive to trace 'the technical forms accorded to the relation to oneself in various practices' (Rose 1996:33). With this shift, I endeavor to enhance the contestability of the
forms of being invented by cognitive-behavioral psychology for the subject know as 'incest offender'.

Thus in the time it has taken me to complete this thesis, my intellectual vision has shifted from a notion of an autonomous self to that of an invented self, a term I borrow from Rose (1996). The type of subject I am now is different to the type of subject that I was when participating at SAIF and in the research group. No longer do I pursue the idea of a subjectivity that constitutes meanings into discourse, the idea that animates the question 'what meaning does this have in my life?' Rather, in regard to the research participants, my concern is with tracing the technical forms, such as familial, economic, educational, military, accorded to the relation of each man to himself in various practices. This shift in vision converges in turn with the accidental beginnings of the recording of two in-depth interviews with two research participants. This, in turn, has created the possibility for me to choose these stories to investigate as opposed to the wealth of narratives recorded in the first three research group sessions. Further, in the following section I outline why I have chosen to situate my investigation of the two men's storytelling in Chapter One, and then I outline the architecture of the remainder of this thesis.

1:4 Thesis Structure

First, I would like to explain how a major shift in the focus of this thesis occurred for me when I enacted a reversal of gaze whilst engaging with the seemingly innocent question 'why did I do it?' This shift subsequently became critical to the structure and content of this thesis. It was during the process of rendering the men's actions intelligible through a feminist engagement with a Foucauldian way of thought, further developed by Rose (cf. Rose 1990; 1996), that a further question emerged. I now asked 'how is it possible for this question to be asked?' This question shifted my gaze from its
focus upon the men’s relations with themselves, to a focus upon the institutional dimension where authorities constitute themselves as subjects acting on others (Foucault 1984b). It was the 1990s Field of Sex Offender Treatment, the discourse of cognitive-behavioral psychology and the sex offender as deviant individual that now became the focus of this reversal of my gaze.

Hence it was now possible for me to situate my investigation of the invented self of the (ordinary) men who chose to sexually abuse their daughters, against this second investigation of the manifest appearance of the deviant individual. The question that now animated this second investigation was ‘how do such men come to be constituted within the Field of Sex Offender Treatment as deviant individuals?’ It now lent coherence to my text to position the men’s storytelling in Chapter One followed by the three chapters of my genealogical investigation of this second question. Here, the subject of my investigation is the emergence of the deviant individual and the discourse of cognitive-behavioral psychology, together with an investigation of the historical conditions that motivate conceptualization in the 1990s Field of Sex Offender Treatment. I therefore take the body of the incest offender in the 1990s as my point of departure, and then trace the pattern of intellectual descent from the present backwards, offering the reader an historical awareness of present circumstances in the Field of Sex Offender Treatment. However, by way of narrative convention, my account of this investigation moves forward from the sixteenth century to the 1990s.

Chapter One is therefore the site where I analyze how the men have established a particular relation with themselves and others in different places and spaces as sexed selves. Within their respective genealogy of subjectification, I analyze how they have established a relation to different corporeal regimes, different ways of disciplining the body (Foucault 1977) and how they have shaped their ways of understanding their existence in the
name of the objective of manliness. I analyze how the men have enjoined a particular relation to themselves through the inculcation of certain capacities such as memory, and how they have rendered their introspection intelligible in particular vocabularies. That is, in vocabularies of feelings, beliefs, passions, desires and values according to a particular explanatory code derived from some source of authority (Rose 1996). My investigation is concerned therefore with the conditions, the demands and forms of authority under which each of the men put together their regime of the self. It is concerned with how they made choices of the self within the diverse and conflicting moral obligations of different spheres of life, for example in the family, in work and in sexuality.

In Chapter Two, I first situate the reader in the Field of Sex Offender Treatment through an analysis of forms of authority and regimes of knowledge through which certain selves get transformed into certain forms of personhood, here - sex offender. My historical analysis then focuses upon transformations in the exercise of political power in contemporary liberal democracies. Here my investigation concerns governmentality and bio-power and strategies of regulation, for example discipline and surveillance. This is followed by my investigation of the emergence of confession into a field of rationality. The problemization of 'sex' in the eighteenth century, first, in relation to bourgeois sexuality and then in relation to the sexuality finally conceded to the working class in the mid-nineteenth century constitutes the next subject of investigation. Here my concern is with regimes of truth, to include psychoanalysis, and strategies of control and regulation of the urban working class. My final investigation is concerned with the difference between an anatomical style of reasoning, where anatomical sex exhausts one's sexual identity, and a new psychiatric style of reasoning in which new concepts are 'identified' such as impulses, aptitudes and psychic traits. This is followed with a brief introductory discussion of technologies of normalization.
Chapter Three is the site of my investigations of the intellectual machinery, intellectual techniques and techniques of inscription that are deployed for rendering human being thinkable as a certain mode of existence. First, I investigate the theories, concepts and explanations of psychiatry that make being thinkable as homicidal mania. I then analyze the arts and skills that criminal anthropology deploys in order to produce tainted citizens made thinkable as dangerous, risky individuals. It is then the language and vocabularies of sexology and its techniques of inscription, to include ordering, classification and segmentation, that are the subject of analysis as they relate to the manufacture and production of sexual perverts. This chapter is also concerned with battles over truth claims within and between the discourses of psychiatry, psychoanalysis and psychology, such as psychiatry's truth claims as they relate to the theory of hereditary degeneracy. Finally, it is the disciplinary techniques of surgical and medical castration and the emergence of psychology's domain of the modification of pathological behavior that are the subjects of analysis.

Chapter Four commences with an investigation of how the discourse of antipsychiatry and the civil rights movement converge in the 1970s to challenge the validity of the psychiatric treatment of sex offenders in relation to psychosurgery and surgical castration. I then analyze how, at the same historical moment, behavioral psychology challenges the hegemony of psychiatry in the treatment of sex offenders. It is within the emergence of behavioral and then cognitive-behavioral psychology that psychologists conduct the conduct of sex offenders within institutional spaces such as the laboratory. Techniques such as electric shock aversion therapy are deployed, followed later by techniques such as covert sensitization and orgasmic reconditioning. The final subject of investigation in this chapter is the cognitive-behavioral program of Relapse Prevention and I re-visit Victim Empathy. Here, I analyze Relapse Prevention as a self-governance regime that problematizes the behaviors of child molesters as 'addictive', deploying.
the language and vocabularies of addiction. In re-visiting Victim Empathy, I explore alternate conceptualizations of the notion of 'empathy', and analyze how certain notions of empathy have been deployed within the discourse of cognitive-behavioral psychology to render the child molester/incest offender thinkable as 'empathy deficit', and therefore in need of victim empathy education. I then employ an alternate notion of empathy, to explore an alternate possibility, namely, that child molesters/incest offenders arguably have experience of empathy and deploy a certain understanding when engaging with their (prospective/current) victim/survivors. This opens up a space in which to consider how an incest offender might choose to engage with the notion of an invented self, and develop understanding of how his victim/survivor infolded the sexual assault within her genealogy of subjectification. By developing such an understanding, and feelings in the form of sympathy and compassion for his survivor, the incest offender can choose to invent himself differently, as an ethical subject.

In my Conclusion, I first draw together the threads of my genealogical analysis of events that render possible the emergence of the Field of Sex Offender Treatment as it is and the emergence of the deviant individual, and review the historical conditions which motivate present conceptualization of the incest offender. I then draw together the threads of my investigation of the relations that the incest offenders established with themselves, and how they came to relate to themselves as invented selves. I then conclude with reflections and questions. My reflections are concerned with how treatment of both incest perpetrators and victim/survivors might be constituted differently, if the space of interiority is challenged by the notion of invented selves. My questions are concerned with whose interests have been created by pathologizing the incest offender as a sexual deviant. I invite the reader to consider alternate possibilities.
CHAPTER ONE
THE INCEST OFFENDER
AS
INVENTED SELF

Who speaks, according to what criteria of truth, from what places, in what relations, acting in what ways, supported by what habits, routines, authorized in what ways, in what spaces and places, and under what forms of persuasion, sanction, lies, and cruelties? (Rose 1996:178)

1. INTERVIEWING

I commence this chapter by picking up the threads of the discussion commenced in the Introduction concerning my shift in understanding regarding collaborative inquiry and the constitution of the research space at Murdoch University. I now argue that these rooms became what Rose (1996:193) terms 'psy spaces'. In using this term, I mean that 'psy' was territorialized within these spaces through an organization of practices of research that involved an assemblage of researcher and research participants - initially conceived of as 'co-researchers'. Research participants were seated on chairs positioned for bodies to relate in an intimate circle, and technical means were deployed to record the men's narratives, such as tape recorder and transcripts. Hence, whilst we were no longer situated within the cognitive-behavioral 'psy' space of the SAIF Program, this was not a 'free' space for subjectivity was machinated through the men infolding a relation to themselves in therapeutic terms. As at the SAIF Program, the men problematized themselves according to the values of normality and pathology (Rose 1996), diagnosing their desires, choices made and misfortunes in 'psy' terms. Once again, each man became a subject for himself in his storytelling, in the act of speaking, through the obligation to produce words that were true to an inner reality, and through the self-examination that preceded and accompanied speech. At the very moment that the men affirmed their
identity, they inhabited a space formed at the intersection of disciplinary mechanisms and a mode of subjectification through which humans are urged and incited to become ethical beings. Rose (1996) describes such ethical subjects as:

beings who define and regulate themselves according to a moral code, establish precepts for conducting and judging their lives, and reject or accept certain moral goals for themselves. (Rose 1990:241)

Within practices of 'self' undertaken within the 'panoptic' space of the SAIF Program, the men had already been situated within the ethical territory mapped out by moral codes that had calibrated and evaluated them as sexual deviants. I discuss the Panopticon, a model prison, in detail in Chapter Two. Suffice it to say here, that it is a model that captures the essence of the method of disciplinary power that operates by hierarchical observation and normalization, in which the individual subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, 'assumes responsibility for the constraints of power' (Foucault 1977:202). By inscribing in themselves the power relation in which they simultaneously play both roles, persons become the principle of their own subjection (Foucault 1977). Within SAIF's cognitive-behavioral 'panoptic' space and ethical territory, the men had been educated in pitfalls to be avoided, for example, whilst participating in Relapse Prevention. They had established the goals to pursue, for example healthy (hetero)sexuality. They had identified the attributes of an ethical person, such as 'Truthfulness'. These moral codes were administered within SAIF ethical scenarios, that is, within group settings, deploying various technical means such as theoretical 'models', confessional exercises, videotaped role-plays, etc., in which moral codes were enjoined. The men deployed what Foucault (1988e) terms technologies of the self, in order to develop a relationship with themselves through such techniques as self-reflection and self-examination. The men were thus required to decipher their 'self' by themselves for the transformation they sought to accomplish with themselves. In other words, the men had been
the target of a multiplicity of types of work required to diagnose their 'interiority' as a psychological system.

Within the Murdoch University research 'psy' space, the men continued to diagnose their 'interiority', deploying technologies of the self. And whilst I had initially envisioned this as being a collaborative, free space, in which I worked with the men as 'co-researcher', I now argue that this was an untenable expectation, for it was the men as subjects who were caught up within the narrativization of their lives. It was the men who were the ones required to self-reflect and self-examine and it was their stories that were rendered into an element of psychological research. Furthermore, Rose (1996:192) suggests that such stories, or autobiographies, or case histories, are 'fictional'. That is to say, they are fictional in the sense that 'psy "invents" and reinvents imagined worlds in the quest for what it takes as its premise: that a real world inhabits our being as humans'. Hacking (1995) cautions us not to forget that the sciences of memory and memoro-politics, or the politics of memory, emerged precisely in the scientific context of positive psychology, within a space of possibilities established in the nineteenth century. Sciences of memory delivered knowledge about some object of study, namely, 'the memory' (Hacking 1995:202) and they emerged in the late nineteenth century as 'surrogate sciences of the soul' (Hacking 1995:209). They provided new kinds of knowledge in terms of curing, helping and controlling the one aspect of human beings that had hitherto been outside science (Hacking 1995). In the science of personal memory, that Hacking (1995:199) names the 'psychodynamics of memory', memory is studied in terms of 'observed or conjectured psychological processes and forces' (Hacking 1995:199). Hacking (1995) argues that the science of personal memory is part of a humanistic drive to capture the soul not as science, but as narrative. The success of this endeavor - to weave stories about our lives - is manifest, Hacking (1995:260) states, insofar as we have 'come to think of ourselves, our character, and our souls as very much formed by our past'. These two premises, that a real world inhabits our being as humans and that we are

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1 This term coined by Hacking (1995) is patterned on Foucault's (1979a) anatomo-politics and bio-politics, which I discuss in detail in Chapter Two.
formed by our past, inform collaborative research to the extent that the 'information sought' is taken (uncritically) to be 'centred on the direct [real, past] experience of the individuals involved' (Kirby and McKenna 1989:102). Further, as Rose (1996:187) comments, '[f]or our culture, of course, agency is part of an 'experience' of internality - it appears to well up and rise out of our depths, our inner instincts, desires, or aspirations'.

In investigating the men's storytelling I therefore resist 'psy' premise that a real world inhabits our being. Rather, I choose to analyze the ways in which the men's existence has been rendered intelligible and practicable within a diversity of contexts and apparatuses in which they have administered, enjoined and assembled a particular relation to themselves. In taking this position, I draw upon work in the name of Nikolas Rose (Rose 1996), Elspeth Probyn (Probyn 1993), and Gilles Deleuze (Deleuze 1988), borrowing the metaphor of 'fold' that animates the ideas of the author know as Foucault (Deleuze 1988). That is, I draw upon the notion of 'folding', such that the 'interior' is a 'discontinuous surface, a kind of infolding of exteriority' (Rose 1996:37). It is in the techniques of objectification that the mode of articulating the 'outside' is found (Probyn 1993). It is this 'outside' that 'is "twisted", "folded" and "doubled"' (Deleuze 1988:110) by an 'inside', articulated in the process of subjectification (Probyn 1993). This act of folding, or pleating is 'the bending-onto-itself of the line of the outside in order to constitute the inside/outside - the modes of self' (Probyn 1993:129). The critical point for this analysis is that the fold indicates a relation without an essential interior. That is, without one in which what is 'inside' is merely an infolding of an exterior (Rose 1996), for folds incorporate without totalizing and internalize without unifying (Rose 1996). Rose (1996) suggests that within a genealogy of subjectification, that which would be infolded could be anything:

that can acquire authority: injunctions, advice, techniques, little habits of thought and emotion, an array of routines and norms of being human - the instruments through which being constitutes itself in different practices and relations. (Rose 1996:37)
Rose (1996), taking a similar position to Hacking (1995), argues that the way that we as human beings have partially stabilized these 'infoldings' is to imagine ourselves as the subjects of a biography. In our everyday existence, we employ certain 'arts of memory', such as rituals of storytelling and photograph albums, which we then utilize to render our biography stable. We employ certain vocabularies and explanations in order to make this intelligible to ourselves (Rose 1996). I suggest that it is these 'arts of memory', or narratives, and rituals of storytelling, vocabularies and explanations that are deployed in (collaborative) research. Further, Rose (1996:184 original italics) argues that as humans we are caught up within an unstable regime of corporeality that is the result of assemblages which 'induce a certain relation to ourselves as embodied'. Within this assemblage 'the body' is rendered organically unified, traversed by vital processes that differentiate, accord depth and limit, establish things the body can and cannot do and equip it with a sexuality (Rose 1996). However, the argument here is that the body is not 'the body' but rather, as Rose (1996:184) clarifies, it is merely a particular relationship, capable of being affected in particular ways. As a historical phenomenon, it is an assemblage of organs, such as heart, liver, lungs, processes, such as breathing, swallowing, reading, pleasures, such as touching, eating, passions, for lovers, for sport, for art. Hence these assemblages are not delineated by the envelope of the skin, but 'link up "outside" and "inside"' (Rose 1996:185). However, as Rose (1996) points out, at any one time and place, it is not into anything that persons may be assembled, and the vectors that are folded, 'have limits that are not ontological but historical' (Rose 1996:189). Furthermore, most importantly, as stated above, what is infolded within a particular assemblage is anything that can acquire the status of authority. This might be a certain way of walking that infolds a certain voice, for example that of one's father, little habits of thought such as 'real men don't eat quiche'. Bodies are therefore 'thought bodies', for as Rose (1996:185) observes, 'organs, forces, energies, passions and dreads are assembled through connections with words, dreams, techniques, chants, habits, judgments, weapons, tools, groups', and bodies are capable of so much within these machinations. Hence the argument, which Rose (1996:185) puts convincingly and which I critically deploy in this thesis, that if we have
become psychological creatures, it is not because of a *givenness* of an interior, or because of the *meanings* of a culture, but rather:

because of the ways in which, in so many locales and practices, psy vectors have come to traverse and link up these machinations. (Rose 1996:185)

In the following investigation, I therefore render the men intelligible in terms of assemblages that have been stabilized in relation to *themselves* through storytelling, narratives, that situates each man as the subject of his own biography. The men's narratives of memories are storied in the form of scenes as well as views and feelings. Our common conception of remembering is remembering by scenes and episodes, and whilst we may present this remembering by narrative, it is nevertheless a memory of scenes (Hacking 1995). I therefore use the metaphor of *scene* to present much of the men's storytelling.

2. **STORYTELLING**

2:1 Jack and the 'Backyard' and 'Country Road' Scenes

The following scenes took place in 1937, in country Australia, when 'Jack' was four years of age. Jack's father had immigrated to Australia from the United Kingdom with his brother when they were both young men. Prior to leaving the United Kingdom, Jack's father had been a sports master at a girls' school. Jack had little to say about his mother, though he spoke of a twin sister whom he loved and an elder sister whom he hated. When Jack was four the family lived on a farm and this is the historical location for the following two scenes, most recently recalled by Jack when he was completing the Autobiographical Outline at SAIF:

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2 As mentioned in the Introduction, the names of all research participants and other identifiable persons have been changed in this thesis, signified initially by inverted commas.
Jack: when we had to write down early childhood memories [at SAIF] a lot of this came back, a lot that I'd put to the back of my mind. Em, for instance, as I've told you before, my father used to hold me on an outstretched hand...arm-hand, and I must have been about three or four then. I may have been a little bit older, but I used to be terrified. Perhaps that's one reason I grew up terrified of heights. But I used to scream and carry on and, and he used to say... 'pardon'?

Kisane: oh...

Jack: he was a very strong man and he just used to hold me there and bounce, bounce his hand up and down you see, and I had nothing to hang on to. And I used to be terrified, and the more I cried the more he laughed and the more fun he seemed to get out of it. And he, and he, and he... and I can remember things like 'oh, we'll make a man of you' and things like that. Like the same when he shoved the branch down the back of my (pause) shirt and pants to make me walk straight...things...

Kisane: when did that happen?

Jack: I can remember walking down this country road and going visiting the next door neighbors. And it must have been about half a, half a mile to... a mile to walk and that was a regular Sunday excursion. And, and, every Sunday I got this. And I was, would have been four or five at the time... no, I must have been about four, four... yeah.³

In his storytelling, Jack made sense of these two actions within the context of his father 'making a man' of him. Hacking (1995:257) states that there is a semantic⁴ phenomenon that has to do with the way in which memory is most satisfying. What Hacking (1995) argues, is that when memory provides a narrative, that narrative is most tight when it has a clear, causal structure.

³ (Jack and Kisane 8/12/92 p2)
Jack also created a *linkage* between both scenes with the notion that his father's actions formed part of that *objective*. Indeed, Jack stated that his father always wanted to 'make a man of me...help make a man of me...he always wanted to make a man of me'⁵, stating in another part of the transcript that this was his father's 'favorite saying'⁶. Jack extended the causal structure by making a *connection* with the claim that it was a certain kind of man, a middle class man, that was the objective his father had for him. Jack substantiates this claim in the following quote in which he described his father as:

> a very cold, very aloof...very aloof man, and we were frightened like the devil of him, we were...I, well I was terrified of him, I was terrified of him until em, well the last year of his life. And I was always...from about seventeen onwards, I was always trying to *prove* myself because (pause) I was the black sheep of the family. The two girls had gone on to High school and I'd opted out, and...I wanted to be a *carpenter* you see and he wanted me to be a *gentleman*.⁷

One of the reasons that Jack was 'terrified' of his father was because of a disciplinary regime that was widely practised in country Australia at the time, namely 'beltings' with the razor strop. Both Jack and his two sisters were 'subjected to er, beltings, if you like to use that word, with a razor strop, to keep us in line...both mother and father⁸. Jack then stated:

> and you are looking for some sort of help from somewhere for something, you know, to help you em...live through the times, for want of a better word. Live through the agony of what's going on...to you, mentally and this terrible fear, this fear of your father all the time. I mean, I, I, it's hard er, to explain the

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⁴ Here Hacking (1995:257) chooses the word 'semantic' to make it plain that he is speaking from a space of logic rather than the 'overtilled country called "social construction."'
⁵ (Jack 8/12/92 p5)
⁶ (Jack 8/12/92 p20)
⁷ (Jack 8/12/92 p4)
⁸ (Jack 8/12/92 p1)
fear that you've got waiting for your father to come home. Er, and there is no joy in life.9

I commence my investigation by analyzing the way in which the activity of 'shoving' the branch down Jack's shirt and pants to make him 'walk straight' functions in relation to the statement 'to make a man of me'.

I take the eighteenth century as the historical moment of departure for this investigation, for it was during this era that the bourgeoisie was occupied with forming a specific 'class' body (Foucault 1979a), developed against the 'decadent' aristocracy and 'immorality' of the lower orders (Weeks 1986). It was the era when the new regime of 'bio-power'10 (Foucault 1979a) constituted two poles of development, the one centering on the body as machine, and the other on the species body. With 'anatomo-politics' (Foucault 1979a), to be discussed in the following chapter, the disciplining of the human body was enabled by numerous and diverse techniques for its subjugation, such as regimes for governing movement in time and space. By the middle of the eighteenth century, bio-politics, or regulatory controls of the population, enabled it to be managed and made to flourish (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982). This required increasing knowledges of the population, such as its births, deaths and marriages. By the nineteenth century, these knowledges that had emerged from 'moral science' (Hacking 1982), that is, 'statistics'11, were deployed to control the moral tenor of the newly urbanized population. It was at that time that the bourgeois discourse of 'Christian manliness', that intersected with the liberal system for a governed economy (Foucault 1981), stressed 'spiritual, cerebral and moral precepts, as well as the dignity of labour and the importance of manly independence and autonomy' (Segal 1990:106). Christian manliness also entailed the deployment of techniques of inscription that rendered certain (middle class) men remarkable in particular ways, for example as 'tender' and capable of 'intellectual earnestness' (Segal 1990:106). Edley and Wetherell (1995) trace a succinct summation of this understanding

9 (Jack 6/10/92 p1)  
10 I discuss Foucault's (1979a) notion of 'bio-power' in depth in Chapter Two.  
11 Statistics is also discussed in depth in Chapter Two.
of the assemblage of Christian manliness to Dr Thomas Arnold, who was the headmaster of Rugby school from 1827 to 1839. Edley and Wetherell (1995:149) quote Dr Arnold as stating in the following assemblage of enunciation\textsuperscript{12} that manliness was the pursuit and practice 'of "first, religious and moral principles; second, gentlemanly conduct; and third, intellectual ability"'.

However, by the close of the century, competing discourses emerged to challenge the early nineteenth century discourse of 'Christian' manliness. Segal argues that this shift emerged in Britain at the historical moment of British imperialist expansion and conquests and 'increasing demands on the defence of existing colonial territories' (Segal 1990:107), which converged in turn with 'public concern about men's physical weakness' (Segal 1990:107). Also implicated in this shift was the Darwinian evolutionary discourse\textsuperscript{13}, with its theory of 'natural selection' leading towards ever more environmentally suited or adapted individuals (Edley and Wetherell 1995). It was the 'scientific' truth claims in the Darwinian discourse that 'seemed to establish the "scientific" basis for the necessary elimination of the weak by the strong' (Segal 1990:107).

It was therefore the multiple interconnections of the above discourses, regimes, practices and transformations, as well as a resistance to the 'intensely feminine atmosphere of the middle-class home' (Segal 1990:107), that led to an emergence of 'an increasing stress on sport and physical strenuousness' (Segal 1990:105). Christian manliness was thus challenged through the assemblage of a manliness that was more \textit{spartan}, \textit{athletic} and \textit{muscular} (Segal 1990). To be a man in the late nineteenth century required the constitution of a male self that resisted 'all signs of love or tenderness or affection' (Segal 1990:107-08), in favor of the assemblage of a 'more muscular, militaristic masculinity' (Segal 1990:106). This new infolding of

\textsuperscript{12} By this term I mean the form in which language appears in the 'Rugby' space and place such that it is irreducible to linguistic categories (Rose 1996; Deleuze and Guattari 1988; Foucault 1972).
\textsuperscript{13} The significance of this discourse for Criminal Anthropology is discussed in Chapter Three.
manliness was shaped by the disciplinary regimes of physical fitness that entailed the production of a 'courageous' and 'audacious' self. Manliness was assembled most directly within the regimes, disciplinary practices and technologies deployed within the institutional spaces of the public schools, where groups of middle class boys shaped and reformed their selves. This was especially so after the mid-nineteenth century expansion of the education system for middle class boys (Segal 1990).

In Britain and America the discourse of middle class masculinity, with its norms and vocabularies, its regimes of personhood, its practices and programs, was dominant between 1800 and 1940 (Edley and Wetherell 1995). Publishing technologies were deployed to disseminate middle class vocabularies and ethical valorizations to both middle class and working class boys in texts such as Boys Own Paper and Tom Brown's Schooldays (Edley and Wetherell 1995). The human technologies (Rose 1996) of the Boys' Brigade and the Scouts attempted to constitute and enframe working class boys within the ideals of personhood articulated within the assemblage of middle class masculinity.

These, then, were the discourses and the regimes of subjectification that had shaped the social territory within which Jack's father experienced, understood, judged and conducted himself. It will be recalled that he was raised in Britain and had been a sports master. And whilst the shoving of a branch down Jack's shirt and pants was a relatively minor disciplinary technique, the forces of history acted upon and through Jack's young body. Jack functioned here as arrangements, where his capacities such as posture, stride and bodily comportment were technical achievements within a gendering body regime, in which disciplinary coercion established in the body 'the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an increased domination' (Foucault 1977:138). Jack's father's action of shoving the branch down Jack's shorts was thus situated 'in the coherence of a tactic' (Foucault 1977:139), through which he wished to enjoin a relation between Jack and his body. In this relation, bodily comportment would both manifest and maintain a certain disciplined mastery exercised by Jack over himself (Foucault 1977; Rose
1996). West (1996:87) argues that at this historical moment, a father might have seen himself as 'modeled' on a parade sergeant, commanding respect and issuing orders. Furthermore, in wanting his son to be a 'gentleman', Jack's father made visible the division among men along race and class lines. A gentleman was a white, middle class male, caught between the ruling class and the working class and hence 'must aspire upwards' (Segal 1990:117), necessitating an 'upright' comportment that announced confidence and ease.

The action of Jack's father in bouncing Jack up and down on his arm shares similar connections to those that the branch tactic shares with the statement to 'make a man' of Jack. However, here the corporeal regime of 'bouncing' is devised as a rationalized attempt to incite Jack to self-mastery of his emotions. Such a self-mastery was required of a man in order to enter into certain forms of life, for example, 'breadwinner' of a family, 'commander' of a regiment. A regime of language was deployed in this era to enjoin in boys a particular relation to self, for example to be 'tough' (West 1996:11). Vocabularies and forms of judgement could equally enjoin in boys a relation with self that was what they were not - 'not male, not manly'. That is, to be 'sissy' (West 1996:11) or 'sooky'. Jack constituted his self, whilst being constituted by others, in the latter category. That is, as a:

big 'sook'. But, but I realize now, at my age now, that I was just easily em...upset. And, and (pause) I learnt not to show that...I learnt to keep my sentimentality to myself, my innermost feelings. And I learnt to show the hard exterior because that's all we were allowed to show anyhow. Otherwise, you were called a 'sook', you know. You cried, you were called a sook...'stop that crying, you're a big sook'...my mother used to do that.\textsuperscript{14}

These vocabularies, judgements and practices are evidenced in West's (1996) research\textsuperscript{15} with men who grew up in Australia in the same historical moment as Jack. A woman who was interviewed in relation to her brother stated that

\textsuperscript{14} (Jack 8/12/92 p5)  
\textsuperscript{15} The men in West's (1996) research in his book Fathers, Sons & Lovers: Men Talk about their Lives from the 1930s to Today were not interviewed as sex offenders.
he was 'taught that boys don't cry, they've got to be big and tough and wear the trousers around the house, they can't be sooky and they have to stand up for themselves. They were made to be tough and they had to be tough' (West 1996:11 my italics). Such were the injunctions infolded by Jack's father, to be passed on to his son within their relations and through disciplinary practices, such that they became part of Jack's subjectification. With the infolding of the injunction to 'be a man' authorized through his father's voice, Jack, the four-year old boy, commenced shaping and reforming his self, his 'body-thought', into a middle class norm of manliness. This assemblage demanded that he 'stand up' like a man, and be courageous, that is, not 'sooky'.

The 'backyard' scene took place when Australia was emerging out of the Depression. It was an era when one of the crucial ways in which multiple masculinities were shaped was in relation to the labor market as a whole, rather than a specific workplace, for it shaped experience as an alternation of work and unemployment (Connell 1995). Here, I use the term 'multiple masculinities' to refer to the temporal, spatial and cultural diversity of masculinity (Collinson and Hearn 1996). Then men, as now, lived their masculinity within the relatedness of interaction with other men, women, children and the impact of being experienced by other men, women and children within gendering power relations and material and discursive practices, such as those evidenced within economic class inequalities. These inequalities were reproduced in multiple workplaces within the labor market that, in turn, reproduced them through routine workplace practices (Collinson and Hearn 1996). Such practices included a complexity of organizational features such as hierarchy, managerial control, subordinations and resistances. In early twentieth-century Australia, the elevation of specifically masculine values of being was a strategy used by working class men to resist the positioning of second-class citizenship (Donaldson 1991). For men who had the strength to do manual labor, it included the constitution of selves, of 'bodies-thought' as 'heroic males', able to stand up to the brutality of the working situation (Donaldson 1991). It included the constitution of male selves as 'family breadwinner' and the infolding of the ability to 'give and take a joke' or 'give and take the piss' (Collinson and Hearn 1996), in order to
negotiate techniques of objectification and the process of subjectification. By mid-1932 in Australia, the year before Jack was born, 'one-third of all workers were unemployed and family poverty was widespread' (Edgar 1997:113). At that time, within the dividing practices organized around gender, women were both criticized for working outside the home, and were caught up in an assemblage within the space that was constituted as a *woman's place*, namely 'the home'. In 1933 'over half of Australian families were earning less than two-thirds of the 'basic wage' (Edgar 1997:113), and in the same year the *Women's Weekly* was first published and soon became 'the gospel of homemaking for women to get behind their man and not compete with him' (Edgar 1997:120). Single woman were also constituted as a threat to male jobs when 'full employment (for males) must be restored' (Edgar 1997:116). It was a time of caution, 'saving for a rainy day, a strong demand for security in employment, self-denial of extravagant pleasures for the benefit of the next generation' (Edgar 1997:116). Within the machine of (masculine) accountability, vocabularies incited a man to perform, protect and provide (West 1996).

Language therefore sexes, and bodies are always thought bodies or 'bodies-thought' (Rose 1996:183). Hence, to be 'masculine' at that time was to be *not* feminine, and to be a man was to be thought *not* gay or tainted with any marks of inferiority' (Segal 1990 original italics). To have a 'body-thought' as that of a 'girl' was what 'boys feared and hated' (West 1996:8) the most. The 1930s was the time when masculinities and femininities were starting to be informed by the notion of the 'role', a technical concept of the social sciences deployed as a way of *explaining* social behavior generally (Connell 1995). *Role theory* drew attention to the way in which most people, most of the time, behaved in ways that were socially prescribed, or so it was claimed in this 'simplification' of human being. Hence the appeal of the role concept was that it provided a handy way to *link* 'the idea of a place in social structure with the idea of cultural norms' (Connell 1995:22). Being a man or a woman meant enacting a general set of *expectations* of personhood attached to one's sex (Connell 1995). 'Masculinity' and 'femininity' were now *interpreted* as *internalized sex roles*, the products of social learning or socialization (Connell
1995). By the end of the 1950s, the concept of 'sex role' had become a conventional term within anthropological, sociological and psychological discourses, the term eventually passing into popular discourse (Connell 1995). For Jack, his assemblage of self therefore included the infolding of injunctions concerning his role as future 'breadwinner'. It included the injunction to 'be a man', combined with disciplinary techniques for the achievement of middle class norms of masculinity. Jack's subjectification thus constituted a life spent:

constantly searching for something as I've told you before, and I can never, ever (sigh) seem to suss out what it was. And I think all the time I was trying to really prove myself to my father.\(^\text{16}\)

Jack thus struggles to be a certain kind of self, a self of whom his father would approve. But at the same time as he attempts to identify that self, to be that self, he distinguishes himself from it, by being the self that failed in the endeavor. In the following 'barn' scene Jack, who is by now twelve years of age, commences to enact the injunction to 'be a man' through the deployment of sexuality.

2:2 Jack and the 'Bedroom' and 'Barn' Scenes and the First 'Kitchen' Scene

When Jack was twelve he was having increasing difficulties at school, so his father got him a job, once again to 'make a man'\(^\text{17}\) of him. At that time, a boy 'became a man when he did a man's work' (West 1996:42). Jack's father 'sent him off' to work for the son-in-law and daughter of the local postmaster, who were leasing a farm. In Jack's storytelling the 'barn' scene started when he and the six-year old daughter of the couple were:

watching the bull mount...er, mate with a cow and she told me they were 'bulling'. I didn't have a clue...I didn't have, I, I was

\(^{16}\) (Jack 20/12/92 p4)  
\(^{17}\) (Jack 8/12/92 p5)
so stupid in those days. I didn't know the first thing about anything. But she knew all about it and told me em, what they were doing and one thing led to another and, and we were doing it ourselves. Em, it just seemed...although in a way I sensed it was wrong, it just seemed a natural thing for us to do anyhow. I mean we both knew it was wrong because we used to sneak off and do it. I mean we didn't do it in front of her parents, or we'd wait until the parents had their siesta and then we'd just sneak off, you know. But it just, just seemed natural.18

The farm that Jack was working on was a dairy farm and the work practice was to be up at four in the morning, get the cows in and milk them, do farm work, have lunch, and then at twelve noon everyone would have a siesta for three hours. Then it would be time to get up and round up the cows again, milk them, then have 'tea' (supper) and go to bed.

When 'Rayleen's' parents were having their siesta, Jack and Rayleen went to the barn and:

she used to sit on my lap facing me and we used to sit looking at one another for quite some time. And the penetration used to take, although I fully penetrated, I was quite big in those days I suppose, but it used to take five or six or seven or eight or nine minutes, gently easing. So, you know, and we used to be looking at one another and it fascinated her as much as it fascinated me. So it was mutual satisfaction, fascination, yes.19

Jack remembered them as sitting like that for hours 'just cuddling one another'20 for although he could 'achieve an erection that was all I could do. I mean, er, I don't know what age boys reached puberty then, but that's all I could do anyhow'.21 Within discourses of masculinities, it is a habit of thought for men to judge the size of their penis as Jack does in the above

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18 (Jack 8/12/92 p5-6)  
19 (Jack 8/12/92 p15)  
20 (Jack 8/12/92 p5)  
21 (Jack 8/12/92 p6)
quote. In the statements about the 'bulling' incident, Jack also sexed himself as the naive lad, he sexed Rayleen as the knowing female and 'sex' was constituted as 'natural'. In relation to his own 'sex education', Jack stated in the conversations in session one 6/10/92 that:

Jack: my sisters were given a book to read...that was it. I don't know what my mother said. Em, I had to pinch the book and read it to try and work out what the hell these diagrams meant, which didn't do me one bit of good.

Kisane: mmm...

Jack: my father, when I asked him, eventually told me er, took me out to the fowl yard, showed me the chook on the rooster (sic) and then he cracked up under pressure and said, 'well, there the rooster is helping the chook lay the egg' you know. Which left me scratching my head, quite bewildered and not knowing what he was talking about.22

The problem Jack encountered was that the public or 'official' discourse on sexuality, to include his mother's 'book' and his father's 'fowl yard' explanations were, as McHoul (1986:69) argues, designed for the 'already sexually competent'. Situated within a regime of propriety, entailing interdictions, customs, habits, etiquette, silences, Jack's father chose not to transform his own sexuality into discourse and vocabularies in order to educate his son. One of the men interviewed in West's (1996:128) research referred to above, narrated how he attempted to negotiate the relations between official discourses on sex, marginal discourses and sexual practices in everyday life. He stated: 'nobody gave us advice about sex. Boys told one another what they knew. Or they just lay down with a girl and they worked out how to do it themselves'. Here, in the latter statement, the man referred to what McHoul (1986:69) identifies as the 'purely pedagogic difficulty' that a learner faces in closed regimes. The man in West's (1996) research also gave an example of the acquisition of what McHoul (1986:69) terms 'folk knowledge' in youth cultures. He stated:
Once behind a billboard I saw a man and a woman going hard at it. I was ten - I thought they were real old. I was there with my mates, and we all had a good look. Then we started throwing stones at them. The guy stood up and shook something at us. When we went to the movies we saw kissing. Then we read some books and picked up a bit more. (West 1996:128)

Jack's storytelling indicated that prior to the 'bulling' incident and his sexual activities with Rayleen, he had acquired neither the 'folk knowledge' about what 'went on' in intimate sexual relations nor the sexual competence that could have been achieved through (private) practices that involved 'doing it'. Jack had spent his early years living on a potato farm where he was 'disciplined harshly and we all had our chores to do'\(^{23}\). The chores were extremely time-consuming. Jack had to:

chop the wood and I'd have to fill up the wood boxes morning and night. I'd have to milk the cow and before milking the cow, I'd have to cut the lucerne to feed the cow. And when I've done that, if there's any daylight left, I had to go and do gardening, there was always something to do. Then I could come home, then I could go in and do my homework, which is probably why it got up my nose a bit about doing homework, because I was tired and I didn't want to do it. On weekends, like I told you, we were always working. My father was building his new house and Saturdays, Sundays, work. There was an awful argument if I wanted to go away. I was in the scouts then. I was allowed to go one night a week and I was allowed to go away to annual camp, not the weekends. Then, when I wanted to play football, oh my God!\(^{24}\)

The practice of allocating chores to boys was not unusual for that time and place when boys 'were expected to play their part in the upkeep of the family farm' (West 1996:6). Jack did not mention any sexual experimentation with

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\(^{22}\) (Jack 6/10/92 p35)
\(^{23}\) (Jack 8/12/92 p20)
\(^{24}\) (Jack 8/12/92 p20)
girls of his own age during that period. However, when he was six years old, he fell 'madly in love' with a fifteen or sixteen-year old friend of the family. She showed Jack 'an awful lot of affection, she used to cuddle me, but she used to cuddle me with her breasts naked, naked breasts. I asked Jack when and where this happened and he stated 'in her bedroom', on visits to the family when 'she used to bath me, six years old. She'd have her nightclothes on and we'd sit on her bed and cuddle'. Here, in this 'bedroom' scene, Jack referred to organs, the young woman's breasts, that were 'tactile', 'the touch conjoining thought and object in sensuous relations of contact and exchange' (Rose 1996:184). Jack linked cuddles with 'affection' and his 'love' for the young woman in the 'bedroom' scene, and in the 'barn' scene with Rayleen, cuddling 'one another' and 'looking at' one another was linked with 'mutual satisfaction' and 'fascination'. In both the bedroom scene and the barn scenes, intimate, sensuous relations of contact were exchanged that were for Jack expressive of nurturance and tenderness.

I now turn to Jack's 'common sense' notion that sex was 'natural'. Here, in his deployment of sexuality, Jack's habit of thought was shaped within the late 1940s, early 1950s discourse of sexuality and a psychiatric style of reasoning, discussed in depth in Chapter Two, that rendered thinkable a notion of a biological instinct. As McNay (1992:29) states, the notion of 'natural sex' renders it possible to group together 'in an "artificial unity" a number of disparate and unrelated biological functions and bodily pleasures'. Within such a common sense understanding, doing sex was deemed 'natural' and therefore, ipso facto, one did not have to 'learn it' (McHoul 1986:70). However, as McHoul observes, when an ideal-typical notion of 'natural sex' is required, it leaves a socially arbitrary residue of practices that:

come under the classification of 'deviance' or 'unnaturalness',
practices which when engaged in - and many learners, in the

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25 (Jack 8/12/92 p16)
26 (Jack 8/12/92 p16)
27 (Jack 8/12/92 p16)
28 (Jack 8/12/92 p16)
absence of the very classifications they are learning, must engage
in them - produce sanctions, guilt and shame. (McHoul 1986:70)

But as McHoul (1986:70 original italics) points out, 'just which practices are
natural is not available until one is a competent practitioner' and can then
begin to make such discriminations. Hence McHoul argues that deviance is
built into a training which would ideally omit it and the route to the natural
'becomes "structurally" paved with shame' (McHoul 1986:70).

Jack, however, made a causal link between watching the 'bulling' and his and
Rayleen's subsequent sexual activities in the barn. Jack thus infolded a
knowledge of sexual practices that was limited to historically situated vectors
that included the observation of the sexual performance of animals, his
previous 'loving' (sexualized) relations with the sixteen-year old when he was
six years old, a willing partner, and routine farming practices to include
'siestas'. Jack was also incited to become an ethical being ('I sensed it was
wrong'), regulating himself according to a moral code that intersected with the
discourse of sexuality in 1949-1950 Australia, that prohibited sexual
intercourse between persons who were not adult, married, heterosexual
couples and discouraged sexual experimentation. However, whilst infolding
these injunctions, at the same time Jack resisted such publicly defined codes
of legitimate sexual behavior by deploying (secret) strategies of resistance,
that resulted in relations of contact and interconnection. Jack stated that 'I, to
me, it, it, I wasn't hurting anybody because of our enjoying and I never, ever
thought of it in any other way but, but enjoyment. In Jack's storytelling
there is no evidence of gendered power relations being made visible in action
in the 'barn' scenes. However, in the following first 'kitchen' scene, in which
Rayleen was being bathed in a tin bath by her mother, gendering power
relations are rendered visible. Jack stated:

her mother used to bathe her nude in front of me. And I used to
cut quite embarrassed about that, and she used to taunt me over

29 (Jack 8/12/92 p13)
that...the girl...she used to stand up, you know, and flaunt herself.  

Within the above assemblages, intersected by gendering power relations, the vocabularies used by Jack - 'taunt' and 'flaunt' - sex Jack as male, sex Rayleen as female, and connect up with notions of masculinities and femininities, objectifications, regimes of propriety and prescriptions of deportment and comportment. What these words do therefore, that Jack has selected, with their connections and associations and linkages assembled through vectors that run across and through the envelope of the skin (Rose 1996), between eyes and 'body-thought', is sexualize Rayleen's body. In this particular scene, Jack incrusts himself as 'male connoisseur' (Bartky 1988:72), the infolding of such an authoritative stance being enabled through the authority of the more global patriarchal system. Jack thus situates Rayleen within his gaze and under his judgement, within an 'active and never-completed process of engendering or enculturation' (McNay 1992:71), in which 'the history of the female body is caught up with the history of the male body' (McNay 1992:38). Hence, both female and male bodies are worked upon in socially and historically specific ways. At this historical moment in the farm 'kitchen' space, Rayleen did not display, in Jack's view, the 'proper styles of feminine motility' (Bartky 1988:68), that conformed to a normative femininity to which even a pre-pubescent girl was expected, by Jack, to conform.

Also included within the relationship that Jack had developed with his (male) self was the infolded habit of thought that sex was 'not sex' unless it was heterosexual intercourse that included ejaculation. Hence, he was able to argue that his activities with Rayleen were not 'sexual' whilst, at the same time, sexualizing Rayleen with his habits of thought, regime of vocabulary. In session one 6/10/92, Jack stated:

at sixteen years old I still knew nothing about sex, even though I had that, no it wasn't sexual because...what it was...liaison when I was twelve with that girl who was six. Er, I didn't

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30 (Jack 8/12/92 p13)
ejaculate, so although it was pleasurable, it meant nothing to me...I didn't, I still didn't know what it was all about, the whole thing.\footnote{Jack 6/10/92 p35}

Here again, Jack invoked a habit of thought in which he refused to conflate a child's sensual relations involving bodily contact that was satisfying, enjoyable and fascinating, including exchange of looks, with 'meaningful' sexual relations of adulthood taken to mean sexual intercourse and 'ejaculation'. It was this 'refusal' that enabled Jack to make the statement that his 'liaison' with Rayleen was not 'sexual', despite the fact that he had had contact with Rayleen after he had left the farm at fifteen and was working in the local post office. As Jack tells his story, one day, when he was returning from a work related errand:

she was sitting up in the tree, waiting for me to come back and she's sitting...she would have been about nine then...she's sitting in the tree waiting for me, grabbed me by the hand, and that was it. 'Right', she said, 'come on let's into it'. She frightened the living daylights out of me, because that's the first time in my life I'd been pressured by a...I shouldn't say a woman, she wasn't a woman of course, but, but by the opposite sex into a situation like that. And, em, and she really did scare the pants off me...oh dear, I shouldn't have said that! But yes, she said 'come on'...but sex as it was before. There was no ejaculation, nothing, just the same. But by that...I was terribly nervous about the whole thing and em, and I, I didn't want to...but she insisted. She was...and I think I told you that somewhere along the line the word marriage came in...now it wouldn't have meant anything to me.\footnote{Jack 8/12/92 p6-7}

But for a nine-year old girl-child, who has had an intimate, sensual (sexualized) relationship with someone since she was six years of age, in country Australia in the early 1950s, the injunction 'to marry' would have been hard to resist. Girls were expected to become wives and mothers (West 1996)
an assemblage promoted by the 'domestic and family-oriented images of the 1940s' (Reekie 1993:171). Kivel (1992) asserts that men were warned about 'girls' that would try to 'hook' them because they were eligible for marriage. He states that he was told girls would do this by 'using sex, falsely accusing me of paternity, giving me a venereal disease, or enrapturing me and tricking me into falling in love before I found the right woman' (Kivel 1992:49). The 'right' woman would 'be a virgin' (Kivel 1992:48).

Jack lasted at the post office for a year and then his father 'took me by the ear and marched me off to the bank and I lasted there three years'\textsuperscript{33}. Jack subsequently had four other girlfriends all with the same name... 'Rayleen', before getting married at twenty to a sixteen-year old woman who was 'the first girl that I had full sexual congress with and she was more experienced than I'\textsuperscript{34}. Thus, up until this historical moment in time, Jack continued to constitute himself as the naïve lad. The name of the 'girl' Jack married was also... 'Rayleen'.

When Jack was twenty-two and already had children, he and his family visited his old hometown on holiday. Suddenly, (the first) Rayleen, who was now approximately sixteen:

emerged from nowhere and said to me 'you don't know me do you?' and I said 'no'. But by that time, of course, a lot of the kids I went to school with had grown up, and I was having difficulty recognizing a lot of people ... and then she told me who she was. It was Rayleen, that word, that name again...and she cursed me and frightened the living daylights out of me again. And if you've ever seen, if you've ever read about a gypsy in full flight, that's what she looked like...the eyes were flashing and she laid a curse...So er, and then she just disappeared. And I, and I mean I just stood there with my mouth wide open, gawking like an idiot. I had my eldest child on my hip, and trying to work out who it was. It took about five minutes for the penny to drop, and

\textsuperscript{33} (Jack 8/12/92 p4)
\textsuperscript{34} (Jack 8/12/92 p8)
I was still standing there and my wife...Rayleen...came back and said 'what's wrong with you? You look like you've seen a ghost'. And indeed I thought I had.\(^{35}\)

Here again, (the first) Rayleen resisted normative femininity in Jack's view by 'cursing' him with 'eyes flashing'. As Bartky (1988) states, 'nice' girls don't look at men in a bold and unfettered way, only 'loose' women ('gypsies') behave in such a manner. Jack subsequently tried to find out where (the first) Rayleen was staying in town, but nobody had seen her or knew where she might be. Jack then said:

well, wouldn't I like to see her now and apologize to her and, you know, try and explain...try and...you see, I just don't know what happened to her, how her life was. Those things bother me now...a lot.\(^{36}\)

2:3  Jack, His Daughter and the Second 'Kitchen' Scene.

Jack stated that he first 'offended' against his daughter when:

my eldest daughter was six and that's when I first offended against her in S.....my wife took off...[before the 'offending'] went home to mum, had enough.\(^{37}\)

At that time Jack was in his late twenties and his wife was four years younger and it was the end of the 1950s. They had five children and his wife had taken three of them with her, returning to her home State to spend time with her mother. The eldest daughter and one son had remained with Jack. At that stage, after numerous other occupations, Jack finally had the job he had always wanted as a self-employed carpenter. But he had decided to take the family and move to another State, one of the reasons being the many tensions

\(^{35}\) (Jack 8/12/92 p7)
\(^{36}\) (Jack 8/12/92 p7)
\(^{37}\) (Jack 8/12/92 p11)
in his relationship with his wife's family. Whilst *en route* to P..., the car broke down and the family of seven was living in a caravan with an annex. It was at this point that Rayleen, Jack's wife, left with three of the children. In the theorization of 'dysfunctional' families - one of the many forms of thought that has entered into discursive battle around incest - the notion of the 'abandoning wife/mother' informs the habit of thought to blame the wife/mother for her complicity in the incestuous abuse\(^{38}\). This was not the position taken by Jack, nor is it the position that I take. As Jack said, Rayleen had quite simply 'had enough'.

Prior to leaving his home State, Jack had been having difficulty making the payments on a Housing Commission home he was purchasing. In the decade of the fifties, sixty four per cent of the Australian population owned their own homes and by October 1959, the Commonwealth Savings Bank had provided over £170 million for housing to more than 100,000 families (Lees and Senyard 1987). Lees and Senyard (1987:22) state that whilst it had always been an important ideal for Australians, 'home ownership now became an acceptable obsession'. Happiness and a home went 'hand in hand' (Lees and Senyard 1987:23). A whole new genre of magazines flourished to promote the 'home', home ownership being constituted as 'the answer to the insecurity of poverty' (Lees and Senyard 1987:23), especially to those who had gone through the Depression and had bitter memories of tenancy and eviction. Here the knowledges and techniques of subjectivity underpinned the expertise of market research, promotion and communication that, in turn, provided the relays 'through which the aspirations of ministers, and the ambitions of business, and the dreams of consumers achieve mutual translatability' (Rose 1996:162). Consumers were thus constituted as actors:

> seeking to maximize their 'quality of life' by assembling a 'life-style' though (sic) acts of choice in a world of goods. Each commodity is imbued with a 'personal' meaning, a glow cast back upon those who purchase it, illuminating the kind of person they are, or want to come to be. (Rose 1996:162)

\(^{38}\) For variations on this 'abandoning' theme see Ward 1984.
However, despite working hard, Jack failed in his quest to provide this 'happiness' and security for his family. As West (1996:59) states, 'a man ha[d] to prove his masculinity over and over' and the primary way by which he could be seen to be doing this was by providing 'shelter and protection for his loved ones' (West 1996:60). Men were required to infold the injunction to be a responsible 'breadwinner', to provide for their family, to assemble a lifestyle, to purchase a 'home', to meet their social obligations through promising to meet the personal aspirations of their wives and children, thereby gaining their own happiness. Jack had infolded the injunction to 'be an man' in all the aforementioned senses. Jack stated 'I was aware of my responsibilities supporting the family, so therefore I used to work seven days a week'.

However, as Rose (1996:191) points out, the injunction to be a certain kind of self 'is always conducted through operations that distinguish at the same time as they identify', (see also Taussig 1993). As Rose (1996:192 original italics) observes, '[t]o be the self one is one must not be the self one is not - not that despised, rejected, or abjected soul'. But Jack was the self he was not (supposed to be), he was the despised, rejected, abjected soul. Jack had failed in his quest to 'be a man' in 1950s Australia. Jack did not have an adult family member to turn to for support and at that time in his life he had isolated himself from male companionship, had no 'mate' to talk to. Jack did not choose to go down to the pub. Jack said that when his wife left to return to their home State he 'snapped, I suppose you could say'. Hence, at the time of the accidental beginnings of Jack's 'incestuous' (i.e. between Father and daughter) behaviors, the social organization of the family unit included close living quarters whilst 'on-the-road', the absence of Jack's wife and three of his children, combined with Jack's lack of alternative adult support. Here I adopt a Foucauldian attitude of scepticism, suspending belief in both an incest prohibition and incestuous desire and, following Bell (1993), take the approach that incestuous abuse is not about the breaking of the incest prohibition. The reason this is a critical point here is because when cognitive-behavioral psychology situates Jack as outside 'normal' sexuality and ties him to the object of desire, his 'perversion' requires both 'incestuous desire' and the

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39 (Jack 8/12/92 p16)
40 (Jack 8/12/92 p11)
incest prohibition. In other words, as Bell (1993:114 orginal italics) stresses, it is 'the breaking of the prohibition' that justifies labeling a man 'perverted'. Hence, by creating a distinction between the 'normal' man and the incest offender that appeals to a notion of perverted sexual desire:

this discourse perpetuates a way of speaking about incest that fails to acknowledge or investigate the ways in which both the normal and the abnormal are produced by similar, even the same, 'acceptable' discourses. (Bell 1993:114)

In this sense, the discourse of cognitive-behavioral psychology relies upon the notion of an incest prohibition and 'maintains its existence in the face of evidence to the contrary' (Bell 1993:114). This does two things that are critical to highlight here. The first is that in positioning the offender as perversely asocial, these 'psycho-medical discourses avoid the "normality" of his behavior' (Bell 1993:114). As Bell (1993:114) states, the normality of the action is denied, 'because of the relationship between the persons involved'. Secondly, and most importantly, in focusing upon offenders as sexually perverted, that is, 'outside normal sexuality', cognitive-behavioral psychology, as we shall see in Chapter Four, fails to question the exercise of power within the family. On the other hand, suspending belief in the incest prohibition and incestuous desire opens up the possibility to argue that incestuous desire is not 'behind' Jack's 'incestuous' behaviors. As Bell (1993) points out, desires may not be incestuous in the sense that:

they are desires that are focused on family members, most frequently on girl children, not because they are family members but for other reasons such as the fact that these people are closest to hand, because the Father has some authority over these people, because he may feel he has some 'right' to them, etc. (Bell 1993:121)

Hence I suggest that Jack's daughter was not the object of incestuous desire. Rather than Jack engaging in these behaviors with her because she was a
family member, I suggest it was because she was unfortunate enough to be the
closest (female) person at hand at that time. Further, Jack did have the
'authority' awarded through his position as patriarchal Father in the family.
His daughter also happened to be the same age as (the first) Rayleen when she
and Jack had first shared their sensual relations. Rather than Jack's 'desire'
being tied to his daughter, I suggest that his 'incestuous' behaviors were a way
of his negotiating a discourse of masculinity that authorized the injunction that
a man perform, protect and provide. Jack's failure in these endeavors had in
turn authorized his infolding of certain emotions, where Jack's corporeality
was the unstable 'resultant of assemblages within which humans are caught up'
(Rose 1996:184), such assemblages linking up the 'inside' and 'outside' of the
'thought-body'. Having rendered his reality thinkable in a certain way, I
suggest that Jack then chose to instigate the 'incestuous' behaviors in order to
alleviate his sense of 'embodiment' of his 'being-thought' as failure. This
account, and the suggestion that Jack's desires were not focused upon his
daughter because she was a family member, takes the analysis of Jack's abuse
'outside' the family and situates it within the discourses and regimes of
subjectification that shape the social territory. Further, within his 'body-
thought', Jack also made connections with memories of previous sensuous
relations that had provided him with affection, tenderness, enjoyment, and he
made judgements based upon habits of thought that such relations were 'not
hurting anybody'.

Once commenced, Jack's 'incestuous' behaviors continued 'intermittently' until his daughter was thirteen years of age and Jack stated that:

maybe it, maybe it would have got to the full intercourse had
not, by the time she was thirteen and we came to P..., had not
we been discovered. It may have, because I think it was heading
that way, I really do. So that was when she was thirteen.42

41 (Jack 8/12/92 p11)
42 (Jack 8/12/92 p12)
Here Jack indicates that he had moved towards a desire for sexual gratification through intercourse. By the time Jack's daughter was thirteen the abuse would have been going on for seven years, and I suggest that this perception on Jack's part would have been rendered thinkable by a particular assemblage, as opposed to his incestuous desire for his daughter. Given that Jack's daughter lived in the same social territory as Jack, proximity, exposure and vulnerability would have formed part of this assemblage. Power relations would also have been implicated for Jack's daughter had grown up whilst being subjected to a regime of surveillance and had been implicated in gendering power relations that enabled the maintenance of 'the secret'. This assemblage also included Jack's habits of thought, habits of emotion, and his repeated decision to engage his daughter in 'incestuous' behaviors, through taking advantage of his wife's absences and opportunities created by his work practices.

When Jack's daughter was younger, because Jack worked for himself, he would take her out on jobs with him and:

if she was out with me on a job or something like that (cleared throat) and an opportunity arose, she never, ever demurred or refused, you know. So although it didn't happen all that often, and sometimes my wife got a job as a … at an … and sometimes it would happen then. She, she did two or three hours of the nights. But that was very rare too, because the other kids were home as well, so they were very rare.43

When I asked Jack if he ever thought how his daughter might be feeling he said:

I didn't give it a thought, if I thought about it at all I thought that she, well she, as I said, never demurred, so I just presumed that that was ok with her, that there was no problem, that she, that she enjoyed it. The same as I, I did when I originally did it with

43 (Jack 8/12/92 p12)
the...and she was the demanding (cleared throat), so therefore I, I... 44

Jack stated that there were never any threats involved and that, as with (the first) Rayleen:

she didn't tell anybody either and she had, you know, and I just, you know, it was just, seemed to be a natural train of events, didn't seem to be any drama and certainly wasn't with the first Rayleen, with the first young lass, not at all, it was...enjoyment. 45

Jack thus compared his daughter with (the first) Rayleen and I suggest that Jack was referring here to the fact that neither Rayleen or his daughter said anything about the 'secret' activities to their mothers. Jack also stated that his daughter kept silent about her feelings and never 'let on' how she was feeling. However, as Foucault (1979a) states, silence itself, what one declines to say or is forbidden to name:

is less the absolute limit of discourse, the other side from which it is separated by a strict boundary, than an element that functions alongside the things said, with them and in relation to them within over-all strategies. (Foucault 1979a:27)

Jack presumed that both Rayleen and his daughter's 'silences' were similar. However, I argue that Rayleen's 'silence' was a strategy of choice. For Jack's daughter however, it was a silence that had to be kept. In her infolding of the injunction 'don't tell the secret' (for from six to thirteen she never did), Jack's daughter made linkages with closed doors, (private) questionings ('is it ok?') and sensual/sexual awarenesses - to be denied. These behaviors were situated within a context in which social institutions, to include the family, reiterated and operated around an understanding that such behaviors were incestuous

44 (Jack 8/12/92 p13)  
45 (Jack 8/12/92 p13)
and that incest was immoral, criminal and perverted. It is these attitudes that constitute the substance of the 'incest taboo' (Bell 1993).

When I asked Jack if he believed his daughter was getting 'enjoyment' he replied:

yes, yes she did...she said she did (cleared throat). But underneath now I know she was hurting, I know that now. But she didn't let on, did not let on. So now, all I can do is try and make it up to her. But she's coming good now.  

Elaborating further, Jack stated:

for some unknown stupid reason I thought, once again, well that's ok because, look, I've asked and she said...and they [Rayleen also?] did say 'no' a few times. Well, that's ok, she said 'no' and she says 'yes' well then, that's ok. See...that's your line of reasoning. I don't know if everybody goes through that or not, but that's the, that's the process I went through. And as long as she said 'ok', it's ok, and that's obviously my inner seeking er, seeking approval of what I'm doing.  

Here Jack deployed self-inspection and vocabularies for self-description - 'inner seeking', 'seeking approval' - in order to render himself visible through psychological thought, technologies of autonomy. In asking his daughter for her consent, Jack presumed that she was capable of giving 'consent'. However, Linnell and Cora (1993:14) argue that it is 'availability and exposure to the abuser's objectifying [authoritative] gaze' that are the instruments through which the child constitutes herself as someone who is, 'in the most insidious sense, "there for others"' (Linnell and Cora 1993:14). Linnell and Cora (1993:14) state that all such practices over time 'inscribe a child with a sense of herself as isolated, disempowered, guilty and there to please and protect other people'. Another one of the effects of 'incestuous'

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46 (Jack 8/12/92 p13)
47 (Jack 8/12/92 p15)
behaviors such as Jack's is what Linnell and Cora (1993:14) describe as the 'profound influence on the development of a young person's view of herself, her relationships and her world'. In other words, the profound influence upon the assemblage of a young person's genealogy of subjectification. Habits of thought get infolded, informed by authoritative knowledge claims and popular discourses that are interconnected with an inscription of (aberrant) sexual desire as a part of self, her self. The young women at Judith House articulated two of the most common forms of thought in this regard, in language and vocabularies expressed as 'I'm a slut' (I must have wanted it) and, hence, 'I'm dirty' (for a boy it might be 'I must be gay'). A female survivor's genealogy of subjectification is assembled through such relations, through the infolding of little habits of thought, habits of emotion and this 'inner truth' of her sexuality. Hence, there is an entire assemblage of self that cannot be shared with significant others (Slaney 1991), for example mothers, sisters, girlfriends, brothers, classmates, teachers, doctors, extended family members. For Jack's daughter, in the future, there would also be the vocabularies of the technologies of autonomy that would emerge as they related to 'incest victims', for example, 'damaged goods'. These would emerge within an expanding multidisciplinary literature that provided 'a vivid and poignant description of the damage to self experienced by different categories of victims' (Rieker and Carmen 1986:360 my italics). Hacking (1995) states that truth claims within discourses such as sociology or psychology are frequently based upon consequentialist ethics. Consequentialism assesses whether an act is good or bad in terms of its consequences. As Hacking (1995) states, many child abuse activists have focused upon trying to discover the bad results of acts of abuse. However, Browne and Finkelhor (1986) argue that regardless of whether or not these technologies can constitute a correlation between child (sexual) abuse and subsequent behavioral or psychiatric problems in childhood, adolescence or adulthood, child abuse remains completely unacceptable 'in itself'. That is to say, if only for the 'immediate pain, confusion, and upset that can ensue' (Browne and Finkelhor 1986; cited in Hacking 1995:64). I also take the position that (historically situated) child abuse, here, specifically, child sexual abuse, is unacceptable, for victim/survivors link up inside pain, confusion, upset and habits of thought
with outside words, sights and smells, judgements, techniques and norms of being human infolded within her genealogy of subjectification.

In describing his experience of the 'incestuous' behaviors, Jack stated:

it's some sort of drive, some need, it's a definite need, it's a, it's an inner need that...a need of fulfillment. The problem is you don't know what it is so there, there you turn to a...I guess probably it's like a drug...why people take drugs. And the act itself is a type of high, if you like, so therefore that's what drives you to keep on doing it, even though you know it's dreadfully wrong. 48

Here Jack scrutinizes his self within vocabularies that employ a notion of a biological instinct, a 'stubborn drive' (Foucault 1979a:103). He has undertaken forensic work to identify signs and interpretive work to link this 'drive' to that hidden 'interior' realm that generates a need for 'fulfillment'. As Rose (1996) states, contemporary techniques of subjectification operate through assembling together in a whole variety of locales:

an interminably hermeneutic and subjective relation to oneself: a constant and intense self-scrutiny, an evaluation of personal experiences, emotions, and feelings in relation to psychological images of fulfillment and autonomy. (Rose 1996:195)

Further clarifying his experience, Jack stated:

it's an adrenaline high, it, you get this rush of adrenaline when you...it's like climbing Mount Everest, or, or doing something very dangerous, maybe like bungie jumping, something like that...getting in out of your depth. No, it just gives you that rush...and I think it might be the seduction bit and the...just the whole process, the whole play. And to me anyhow, the anatomical...anatomical? Anatomy, ana, an, em, used to

48 (Jack 8/12/92 p14)
fascinate me with the girls (Rayleen too?), absolutely used to fascinate me...I could sit there for hours just looking. Where that came from I don't know. Why I should be like that I don't know. I don't know if every man is like that, but that sort of thing used to fascinate me. And, and, you know, I, I'd be quite happy just looking and not touching a lot of the time, so...

Here Jack, in his relation with self, was caught up in the practice of seduction within a regime of conquest: climbing the highest mountain, doing something dangerous, bungie jumping, being 'out of depth' with its linkages with masculine prowess. In choosing these vocabularies of excitation: 'rush', 'high', 'adrenaline', and strategies — 'the whole play' - Jack described a regime that included relations with female anatomy and its objectification as well as his own 'body-thought' and habits of emotion.

Jack rendered his daughter visible by the deployment of discipline as a mode of power that works through observation. He put her under surveillance, looking at her 'for hours'. Being placed under this non-reciprocal, panoptic gaze when she was six, his daughter would not have been able to protest for she would not have had the vocabularies, the knowledges through which such protest could be articulated. Through Jack's voyeuristic gaze his daughter was perceived as an object 'whose objectification [wa]s revealed by her subjectification to the abuse' (Bell 1993:69). Jack's behavior was situated within the 'continuing containment, sexualization and objectification of the female body' (Bordo 1993:273) in which his daughter's body was assembled as anatomy, based on a biological determinism and the difference between male and female bodies. It was this assemblage of gendered anatomical 'difference' that incited Jack to 'fascination'.

Kivel (1992) states that when he was at school, the boys usually chased the girls and their 'difference' was 'fascinating' to the boys. And since they were not allowed to see the girls' bodies, the boys were 'curious about what was under their skirts. We dared each other to peek' (Kivel 1992:45). In the

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49 (Jack 8/12/92 p15)
1970s, John Berger encapsulated the formula he saw as regulating the representation of gender difference insofar as 'both through the history of art and in contemporary advertising: "Men act, and women appear."' (Berger 1977; cited in Bordo 1993:118). Here Berger was referring to women's 'looked-at-ness', already discussed in relation to Jack's objectification of Rayleen in the first 'kitchen' scene. This oppositional regime does not hold so rigidly as the twentieth century draws to a close, but did when Jack submitted his daughter to his 'gaze'.

At the same time, Jack had constituted his ethical self through infolding an authority of some system of truth that enabled him to judge that what he was doing was 'dreadfully wrong'. I suggest, drawing upon McHoul's (1986) analysis above, that Jack, through having become a competent practitioner in 'natural sex', was now able to discriminate between so-called 'natural' and 'unnatural' or 'deviant' sexual practices. Jack therefore infolded certain emotions. He felt:

eternally guilty, you're always guilty and sometimes things get said and 'bong', you know, the guilt comes...it's terrible and yet you keep on doing it, I don't know why.50

When Jack's daughter was thirteen:

Jack: em, my wife walked out and saw us, em, it was in the morning, early morning, in the kitchen and I was fondling her and that's, that's how it came out. And then (sigh) well, we didn't know what to do. Em, there was nowhere we could go or turn to and we just tried to work it out ourselves. But I, but she never ever, my wife, never ever fully got over that. I think it was the betrayal.

Kisane: how did your wife respond to... (daughter)

Jack: oh well, she talked to the daughter as well, had long conversations with the daughter. And she, to her credit,
she gave the daughter full support, full support, didn't reject her in any way. So that was a wonderful thing she did. It was the right thing to do of course, obviously, but a lot of people wouldn't. And em, well, there was no counseling. She could have gone to the doctor, but I don't think the doctor could have helped her very much. So we just tried to work it out and bumbled through it ourselves.\textsuperscript{51}

Here it can be argued that a mother's watchful gaze was set up to challenge the objectifying gaze of the Father and gendering power relations within this normal (heterosexual) family. However, this could also be perceived as a conservative move that places a burden on the woman, the 'mother'. As Bell (1993:107) observes, in such circumstances, women may believe that henceforth they should personally watch over their children and 'disallow men, whether partners or other men, to be alone with their children'. Women thus become tied to their children in a 'protective mother' role, a role that feminism, Bell (1993) argues, has consistently challenged as oppressive.

Thirty years later, Jack made the same bad choices in commencing to engage in the same habits of thought, employing similar regimes of abusive behaviors to those practised with his eldest daughter. Jack commenced sexually abusing his granddaughter. Here I use the term 'sexually abused' for this was now a description under which people could act (Hacking 1995). In the above investigation, I have chosen to refer to Jack's actions with his eldest daughter as 'incestuous behaviors', since at that time there was no concept of 'child sexual abuse'. Hacking (1995:241) cautions us about 'retroactive redescription' in which the intentional acts under description are described in descriptions that did not exist, or were not available, at that time. Hence, it is only later that it becomes true that 'one could act under that description' (Hacking 1995:243). In Jack's words 'I ended up in the same situation again with the granddaughter didn't I, although not to the same extent - nowhere

\textsuperscript{50} (Jack 8/12/92 p14)  
\textsuperscript{51} (Jack 8/12/92 p13)
near the same extent\textsuperscript{52}. This was the child of another daughter, not Jack's eldest daughter, the one he engaged in 'incestuous' behaviors. Jack stated that his granddaughter was:

always jumping all over me and cuddling me and kissing me, and, and, that's, it's back to this, this seeking love of some sort which (clears throat), I've been seeking all my life, and not actually finding, and getting all my, my 'thingos' mixed up. And starting to fondle her and her enjoying it and (sigh) and, you know.\textsuperscript{53}

Prior to the disclosure of the sexual abuse of his granddaughter, Jack's wife Rayleen, who had approximately a year before separated from Jack, had been out with two of her daughters, one of them being her eldest daughter (the one Jack abused). Jack said that his eldest daughter had been 'living with a no-hoper'\textsuperscript{54} since she had split up with her husband who used to 'beat her up, her husband, he used to get drunk and beat her up'\textsuperscript{55}. Jack's wife was upset because when her eldest daughter had left her husband she had left him with furniture given to her by her brother. Jack said this was because she was 'using and stuff like that so, probably er, she was spaced out when they took off and left all this furniture, just left it\textsuperscript{56}. As a result, Rayleen went down to visit her eldest daughter, together with her other daughter, in order to 'tear a strip off her'\textsuperscript{57}. However, when she spoke to her eldest daughter, her daughter said:

'well, you know, it's not my fault, it's what happened to me, you know. I can't help it'. And when they came home, 'Sue' [the granddaughter] was sitting up and her mother [Jack's other daughter] said to her 'if you ever, if anybody ever touches you' - I can't tell you the exact words 'cause I wasn't there, you know -

\textsuperscript{52} (Jack 8/12/92 p13)  
\textsuperscript{53} (Jack 8/12/92 p14)  
\textsuperscript{54} (Jack 8/12/92 p14)  
\textsuperscript{55} (Jack 8/12/92 p14)  
\textsuperscript{56} (Jack 8/12/92 p14)  
\textsuperscript{57} (Jack 8/12/92 p14)
'I want to know' - something like that. And Sue burst into tears and that's how it all came out. 

Thirty years on, a feminist discourse converged with the discourses of psychology and sociology to enable Jack's daughter to infold the injunction that she was a 'damaged' self. Such can be the effects of discourses, to include that of feminism, and the operation of disciplinary agents around the family. As Bell (1993:107) comments, the feminist discourse 'carries with it ambiguities and effects that are not desirable from a feminist perspective'. These same discourses enabled the granddaughter's 'disclosure' and, when combined with the emergence of the Field of Sex Offender Treatment, with its diversity of services for incest perpetrators, gave Jack the option of entering the SAIF cognitive-behavioral space and its therapeutic scenarios. Jack said that upon entry into SAIF he 'felt like death' , but went on to state that he was 'so glad' he had entered the program:

because of what I've learnt and for the good it's going to do everybody else as well. And of course, I was very lucky that my family stuck by me as well and supported me through this. Even my wife who - we've been separated for over a year - even she supported me and, and it's been quite wonderful because, although you've dealt with a lot of cases, you'll never ever realize what it is like inside...to go through this trauma. And, er, coming to grips with what you've done to other people as well, and learning to live with it. It's very hard. 

In the above quote, in which Jack claims his knowledge and hence expertise, he also renders visible how 'psy' vectors have come to traverse and link up inside and outside in his 'experience of internality'. What is also made visible here is how the truthfulness, or accuracy, of Jack's confession is guaranteed by the bond, or basic intimacy in discourse, between Jack, as the speaking subject, and what he is speaking about. Further, in this example, Jack renders

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58 (Jack 8/12/92 p14)
59 (Jack 8/12/92 p14)
60 (Jack 8/12/92 p14)
visible yet another reason why the notion of us being 'co-researchers' was always untenable given that my assemblage of self did not include that of sex offender. It is here that we leave Jack, and turn to the investigation of Dan's storytelling.

2:4 Dan, Gradings, the 'Dredge' Scene and His Step-daughter

Dan was born in Australia approximately twenty years later than Jack and it was the disclosure of his sexual abuse of his step-daughter that brought him to SAIF. In addition to SAIF, Dan also attended private therapy sessions for approximately six months. My historical point of entry into Dan's storytelling is the early 1960s, when Dan reached the end of Year Seven and 'fell in love'.

Dan fell in love shortly before being tested for his high school 'grading'. It had been in the late nineteenth century and early in the twentieth, that education everywhere had become 'more organized, more standardized and more directly and centrally controlled' (Meyer 1986:213). As Rose (1996) states, the education system as a human technology is now a hybrid assemblage of:

knowledges, instruments, persons, systems of judgment, buildings and spaces, underpinned at the programmatic level by certain presuppositions and objectives about human beings. 
(Rose 1996:26)

As Connell (1995:239) observes, education is the 'formation of capacities for practice'. It was the purpose of these tests therefore to classify and calibrate each student's competencies in relation to (future) work practices. Students were then placed in the appropriate 'A' or 'B' 'streams' in order for their capacities to undergo the appropriate additional formation. In Year Seven at his State primary school, despite the fact that there was an 'A' and a 'B' class, Dan had not yet infolded self-comparison. Dan said he did not feel compared
to anyone because 'I had my mates, I had my circle of friends, whatever, there was none of that'\textsuperscript{62}.

However, the effect that emerged from the accidental happening of Dan's 'falling in love', with all its assemblage of distractions, at the same historical moment as he was preparing and sitting for the high school tests, was that Dan was placed in a lower 'B' stream. As Smith (1996:3) states, the everyday life of men (and boys) 'passes through these practices in unpredictable and various complex ways'. When Dan commenced high school, he therefore found he had been placed in 1G7, a lower 'B' stream class. Dan subsequently found the 'maths' was far too easy, 'I was doing really easy stuff and it was all because of these tests that I had in Year Seven. So from a very early age I started to stuff up my life, or I suppose so, I don't know'\textsuperscript{63}. Here Dan situates his 'body-thought' as the site of the problem.

In response to this organizational decision to place Dan in the lower 'B' stream, and based upon his judgement that this was an incorrect classification, Dan's father went to his son's high school where he:

\begin{quote}
Dan: made a big deal that I should...that I could do better and that I should have been in this other class. Now he went up and he almost flattened the Deputy Principal...this is the story he's told me...there was a lot of 'aggro' involved. And so he's gone...in my mind, at this very early age...he's gone out of his way to do this for me, em...

Kisane: so now you've got to really come up to his expectations

Dan: that's...exactly.\textsuperscript{64}
\end{quote}

Having infolded the injunction 'try hard'\textsuperscript{65}, Dan was subsequently very successful, topping the class in both Second and Third Year. But he was 'not

\textsuperscript{61} Dan 20/12/92 p3)
\textsuperscript{62} (Dan 20/12/92 p3)
\textsuperscript{63} (Dan 20/12/92 p3)
\textsuperscript{64} (Dan 20/12/92 p4)
\textsuperscript{65} (Dan 20/12/92 p23)
the same socially. Dan had enjoined a form of personhood - conscientious student - within an institutional space that separated him from his 'mates'. This, Dan stated:

really killed me. All my friends like Robbie G... it really breaks my heart, these guys are now, it just breaks my heart, because I mean I lost it, they just went...they didn't have to be something, you know. I had to be something (voice shaky) and it was just like it was put on me. And so I was in this group of people that I didn't really know. All your friends that you grew up with who'd been off to be boilermakers, or whatever, brick laborers, or whatever, they disappeared out of this stream. And I was topping the class, probably because of this background from dad (voice shaky) forcing me on, ok. And then I went on to Fourth and Fifth Year and again I was like in the, I wasn't in the very top...but I was with a different stream of people that I never, ever really got into.

After graduating from high school, Dan went on to College to study to be a teacher. Within this assemblage of spaces and places, practices and rituals, knowledges and customs, and after self-inspection and selection from vocabularies of maladjustment, Dan made the judgement that he was 'different'. Dan stated:

I've always felt different. Em, like, I mean, when I was the teacher, at staff meetings, I mean when I was a teacher for 20 years, you just don't know the pain that was inside me, because I was so different (voice shaky). I felt I was an imposter there. I was an imposter all my life...trying to pretend to be a good teacher. I mean, people tell me I was a good teacher, but I just, I just, I was stressed all the time. I like, I er, I just had this pain in my neck all my life and just really stress on me.

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66 (Dan 20/12/92 p5)
67 (Dan 20/12/92 p5)
68 (Dan 20/12/92 p5)
In Australia in the 1930s, according to school records and newspaper reports of the time, 'over 80 per cent of State school boys entered into some manual occupation' (West 1996:9). But this had changed by the time Dan was in high school with the expansion of the job market and changes in the education system (West 1996). It was then the practice for boys and girls to stay at school longer and they were judged to be 'performing' better.

Dan's high academic performance had created the possibility of a choice of 'career', rather than a job or a trade. West (1996:52) argues that a man wanting to rise out of the working class into the middle class commonly chose teaching to make the transition, teaching having historically been a middle class occupation. However, it was not Dan but his father who thought it desirable that Dan move 'upwards'. When Dan went on to College and then into teaching, he therefore shifted from a working class assemblage of knowledges, norms, vocabularies, practices, explanatory systems, allegiances, forms of life, persons, places and spaces to a middle class assemblage. This assemblage incited Dan's self-inspection and deployment of vocabularies of self-description that rendered him visible as an 'imposter'. Having since evaluated his personal experience, Dan stated:

I think if I'd gone on in the class that I was in and gone on, I would have been a different person. I would have been a boiler maker, or a person who liked to do things with his hands, which I always wanted to do, instead of ending up a school teacher for twenty years, frustrated out of my mind, a child abuser and whatever. See this is a really critical thing that happened to me then. My life was changed.69

Here Dan identified a clear causal structure in his narrative in relation to his becoming a child abuser. Dan made linkages between classifications (streaming), places (same class), emotions (frustration) and forms of life (boiler maker/school teacher/child abuser).

69 (Dan 20/12/92 p3)
Dan stated that he believed that prior to the above high school event, he was a 'really normal sort of kid'. This evaluation was a consequence of examinations of past experiences incited whilst participating in the ethical scenarios at the SAIF Program and in private therapy. It was after Dan went to high school that he infolded his father's expectations in the injunction to 'try hard'. Dan (who is no longer a teacher) says of his father:

Dan: the image I have of him, which has since been reinforced when I've had mates of his in the taxi, is that he was a drunk. He was a bloke who went to sea and he, and his way...he got himself off the stress of being at sea or whatever...was that he used to drink a lot.

Kisane: that was a navy thing, wasn't it?

Dan: yeah, he was in the merchant navy, but yeah, that's right, you know.\textsuperscript{71}

Whilst at SAIF and 'in therapy', Dan had 'done a lot of blaming, you know, blaming of my father', of whom he was 'scared shitless'.\textsuperscript{72} However, Dan's self-scrutiny of his biography had also produced warm feelings for his father. Through forensic and interpretive work that rendered his father visible through psychological and sociological (family dysfunction theory - systemic analysis) thought, Dan stated that he could now see where his father was coming from, it being a 'multi-generational thing'.\textsuperscript{74} Dan stated that his dad's father was 'the most brutal, angry...and my father ran away when he was 15...my father ran away at 15 and went to sea!'.\textsuperscript{75} Dan goes on to say that 'in all his photos and that... he's like with his mates...and he's happy and he's got a smile and...but that's not the image that I saw, do you understand?' Here the man in the photograph was situated in a space and place that Dan never knew, and had constituted an assemblage that linked up 'outside' and 'inside' in a way that Dan would never see.

\textsuperscript{70} (Dan 20/12/92 p2)
\textsuperscript{71} (Dan 20/12/92 p22)
\textsuperscript{72} (Dan 20/12/92 p22)
\textsuperscript{73} (Dan 20/12/92 p21)
\textsuperscript{74} (Dan 20/12/92 p23)
\textsuperscript{75} (Dan 20/12/92 p23)
Dan described one scene that brought back a 'really warm image'\(^76\) of a time with his father. He stated that:

> my dad used to be on the dredges down in .......I can remember him, you know, must have been when I was about nine or ten, he took me down there. He went over the dredge and all that, you know. It was really nice...so, you know, there's that feeling there as well, you know.\(^77\)

Here Dan gained honorary entry into a man's world of work and within the relations of communication Dan experienced a feeling of closeness. But later came the expectations and Dan said:

> but it, you know, the thing that he did was he just...that I had to be, do the right thing. But I can see where it came from, you know, that he wanted the best for me, and he wanted, you know, me to really try hard and all that.\(^78\)

When I said that my research was concerned with notions of masculinity, Dan said 'I never felt like a male...never'\(^79\). I asked him what 'being a male' meant to him and he described the following qualities, prefaced by the statement that they were:

Dan: all false to me now. But, good-looking, good with the women, er, quick talking, er these are all things that I felt I wasn't, of course. Em, able to tell jokes, em, you know, these are all things I really envy, you know, I really envy about these blokes. Em, em, sports minded, able to play sports, able to talk about sports, able to drink lots, em...count the number of bloody roots I've had, you know, whatever. All that sort of stuff is

\(^76\) (Dan 20/12/92 p23)  
\(^77\) (Dan 20/12/92 p23)  
\(^78\) (Dan 20/12/92 p23)  
\(^79\) (Dan 20/12/92 p18)
how...now, going through college, I mean I knew...I
met people like that...I was never like that (laughs).

Kisane: how did that make you feel?

Dan: oh, shithouse...just totally shithouse (laughs). I was just
like, em, again that was just part of me not being...of
me being different, you know. So I was worthless...this
feeling of just being useless, useless.\footnote{Dan 20/12/92 p19}

Still on the subject of masculinities and employing the psychological system
of 'inside', interiority, as an infolding of 'outside', exteriority, Dan said that as
a young bloke:

trying to relate to women, this is a joke, you know. Trying to,
em, get a girlfriend, when you're seventeen or whatever, being
this wimpy type character inside, trying to be this masculine
person on the outside, not having any skills to be that
naturally...no wonder I had a lot of trouble.\footnote{Dan 20/12/92 p26}

Inciting Dan to further self-scrutiny, I asked him if there had been any other
ways that he felt different and he stated:

Dan: my father got me into playing rugby when I was about
fifteen. Now, in, in going to play that, I was, I felt
different and the other kids must have picked up on it,
because the very first night there, somebody tried to
bash me up, you know...so you, I don't know...

Kisane: was it a lack of aggressiveness, is that how you were
different? Were you scared?

Dan: yeah, I, I was soft...yeah, I was scared...I was scared of
other kids, yeah...I never, but, but...

Kisane: male...boys?

Dan: male, male...boys... yes.\footnote{Dan 20/12/92 p19}
Here, like Jack and his relation with his *self* as a 'sook', Dan's 'body-thought' is caught up in assemblages of masculinities in relation to femininities. He infolded habits of thought in vocabularies of self-description that included 'I'm different' (from other boys), that later became 'I'm different' (from other men), 'I'm soft', 'I'm useless', 'I'm worthless', 'I pretend', 'I'm an imposter' and habits of emotion, thought in vocabularies that included 'I'm scared', 'I'm in pain'. Dan said that he then:

walked on egg shells for forty two years of my life, you know. I was scared...I was scared all the time. I would be scared in class they were going to ask me a question. I was scared when I was teaching...I mean, fucking...I was scared, you know, that I would be doing the wrong thing, and I'd always be trying to do the right thing, all the time. I was just so scared of making a mistake...of making a mistake, you know. I mean in the staff meeting I just couldn't...you know, if it came around to me, I just like, whatever, you know, I'd just sit there, so...tense...so...scared.\(^{83}\)

It was then, Dan said:

I'd go home and abuse 'Mandy' (step-daughter), you know. I mean, it wouldn't be directly like that, but there would be a number of things like that. 'Susan' (Dan's wife) would say something...and I would take it in, and I'd get really...and there'd be just *anger* inside of me, you know. I'd just be really angry and resentful and, and, er, moody.\(^{84}\)

Dan directed all his anger at Mandy:

Dan: now I can only put that down to the fact that in marrying Susan I got Mandy as well. She was six, er, I, I was a child...I'd been a child all my life, ok. Er, I had childish emotions, I had childish ways of handling things, em, I

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\(^{83}\) (Dan 20/12/92 p8)
could relate pretty well to Mandy and in relating well to Mandy I could let out a lot of my emotions as well. If Susan was around, I'd, I'd be very careful about letting out those emotions, because I wanted to keep my relationship as well.

Kisane: so Mandy was stuck there, whereas...

Dan: she was stuck there, she was in the middle, she was like...she couldn't escape, see, that was it. And I used to say that to her when she was sixteen or seventeen. I didn't say you couldn't escape, but I'd say 'well, if you don't like it, you know where the door is', stuff like that...

Kisane: mmm

Dan: ......really bad...................(silence).........................

Yes, I did that. So yeah, it was, it was, it was a sense...a way of me getting this anger out and she used to cop the lot (voice shaking). I used to restrict her on going out, I used to do everything, you know.\(^\text{85}\)

Once again, I suggest that *incestuous desire* was not 'behind' Dan's sexual abuse of Mandy. As Dan said himself, when he married his wife he 'got Mandy' as well, and therefore I suggest that Dan's desire focused on Mandy because she was 'there' and vulnerable, rather than because she was a family member. In other words, I argue that Dan was no more a sexual deviant, a pervert, than Jack. Dan was a 'normal' step-father, within a normal family, who chose to negotiate his relations with his step-daughter in a certain way. In Dan's narrative there is a clear causal structure in which Dan makes connections within an assemblage of emotions, relations of communication and power relations. Following Foucault (1982), I understand power relations to be the action upon *an action* of another or others, rather than a mode of action that acts directly on others. Foucault (1982:789) argues that it is a relationship of violence that 'acts upon a body or upon things', where the possibility of resistance is taken away. Power therefore operates over free

\(^{84}\) (Dan 20/12/92 p8)
\(^{85}\) (Dan 20/12/92 p10)
subjects, and only insofar as they are free. By this, Foucault (1982:790) means that individual or collective subjects face a field of possibilities in which 'several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments, may be realized'. On the other hand with slavery, for example, where the 'determining factors saturate the whole, there is no relationship of power' (Foucault 1982:790 my italics). Rather, this is a physical relationship of constraint (i.e. chains), involving a complicated interplay that may also involve a relationship of violence. Power operates therefore to control the actions of the other or others and where power operates there is always, ever the possibility of resistance. Hence there is no relationship of power without the means of escape or possible flight (Foucault 1982). Therefore, every power relationship implies 'at least in potentia, a strategy of struggle' (Foucault 1982:794 original italics) and at every moment 'the relationship of power may become a confrontation between two adversaries' (Foucault 1982:794). Of course, as Foucault (1982) points out, the bringing into play of power relations does not exclude the use of either violence or the obtaining of consent, however these do not constitute the principle of the basic nature of power. Relations of communication are concerned with communication, signs, reciprocity and the production of meaning (Foucault 1982). These relations of power and communication do not occupy separate domains, rather they overlap one another 'support one another, reciprocally, and use each other mutually as means to an end' (Foucault 1982:787). Dan was careful not to jeopardize his relationship of communication with his wife, so he deployed the strategy of 'monitoring' himself when Susan was around, so as not to upset her. At other times he put into operation certain elements of meaning that enabled him to justify his anger at Mandy. Here, power is exercised through strategies of 'monitoring' and 'separation' that overlap with regulated ('angry') communications. I use the word strategy here to denote that Dan employed certain means to attain a certain end, namely, communicating his anger towards Mandy, whilst maintaining a good relationship of communication with Susan. Here, it is a question of 'rationality functioning to arrive at an objective' (Foucault 1982:793). Dan said he had a good relationship of communication with Mandy when she was younger. However, when she got older, power relations increasingly overlapped with relations of
communication between Dan and Mandy. Dan acted upon the *actions* of Mandy by, for example, restricting her from going out, since within a relationship of power a mode of action may act on existing actions or those which may arise in the future (Foucault 1982). Dan, by threatening Mandy with the statement 'you know where the door is', also structured Mandy's possible future actions through the implication that she was 'trapped' (due to her age, economic constraints and so forth). Here, not only are operations of power made visible, but also processes of *domination*, being the means by which obedience is obtained (Foucault 1982). Here, I wish to draw attention to the distinction between power and domination. Domination is the name given here to a state of 'perpetual asymmetry' where, as Bell (1993:41) points out, following Foucault, the relations of power are fixed in such a way that a *reversal* in power relations appears to be 'almost impossible'. However, as Bell (1993) observes, domination is based on the operations of *unstable* tactics of power. Further, Dan's disciplinary power techniques were productive, insofar as they produced Mandy's compliance. I shall return to the subject of power and domination at the end of this chapter.

When *sexually* abusing Mandy, Dan, in his *self-description*, was caught up in the practice of 'sex education' within a regime of instruction, deploying vocabularies of 'helping', 'learning'. Dan stated that he told himself that he was:

helping Mandy, or whatever. I used to think that I was helping her to learn about her sex life. I used to make excuses to myself I suppose. But this is the thing - if I could talk about that - if I abused Mandy, then the next day, then I was everybody's friend. I was so happy and I felt really good, and I felt, you know.\(^{86}\)

Whilst Jack was caught up in the practice of seduction Dan, in his *self-description*, was caught up in the practice of 'sex education', and I suggest that for Dan there were also linkages with *masculine prowess* within this gendering power relation. As discussed above, men live their masculinity,\(^{86}\)

\(^{86}\) (Dan 20/12/92 p9)
their 'manliness', within the relatedness of interaction with other men, women and children. Technologies of subjectification, with their assemblage of particular ways of thought, techniques and so forth, produce certain ways of being-male that stratify, fix, organize and 'render durable particular relations that humans may truthfully establish with themselves' (Rose 1996:186). Gendering relations entail prescriptions that are meticulously and continually repeated in thought, speech, passion, will, intellect, appearance, etc. (Rose 1996). People, as 'bodies-thought', are assembled through being connected up not only with vocabularies, but also with regimes of comportment, as we have seen with Jack, with artifacts such as clothes, with spaces, and places such as shopping malls, and objects that inhabit them (Rose 1996). Within Dan's assemblage of 'manliness', I suggest that he had infolded the habit of thought of 'counting the number of bloody roots'. I suggest that, having sexually abused Mandy, in the links, flows and lines of force that constitute persons and run across, through and around them (Rose 1996), Dan, like Jack, got a 'rush', got a 'high'. As Bell (1993:76) comments, 'getting a woman' is "deployed" as part and parcel of the deployment of sexuality'. Within this complexity of machinations, of being-assembled-together, Dan was left feeling 'so happy' and 'really good'.

In the above investigations what I have aimed to do is to render visible how, or by what means, the men's regime of the self was put together such that they became an 'invented self' and made the choice to engage in 'incestuous' behaviors, sexual abuse. In this endeavor, I have chosen not to investigate what each man meant in his storytelling, speaking as the 'universal operator of all transformations' (Foucault 1991b:70). That is, in terms of a unified 'personality', an identity to be 'revealed, discovered, or worked on' (Rose 1996:39). Rather, I have investigated the men's 'identity' in terms of a regime of subjectification in order to understand how it was possible for the men to make such choices. Hence, this has not been an investigation into the clues that might give us the key to the men's deviance. Nor has it been an investigation that has situated the men within dysfunctional families (Emetchi and Summerfield 1986; Pengelly 1991), constituted children as seductive (Justice and Justice 1979) or mothers as collusive (Ward 1984; Koch and
Jarvis 1987; Jacobs 1990). Rather, it is an investigation informed by feminist analyses (cf. Herman 1981; Ward 1984) that have argued that the incest abuser is *not* sexually perverted, and that he *has* committed a criminal offence because he has chosen to sexually abuse. As Bell (1993:82) observes, feminists have argued that the depiction of the abuser as a pervert is a 'myth repeated in common knowledge as well as in academic explanations and treatment programmes'. By this, Bell (1993:88) means that certain ways of talking about incest constitute knowledges, 'often institutionalised as truths with practices informed by and informing them'. In regard to treatment programs, Bell (1993) illustrates her point by referring to attempts to identify a particular (deviant) *sexual preference* in incest offenders, a hypothesis that I investigate in detail in Chapter Four. Here, Bell (1993:82) argues, psychologists drastically miss the way in which:

normal sexuality, normal power relations and the normal family are implicated in incestuous abuse. The men who are known to have abused children are not perverted, but 'normal', everyday men...
(Bell 1993:82)

It is this position that I have taken in the above investigation of the men's storytelling, in which I have analyzed the men as *invented selves*, who had little to distinguish them from other 'normal', or ordinary, men other than their choice to sexually assault a child. I have analyzed how both Jack and Dan exercised power in relation to their respective daughters, and how domination was also implicated in these power relations. Here, the critical point is that power has been *exercised* rather than *possessed* (Foucault 1982). From such a position, power cannot be theorized as a possession in the hands of one group or even one individual. This opens up the possibility for contradictions within 'domination'. This is because, if power is exercised not possessed, contingent rather than static, then, as Bell (1993:41) observes, feminist opposition to the various operations of power may expect to identify 'more gaps and weaknesses in power's operations'.
However, the reader will recall that in the 1980s, in 'power theory', feminists adopted the notion that power could be possessed by a group. Feminists argued that all men as a class held power over all women as a class, thereby constituting a powerful/powerless division. As Bell (1993:28 original italics) states, whilst power is a central theoretical concept in feminism, feminist work has tended to be 'about power rather than a theoretical analysis of how the concept is being used'. Hence, up until the latter 1980s, there had not been 'much emphasis on developing a "feminist theory of power" as such' (Bell 1993:28). Bell (1993:28) suggests that this was partly due to the nature of the feminist task, in which there had been so many areas in which to demonstrate the operations of power, that not much time had been spent 'musing on the concept itself'. However, from the late 1980s, early 1990s, feminists increasingly engaged critically with the implications of postmodernism (Flax 1990), and poststructuralism (Weedon 1987; Sawicki 1991) for feminist forms of thought. The poststructuralist philosophical critique of the rational subject resonated strongly with the feminist critique of rationality as an essentially masculine construct (McNay 1992; Braidotti 1994). Feminists increasingly engaged with the author known as Foucault, tending to draw upon the texts of Discipline and Punish (1977) and The History of Sexuality (1979a). Feminists such as Bartky (1988) found these texts useful, insofar as they provided an analytics with which to explain how the experience of women is impoverished and controlled within certain culturally determined images of feminire sexuality. However, Bartky (1988) voices the criticism of other feminists (see de Lauretis 1987; Braidotti 1994), when she critiques Foucault's gender blindness, evidenced insofar as he devotes little or no attention to the gendered nature of disciplinary techniques on the body. Bartky (1988:64) argues that Foucault is 'blind to those disciplines that produce a modality of embodiment that is peculiarly feminine' and hence, 'his analysis as a whole reproduces that sexism which is endemic throughout Western political theory' (Bartky 1988:64). Taking a somewhat more sympathetic approach towards the work of Foucault, McNay (1992) offers a critical analysis of later work to include The Use of Pleasure (1986). McNay argues that these works go some way towards 'overcoming the limitations of his
earlier work on the body through the elaboration of a notion of the self (McNay 1992:3). Furthermore, McNay warns against the dangers of placing too much emphasis upon the different strategies by which women's bodies are disciplined, since one ends up 'by positing a separate history of representation for women, thereby perpetuating an artificial polarization between the experiences of men and women' (McNay 1992:36). Whilst being aware of the critical limitations of certain Foucauldian notions of the body, I also draw extensively upon Foucault's notion of technologies of the self and the idea that power is a productive and positive force. My thesis is thus situated within current work of feminists operating within the Field of Child Sexual Abuse. It is 'within' insofar as feminists have started to engage with Foucauldian notions of discourse or discursive formation and the thesis that power relations are constitutive of the social realm (see Linnell and Cora 1993). However, this thesis extends feminist analysis by actively engaging with the conceptualization of the perpetrator's genealogy of subjectification.

IN SUMMARY

This chapter has been an investigation of the storytelling of the men who had previously situated themselves within the cognitive-behavioral space of the SAIF Program, participating within its diversity of ethical scenarios. In this investigation, I have analyzed the men's narrativization of their lives, in which they imagined themselves as subjects of their own biography. I have argued that within a genealogy of subjectification, in particular historically situated assemblages, the men infolded a multiplicity of norms and routines, habits of thought and emotion, injunctions and so forth. For example, Jack infolded the injunction to 'be a man', an injunction that initially acquired authority through the voice of his father. This key injunction was also infolded within an assemblage of economic regimes, routines and work practices, and norms of being human that made demands of his self in the form of dutiful son and breadwinner of the family. For Dan, the key injunction infolded was to 'try hard' which, as with
Jack, acquired its initial authority through his father's voice. This injunction was infolded within an assemblage of regimes of education and work practices that made demands of his self in the form of conscientious student and good teacher. Both Jack and Dan's regimes of the self were constituted within a diversity of languages of personhood that took shape within practices that were historically situated. For Jack it was the language of character and vocabularies of manliness, namely tough/sooky, responsible, and language of identity, namely provider, that was infolded. For Dan it was the language of the individual and vocabularies of maladjustment, namely different, useless, worthless, and the language of identity that included imposter and pretender that was infolded. At the historical moment of the assault of their daughters, within their respective assemblages of locale, as 'bodies-thought', the men had thus inscribed a particular relation with themselves. They then brought power relations into being, exercised in Jack's case through seductions that deployed surveillance and incited anatomical fascination, and little habits of thought, rationalizations, articulated through vocabularies such as 'mutual satisfaction' and, in Dan's case, 'helping to learn'. So Jack and Dan, as 'bodies-thought', within a field of possibilities, situated within relatively mundane assemblages of locale, chose to abuse their respective daughters.

In choosing to analyze Jack and Dan as invented selves, I have distinguished my approach from that of cognitive-behavioral psychology, the discourse that constitutes Jack and Dan as deviant individuals, thereby transforming them into the form of personhood known as sexual deviant, sex offender. It was my clarification of this distinction between the notion of an invented self and that of an individualized, deviant self that enabled the emergence of my question 'how do such men come to be situated within the Field of Sex Offender Treatment as deviant individuals?' It is this question I investigate in the following three chapters.
CHAPTER TWO
GOVERNMENT OF HUMAN BEING:
THE CONDUCT OF CONDUCT

What means have been invented to govern the human being, to shape or fashion conduct in desired directions, and how have programs sought to embody these in certain technical forms? (Rose 1996:26)

1. SUBJECTIFICATION

1:1 Beginnings

When Jack and Dan entered the SAIF Program and the domain of cognitive-behavioral psychology and asked the question 'why did I do it?' they constituted themselves as ethical subjects, where ethics means the personal capacity to draw upon moral codes as a means of managing one's conduct (Miller 1993). Having been invited, or incited, to recognize their moral obligations, to be aware of ethical dilemmas, the men were required to identify the areas of judgement that necessitated the use of what Miller (1993:xiii) terms, 'ethical substance'. They needed to know how to develop it, and they needed to find a goal 'of becoming' (Miller 1993:xiii). At the SAIF Program, the men had the Victim Empathy module to educate them in how to develop 'ethical substance', whilst they were invited to pursue the specific goal of becoming an empathic subject. That is, they were invited to infold empathy in order to act as an ethical subject in relation to their survivor, the area of their existence that required the development of ethical substance. As Miller (1993) states, what is involved here are exercises of the mind, dedicated to understanding:

both the maintenance of boundaries and the means to cross them via a debate about thought and feeling, desire and action, structure and agency, and the publicly concerned versus the privately concerned self. (Miller 1993:xiii)
Through this mental activity, the men were 'reconditioned by the effort of interiorizing and exteriorizing such precepts' (Miller 1993:xii). The men thus entered into what Miller (1993:xiii) terms a state of 'ethical incompleteness'. Miller (1993:xxviii) argues that to be ethically incomplete, as the question 'why did I do it?' implies, is to engage in an endless process of self-remedy in which the promises of a center and a totality, 'uncovered via the stripping-away of layers to reveal a core', remain necessarily unfulfilled. For Miller (1993), the process of formulating this ethical incompleteness works through the operation of technologies of governance as a means of managing human being by having subjects manage themselves. Hence, for Miller (1993:xxiii), the self, or what is taken to be the preexistent self, ends up 'not uncovering itself to itself, but making a new self under the sign of the rules of scientific (or bureaucratic) method'. To accept this position on the subject is to radically rewrite the classic account of government. Here, Miller draws upon the work of (the author known as) Foucault for his account of technologies of governance that, in turn, inform his own formulation of the notion of ethical incompleteness, a subject to which I shall return.

But first, since the notion of governance is central to this chapter, I turn to Foucault's (1988e) text *Technologies of the Self* in which he identifies four major types of technologies. Of these four, it is the technologies of power and technologies of the self that are specifically relevant to this account. First though, Foucault (1988e) identifies technologies of *production* that enable us to transform or manipulate material objects. Secondly, there are technologies of *sign systems* that enable us to use systems of meaning. However, it is technologies of *power* that form subjects as a means of dominating individuals, objectivizing them as subjects, and bringing them to define themselves in certain ways. I deployed Foucault's understanding of how technologies of power are exercised as an analytic tool in Chapter One when investigating Jack and Dan's storytelling. For example, Jack put his daughter under surveillance, which is a mode of power that works through observation. As Foucault (1988e:18) points out, the four types of technologies hardly ever function separately, 'although each one of them is associated with a certain type of domination'. The reader will recall that I analyzed how relations of
power and communication overlapped, when Dan regulated certain 'angry' communications with Mandy. Finally, it is through technologies of the self that individuals effect, either themselves or with the help of others, certain operations on their own 'bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being' (Foucault 1988e:18). These are the ways in which humans are urged and incited to become ethical beings, defining and regulating themselves, attaining through such transformation a more autonomous sense of 'happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality' (Foucault 1988e:18). Foucault (1988e:19) states that it is the contact between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self that he calls 'governmentality'. This returns us to Miller's (1993) notion of ethical incompleteness, which for Miller works, following Foucault, through the operation of these technologies of governance in which subjects and objects of knowledge are constituted via a mutual mode of formation. Here power is exercised by institutions formed by, whilst themselves in turn forming, knowledges about available subjectivities (Miller 1993).

The insights that Foucault's (1988d; 1982) texts On Power and The Subject and Power offer in relation to the birth of the human sciences, with the concomitant installation of new mechanisms of power, are also pertinent here. That is, they are pertinent in regard to how the human sciences deployed three modes of objectification or three methods of manufacturing subjects. The first of these gave modes of inquiry the status of a science by 'objectivizing' (Foucault 1982:777) the speaking subject through grammar, through pronouncing the conditions and the operation of speech, such that it permitted the making of choices only within its own rules. The second mode of objectification, that is of particular relevance to the investigation in the next chapter, is where the objectivizing of the subject takes place within what Foucault (1982:777) terms 'dividing practices'. It is here that the subject is either divided within itself or divided from others. For example, in the nineteenth century the sex offender was objectivized through his 'dangerousness', thus dividing him from those who were not dangerous. Constituted as a sexual psychopath, he was sick whereas others were healthy, he was bad whereas others were good, his conduct was inappropriate
compared to the appropriateness of the conduct of others. The third mode of objectification that is explored by Foucault (1982) is the way in which human beings turn themselves into subjects. Dan, for example, turned himself into a subject to institutions of power through the education system/regime, that is, first as 'diligent student' and then as 'good teacher'. He was also subject to discourses, for example the discourse of cognitive-behavioral psychology, such that he came to recognize himself as a subject of 'deviant' sexuality. Through these modes and technologies, the subject is thus known as the subject of governance by itself via knowledge and administration and via policy (Miller 1993). As Miller (1993:xvii) observes, this position suggests that there is no preexisting category of the person that is knowable 'outside the knowledges and categories enumerated through the governance of the subject'.

Psychology has played a crucial role in the governance of the subject insofar as it has been bound up with practices and criteria for the conduct of conduct. For example, as Rose (1996) points out, psychology has played a particular role in relation to a transformation within the nature of social authority, to include shifts in the conceptualization of the attributes that make authority legitimate, combined with the production of a range of new social authorities. Here psychology's terminology and techniques have been infused into already existing systems of authority. This infusion transforms systems of authority, so that they accumulate what Rose (1996:63 original italics) terms an 'ethical basis'. Rose (1996:63) argues that authority becomes ethical to the extent that it is exercised 'in the light of a knowledge of those who are its subjects', and here the nature of the exercise of authority is itself simultaneously transformed. This is because it becomes not so much a matter of ordering or controlling or commanding obedience and loyalty, but rather of 'improving the capacity of individuals to exercise authority over themselves' (Rose 1996:63).

My investigation in this chapter is concerned therefore with how the conditions emerged that created the possibility for the domain of behavioral, and then cognitive-behavioral psychology to become part of the great movements constituting and reconstituting subjectivities in search of a true self. This is a search, Miller (1993) argues, in which the unstable subject is
endlessly engaged. This, in turn, necessitates an investigation of how a style of political reasoning could emerge that created such a possibility for governance. For this task, I take the sixteenth century as my point of departure, in order to investigate a style of political reasoning, the form of rationality that Foucault (1991a) terms governmentality. Here, I deploy a method of analysis that accounts for the constitution of knowledges, a method that Foucault (1980d) terms genealogy. Furthermore, in investigating the historical conditions that motivate conceptualization deployed in the governance of sex offenders, I aim to provide an historical awareness of present circumstances. I therefore commence this investigation by first situating the reader within the present domain of cognitive-behavioral psychology, through an analysis of an account of the emergence of the Field of Sex Offender Treatment as constituted by David Marshall (1996) and Marshall and colleagues (1990a; 1990b). Marshall is a leading 'expert' in the field - 'field' being an economico-juridical notion (Foucault 1980f).

1:2 Historical Consciousness

Marshall (1996) nominates the early 1970s as the beginning of the history of the Field of Sex Offender Treatment, thus adding his historical account to the many 'weighty tomes [that] tell the story of the long development of the scientific study of psychological functioning, normal and pathological' (Rose 1996:41). Marshall et al. (1990b:iix) state that prior to the 1970s, there was very little know about sex offenders, due to minimal 'public and scientific awareness of the problem'. However, Marshall (1996:162) informs us that in the early 1970s, 'a systematic approach to the explanation, assessment, and treatment of sex offenders began to emerge'. This was due, Marshall (1996:162) argues, to the advent of behavior therapy in the 1960s and its 'subsequent rapidly expanding acceptance and application in the early 1970s'. Marshall (1996) then ratifies the modernity of the field by its demarcation from a past described as inadequate:

[Although there were some quite valuable attempts to assess and treat sex offenders prior to the 1970s, most such attempts
occurred in relative isolation and without a commonly shared
approach to the problem. (Marshall 1996:162)

Marshall then expresses his confidence that progress is being made, noting
that excellent work on classificatory systems of sex offenders has been
achieved and that this 'should enable us to develop theories specific to
particular subtypes of offenders' (Marshall 1996:191). This, Marshall argues,
should in turn lead to 'more precise assessments and more specialized

In narrating the past of the Field of Sex Offender Treatment and faith in the
continual improvement of its (cognitive-behavioral) theory and practice,
Marshall (1996) thereby constructs an image of the present reality of the
discipline, at the same time as he constructs a progressively better future:

I believe that the next twenty years will produce a very
significant increase in knowledge and a greater understanding of
the actual impact we can have on these problematic behaviors.
(Marshall 1996:192)

It is through such authoritative texts as these that the discourse of cognitive-
behavioral psychology constructs a continuous tradition of thinkers and
practitioners who seek to grasp and rectify the problematic behaviors of sex
offenders. A discourse, in the sense that I use the term here, is a group of
statements that are part of an historically variable and relatively well-bound
area of social knowledge (McHoul and Grace 1993). These statements act to
determine actions and thoughts and decide what can and cannot be said, done,
represented or known (Miller 1993). Hence a discourse or group of
statements is part of a technique or techniques for the production and
maintenance of political institutions and the production of human subjects. A
discourse thus always functions in relation to power relations enabling, for
example, some to judge and some to be judged, some to cure and some to be
cured (Rose 1996).
However, critical to this investigation is Rose's (1996:54) suggestion that the psychological discourse can also be understood as technological. A 'technology', for Rose (1996:54), means an ensemble of arts and skills 'entailing the linking of thoughts, affects, forces, artifacts, and techniques' that do not simply manufacture and manipulate but, more fundamentally, order being, framing and producing it. In this way, being is made thinkable as a certain mode of existence that must be addressed in a particular way. Hence, for Rose (1996:54), psychology is technological in a number of senses. First, in the sense that its language constitutes certain intellectual techniques (Rose 1996:54) that render reality thinkable in particular ways by 'ordering it, classifying it, segmenting it, establishing relations between elements, enabling it to become amenable to thought'. Further, psychological language in the form of its theories, concepts, entities and explanations makes up what Rose (1996:54) terms a kind of intellectual machinery that can render the world amenable to being thought, but only under certain descriptions. However, psychology is more than just a complex of language for it is also an array of techniques of inscription and procedures for entering aspects of the world into the sphere of the thinkable in forms that include charts, graphs and diagrams, observations and notations of various sorts (Rose 1996). Rose (1996:54) suggests that these 'make up' the objects of psychological discourse by 'rendering them remarkable in particular ways'. Thirdly, Rose (1996:54) sees psychology as intrinsically bound to what he terms 'human technologies', whereby psychology forms a part of the 'practical rationalities of assemblages that seek to act upon human beings to shape their conduct in particular directions'. By assemblages, Rose (1996:54) refers to those of the legal apparatus, of schooling, child rearing and 'even spiritual direction'. Hence my argument that Marshall et al. deploy psychology's intellectual techniques and intellectual machinery in order to argue that there was 'very little known' about sex offenders prior to the 1970s, due to minimal public and scientific awareness of the problem. To clarify, first Marshall et al. order reality as ahistorical and asocial, such that it becomes possible to conceive of a universal sovereign subject, a preexistent self, classified as a 'deviant' form of life prior to psychology's 'sophisticated procedures' (Marshall, Laws, and Barbarce 1990a:5) of identification and investigation. Further, behavioral psychology's
intellectual machinery is deployed in the development of its theories and explanations as they relate to the 'sexual deviant' subject, who is thereby segmented out from 'non-deviant' (i.e. 'normal') subjects, into particular 'subtypes' of offenders. This production, or 'making up', of individual subjects renders the sex offender remarkable in particular ways, and thinkable as a particular form of existence that must be addressed by cognitive-behavioral psychology in particular ways. Finally, Marshall et al. are bound up in an 'assemblage' identified as the Field of Sex Offender Treatment, that seeks to act upon sex offenders and shape their conduct in particular directions. Practices implicated in the constitution of this assemblage are discussed in depth below.

Let us now return to cognitive-behavioral psychology's history, which is situated within the recurrent history of the psychological sciences. It is stories such as Marshall's above, that enable scientific disciplines to identify themselves through a conception of the past, through the establishment of a chronological narrative that effects a division between sanctioned and lapsed texts. The sanctioned texts govern what can count as knowledge within the current self-image of the discipline. Hence there is a 'set of rules of formation for all its objects' (Foucault 1991b:54 original italics), within the current domain of this discursive formation, which brings us back to a discussion of power relations. Here I draw upon Foucault's account of power/knowledge relations where, as already discussed in the previous chapter, power is not conceived as something that is possessed, but rather as something that is exercised (Foucault 1977). From such a position, there is no power relation 'without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations' (Foucault 1977:27). It is critical to note here that Foucault (1988a:43 original italics) is arguing for a 'relation' between power and knowledge (power/knowledge) rather than arguing that "Knowledge is power," or "Power is knowledge," (Foucault 1988a:43). Within a single discursive formation such as that of cognitive-behavioral psychology, there are not only intradiscursive dependencies between the objects, operations and concepts, but there are also interdiscursive dependencies (Foucault 1991b).
These are dependencies between different discursive formations, for example the dependencies between the discourse of cognitive-behavioral psychology and the disciplinary and correctional discourse of the prison regime. In the following section, I analyze how the expert known as 'Marshall' was mobilized around particular objectives, to techniques for the construction of collective identities and aspirations (Rose 1996) within the emergent Field of Sex Offender Treatment. This mobilization involved intradiscursive dependencies between 'experts' in the field. It is through such mobilizations, that alliances come to be formed between those who 'come to be convinced, in different ways, that they have certain interests and that their interests are the same as those of particular others' (Rose 1996:46). As Rose (1996) observes, interests are achievements not explanations, as would be offered in response to the question 'whose interests are being served?'

1:3 Expertise

The discursive practices that constitute the trained and credentialed self within the institutional domain of psychology, 'domain' being a juridico-political notion (Foucault 1980f), enable Marshall to function as 'expert' practitioner, claiming special competence in the administration of persons and 'interpersonal relations'. Deploying the knowledges and techniques, that is, the techne of psychology, Marshall works within diverse locales such as correctional institutions, within diverse modes of operation such as 'theorist' and 'clinician', and participates at national/international conferences, within diverse modes of operation such as 'keynote presenter' and 'author' of official 'papers'. In the following account, I analyze how Marshall et al. function in the 'publishing machine', having formed an alliance to amalgamate knowledges from different sources into a complex 'know-how', to be unified in the pedagogic practice of editing and publishing a 'textbook'.

After the annual meeting of the International Academy of Sex Research in Amsterdam, September 1986, cited by Marshall et al. (1990b:ix) as being 'a most prestigious and information-filled conference', Marshall and several other experts got together to share a post-conference debrief at an outdoor
café. At this locale, these experts formed an alliance to edit the first textbook on the issues, theories and treatment of sex offenders. This, we are told, was because although some of the topics at the conference had been relevant to sex offenders, this group of experts were 'left feeling that a concentrated focus was absent' (Marshall, Laws, and Barbaree 1990b.ix), that is to say, with regard to sex offending.

Marshall et al. subsequently entered into the specific discursive conditions necessary in order to edit a text 'that would bring readers up to date on current knowledge and thinking in the area' (Marshall, Laws, and Barbaree 1990b.ix). In this way, as Rose (1996:87) observes, 'in purporting to underpin authority by a coherent intellectual and practical regime', cognitive-behavioral psychology offers others 'both a grounding in truth and some formulas for efficacy' (Rose 1996:87). The reader will recall that Marshall believed that an intellectual and practical regime had previously been missing due to a lack of a commonly shared approach to the problem of sex offending. Here Truth is centered on the form of scientific discourse and mode of thought of the institution that produces it. Truth, in this Foucauldian sense, is subject to constant economic and political incitement, that is, subject to a 'demand for truth' (Foucault 1980g:131). In this instance, it was a demand for the Truth of 'sex offending'. This Truth became the object of immense diffusion and consumption (Foucault 1980g), to be circulated in the form of a published text consumed by (expert) subjects positioned within (and possibly beyond) the Field of Sex Offender Treatment. Such Truth is produced under the control of 'a few great political and economic apparatuses' (Foucault 1980g:132). In this case, it was apparatuses of writing and publishing.

In 1990 Marshall et al.'s edited text entitled *Handbook of Sexual Assault: Issues, Theories, and Treatment of the Offender* was published. Marshall et al. can thus be seen to have had an authoritative function within a discourse (cognitive-behavioral psychology) in which Truth is bound up with historically specific regimes of power that have a normalizing and regulatory function upon the objects of knowledge. Theoretical knowledge is not a disinterested, abstract realm of inquiry, but an instrument of social control and
discipline, that invests human bodies and subjugates them by 'turning them into objects of knowledge' (Foucault 1977:28). Such knowledges, with their claims to Truth, with their 'concepts' and 'theories', are then bound into ways of seeing and acting, that is, into techniques deployed within a technology, here specifically that of psychology. The 'will to know' incites the desire to have more knowledge, more expertise, such expertise in turn being enmeshed in definite practices of experimentation, investigation and so forth.

In the following account of mobilization that involves interdiscursive dependencies, Marshall functions as agent of authority entering into alliance with other agents of social authority, thereby attempting to colonize:

their ways of calculating and arguing with psychological vocabularies, reformulating their ways of explaining normality and pathology in psychological terms, giving their techniques a psychological coloration. (Rose 1996:87).

In the early 1990s Marshall was commissioned by the United Kingdom Prison Service to assist in setting up the sex offender treatment program in British prisons, primarily in the function of staff trainer (Sampson 1994). Sampson (1994:110) constitutes Marshall, who was the Director of the Kingston Sexual Behavior Clinic in Canada at the time, as the 'moving spirit behind the treatment programmes in Canada and New Zealand'. This is an example of how psychological modes of thought can come to underpin and then transform a range of diverse practices for dealing with persons 'via the charisma of the persona of the authority' (Rose 1996:88).

However, whilst practices may be transformed via the charisma of the persona of the authority, the activity of the agent of authority does not produce a corpus of knowledge that is useful or resistant to power. Rather, power/knowledge, 'the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up' (Foucault 1977:28), determine the forms and possible domains of knowledge. In this instance, the struggles that were involved in attempts to constitute a cognitive-behavioral treatment program within the United
Kingdom criminal justice regime were considerable\(^1\). Implicated within these struggles was the absence of a coherent policy towards sex offenders and Government policy that did not provide for an increase in resources to cover programming costs. Sampson (1994:108) states that the Government was 'adamant that no additional resources would be provided'. As a consequence, it was existing staff that had to be freed from normal duties for training and program delivery. At the same time, there was a shift in practice to harsher sentencing for sex offenders, attributed by Sampson (1994:58) to the 'pressure exerted upon sentencers by politicians and the media'. West (1996:58-59) states that inmates serving sentences for sex offences in prisons in England and Wales, including those serving life, 'more than doubled between 1982 and 1992, from 1,394 to 3,156 (Home Office (1994b))'. Yet, despite this increase, both West (1996) and Sampson (1994) argue that resources in money, trained personnel and 'confident, well-motivated leadership' (West 1996:63) were in desperately short supply. The British Government insisted that 'resources to run the treatment programme would have to be found from within existing resources by means of "efficient savings" and the general year-on-year Prison Service allocation in the PES round' (Sampson 1994:108). Furthermore, Sampson (1994:108) states that Ministers let it be known 'informally' that the treatment initiative would be ended unless significant reductions in the recidivism rate were achieved within a five year period. However, the timing of the treatment program for prisoners, which was to be at the beginning rather than the end of their sentence, was strongly criticized by Marshall, particularly in light of the claims that the initiative would deliver significant reductions in the level of sexual crime. Sampson (1994:113) reports that Marshall argued that 'it was futile to expect the effects of treatment to be sufficiently resilient to last from the beginning of a prisoner's sentence until that offender was finally released'. Further, Marshall argued that a Relapse Prevention program designed at the commencement of an offender's sentence might well be irrelevant to the prisoner's needs by the time he was released. However, these arguments did not persuade the Prison Service to change its policy, despite Marshall seeking a meeting in November 1991 with the

\(^1\) For an analysis of these struggles see Sampson's (1994) *Acts of Abuse: Sex Offenders and the Criminal Justice System*. 

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Director of Inmate Programs to protest about program timing (Sampson 1994). There were also other areas of struggle that emerged, for example in regard to plans for evaluation; the reluctance in some prisons of sex offenders to volunteer for the program; and, conversely, in other prisons the problem of twelve-month waiting lists for treatment. These were just some of the struggles that converged with a lack of resources to guarantee treatment for all prisoners serving over four years. The result was that in the early 1990s, policies towards sex offenders and the delivery of cognitive-behavioral treatment programs in the United Kingdom Prison Service in most cases continued to exist only on paper (Sampson 1994).

At this point, I leave the contested domain of cognitive-behavioral psychology and the Field of Sex Offender Treatment with its constituted knowledge claims in order to investigate the accidental beginnings that created the possibilities for the 1970s emergence of the 'field'. This first necessitates a brief outline of the genealogical method in order to clarify that I do not pretend to go back in time to restore an 'unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things' (Foucault 1984a:81). This is because it is not the duty of a genealogical analysis to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present, that it 'continues secretly to animate the present, having imposed a predetermined form on all its vicissitudes' (Foucault 1984a:81). Nor is it the task of the genealogist to search for the origin, the 'formal beginning' (Hutton 1988:129), but rather it is a search for accidental beginnings:

the minute deviations - or conversely, the complete reversals - the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents. (Foucault 1984a:81)

Genealogy thus challenges the notion of linear, teleological development (Brown 1998), revealing instead how contingently history comes into being,
'how non-inevitable its existence is' (Brown 1998:36), thus making the present appear as something that *might not be* as it is. It places temporal limits on reason, restricting it by its contingency or, as Poster (1988:113) states, its 'presentness'.

Hence, in a genealogy the search for descent is not the 'erecting of foundations' (Foucault 1984a:82) for it disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it 'fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself' (Foucault 1984a:82). What such a 'descent' shows therefore is not an uninterrupted continuity but rather what Foucault (1984a:83) prefers to term an 'emergence' at different stages where there is a struggle waged between different forces. Hence, 'emergence' designates a place of confrontation, but not one between equals, for the adversaries do not belong to a common space (Foucault 1984a). Consequently, no one can glory in an emergence for no one is responsible for it, since it always occurs in the interstice (Foucault 1984a).

A genealogical analysis is of particular usefulness to this investigation insofar as it takes into account the notion that the body does not escape the influence of history. Rather, the body is molded by a great many distinct regimes, 'it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances' (Foucault 1984a:87). Hence we can identify the molding of Jack's body by 'the branch' disciplinary regime, by his home and farm chores regimes, the rhythms of dairy farming work practice, the moral law of 'no sex before marriage' and his resistances. Jack's body, as we saw in Chapter One, was thus produced as a certain type of body within the configuration of his historical conditions (McHoul and Grace 1993). It is the body of the subject that psychology constitutes as 'sex/incest offender' that is of central concern to this genealogical investigation. For example, in the following chapter I investigate how the body of the sex offender is constituted within an assemblage of urges, automatic physiological responses, drives and hormones. Caught up within this regime of corporeality, the 'embodied' sex offender is, at a certain historical moment, disciplined by psychiatry through the techniques
of surgical and medical castration. Effective history therefore takes the examination of the body as its starting point, analyzing the effects of power in their most specific and concrete form (McNay 1992). The eighteenth century is the historical moment identified by Foucault (1979a:143) when the 'taking charge of life', more than the threat of death, first gave power access to the body for this was the first time in history that biological existence was reflected in political existence. This power was what Foucault (1979a) terms bio-power. I investigate bio-power below, for this notion is critical to understanding how power gained access to the body of the sex offender. But without the notion of 'population' and without the identification of the need for 'statistics', the possibility for bio-power would not have emerged as it did. For this emergence, a new style of political reasoning to that of early-modern governments was required. Further, it was, Rose (1996) suggests, the belief in the necessity and possibility of the management of particular aspects of social and economic existence, combined with the use of more or less formalized means of calculation, that created the possibility for the emergence of the modern discipline of psychology. That is, psychology's emergence was enabled through its relation to the issue of calculability. Hence the necessity for an investigation of the emergence of 'governmentality', 'population', 'moral science', for without them the emergence of psychology - as one of the human sciences - if it had emerged at all, may not have been regarded as a significant occurrence. Its knowledge claims may not have had the efficacy that they have since achieved.

1:4 Governmentality and Population

Modern government rationality, Foucault has said, is simultaneously about individualization and totalization: that is, about finding answers to the question of what it is for an individual, and for a society or population of individuals, to be governed or governable. (Gordon 1991:36)

Governmentality, Foucault's own neologism, is about how to govern (Gordon 1991). This should not be confused with the growth of the state or the rise of
the disciplinary society for, as Allen (1998:180) notes, governmentality is a style of political reasoning more than a specific institution or practice. As Rose (1996) observes, this understanding helps to free us from the profoundly misleading view that we should understand the practices of normativity that have shaped our present in terms of the political apparatus of the state.

Foucault (1991a:87) argues that from the middle of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century a series of political treatises developed and flourished that presented works on the 'art of government'. It was during this time that questions were posed for discussion in terms of the government of oneself, the government of souls and lives, the government of children and the problematic of pedagogy and, lastly, the question of the government of the state by the prince (Foucault 1991a). According to Foucault's (1991a:87) argument, questions on how to 'govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people will accept being governed, how to become the best possible governor' when asked in the sixteenth century were situated at the crossroads of two processes. The first of these shattered the structures of feudalism in which personal identity was anchored in a 'hereditary status and an associated network of loyalties and dependencies' (Gordon 1991:12), and led to the establishment of the 'great territorial, administrative and colonial states' (Foucault 1991a:87-88). The second was a totally different movement that, together with the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, raised the issue of 'how one must be spiritually ruled on this earth in order to achieve eternal salvation' (Foucault 1991a:88). It was this first process of state centralization that created the possibility for the emergence of the notion of population and the deployment of the 'moral science' of statistics. I therefore focus my investigation on this process first, returning later to the second movement of dispersion and religious dissidence.

By the end of the sixteenth century certain values were assumed in the exercise of power relations by early-modern governments that contributed towards the possibilities of the above questionings of the art of government. These included the value of *ordering time* (Deleuze 1988), enabled by more accurate means of measuring time; new *distributions in space* (Deleuze 1988),
which took concrete form in the guarding of frontiers; and the maintenance of military forces placed in readiness for mobilization. This exercise of power had the effect of inciting the production of better maps, the building of better roads, and the deployment of a whole set of techniques for recording, registering, filing, indexing and building up dossiers, inherited from the medieval inquisition (Allen 1998).

However, in the seventeenth century, the institutions of sovereignty continued to remain the basic institutions throughout the great crises of the Thirty Years War, the mid-century peasant and urban rebellions and the crisis of revenue that affected all western monarchies at the end of the century (Foucault 1991a). During this period, whilst the exercise of power was conceived as an exercise of sovereignty, the art of government could not be developed in a specific and autonomous manner, but remained instead trapped within a framework of sovereignty that was 'too large, too abstract and too rigid' (Foucault 1991a:98). To overcome this block, the art of government would need fresh outlets. These emerged in the eighteenth century when government rationality, or governmentality, was linked with demographic expansion and the increasing abundance of money linked, in turn, to the growth of agricultural production through a series of circular processes (Foucault 1991a). Capital gradually took priority over the former land and state system of inheritance and 'population' now emerged as a problem.

Prior to the emergence of the notion of population, the art of government was conceived in terms of the government of the family, and 'economy' was conceived as the management of family (individuals, goods and wealth) through the meticulous attention of the father, the head of the family (Foucault 1991a). By the eighteenth century, the art of government was essentially concerned with how to introduce 'economy' into the management of the state (Foucault 1991a). The former difficulties encountered in developing the art of government in an autonomous manner were now finally overcome with the emergence of the problem of population, which necessitated the re-deployment of the family as an element internal to population, rather than as a model for state management.
This shift enabled *economy* to become visible as a distinct dimension of reality (Allen 1998) and a field of intervention, rather than as a function internal to the management of the family. And with this re-centering of the notion of economy, 'the problem of government finally came to be thought, reflected and calculated outside of the juridical framework of sovereignty' (Foucault 1991a:101). With this movement *statistics* - that in the mercantile tradition only worked within and for the benefit of a monarchical administration - became a major technical factor of the new technology of political economy (Foucault 1991a). Henceforth, the population was the object government must take into account in all its observations and *savoir* (i.e. forms of knowledge) and the family, in turn, became the privileged instrument for the government of the population (Foucault 1991a).

The eighteenth century thus marked the transition from an art of government to a political science (Foucault 1991a). This transition intersected with the emergence of the Industrial Revolution and then, with the appearance of *laissez-faire* capitalism and the development of modern industries, came the emergence of the modern city, cultural policy and the notion of 'public opinion and a public culture' (Miller 1993:18). Miller (1993) argues that the abandonment of the country in favor of the city also marked a shift in generational terms, for youth no longer moved through life transitions in the same way as their forbears, processing aging in a stable way within a stable culture. Rather, youth had become an 'indeterminate social phenomenon' (Miller 1993:19). What is significant for Miller (1993) is that these developments coupled mobility with *interiority*, as the physical search for work was matched by a psychic search for *self*. Youth was being refashioned in the eighteenth century 'to stand in for modernity, a specific manifestation of a broader restlessness' (Miller 1993:19). With the appearance of factory life, people trained as peasants or self-employed artisans were now *transformed* into workers in a system (Miller 1993). People worked for accumulation in place of subsistence, learning to calculate potential benefit to themselves and hence to act accordingly.
These new forces organizing life in the modern city rendered untenable old ways and manners of a passing era, necessitating philanthropic and educational change that attempted to keep pace with changes in industrial and technical innovation. Miller (1993:20) argues that new modes of production were accompanied by rhetoric accounting for life, taking the form of 'policing leisure activities; discouraging inefficient investments in recreation, such as drunkenness; and generally promoting a high degree of fit between workplace and home'. This new definition of the person was an assemblage that deployed vocabularies of 'selfhood' and 'collectivity', 'individuality' and 'efficiency' combined with an infolding of a sense of utility and obedience. The eighteenth century can therefore be characterized as the era that saw the emergence of the human being as the center of the new sciences, moving towards a new 'freedom' of self-knowledge (Miller 1993). The making of the modern state had thus necessitated the making of the modern person with a 'civility to match the economic and constitutional movement beyond tribalism / village life' (Miller 1993:9). This was also the era that saw the advent of liberalism, and its concern with the 'dense autonomous character of the processes of population' (Gordon 1991:20). Gordon (1991), following Foucault, argues that liberalism was preoccupied with the vulnerability of these same processes and hence with the need to enframe them in 'mechanisms of security' (Gordon 1991:20). Thus, from the eighteenth century onwards, security tended increasingly to become the dominant component of modern government rationality (Gordon 1991). In Chapter One we saw how by the end of the nineteenth century, with Britain's expanding imperial conquests and the resultant increasing demand on the defence of existing colonial territories, this concern was literally infolded into male being through the assemblage of a more muscular and militaristic masculinity.

This brings us to the next section that I commence with a discussion of biopower in the eighteenth century and its linkages with population and statistics. I then focus my investigation upon statistics, specifically in relation to its connections with calculability, categorization and hence psychology. Here there are critical linkages with new conceptualizations of human being, the individualization of criminality and the surveying of deviancy.
The force of bio-power lies in defining reality as well as producing it. (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:203)

Hacking (1982), following Foucault, argues that by the middle of the eighteenth century, Life became an object of thought and an object of power. Here it was not only the individual living person who might be subjected to the orders of the sovereign, but also Life itself, 'the life of the species, the size of the population, the modes of procreation' (Hacking 1982:279). As Foucault (1979a) observes, Life more than the law now became the issue of political struggles. That is to say, struggles were now over the 'right' to Life: 'to one's body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs' (Foucault 1979a:145). Here, Foucault (1979a:138 original italics) states that one might say that 'the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death'. This new regime of bio-power evolved in two basic forms or, rather, constituted two poles of development (Foucault 1979a). The first centered on the body as machine, that is, its disciplining and Foucault (1979a) names this procedure of power an 'anatomo-politics of the human body' (Foucault 1979a:139 original italics). The second pole focused on the species body, 'the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes' (Foucault 1979a:139), such as propagation and birth. These are regulatory controls that Foucault names a 'bio-politics of the population' (Foucault 1979a:139 original italics).

For Foucault (1979a), the bio-politics of the population was exemplified at the beginning of the eighteenth century in, amongst other things, the socialization of procreative behavior. This was an economic socialization via all the incitements and restrictions that social and fiscal measures brought to bear on the fertility of couples, for a country had to be populated if it hoped to be 'rich and powerful' (Foucault 1979a:26) and maintain its security. So, on the one hand, there was the regulation of the population and on the other, the disciplining of the body with an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for its subjugation (Foucault 1979a). The population thus became
something to be 'controlled, taken care of, made to flourish' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:170) and by the middle of the eighteenth century this achievement came to appear as the ultimate goal of government (Foucault 1991a).

However, in order to know the domain to be governed, the government required knowledge of the population and for this, certain features needed to be highlighted such as births, deaths and marriages, the types of illnesses, work and diet of persons and so forth. That is to say, what was needed was 'statistics': printed numbers that could be turned into inscriptions that could be added, subtracted, compared and accumulated in the offices of officials where decisions had to be made (Rose 1996).

In England and Wales, the practice of counting bodies developed with the emergence of bio-politics. This marked a shift from the counting of hearths and windows, previously used as the basis of taxation, and considered to be the most reliable source of data for estimating the size of the population (Hacking 1982). However, this transition from counting hearths to counting bodies had the subversive effect of constituting new categories of people, new conceptualizations of the human being. As Hacking points out, enumeration demands 'kinds of things or people to count' (Hacking 1982:280 original italics) and counting is 'hungry for categories' (Hacking 1982:280).

By the 1820s, there was enormous enthusiasm for statistical data-collection and between 1820-1840 there was what Hacking (1982:281) calls an 'avalanche of printed numbers'. In this period statistics was called moral science, its aim being to gain information about and control of 'the moral tenor of the population' (Hacking 1982:281). The transformation of the population into numbers was thus utilized in political and administrative debates and calculations and this 'extended into a statisticalization of the morals and pathologies of the population' (Rose 1996:74). The domain of moral science was thus connected to the great 'medico-psychological domain of the "perversions"' (Foucault 1979a:118) that was opened up and destined to 'take over from the old moral categories of debauchery and excess' (Foucault
1979a:118), a shift I investigate in detail later in this chapter, in 'Sexuality, Perversion and Normalization'. Moral science was informed by the analysis of heredity that placed sex, that is, sexual relations, venereal diseases, matrimonial alliances and perversions, 'in a position of "biological responsibility" with regard to the species' (Foucault 1979a:118). There was now an understanding that sex could not only be affected by its own diseases but, if not controlled, could also transmit diseases or create others that would affect future generations (Foucault 1979a).

Foucault (1979a:118) argues that in the second half of the nineteenth century, what came out of this merging of the innovations in the technology of sex and the theory of degenerescence, with its program of eugenics, was the 'medical - but also political - project for organizing a state management of marriages, births, and life expectancies'. Hence this analysis brings us back in a circular fashion to the discourse of 'moral science', or statistics, and its correlative formation of domains and objects.

It was in the first half of the nineteenth century that the first systematic study of sickness rates began. By 1840, sickness had become subject to statistical laws of Nature and 'an immense amount of data not only was accumulating but was beginning to be understood' (Hacking 1982:285), or, could we say, creatively deployed? The English statistician William Farr, appointed to the Office of the Registrar-General of England and Wales in 1837, increasingly designed a list of countable diseases. No one was allowed to die without a doctor signing a death certificate, but the cause of death had to be uniform and easily applicable, 'in order that the certificates could be enumerated to discover who was dying of what, in what numbers' (Hacking 1982:293). The aim was thus a standardized list of diseases.

In England, not only sicknesses and diseases were counted for there were also endless reports on 'the poor, the criminal, the infanticide, the mad, as well as questions of trade [that] were churned out in the "Blue Books" - Official Papers of Parliament, printed, bound in blue' (Hacking 1982:286). The French started to produce annual reports, but it was the Swedes who provided the best
statistical information from within the framework of the parish (Hacking 1982). In France, from 1826 statistical data on 'admissions to, deaths in, and releases from the great hospitals and asylums' (Hacking 1982:286) was made available in the annual set of 'sombre pages printed by the Ministry of Justice' (Hacking 1982:286). The statistics were then reproduced or condensed and put into the public domain in the mass circulation police gazettes (Hacking 1982). Within ten years there were so many numbers that every salon in Paris spoke 'in fear, and with full knowledge, of the *croissance affrayante* (buzzword of the day) for crime, insanity, prostitution, vagabondage, vagrancy, suicide' (Hacking 1982:286). Hacking (1982:287) states that:

*...disease, madness, and the state of the threatening underworld,*  
*les misérables, created a morbid and fearful fascination for numbers upon which the bureaucracies fed.* (Hacking 1982:287)

As we shall see in the following chapter, these technologies of enumeration and classification and publication had a particular effect upon the bourgeois population. Social statistics, 'the stuff of moral science' (Hacking 1982:287), now appeared everywhere, for example in education in the form of (the will to know) the number of primary school students, their enrolments and so forth. Statistics on education could in turn be correlated with crime rates combined, if necessary, with data from 'the third disciplinary element after education and deviancy: the army' (Hacking 1982:287).

After Sweden, Britain and France, Belgium and then Germany and Italy took up statistics and it was in Italy that criminal anthropology was created out of English and French statistical 'know-how' combined with Kantian *Anthropologie* (Hacking 1982:288). In this 1820-1840 'episode in biopolitics' (Hacking 1982:289), that converged with the intervention of psychiatric medicine into the penal system, there was therefore a strong element of the surveying of deviancy, that stood within a longstanding concern with war, taxation and profit. I investigate the emergence of the discipline of psychiatry and criminal anthropology and its links with the notion of 'dangerousness' in detail in the following chapter. Here we shall see that the transformation of
events and phenomena into statistical data and techniques of inscription of human difference increasingly come to play their part in the materialization of the theoretical and the management of individuals and population of individuals.

In America the idea of counting people was so well entrenched that in 1778 it was written into the American constitution (Hacking 1982). In 1790, in the U.S. census, Americans were asked only four questions, but by 1870 this number had risen to 156 (Hacking 1982). Kirk and Kutchins (1992:25) argue that the earliest classification systems of mental disorders in the United States were 'developed by the federal government for the U.S. census'. In the 1840 census there was only one category of mental disorder, namely 'idiocy', that included insanity (Kirk and Kutchins 1992). However, by 1880 there were seven categories: 'mania, melancholia, monomania, paresis, dementia, dipsomania, and epilepsy' (Kirk and Kutchins 1992:26). By 1880, the total number of questions in the U.S. census had risen to 13,010 (Hacking 1982). Hacking suggests that rather than an avalanche of numbers this represented a 'volcanic eruption' (Hacking 1982:290). Only a handful more questions were asked in the 1890 census, but it did something more important, namely, 'it developed techniques of mechanical manipulation of data ... the 1890 census gave us the punch card, chief peripheral tool of early computing devices' (Hacking 1982:290).

Thus, revolutionary bio-power brought into being new concepts of the person and, over a period of time, the fine categorization of people by what they 'did' for example, 'acrobat', 'charlatans' (Hacking 1982). The idea of classifying people in minute divisions according to their work was therefore 'already an instructive transformation that occurred in the nineteenth century' (Hacking 1982:292-93). But as Hacking (1982:293) observes, it is the 'very idea of categorizing' that is the key point to be noted here, rather than categories of work per se. It is this idea that is significant in relation to the creation of the possibility for incest offenders to be categorized as 'sub-types' of deviant individuals.
Hacking (1982) argues that Farr's standardized list of diseases was the ancestor of the international list of diseases\(^2\) published by the World Health Organization (WHO); categories that were as responsible for the 'need to count uniformly as they were to any interest in "correct" diagnosis' (Hacking 1982:293 original italics). Similarly, Hacking (1982:293) argues that the aim of the Third Edition of The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III)\(^3\) issued by the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-I was published in 1952) was to produce a nationally standardized classification of mental disorders. However, such standardization was not in terms of their causes, but rather in terms of the ability of practitioners from different ideologies to agree upon the classifications into which to insert patients (Hacking 1982).

Hacking (1982:293) considers DSM-III to be the linear descendant of the Annales d'hygiène publique et de médecine légale. This influential French journal was first published in 1829 and it is significant to this investigation for it marks the emergence of the individualization of the criminal. The Annales published, amongst other things, penal reports on cases written up by medico-legal and psychiatric experts and the cases sometimes included the memoirs of the prisoners. It was this practice of philanthropists and (in America) doctors and judges of getting some prisoners to write their memoirs that exemplifies, Foucault (1980e:49 original italics) states, 'the first great burst of curiosity about the individuals whom it was desired to transform and for the sake of whose transformation it was necessary to acquire a certain savoir, a certain technique'. This assumes critical significance because, prior to the nineteenth century, no such curiosity about the criminal had existed. Rather, it was simply a matter of knowing whether the person accused had really done what he or she was accused of doing and, once that was established, then a tariff was fixed (Foucault 1980e).

\(^2\) International Classification of Diseases - ICD
\(^3\) Since Hacking's (1982) publication a fourth edition of the DSM has been published, namely DSM-IV.
After formal publication of the *Annales* began, the avalanche of numbers was so swift that 'as many as six volumes a year' (Hacking 1982:288) were required in order to encompass all of its news. Its cases were also fine examples of the growing disciplinization of the individual by the new medico-legal establishment (Hacking 1982). The translation of the individual into the domain of knowledge (Rose 1996) is operationalized through disciplinary technologies that operate in terms of a detailed structuring of space, time, and relations among individuals, through procedures of hierarchical observation and normalizing judgement (Rose 1996). Disciplinary techniques form both the internal and external aspects of persons under surveillance; 'their bodies and minds, as objects' (McHoul and Grace 1993:24, original italics). We have seen examples of disciplinary techniques in Chapter One, and we shall see further examples in Chapter Four, when I analyze in depth the techniques deployed by behavioral psychology in laboratory work with sex offenders.

1:6 Discipline and Surveillance

... hospitals and prisons are first and foremost places of visibility dispersed in a form of exteriority, which refer back to an extrinsic function, that of setting one apart and controlling...

(Deleuze 1988:60)

In the eighteenth century, early nineteenth century, there is a shift in the exercise of disciplinary power, which is no longer exercised by ministerial agents over a territory, but rather is exercised over bodies via surveillance (Allen 1998). Here, discipline is not identified with any one institution or apparatus because it is a type of power, a technology, that traverses every kind of apparatus or institution, linking them and making them converge and function in a new way (Deleuze 1988). This new mode of exercise of power converges with an understanding that it is more efficient and profitable to place people under surveillance, than to subject them to an exemplary penalty such as public execution (Foucault 1977). Gradually, this new political anatomy spreads through a multiplicity of often minor processes of different origin and scattered location, processes that overlap, repeat, imitate and
support one another as they distinguish themselves from one another according to their domain of application (Foucault 1977). As they converge, they gradually produce the blueprint of a general method (Foucault 1977). The diagram of modern disciplinary societies, that is, the map or rather 'several superimposed maps' (Deleuze 1988:44), can be said to be the 'plague', which 'cordons off the stricken town and regulates the smallest detail' (Deleuze 1988:34). On the other hand, the diagram for ancient sovereign societies was 'leprosy' (Deleuze 1988:35). Whereas for the marked leper there was 'separation', for those analyzed as sick of the plague, there was 'segmentation' (Foucault 1977). Therefore, as Foucault (1977) clarifies:

[1]he exile of the leper and the arrest of the plague do not bring with them the same political dream. The first is that of a pure community, the second that of a disciplined society. (Foucault 1977:198)

The beginning of the nineteenth century is the time when these two different projects come together; when lepers are treated as plague victims, and the subtle segmentation of discipline is projected onto the confused space of internment (Foucault 1977). Through the operation of disciplinary power the individualized are now excluded, but procedures of individualization are used to mark exclusion in the psychiatric asylum, the penitentiary, the reformatory, the approved school and, to some extent, the hospital (Foucault 1977).

The architectural figure of disciplinary power in the disciplined society is that of Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon, in which the organization of space becomes itself a tactic of power (Brown 1998) with the organization of visibility around a dominating, overseeing gaze (Foucault 1980b) that solves the problems of surveillance. In the panopticon the principle of the dungeon, where the prisoner is kept in darkness, is reversed when the individual prisoners (or, for example, hospital patients in cubicles or schoolchildren in dormitories) are kept in individual cells that are constantly backlit. Hence, each inhabitant is 'individualized and constantly visible' (Foucault 1977:200). At the center of the panopticon, surrounded by the individual cells, is the observation tower in
which the overseers reside. However, the interior of the observation tower is not visible to the cell inhabitants. It is in the constant presence of the central observation tower and its overseers that the power of the panopticon is visible, for the inmate is constantly seen, constantly under surveillance without ever seeing. The ultimate goal is that each inmate will keep him/herself under constant self-surveillance, for they never know if/when they are being spied upon for they can never be sure whether or not an overseer is actually present in the central tower. But the overseers who exercise this form of power are also thoroughly implicated in power relations since the panopticon includes a system for observing and controlling the controller (Rabinow 1984). Jack exercised this mode of disciplinary power as we have seen in the previous chapter.

Unlike the 'compact, swarming, howling masses' (Foucault 1977:200) found in places of confinement such as the asylum, in the panopticon the separation of the cells implies a lateral invisibility. Hence, if the inmates are convicts, there is no danger of a plot, or, if they are patients, there is no danger of contagion (Foucault 1977). Madmen cannot perpetrate violence upon one another, schoolchildren cannot copy from each other, and workers are not distracted from the task at hand (Foucault 1977). Hence the panopticon can also be seen as a diagram, a function that must be 'detached from any specific use' (Foucault 1977:205), for it traverses all forms (education, care, punishment, production) and is applied to all substances (prisoners, the sick, schoolchildren, madmen, workers, soldiers and so forth) (Deleuze 1988). It is the diagram of a mechanism of power 'reduced to its ideal form ... it is in fact a figure of political technology' (Foucault 1977:205).

The target of this disciplinary power is the body that is manipulated, shaped and trained to obey and respond (Foucault 1977). The aim of disciplinary technology, no matter what its institutional form, is to forge a 'docile body'. The notion of 'docility', Foucault (1977:136) argues, joins the analysable body to the manipulable body, such that a 'body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved' (Foucault 1977:136). The logic of panopticism is both efficiency and normalization. This is achieved not only
through the observation and control of the inhabitants of the panopticon (be it a prison, an educational institution, a hospital or a cognitive-behavioral laboratory) but also through *knowledge* of each object of the gaze. The control and observation of the prisoner, the army cadet, the patient, the sex offender is also, therefore, a mechanism which facilitates the formation of knowledge *about* subjects. This knowledge leads, in turn, to a 'knowledge of the means of controlling and disciplining that "subject"' (Kenworthy 1994:39). As we shall see in the investigation in Chapter Four, such 'knowledge' was to be deployed in the creation of the multiple disciplinary behavioral techniques employed to manipulate, shape and train into 'normality' the body and mind of the sex offender.

I now return to the second aspect of the problematic of government raised in my discussion of Governmentality and Population. It concerns the issue of how to be ruled spiritually on earth in order to achieve eternal salvation. Foucault (1979a:116) argues that the raising of this issue, together with other questionings of the art of government, marked an important mutation and a 'schism in what might be called the "traditional technology of the flesh"'. It was around the middle of the sixteenth century, after the Council of Trent, that the Church developed procedures of direction and examination of conscience alongside the ancient techniques of the confessional (Foucault 1980a). These were developed within the ecclesiastical institutions for the purpose of training and purifying ecclesiastical personnel, and detailed techniques were elaborated:

> for use in seminaries and monasteries, techniques of discursive rendition of daily life, of self-examination, confession, direction of conscience and regulation of the relationship between director and directed. (Foucault 1980a:200)

Foucault (1980a) suggests that as this technology was injected into society as a whole, an unprecedented form of relation between sex and discourse was thereby instituted. Throughout the seventeenth century there was a gradual 'policing of statements' (Foucault 1979a:18) about sex, where and when it was
not possible to talk about such things became much more strictly defined. At the same time, there was a steady proliferation of discourses concerning sex, 'a discursive ferment that gathered momentum from the eighteenth century onward' (Foucault 1979a:18). The society that emerged in the nineteenth century, the bourgeois, or capitalist, or industrial society, then put into operation an entire machinery for producing true discourses concerning sex (Foucault 1979a). One of the key techniques deployed to produce true discourses on sex was the confession. In the following section, I first engage with Foucault's (1979a) analysis of the emergence of confession into a field of rationality, followed by an investigation of the emergence of 'bourgeois' sexuality and the discourse of psychoanalysis. As Rose (1996:184) observes, it is within psychoanalysis that 'the body' is constituted as a 'bounded envelope that can be revealed to contain within it a depth, and a set of lawlike operations'.

1:7 Confession, Bourgeois Sexuality and Psychoanalysis

... our society has equipped itself with a scientia sexualis. To be more precise, it has pursued the task of producing true discourses concerning sex, and this by adapting - not without difficulty - the ancient procedure of confession to the rules of scientific discourse. (Foucault 1979a:67-68 original italics)

Foucault's (1979a) analytics leads him to assert that since the confession became one of the Western world's most highly valued techniques for producing truth, we have become 'a singularly confessing society' (1979a:59). Whether we confess or are forced to confess, we have all become 'confessing animals'. Foucault (1979a:59) argues that the effects of confession have been widely spread, playing a part in 'justice, medicine, education, family relationships, and love relations, in the most ordinary affairs of everyday life'. We confess our crimes, sins, thoughts and desires, illnesses and troubles (Foucault 1979a). We do so in public, for example on confessional TV and in private, for example to a lover or best friend. Since the Christian penance to the present day, the privileged theme of confession has been sex. In his text
"The History of Sexuality, Volume One: An Introduction," Foucault (1979a:61) asks the question '[w]hat if sex in our society, on a scale of several centuries, was something that was placed within an unrelenting system of confession?'

In Chapter Four, we shall see how confession is one of the key rituals deployed in behavioral disciplinary techniques used in laboratories with sex offenders to extract the Truth of 'deviant' sex. Here, I suggest that what behavioral psychology does with sex, when it places the sex offender within its panoptic laboratory space, is precisely to place it within an unrelenting system of confession that has, so far, spanned three decades. The confession, Foucault (1979a:61) argues, is a ritual of discourse in which 'the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement'. This ritual unfolds within 'a power relationship' for one does not confess without the presence of the authority who requires it (Foucault 1979a:62). Further, the truthfulness or accuracy of the confession is guaranteed by the bond, that is, the basic intimacy in discourse between he, or she, who speaks and that which he or she is speaking about (Foucault 1979a). The agency of domination resides in the one who listens, and is constrained from speaking, saying nothing, being the one who questions and is not supposed to know.

The confession has undergone a considerable transformation, in order to become the general standard governing the production of the true discourse on sex. Foucault (1979a) suggests that it remained for a lengthy period of time entrenched in the practice of penance. However, with the rise of Protestantism, the Counter Reformation, eighteenth century pedagogy, and nineteenth century medicine, 'it gradually lost its ritualistic and exclusive localization' (Foucault 1979a:63), spreading out to be employed in different relationships, such as between child and parent, patient and psychiatrist and, in the twentieth century, between incest offender and cognitive-behavioral psychologist. It is within the confession, Foucault (1979a:63) suggests, that for the first time a society has taken upon itself to solicit and hear the imparting of individual pleasures. The keeping of records of people's pleasures first emerged as a practice in the late nineteenth century, when medicine, psychiatry and pedagogy began to solidify the outpourings of confessions, deploying systems of classification that were undertaken by
'experts' such as the psychiatrist Krafft-Ebing. I investigate Krafft-Ebing's contribution to a confessional science and his techniques of classification and inscription that brought into being the sexual pervert in the following chapter. The nineteenth century thus marks the emergence of a complex machinery for producing true discourses on sex, one that connects the ancient injunction of confession to clinical listening methods (Foucault 1979a). It is this deployment, Foucault (1979a:68) suggests, that 'enables something called "sexuality" to embody the truth of sex and its pleasures'.

However, having situated this 'sexuality' at the point of intersection of a technique of confession and a scientific discursivity, certain major mechanisms had to be found for adapting the one to the other (Foucault 1979a). Certain techniques had to be employed in this domain of sexuality that was susceptible to pathological processes that called for therapeutic or normalizing interventions (Foucault 1979a). The following are examples of the confessional techniques that Foucault (1979a) offers as exemplifying the integration of confession into a field of rationality; the same confessional techniques that will be deployed throughout the twentieth century. The first example is of the technique of listening. This technique is deployed through a 'clinical codification of the inducement to speak' (Foucault 1979a:65 original italics). Here the confession is combined with the examination, and the personal history with the deployment of a 'set of decipherable signs and symptoms' (Foucault 1979a:65). The interrogation, the questionnaire, the recollection of memories and hypnosis are all ways of 'reinscribing the procedure of confession in a field of scientifically acceptable observations' (Foucault 1979a:65). It is this technique that was deployed with the men when they first entered the SAIF Program and filled out the Autobiographical Outline and Wilson Fantasy Questionnaire.

The second mechanism Foucault (1979a) describes is the postulation of causality. Here sex is endowed with an 'inexhaustible and polymorphous causal power' (Foucault 1979a:65) and through this principle, justification is found for having to 'tell everything, being able to pose questions about everything' (Foucault 1979a:65). This was the justification that authorized the
requirement that the men confess the details of the sexual abuse of their survivors in the SAIF Introduction module. Foucault also describes the principle of latency said to be intrinsic to sexuality. Here, it is necessary to deploy the technique of confession to extract the truth of sex because the ways of sex are said to be obscure. There is then the method of interpretation, where scientific validation is achieved when truth 'passes through' the person to whom one confesses. This is the method described in the Introduction, as deployed in the Whiteboard Exercise in Victim Empathy, where the men confessed to the facilitators and other group members the Truth of what they did to their victim/survivors.

The final mechanism that Foucault (1979a:67) describes, and the one that is more relevant to this investigation, is the 'medicalization of the effects of confession'. Here the obtaining of a confession and its effects are 'recodified as therapeutic operations' (Foucault 1979a:67), termed the 'psy effect'. This is where a mutation from the category of morality to that of sexuality can be observed, for the sexual domain is no longer accounted for simply by the notions of 'error or sin, excess or transgression' (Foucault 1979a:66). The sexual domain is now placed 'under the rule of the normal and the pathological' (Foucault 1979a:67), that is, within a psychiatric style of reasoning that inscribes the discourse of sexology, articulated by psychiatrists such as Krafft-Ebing, whose voices are authorized by apparatuses such as the university. This style of reasoning that emerges in the late nineteenth century is the subject of investigation in the final section in this chapter, entitled Sexuality, Perversion and Normalization.

Focusing now upon the emergence of bourgeois sexuality, Foucault (1979a) suggests that it was at the end of the eighteenth century when the sexuality of children and adolescents was first problematized and feminine sexuality medicalized in the bourgeois family. It was at this time that a completely new technology of sex emerged, that for the most part escaped the ecclesiastical institution 'without being truly independent of the thematics of sin' (Foucault 1979a:116). Through pedagogy, medicine and economics this completely new technology of sex made sex both a secular concern and a concern of the state.
Sex now became a matter that required 'the social body as a whole, and virtually all of its individuals, to place themselves under surveillance' (Foucault 1979a:116). Expanding along three axes, three privileged areas of this new technology were designated, namely that of:

pedagogy, having as its objective the specific sexuality of children; that of medicine, whose objective was the sexual physiology peculiar to women; and last, that of demography, whose objective was the spontaneous or concerted regulation of births. (Foucault 1979a:116)

Foucault suggests that from that time on, the technology of sex was ordered in relation to the medical institution, the exigency of normality and the problem of life and illness. In this way, 'the flesh was brought down to the level of the organism' (Foucault 1979a:117). However, these techniques were first formed and applied, with the greatest intensity, in the economically privileged and politically dominant classes, in 'the "bourgeois" or "aristocratic" family' (Foucault 1979a:120). However, Foucault (1979a:122) states that 'it seems that the deployment of sexuality was not established as a principle of limitation of the pleasures of others by what had traditionally been called the "ruling classes"'. Rather, this was a challenge taken up by the bourgeoisie, who first tried out the deployment of sexuality on themselves. The bourgeoisie provided itself with:

a body to be cared for, protected, cultivated, and preserved from the many dangers and contacts, to be isolated from others so that it would retain its differential value; and this, by equipping itself with - among other resources - a technology of sex. (Foucault 1979a:123)

From the mid-eighteenth century on, the bourgeoisie was thus occupied in forming a specific body based upon its own sexuality. This body was 'a "class" body with its health, hygiene, descent, and race' (Foucault 1979a:124). The aristocracy had its 'blue blood', but now the 'bourgeoisie's "blood" was its
sex' (Foucault 1979a:124). Sexuality, having first developed on the fringes of familial institutions, gradually became focused on the family. Parents and relatives became the chief agents of the deployment of sexuality, drawing upon the expertise of normalizing agents such as doctors, educators and later, in the nineteenth century, psychiatrists, the bourgeois family becoming the first locus for the psychiatrization of sex (Foucault 1979a).

Returning briefly to the aristocracy, it should be noted that the nobility had also employed methods for making and maintaining its caste distinction. That is, through 'relations of alliance', a term Foucault uses to refer to the system through which the aristocracy asserted the special character of its body in the form of 'blood, that is, in the form of the antiquity of its ancestry and of the value of its alliances' (Foucault 1979a:124 original italics). It was upon the basis of the employment of the system of alliance that the deployment of sexuality was first constructed, commencing in the sixteenth century with the Christian practice of penance, in which people confessed their sins to a priest. The system of alliance was built upon a system of marriage and the fixing and development of kinship ties and the transmission of names and possessions, that tied it to the economy in the role it played in the transmission and circulation of wealth (Foucault 1979a). It was built therefore upon a system of rules defining the permitted and forbidden, the licit and the illicit, thereby placing constraints upon 'sex', which was the basis of these relations. This required a complex knowledge, together with mechanisms of constraint, in order to ensure the continuance of the reproduction of the institution of marriage and kinship systems.

During the sixteenth century, the rules of canon law deployed in the spiritual or canonical courts were centered on the distinction between the lawful and the unlawful. The model of power was essentially juridical, centered on nothing more than the statement of the law and the operation of taboos whereby 'all the modes of domination, submission, and subjugation [were] ultimately reduced to an effect of obedience' (Foucault 1979a:85). But in the second half of the sixteenth century, with the growing application in
seminaries, monasteries, convents and secondary schools of the techniques of self-examination and confession, a movement occurred away from:

the problematic of relations toward a problematic of the 'flesh,' that is, of the body, sensations, the nature of pleasure, the more secret forms of enjoyment or acquiescence. 'Sexuality' was taking shape, born of a technology of power that was originally focused on alliance. (Foucault 1979a:108)

In the seventeenth century there was the gradual policing of statements about sex, and then in the eighteenth century, with the emergence of the notion of the population and that of the family as the privileged instrument for its government, the bourgeois 'family unit' took shape. Here the determining axis now became 'husband-wife' and 'parent-child', as opposed to the parent-parent axis of the aristocratic family (Foucault 1979a). The family unit became both an agency of control and a point of sexual saturation. The bourgeois family was now seen to have as one of its primary functions the provision of the best possible environment within which to raise children. The bourgeois mother, charged with conjugal and parental obligations (Foucault 1979a), became the pivotal link between the basic unit of society and the state, being positioned as the doctor's ally in her role as nurse and protectress (Donzelot 1980). It was at this time, at the end of the eighteenth century, that the sexuality of children and adolescents was first problematized (Foucault 1979a). There was now an intensification of intra-familial relations, mothers being exhorted to be ever vigilant in their surveillance of their children, searching out any manifestation of inappropriate sexual activity (i.e. masturbation) that was at the same time "natural" and "contrary to nature" (Foucault 1979a:104).

The campaign launched against masturbation in the eighteenth century exemplifies the affective intensification of the family space and how the discourses of the deployment of sexuality had the effect of drawing a line between the sexuality of adults and children and of constituting childhood sexuality. Foucault (1980g:120) argues that in all the 'books on pedagogy and child medicine - all the manuals for parents that were published in the
eighteenth century, children's sex was spoken about constantly and in every possible context. Hence, rather than preventing children from having a sexuality, which it might have been argued was the purpose of these discourses, it had the opposite effect, for it was 'din[ned]into parents' heads that their children's sex constituted a fundamental problem in terms of their parental educational responsibilities' (Foucault 1980g:120). At the same time, children came to understand that they had a problem with their relationship to their own body and their own sex (Foucault 1980g). This had the effect of sexually exciting the bodies of children whilst, at the same time, 'fixing the parental gaze and vigilance on the peril of infantile sexuality' (Foucault 1980g:120). The result was:

a sexualising of the infantile body, a sexualising of the bodily relationship between parent and child, a sexualising of the familial domain. (Foucault 1980g:120)

At this time, the sexual activity of masturbation was said to pose 'physical and moral, individual and collective dangers' (Foucault 1979a:104). The sense of danger was informed by one of the tenets of eighteenth - nineteenth century medicine, namely, that precocious sex would eventually result in 'sterility, impotence, frigidity, the inability to experience pleasure, or the deadening of the senses' (Foucault 1979a:153). Children's sex thus became a target of power, where sexuality is conceived in the Foucauldian sense as a positive product of power, as opposed to the argument that power was repressive of sexuality. Hence the argument that Victorian child-raising manuals incited mothers to 'physically restrain little hands in specially designed gloves' (Finch 1993:55) if the 'problem' of masturbation continued. The onanistic bourgeois schoolboy, surrounded by domestic servants, tutors and governnesses, was thought to be in danger of compromising not so much his physical strength as 'his intellectual capacity, his moral fiber, and the obligation to preserve a healthy line of descent for his family and his social class' (Foucault 1979a:121). Within this process of what Foucault (1979a:104 original italics) terms the 'pedagogization of children's sex', educators and doctors combated children's onanism 'like an epidemic that needed to be eradicated' (Foucault
1979a:42), since it was thought to be capable of compromising the whole human race.

The deployment of sexuality required the introduction of a new vocabulary for describing sexual practices (Finch 1993). Bourgeois women, having the responsibility for their children's education and being the link between the family and the medical profession, were the ones who had to learn this new language that emerged out of the medical discourse. This was to provide bourgeois women with a new way of perceiving and speaking about sexuality (Finch 1993). However, even before the sexualization of her children, the bourgeois woman took on her own 'sexuality'. Her feminine body was analyzed as being 'thoroughly saturated with sexuality' (Foucault 1979a:104), thereby integrating her body into medical practices by reason of a pathology intrinsic to it. Foucault (1979a:153) describes this process as the 'hysterization of women'; a process whereby the woman's body was ordered 'wholly in terms of the functions of reproduction ... keeping it in constant agitation through the effects of that very function' (Foucault 1979a:153). This 'hysterization', and a further process that Bland (1981; cited in McNay 1992:31) describes as 'splittings or differentiations', brought into play a new relation between the female body and medical discourse. Bland (1981; cited in McNay 1992:31) argues that women's sexuality now became the object of 'hygienization, of splitting of cleanliness and pleasure'. Sexual pleasure in (bourgeois) women was now seen as perverse and, correspondingly, 'good' women were constituted as 'not passionate [having] no sexual desires' (McNay 1992:31). The assertion that the feminine body had to guarantee the life of children by virtue of a biological/moral responsibility (Foucault 1979a), rendered possible the argument that bourgeois women were fulfilled through their reproductive capacities, for which they tolerated sex but did not 'enjoy' it (Schwartz 1993). Bland argues, therefore, that it was not so much that the bourgeois woman's body was saturated with sexuality, as in Foucault's claim above, but that her body was suffused with 'the wild workings of her reproductive system rather than with wild sexual desire' (Bland 1981; cited in McNay 1992:31). From late eighteenth century through to the early nineteenth century, it continued to be exclusively the sexuality of the bourgeoisie, the middle class that was the
focus of concern. Foucault (1979a) argues that the living conditions of the proletariat show that there was anything but concern for the body and sex of that class. Indeed, it was of little importance whether *those* people lived or died, since their reproduction was something that took care of itself in any case' (Foucault 1979a:126 original italics).

During the course of the eighteenth century, the strange effects of the deployment of sexuality were beginning to be felt, among them the affective intensification of the bourgeois family space. The family now demanded help in reconciling conflicts between sexuality and alliance, broadcasting complaint of its sexual suffering to 'doctors, educators, psychiatrists, priests, and pastors' (Foucault 1979a:111) and all the other experts who would listen. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the family appeared to have become the crystal in the deployment of sexuality, 'it seemed to be the source of a sexuality which it actually only reflected and diffracted' (Foucault 1979a:111). Foucault suggests that the family now engaged in searching out the slightest traces of sexuality, opening itself to examination, wrenching confessions from itself. The deployment of sexuality, that in turn needed the family as the anchor for its discourse, now required the incest prohibition as a *defence* against the expansion and the implications of its discourse (Foucault 1979a).

It was here that psychoanalysis went to work, making it possible to keep the deployment of sexuality coupled to the system of alliance by 'guaranteeing' that one would find the parent-child relationship at the root of everyone's sexuality (Foucault 1979a). It did this by *rediscovering* the law of alliance and the involved workings of marriage and kinship in the Oedipus complex, where incestuous desires and the operation of the incest prohibition were *rediscovered* at the heart of sexuality, as the 'principle of its formation and the key to its intelligibility' (Foucault 1979a:113). It was the incest taboo, taken to be valid for every society and every individual in one form or another, that caused the parent to frustrate the child's desires: psychoanalysis declared that without it sexuality would not be as it was (Bell 1993). Thus the formation of each individual's sexuality was 'tied to her or his familial relationships and the crucial role of both incestuous desires and the incest prohibition within those relationships' (Bell 1993:99). From the direction of conscience to

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psychoanalysis, the deployments of alliance and sexuality were thus involved in what Foucault (1979a) describes as a slow process that had them turning about one another until, with psychoanalysis, sexuality gave body and life to the rules of alliance 'by saturating them with desire' (Foucault 1979a:113).

It is important to note here that Foucault (1979a:109) suggests that the incest prohibition may have been seen as a social universal, a fundamental rule of all rules, because it was found to be a means of self-defense, 'not against an incestuous desire, but against the expansion and the implications of this deployment of sexuality'. Whilst the deployment of sexuality had been set up with many benefits, it had the disadvantage of 'ignoring the laws and juridical forms of alliance' (Foucault 1979a:109). Furthermore, Foucault (1979a:302) states that the 'great interdiction of incest' - expressed as the 'incest prohibition' - was an 'invention of intellectuals', thereby indicating that the universal incest prohibition is a recent creation of certain discourses, such as anthropology and sociology. However, as Bell (1993) points out, there is a certain ambiguity in Foucault's statement. That is, there is ambiguity as to whether or not Foucault is suggesting that the incest taboo used to exist and kinship patterns were adhered to, or whether he meant that this is (merely) the way that the past is spoken about now (Bell 1993). Bell (1993) suggests that Foucault aligns himself with the latter point of view, going on to state herself that however the family used to be linked with incest, 'in discourses of this century [20th century] incest is part of the discourses both "old" and "new", although both are actually contemporary'. In other words, there is a modern way of speaking about incest which 'suggests that at all times past and present there has been a universal incest prohibition' (Bell 1993:98 original italics). Bell (1993:13) therefore suggests that the incest taboo 'exists "only" as a discursive rule'.

Foucault (1979a:83) argues that this prohibition is exercised as a straightforward example of what he terms juridico-discursive power in which, '[w]here sex and pleasure are concerned, power can "do" nothing but say no to them'. It is here, Foucault (1979a:83) argues, that we see the 'insistence of the rule', by which he means 'first of all that sex is placed by power in a binary system: licit and illicit, permitted and forbidden...[a]nd finally, power acts by
laying down the rule'. The theme of such an approach is that power represses sex, being a power 'whose model is essentially juridical, centred on nothing more than the statement of the law and the operation of taboos' (Foucault 1979a:85). It is this negative instruction, 'thou shalt not', Foucault (1979a) suggests, that is fundamental to the deployment of alliance and the maintenance of family roles and the rule of exogamy.

Foucault (1979a:89) claims that we have been engaged for centuries in 'a type of society in which the juridical is increasingly incapable of coding power'. The operation of new methods of power are no longer ensured by right but by technique, 'not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus' (Foucault 1979a:89). The expanding production of discourses on sex is immersed in this field of multiple and mobile power relations. So, on the one hand, there are ways of speaking about incest as an act that is prohibited within a system of kinship ties and blood relationships, namely the system of alliance that, in turn, forbids incest within the intimate family space. On the other hand, there are those who speak of incest within a context of desire and bodily pleasure, namely the deployment of sexuality, as we have seen above in the example of the talk about the dangers of childhood sexual activity. All this talk surrounding the family as a place where sexuality develops and expresses itself incites further talk, 'including talk about incest, i.e. as a social problem, a potential social danger' (Bell 1993:95). This interpenetration of the deployment of alliance and that of sexuality in the form of the family allows us, Foucault (1979a:108) states, to understand a number of facts that explain why 'sexuality is "incestuous" from the start' (Foucault 1979a:108).

First, Foucault (1979a) suggests that since the eighteenth century sexuality has had its privileged point of development in the family, because it was this site that became an obligatory locus of affects, feelings and love. Secondly, incest occupies a central place, constantly being solicited and refused, an object of obsession and attraction, 'a dreadful secret and an indispensable pivot' (Foucault 1979a:109) in a society such as ours, where the family is the most
active site of sexuality, and it is the demands that result from this that prolong its existence. Further, whilst manifest as being strictly forbidden in the family insofar as the latter functions as a deployment of alliance, 'it is also a thing continuously demanded in order for the family to be a hotbed of constant sexual incitement' (Foucault 1979a:109). Bell (1993:96) suggests that Foucault is arguing here that 'incest is actually incited by the operation of the deployment of sexuality'. Bell (1993:96 original italics) goes further, arguing that when Foucault suggests that the deployment of sexuality incites incest, it seems that he was not merely referring to talk about the practice of incest, 'but that the discourses on sexuality that converged around the family incited the actual practice of incest'.

In the late nineteenth century however, it was the task of psychoanalysis to relieve the effects of the incest taboo where its rigor made it pathogenic (Foucault 1979a). Psychoanalysis was reserved strictly for the middle class, the bourgeoisie, in whom the repression was held to be so deep that it was a source of danger to them (Bell 1993). These dangers would be alleviated 'by freeing sex, allowing sex to speak' (Bell 1993:99), by telling the truth of its truth and allowing the analysand to tell the deeply buried truth of that truth about themselves. For the working class, on the other hand, it was held that there was no repression for the incestuous desires of that class were acted upon. In the case of the working class, therefore, what was required was the regulation of their sexual behavior by the middle class. The place of incest in psychoanalysis therefore functioned as a point of differentiation between social classes' (Bell 1993:99). There was a systematic campaign to hunt out incestuous practices in rural areas and certain urban quarters 'inaccessible to psychiatry' (Foucault 1979a:129). Children identified as being 'endangered' minors were now removed from families where it was suspected that incest was being practised 'through lack of space, dubious proximity, a history of debauchery, antisocial "primitiveness", or degenerescence' (Foucault 1979a:129). Hence Foucault's (1979a:129) argument that social differentiation would be affirmed 'not by the "sexual" quality of the body, but by the intensity of its repression' (Foucault 1979a:129). Herein lies the significance of psychoanalysis, for it emerged at this juncture not only as a
theory of the essential inter-relatedness of the law and desire (Foucault 1979a), but also as a technique for relieving the 'pathogenic' effects of the taboo within a privileged class, the bourgeoisie or middle class.

It was the mid-nineteenth century that marked the emergence of the surveillance of the body and sexuality finally conceded to the working class. Around the 1830s, the organization of the 'conventional' family came to be regarded as 'an indispensable instrument of political control and economic regulation for the subjugation of the urban proletariat' (Foucault 1979a:122). This was the time of what Foucault (1979a) terms a great campaign for the moralization of the poorer classes. There were also certain other requirements necessary for the proletariat to be granted a body and sexuality at this time. First, conflicts, in particular over urban space, cohabitation, epidemics and so forth (Foucault 1979a). Secondly, the emergence of economic demands, such as the need for a stable and competent labor force for the development of heavy industry (Foucault 1979a). Finally, the need for schooling, public hygiene, institutions of relief and insurance and so forth, required in order to keep the body and sexuality finally conceded to the working class, the exploited class, under surveillance (Foucault 1979a).

1:8 Policing Working Class Sexuality

From the middle of the nineteenth century a series of social surveys into the urban poor, informed by the avalanche of printed numbers described above, and accompanied by a series of Royal Commissions, heralded a newly acquired interest in the birth and survival rate among the proletariat. Maternal mortality, for example, was now perceived as a national tragedy and infant death was re-conceptualized as the loss of a potentially useful citizen in what was now identified as the 'working class' (Finch 1993:32). Hence the necessity for the 'fostering of life' and all that that entailed in the new regime of bio-power.

One of the major strategies deployed in the new regime is what Foucault (1979a:104 original italics) terms the 'socialization of procreative behavior'.
Taking Great Britain as an example, throughout the nineteenth century it was believed that the 'art of fooling nature' (i.e. birth-control practices, for example 'coitus interruptus') was a serious threat to national security. This was due to what was believed to be a decrease in the population of Britain and its colonies (Finch 1993). At this time, Britain believed that its national greatness rested in a thriving population, and that the British birth rate was being overtaken by the prolific breeding of the French (Finch 1993). Hence the significance of the perceived decrease in population. Both reproductive and 'birth-control' practices thus became the 'legitimate' concern of science, 'allowing the same sort of detailed intervention into the family unit as the church had once enjoyed' (Foucault 1979a:105). Couples were now held to be responsible to the social body as a whole, social and fiscal measures were brought to bear on their fertility and a medical socialization took place by 'attributing a pathogenic value - for the individual and the species - to birth-control practices' (Foucault 1980g). 'Sex' was now located at the intersection of the discipline of the body and the control of the population, hence its political significance (Foucault 1980g).

The bourgeoisie, or middle class, were now preoccupied with the living space of the urban working class, being primarily concerned with the perceived 'immoral' implications of cramped conditions in urban slums (Finch 1991). Overcrowding was implicated insofar as it was thought to create conditions of enforced immorality, hence the need to reform working class domestic geography. 'Middle class mappers' (Finch 1991:17) argued that where families lived in tiny spaces and children were forced to sleep in the same room as their parents, the moral effect upon the children of the working class was 'extremely detrimental' (Finch 1993:58). Failure to privatize the bedroom or to provide an individual bed for each member of the family - thus preserving the privacy of the conjugal bed via spatial as opposed to moral boundaries - was regarded as evidence of personal failure. Finch (1993) argues that overcrowding was therefore used as an explanation for the alleged failure of the working class to adhere to middle class sexual practices.

In 1861, Lord Shaftesbury reported to the House of Lords that:
It is impossible, my Lords, to exaggerate the physical and moral evils that result from this state of things [in London slums] ... I would not for all the world mention all the details of what I have heard, or ... seen ... But there are ... grown-up sons sleeping with their mothers, brothers, and sisters, sleeping very often, not in the same apartment only, but in the same bed. My Lords, I am stating that which I know to be the truth ... when I state that incestuous crime is frightfully common in various parts of this Metropolis ... (Lord Shaftesbury; cited in Twitchell 1987:140)

In 1881, the House of Lords heard further evidence regarding incest amongst the working class from the Select Committee on Law Relating to the Protection of Young Girls. It was stated that at some levels of the working class the pattern of incest was so deeply entrenched in social behavior that it 'crossed several generations' (Finch 1991:24). Finch (1991) states that in 1882 the Reverend John Horsley, Chaplain of Clerkenwell Prison, gave evidence to the House of Lords report on the same topic. The Reverend stated that it was his practice to inquire into every case of offender in the prison whose crime was incest and almost invariably he found the incest was due to overcrowding (Finch 1991).

In 1885, the Criminal Law Amendment Act was passed in order to make further provision for the protection of women and girls than had the groundbreaking Offences Against the Persons Act 1828. The earlier Act provided that every person convicted of rape should suffer 'death as a Felon' (Rayner 1991:36). For the crimes of buggery and unlawfully and carnally knowing and abusing any girl under the age of ten the sentence was also death as a felon. The crime of unlawfully and carnally knowing and abusing any girl 'about' the age of ten and 'under' the age of twelve was that of a Misdemeanor, and the sentence was imprisonment with or without hard labor (Rayner 1991). However, the reason the earlier Offences Against the Persons Act 1828 was groundbreaking legislation was because it did away with the requirement to prove the actual emission of seed in order to constitute carnal
knowledge, deeming the felonies 'complete upon the Proof of Penetration only' (Race 1997:32). Since 1577, two proofs had been required in order to gain a conviction concerning crimes of rape, buggery and carnal knowledge, namely, penetration and emission (Race 1997). This was because all three crimes contravened religious teachings regarding non-procreative sex, hence the necessity for dual proof (Race 1997). In other words, as Race (1997:32) points out, it was the non-procreational emission of semen that was deemed 'elemental to contravening biblical law'. In addition, rape could contravene canonical law against adultery. The Offences Against the Person Act was therefore the site at which the law shifted from an emphasis upon the sinfulness of the act (i.e. in the spilling of the seed or adultery) to an emphasis upon the moral offensiveness of the act. It was no longer procreation within marriage that was being protected, but the body of the individual (citizen) as a member of the social body (Race 1997). It was not canonical law that was being upheld, concerning sins of the flesh articulated within the category of morality, but secular, normative standards of behavior deploying a sexuality articulated within a new technology of sex. In commenting on the legislation, Race (1997:32 original italics) quotes the Home Secretary, Robert Peel, as stating that 'it was not necessary to a capital conviction to prove more than that which constituted the moral offence'.

The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 further entrenched this shift in English jurisprudence. This Act, subtitled 'An Act to make further provision for the Protection of Women and Girls, the suppression of brothels, and other purposes' (Race 1997:32), further established middle class norms, so that:

in the words of Secretary of State, Sir R. Assheton-Cross - 'the purity of households in this country shall be maintained and ... those who wish to violate them shall be punished.'

(Race 1997:32)

Apart from raising the age of consent for girls from thirteen to sixteen, the Act also allowed for police regulation of brothels. Hence brothels came under the surveillance of the police network. Sex was now a police matter. The Act
also did away with the crime of buggery, a type of sexual relation, recodifying it as 'any act of gross indecency with another male person...' (Race 1997:32). What was involved now was a certain quality of sexual sensibility, 'a certain way of inverting the masculine and the feminine in oneself' (Foucault 1979a:43). The sodomite that had been a 'temporary aberration' (Foucault 1979a:43) now became a *homosexual*, a new kind of person. Here it is the discourse of sexology that intersects with the law, informing it with its vocabularies of *perversity* (a product of vice) and *perversion* (a psychopathological condition) and *homosexuality*, the term having been invented in the 1860s.

It was therefore in the latter part of the nineteenth century that 'abnormalities' became the object of a system of psychiatric knowledge that had its own very particular style of reasoning and argumentation. The emergence of this new *psychiatric* style of reasoning opened up the conceptual space for 'sexuality' to become a possible object of psychological investigation and clinical knowledge (Davidson 1987). It was this new style of reasoning and the discourse of sexology, to be investigated in the following chapter, that created the possibility for the appearance of entirely new kinds of sexual diseases and disorders within what was now a 'normalizing' society.

1:9  Sexuality, Perversion and Normalization

Davidson (1987) nominates the second half of the nineteenth century as the period when this new style of psychiatric reasoning emerged. It was a period during which rules for the production of true discourse about *sexuality* 'changed radically' (Davidson 1987:21), for it was the period of the opening up of the great medico-psychological domain of the 'perversions' (Foucault 1979a). This new style of reasoning, which bears such an intimate connection to the emergence of sexuality, no longer linked sexual identity exclusively to the anatomical structure of the 'internal and external genital organs' (Davidson 1987:21). This had been the reasoning of an *anatomical* style which, in taking sex as its object of investigation, had concerned itself with 'diseases of structural abnormality, with pathological changes that resulted from some
macroscopic or microscopic anatomical change' (Davidson 1987:22). This style of reasoning is exemplified in classifications of hermaphroditism since, by the nineteenth century, classifications of the hermaphrodite's true sex were based upon anatomical facts (Davidson 1987). On the other hand, within the psychiatric style of reasoning a whole new set of concepts were 'identified', such as 'impulses, tastes, aptitudes, satisfactions, and psychic traits' (Davidson 1987:22). Hence Davidson's (1987) argument that our current medical concept of sex reassignment would have been unintelligible or incoherent within an anatomical style of reasoning that linked sexual identity exclusively to the anatomical structure of sexual organs. This leads Davidson (1987) to conclude that it is impossible to write a unified history that passes from hermaphroditism to homosexuality, since the hermaphrodite and the homosexual are 'as different as the genitalia and the psyche'. In other words, Davidson is arguing that there is not a 'smooth transition' from one style of reasoning to the other, rather there was a mutation in a technology of sex. The critical point here is that the sex of the hermaphrodite is concerned with biology. On the other hand 'sexuality' is linked to psychology and hence there can be no such thing as 'sexuality', as we understand it, outside of the psychiatric style of reasoning. Indeed, the word 'sexuality', with our current conceptualization of it, did not appear, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, until the late nineteenth century (Davidson 1987). As Davidson (1987:23) points out, without this style of reasoning, 'we would be forever talking about sex'.

Davidson (1987) also argues that it is equally crucial to separate categories of sexuality from older moral categories. This is because to argue that these older categories such as 'lusts' were merely 'taken up' within the new psychiatric style of reasoning is to blur the boundaries, leading to a conceptual lack of differentiation. Davidson (1987:37) warns that this results in 'the historiographical infection that the great French historian of science Georges Canguilhem has called the "virus of the precursor"'. When we insist on perpetually looking for precursors to our categories of sexuality in essentially different domains, then we produce 'anachronisms at best and unintelligibility at worst' (Davidson 1987:37). We see examples of this type of confusion in
the media when a sex offender is described in the same article as a 'paedophile' (Taylor 1998:28), taken from the category of sexuality, and as an [evil] 'monster' (Taylor 1998:28), taken from the category of morality. Davidson (1987) argues that lusts reside within the domain of transgression and sins of the flesh, and belong to the categories of morality. Chastity and virginity are further examples of moral categories 'denoting a relation between the will and flesh' (Davidson 1987:37). Davidson (1987:37-38) points out that 'even Aquinas' discussion of the parts or species of lust in part 2.2, question 154 of the Summa Theologica ought not to be assimilated to a discussion of sexuality'. Hence, Davidson (1987) cautions us not to suppose that in nineteenth century psychiatry moral deviation was simply transformed into disease.

With the emergence of the new style of psychiatric reasoning, in which the sexual instinct was isolated as a separate biological and psychological instinct, there emerged entirely new kinds of sexual diseases and disorders. For example, perversion was now conceptualized as a kind of deviation or disease category. Davidson (1987:41) argues that prior to the psychiatric style of reasoning the medical concept of perversion did not exist, leading him to assert that there were therefore 'no perverts before the existence of this concept'. Previously, in the tradition of philosophy and theology that dealt with the nature and kinds of lust, the theological concept of perversion described evil acts of the will. Hence it was the will that was perversely affected when it failed to adhere to God, when it defected from the immutable to mutable good. Therefore perversion was not intrinsically connected with lust, but described any act of the will that was contrary to God and so contrary to nature (Davidson 1987). Hence the significance of Davidson's (1987:45) argument that even when Aquinas attempted to distinguish kinds of lust it was clear that distinct species of lust did not map onto distinct kinds of individuals. As Davidson (1987:45) states, we are all subject to all kinds of lust but 'the principle by which we distinguish lusts from one another does not permit us to distinguish different types of people from one another'. Hence the significance of the point above that the sodomite (i.e. the person who practised the act of

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sodomy, the sin of Sodom) had been a temporary aberration, whereas the *
*homosexual* is a new kind of person.

By the late nineteenth century in the Western world, a veritable proliferation
of sexualities occurred within what was now a 'normalizing society' (Foucault
1979a:144), being the historical outcome of a technology of power now
centered on life, a power that had to:

qualify, measure, appraise and hierarchize, rather than display
itself in its murderous splendor; it does not have to draw the line
that separates the enemies of the sovereign from his obedient
subjects; it effects distributions around the norm. (Foucault
1979a:144)

An essential component of technologies of normalization is the key role they
play in the 'systematic creation, classification, and control of "anomalies" in
the social body' (Rabinow 1984:21). Rabinow (1984:21) argues, following
Foucault, that first, certain technologies serve to isolate anomalies and second,
that one can then 'normalize anomalies through corrective or therapeutic
procedures, determined by other related technologies'. The 'norm' thus
becomes inseparable from concepts of normativity and normalization, and the
specification of a norm is inseparable from 'the specification of natural and
technical operations which effect or correct this normativity' (Gordon
1980:250). Further, with the conceptualization of the norm, abnormalities
come to be understood as effects of a human or social pathogenic 'which is as
natural as the norm itself and hence the object of a complementary form of
knowledge' (Gordon 1980:249-50). The entry of medicine, psychiatry and
some social sciences into legal deliberations leads in the direction of a
systematic *normalization* of the law and an 'increasing appeal to statistical
measures and judgements about what is normal and what is not in a given
population' (Rabinow 1984:21). The judicial institution is thus increasingly
incorporated into a continuum of medical and administrative apparatuses
whose functions are for the most part regulatory (Foucault 1979a). Such is the
function of psychiatry, as it deploys its psychiatric style of reasoning in a
whole new arena now opened up 'for the detailed chronicling and regulation of individual life' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:172) in a society that now has a 'sexuality'. Prohibited acts are turned into 'symptoms of a signifying mix of biology and action' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:173) and all behavior can now be classified along a scale of normalization and pathologization of this 'mysterious sexual instinct' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:173).

IN SUMMARY

In the above investigation my concern has been with how certain aspects of human being have been rendered problematic and by whom. I commenced with an investigation of how Marshall et al. mobilized themselves as agents of authority and, together with knowledges and truth claims of cognitive-behavioral psychology, rendered problematic certain aspects of the behaviors of human beings who had come to be recognized as 'sexual deviants'. Furthermore, my purpose in providing this brief introduction to the Field of Sex Offender Treatment was to situate the reader in the present, the historical moment of departure for this investigation.

My investigation then focused on the emergence of 'governmentality' and biopower, and the shift in disciplinary power now exercised over bodies via surveillance. This genealogical investigation also focused upon the ways in which human being has been thought through the problemization of different aspects of its conduct. For example, there was the eighteenth century problemization of 'lack of fit' between people trained as peasants and the new requirements of persons to be deployed as workers in a system. There was also the problemization of birth control practices as they related to British national security, and the problemization of the 'moral tenor' of the population that necessitated the requirement for statistics on crime rates. It was problemizations such as these that necessitated the mobilization of inspectors, agents of statistical data collection, authorized to deploy techniques of investigation, documentation, calculation, etc. It was from this cascade of figures that 'tables were compiled, charts drawn up, rates calculated, trends noted, averages compared, changes over time discovered' (Rose 1996:73-4).
Statistical tools and methods then came to play an increasingly constitutive role in the construction of psychological regimes of truth (Rose 1996) and the construction of categories and identities of human being.

I also investigated the problemization of 'sex' and different aspects of first bourgeois and then working class sexuality that, in turn, necessitated the mobilization of agents of 'expertise', such as doctors, educators, psychiatrists and psychoanalysts. These problemizations of thought entailed, in turn, systems of judgement, such as those that informed the notion that the practice of masturbation was capable of compromising the whole human race, or that the rampant practice of incest amongst the working class was the result of overcrowding. It was in the identification and management of these 'problems', in seeking to reform or cure them that elaborate theories and norms of behavior and thought were constituted. A range of human technologies were deployed, for the political control and economic regulation of the urban working class. Strategies of regulation were deployed, to include discipline, surveillance, confession, and policing in response to certain concerns. The concerns included, for example, the dangers of infantile sexuality, the pathogenic effects of the severity of the repression of incestuous desire within the middle class, and the problem of working class 'degenerescence' and 'immorality'. In order to achieve certain objectives, agents of social authority were mobilized including urban reformers, politicians, prison administrators, doctors, psychiatrists and psychoanalysts.

Finally, I undertook a preliminary investigation of perversion by focusing on the shift from an anatomical to a new psychiatric style of reasoning, tentatively investigating links created between psychiatry, sexuality and the government of subjectivity. It is these linkages that I investigate in more depth in the following chapter, commencing in the nineteenth century with the emergence of psychiatry as a discipline.
CHAPTER THREE
RENDERING BEING THINKABLE
AND
BATTLES OVER TRUTH CLAIMS

1. MAPPING THE TERRITORY

In this chapter, I explore and analyze the emergence of a range of discourses, including psychiatry, criminal anthropology, sexology, psychoanalysis and psychology, and a diversity of modern manifestations of historical existence, such as social order and public hygiene, risk management and new specifications of individuals. I argue that it was these emergences, and the accidental beginnings that gave birth to them, that created the possibility for a particular conflict to arise in the 1960s, early 1970s, between the two power blocks of psychology and psychiatry. At the center of this conflict was the body of the sex offender and the shifting of responsibility for his treatment. Had it not been for this conflict, and the struggle between these two forces, the Field of Sex Offender Treatment would not have emerged as it did in the 1970s. These are therefore critical emergences for us to investigate in order to gain an historical awareness of present circumstances in the field. However, before commencing this investigation, I first offer the reader a brief overview of the territory to be explored.

In The Construction of Recognition, I explore the emergence of the discipline of psychiatry. Here, my investigation is concerned with psychiatry's task of defining its specificity in the field of medicine (Foucault 1988c). This task first necessitated that psychiatry become a function of social order (Foucault 1988a), protecting society from the dangers inherent in the social body, such as the dangers hidden in human behavior (Foucault 1988c). Homicidal mania was constituted as just such a danger, an 'insanity' that was remarkable in the way that it remained invisible until it exploded. Hence, what was required to spot it, was the trained eye of the experienced psychiatrist (Foucault 1988c). However, in the latter half of the nineteenth century psychiatry abandoned the
notion of monomania, whilst at the same time there was an increased interaction between psychiatry and the judicial institution as criminality came to be seen in both judicial and medical terms. It is at this point, in A Dangerous State and Risk, that I investigate the discourse of criminal anthropology and the emergence of the notion of the dangerousness of certain beings and the notion of risk management. It was the establishment of a relation between these two notions that marked a point of connection for the discourses of criminal anthropology, psychiatry and the judicial institution. Once again psychiatrists, and also criminologists, argued that it was their knowledges and skills that were required in order to assess the criminality of individuals, made thinkable as having a level of dangerousness that only they, the experts, could recognize and judge. Further, they alone could recognize and judge the risk of the dangerous criminal's potential or future behavior, a risk that had to be addressed in order to protect a society now under threat. Similar knowledges and skills will be demanded of twentieth century psychologists when asked the question 'is he dangerous?' in relation to the 'sex offender'. Whilst still in the latter part of the nineteenth century, in The Biological Instinct and Sexual Anomalies, I investigate the discourse of sexology. Here we pick up the threads of the argument commenced in the previous chapter in relation to the psychiatric style of reasoning. It was the discourse of sexology that provided the language and vocabularies and techniques of inscription that enabled confessions to be transformed into classifications of a new specification of individuals, now 'thinkable' within a new style of reasoning. Having investigated the emergence of the domain of the 'perversions', in Psychiatric, Psychoanalytic Encounters we move into the twentieth century, re-entering the territory of psychiatry when it finally shifted beyond the confines of the asylum. It was in the first half of the twentieth century that the emergence of the encounter between psychiatry, with its notion of gross insanity and theory of hereditary degeneracy, and psychoanalysis, with its dynamic conception of psychological processes, occurred. In the latter 1930s, this encounter would reach a point of convergence with United States legislation in the form of sexual psychopath statutes. Reports in the literature in the 1960s and 1970s confirm that psychodynamic approaches to therapy were deployed in work with some sex
offenders, including incest offenders, in both individual and small group settings situated in court clinics, houses of correction and 'special hospitals'. The goal of such work was to 'treat' and 'cure' mandated sex offenders. However, as we see in Discipling the Urge, some psychiatrists preferred to 'treat' sex offenders by deploying an essentialising sexuality in which sex was said to reside within the body as a biological instinct that, in the case of sex offenders, was 'out-of-control'. The problemization of the sex offenders' sexuality in terms of 'out-of-control' sex drives fueled by the hormone testosterone, authorized the deployment of techniques of surgical and medical castration and stereotactic neurosurgery, in order to reduce deviant sexual arousal. This investigation takes us through to the 1960s/1970s where we leave the territory of psychiatry. In Emergence, we enter the domain of psychology, the discipline that expanded after World War II. The expansion of the discipline of psychology contributed, in turn, towards opening up the possibility for the emergence of the domain of the modification of pathological behavior in the 1950s. It is this domain, with its experimental laboratories and techniques of precise measurement and manipulation of behaviors, that is the subject of investigation in Reshaping Behavior. Behavioral psychology subsequently competed with the hegemony of psychiatry and psychoanalysis in the psychopathology market, thereby opening up the possibility for it to enter into a struggle with psychiatry for the body of the sex offender and responsibility for his treatment.

2. PSYCHIATRY

2:1 The Construction of Recognition

Why did doctors want so badly to describe as insane, and thus to claim, people whose status as mere criminals had up to that point been unquestioned? (Foucault 1988c:133)

Psychiatry became an autonomous discipline at the beginning of the nineteenth century, or rather at the turn of the century, having previously been an 'aspect' rather than a field of medicine. From the outset, the project of
psychiatry was to be a 'function of social order' (Foucault 1988a:180) and this required that it gain recognition for itself as a component of public hygiene. Since the eighteenth century, it had been the doctor who had been authorized as advisor and expert in the observation, correction and improvement of the social 'body' and its maintenance in a permanent state of health (Foucault 1980d). Here, the emergence of the population, the organization of the family as a relay in a process of medicalization, and the imbrication of the medical and the administrative had come together in the control of collective hygiene (Foucault 1980d). The social body thus became intelligible as such, and became an object for systematic investigation (Minson 1985), thereby inaugurating a huge labor of inquiry to transform events such as births, deaths, illnesses, marriages and divorces and phenomena such as levels of income, types of diets and so forth into information. Reality was rendered into a form in which it could be calculated, debated and diagnosed (Rose and Miller 1992), as it related to problems of demography, housing conditions, longevity, fertility, public health and hygiene. Hence Foucault's (1980d) observation that it was the doctor's function as hygienist, rather than as therapist, that assured a politically privileged position. This would in turn lead to economic and social privileges in the nineteenth century for those agents authorized to intervene into the health, hygiene and normality of the population. The medico-administrative knowledge that grew out of the eighteenth century program of eugenics and the great medical inquiries into the health of the population thus had direct links to the constitution of the medico-legal apparatus. What the newly formed discipline of psychiatry required therefore, in order to constitute a place for itself as a component of public hygiene, was a danger to combat that was comparable with that of 'an epidemic, a lack of hygiene, or suchlike' (Foucault 1980a:205).

Foucault's (1980a) understanding of the strategies deployed by psychiatry in order to establish its basis is useful here. He suggests that it was homicidal mania that was constructed as just such a danger, being diagnosed as an extreme case of madness that could suddenly explode into a monstrous crime that was unforeseeable except to the trained eye of the expert, namely the psychiatrist:
Only a doctor can spot it, and thus madness becomes exclusively an object for the doctor, whose right to intervention is grounded by the same token. (Foucault 1980a:205)

Henceforth, the punitive machine of the prison could only function effectively if it operated at the level of the *individual*, 'the criminal and not the crime, so as to transform and reform him' (Foucault 1980a:205). But this now implied that the person to be punished had to be *known*. The reader will no doubt recall that the beginnings of such knowledge claims emerged with the practice of getting some prisoners to write down their memoirs, some of which were subsequently included in reports published in the *Annales d'hygiène publique et de médecine légale*, first published in 1829. Magistrates were thus 'forced to make room for the psychiatrists' (Foucault 1980a:206) and psychiatry became important because it instituted a new medical technology in the treatment of mental disorders, thus enabling the judicial apparatus to police public hygiene through the treatment of such disorders.

The psychiatrist now became a specialist in motivation, having to evaluate not only the subject's reason, but also the rationality of the act, 'the whole system of relationships which link the act to the interests, the plans, the character, the inclinations, and the habits of the subject' (Foucault 1988c:138-39). In summary, therefore, Foucault suggests that the intervention of psychiatric medicine into the penal system that started in the nineteenth century can be seen to be the regulation of two phenomena, the first being the functioning of medicine as a public hygiene. The second was the functioning of legal punishment as a technique for *transforming* the individual. These two new demands were both bound up with the control of the social body through the transformation of mechanisms of power. The monstrous crime of homicidal mania thus became the meeting point, or a point of convergence, of the medical demonstration that insanity was ultimately always dangerous, and of the court's inability to determine the punishment of a crime without having first determined 'the motives for the crime' (Foucault 1988c:139 my italics). Hence Foucault's (1988c:140) suggestion that the theme of the dangerous man was inscribed in the institutions of both psychiatry and justice, and the more
psychologically determined an act was found to be, the more its author could be considered 'legally responsible'. Increasingly, Foucault (1988c:140) argues, pathological stigmata which might mark dangerous individuals, such as 'moral insanity, instinctive insanity, and degeneration', were sought out by nineteenth century psychiatry.

However, shortly before 1870 the notion of monomania was abandoned within the discipline of psychiatry. Following Foucault's (1988c) argument, there are two reasons for this move. The first was the abandonment of the essentially negative idea of a partial insanity that bears on only one point and is unleashed only at certain moments. This was replaced by the idea that a mental illness was not necessarily an affliction of thought or of consciousness, but that it might 'attack the emotions, the instincts, spontaneous behavior, leaving the forms of thought virtually intact' (Foucault 1988c:141). Foucault suggests that the second reason for the abandonment of monomania was the idea of degeneration, and the notion that mental illness had a complex evolution that might present different symptoms at different stages in life, involving not only the individual but, possibly, even several generations. Hence Foucault's argument that:

[w]hat was called moral insanity, instinctive insanity, aberration of the instincts, and finally perversion, corresponds to this elaboration, whose favored example since about the 1840s has been the deviations in sexual conduct. (Foucault 1988c:141)

Henceforth, whether it be a crime against property or a crime of sexuality 'in every case one might suspect a more or less serious perturbation of instincts or the stages in an uninterrupted process' (Foucault 1988c:141). The inter-weaving of the fabrication of sexuality and the segregation of madness within the vast technology of the psyche thus made it possible to adopt the same modalities for dealing with both (Foucault 1980c). It now became possible to pose questions in medical terms at any level of the penal system. This led in turn to a gradual shaping of the notion of the 'dangerous individual', as, increasingly, madness and criminality came to represent the threat posed to the
community by a marginal, excluded, outcast sector (Rose 1999). It is the shaping of this notion that is the subject of investigation in the following section, where the management of dangerous persons is linked with shifts in the conception and valuation of both normality and civility.

2:2 A Dangerous State and Risk

Prior to the emergence of capitalist economies, wealth was in the hands of the governing elite. However, with the emergence of capitalism, there was a requirement for raw materials and means of production to be physically entrusted into the hands of members of the 'populace'. Hence, in this industrial society, now that wealth had to be protected, a closer surveillance of the everyday lives of domestic populations was initiated in order to regulate the criminal or delinquent, as well as the mad. It was now perceived as absolutely necessary to constitute the populace as a 'moral subject and to break its commerce with criminality' (Foucault 1980e:41). The perception of the growing problem of social disorder encouraged expenditure on institutional solutions 'with pretensions to re-education as well as repression' (Walton 1985). At the same time, a formidable layer of moralization was instigated and deposited on the nineteenth century population, exemplified, as Foucault (1988c) suggests, in the immense campaigns to christianize the workers during this period. These campaigns, as briefly discussed at the conclusion of the last chapter, necessitated that delinquents be shown to be dangerous to both rich and poor alike (Foucault 1980e).

From the 1820s onwards, it will be recalled from the previous chapter, the police gazettes in Paris released statistics on crime, insanity, prostitution, vagabondage and so forth, and in England reports were churned out on the poor and the criminal in the Blue Books. From the 1860s to the 1890s prostitution, the moral standard of society, and moral reform were at the heart of public debate, many seeing this as a time of 'moral decay' and a sign of 'impending imperial decline' (Weeks 1986:35). At the same time, a literature of criminality developed, that included horrific newspaper crime stories and detective novels, thus affirming criminality as a constant menace to the social
body. The collective fear of crime and obsession with its danger, which seemed to be an inseparable part of society itself, thus became 'perpetually inscribed in each individual consciousness' (Foucault 1988c:142). This literature converged in turn with the intensive development of the police network, a network that first emerged in the eighteenth century as 'the ensemble of mechanisms serving to ensure order, the properly channeled growth of wealth and the conditions of preservation of health "in general"' (Foucault 1980d:170). It was the police force that assured urban supplies, hygiene, health, and the necessary standards for handicrafts and commerce as well as the maintenance of law and order (Foucault 1982). The intensive development of this network in the nineteenth century led to a new mapping and closer surveillance of urban space.

However, with the strong social and political demand for both a reaction to and a suppression of crime, now that criminality was thought of in judicial and medical terms, the judicial notion of 'legal responsibility' seemed an utterly inadequate conceptualization (Foucault 1988c). Foucault (1988c) suggests that around the 1890s these inadequacies, at both a conceptual and institutional level, were highlighted in a conflict that arose between the school of Criminal Anthropology and the International Association of Penal Law. In attempting to cope with the traditional principles of criminal legislation, the Italian School (the Criminal Anthropologists) called for an approach that involved nothing less than a putting aside of legality, a move that Foucault (1988c) suggests represented a true depenalization of crime. This approach would, in turn, require the setting up of an apparatus of an entirely different type from the one 'provided for by the Codes' (Foucault 1988c:143). The Criminal Anthropologists of the Italian School proposed totally abandoning the judicial notion of responsibility and instead of posing the degree of freedom of the individual as the fundamental question, it was the level of danger an individual represented for society that became the key question (Foucault 1988c). Furthermore, criminal anthropologists noted that the accused, who was the most seriously and immediately dangerous, was precisely he whom the law recognized as not responsible, because he was 'ill, insane, a victim of irresistible impulsed (sic)' (Foucault 1988c:143).
In Italy, the development of criminal anthropology up until the 1890s was deeply influenced by the theories and practices of the psychiatrist and criminal anthropologist Cesare Lombroso. In the first edition of his book L'uomo delinquente, Lombroso gave descriptions of the 'anatomical, physical, and psychological stigmata that supposedly set criminals apart from the rest of humanity' (Schwartz 1993:163). Lombroso grounded his authority in both knowledge claims and upon techniques that followed his examination of the brain of a wild bandit, who had been executed for terrorizing local villages early on in Lombroso's career as a doctor (Schwartz 1993). Lombroso inscribed the criminal's brain with a difference that produced it as 'other' to those of normal humans, thereby making it thinkable as more similar, anatomically, to the brains of primates such as gorillas and chimpanzees (Schwartz 1993). Lombroso went on to study the skulls of hundreds of criminals and, in each case, established a relation between their heads and those of lower animal species. This was based in part upon observations and notations that took the form of certain physical stigmata: 'small skull, asymmetrical face, narrow forehead, protruding ears, and prominent cheekbones' (Schwartz 1993:163). Such techniques of visualization and inscription of human difference in the 'psy' sciences 'constituted the surface of the body as the field on which psychological pathologies were to be observed' (Rose 1996:108). Lombroso subsequently became a champion of physiognomy, the theory that a person's character reflects his or her physical appearance. Here the linking of pictorial representations with case studies and psychopathologies performed the vital cognitive function of:

linking up the theoretical and the observable, materializing the theory and idealizing the object, instructing the mind through the education of the eyes. (Rose 1996:108)

Clinical psychiatrists situated within the apparatus of expertise and sympathetic to Lombrosian anthropology were also interested in discovering in the body of the mad patient the signs of a morbid past, deploying evolutionary theory not only to describe, but also to account for mental pathologies (Tagliavini 1985). Psychiatrists who subscribed to this new
legibility set about the search for the typical madmen: madmen who possessed a Lombrosian stereotypic 'criminal personality' (Tagliavini 1985:188).

Tagliavini (1985:188) states that in 1860, the French psychiatrist Benedict Morel claimed that madness, like certain other kinds of illness, developed in the individual 'as a progressive degradation towards a final state of degeneration', and it was this notion that was grafted onto Lombrosian truth claims. Morel made this claim in his 1860 Traité des maladies mentales (Tagliavini 1985), and Tagliavini suggests that this marks the historical moment at which the idea of time officially entered psychiatry. The reader will recall that it was this idea that contributed towards the demise of the theory of monomania. Criminal Anthropology established a further alliance with the theory of atavism, according to which delinquency and madness could be seen as 'different forms of throwback to a past, more primitive form of behaviour' (Tagliavini 1985:188).

Theoretical development in psychiatric and criminal anthropological research in Italy was therefore concerned with both the 'spatial organization of the brain and a temporal dimension represented by the past animal behaviour of man' (Tagliavini 1985:188). The carriers of the germs of madness were described as the vanquished in the battle of survival - hence intersecting with the more general Darwinian evolutionary discourse - for they were the weak, whereas the strong, who came through, were the normal (Tagliavini 1985). The reader may recall that it was the Darwinian discourse, with its theory of 'natural selection', that intersected with the discourse of middle class masculinity in Britain at the end of the nineteenth century, as discussed in Chapter One. The more muscular, militaristic masculinity that emerged was in part authorized by the 'scientific' truth claims of the Darwinian discourse insofar as it seemed to establish a 'scientific' basis for the necessary elimination of the weak by the strong. Darwin also contributed to the theory of facial expression through the collection of hundreds of photographs, his interest in the mentally ill and his reliance on photographs and their expressions converging with changing attitudes towards the nature of empirical evidence for behavioral studies (Gilman 1988). This change was connected in turn to technological
developments in both neurology and photography and their deployment in nineteenth century visual documentation of evidence of the insane (Gilman 1988). Gilman (1988:139) argues that for Darwin, the insane were those individuals who, through their illness, 'lost the protective structure by which civilized humans control their expressions of emotion'. Hence, for Darwin, the insane and the idiotic formed a 'missing link' to the emotional past of mankind (Gilman 1988).

Within psychiatric and criminal anthropological research, various types of degeneration were constituted at this time. On the one hand, there were those with social consequences, to include 'the vagabond who produced nothing to the murderer, from the beggar who lived off others to the fraudulent bankrupt' (Tagliavini 1985:188). On the other hand, there were individual forms whose main characteristics were 'lack of balance or symmetry in the cerebral organs' (Tagliavini 1985:189), the most frequently mentioned illness of this kind being epilepsy. Tagliavini (1985:189) argues that Lombroso considered epilepsy to be a paradigmatic case of degeneracy.

It is hardly surprising therefore that the Criminal Anthropologists emphasized that a penalty did not have to be a punishment, but could be a mechanism for the defense of society (Foucault 1988c). What was important to the school of Criminal Anthropologists therefore was that the relevant difference was not between subjects who were legally responsible and found guilty, and subjects who were legally irresponsible and hence released, but between subjects who were 'absolutely and definitively dangerous' (Foucault 1988s:144) and those who would cease to be dangerous 'provided they receive certain treatment' (Foucault 1988c:144). Indeed, Schwartz (1993:163) argues that Lombroso was an active campaigner for the constructive treatment of criminals during his career, arguing that they required 'firm but fair treatment', capital punishment being reserved for only the most incorrigible. Here criminal anthropology grafts itself onto practices of law, punishment and management through its promise to combine efficacy and utility with humanity (Rose 1996).
The school of the Criminal Anthropologists proposed three main types of social reaction to the danger represented by the criminal:

definitive elimination (by death or by incarceration in an institution) temporary elimination (with treatment), and more or less relative and partial elimination (sterilization and castration).
(Foucault 1988c:144)

Foucault's (1988c) analytics suggest that one can see here a series of shifts required by the anthropological school. First, a shift is required from the crime to the criminal, then from the act committed to the danger potentially inherent in the individual and, finally, from the punishment of the guilty party to the absolute protection of others. These were critical shifts for opening up the space for the possibility in the twentieth century of the incarceration of sex offenders in what Pilgrim and Rogers (1993:39) describe as the most stigmatized and policed part of the mental health system, namely the 'special hospitals'.

However, in order to be able to assess the criminality of an individual, or the index of his dangerousness or his potential or future behavior, or in order to protect society at large from these possible perils, a technical knowledge-system was required. Such a knowledge system was required in order to make these notions function in a rational way since, Foucault (1988c) argues, they were not juridical notions in the classical sense of the term. That is, penal law revolved around the illegal act and punishment of the act according to its gravity as defined by law. On the other hand, notions of the index of dangerousness and so forth required a knowledge system able to measure the index of danger present in an individual in order to establish the protection necessary in the face of danger (Foucault 1988c). And so it was, that the idea emerged that crime ought to be the responsibility not of judges but of experts in psychiatry, criminology and psychology, and hence the support of the discourse of Lombrosian criminology by psychiatry (Foucault 1988a).
This brings us to another key emergence that is critical to this investigation, namely the notion of 'risk' as it relates to the dangerous individual. It is critical for our understanding of how such a notion could come to inform the sentencing, treatment and release of sex offenders in the twentieth century. Foucault's (1988c) understanding of how linkages were established between the notions of dangerousness and risk, and how certain fundamental theses of criminal anthropology took root in penal thought and practice, despite criminal anthropology disappearing in the nineteenth century, are therefore useful here. Foucault (1988c) suggests that it was the evolution in civil law that introduced into law the notion of causal probability and risk. This took place at the same time as criminal anthropology was developing its thesis of the dangerous individual. In civil law, by eliminating the element of fault within the system of liability, the idea of a sanction was introduced 'whose function would be to defend, to protect, to exert pressure on inevitable risks' (Foucault 1988c:148). It was the transformation in civil law around the notion of accident and legal responsibility that enabled this mutation in the notion of responsibility (Foucault 1988c). The depenalization of civil liberty constituted a model for penal law on the basis of the fundamental propositions formulated by criminal anthropology, since after all:

what is a 'born criminal' or a degenerate, or a criminal personality, if not someone who, according to a causal chain which is difficult to restore, carries a particularly high index of criminal probability, and is in himself a criminal risk? (Foucault 1988c:148)

By his very existence, the criminal is therefore a creator of risk (Foucault 1988c). And so, as in civil law, the purpose of sanction will not be to punish a legal subject who has voluntarily broken the law, but rather its role will be to 'reduce as much as possible - either by elimination, or by exclusion or by various restrictions, or by therapeutic measures - the risk of criminality represented by the individual in question' (Foucault 1988c:148). Hence the logic of risk locates the careers and identities of tainted citizens within a
regime of surveillance that constitutes them as actually or potentially 'risky' individuals (Rose 1999).

The key questions that now emerged were formulated around whether or not an individual was *intrinsically* dangerous, what *signs* could they be recognized by and how could one *react* to their presence (Foucault 1988c). In the course of the nineteenth century penal law thus enlarged, organized and codified the suspicion and the locating of dangerous individuals, 'from the rare and monstrous figure of the monomaniac to the common everyday figure of the degenerate, of the pervert, of the constitutionally unbalanced, of the immature, etc.' (Foucault 1988c:149). This transformation took place through the interaction between medical or psychological knowledge and the judicial institution and thus a set of objects and concepts were born at their boundaries and from their interchange (Foucault 1988c).

It is psychiatry therefore that moves into the twentieth century as the discipline charged with the difficulty of protecting others from the potential risk that the dangerous sexual psychopath poses to society. Increasingly, techniques are devised to identify signs and indicators of risk, levels of risk and so forth. As we shall see in this and the following chapter, the administration of individuals in light of a calculation of their 'riskiness', and in the name of risk reduction and risk management, appears to become the primary contemporary obligation of the professions engaged with the subject of psychiatry (Rose 1999). This is especially so with regard to the subject, the dangerous individual, that comes to be known as 'sex offender'. Further, as Castel (1991:285) points out, 'we often fail to remember that eugenic practices were widespread during the first third of this [20th] century'. At this time sterilization, on the basis of a much broader range of indicators than those of strictly defined mental illness, could be applied in a more widespread and preventive manner (Castel 1991). Here the goal of intervention, made in the name of preservation of the race, is 'much less to treat a particular individual than to prevent the threat he or she carries from being transmitted to descendants' (Castel 1991:285).
We now enter the field of the discourse of sexology in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It was this discourse, inscribed in the psychiatric style of reasoning, that first deployed techniques of mapping and charting, classification and inscription in order to bring into being new species, namely, sexual perverts. Psychiatrists and sexologists, such as Krafft-Ebing, argued that perpetrators of sexual delinquencies posed the gravest danger to society. In order to reduce the risk of their criminality, in order to protect society from the dangers such individuals represented, it was therefore their elimination, exclusion, restriction and/or treatment that was necessary, rather than their mere 'punishment' for the crime and subsequent release back into society.

2:3 The Biological Instinct and Sexual Anomalies

Man has beyond doubt the stronger sexual appetite of the two ... a mighty impulse of nature makes him aggressive and impetuous in his courtship ... Woman, however, if physically and mentally normal, and properly educated, has but little sensual desire. (Krafft-Ebing 1953:14)

In the latter half of the nineteenth century the discourse of sexology - the science of sex that laid claim to a positive knowledge - isolated sex as a biological and psychical instinct capable of presenting pathological processes. As a biological instinct, sex was constituted as an overpowering natural force:

a biological imperative mysteriously located in the genitals (especially the wayward male organs) that sweeps all before it (at least if you are male) like hamlets before an avalanche ...

(Weeks 1986:13)

The vocabularies of 'overpowering forces, engulfing drives, gushing streams, uncontrollable spasms' (Weeks 1986:46) deployed by early sexologists constituted sex as an 'irresistible natural energy held in check by a thin crust of civilization' (Weeks 1986:24). These persuasions fashioned a mode of perception whereby 'culture' came to be visualized as an overlay on
biologically determined human nature, and 'causes' of human behavior were situated and problematized within that biological substrate (Bruner 1990). In the process of making the human subject thinkable according to the logic of biological determinism, sex was conceptualized as:

a natural urge or drive, dependent on internal, biological factors, such as hormones, but capable of being triggered off by external stimuli. The erotic stimulus, which can be almost anything, but is usually a member of the opposite sex, triggers man's deep-seated impulse, which in turn provokes sexual response. (Jackson 1984:45)

Here the greater aggressiveness of the male has been constituted as biological fact, the science of sex forming an alliance with the advances of biology (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982). These scientific knowledge claims endowed extra credibility on account of their apparent grounding in positive knowledge, thereby legitimizing the 'logic' of the universality of sexual dominance by the male and sexual submissiveness by the female.

Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Professor of Psychiatry and Nervous Diseases at the University of Vienna from 1889, and whose authority was thereby authorized by the university apparatus, shaped modes of thinking when stating that '[i]n the intercourse of the sexes, the active or aggressive rôle belongs to man; woman remains passive, defensive' (Krafft-Ebing 1953:85 original italics). It was truth claims such as this, in the authoritative voices of experts such as Krafft-Ebing (1953), that were the instruments through which women and men constituted themselves as certain kinds of human beings within their deployment of sexuality. Through statements such as Krafft-Ebing's (1953) above, where he states that physically and mentally normal and properly educated (middle class) woman have little sensual desire, doctors and psychiatrists are authorized to incite women to continue a certain normative relation with their own bodies and those of men. This incitement first acquired authority in the eighteenth century, when bourgeois women's bodies were (deemed to be) suffused with the wild workings of their reproductive
system, rather than with wild sexual desire, as discussed in the previous chapter. In his capacity to speak truthfully about humans, Krafft-Ebing (1953:85) also classified and differentiated a certain kind of (normal) male self - who gained great pleasure from 'winning' and 'conquering' a woman - from a (deviant) male self who resorted to brutal force, robbery or even blows to render a woman powerless. Within sexology's grid of codeability of personal attributes (Rose 1996) and the resultant regime of visibility, such latter (deviant) men were also identified as 'possibly atavistic'.

Krafft-Ebing's truth claims, injunctions and advice were widely disseminated, and the examples above are drawn from his text Psychopathia Sexualis: A Medico-Forensic Study (Twelfth Edition) first published in Stuttgart in 1886. When it was first released, Psychopathia Sexualis was the most comprehensive collection of sexual disorders ever published (Schwartz 1993). The text ran to twelve German editions, and was widely translated. Through the technology of publishing, Psychopathia Sexualis educated citizens in their professional roles through the mapping and charting of a complex 'know-how' that had, in turn, deployed intellectual techniques and techniques of inscription to include investigation (soliciting), confession (hearing), classification (categorizing) and judgement (authorizing). This mapping and charting offered formulas for efficacy in distinguishing human behavior through a system of classification that deployed vocabularies of necrophilia, voyeurism, 'homo-sexual' feeling in both sexes, 'deviant attractions' such as sadism and masochism and 'perverse sexual acts', such as atrocities against children, perpetrated by 'defective' individuals (Krafft-Ebing 1953).

With the publication of this text Krafft-Ebing can be seen to have functioned in a similar manner to Marshall et al. as described in the previous chapter. Here it was Krafft-Ebing who wanted to bring readers 'up to date' on current knowledge and thinking in the area. Whereas for Marshall et al. it is the Truth of sex offending that becomes the object of immense diffusion and consumption by psychologists, etc., for Krafft-Ebing it was the Truth of sexual neurotics, their psychopathology that was the object of immense diffusion and consumption by doctors and lawyers. This publication targeted this select
group of experts for whom the explicit descriptions of sexual behaviors were written in Latin. This was a tactic deployed in order to protect the author from disciplinary practices, since those who published sexually explicit material in that era were 'often charged with lewdness and pornography and sometimes brought to court' (Schwartz 1993:182). It was precisely because of this 'sexually explicit' material that schoolboys, who were also capable of understanding Latin, made every effort to get their hands on copies (Schwartz 1993). As with Marshall et al., Krafft-Ebing thus had an authoritative function within a discourse of Truth, in this instance the discourse of sexology. This function was bound up with historically specific regimes of power that included the apparatuses of writing and publishing and also the university, here the University of Vienna. The discourse of sexology, bound up with these regimes of power, thus had a normalizing and regulatory function upon the objects of knowledge, now rendered visible and classified in the text by the author known as Krafft-Ebing.

In Psychopathia Sexualis Krafft-Ebing ordered what he termed 'sexual neuroses' into three categories, namely 'peripheral', 'spinal' and 'cerebral' (Krafft-Ebing 1953). The first two categories related to physical and psychosomatic conditions. The cerebral neuroses consisted mainly of what would now be termed paraphilias (Schwartz 1993), the meaning of paraphilia being 'attraction to deviance'. Alliances between the discourses of sexology, criminal anthropology and the 'science' of eugenics are clearly discernible in Krafft-Ebing's (1953) case studies. An example is the 'atavistic' reference above and the physical characteristics of one patient rendered visible by the vocabulary of 'narrow, deformed facial bones; the halves of the face and the ears asymmetrical; brows low' (Krafft-Ebing 1953:465). Here Krafft-Ebing (1953) cites Lombroso in the text. Individuals are variously identified deploying the vocabularies of degeneracy, for example, 'good heredity', 'very bad heredity', 'tainted heredity', 'heavily tainted by heredity' (Krafft-Ebing 1953) and so forth.

Through the techniques of classifying then calibrating the capacities and conduct of humans, through inscribing and recording their attributes and
deficiencies, Krafft-Ebing and other agents of authority such as Havelock Ellis (1897-1928), thus bring into being new kinds of people (Hacking 1986), that is to say, sexual perverts. Through these assemblages, the homosexual now emerges as a species:

a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an discreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. (Foucault 1979a:43)

Within the discourse of psychiatry, deploying the language and vocabularies of sexology and the theory of degeneracy, attempts to render homosexuality intelligible entailed endless scrutiny. For example, was it a 'degeneration or a harmless anomaly, congenital or acquired, the result of tainted heredity, or the effects of moral corruption, a product of psychic trauma or free and wilful choice?' (Weeks 1986:70). It is through the deployment of intellectual techniques such as these, that psychiatry attempts to grasp and rectify 'conditions deemed pathological' (Rose 1996:82) and by such means that a 'psychological discipline of the normal individual appears possible' (Rose 1996:82). It was after the emergence of 'homosexuality' that 'heterosexuality' was taken as the 'self-evident' norm. The truth claim as to the normality of heterosexual relations contributed towards a sharp distinction being made between the sexes and towards the sexual territory being divided into the normal and abnormal.

In regard to the case of immoral acts with children under the age of fourteen, Krafft-Ebing (1953:498) states in Psychopathia Sexualis that criminal statistics 'prove the sad fact that sexual crimes are progressively increasing in our modern civilisation'. After quoting numerous statistics regarding sexual atrocities against children, Krafft-Ebing (1953) states that the medical investigator is driven to the conclusion that this manifestation of modern social life:
stands in relation to the predominating nervous condition of later
generations, in that it begets defective individuals, excites the
sexual instinct, leads to sexual abuse, and, with continuance of
lasciviousness associated with diminished sexual power, induces
perverse sexual acts. (Krafft-Ebing 1953:499-50)

Here Krafft-Ebing's argument is characterized by a way of seeing and thinking
that first emerged in the eighteenth century. It was then, when the fear of
madness had grown, that it was believed that nervous diseases were
multiplying and becoming more dangerous and complicated and that
civilization, in general, constituted a milieu favorable to the development of
madness (Foucault 1971). However, as the unity between madness and
unreason gradually became broken as madness became individualized
(Foucault 1971) the madman was no longer perceived as 'irrational', rather he
was perceived as having crossed the frontier of bourgeois order of his own
accord, thus alienating himself (Foucault 1971).

So whilst Krafft-Ebing's argument is situated within current public debates on
'moral decay' and the release of statistics on crime and reports on the poor and
criminal, at the same time it seems to imply a crossing of the frontier of
bourgeois order with the advance in the 'physical decadence (impotence) and
psychical degeneration of the adult population' (Krafft-Ebing 1953:500).
Krafft-Ebing argues that this advance seems to point to the relative increase in
the sexual crimes against children.

Furthermore, Krafft-Ebing (1953:500) argues that the individuals who
perpetrate sexual delinquencies - that is, horrible sexual crimes to which 'only
anthropological and clinical investigations can afford light and knowledge' -
suffer a 'disease'. And it is psychiatry that must be given the credit for 'having
recognised and proved the psycho-pathological significance of numerous
monstrous, paradoxical sexual acts' (Krafft-Ebing 1953:500). That is,
psychiatry is to be credited with having the knowledge system that enables the
recognition of such psychopathological stigmata, the ability to measure the
level of danger inherent in the individual and the expertise to recognize signs
of that danger. After criticizing the law for first *punishing* and then *releasing* such delinquents to prey on society, Krafft-Ebing (1953:501) states that those who are as 'dangerous to society as a murderer or a wild beast' should be *removed* from society for life, but 'not as a punishment' (Krafft-Ebing 1953:501). Here Krafft-Ebing aligns his way of thought with criminal anthropology, and its shift from concern with the punishment of the guilty party to the absolute protection of others from the level of danger the perpetrator represents for society. Hence, for Krafft-Ebing (1953), the judge who considers only the crime - and not the *criminality*, and hence dangerousness - of the individual, is always in danger of injuring not only important interests of society, but also the (best) interest of the individual, who requires 'removal' and certain treatment. Deploying the professional persona that exercises a vocation 'with wisdom and dispassion' (Rose 1996:27), Krafft-Ebing (1953:501) states that in no domain of criminal law 'is co-operation of judge and medical expert so much to be desired as in that of sexual delinquencies'. Hence the discourse of sexology justifies the function of psychiatry and the necessity of its expertise, whilst affirming the necessity for on-going interaction between medical/psychological knowledge and the judicial institution.

As the text of *Psychopathia Sexualis* affirms, from the mid-nineteenth century perversion, heredity and degenerescence form the solid nucleus of the new technology of sex (Foucault 1979a). The administration of fertility, the theory of degeneracy and the medicine of perversion merge together to explain how a heredity that is burdened with various maladies - whether organic, functional or psychical - ends 'by producing a sexual pervert' (Foucault 1979a:118). It is not until the end of the nineteenth century that psychiatry starts to free itself from the ties of eugenics and an entire social practice that 'took the exasperated but coherent form of a state-directed racism, [that] furnished this technology of sex with a formidable power and far-reaching consequences' (Foucault 1979a:119). Conversely, psychoanalysis, whilst being one of the institutions that set out in the nineteenth century to medicalize sex, was the one that 'up to the decade of the forties, rigorously opposed the political and
institutional effects of the perversion-heredity-degenerescence system' (Foucault 1979a:119).

But despite the gradual decline of the effects of its theoretical formulations, eugenic practices still remained widespread during the early part of the twentieth century, as discussed above, even in 'liberal' countries such as the United States (Castel 1991). It was here, Castel (1991 285-86) argues, that 'special laws imposing sterilization for a wide range of deficient persons were enacted in almost all states', at the time when eugenics started to reason in terms of risks rather than dangers. It was not until the 'scientific' basis of eugenics was challenged and the 'monstrously grotesque version provided by Nazism helped both morally and politically to discredit eugenic techniques' (Castel 1991:286) that the final rupture with the system of degenerescence took place. In the following section, we shall see how the challenge to the theory of hereditary degeneracy first emerged in Britain during the First World War, converging with the identification of 'shellshock' and the practice in army hospitals of the new medical psychology, namely psychotherapy. This convergence of shellshock, psychoanalytic techniques and the discrediting of the monolithic theory of hereditary degeneracy were also implicated in British psychiatry's subsequent shift beyond the asylum. In the United States, it was only after World War II that psychoanalysis moved from the margins of psychiatric practice to inscribe new ways of thinking within the discipline of psychiatry. It was during this encounter that sexual psychopath statutes were enacted in the United States, thus marking a point of convergence of psychiatry, psychoanalysis and state legislation upon the bodies of both homosexual and heterosexual sex offenders. This state legislation was informed by the premise that sexual offenders were affected by psychopathology, and it was this that predisposed them to abuse. Psychiatry was therefore able to offer its techniques for the assessment of the level of danger present in each offender, and psychoanalysis offered its psychotherapeutic techniques for the offenders' treatment and 'cure'. Hence, this site is rendered visible as a point at which the technology of eugenics is challenged by the technology of psychoanalysis, psychotherapy.
This particular investigation commences at the beginning of the twentieth century when psychiatry was still practised almost exclusively in the asylum. On the other hand, psychoanalysis originated out of the laboratories of neurology in Vienna and Paris - where Sigmund Freud conducted his early work - not out of the psychiatric clinic (Gilman 1988). Hence, up until this historical moment, there had been no mutual influence between psychoanalysis and psychiatry.

The separation of psychiatry as a mode of treatment undertaken in the asylum rather than in the general hospital continued throughout the early years of the twentieth century and this lowered the prestige of the alienist, that is, the practitioner in lunacy - the psychiatrist. As a result, alienists were still perceived in their older, nonscientific function of administrators of institutions of control, despite their claim to the status of the world of science through the introduction of the medical model of madness (Gilman 1988). Gilman (1988:184) argues that it was this relatively lower status of psychiatry that enabled 'individuals viewed as marginal, such as Jews, to enter this new medical speciality'. Such racist marginalization thereby situated the Jewish psychiatrist, the Jewish psychoanalyst, at the bottom of the social ladder within the discourse of medicine.

In Great Britain, in the years leading up to the First World War, psychoanalysis remained a marginalized discourse, despite a certain level of dissemination of psychoanalytic knowledge claims (Stone 1985). Consequently, when the London Society for Psychoanalysis was first constituted in 1913, it attracted only a dozen members and only four were interested in becoming practising analysts (Stone 1985). Prior to World War I, those authorized to make pronouncements within the medical apparatus, for example the psychiatrist Charles Mercier, had scrutinized psychoanalysis and judged it to be 'morally corrupting' (Stone 1985:243).
However, by the end of the war the situation had changed dramatically. In the first few months of World War I there were an alarming number of casualties suffering not from physical injuries, but from a condition termed 'shellshock'. It was estimated that by December 1914, seven to ten per cent of officer casualties and three to four per cent of casualties from other ranks fitted this category (Rose 1990). Numerous young doctors were suddenly exposed to working with persons who exhibited well-developed psychiatric symptoms, but whose backgrounds were apparently normal (Rose 1990). This experience had a profound effect on psychiatry for it exposed an area of mental medicine about which many asylum doctors knew little and the assemblage of orthodoxies of the psychiatric establishment came under increasing pressure during this period (Stone 1985). The monolithic theory of hereditary degeneration was 'significantly dented as young men of respectable and proven character were reduced to mental wrecks after a few months in the trenches' (Stone 1985:245). Thus psychiatry lost a great deal of credibility over shellshock, not only in the eyes of the rest of the medical profession, but also in the eyes of the public and the government authorities who had become involved in the problem. The ensuing problemization of the asylum system led to the logic of the need for reform.

Many British doctors received their first practical introduction to psychotherapy, the new medical psychology, whilst working with shellshock cases in army hospitals (Stone 1985). World War I was also the time when psychology first emerged as a discourse (Stone 1985), putting the systematic management of individuals participating in military life, that is, the 'human factor', on the agenda (Rose 1990). For example, there was the introduction of intelligence tests for the screening of recruits by the United States military, although there was no mass psychological testing of recruits to the armed forces in Britain during World War I (Rose 1990). Many psychologists made contributions to the study of shellshock, an engagement that subsequently authorized them to lay claim to the capacity to speak truthfully about the problems of nervous disorders after the war. Authorized by the medical apparatus to treat and speak the truth of 'nervous disorders', psychologists subsequently wrote and published a prodigious number of books and articles
on psychotherapy and psychopathology during the 1920s, and an array of procedures formalized this new 'specialism' (Rose 1996). The pedagogic practice of revising (neurological) texts, the enlargement of sections devoted to neuroses, and the addition of references to psychoanalysis are examples of some of the strategies deployed.

These regimes of truth, widely disseminated during this period, claimed good results from the use of 'psychotherapeutic techniques broadly derived from the work of Freud and Janet' (Rose 1990:20). Rose (1990) argues that this work and its success appeared to subsequently lead in two directions. First, it appeared to support a dynamic conception of psychological processes, with such characteristics as an unconscious and repression (Rose 1990). At the same time, it appeared to challenge the Freudian truth claim for a specific sexual aetiology (i.e. causation) of mental disturbance. This tended to be replaced with a theory of 'multiple instincts that came into conflict with one another because of contradictory social pressures' (Rose 1990:20-21). This truth claim thus challenged the previous focus upon 'gross insanity requiring prolonged incarceration, mainly considered to be of organic origin and untreatable' (Rose 1990:21). Psychoanalysis now formed an alliance with the discourse of British psychiatry and when the newly formed British Psychoanalytical Association held its first open meeting in 1919, a number of respected medical personages attended, several of whom joined as associate members (Stone 1985).

With the reconfiguration of the professional structure of British psychiatry during the early 1920s, a profound shift took place in regard to the position of psychiatry within a new conceptualization of the relation between madness and society. Psychiatry was now situated within an expansion of the field of medicine that included a broadening of the concept of mental disorder, an incorporation of other professions under its medical umbrella, and an opening up of new sites of practice outside the asylum (Stone 1985). For example, the 1930 British Mental Treatment Act promoted 'out-patient' clinics and 'voluntary' treatment (Stone 1985).
In the United States shellshock, and the resultant anxieties about the possible epidemic of neurosis, opened up the space for the translation of the mental state of the population into a calculable form (Rose 1996), hence the accidental beginnings of the mental hygiene movement. The professional discipline of psychiatric social work emerged within this discourse (Stone 1985) in which language and vocabularies made it possible to conceptualize and talk about human troubles in psychological terms (Rose 1996). Family life and institutional existence was scrutinized in terms of mental normality, mental health being linked to the proper adjustment to the conditions of life and work. It could now be thought that poor mental hygiene and stress could promote 'neurosis in large numbers of people' (Rose 1990:21) and insanity, crime and delinquency, as well as industrial and other social inefficiencies, were constituted as 'indices of the mental hygiene of the population' (Rose 1990:23). No longer were social ills thought to be the result of 'personal evil, immoral character or degenerate constitutions inherited down a family line' (Rose 1990:23). This was a way of thought, it will be recalled, that had converged with allegations of the 'immoral' implications of overcrowding in the urban slums of the working class in the nineteenth century. Social ills were now thought of in new ways, namely in terms of poor mental hygiene in the family and in society at large (Rose 1990).

Freud first visited the United States in 1909 and lectured at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts (Klerman 1990). In America, the decline of human technologies that embodied the asylum and Freud's alliance with psychiatrists such as Adolf Meyer, enabled psychoanalysis to circulate within particular apparatuses of learning that disseminated and adjudicated its truths. Psychiatric hospitals and medical schools began to employ and teach psychoanalytic techniques and influential psychoanalytic medical texts were written and published (Klerman 1990). Between the time of Freud's first visit in 1909 and the end of World War I in 1918, the number of physicians whose habits of thought had been transformed by psychoanalytic truth claims had increased across the country. Intellectual technologies such as universities and medical schools, and human technologies that included persons such as Adolf Meyer, William James, Morton Prince, as well as systems of judgement,
inscribed the psychoanalytic way of thought in the medical academic centers of Boston, Baltimore and New York (Klerman 1990). However, whilst the psychoanalytic discourse initially circulated amongst a rather elitist audience (Castel, Castel and Lovell 1982), it was the 1930s emigration of many European psychoanalysts to the United States that enabled psychoanalysis to move from the margins of psychiatric practice in the USA. Its theories and explanations subsequently inscribed new ways of seeing, thinking and practising within a new generation of psychiatrists, and it was these psychiatrists who would gain prominence after World War II.

Psychoanalysis also transformed the capacities of the cultivated middle class and Castel et al. (1982:32) argue that this was because it converged with a crisis in American values, 'particularly in regard to the rigid traditional sexual morality inherited from colonial days'. It was this convergence that constituted its success in 'high society', occurring as it did at a historical moment when the 'intelligentsia' was resisting New England puritanism and moral conformity. Just as psychoanalysis had formed an alliance with the middle class in Vienna, so in the United States it was the middle class 'that flocked to analysts' couches' (Castel, Castel and Lovell 1982:32), their requirements being quite different to those of the patients traditionally cared for by psychiatrists.

It was in the late 1930s in the United States that state legislation became a point of convergence for the discourses of psychiatry and psychoanalysis, enabling them to expand mechanisms of power for acting upon the body and mind of the sex offender. Between 1938 and 1966, thirty-one states enacted sexual psychopath statutes (Pithers 1990) based upon the premise that such offenders were 'affected by psychopathology which predisposes them to abuse' (Pithers 1990:345). In Massachusetts state law, for example, a sexual psychopath was defined as a person whose misconduct in sexual matters indicated his lack of power to control his sexual impulses (Castel, Castel and Lovell 1982). Hence, within this place and space, the deployment of sexuality is articulated through a psychiatric style of reasoning that inscribes the language and vocabularies of a science of sex that has constituted a 'biological
imperative' deemed to be an overpowering natural force. This 'out-of-control-state' was said to be evidenced by 'repetitive or compulsive behavior and either violence or aggression of an adult against a victim under the age of sixteen years' (Castel, Castel and Lovell 1982:179). These men were thus said to possess an inherent dangerousness that warranted their 'definitive elimination' by one means or another (Foucault 1988c). Under these statutes, if a convicted sex offender was found to be 'mentally disordered' by a court-appointed mental health practitioner, he was civilly committed to a treatment institution for an indeterminate period (Pithers 1990). These statutes therefore involved sentences that were longer than they would be under regular convictions (Bohmer 1983); a possibility first created by the discourses of criminal anthropology and civil law and notions of risk and dangerousness. Bohmer (1983:15) argues that the justification for treatment programs in the institutions was that they would treat and cure those who had not been able to control their 'aberrant sexual behavior'. Pithers (1990:345) supports Bohmer's (1983) claim insofar as he states that an assumption was made that 'treatment within an institution would create enduring changes in offenders' personalities, thereby ameliorating their danger to others'. These statutes were phrased in such a way as to give wide discretionary (disciplinary) powers to both judges and institutional personnel in 'matters of admission and release standards' (Bohmer 1983:15). Freeman (1979:429) states that these sentences were not only indeterminate, but they presupposed the existence of adequate psychiatric assistance, which was not always available. Furthermore, Freeman (1979) remains skeptical in regard to the efficacy of psychiatric 'treatment' that deploys the technique of analytic psychotherapy. For example, in relation to the notion of sex offenders gaining 'insight' as a consequence of successful engagement in psychotherapy, Freeman (1979:430) asks '[w]hat is "insight"? The moral overtones of evaluation like this are undeniable'.

In regard to the treatment of 'incestuous behavior', Harbert et al. (1974) cite numerous references to support their argument that although 'psychological and psychiatric literature is replete with descriptions and theoretical papers accounting for the genesis of incestuous behavior...relatively few detailed accounts of psychotherapeutic treatment have appeared'. Further, Harbert et
al. (1974:79) are critical of the fact that in case studies that have been reported, 'careful assessment (objective and subjective) of progress throughout treatment and follow-up' has not been provided. Shelton (1975:140) quotes Wahl (1960) as remarking that 'he was able to find only 34 reported cases of all types of incest in the literature up through 1960'. In regard to the incidence of incest, the figure quoted in the 1940s-1950s psychiatric literature generally referred to 'less than one case per million persons in modern western societies' (Lindzey 1967). However Lindzey (1967) refers to data collected by Kinsey, Gebhard and their collaborators in 1948, 1953 and 1965, in which the data collected by Gebhard et al. (1965) was from a group of over 3,500 subjects who were imprisoned for sexual offences. Amongst these offenders, 'the incidence of incest was roughly 30 cases for each 1,000 persons in the sample' (Lindzey 1967:1055), which, as Lindzey (1967:1055) observes in the late 1960s, 'vastly exceed the customarily cited index of "less than one case per million"'.

However, as Harbert et al. (1974) indicate above, up to the 1960s, it was not the incest offender's treatment that was rendered visible in the professional literature. Rather, it was daughters and mothers who were submitted to the psychiatric gaze and inscribed through observation and notation undertaken within psychological, clinical examination. Theories, concepts and explanations rendered the world of the 'incest family' amenable to being thought as 'dysfunctional' (Lustig et al. 1966). Relations were established between the 'attitudes', 'behaviors', and 'pregenital drives' of daughters rendering them thinkable as 'seductive'. Mothers were classified as 'ambivalent' and 'hostile', rendering them thinkable as 'collusive'. Bender and Blau's 1937 published case study in the form of a text entitled The reaction of children to sexual relations with adults, and Kaufman et al.'s 1954 case study published in the form of a text entitled The Family Constellation and Overt Incestuous Relations Between Father and Daughter were influential in 'making up' these objects of psychological discourse. These texts were informed by clinical practice deploying a psychoanalytic way of thought that, at the same time, informed concrete practices in clinical settings. By problematizing the 'seductive behaviors' of the girls in their 1937 study,
Bender and Blau employ the strategy of the deployment of sexuality that focuses upon the dangers of children's sexuality, and also set up a dichotomy between provocative/innocent (Bell 1993). The reader will recall that it was nineteenth century psychoanalysis that had first 'guaranteed' one would find the parent-child relationship at the root of everyone's sexuality, and that it was said to be the incest taboo that caused the parent in the bourgeois, or middle class, family to frustrate the child's desires. On the other hand, 'among the lower classes, a danger to the child emanated from a lecherous parent or older sibling' (Minson 1985:35). This had required different mechanisms of intervention, namely 'medical and psychological advice for the rich, compulsory police action for the poor' (Minson 1985:35).

In Kaufman et al.'s 1954 case study, it is mothers and grandmothers that are problematized within a family constellation, or a web of interpersonal family relationships, rendered thinkable as being implicated in the incest. Here mothers stand accused of failing in their biological-moral responsibility to protect their children thus being, in part, held responsible for the abuse (Bell 1993). These habits of thought and psychoanalytic ways of speaking about incest are widely disseminated in psychiatric literature through to the 1980s. For example, Lustig et al. (1966:36) report that in their cases 'much of the fore-play preceding sexual contact between father and daughter involved the girl's fantasies regarding incorporation of the father's penis. This appeared to reflect penis envy'. Raphling et al. (1967:509) insist that 'there is no doubt that the ultimate factors which determine the adherence to or the transgression of the incest barrier are related to the conscious and unconscious communications between parents and child'. They conclude that 'the sexual strivings of a child in the direction of the parent of the opposite sex are potent ones which may either be encouraged and/or discouraged by one or the other or both parents' (Raphling et al. 1967:509). Justice and Justice (1979:149) state that in some instances, 'a daughter may be so seductive toward her father that she represents a primary reason as to why incest occurs'. Koch and Jarvis (1987:95) argue that the father, lacking sexual fulfillment from his wife, 'turns to the daughter for sexual fulfillment because she has assumed the role of mother's little helper and replacement'.

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Further, the mother 'does not protect her daughter because she is fearful of violence or retaliation from her husband' (Koch and Jarvis 1987:95). Here, there is a passing reference to the dangerousness of the 'husband' and an indication that he is a potentially 'risky' individual in relation to his wife. However, in the above accounts of sexual assault within the familial domain, it is not the 'father's' behavior or dangerousness, or the level of risk he might pose to his daughter that is problematized. As a case in point, Farmer (1989) reports that:

[i]t has been observed in incestuous families that the mother is often in passive agreement with the incestuous relationship between father and daughter. At some level she knows what is going on but denies it. She may secretly feel relieved that somebody else is fulfilling her husband's sexual needs. (Farmer 1989:28)

Nevertheless, some men were convicted and jailed for incest. Williams (1974:64) states that in England and Wales criminal statistics show that 'between two and three hundred cases of incest become "known to the police" every year'. However, of these cases less than half were prosecuted to conviction (Williams 1974). For example, in 1971, 70 incest offenders were imprisoned in England and Wales (Williams 1974). Williams (1974) states that these findings appear to correspond closely with those of the 1973 German study of Dr H. Maisch, whose offenders were 'found' in the lower strata of the population. Williams (1974) quotes Dr Maisch (1973) as concluding in his study that incest was 'not the cause but the symptom or the result of a disturbed family order'. Hence, Dr Maisch's 'conclusions' appear to be informed by the discourse of psychoanalysis and its way of thought as articulated by the psychiatrists above. Further, psychoanalysis is rendered visible here as functioning as a point of differentiation between social classes, with the imprisonment of offenders 'found' amongst the lower classes.

In the United States, Shelton (1975), a psychiatrist working in the Massachusetts Court Clinic and The House of Correction at Billerica,
Massachusetts from 1962, states that up until 1975, using the rigid criteria of incest cases involving actual intercourse, he had only four cases out of approximately 2,500 sex offenders. However, Shelton (1975:149) goes on to state that incest is considered a felony in the United States and 'fathers quickly pass through District Courts on to Superior Courts, and usually to jails. Certainly, this is one reason why these cases have not been adequately studied over long term'. Shelton (1975:139) also states that a statistical survey covering a 20-year period from 1913 to 1933 'reported 241 incest families before the Swedish courts'. Referring to his own clinical work, Shelton (1975:143), who also deploys a psychoanalytic way of thought and way of seeing, states that:

I was always on the lookout for material which would have substantiated some type of actual or fantasied (sic) seduction of these fathers in their own youth, such as a seductive mother and a submissive, weak or absent father, based on the theory that because of such factors, these fathers would have less sexual repression and could more freely, as adults, jump the incest barrier. (Shelton 1975:150)

In an Editorial Note at the end of Shelton's (1975:151) paper, therapists are said to have found 'even from middle class private practice...that incest between father and children is by no means infrequent'. However, it is also stated that incest is 'likely to be more frequent still among slum dwellers huddled together'. Here, I suggest that knowledge claims disseminated after, for example, social surveys carried out on the working class during the policing of working class sexuality in the mid-nineteenth century, continue to motivate conceptualization in the mid-1970s.

In the United Kingdom, Broadmore is the site of a 'special hospital' that treats sex offenders. In the late 1970s Cox (1979:335), who worked with 'many patients whose lives have included incidents involving the "basic" crimes, such as murder and incest', reports on his deployment of a 'dynamic
psychotherapy' with his patients. Treatment includes both individual psychoanalysis and group psychotherapy, group methods 'having become one of the most widely used therapeutic techniques in our correctional institutions' (Cox 1979:331). Cox (1979:317) states that such therapy might help a sex offender to 'understand and modify his inner world of fantasy and his idiosyncratic construction of reality, which led to an incident in his outer world of action and designated him as a sex-offender'. Cox (1979:347) informs us that this contemporary regime of the self is 'likely to be a long and arduous process' for the sex offender is required to master his desire through bringing its roots to awareness. Through this technology, the self can be restored to its conviction that it is 'master' of its own existence (Cox 1979). This is to be achieved through a reflexive hermeneutics in order for the sex offender self to be freed, in psychoanalytic terms, from the 'self destructive consequences of repression, projection, and identification' (Rose 1996:32). Here the techne of confession is the technical form of therapeutic procedure, to be undertaken in the presence of the authority who requires, prescribes and appreciates it (Foucault 1979a). It is within this ritual, Foucault (1979a) argues, that the Truth is corroborated, that is, through the obstacles and resistances it has to surmount in order to be formulated. Hence Cox's (1979:319) statement that he regards 'the core datum of dynamic psychotherapy as the fact that movement always occurs in the direction of disclosure, as defences are gradually relinquished'. The sex offender is therefore required to become the subject of his own biography as he attempts to discover his self, his secrets and his hidden Truth, thereby discovering the answer to the question of why he did it. Cox (1979:309) states that '[p]hysical treatments, medication, or behavioural modification (Bancroft 1976) may be appropriate, and frequently co-exist alongside dynamic psychotherapy as part of a total therapeutic policy'. However, in referring to such behavioral treatments, Freeman (1979:430) states that aversion therapy, mainly used to 'treat' homosexuality, transvestism, and fetishism, is 'totally repellent', and that hormonal so-called treatment is a 'similarly repulsive approach' (Freeman 1979:430). Freeman (1979:430) is equally skeptical about claims that 'individuals appreciate treatment'.
The first report in the Field of Sex Offender Treatment literature in regard to the use of psychotherapy with child molesters and rapists was based upon a comparative study between behavioral techniques and psychotherapeutic techniques undertaken in the Kingston Penitentiary in Canada in 1975 (Marshall and Barbaree 1990). Marshall and Barbaree state that the results of this study show that psychotherapy did not achieve the 'within-treatment' goals of changing various features of the child molesters and rapists, whereas they claim that results did show that behavioral techniques were successful in achieving specific goals. Nietzel (1979) states that by the end of the 1970s there were no studies with adult sex offenders that provided evidence that psychotherapy contributed to a reduction in recidivism. I return to this discussion at the end of this chapter.

I now shift my focus of investigation away from psychological explanations of sex/incest offending onto co-existent, biological problemizations and solutions. Within this problem-solution linkage, disciplinary techniques are deployed that include surgical castration, stereotactic neurosurgery and medical castration.

2:5 Disciplining the Urge

2:5:1 Surgical Castration

As Balint (1957) has put it: sexual restrictions 'protect the structure of society against the onslaught of sexual highly excited individuals, that is, people 'on heat'. (Freeman 1979:376)

Faced with the difficulty of providing a cure for the recidivist sex offender, psychiatrists focusing their gaze upon the biological instinct construed the problematic behavior to be the consequence of the men's failure to 'resist their urges' (Sturup 1968:11). These were constituted as relatively automatic physiological responses (Berlin 1983) that were 'beyond their control' (Sturup 1968:16), thus leading to sexual crimes that 'always have some relationship to the sex drives...' (Sturup 1986:8). The men's 'sexual drives' were said to be
fueled by the hormone testosterone (Berlin 1983). Here this conceptualization of the problem was rendered thinkable through an intellectual machinery that included the notion of 'biological determinism', combined with the deployment of the language and vocabularies - urges, drives - of sexology. This way of thought also rendered it thinkable that a reduction in deviant sexual arousal was the solution to the problem of 'out-of-control urges'. The deployment of the experimental technique of castration in order to achieve this solution was authorized through the propositions of criminal anthropology, namely that the dangerous criminal was actually or potentially a 'risky' individual, warranting more or less relative and partial elimination through sterilization and castration. The experimental technique of castration involved the surgical practice of removing the testes thereby bringing about the cessation of the production of testicular sex hormones (Bradford 1990). Testosterone, the principal androgen produced by the testes, was thought to be the most important of the sex hormones. In order to constitute a connection between hormone levels and the 'sexual behavior in human males' (Bradford 1990:299), a causal link was made between levels of testosterone, the sexual drive in men and their sexual aggressiveness (Bradford 1990). Hence there was a movement from the problem - out-of-control urges, to the solution - a reduction in deviant sexual arousal, achieved through the reduction of testosterone levels to reduce the sex drive, to the theory - of biological determinism, to the experiment - surgical castration. Psychiatrists thereby aimed to reduce recidivism rates.

Having medicalized the problem, conditions were developed to make the solution - and the implementation of the techniques required for its successful execution - possible. In Switzerland and Holland, a suitable interpretation of laws relating to mayhem enabled castration to be performed in cases where it was warranted on 'medical' grounds (Sturup 1968). In Denmark, a section of the Danish Criminal Code specifically concerning castration enabled sex offenders to have the 'choice' of castration from 1929 through to the mid-1960s. Here we see the productive nature of power relations as they incite, induce and seduce, the latter through the invitation to the experimenters to castrate men, whilst at the same time being seen to 'do good' for the good of
the men and society. Up until 1967 this law also provided for the forced castration of 'certain very serious sexual criminals' (Sturup 1968:13). However, in the deployment of 'forced castration' it is not power relations that are made visible for, as previously discussed in relation to slavery in Chapter One, there is no relationship of power. Rather, it is a question of a physical relationship of constraint. Here there is a complicated interplay that also involves a relationship of violence that acts upon the body, an interplay that renders it impossible to consider such punishment as 'treatment'.

Based upon the follow-up of 900 cases of castration between 1929 and 1959, Sturup (1968) quotes Sand et al., who draw upon the discourse of humane science, stating that Danish law concerning castration:

must be looked upon as the best social measure for and treatment of sexual crimes and abnormal sexuals in general. It is the most humane in relation to the single subject and most effective from a criminal-therapeutical and social point of view. (Sand, Dickmeiss, and Schwalbe-Hansen 1964; cited in Sturup 1968:15)

Freeman's (1979) observations challenge the notions of humane science. In his discussion of Scandinavia, where 'castration of sexual recidivists is performed fairly extensively', Freeman (1979:431) states that the procedure is 'usually carried out with consent (sic), often influenced by promises of earlier release from prison or security hospital'. Freeman (1979:431) quotes Power (1976) as stating that, not surprisingly, 'some castrated individuals remain embittered and resentful'. In commenting upon the 900 men castrated in Denmark, Freeman (1979) states that the value of castration might be doubtful. That is to say, given that approximately 180 of the 900 men relapsed, the average relapse rate being 20 per cent, 10 men committed sex crimes after the operation, and 5 of the men castrated between 1935 and 1967 committed suicide. Freeman's (1979) critique of disciplinary practices involving medical intervention concludes with the observation:
that this is a punishment and not treatment is quite clearly expressed in statements which abound in the literature like this one from Power: 'three male patients had hypothalamotomy for repeated homosexual offences with pubertal boys' (1976) (italics mine). They were doctored because they had committed criminal offences. (Freeman 1979:431)

From 1935 to 1965, 368 sex offenders were castrated within the panoptic space of Herstedvester in Denmark. Thirty-eight of these men were classified within the category of 'Other', namely 'incest, exhibitionism and indecency' (Sturup 1968:20). Sturup (1968:19) stresses that castration was never advised unless the operation was found 'clearly indicated from a medical point of view'. In some cases treatment might be considered to deal with the 'causal elements' of behavior; in others, it was 'more in the nature of an orthopedic, non-causal intervention' (Sturup 1968:13). In this latter case, Sturup (1968:19) states that castration was designed to 'make life more bearable, by freeing a man from the fear of relapse and thus increasing his chances for a better future'. Within this locale, authorities thus give a moral worth to the undertaking thereby ethicalizing, and hence transforming, the powers of authority (Rose 1996).

Sturup (1968:34) describes various cases of sex offenders treated at Herstedvester, one of whom is a 60 year-old incest offender who is 'very psychopathological' and 'primitive and not sufficiently interested in morality'. Here it is the vocabularies and modes of thought of the discourse of sexology and the theory of degeneracy that enable this constitution of the incest offender, whose sexual drive had been increasing, along with his (objectified) 'impulsive imperative sexual urges which he was unable to check' (Sturup 1968:35). The offender is also rendered visible as a stable worker who 'wanted castration' (Sturup 1968:35). Here the offender has (or so we are told) infolded the desire for 'castration', informed by an injunction that has acquired authority through the voices of the psychiatrists and possibly incitements such as his earlier release from incarceration/hospitalization. Through such incitements and infolding of 'Herstedvester' techniques of thought for
understanding and improving his *self*, the sex offender thus decides that it is desirable to effect, with the help of others, the operation of castration upon his body.

2:5:2 Stereotactic Neurosurgery

The technique of stereotactic neurosurgery, experimental surgery using microscopic-sized surgical instruments capable of producing minimal-sized brain lesions, was another disciplinary technique deployed by psychiatry in order to achieve sex drive reduction in sex offenders. Both the techniques of stereotactic neurosurgery and castration had been used in animal experimentation, a method invented for the establishment of psychiatric/psychological regimes of truth. These experiments, deploying neurosurgery, attempted to identify structures in the brain of the animal that accumulated relatively large amounts of sex hormones, leading to changes either in the output of sex hormones or in sexual behavior in response to either stimulation or ablation (surgical removal of body tissue). For example, a study in 1939 by Kluver and Bucy described a syndrome in cats produced (in the laboratory) by bilateral temporal lobectomy (Berlin 1983). A behavioral manifestation of the induced 'syndrome' included 'intensified indiscriminate sexual behavior' (Berlin 1983:114). The results of castration (of the cats) followed by testosterone replacement therapy produced the truth effect that (i) the hypersexuality in the animals was sex hormone related and (ii) that lesions to specific sites in the ventromedial nucleus of the hypothalamus could also abolish this hypersexual activity (Berlin 1983). Based upon this now 'established' truth claim and the 'scientific', institutional practice of extrapolation from animal to human experimentation, the bodies of sex offenders were subjected to the disciplinary technique of stereotactic surgery. For example, a homosexual paedophile was operated on in 1966, and his brain surgery included 'making a lesion in the ventromedial nucleus in the same area that had seemed to decrease hypersexuality when it had been ablated in Kluver-Bucy cats' (Berlin 1983:114). The paedophile was reported to have subsequently indicated after surgery that 'his erotic fantasy life was virtually abolished and that he had lost his pedophilic urges' (Berlin 1983:114). Hence
he appears to have come to infold the norms and values of the institutional regime.

2:5:3 Medical Castration

In the 1960s in West Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland an alternative technique to surgical castration was introduced in the form of medical castration using the drugs cyproterone and cyproterone acetate ( CPA). These antiandrogens were used to diminish the frequency and intensity of sexual 'fantasies' and behavior in sex offenders. Hence, in order to know these men, their bodies and minds were objectified as behaviors and then placed under surveillance. Rose (1976:121) argues for the potential of the use of these drugs for young men who are 'distressed by the intensity of their sexual drive, and are also aware and troubled by the inappropriateness of the object of their sexual fantasies and activities'. Here, as at Herstedveder, authority accumulates an ethical basis as it is exercised in light of knowledge of subjects.

In the United States it was not federally permissible to use cyproterone acetate for sex offenders. But from the mid-1960s, Medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA), or Depo-Provera, was the drug substitution most frequently used with patients attracted to deviance, that is, 'paraphiliac' patients (Berlin 1983). In the 1930s, as part of its codification of the 'vicissitudes of individual conduct' (Rose 1996:62) and regulatory pedagogic practices, psychiatry had replaced the term 'perversion' with the term 'sexual deviation', then added the medical term 'syndrome' (i.e. symptom patterns). A psychiatric diagnosis was required for all sexual deviation syndromes, which in early classifications were considered to be a subdivision of the sociopathic personality type.

With medical castration, the effects of power were felt upon/within the body of the sex offender through a technique to control the body and its 'urges' through a method of decreasing sexual libido. The injection of the synthetic steroid into muscle lowered testosterone levels for between seven to ten days, the greater the dose the greater the loss of libido, then erection, then orgasms.
(Howitt 1995). In the early 1970s in Australia, sex suppressant drug treatment was implemented in the Victoria Children’s Court Clinic with juvenile offenders with a history of repeated serious assaults on girls or children (Chatz 1972:112). For example, thioridazine was used ‘therapeutically’ as it had the ‘side effect of producing impotence’ (Chatz 1972:112). Stilboestrol was administered in daily doses to adolescent male sex offenders, but Chatz (1972:113) states that ‘[u]nfortunately, the stilboestrol medication has side effects and sometimes produces gynaecomastia, fluid retention with ensuing headaches and phlebothrombosis, and may aggravate epilepsy’.

Stilboestrol was combined with a course of oestrogen tablets. However, disciplinary techniques were deployed with juveniles who openly resisted taking their oestrogen tablets regularly, or deployed the tactic of 'pretence', stating they had taken the tablets when they had not. In such cases, the clinicians subjected the body of the juvenile offender to a once fortnightly administration of 'an intramuscular depot oestrogen derivative known as Oestradiol Valerianate (Primogyn Depot, Schering, Berlin)' (Chatz 1972:113). This disciplinary technique was considered to cause less long-term damage to teenagers, who would otherwise have been detained in a maximum security institution for an indefinite period (Chatz 1972), but were now able to be released into the community whilst continuing fortnightly injections. However, in order to assess a young offender's level of dangerousness and the risk he might pose to others, it was necessary to know the young offender. First, was there a history of repeated and deliberate dangerous behaviour; secondly, what of his personality, in particular his ability or inability to control aggressive outbursts; and thirdly, what was the quality of his psychotherapeutic relationship and his ability to develop insights (Chatz 1972). Hence it was necessary to know the whole system of relationships that linked the act to the character, inclination, capacities and habits of the subject. With assaultive sex offenders, the combination of oral thioridazine and fortnightly intramuscular oestradiol valerianate was initially commenced in the institution (Chatz 1972). Then, by questioning the patient 'non-directively' as to the frequency of his erection and masturbation and his general
preoccupation with sex, it could be ascertained whether his sex drive had been 'sufficiently reduced' (Chatz 1972:113).

In 1978, Bancroft (1978:514) critiqued the 'widespread need to find a simple hormonal key to the understanding of human sexual behaviour', arguing that the relationship between circulating levels of steroid hormones or gonadotrophins and sexual interest, responsiveness or behavior remained totally obscure. Bancroft's (1978) comments were situated within a growing critique of the practice of surgical castration, and now 'psychosurgery', that had first emerged in the late 1960s, early 1970s, together with a wider challenge that threatened the very hegemony of psychiatry and psychoanalysis in the treatment of sex offenders. This challenge emerged from the discipline of psychology and its discourse of behaviorism with its techniques of behavior therapy. Also implicated in behavioral psychology's challenge were the discursive transformations that resulted from a whole play of political and social changes instigated by the movement of 'antipsychiatry' and the women's movement. The feminist challenge has already been discussed in the Preface and Chapter One and I commence the following chapter with an investigation of the 'antipsychiatry' movement and its connections with behavioral psychology's struggles to claim the body of the sex offender for its disciplinary treatment regimes. But first, to conclude this chapter and to enable the investigation that follows in Chapter Four, I investigate the emergence of psychology and the discourse of behaviorism.

3. **PSYCHOLOGY**

3.1 Emergence

Contemporary scientific reality - and this goes for a science like psychology as much as any other - is the inescapable outcome of the categories we use to think it, the techniques and procedures we use to evidence it, the statistical tools and mode of proof we use to justify it. (Rose 1996:52)
Prior to World War II, there were still very few practising psychologists despite their involvement in the First World War. In the United States for example, in 1918 it was estimated that there were only 375 psychologists of whom only 4 per cent had a clinical orientation (Davidson 1979).

In World War II however, psychological warfare was developed as a specific and effective weapon, and a battle ensued for the mind of the civilian and soldier alike (Rose 1990). Discussion of warfare in psychological terms became routine, for example 'the psychological causes of war, the psychology of conflict and of fighting, the effects of warfare upon the psychological states of combatants' (Rose 1990:16). Warfare produced new ways of thinking about the functioning of organizations in terms of 'human engineering' and warfare also give rise to new ways of conceptualizing institutional life in terms of 'human relations' and 'the group' (Rose 1990), as has already been discussed in relation to the mental hygiene movement. It was also at this time that emotional and personal relations between individuals become central to psychological theory and expertise and new ways of calibrating psychological factors were invented, such as personality and attitude (Rose 1990).

Psychologists drafted into the war were assigned to work with clinical populations such as military men suffering from 'war neuroses' and the increasing number of war veterans with psychiatric conditions (Davidson 1979). They were also engaged in the study of attitudes of soldiers and morale analysis (Davidson 1979). There was a concomitant growth of mental hospitals and other clinics and institutions to treat pathological disorders and this in turn led to an increase in the hiring of clinicians. By the end of World War II the number of psychologists in the United States had grown to over 20,000 of whom almost one third were clinically oriented (Davidson 1979). However, most treatment was still educational and counseling in nature or psychodynamic since laboratory science had yet to be developed. In 1947, the American Psychological Association's Board of Education and Training stressed the concept of the 'scientist-professional or the psychologist properly trained to execute high quality research, as well as treatment' (Davidson 1979:26). The APA now saw the need for its members to prepare themselves
for the 'precise measurement and manipulation of the experimental laboratory' (Davidson 1979:2). By the late 1950s, the era of the modification of pathological behavior had arrived and the discipline of psychology came into its own in the laboratory.

3:2 Reshaping Behavior

In the late 1950s and 1960s, the tenets of radical behaviorism (a philosophy of the study of behavior) guided the study of operant conditioning (the study of the way in which behavior is modified by its consequences) as espoused by the psychologist Skinner (Davey 1988). Learning theorists were primarily interested in operant conditioning in animals in the belief that any principles they discovered with a limited number of laboratory species would be 'more or less relevant to human behavior' (Davey 1988:1).

The principles that they looked for involved the search for variables controlling behavior and the construction of a functional analysis of behavior. Hence there was an extensive study of performance on schedules of reinforcement and of the 'discriminate control of behavior' (Davey 1988:1). This led to refinements in principles of reinforcement, punishment, stimulus control, extinction and conditioned reinforcement and so forth (Davey 1988). It was now possible to reshape human conduct into a science capable of direction by psychological expertise through behavioral therapies and techniques associated with the laboratory, to include experimental methods, advanced statistical techniques and the 'objectivity and neutrality of the white-coated psychologist' (Rose 1990:229). Hence Rose's (1990) argument that a single conceptual and practical space was thus established for the explanation and reformation of all abnormalities of behavior. As Rose (1996) observes, behavior therapy proved to be an ideal mechanism for grasping in thought all the irritating, maladaptive difficulties of adjustment and antisocial behavior troubling parents, teachers and the authorities.

In 1968, Ayllon and Azrin designed the first token economy based upon operant conditioning techniques (Davey 1988). In the form of 'contingency
management', token economies provided a set of more or less rigorously applied instructions for the organization of institutional regimes. In its most systematic form, institutionally desired behavior was 'made translatable into a universal reward of tokens, points, or money' (Rose 1990:236), and these could be exchanged for those things that the subject considers desirable which could be anything from 'love' to 'food'. Rewards were withheld or reduced in response to undesirable behavior rather than reinforcing the behavior by attention (Rose 1990).

In 'milieu therapy' the rationale of behavior therapy merged with that of the therapeutic community as the principles of reward and punishment were integrated into the very fabric of the institution (Rose 1990). All aspects of the environment of the patient or inmate - 'from timetabling to interactions with the cleaning staff - were instrumentalized according to the calculus of reinforcement' (Rose 1990:236). Henceforth, behavioral techniques could be deployed wherever particular forms of human conduct could be specified or desired. These techniques, Rose (1990:237) states, were implicated in the expansion and reshaping of psychotherapies far beyond the psychiatry of mental illness, providing a way of promoting the capacity to cope 'in accordance with social norms among new sectors of the population and in new institutional sites'. Behavioral psychotherapy was generalized to include such symptoms as 'sexual orientation, anxiety, lack of assertiveness, and the wish to increase self-control' (Rose 1996:158). Or, in the language of behavioral psychology, 'the systematic management of environmental circumstances and response-contingent reinforcements by the clients themselves' (Rose 1990:237). Therapists therefore instruct clients in the rationale of the technique for the management of their natural and social environment. Most importantly, the therapist:

educates him or her in the means of self-inspection to be used: systematic self-monitoring and record keeping, showing the occasions on which desired and undesired behaviour occur, and the construction of a detailed plan ... (Rose 1990:237)
It was now possible to think of all forms of social behavior, whether successful or unsuccessful, 'not as expressions of some inner quality of the soul, but as learned techniques or social skills' (Rose 1990:237). Clinical psychologists saw their programs as being an educational and skills model of human problems, taking over from a disease and treatment model (Rose 1990). Hence the therapist's job was seen more as the teaching of new skills rather than the removal of 'not very well defined "illnesses"' (Rose 1990:238). Such was the case with therapists who ran the heterosocial skills modules in the multi-modal programs developed in work with sex offenders in the 1980s, to be discussed in the following chapter.

Behavior therapy competed with the hegemony of both psychiatry and psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis was discredited by psychology at the level of its diagnostic techniques, its theoretical codes and treatment modalities (Rose 1990). The application of the rules of scientific experimentation when applied to psychoanalysis showed that the claims of psychoanalysis as to its efficacy were unfounded (Rose 1990). Behavioral critics maintained that spontaneous remission from symptoms accounted for 'positive change in two-thirds of neurotic patients (Eysenck, 1952; Rachman, 1971)' (Pilgrim and Rogers 1993:107). Further, Pilgrim and Rogers argue that the so-called 'deterioration effect', where symptoms got worse during the course of therapy, were rendered problematic and women were identified as being particularly prone to adverse effects when faced with 'male stereotypical expectations of mental health held by male therapists' (Pilgrim and Rogers 1993:107). Pilgrim and Rogers assert therefore that:

> the overall estimate of psychotherapy is that it is only of marginal (though positive) utility because the gains it achieves are offset by deterioration effects and spontaneous remission (Bergin and Lambert, 1978). (Pilgrim and Rogers 1993:107 original italics)

The behavioral critique of the deployment of 'conversational modes of treatment' (Pilgrim and Rogers 1993:102) with sex offenders was thus situated
within wider truth struggles between the discourse of behavioral psychology and the discourse of psychoanalysis. Freeman (1979:430) quotes Field and Williams (1971) as stating that 'Bieber et al. (1962) say that analytic psychotherapy is an appropriate treatment for sex criminals in general, but, as judged by the reduction in the reconviction rate, its practical value may be doubted'. In the United States, second wave feminism was also implicated in this evolving censorship of the discourse of psychoanalysis. American feminists critiqued the theory of penis envy, the concept of the 'normal' feminine role and the attribution to women of specific character traits such as masochism, passivity and narcissism (Castel, Castel and Lovell 1982). As Castel et al. state, the feminist rejection of psychoanalysis and traditional psychotherapy 'was backed by a political movement and publicized widely in pamphlets, brochures, and books printed by alternative presses and distributed at political meetings, rock festivals, and on college campuses' (Castel, Castel and Lovell 1982:232). This convergence of multiple voices of critique of psychoanalysis thus contributed towards its gradual exclusion from treatment technologies deployed in the Field of Sex Offender Treatment. It will be recalled that in 1975, a comparative study between psychotherapeutic and behavioral techniques was undertaken in the Kingston Penitentiary in Canada. This study resulted in claims that psychotherapeutic techniques had been unsuccessful in achieving specific goals, thus adding weight to the censure of the deployment of its techniques with sex offenders/child molesters. In the 1990 text edited by Marshall et al., referred to in Chapter Two, the only reference to psychoanalysis in the 400 pages was in relation to the above comparative study.

With regard to psychiatry, whilst acknowledging the medical aspect that dealt with the effects of tumors, lesions and other physical conditions through physical and pharmacological treatment, psychology nevertheless challenged the appropriateness of psychiatric treatment in a great proportion of the problems it addressed that were not diseases (Rose 1990). Psychologists argued that not only were there no organic correlates of such disorders currently recognized, but furthermore they were 'not "symptoms" of "underlying disorders" at all' (Rose 1990:233). Neurotic disorders, personality
disorders, and many types of criminal conduct, for example deviant sexual offending, were not 'illnesses' but problems of behavior, acquired in large part by the processes of learning, unlearning, or failure to learn. Hence the argument that it was inappropriate for psychiatry to treat such problems for the processes involved were outside the scope of medical training and did not require the 'sophisticated and expensive clinical skills of the doctor' (Rose 1990:233).

Psychology thus opened up the scientific and moral space for a new expertise and the profession of clinical psychology. It was a profession that remained at the level of the problem itself, at 'the discrepancy between the behaviour produced and the behaviour desired' (Rose 1990:234). Hence, as Rose (1996) observes, psychology, whilst seeking to claim a corner of the market in psychopathology, did not explicitly challenge the jurisdiction of psychiatry over medical matters. Rather, it made its claim to clinical expertise. Psychologists were no longer confined to administering a battery of tests to each patient, to answer the questions of a psychiatrist who 'knew little of psychology or of the skills of the psychologist' (Rose 1990:234). Rather, behavior therapy now allowed psychologists to have a say in the questions and to claim 'exclusive capacities to carry out treatment' (Rose 1990:234). The Field of Sex Offender Treatment is a case in point, for as Abel and Blanchard (1976:99) state, the problem of deviant sexual behavior was 'one of the earliest areas of psychopathology to which behavioral techniques were applied'. Hence the treatment of sex offenders was one of the earliest areas to which clinical psychology made its claim.

The reader may recall that in 1996, Marshall maintained that it was the advent of behavior therapy in the 1960s, and its subsequent rapidly expanding acceptance and application in the early 1970s, that led to the emergence of a systematic approach to the assessment, explanation and treatment of sex offenders. However, I have argued that the emergence of clinical psychology and its techniques of behavior therapy did not mark an era of rapidly expanding acceptance, but rather marked the emergence of a period of conflict between the discipline of psychology and the discipline of psychiatry. At the
center of one of the struggles waged between these two forces was the body of the sex offender. The shifting of responsibility for his treatment within the practical division of labor between psychiatrists and psychologists within the psychiatric apparatus was thus a somewhat less smooth process than Marshall (1996) would have us believe. This struggle, and the treatment regimes deployed within the Field of Sex Offender Treatment upon the body of the sex offender - where the effects of power are felt - are two of the subjects of investigation in the following chapter.

IN SUMMARY

In this chapter, my investigations have been concerned with how being and reality have been rendered thinkable within the discourses of psychiatry, criminal anthropology, sexology and psychoanalysis. My first investigation focused on the discourse of psychiatry and the deployment of its intellectual machinery within its psychiatric style of reasoning to render being thinkable as a mode of existence - homicidal mania - in which insanity existed as an invisible danger hidden in human behavior. My second investigation concerned criminal anthropology and the deployment of its arts and skills in order to link up artifacts (skulls), techniques (physiognomy and photography), affects (emotions, expressions) and observations and notations (physical stigmata) in order to frame and produce tainted citizens made thinkable as dangerous and 'risky' individuals. I then investigated the discourse of sexology, the science of sex, that through its language and vocabularies, inscribed within a psychiatric style of reasoning, through its skills of ordering, classification and segmentation, manufactured and produced sexual perverts. My investigations have all been concerned with battles over truth claims within and between the discourses of psychiatry, psychoanalysis and psychology. It was psychiatry's truth claims as they related to its theory of hereditary degeneracy that were challenged by those of psychoanalysis, with its dynamic conception of psychological processes and theory of 'conflicting' multiple instincts. Psychoanalysis was also implicated in battles over Truth as it related to the efficacy of the treatment of sex offenders. In this conflict, psychoanalytic and behavioral techniques were compared. Also investigated
were the disciplinary techniques of surgical and medical castration and stereotactic neurosurgery, and in the following chapter we shall see how battles are waged when the validity of such surgical 'treatment' is challenged. We shall also see in the following chapter how the emergence of behavioral psychology’s domain of the modification of pathological behavior enables psychology to deploy certain truths to lay claim to the exclusive treatment of the sex offender, thus successfully challenging the hegemony of psychiatry in this specific treatment domain.
CHAPTER FOUR
SEDUCTIONS AND PLEASURES

Yet psychology has a characteristic and seductive relation to the practices it has come to regulate, in that it offers a means of exercising power that is ethical because it has as its basis not an external truth ... but an internal truth, one essential to each individual person over whom it is exercised. (Rose 1996:92)

1. SEDUCTIONS

1:1 Antipsychiatry

I begin this chapter with an investigation of the broad movement known as antipsychiatry (i.e. critique of psychiatry) which, together with civil rights movements such as gay liberation, converged with behavioral psychology in challenging the hegemony of psychiatry in the treatment of sex offenders. For example, the antipsychiatry and civil rights movements in the United States played a key role in challenging, on ethical and legal grounds, the deployment of 'traditional' psychiatric techniques such as surgical castration and psychosurgery. Challenges were made on similar grounds concerning the use of behavior modification experiments, particularly as they pertained to attempts to 'cure' homosexuality. Whilst behavior modification techniques administered by behavioral psychologists were also challenged, such as the use of aversion therapy, 'widely used on "hard-core" inmates and sexual offenders' (Castel, Castel and Lovell 1982:18), it was psychiatry's treatment of sex offenders that was increasingly marginalized. But by far the greatest threat to psychiatry's hegemony came from the challenge by antipsychiatry, civil rights proponents and behavioral psychology to the validity and efficacy of programs for sexual psychopaths, which had as their 'justification "treatment" and/or "cure"' (Bohmer 1983:15). It was here that the antipsychiatry and civil rights movements contributed towards opening up the possibility for behavioral psychology to make its most significant bid for the
exclusive right to deliver 'appropriate' treatment to sex offenders who, behavioral psychologists argued, did not in the vast majority suffer from a 'disease'.

It was in the late 1950s, early 1960s that the intellectual movement of antipsychiatry first emerged in France, England, America, Italy, Germany and Japan. Antipsychiatry denounced the mental hospital as a total institution, seeing a 'political (repressive) function to psychiatric practices and techniques' (Castel, Castel and Lovell 1982:x). It was the authoritative voices of psychiatrists themselves, such as Ronald Laing, David Cooper and Thomas Szasz that accorded legitimacy to the movement (Kirk and Kutchins 1992). In France, it was through the study of institutions such as medicine, psychiatry, the prison and the police (Castel 1991) that French philosophy had evolved towards a structured reflection on the power of discourse (Braidotti 1991). Castel et al. (1982:x) argue that intellectuals now 'reconstructed' both the discourses that institutions produced, as well as the populations 'dominated by such discourses and the everyday social relations reflected in them', and began to perceive power where they had never looked before. Michel Foucault's (1971) Madness and Civilization became one of the key texts of the times to be read, applied and incorporated within the movement of antipsychiatry. Castel et al. (1982:x-xi) argue that in Italy, the 'crucible of such activity was Psichiatria Democratica', the Italian democratic psychiatry movement, which was a fifteen-year-old anti-institutional movement in which mental health workers and professionals actively participated. Since the nineteenth century, Italian psychiatry had been concerned with 'solving practical problems' (Tagliavini 1985:190). However, with the closure of psychiatric hospitals in Italy during the era of antipsychiatry, it was the texts of intellectuals such as Foucault, that were influential in the negotiation of ongoing struggles to articulate a praxis that was neither purely psychiatric nor institutional.

In the United States the texts of Szasz (1961), on the 'myth' of mental illness, Laing (1971), on antipsychiatry, and Rosenham (1973), on 'pseudopatients', were influential in many legal and academic circles (Klerman 1990). At the same time, many of the sociologists teaching in major American universities
identified themselves as 'labeling theorists'. Within symbolic interactionism, a theory articulated within the discourse of sociology, 'mental illness' was rendered thinkable as an arbitrary social label, 'conveying more about the structure of authority in a particular social situation than about pathology' (Kirk and Kutchins 1992:21). Mental illness was thus spoken about as merely another instance of how society labeled and controlled those who behaved badly (Kirk and Kutchins 1992). Hence many psychiatrists and sociologists became convinced that they had certain shared interests, an understanding achieved in part through the dissemination of psychiatric texts such as the above and those of sociologists such as Erving Goffman. Pilgrim and Rogers (1993) state that it was in his 1961 text entitled *Asylums: essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates*, that Goffman critiqued the role imposed on psychiatric patients admitted to the asylum, focusing upon the degradation of the individual and their loss of citizenship. Further, Pilgrim and Rogers maintain that within the labeling theory way of thought, the low social status and 'powerlessness' of psychiatric patients was thought to render them both unimportant and invisible within the psychiatric regime. Within the antipsychiatry movement, it now became possible therefore to conceive of a psychiatric diagnosis of mental illness as a practice of stigmatization. Klerman (1990:106) argues that such practices thereby confirmed a patient in a situation that reified the conditions such labeling was 'intended to diminish'. The separation of the 'mentally ill' from the larger population was now thinkable as a form of social control, mental health professionals being constituted as instruments of such control (Klerman 1990).

Multiple disciplinary voices also contributed towards the critique that the mental health profession was extending itself into social areas where psychiatric expertise could not be justified (Klerman 1990). Kirk and Kutchins (1992:22) note that by the early 1970s 'some psychiatrists argued that psychiatry and the medical model were dying and deserved a good Irish wake'. Such observations and controversies articulated by the multiple voices that converged within the antipsychiatry movement opened up the possibility for research on the adverse social and legal consequences of psychiatric practices. These discursive practices in turn influenced many lawyers trained
identified themselves as 'labeling theorists'. Within symbolic interactionism, a theory articulated within the discourse of sociology, 'mental illness' was rendered thinkable as an arbitrary social label, 'conveying more about the structure of authority in a particular social situation than about pathology' (Kirk and Kutchins 1992:21). Mental illness was thus spoken about as merely another instance of how society labeled and controlled those who behaved badly (Kirk and Kutchins 1992). Hence many psychiatrists and sociologists became convinced that they had certain shared interests, an understanding achieved in part through the dissemination of psychiatric texts such as the above and those of sociologists such as Erving Goffman. Pilgrim and Rogers (1993) state that it was in his 1961 text entitled *Asylums: essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates*, that Goffman critiqued the role imposed on psychiatric patients admitted to the asylum, focusing upon the degradation of the individual and their loss of citizenship. Further, Pilgrim and Rogers maintain that within the labeling theory way of thought, the low social status and 'powerlessness' of psychiatric patients was thought to render them both unimportant and invisible within the psychiatric regime. Within the antipsychiatry movement, it now became possible therefore to conceive of a psychiatric diagnosis of mental illness as a practice of stigmatization. Klerman (1990:106) argues that such practices thereby confirmed a patient in a situation that reified the conditions such labeling was 'intended to diminish'. The separation of the 'mentally ill' from the larger population was now thinkable as a form of social control, mental health professionals being constituted as instruments of such control (Klerman 1990).

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during the civil rights era, who initiated legal suits on behalf of hospitalized mental patients (Klerman 1990). Hence Klerman's (1990) observation that psychiatric expertise in legal, legislative and public opinion arenas was challenged by critics calling into question the reliability and validity of diagnoses of mental disorders.

With the convergence of antipsychiatry and civil rights, the validity of 'time-honored' psychiatric treatment of sex offenders was called into question. For example, although prior to 1968 Californian courts had approved voluntary surgical castration, by the early 1970s the availability of the 'treatment' to consenting subjects was 'extremely limited' (Bohmer 1983). Moreover, neither castration nor psychosurgery was available as a 'treatment' option for non-consenting patients. However, this may not have been as it was, had it not been for the struggle between two forces, namely the California Department of Corrections and the Prisoners' Action Committee. In 1971, due to the small scale of the practice of psychosurgery, the Corrections Commissioner asked for funding for a more systematic program (Castel, Castel and Lovell 1982). In this proposed program, all violent inmates were to be examined and 'if brain abnormalities were deemed to be the cause of their violent behavior, psychosurgery would be performed' (Castel, Castel and Lovell 1982:185). However, the project had to be abandoned after the Prisoners' Action Committee publicized the plan (Castel, Castel and Lovell 1982) as part of its strategy of resistance.

In 1973, the Medical Committee for Human Rights brought suit against the Lafayette Clinic in Detroit. The Clinic was accused of performing psychosurgery on prisoners and the court ruled that '[w]hen institutional constraints play a part in the decision, the choice is not free' (Castel, Castel and Lovell 1982). When a citizens' group raised doubts as to whether it was ever really possible for prisoners to submit voluntarily to psychosurgery, the head of California's Department of Justice responded by 'invoking the plight of criminals sentenced to life terms and asked, "What else can they do?"' (Castel, Castel and Lovell 1982:189). The critical point here, as we saw in regard to the deployment of the technique of surgical castration, is that authority is
exercised over the prisoners in light of knowledge of them as subjects, thereby transforming the exercise of authority. Hence, it is not a matter of ordering or commanding the prisoners to have psychosurgery, but of improving the capacity of the men to exercise authority over themselves and thereby to 'choose' it for themselves, such a choice being in their own 'best interest'. The exercise of authority thereby becomes a therapeutic matter for, as we have seen in Chapter Two, the most powerful way of acting upon the actions of others is to change the way in which they govern themselves (Rose 1996). Therefore it was not so much a problem of constraint that precluded 'voluntary submission', but rather an issue of 'freedom' to choose. In the early 1980s, a United States government task force appointed to consider the topic of psychosurgery concluded that the technique did hold therapeutic promise, but recommended that its use be 'confined to designated research centers' (Berlin 1983:114) in order to assure proper safeguards. My question is, for whom were proper safeguards intended in this recommendation, given that there were now external constraints on experimentation? Would it be safeguards for the subjects, or for the experimenters, or for both?

At the same time as the antipsychiatry and civil rights movements gained momentum in the latter 1960s, early 1970s, a plethora of new behavioral techniques were developed for rendering 'sexual deviates' (Abel and Blanchard 1976:101) amenable to reshaping. This development was situated within the emerging controversy and tension between M.D. psychiatrists and Ph.D. clinical psychologists. Behavioral psychologists placed emphasis upon the systematic and experimental approach to deviancy which was 'the heart of behavior modification' (Begelman 1975:162). The effectiveness of techniques of behavior change was explained in terms of experimentally derived psychological principles or learning theory. However, Klerman (1990) notes¹ the argument that claims by behaviorists that learning theory provided a scientific basis for clinical practice, as well as their attack on mental entities, appeared to be related:

¹ Klerman (1990) attributes this argument to London (1971). However, it is not traceable within London's (1971) text.
more to the need of behavior therapists to separate themselves from their psychoanalytic and psychiatric colleagues than to a large body of directly relevant scientific evidence. (Klerman 1990:118)

In 1979, Gelder argued that whilst behavior therapy was scientifically based, employing principles established in the psychological laboratory, it was still 'somewhat remote from the complexities of psychopathology' (Gelder 1979:352). Gelder (1979) then went on to suggest that the real task of behavior therapists was:

not to defend their approach against criticism that is too narrow, but to push the explanatory principles to their limits, being prepared to revise them when they no longer accord with clinical observation. (Gelder 1979:352)

On-going truth struggles between behavioral psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis, previously discussed in Chapter Three in relation to the emergence of psychology and behavior therapy, also included attacks by behavioral science upon the conceptual foundations of psychiatry. This was because the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Second Edition (DSM-II), the psychiatric nosology first published in 1968, had 'continued the psychodynamic tradition of DSM-I' (Kirk and Kutchins 1992:27). DSM-I had incorporated major political and theoretical shifts in American psychiatry after World War II, when psychodynamic truth claims and psychoanalytic discursive practices were being increasingly deployed within the discourse of psychiatry, as discussed in the previous chapter. A key issue for social and behavioral scientists was the fact that psychiatric nosology (i.e. classification of diseases), as expressed in DSM-II, did not provide a conceptual definition of mental disorder. Rather, it offered 'general, vague descriptions of specific disorders that had evolved over the years through professional consensus' (Kirk and Kutchins 1992:29). Hence the challenge by social and behavioral scientists, particularly psychologists concerned with measurement and diagnosis, to the construct validity of psychiatry's
conceptualization of 'mental illness'. In the early 1970s, the issue of validity became central to the heated debate about the psychiatric status of homosexuality, a debate within which civil rights/gay liberation and antipsychiatry converged.

In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association devoted a session of its May 9th Annual Meeting in Honolulu, Hawaii, to 'Should Homosexuality Be in the APA Nomenclature?' (Stoller et al. 1973). Begelman (1975:182) states that the possibility for such a debate was created by the increasing pressure from gay liberation groups and the writings of commentators such as Szasz (1961), Goffman (1961) and Laing (1966). By mid-December 1973, a majority of trustees of the APA approved a decision to remove homosexuality from its list of 'mental disorders' as contained in DSM-II (Begelman 1975). The diagnostic category of 'homosexuality' - listed in the section on sexual deviations - is substituted with the new category of 'sexual orientation disturbance,' (Begelman 1975:178). However, as Begelman (1975:178 original italics) points out, the newer concept of "sexual orientation disturbance" covers individuals who are "disturbed" only when their sexual interests are directed toward persons of the same sex'. On the other hand, there is:

no such thing as 'the problem of heterosexuality' in the psychiatric or behavioral lexicon. The category is typically parsed as 'the problem of marital discord,' or 'the problem of aggressive behaviors,' or 'the problem of impotence,' or 'the problem of frigidity,' and so forth. (Begelman 1975:179)

Here Begelman (1975) identifies how the language and vocabularies of psychiatric and behavioral reasoning constitute modes of existence. And once again, the decisions of authorities are conducted in a way that appears to be in the (best?) interest of those who will be affected, namely those identified as homosexuals who 'suffer' from so-called sexual orientation disturbance. This new classification is seductive insofar as it gives a kind of human and moral worth to the undertaking, for here it is the psychological expert who can do a
good job whilst at the same time appearing to do good (Rose 1996). Nevertheless, the adoption of this new categorization did result in an 'almost complete elimination of work concerning methods to increase appropriate sexual arousal' (Quinsey and Earls 1991:286). In 1974, Volume 1, Number 1 of the Journal of Homosexuality was published, specializing in 'alternative sexual life-styles' (Silverstein 1974:5), thereby articulating resistance to the notion of 'sexual orientation disturbance'.

It is nevertheless valuable for us to investigate here behavioral psychology's early work to increase so-called 'appropriate' sexual arousal in homosexual men. This is because knowledges and truth claims generated from experiments that deployed, for example, the technique of electric shock aversion therapy, were then fashioned by behavioral psychology into diverse modes of application with other subjects, to include heterosexual sex offenders. Further, the technical means deployed to discipline the body of the homosexual, specifically the technique of electroconvulsive shock, played a key role in the materialization of electrical aversion therapy and hence the technique was implicated in on-going debates about behavior modification and criticisms of its methods. To illustrate this point, in the 1990s the behavioral psychologists Quinsey and Earls (1990:285) bemoan the fact that since 1983, the literature on the deployment of electric aversion therapy to reduce inappropriate sexual arousal in sex offenders 'appears to have dried up'. They conclude that 'electrical aversion, or at least its evaluation, appears to have gone out of fashion' (Quinsey and Earls 1990:285). In 1975 however, Begelman (1975:161 original italics) had noted that because of the 'opposition to drastic methods of behavior change on the part of civil libertarian groups such as the A.C.L.U. or Children's Defense Fund', legal definitions of behavior modification were defined in order to encompass:

modalities such as electroconvulsive treatment (ECT), chemotherapy and psychosurgery, normally understood to be aspects of traditional psychiatric practice. (Begelman 1975:161)
As a consequence, Begelman (1975:161) suggested that ethical and legal criticisms of, or opposition to, behavior modification 'probably altered the frequency of certain time-honored psychiatric procedures, as well as those classified as behavior modification'. It is this, I suggest, that accounts for the literature having 'dried up' and electrical aversion therapy, including the technique of electroconvulsive shock, having 'gone out of fashion'.

According to Pilgrim and Rogers (1993:41) the prioritization of men as suitable cases for such treatment was 'at its most exaggerated in the late 1960s and early 1970s'. In electric shock aversion therapy, the procedure was first to *elicit* the undesirable behavior from the patient. The behavioral psychologists Abel and Blanchard (1976) comment that in earlier treatment more time was spent in satisfying the requirement to elicit behaviors of 'neurotic maladaptation', than in actually carrying out the behavior therapy. This comment is made in light of the fact that 'neurotic maladaptation' is a way of thought based on *psychodynamic* theory that constitutes homosexual behavior as a heterosexual phobia, that is, homosexual males are said to be basically phobic of females (Abel and Blanchard 1976:109). However, once the behavior *had* been elicited, it was accompanied by an experience *induced* by electric shock, which completed the experiment. Shlien (1997), having witnessed this technique, argues that part of this experience was *fear*, the *smell* of which was stark, intense, and common to patients who were subjected to electroconvulsive shock. At Atascadero State Hospital in the United States, aversion therapy techniques included the administration of electric shock treatments as well as the injection of succinylcholine, which was used to punish homosexuals who "misbehaved" within the institution' (Castel, Castel and Lovell 1982:187).

Behavioral psychology subsequently extended its disciplinary gaze and behavior modification techniques to include heterosexual as well as homosexual sex offenders. At Somers State Prison in Connecticut, for example, electrodes were 'attached to the skin of child molesters and a shock was administered each time a photo of a naked child was projected on a screen in front of the prisoner' (Castel, Castel and Lovell 1982:187). The use of
behavior modification techniques by behavioral psychologists in 'treatment' of heterosexual sex offenders was in part justified by statistics that had included 'recidivism data' as it related to sex offenders who had undergone psychiatric treatment in 'special hospitals'. The reader will recall from the previous chapter that between 1938 and 1966 thirty-one states had enacted sexual psychopath statutes in the United States. Pithers (1990), one of the earliest pioneers of the cognitive-behavioral program Relapse Prevention, concludes that reviews of outcome data regarding treated sex offenders incarcerated under sexual psychopath statutes demonstrated that 'the enterprise was a failure (Furby, Weinrott, & Blackshaw 1989)' (Pithers 1990:345). Further, Pithers notes that investigations that followed up on offenders who had been released from institutional treatment found 'no difference' in recidivism could be demonstrated between treated and untreated sex offenders, and that 'the efficacy of sex offender treatment ha[d] not been proved (Brecher, 1978)' (Pithers 1990:345). It was this data that was subsequently 'cited by the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (1977), when advocating incarceration, rather than treatment, of sexually aggressive individuals' (Pithers 1990:345).

The above research findings, combined with a growing concern for the ethical rights of special categories of prisoners, together with the acknowledgement of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry that treatment had failed, opened the possibility for behavioral psychology to extend its claim to the treatment of sex offenders. Behavioral psychologists argued that the failure of treatment in 'special' hospitals did not represent a failure of treatment per se, but represented the failure of the wrong kind of treatment, based upon the 'dramatically mistaken' (Pithers 1990:345) assumption that justified sexual psychopath legislation. This assumption, Pithers (1990:345) argues, was that 'sexual offenders suffer[ed] from mental disorders'. As the reader will recall, this assumption, or presupposition, emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth century, out of an alliance between sexology, criminal anthropology and eugenics; an alliance that had enabled the claim to be made that sexual psychopaths suffered from a disease. Within United States sexual psychopath legislation, sexual psychopaths were defined as 'persons who lack the power to control their sexual impulses or who have criminal propensities towards the
commission of sex offences' (Freeman 1979:429). Freeman (1979:429) comments that '[m]ost of the states require a person to have been convicted of some offence, but some simply demand that cause be shown that he is probably a sexual psychopath'. However, after a comprehensive review of an impressive array of research studies, Pithers (1990:345) states that research consistently concluded that the vast majority of sex offenders were 'not significantly impaired'. Pithers (1990) goes on to argue that, based upon the above mistaken assumption, nearly all of the initial programs for sex offenders 'adopted a central premise of the medical model: treatment enables cure' (Pithers 1990:345). It was therefore the notion of 'cure' in relation to sex offenders that was challenged by behavioral psychology. The reader will recall that it was a key argument of behavioral psychology that in a great proportion of the problems that psychiatry addressed there was no disease and therefore (psychiatric) treatment was inappropriate. Hence, the attempted 'cure' of sex offenders by psychiatry was for behavioral psychology a case in point.

Psychiatry's truth claim that sexual aggressors were sexual psychopaths was thus successfully challenged and undermined by behavioral psychology and the 'increasing attack' (Freeman 1979:429) leveled against sexual psychopath legislation by civil libertarians and proponents of antipsychiatry. Having justified its claim that psychiatry had deployed 'inappropriate' treatment with sex offenders, behavioral psychology thus opened up the space within which to provide the 'appropriate' treatment. The body and mind of the sex offender was now increasingly situated within the Field of Sex Offender Treatment, the domain of behavioral psychology and its 'behavior modification' disciplinary techniques. Thus it was the 'accidental' emergence and convergence of the antipsychiatry and civil rights movements and their linkages and connections with the human technologies of psychiatry and psychology that contributed towards the demise of the deployment of the techniques of surgical castration, psychosurgery and electroconvulsive shock with sex offenders. It was also this convergence that assisted in the authorization of behavioral psychology's claim to the exclusive treatment of the subject 'sex offender'. In the following
section, I investigate the specific treatment techniques to which behavioral psychology submitted the 'body-thought' of the heterosexual sex offender.

2. PLEASURE

2:1 The Pleasure of the Surveillance of Pleasure

There is something in surveillance, or more accurately in the gaze of those involved in the act of surveillance, which is no stranger to the pleasure of surveillance, the pleasure of the surveillance of pleasure, and so on. (Foucault 1980c:186)

In the following techniques of Covert Sensitization, Orgasmic Reconditioning, Satiation Therapy and Orgasmic Reconditioning without Deviant Fantasy the target of disciplinary power was the body/mind, the 'body-thought', of the sex offender. In these techniques, bodies and minds were manipulated, shaped and trained into 'normality' through the deployment of strategies of observation and control of subjects. This, in turn, required the invention of spaces, such as laboratories, at functional sites where the tests or experiments could be conducted. These were usually in mental health hospitals; state hospitals, forensic or correctional facilities, and sometimes in universities. Within these spaces, disciplinization took place through the experimental nature of the encounter. In such experiments, there was a reciprocal play between the theoretical, for example, the theory of deviant sexual arousal, and the technical, for example the laboratory and the techniques and technical means deployed, here, specifically, gadgets invented to measure so-called deviant sexual arousal. It was within this reciprocal relation that the programs for the stabilization of behavioral psychology's Truths were enacted. Within the laboratory space, behavioral psychology's ways of seeing and thinking were transformed through the deployment of a certain simplification to their tasks (Rose 1996), that lent coherence and systematization to the ways they evaluated and diagnosed the conduct of sex offenders. Furthermore, all tasks were concerned with different aspects of the personhood of the sex offender. Hence all mundane and heterogeneous activities were given what Rose
(1996:62) terms a 'coherence and a rationale' that located them within a single field of explanation and deliberation, whilst at the same time purporting to be grounded in a positive knowledge of the person. Within this behavioral psychological territory, through a complex of problemizations, associations and seductions, certain forms of thinking and acting propagated, and this was because they appeared to be solutions to the problems and decisions confronting the offenders in a variety of settings.

This, in turn, required what Rose (1996:56) terms a 'political and rhetorical labor' in order to construct a translation between the academic training, the textbooks and manuals, the papers and reports and the laboratory. Rose suggests that one of the tactics through which this translation occurs can be characterized by the circulation of a language in which problems come to be articulated in certain terms. They then get accounted for according to 'certain rhetorics, objectives, and goals identified according to a certain vocabulary and grammar' (Rose 1996:56). For example, Marshall (1996:165 my italics) states that early studies support the notion that sex offenders were 'driven to engage in their offensive behavior by the fact that they actually prefer deviant sex'. Marshall (1996:165 my italics) goes on to state that this way of thinking is circulated in an array of locales as 'the "sexual preference hypothesis" which obviously assumes that sexual offending is driven by sexual desires'. Here, behavioral psychology enters the power/knowledge networks of the deployment of sexuality through the grammar and vocabulary of sexology, the constitution of the biological instinct and the 'sex drive'. Sexuality is thus described as a stubborn drive, 'of necessity disobedient to a power which exhausts itself trying to subdue it and often fails to control it entirely' (Foucault 1979a:103). In arguing that it is the child molester/incest offender's sexual desire that has driven him to engage in offensive (deviant) behavior, behavioral psychology both requires 'incestuous desire' that has to be controlled and accepts its existence, 'obviously' (Marshall 1996). Furthermore, in order to problematize the child molester/incest offender's failure to control his stubborn sex drive, fueled by sexual (incestuous) desire, behavioral psychology requires a 'prohibition'. Only if the offender has broken the prohibition is behavioral psychology justified in rendering the
offender thinkable as 'perverted' and his behaviors thinkable as the expression of a perverted sexual desire. Hence the status of the incest prohibition must also go unchallenged (Bell 1993). And in describing the perverted sex offender's sexual behavior as deviant, behavioral psychology can judge sexual behaviors that do not 'break the prohibition', that are not fueled by incestuous desire, as 'normalized' or 'socially acceptable' and the men who engage in such behaviors as 'normals' or 'nondeviants'. The child molester/incest offender's deviant sexuality can now be made thinkable in terms of a 'sexual preference hypothesis', i.e. preference for 'deviant sex', now that he is tied to the relationship between his self as desiring agent and the object of his desire, and hence situated outside 'normal' sexuality. This 'hypothesis' is accounted for within learning theory and the psychological principle that 'organisms perform behaviors which produce greater rewards more frequently and vigorously than [they perform] other less rewarding behaviors' (Barbaree 1990:116).

Furthermore, engaging in hypothetical rhetoric, clinicians articulate the problem of deviant sexual preference in terms of a man getting greater satisfaction or reward from a deviant stimulus or act if that causes his maximal arousal (Barbaree 1990). This 'maximal' response is measured against a less strong response to normalized or socially acceptable stimuli or acts (Barbaree 1990). Barbaree (1990) states that the sexual preference hypothesis is therefore:

not so much a formal hypothesis or theory articulated by a single author or group as much as it is an implied set of working assumptions shared by many clinicians in the field. (Barbaree 1990:116)

This hypothetical rhetoric, or so-called 'working assumptions', of the sexual preference hypothesis are situated in a 'psychologized' network that entails the establishment of what Rose (1996:56) terms a problem-solution linkage. Now that the offender's inappropriate (deviant) sexual preferences have been hypothesized, that is, problematized, and situated against 'normal' (adult) (hetero)sexual preferences, clinicians construct a diversity of experiments, or
techniques, in order to disrupt the relationship between child molester/incest offender and the object of his desire, thereby attempting to establish normalized, socially acceptable preferences in the offender. Attempts to achieve this solution, i.e. 'transformation', through the deployment of behavioral techniques subsequently occupy behavioral psychologists for decades. A similar problem-solution linkage will later be made by cognitive-behavioral psychologists in relation to child molesters/incest perpetrators where one of the problems 'identified' is perpetrators' so-called empathy deficit. Having identified the problem, the designated solution is 'victim empathy', to be achieved through the technique of victim empathy education. This education is situated in turn in relation to the relapse prevention disciplinary regime. I investigate Relapse Prevention and re-visit Victim Empathy later in this chapter. But first, I focus upon the behavior modification techniques deployed with heterosexual sex offenders that are situated between the earlier 'treatment' of homosexuals and subsequent cognitive-behavioral techniques. I commence with Covert Sensitization.

In 1966, Cautela was the first to circulate and disseminate psychological 'truths' on the use of Covert Sensitization as a treatment technique with child molesters. However, for the following analysis it is more valuable to draw upon Howitt's (1995) review of this technique. Whilst similar to aversion therapy, the punishment in this technique is a psychologically unpleasant fantasy substituted (pragmatically/creatively, in light of critique) for an electric shock. Hence the 'shock' is aimed here at the mind and emotions of the offender as opposed to a physical shock to his body. First, however, the offender charts his own, what I term, 'offence regime', for which he draws upon his own habits of thought and particular images with which he is familiar, for they were deployed in his sexual abuse of his victim. This assemblage of his own offence regime is undertaken together with the experimenter. A diagram of sexual abuse is thus imaged. Here I choose the term 'imaged', in conjunction with offence regime, in preference to the conventional psychological terminology of 'fantasy' or 'fantasized'. I consider 'fantasy' to be an inappropriate and misleading term for a series of chosen acts that were engaged in, that are now being deliberately recalled, or 'imaged' in
the form of the *offence regime*. Next, the offender is required to fashion an event, in this case to actually 'fantasize', an unpleasant consequence (for him) resulting from the disclosure of the abuse, for example, a prison term (Howitt 1995). Here, it is the offender's own perception of the unpleasantness of the event that is required. The offender then charts his course through the *offence regime*, but interrupts with an 'aversive fantasy episode', that is, thoughts of the unpleasant consequences he might suffer. This interruption occurs in the imaged *offence regime* sequence, before the stage at which the offender abuses the child (Howitt 1995). Finally, a transformation is required to take place that involves fashioning a mode of perception in which 'pleasant consensual sex with an adult partner' (Howitt 1995:195) is visualized, in order to 'dispe[1]' (Howitt 1995:195) the 'aversive thoughts' (i.e. not the *offence regime*). Here the imaging of a diagram of sexual abuse is a confessional technique for it requires the child molester to do more than merely describe the deviant sexual acts. The experimenter requires the offender to reconstruct in and around the acts the 'thoughts that recapitulated it, the obsessions that accompanied it, the images, desires, modulations, and quality of the pleasure that animated it' (Foucault 1979a:63). What is demanded, therefore, is the shared 'listening to pleasure', the organizing and shaping of erotic speech within a power relation to produce an *offence regime* to include the habits of thought and emotion, techniques, routines and injunctions infolded within the offender's genealogy of subjectification. I argue therefore that there is no more 'transformation' or 'liberation' for the child molester from his so-called deviant, incestuous desires in this confessional technique, than for the men at SAIF in the 'whiteboard' confessional technique, as discussed in the Introduction. Rather, the molester is further enjoined to his 'molesting' self. Further, in the requirement that the offender deploy the technique of visualizing pleasant, consensual sex with an adult partner, the *offence regime* is situated within deviancy, and 'pleasant, consensual (heterosexual) sex' with an adult is situated within 'normalcy'. As a sexual pervert, situated on the side of deviancy, the child molester is required to infold thoughts/images of normal, consensual sex with an adult in order to both manifest and maintain a certain disciplined mastery exercised by his self, over his molesting self. Should he be successful, the offender will be rewarded by, to continue the above example, not going to jail. Hence this
technique is concerned with patrolling the boundaries between 'normalcy' and 'deviancy', and appears to preclude any concern for the safety and wellbeing of the victim/survivor.

*Orgasmic Reconditioning* is a variation on the above technique that employs imaging during *masturbation*, an 'assumption' having been made that sexual arousal, a betrayal of *incestuous desire*, has already been conditioned, via masturbation, to some inappropriate stimulus (Earls and Marshall 1983), the *object* of desire. Here clinicians have engaged in hypothetical rhetoric that links the corporeal regime of acts of masturbation with the (masculinist) habit of thought of engendering the objectification of an 'other'. Techniques of visualization and imaging are rationalized in terms of a masculinist claim to the truth of the normativeness of the female's 'looked-at-ness' and submission to the male gaze within gendering power relations. This rationalization is further infolded in this specific technique within a diagram of pornography, consisting of its assemblage of language, vocabularies, images, habits of thought and practices of sexualization and objectification of the female body, in which women are (frequently) rendered thinkable as finding 'sexual fulfillment in submission' (Herman 1992:76). The offender is required to (voyeuristically) view heterosexually orientated pornography in order to 'help' generate (Howitt 1995) sexual imaging and hence the mind is instructed through the eyes. Initially, the heterosexual offender commences masturbation to his diagram of sexual abuse and then switches to the normative map/diagram of pornography immediately before the moment of 'orgasmic inevitability'. The way of thought and ways of seeing at the 'point of ejaculation' are considered to be the most significant 'since the contents of this are most closely reinforced by orgasm' (Howitt 1995:197). Here, the establishment of this relation is enabled by a normative, masculinist way of thought that bears a linkage with the discourse of sexology, with its language of engulfing drives, gushing streams and uncontrollable spasms. During this technique, the experimenter keeps the subject under constant surveillance and *listens to* the offender who is forced to *verbalize* his mapping regime. In this case, confessional techniques both render the offender as perversely asocial, and fail to address the issue of gendering power relations. Further, this
experimental technique, that requires the child molester to 'switch' from his
offence regime to viewing 'pornographic' sexual practices will later be
challenged in the United States on legal and ethical grounds by those both
inside and outside of this psychologized network. Linkages will be made
between this technique and the feminist challenge to coercive techniques used
to 'subjugate women, in prostitution, in pornography, and in the home'
(Herman 1992:76). A further consideration in regard to this technique, is the
ever-present possibility of the (unacknowledged) pleasure of the surveillance
of pleasure on the part of the experimenter, as he solicits and hears 'the
imparting of individual pleasures' (Foucault 1979a:63).

In a recent report in the West Australian newspaper, the Australian reporter
Hewitt (2000:51) notes that in Canada the technique of the use of phallometry,
combined with the use of pornography, is still 'common'. Hewitt (2000:51)
reports Professor David Greenberg of the University of Western Australia as
stating that in Canada '[p]hallometry tested a convicted sex offender by
playing a pornographic audio tape which told a story of a child being
molested'. The offender's erection was measured after he had listened to the
tape and the results 'used to judge the likelihood of reoffence' (Hewitt
2000:51). Professor Greenberg is reported as stating that whilst the test was
no longer used in the United States for ethical and legal reasons, he believes
concerns about playing pornographic stories to child molesters are
'unfounded'. This is because 'the test was used only on convicted people when
assessing their status for release into the community' (Hewitt 1000:51). In
Professor Greenberg's view, identifying high-risk re-offenders helped both in
the imposition of sentencing and release conditions and is the best way 'to
protect the community from them' (Hewitt 2000:51). Hewitt (2000:51) reports
Professor Greenberg as concluding that alternative forms of testing used in
Australia are unreliable and that the use of phallometry combined with
pornography needs to be considered 'from the public health perspective'. As
we shall see below, the expansion of treatment facilities for sex offenders in
Canada since the early 1980s has been extensive. The reader will recall from
the discussion in Chapter Two in connection with Marshall's commission by
the United Kingdom Prison Service, that one of the earliest programs for child molesters was run by Marshal at Kingston Penitentiary in Canada.

In *Satiation Therapy* the offender is required to seat his deviant self in a darkened room where he maintains contact with the therapist via an audio-intercommunication system, thereby being suitably quarantined. The subject is kept under surveillance within this panoptic space by the experimenter who observes him through a one-way screen, checking that he follows the disciplinary regime within the scheduled time. The offender is instructed to remove his trousers and then to commence masturbation (Marshall 1979), whilst at the same time verbalizing every variation of his diagram of sexual abuse/offence regime that he can think of. In the case of one offender, the 'objects of his desire' were female children aged between six to eight years and thirteen to fourteen years. In each of the first six one-hour sessions, the offender was instructed to masturbate continuously throughout the session, whilst imaging his offence regime involving the six to eight-year-old children. He was further instructed that:

> even if he ejaculated he was to continue, stopping only to wipe himself clean if he found this necessary. (Marshall 1979:380)

When his erectile responses to the six to eight-year-old girls were reduced to 'below an average amplitude of 10% full erection' (Marshall 1979:380), the offender was required to switch to imaging his offence regime involving the thirteen to fourteen-year-old girls. The continuation of masturbation for an hour in each session, combined with the elaboration of the offender's diagram of sexual abuse/offence regime, was designed to produce boredom. Whilst this may have been the case, I argue once again that this technique enabled the offender to infold an ever stronger sense of self as a molester life form. In the 1990s in Australia, sex offenders in one program expressed their resistance to further participation in a Masturbatory Satiation Unit, complaining that participation had resulted in their having 'blisters on their penis' (French 1990:106). Such are the effects of disciplinary power upon the penises of
certain 'beings thought' as sex offender, when combined with the 'stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures' (Foucault 1979a:105).

In the technique of *Orgasmic Reconditioning without Deviant Fantasy* the use of the preferred psychological term of 'fantasy' in the title is self-evident. This technique was developed after the ethics of encouraging child molesters to masturbate to 'deviant fantasies', in other words their *offence regime*, as part of treatment was questioned (Howitt 1995). In this technique only 'socially acceptable' sexual material is used to bring the men to an 'orgasmic state', including videotaped material of women and men engaged in various sexual interactions. This videotaped material therefore includes images categorized as pornographic. In the case of one offender in his twenties, who was confined at a Californian state hospital for the molestation of a six-year-old girl, the strategy of showing *slides* of girls under the age of seven was deployed which subsequently elicited erections in the offender (Howitt 1995). The slide strategy was classified as *pre-treatment* hence the 'ethical' issue was circumvented.

In treatment, this offender was required to begin to masturbate to socially acceptable sexual imaging/habits of thought on a daily basis in a laboratory for a period of eight weeks. During this procedure he was instructed to masturbate to ejaculation as rapidly as possible or for twenty minutes, whichever occurred first, whilst describing his socially acceptable thoughts/sexual imaging *aloud*. This latter procedural variation was included to allow *greater control* by the experimenter over the material the subject was utilizing. The subject was further instructed that when he masturbated outside the laboratory he was to continue to use 'socially acceptable' themes. Howitt (1995:198) reports that following this treatment, thoughts/images of women generated the 'biggest erections'. An apparatus specifically designed to *measure* the size of the erection was used in techniques where various 'stimuli', such as slides or videos, were deployed in order to generate erections. It is the development and deployment of such gadgetry that is the subject of the following investigation. My argument, following Rose (1996), is that the technical means available for the materialization of theory have played a
determining rather than subordinate role in the construction of psychological truths. The development of such gadetry enables behavioral psychology to engage with the network of the deployment of sexuality via the operation of techniques of power that monitor sexualities by the (here, literal) measurement of pleasure, thereby extending its forms of control concerned with sensations of the body.

By the beginning of the 1970s, the direct calibration of penile erection was considered superior to all other measures of deviant sexual arousal, given that 'objective measurement is one of the cornerstones of evaluating behavioral treatment' (Abel and Blanchard 1976). As Howitt (1995:103) observes, the idea that it is possible to gain insight into deviant sexuality by 'investigating the penis is well established in work with sex offenders'. Marshall et al. (1990c) state that the technique of penile plethysmography, in plain language, measurement of the erect penis, is one of the hallmarks of work with sexual offenders, 'scientists' in the area becoming 'quite enamored of the technology' (Marshall, Laws and Barbaree 1990c:393). Here, the choice of the word 'enamored' creates a linkage between the gaze of those involved in the act of surveillance and the pleasure of the surveillance of pleasure: such 'pleasures', by implication, moving beyond technicalities and mere job satisfaction.

When the technology of penile plethysmography was first introduced, an 'act of faith' (Marshall, Laws and Barbaree 1990c:394) was made that declared that 'if a subject produces a penile erection to a stimulus deemed "socially inappropriate" that was "deviant arousal" and the producer therefore a "sexual deviant"' (Marshall, Laws and Barbaree 1990c:394). This hypothetical 'act of faith' was rendered thinkable through the logic of biological determinism and the truth claims of sexology and operationalized in the form of assessment. Hence, within the new psychological style of reasoning, an act of 'deviant' sexual arousal identified a man as a certain kind of specie, namely a 'sexual deviant'. This is a similar move to that made from the act to the specie as described in Chapter Two, with the example of the emergence of the homosexual as a 'specie' within the new psychiatric style of reasoning. In this instance however, behavioral psychology has the added advantage of the
technical means available to materialize its theory of deviant sexual arousal, through the measurement of the emergent 'act' of sexual arousal to socially 'inappropriate' stimuli presented in the laboratory. Technical means thus played their part within a 'perceptual system' (Rose 1996:112), that enabled the sex offender to be visualized in such a way as he embodied the properties of the theory of deviant sexual arousal. The laboratory 'experiments', together with the technical means deployed, thus formed what Rose (1996:112) terms a 'realization system', that enabled the properties of the theory to be embodied in the actions of the sex offender, who then became calculable and manageable as a sexual deviant.

In phallometric laboratories or units, four basic types of apparatus were deployed in the measurement of what came to be termed 'penile tumescence', that is, penis engorgement. In 1944, the earliest prototype was the kymograph, a ring encircling the penis. The thermistor measured increased penile temperature and was developed in 1965. Freund and colleagues developed penile volume measurement between 1957 and 1971 (Abel and Blanchard 1976). These devices enclosed a significant portion of the penis, 'recording volume displacement of the penis' (Abel and Blanchard 1976:104) as tumescence occurred. Penile circumference measurement devices dated from 1965 and consisted of elastic tubes encircling the penis, filled with either water, mercury or graphite. When tumescence occurred, the elastic tubing around the penis lengthened causing contraction of the inner diameter of the tubing. With changes of this inner diameter, the calibration of penile size was made possible (Abel and Blanchard 1976). Each instrument had its perceived advantages or disadvantages, but the more sophisticated circumference measurement technologies of the Barlow electromechanical 'strain gauge' and the Parks mercury-in-rubber 'strain gauge' eventually superseded the limitations of earlier models (Earls and Marshall 1983). Eventually, circumferential devices were reduced in size till they not only took up little space in a laboratory but they could even be carried around in a briefcase (Earls and Marshall 1983). Hence, not only were technical means now available for the materialization of theory, but they were also 'portable'.
Sexual arousal is defined in measurement techniques as 'any increase in volume, length, or circumference of the penis' (Barbaree 1990:118) as a result of its engorgement with blood (Sampson 1994). Hence the penis is objectified and sex is located in this privileged part of the male body. The reader will recall that it was within the discourse of sexology that the biological instinct was separated out from the psychical instinct, and deemed to be a natural force located in the genitals. In early techniques developed to investigate arousal patterns in heterosexuals, the presentation of 'stimuli' - a procedure that locates sex in sexual desire - took the form of 'still pictures of nude males and females of all ages' (Barbaree 1990:116). In order to maximize the efficacy of this practice, '[p]otentially arousing slides of male and female nudes were selected from four age groups (5-8, 8-11, 12-14, and 22-26)' (Abel and Blanchard 1976:108). From within each age group, five specific body areas were selected ('face, umbilicus to neck, umbilicus to mid-thigh [anterior], umbilicus to mid-thigh [posterior], and mid-thigh to feet [anterior]') (Abel and Blanchard 1976:108). Slides of these objectified body areas, or parts, in each age group were then presented to elicit erections. However, Abel and Blanchard (1976:108) report that these slides also identified that 'nondeviants respond sexually to girls as young as 8 years old'. In commenting on these findings, Abel and Blanchard (1976:108-09) suggest that further study may reveal that 'deviant arousal may not be a simple qualitative difference (demonstrable arousal to young girls) in sexual arousal, but quantitative difference (e.g., the magnitude of arousal to such stimuli)'. Here, psychology's ways of seeing and thinking confer a certain (masculinist) 'simplification' to the ways in which behavioral psychologists visualize, evaluate and diagnose 'deviant' arousal. The diagnosis that deviant arousal may be quantitative not qualitative is thus rendered 'rational', at a time when the technical means are available to measure the 'magnitude' of arousal. This shift from qualitative to quantitative is also a strategic move, since Abel and Blanchard (1976) acknowledge at the conclusion of their paper that the findings referred to above, where 'nondeviants' responded to girls as young as eight:
suggest that the basic concept of a qualitative difference between
deviant arousal and normal arousal may be incorrect. (Abel and
Blanchard 1976:131)

Abel and Blanchard (1976:131) nevertheless persist in the habit of thought
that there is a difference between so-called deviant and non-deviant men. They
state that if a lack of qualitative difference 'turns out to be the case', then what
will be required will be a major rethinking about the basic distinctions
between 'so-called "normals" and deviants' (Abel and Blanchard 1976:131). Hence
their caveat that quantitative variations be considered. Abel and
Blanchard (1976:131) suggest that the next strategy to be deployed in the
search for a distinction between 'normals' and 'deviants', should be an
investigation of arousal patterns in the so-called 'normal' population in order to
determine the 'extent of peculiar, idiosyncratic arousal patterns'. Possibly
Abel and Blanchard (1976) envision that this will enable them to separate out
'deviant non-deviants' from 'non-deviant non-deviants'. What Abel and
Blanchard (1976) resist considering here is the idea that there may be no
distinction between so-called 'normals' and 'deviants', or even 'normals' and
'non-normals'. The reader will no doubt recall that it was such a consideration
that was presented in Chapter One, where I disrupt the normal/abnormal
division central to the deployment of sexuality by arguing that the incest
perpetrator is not 'sexually perverted'. Rather, I argue that the incest
perpetrator is a 'normal' man, living within a 'normal' family, engaging in
'normal' power relations, who makes a choice to sexually abuse. In other
words, he could be any one of the above 'nondeviants' who 'respond sexually
to girls as young as 8 years old'.

Technological advances were subsequently deployed in the continuing search
for deviance and difference, thereby enabling the presentation of stimuli to
become increasingly 'sophisticated'. For example, when the latest technology
of videotaping became available, videotapes as well as movies were
subsequently regarded as the most 'potent means of presenting sexual stimuli
to elicit erections' (Abel and Blanchard 1976:114 my italics). Abel and
Blanchard (1976:113) describe the erection-producing content used with male heterosexuals in order of increasing erotic value, namely:

a woman stripping, a woman naked, a couple with the female stripping, a couple with the male petting the female's breasts, a couple involved in cunnilingus, heterosexual intercourse with the woman in the superior position, and heterosexual intercourse with the male using rear entry. (Abel and Blanchard 1976:113)

According to Abel and Blanchard (1976:113), the latter four categories 'clearly generated erection responses superior to the former three'. In this instance, the use of sexually specific material is rationalized and normalized through its identification as the most advanced/effective technical means of *erection production*, hence playing its role in the materialization of theory on patterns of (deviant) sexual arousal. Videotaped depictions of adult sexual interaction included both 'non-deviant' (i.e. non-violent) and 'deviant' (i.e. violent) stimuli in the form of 'consenting acts between adult partners and nonconsenting forceful acts' (Barbaree 1990:116). Alternatively, in cases when the 'deviant act' or behavior was idiosyncratic to the patient, the patient could image his own preferred stimuli or use audio or written descriptions of his 'idiosyncratic' *offence regime*.

Nevertheless, despite the deployment of the above stimuli and sexual arousal measurement techniques, the order of the experimental regime could be disrupted by the play of power relations in the constitution of *selves* and battles over Truth. For example, Quinsey and Earls (1990:280) state that 'it has been repeatedly demonstrated that there are some men who are able to exert considerable instructional control of their erectile response in the laboratory'. These *maneuvers* by subjects were identified as *jaking* an erection so as to appear 'sexually normal'. Strategies were therefore put in place to detect and monitor these methods of 'distortion', such as 'monitoring with a video camera, movement detectors, or additional psychophysiological measures' (Barbaree 1990:117). However, such strategies were neither consistently successful nor always available. For example, in Wormwood
Scrubbs prison in the United Kingdom in the early 1980s, the use of the penile plethysmograph as the basis of sex offender treatment programs was discontinued. This was after it was discovered that prisoners had deployed their own strategy of resistance by 'masturbating shortly before being tested in order to depress the readings' (Sampson 1994:122). Nevertheless, the growing practice of the use of the technology of penile plethysmography for assessing sexual preferences continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in Canada.

In 1983, Earls and Marshall argue that the popularity of the technique of penile plethysmography stemmed in part from 'a growing body of experimental literature indicating that as a "response," erection appears to be the single most reliable index of the early stages of sexual arousal' (1983:336 original italics). Earls and Marshall's 1983 contribution to this body of experimental literature adds a further seventeen pages of text to the discussion of the measurement of penile tumescence. In their chapter, Earls and Marshall (1983:349) added a further measurement procedure to that of volume and circumference, namely that of 'penile lengthening'. Earls and Marshall (1983:349) stated that '[i]f the lengthening can be considered "sexual arousal", and there seems little doubt that it can ... it is apparent that circumferential measures do not completely, or even satisfactorily, describe sexual responsivity'. Encouraged by the 'magnitude of the lengthening response' (Earls and Marshall 1983:349), Earls and Marshall developed a working, 'albeit cumbersome, transducer which is capable of detecting length changes throughout the erectile sequence' (Earls and Marshall 1983:349). This device enabled Earls and Marshall to show that 'penile lengthening can be measured without the necessity of videotaping the penis' (Earls and Marshall 1983:349 my italics). The advantage of this measurement to experimenters was that men were, or so Earls and Marshall argued, unable to control the early stages of penile lengthening. Furthermore, attempts to control penile response by subjects could be 'accurately identified on the basis of polygraphic tracings of both penile diameter and length' (Earls and Marshall 1983:349). Hence the search for justification for the continuance of the measurement of the penis continued and 'faking' detection strategies were 'updated'. Further, Earls and
Marshall (1983:349) believed that penile lengthening responses had the potential to yield important assessment and treatment outcome data. However, in order to improve the validity of penile assessment, Earls and Marshall suggested that *more data* was required.

As with the theory of eugenics, the sexual preference hypothesis enabled an entire edifice to be constructed, to include the materialization of functional sites specifically for the production and manipulation of behavioral psychology's penile phenomenon. Laboratories, careers, techniques, vocabularies and gadgets were built for the sole purpose of focusing an obsessional gaze upon the penis. Within this regime of truth, the sex offender and his penis were held within a system of visibility rendered thinkable through behavioral psychology's intellectual techniques. Such techniques established a relation between inner instincts, incestuous desires and 'deviant sexual preferences'. What they omitted to establish was a linkage with gendering power relations, since feminist and sociological truth claims were not included within the rhetoric of truths within the discourse of behavioral psychology. They were not aligned with its system of visibility and focus of gaze upon the psychological 'individual'.

By the latter part of the 1970s, despite attempts to deploy increasingly sophisticated techniques to identify and treat 'sexual deviants', a general disenchantment with exclusively behavioral methods had emerged. This was exacerbated in part by the failure of research and practice to identify a *single cause* of sex offending (Howitt 1995). The dominant theoretical construct of deviant sexual arousal was now being 'increasingly questioned' (Segal and Stermac 1990:161). There was now a strategic requirement for behavioral psychology to move on and focus its gaze upon another part of the personhood of the sex offender. Having been challenged to focus upon the limitations of its intellectual machinery, that is, its theories, concepts and explanations, and its treatment techniques, behavioral psychology shifted its gaze to complementary objectives, specifically as they related to the sex offenders' 'cognitions' and 'cognitive distortions'. Hence the sex offender occupied a new position and role as speaking subject within the Field of Sex Offender
Treatment. But as we shall see, behavioral psychology was also required to extend its visibility to consider the theories and concepts from within alternate discourses circulating within society, namely feminism and sociology.

3. COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY, RELAPSE PREVENTION AND VICTIM EMPATHY - RE-VISITED

Programmes that cover virtually every conceivable deficit in the knowledge, skills and thinking of offenders are the current recommendation. (Howitt 1995:227)

In this section, my final investigation is concerned with Relapse Prevention, after which I re-visit Victim Empathy, thus bringing us 'full-circle', several centuries later, back to the incest offenders at SAIF, the site at which I began this thesis. Relapse Prevention is a key module within 'multi-modal' programs and was envisioned in order to enable the offender to place himself under constant monitoring, and his environment under constant surveillance for risk factors. The aim is thereby to forestall his deviant behavior and hence to 'protect' society. Victim Empathy is also a key module within multi-modal programs and is situated in relation to Relapse Prevention in order to contribute towards the efficacy of the latter program. But first, in order to enable the reader to situate these two modules within the discourse of cognitive-behavioral psychology, and in order to clarify the transformations that constituted change within the discourse of behavioral psychology, I offer an analysis of the emergence of the domain of cognitive-behavioral psychology.

3:1 Cognitive-Behavioral Psychology

By the early 1980s, behavioral psychology faced challenges not only with regard to its own forms of rationality and behavioral methods, but also from a feminist way of thought that insisted on analyzing sexual violence within the social context in which it existed. Within the feminist discourse, it was 'gender' and 'power theory' that were critical conceptualizations through which
to render reality thinkable, as previously discussed in this thesis. Furthermore, as feminist research and practice increasingly revealed the prevalence and incidence of child sexual abuse, resulting in a rise in prosecutions and convictions, so the sex offender population grew and this, in turn, gave offender treatment programs a higher profile. There was also at this time an increasing demand for corporately run treatment programs that could provide alternatives, such as group therapy, to more costly and inefficient traditional individual psychotherapy (Marshall and Barbaree 1990). Cox (1979:331) comments that whilst group methods came about initially on economic grounds, or because of the scarcity of trained personnel, over a period of time there was a 'striking shift in emphasis towards an appreciation of the intrinsic value of the group process itself'. Hence, this is not an example of where technical means are available for the materialization of theory, but, rather, a situation where it is the theory that is materialized through the technical means, which, in this case, is the group ethical scenario.

Within this play of transformations that constituted change within the Field of Sex Offender Treatment, it was the discipline of sociology that articulated the greatest challenge to behavioral psychology with regard to the set of relations which defined and situated it among other types of discourses. This challenge acquired authority through the voice of the sociologist David Finkelhor. In 1984, David Finkelhor's influential text Child Sexual Abuse: New Theory and Research was published, containing an explanation of child sexual abuse that took into account the work of those protecting and treating children, thereby contributing towards the formation of a strong alliance between feminism and sociology. Finkelhor's explanation took the form of a Four Preconditions Model, in which four preconditions 'needed to be met before sexual abuse could occur' (Finkelhor 1984:54), as briefly outlined in the Introduction. This 'model' was widely received and disseminated in a diversity of locales, including 'multi-modal', community-based programs working with child molesters/incest perpetrators and sex offenders as well as prisoner or offender populations (Howitt 1995). By simplifying the 'model' into 4 separate stages, Finkelhor gave a coherence and rationale to the explanation. It was its resultant 'user-friendliness' that enabled the 'model' to be deployed within such
a diversity of locales, having a 'level of generality capable of accommodating many different types of sexual abuse from father-daughter incest to compulsive and fixated molesting' (Finkelhor 1984:54). The rendering of child sexual abuse thinkable under the description of 'four preconditions', opened up the possibility for it to be said that sexual aggression was a product of active planning and intention. This, in turn, contributed towards the necessity for behavioral psychology to effect changes to its own intellectual machinery and techniques. The possibility was now opened up for behavioral psychologists to target and classify the increasing numbers of sex offenders with whom they were working in terms of their cognitions and cognitive 'distortions', an objective that complemented behavioral techniques that addressed the offenders' bodily betrayal of deviant sexual preferences.

In his 1984 text, Finkelhor also argued that behavioral psychologists had failed to take into account the work of those protecting children. Finkelhor argued that this was due to the fact that psychologists had undertaken their research and development of theory whilst working in isolation with sex offenders in prison settings. In challenging such theoretical truth claims, Finkelhor argued that child sexual abuse was a widespread social problem, and stated that sociological dimensions needed to be 'included' in theory. This battle over truth thus represented a struggle for control of discourse within the Field of Sex Offender Treatment. In an exercise in persuasion, Finkelhor's utterances were circulated in order to constitute change specifically in the theoretical options of behavioral psychology. This strategic intervention intersected with the above correlations, such as the growing questioning of the theoretical construct of deviant sexual arousal and the growth of the sex offender population, and collectively they were successful in constituting change within the discourse of behavioral psychology. By the mid-1980s, behavioral psychologists were arguing that both sociological and cognitive factors were 'crucial to the understanding and treatment of sexual offenders' (Marshall, Laws, and Barbaree 1990a:6). Further, behavioral psychologists argued that lack of attention to 'cognition' had constituted a major deficit in the Field of Sex Offender Treatment. Thus, through these transformations within the Field of Sex Offender Treatment, there was a shift from behavioral psychology to
cognitive-behavioral psychology, which located sex offenders in practices that treated cognitions 'as if they were behavior' (Pilgrim and Rogers 1993:101). 'Multi-modal' models of treatment now 'integrate other factors implicated in the commission of sexual assault' (Segal and Stermac 1990:161). These other factors, problematized as 'deficits' in the growing number of identified sex offenders, thereby inscribed a difference in sex offenders from the norm of cultural values and social expectations. This, in turn, required the government of the sex offender's subjectivity and intersubjectivity, operationalized here in the form of 'multi-modal' programs, in which the sex offender was problematized as deficit in regard to heterosexual social skills, communication skills and so forth, and distorted in certain cognitive behaviors. Having inscribed the sex offender within this perceptual system, such that he embodied the theory of his (presumed) deficit and cognitive distortions, what was required was the sex offender's education in new skills, thereby realizing professional aspirations in terms of certain (middle class?) notions, or norms, of personhood. Power is thus rendered visible here as working through subjectivity to create and shape the sex offender as subject.

Throughout the early 1980s in the United States, a growing number of treatment facilities incorporated 'multi-modal' programmings for sex offenders. For example, there was the Minnesota Security Hospital; the Avenel Medium Security Prison in New Jersey; the Western State Hospital Fort Steilacoom, Washington and the Alpha Human Services, Inc., Minnesota. This latter facility was a private community-based residential center run exclusively for the evaluation and treatment of adult sex offenders (Knopp 1984). In Canada, by 1984, Marshall's treatment program in the Kingston Penitentiary was treating eighty-four patients, sixty five per cent of whom were child molesters. In 1982, special appropriation from the Vermont legislature enabled the creation of the Vermont Treatment Program for Sexual Aggressors, with initial funding for sixteen incarcerated sex offenders. By the late 1980s, the program encompassed three residential and twenty outpatient sites, providing services to one hundred and ninety two offenders in prison and in the community, thus representing the first integrated statewide system of
inpatient and outpatient treatment for sex offenders in Canada (Pithers, Martin and Cumming 1989).

Within these programs, heterosexual social-skills training 'subsequently became one of the most commonly prescribed treatments for rapists, pedophiles, and other sex offenders' (McFall 1990:311). Education and skills training was justified in this regard, through the constitution of a linkage between sexual offending and the sex offender's deficit regarding the 'social skills necessary to enable him to form "normal" sexual and social relationships with women' (Stermac, Segal and Gillis 1990:153). Programs focused variously on conversational skills, social anxiety skills, dating skills, daily living skills, problem-solving, assertiveness and conflict resolution skills. They addressed victim empathy as well as marital and family issues and the use of alcohol and drugs. Also included in the choice were programs for anger management, legal education, sex education and correction of cognitive distortion, particularly in relation to 'sex roles'. The reader may recall the discussion in Chapter One of the emergence of role theory and then the emergence of 'sex roles' in the 1950s. Programs involved the techniques of role-play, modeling, performance feedback, diary keeping, workbook or homework feedback to the group and so forth, and, in the case of victim empathy, talks by survivors of sexual assault or videos that presented the assault from the position of the survivor. Participants worked primarily in group therapy format for both economic and 'therapeutic' purposes. It was within these programs that a relationship between the discourse of feminism and the discourse of cognitive-behavioral psychology was first institutionalized. For example, at the Minnesota Security Hospital female staff functioned in all aspects of the programming, including the role of assistant director, and in the running of groups, in which 'both sexes must always be represented and feminist perspectives clearly stated' (Minnesota Security Hospital 1984:216). That is to say, feminism was one of a multiplicity of perspectives taken up within multi-modal programs. By the early 1990s, and throughout the 1990s, similar prison/community-based, multi-modal programs were operating in Australia and, in the case of the SAIF program, in the community. In Great Britain, both Finkelhor's Four Preconditions Model and
Marshall and Barbaree's *Integrated Theory* (i.e. traditional behavioral techniques, as described above, combined with 'multi-modal' programs) constituted the 'theoretical underpinning of almost all the work with sex offenders that [wa]s undertaken in the British penal system' (Sampson 1994:16).

Relapse Prevention and Victim Empathy subsequently became two of the key programs deployed within multi-modal programming. The notion that the sex offender should be encouraged to develop awareness and *understanding* of the impact that the sexual assault had upon his victim, thus leading to his development of *compassion for* his victim, was formulated initially as a strategic, feminist intervention. However, once this notion was colonized within the territory of the cognitive-behavioral, it was constituted as a 'solution' to the individualized offender's problem of *empathy deficit*, thus situating it within a problem-solution linkage. That is, the problem was now constituted as the child molester/incest offender's empathy *deficit*, the solution being the offender's infolding of feelings of *empathy for* the victim, the technique to be deployed in order to achieve this solution being victim empathy education. Within this process of problemization and simplification, *all* sex offenders were deemed to be 'empathy deficit'. By the early 1990s, ninety four per cent of treatment programs surveyed in the United States targeted (the lack of) victim empathy as a central feature of treatment (Marshall 1996).

Further linkages were subsequently made between empathy deficit and the problem of recidivism as it related to the Relapse Prevention 'behavioral-maintenance' program. This necessitated a specific *re-positioning* of the Victim Empathy module in relation to the Relapse Prevention module. I investigate this maneuver in the following section, in which I analyze Relapse Prevention and its strategies that operate through the deployment of *technologies of the self*. That is to say, the Relapse Prevention self-mastery regime is designed to enable the offender to *shape* his own conduct. This enables Relapse Prevention 'experts' to *individualize* the problem of recidivism, and implicate the offender's so-called 'failure' to utilize the
Relapse Prevention behavioral-maintenance 'self-mastery' regime in the failure of behavioral techniques to reduce re-offence rates. It is here that we see the significance of the above 'solution' of victim empathy education for Relapse Prevention experts. As we shall see in the following investigation, Relapse Prevention experts require child molesters/incest offenders to infold victim empathy, in order to motivate them to deploy the tools of the Relapse Prevention behavioral maintenance program, thereby enabling the Relapse Prevention program to achieve its objective of reducing recidivism rates.

3:2 Relapse Prevention: A Regime of Self-Governance

Relapse Prevention is a cognitive-behavioral treatment regime designed to 'enhance the maintenance of changes induced by other therapies for sexual aggressives' (Pithers et al. 1983:214). The relapse prevention 'model' was initially developed as a maintenance regime for use in the treatment of what were termed 'indulgent behaviors', to include 'alcohol abuse, cigarette smoking, drug abuse, and overeating' (George and Marlatt 1989:2). The targeting of these temptations for preventive intervention is, Castel (1991:289) argues, the result of a 'hyper-rationalism' which is at the same time a thoroughgoing pragmatism that 'pretends to eradicate risk as though one were pulling up weeds' (Castel 1991:289). George and Marlatt (1989:3) state that addictive behavior can be conceptualized - when thought through social cognitive theory - as a 'maladaptive response for coping with life stressors and dissatisfactions'. They emphasize that the relapse prevention model is not an 'outgrowth of the medical-disease model of addictions' (George and Marlatt 1989:3), and hence they do not define addictions as 'disease' entities.

In the early 1980s, a specific model of relapse prevention was designed for use with sexual aggressors. This was a response to what George and Marlatt (1989:1) term the 'disappointing' results of behavioral techniques since, despite 'short-term success in modifying sexual arousal patterns' (George and Marlatt 1989:1), such techniques had failed to manifest in long-term, post-treatment success in reducing re-offense rates. Extensive research undertaken from the early 1980s in the Field of Sex Offender Treatment of both treated
and untreated sex offenders was deployed in the field to problematized this
failure in terms of a 'maintenance problem' (George and Marlatt 1989:2
original italic). That is, it could be thought that there had been a failure to
'maintain non-offensive patterns achieved as a consequence of adjudication,
incarceration, and/or treatment' (George and Marlatt 1989:2). The solution,
the Relapse Prevention maintenance program, could now be operationalized in
relation to the objective of reducing recidivism rates.

Relapse Prevention aims to achieve this objective through its 'self-mastery'
program. That is, each sex offender is to conduct his relations with himself,
through the engagement of his self in a cognitive-behavioral regime of rational
'self-mastery' that will shape his existence according to an ethics of autonomy.
Here, self-steering mechanisms (Rose 1996) require the offender to relate to
himself epistemologically, for he is required to know himself. They also
require the offender to relate to himself 'despotically' (Rose 1996:29), for he is
required to master himself through the development and use of specific
cognitive and behavioral skills. It is through this self-mastery and
development of skills, that the sex offender will be able to control his
decision-making process and behavior, and thus 'reduce the probability of
relapse' (Pithers et al. 1983:214). Self-mastery therefore requires that the
offender be educated in the arts of self-inspection and self-monitoring, in order
to be 'more vigilant for high-risk situations and develop[p] the capacity to
recognize dangerous circumstances rapidly' (Pithers et al. 1983:229). This
will be a lifelong task, since successful treatment will not eliminate the
molester's preference for a 'socially unacceptable sex act or object' (Pithers et
al. 1983:220). The Relapse Prevention expert, deploying the grammar and
vocabularies of addiction, instructs the child molester to compare his
'attraction to children to an addict's craving for heroin' (Pithers et al.
1983:222). Thus, in the Relapse Prevention cognitive-behavioral regime, the
existence of incestuous desire continues to be accepted unquestioningly, albeit
its deployment here being in the guise of a 'craving' for the 'socially
unacceptable', prohibited object. The molester is warned that, just as with
heroin addiction, cravings will not disappear as a result of treatment. Here,
Relapse Prevention underscores that its raison d'être is 'maintenance', not
'cure'. Hence, the most important part of treatment for sex offenders is to learn what to do when they 'feel the need to use a socially unacceptable substance' (Pithers et al. 1983:222) that, in the case of child molesters, is 'female children' (Pithers et al. 1983:222 my italics). It was not until the late 1980s, early 1990s, that the extent of the sexual abuse of boys was rendered thinkable and 'sayable' within the discourse of child sexual abuse, disclosures being made visible through the publication of texts such as *Men Surviving Incest* (1989) and *When Innocence Trembles* (1994). The latter text revealed the extent of the sexual abuse of boys in Christian Brothers' orphanages in Australia, by 'paedophiles' (Davies 1994:175). As Bell (1993) points out, it is the questioning of the obviousness of disciplinary categorizations and those used in everyday life - pertinent examples here, specific to offenders, being 'intra-familial child sexual abuse perpetrator', 'paedophile', 'rapist' - and how we speak about gender and sex, that is encouraged by Foucault.

In order to take control of the domain of the personal, the first task of Relapse Prevention is to transform the *offence regime* into an orderly, predictable sequence. The Relapse Prevention map provides a sequence of simplification as follows: 'affect fantasy conscious plan behavior' (Pithers et al. 1983:216). Here, the risk identifiers bring the 'future into the present and render it calculable' (Rose 1996:95), in order to 'hel[p] the client maintain control of the behavior over time and across situations' (Pithers et al. 1983:216). The undertaking of this 'mapping' technique is endowed with humane, ethical values, insofar as it is said to be 'helping' the client in a *milieu* in which the expert is 'relating to the client as a colleague or co-therapist' (Pithers et al. 1983:223). Pithers et al. (1983:223 my italics) state that by fostering a sense of objectivity and detachment in the client's consideration of his own behavior, 'an atmosphere of openness and cooperation is established in which the client feels free to discuss threatening thoughts and behaviors'. The 'client' and the therapist are then able to 'mutually' begin to 'explore the problem behavior without the *defensiveness* that otherwise might be encountered' (Pithers et al. 1983:223 my italics). Here, the 'helping', 'fostering' and 'exploration' tactics become visible as part of a

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psychotherapeutic strategy within the deployment of behavioral technologies so widely used in practices of reform. Such practices 'seek to "empower" their subjects and restore them to the status of freely choosing citizens' (Rose 1996:196). It is now the task of Relapse Prevention expert and client to 'delineate' situations which 'pose a high risk of relapse' (Pithers et al. 1983:224) by 'identifying communalities (sic) in the circumstances that pose risk' (Pithers et al. 1983:224). Certain arts and skills of manufacturing and framing are deployed in this task. For example, the Relapse Prevention expert, as 'colleague', may directly observe sexual arousal patterns in various stimulus settings through measurement 'by a plethysmograph while the client either views or listens to prerecorded tapes' (Pithers et al. 1983:225). The client, as 'co-therapist', may also be asked to 'create an imaginary account of the circumstances that could provoke a possible relapse sometime in the future' (Pithers et al. 1983:227), and linkages are created by 'co-therapists' between thoughts, emotions, decision making. Here, the 'client' is constituted, at the same time as he constitutes himself, as cognitive subject, 'steered through the world by beliefs and attitudes' (Rose 1996:65). Simultaneously, he is also constituted as calculable subject, 'equipped with relatively stable, definable, quantifiable, linear, normally distributed characteristics' (Rose 1996:65). Certain aspects of the client's 'reality' can now be rendered thinkable as posing a high risk of relapse, now recognizable in terms of calculable, hierarchical risk factors that predict future dangers. Once these risk factors have been 'identified' and 'recognized', they must henceforth be addressed in a particular way in order to prevent future sexual offending. The 'client' must now commence monitoring his self, starting with his being on the alert for Apparently Irrelevant Decisions (AIDs). Failure to identify such potentially dangerous decisions can lead to the client positioning himself in a High Risk Situation. Then, if the 'client' does not successfully deploy his technique of Adaptive Coping Responses, a Lapse is predicted in which the 'client' has 'a fantasy about performing a sexually aggressive act' (Pithers et al. 1983:218 original italics). Following a Lapse, a 'client' may scrutinize himself in the language of addiction and experience an Abstinence Violation Effect (AVE). Here the experts warn that the client may scrutinize himself deploying the language of failure, using vocabularies of 'doom', 'personal weakness',
'powerlessness' and 'inability to refrain'. The 'client' is thus rendered visible, both to others and himself, as a social subject (Rose 1996), who has lost his sense of self-esteem and self-worth. If the client chooses not to use his Adaptive Coping Responses, due to his expectancy that he will continue to fail, then 'the chances of a full-blown relapse' (Pithers et al. 1983:218) will increase. With a Relapse, an offender has failed to bring his self under control through choosing to 'submit to an urge' (Pithers 1990:355). He has broken the prohibition. In Relapse Prevention, an 'urge' is described by cognitive-behavioral psychologists as a 'compulsive intention to engage in a specific behavior that will satisfy or reduce the cravings' (Marlatt 1989:60). Hence, 'urges' are variously described as 'urges to re-offend' - which can be 'ingrained urges' - and, 'urges to perform sexually aggressive acts' - which renders them 'sexual urges'.

The recognition of the presence of some, or a number of, risk factors that can set the 'predictable' sequence in motion now requires that the 'client' be in a constant state of mental alertness. It further requires his ability to deduce a conflict situation from a general definition of the dangers he wishes to prevent. These preventive procedures thus promote what Castel (1991:288 original italics) terms 'a new mode of surveillance: that of systematic predetection'. Here the intended object of surveillance is that of some undesirable event that has to be anticipated and prevented from occurring. Castel (1991:280) argues that whereas previously, risk, in classical psychiatry, meant 'the danger embodied in the mentally ill person', a shift has now occurred. This is due to the changing role of the psychiatrist, now more that of 'auxiliary to administrative "decision makers"' (Castel 1991:286), and this makes it possible for the notion of risk to be made 'autonomous from that of danger' (Castel 1991:287 original italics). Hence risk no longer arises from the presence of particular, precise danger 'embodied' in a concrete individual or group, the notion discussed in Chapter Three in relation to the conceptualizations of Criminal Anthropology. Rather, risk 'is the effect of a combination of abstract factors which render more or less probable the occurrence of undesirable modes of behaviour' (Castel 1991:287 original italics). Hence, in practice, it is these risk factors that psychologists assess in
the 1990s, rather than the 'dangerousness' embodied in each sex offender. Within the Relapse Prevention regime of self-governance, the task of each 'client' is to anticipate and prevent the undesirable (deviant) behavior by being constantly alert to the risk factors that render probable the occurrence of future sexual offending. He is required to maintain this mode of surveillance for the rest of his life.

But just as high hopes for the sexual reorientation of homosexuals were dashed, and a hope for a cure for sexual psychopaths was dashed, and the hope for a key to deviant sexual preference was dashed, so, too, hope for the perfect regime for self-governance was dashed. By the end of the 1980s, it was clear that child molesters/incest perpetrators were not maintaining their regime of self-governance, or self-mastery - they were re-offending. In 1989, Hildebran and Pithers argue that this failure can be attributed to the lack of 'emotional motivation' exhibited by child molesters. It is this emotional motivation that is necessary in order to keep the offender committed to using the Relapse Prevention cognitive and behavioral tools. These tools, Hildebran and Pithers (1989:236) state, will enable the child molester/incest perpetrator to 'control his deviant urges'. However, Hildebran and Pithers make the point that child molesters can only access 'emotional motivation', once they have made an 'emotional acknowledgement of the harm their acts ha[ve] inflicted on others' (Hildebran and Pithers 1989:236). This, they state, requires the molesters to have first gained 'emotional recognition of the victim's trauma' (Hildebran and Pithers 1989:236) through the development of 'victim empathy'. Hildebran and Pithers now diagnose the positioning of Relapse Prevention before the Victim Empathy module as being the problem, this having been a recommendation of the original designers of the program, Pithers having been one such designer. They render this diagnosis coherent, through an evaluation of Relapse Prevention as an 'intellectual' exercise that focuses upon gaining an 'intellectual' understanding of the precursors that lead to victimization. Hence, there is a conceptual link in Hildebran and Pithers' argument, that makes it thinkable that 'emotional motivation' cannot be developed when the men engage in Victim Empathy after having first completed the 'intellectual' Relapse Prevention program.
This conceptual link is informed, I argue, by the habit of thought that the rational and the 'emotional'/irrational can be split. This notion of mind/body dualism, that emerged out of the classical representation of the subject exemplified in seventeenth century rationalism, renders it thinkable that Relapse Prevention is the domain of the 'intellectual', and victim empathy is (primarily) the domain of the 'emotional'. Victim empathy is thus caught up in a dualism that inscribes an essentialising difference between the (female) body, or materiality, on the one hand, and the mental and spiritual on the other, represented by the conscious (male) subject, who is privileged over the former. As Hildebran and Pithers (1989:236) put it, '[v]ictim empathy is an essential, noncognitive component of relapse prevention'. This way of thinking and seeing is also bound into the technological, through the way in which each of the programs are written up: the content; the exercises; the mode of delivery - didactic in Relapse Prevention, experiential in Victim Empathy. This dualism was brought into sharp relief at the SAIF Program, when one of the groups of men 'mutinied' half way through their participation in Relapse Prevention, having previously completed Victim Empathy. A social work student and a psychology student had written a Relapse Prevention program, which they subsequently presented in 1991, in a didactic format. This was in contrast to Victim Empathy. As the reader may recall from the Introduction, Victim Empathy was heavily experiential, involving group participation in various exercises. For example, I designed a Family Drawing Exercise, in which not only the group participants, but also the group facilitators participated, one of whom was always the first to present their drawing to the group in order to 'role-model self-disclosure/trust' (Slaney 1992:19). Furthermore, in Relapse Prevention, a great deal of the material was presented in what was perceived by the participants to be 'professional jargon'. For example, a handout attempted to 'define' the concept of Apparently Irrelevant Decisions (AIDs). The handout stated: 'Through the well-known cognitive process of rationalization and denial, one can covertly plan a relapse by making a series of AIDS, each of which represents another step toward a tempting, high risk situation' (Blood and McCarthy 1992). The
SAIF Coordinator\(^2\) subsequently informed me that one of the participants had stated 'bloody academics...why can't they put it in plain English'. Further addressing the issue (of the relation between power and knowledge), another participant was reported by the SAIF Coordinator\(^3\) as stating, 'I'm sitting down on the floor and she sits on her bloody pedestal'. The SAIF Treatment Committee subsequently decided that many of the complaints had merit and the program was revised.

Let us now return to Hildebran and Pithers (1989), for whom the combination of the theoretical - the mind/body split - and the technological - the constitution and separation of the two modules - renders it thinkable that the positioning of the Relapse Prevention module prior to the Victim Empathy module is problematic. That is to say, insofar as the intellectual, or so it is thought, 'necessarily' impedes/overrides the noncognitive/emotional. Having been re-positioned, Victim Empathy now aims to assist the molester/perpetrator to develop emotional recognition of his victim's trauma and acknowledgement of the harm his acts have inflicted. The resultant emotional motivation will enable the child molester/incest perpetrator to energize himself to use the Relapse Prevention self-governance regime, in order to keep himself on the 'straight and narrow'. As Hildebran and Pithers state, emotional recognition of the victim's trauma is critical in order to:

> energize a dedication to implementing what they had learnt [in Relapse Prevention]. Offenders must develop emotional motivation, as well as cognitive understanding, in order to feel committed to utilizing the behavioral-management tools they have been offered. (Hildebran and Pithers 1989:236)

Hence, the re-offending rates of molesters/perpetrators are not due to the failure of the Relapse Prevention program per se. Rather, what is problematized is the molester/perpetrator's failure to develop emotional recognition of his victim's trauma and all that failure entails, to include his

\(^2\) Personal communication August 1991
\(^3\) Personal Communication August 1991
failure to deploy the tools of the Relapse Prevention self-governance regime. These failures can thus be conceived as contributing factors towards rendering probable the occurrence of the child molester/incest perpetrator's future sexual offending and hence their implication in recidivism rates.

In arguing for the necessity of emotional recognition, Hildebran and Pithers (1989:239) further suggest that victim empathy will provide the offender with the goal of preventing another victimization, thus giving him 'an increased sense of purpose, a higher level of motivation to be authentic'. This argument suggests that victim empathy education will open the offender to the possibility of becoming a creative and ethical subject (Rose 1996), striving for autonomy and authenticity through fulfillment and a desire to make the 'right' choice. Hildebran and Pithers maintain that it is victim empathy that has the potential to assist the offender to exercise his freedom to choose not to re-offend, by 'blocking' the offender's shift into that 'part of his consciousness that wants to reoffend' (Hildebran and Pithers 1989:239). It is here that cognitive-behavioral psychology constitutes the child molester/incest offender as a psychodynamic subject, who is 'driven by unconscious forces and conflicts' (Rose 1996:65). This way of thought establishes an (unacknowledged) alliance with the discourse of psychoanalysis, and enables Relapse Prevention experts to render the 'internality' of the child molester/incest offender into thought. Hildebran and Pithers (1989:237) argue that victim empathy can now become 'the vehicle for penetrating shallow levels of treatment and authentically engaging the offender'. I argue that the above Family Drawing Exercise, designed to assist participants to 'explore their childhood/adolescence at a deeper level' (Slaney 1992:19), also bears a previously unacknowledged alliance with the discourse of psychoanalysis, the purpose of the exercise having been to 'authentically engage' the offender. Further, Hildebran and Pithers are hopeful that the development (infolding) of empathy will 'restrain' the offender when he 'no longer logically recognizes that a specific chain of events is predictable and will almost surely lead to reoffending' (Hildebran and Pithers 1989:237). They argue that with victim empathy, it is possible that the offender will restrain his self when he is getting out of control, and can no longer 'count on logic to pull him back' (Hildebran
and Pithers 1989:238). Drawing upon the logic of biological determinism, Hildebran and Pithers argue that any resolution to not re-offend, when based upon (masculine) logic such as the identification of obvious consequences, has a tendency to break down in the face of 'ingrained urges seen in sexual offenders' (Hildebran and Pithers 1989:237). These 'elusive and irresistible' (Hildebran and Pithers 1989:237) urges to re-offend, when combined with memory of pleasure that 'remains as a seductive invitation to reenter the relapse process' (Hildebran and Pithers 1989:237), result in the offender perceiving himself as 'out of control' (Hildebran and Pithers 1989:237). Hence, despite attempts by cognitive-behavioral psychology to re-codify (sexual) 'urges' in behavioral terms (i.e. urges to perform deviant behaviors), clinical psychologists continue to use the language of nineteenth century sexology. For example, they deploy such vocabularies as elusive, irresistible, and speak of the 'onset of an urge and the speed of its ascent' (George and Marlatt 1989:23), and describe the necessity to "'ride out" the urge-wave and to maintain balance without "wiping out"' (George and Marlatt 1989:23). In the presence of these 'powerful emotional needs and high-risk situations' (Hildebran and Pithers 1989:237), Hildebran and Pithers (1989:237) argue that 'purely cognitive resolutions often dissolve', and hence the offender's need for emotional recognition of the victim's trauma.

The above intellectual and practical techniques are therefore the instruments through which the child molester/incest offender constitutes himself within the territory of the Relapse Prevention 'psy' space. The offender establishes a relation with his self as a sexually addictive, individualized self who is either in remission or in relapse. Evermore attached to this self, he must henceforth monitor himself by being in a constant state of mental alertness, maintaining a mode of surveillance that systematically predetects factors that might lead to a 'risk' situation, and the probable occurrence of future sexual offending. In order for this 'self in remission' to maintain a regime of self-governance, Relapse Prevention experts argue that the offender must first develop empathy for his victim, based upon a presupposition that the offender is 'empathy deficit'. Once the offender has developed victim empathy he cannot, or so it is argued, remain unaware of his victim's pain. The 'emotional' recognition of
his victim's trauma is then combined with 'emotional' acknowledgement of the harm he has caused, both of which can then be deployed by the offender as an 'emotional' motivator to use the Relapse Prevention behavioral-management tools. Should the child molester/incest perpetrator meet the above requirements, this will be the key to his not re-offending, when combined with his cognitive understanding of the precursors that lead to relapse/victimization. The child molester/incest perpetrator thus remains tied to his ahistorical sexually addictive self, and to the relationship between his addictive self and the object of his 'cravings', his (incestuous) desires. In order not to break the prohibition by relapsing, the child molester/incest perpetrator must maintain a state of alertness to the end of his days. Further, should he at any time feel himself getting 'out-of-control', he is to utilize 'victim empathy' in order to 'restrain' himself. Hence victim empathy, initially constituted as a strategic, feminist intervention, is colonized and transformed into a solution to the offender's empathy deficit, and a tool, for him, to be deployed for motivation and restraint.

But what if it can be argued that the initial presupposition formulated within cognitive-behavioral psychology is misguided, and that child sexual abuse perpetrators are not 'empathy deficit'? Where would that leave Relapse Prevention, given the argument that victim empathy is a critical component in motivating the offender to use the behavioral-management tools? To engage with these questions, it is necessary for us to re-visit victim empathy and explore precisely what is said (Foucault 1991b) about the notion of 'empathy' in the Field of Sex Offender Treatment, in order for cognitive-behavioral psychology to constitute the child molester/incest offender as empathy deficit.

3:3  Victim Empathy Re-visited

3:3:1  Conceptualizing Empathy

First, in order to have an historical awareness of what is said about empathy in the present Field of Sex Offender Treatment, it is necessary to explore how the notion of empathy emerged in the English language. For this task, I draw
upon the work of Shlien (1997). Shlien (1997) states that the English word *empathy* is Titchener's 1910 translation of the German word *Einfühlung*. In this original translation, the 'pathy' in em-pathy introduces an association with *pathos*, with the notion of illness, suffering, or 'to suffer with' (Shlien 1997:65). This English translation differs therefore from the German *Einfühlung*, for that is related to appreciation or enjoyment rather than pain. This notion of empathy, suffering *with*, also differs from the word and idea of 'sym-pathy', feeling *for*, thus offering psychologists 'an operation somewhat distinct from ordinary sympathetics by ordinary people' (Shlien 1997:65). Shlien (1997) observes that once empathy spread into popular culture, it moved from being a noun to becoming a modifier, 'empathic' (i.e. as in empathic understanding), and from this, to becoming a verb, as in 'to empathize'. Hence Shlien's (1997:65) argument that a noun is constituted as a verb, and an attitude is transformed 'into a technique'. Shlien (1997:65) argues that the Cartesian credo *I think therefore I am*, is now transformed into the 'vulgar psychological misconception of "I empathize, therefore I am therapeutic."' The target of Shlien's critique is the manner in which the concept of empathy has been deployed by therapists who 'perform "feats of empathy"' within psychotherapeutics, or what Rose (1990) terms, technologies of autonomy. Shlien thus draws our attention to the ways in which psychology is technological, in the sense described in Chapter Two. Here, psychological language and its arts and skills link up affects, thoughts and techniques, thereby forming a 'psychotherapeutic assemblage' that seeks to act on human beings, in order to shape their conduct in certain ways. In this case, Shlien's observations suggest that through this assemblage of psychotherapy, authority is accorded to certain psychotherapists, who then lay claim to the capacity to 'empathize' with their clients, thereby enabling a further claim to be made of therapeutic movement.

In the United States, close connections emerged between the deployment of 'feats of empathy' and psychotherapeutics that came to be linked with the psychologist (known as) Carl Rogers. From the early-1950s, Rogers and his colleagues developed a unique conceptualization of empathy as it evolved within a psychotherapeutic approach 'usually know as client-centered or
nondirective' (Rogers and Dymond (eds) 1954:3). Initially, Rogers (1951) believed that it was the attitudes held by the counselor regarding the worth and the significance of the individual that was the key to success in psychotherapy. Rogers and his colleagues at the Counseling Center of the University of Chicago further developed these tentative principles into three definable conditions which, if provided by the therapist, would enable 'therapeutic movement' (Rogers 1989:11) to ensue. These three attitudinal conditions consisted of:

the therapist's congruence or genuineness; unconditional positive regard, a complete acceptance; and a sensitively accurate empathic understanding. (Rogers 1989:11)

In his earlier work regarding empathy, Rogers stated that in client-centered therapy, it was the function of the nondirective counselor to 'assume, in so far as he is able, the internal frame of reference of the client, to perceive the world as the client sees it' (Rogers 1951:29 my italics). The therapist thus endeavored to see through the client's eyes (Rogers 1951). However, in 1956 Rogers modified this notion by placing a distance between the feelings and experience of the client and those of the therapist. As Shlien states, with this shift, Rogers abandoned entirely 'the idea of identification' (Shlien 1997:73) with the client. In 1989, Rogers stated that accurate empathic understanding meant that the therapist had 'a sensing of the client's inner world of private personal meanings as if it were your own, while never forgetting that it is not yours' (Rogers 1989:15 my italics). Hence, for Rogers, empathy was not about feeling for at all, but about sensing, or feeling, with the (individualized) other. On the other hand, feeling for is the domain of sym-pathy and Shlien (1997:70) argues that Rogers believed that sympathy 'smacked of "feeling sorry for, or looking down upon," both of which were reprehensible' to him. I argue that this distinction is critical for this analysis, since in their work with sex offenders, cognitive-behavioral psychologists speak of an offender's need to develop feelings of empathy for the victim and speak of the offender's failure to share his victim's distress and identify with his victim. For example, in 1996 Marshall reports on a research program undertaken in 1994, in which
Marshall and colleagues had constituted a victim empathy scale after concluding that 'pursuing empathy deficits using general measures, even Davis' multicomponent measure, was not likely to lead to fruitful data' (Marshall 1996:178). After developing and administering their own victim empathy measures for child molesters, Marshall reports that he and his colleagues found that child molesters were most significantly deficient at identifying their victim's distress, and 'sharing the distress of their own victims' (Marshall 1996:178 my italics). Hildebran and Pithers (1989:238 my italics) take the offender's identification of his victim's emotional state a step further, stating that '[e]mpathy for his victim can provide emotional identification with his/her vulnerability and fear'. Further, Hildebran and Pithers (1989:238 my italics) state that both group sessions and individual therapy can help an offender to integrate feelings for himself 'with his developing feelings of empathy for his victim'. I therefore argue that what is said of empathy, and the way it is deployed within the present Field of Sex Offender Treatments, is not motivated by notions of empathy that first emerged in the English language. Furthermore, the notion differs from that of Rogers and his colleagues. Rather, it would appear that it is the notion of 'sym-pathy' that is being spoken about in the Field of Sex Offender Treatment, when the notion named 'empathy' is deployed.

In order to move beyond these conflicting conceptualizations, I therefore draw upon Shlien's (1997) notion of empathy. Shlien's notion is useful here, for it opens up a space in which to engage with a notion of empathy that does not demand an essential interior, that is, a relation of 'outside' and 'inside' that demands that what is 'inside' is an infolding of an exterior. The reader will recall that I challenged the notion of 'interiority' (as a psychological system) in Chapter One, drawing instead upon the notion of 'folding', such that folds incorporate without totalizing and internalize without unifying. First, however, let us distinguish Shlien's notion of empathy from that of Rogers. The critical difference is that in the Rogerian sense of empathy a person struggles to enter the internal world of the other 'as-if' it were one's own. In 1989, Rogers argued that for the therapist 'a sufficiently strong empathy can scarcely exist without a considerable degree of unconditional positive regard'
(Rogers 1989:11). Furthermore, Rogers stated that the therapist must (work to) avoid the 'temptation to present a façade or hide behind a mask of professionalism, or to assume a confessional-professional attitude' (Rogers 1989:11-12). On the other hand, what the therapist must possess is 'genuineness or congruence' (Rogers 1989:11). In other words, the therapist must be an 'expert'. Conversely, Shlien argues that empathy is *highly overrated* and *under-examined* and that it is *not* that difficult to achieve for '[i]t happens' (Shlien 1997:67), that is, we *don't* have to struggle to achieve it. This is because, for Shlien (1997:77), empathy operates at what we might think of as 'primitive levels, cellular, glandular, olfactory, chemical, electromagnetic, autonomic, postural, gestural, and musical-rhythmical, more than the lexical'. It operates on data such as 'smell, sight, and sound: the smell of fear; the sight of tears, of blushing, and of yawning; and the sound of cadences, tone, sighs, and howls' (Shlien 1997:77). In other words, for Shlien (1997:63), it is a normal, *commonplace* capacity, 'almost constant and almost unavoidable'. Hence, for Shlien, empathy could be described as an *experiential actuality* and a form of *intelligence* that gathers information, or data.

Furthermore, most importantly, empathy and understanding are *not* the same, since understanding is a volitional *effort* 'and a service that empathy is not' (Shlien 1979:67). Here, I take the 'understanding' that Shlien refers to as being situated within a time and place that has limits that are historical. Shlien therefore suggests that despite empathy's importance as possibly an 'essential' factor in the *service* of understanding, it is not, in itself, the hoped-for consequence of understanding. In 'empathic understanding' therefore, it is the *understanding* that is the difficult task, requiring effort. Nor does empathy always go hand in hand with 'sym-pathy'. Shlien uses the example of driving on the highway to illustrate this point. He suggests that we have all had the experience of the driver in front, who knows exactly what we want to do, such as to change lanes, pass or turn, and yet the driver deftly and persistently stops us doing it. That, Shlien (1997:64) states, is 'empathy without sympathy'. Empathy may therefore be used to help or to harm. Further, Shlien argues that empathy alone, without sympathy and understanding, may be harmful. This
point is particularly relevant in regard to child molesters and incest offenders, which I shall discuss in more detail below.

I suggest that we can make conceptual links between Shlien's notion of empathy and the notion of 'infolding' discussed in Chapter One, such that bodies are 'thought-bodies', or 'bodies-thought'. This is because when we 'empathize' in Shlien's (1997) sense, we assemble a particular relation with ourselves, our bodies, our sensations through connections with 'data' such as 'visions, sounds, aromas, touches' (Rose 1996:185). My point here, is that such assemblages are not delineated by the envelope of the skin, rather they link up 'outside' and 'inside'. Further, Shlien (1997:78) suggests that empathy is like a guidance system that 'get[s] you to the airport but makes no decisions about what to do once you are there'. It is therefore an enabler and it may be necessary, but it is not sufficient, not if we want to examine and understand an experience, 'rather than simply to have it' (Shlien 1997:77). However, if we think in terms of a 'body-thought', then we cannot think of empathy as being 'thoughtless'. Whilst empathy is more sensational than perceptual, it simply requires that further connections be made with (historically situated) observations, assessments, evaluations, judgements and so forth which, in turn, requires extra effort. Hence, there is a relation between empathy and understanding. When empathy is between 'bodies-thought', we therefore constitute linkages, connections and relations with other human beings, their bodies, sensations, 'data' and certain understandings. These notions of empathy take us beyond a mind-body dualism and the cognitive-behavioral formulation that the Victim Empathy module is an essential, 'noncognitive' component of an 'intellectual' Relapse Prevention. Furthermore, if we consider that empathy works 'as a more or less constantly active system found everywhere in daily life' (Shlien 1997:75), it is impossible to sustain the argument that child molesters/incest offenders are 'empathy deficit' in this sense. This opens up the possibility for us to explore how child molesters and incest offenders, as 'bodies-thought', might have experience of empathy and make the effort to understand their (intended/current) victim/survivors.
For this exploration we can draw productively upon the research of Conte \textit{et al.} (1989). In this research, a group of child molesters - all of whom had rarely abused a child who was not related or know to them (Conte, Wolf and Smith 1989) - and incest offenders were asked what their contribution would be to a manual on 'how to sexually abuse a child'. In response to this question, the offenders first speak of their communication skills, of asking open questions and listening, after encouraging the child to talk. For example, one of the offenders says that he would advocate letting the child think that they could confide and talk to him. When asked how they would engage their victims, another offender states that he gets on their level, asks them how their day is going, asks them what they like, and listens to the child (Conte, Wolf and Smith 1989). I suggest that the men also gather the information, or 'data', upon which their empathy operates, whilst communicating with the children. These men also invest extra effort in order to achieve empathic understanding. For example, one offender, through visual connections and linking up of observations, assessments, judgements, says he would 'probably pick the one who appeared more needy, the child hanging back from others or feeling picked on by brothers and sisters' (Conte, Wolf and Smith 1989:296 my italics). A number of offenders describe the 'look in their eyes. It's a look of trust. They like you. If they are going to show resistance, they'll look away' (Conte, Wolf and Smith 1989:296 my italics). Other offenders describe how a child has:

\begin{quote}
    a look of being \textit{vulnerable} in some way. May not be assertive; may not be outgoing. Trusts adults. You can \textit{see this} in their \textit{body language}, the way they \textit{look with their eyes}. The way they hold themselves'. (Conte, Wolf and Smith 1989:296 my italics)
\end{quote}

Here we see how the men's empathy could be perceived as an experience of 'data' operating at 'postural', 'gestural' levels. One offender says he first gets the child to feel safe and from there on initiates different kinds of contact, such as \textit{touching} the child's back or head, '[l]easing the child to see how much
she would take before she would pull away' (Conte, Wolf and Smith 1989:297). Another offender states that '[w]hen they give an outward sign that they like you, like a hug, start touching their arms, legs, hugging them' (Conte, Wolf and Smith 1989:297 my italics). Here we see how both gesture and touch could provide the 'data' on which empathy operates. One offender describes how he would spend time with children, especially at bedtime, being around them in his underwear, sitting down on the bed with them, 'constantly evaluating the child's reaction' (Conte, Wolf and Smith 1989:297 my italics). As Shlien (1997:77) states, when empathy is interactive it 'takes place at a speed beyond our ability in speech'. Further, in the above gathering of information, we can see why Shlien (1997:63) cautions us against making the popular (Rogerian) assumption that empathy assures gentleness, benevolence, or reciprocity, for empathy can also be an instrument of cruelty. The sadist, for example, 'makes intense use of empathy, albeit without sympathy. The sadist knows your pain and takes pleasure in it' (Shlien 1997:63). The above examples suggest that child molesters/incest offenders could also make intense use of empathy, in this sense. It is through linkages and connections made, through assemblages that link up outside and inside, that a potential offender could seek to understand a child's vulnerability and pain, and take advantage of it. Here I suggest that a relation between empathy and understanding is constituted that could be deployed as a strategy of cruelty, that might also use other tactics, such as 'grooming', together utilized for the benefit of the (would be) perpetrator who intends to sexually assault the child. Power is thus rendered visible 'in action' in relation to knowledge, where knowledge is formed through an experience of empathy, combined with the effort of a certain kind of understanding. Knowledge is then deployed against the child within this power relation. And what of Jack and Dan who lived with, and sexually assaulted, their daughters over a period of years: could we conceive that as 'bodies-thought', they did not experience empathy and constitute a relation with a certain kind of understanding in the sense discussed here? That is to say, empathy and understanding as constituted in relation to their daughters within the context of the sexual assault, within the context of everyday life, for example, when Jack took his daughter out on jobs with him when she was younger. Further, if we asked Jack and Dan and the men in
Conte et al.'s research whether they had experienced feelings of sympathy for the child at the time of the sexual assault - or during the planning of the sexually assault - what might they answer? Shlien (1997:65) states that it is sympathy - 'feeling for' - that is 'a type of commitment. Empathy is not'. Hence it is not empathy, but sympathy that 'involves feelings of concern or sorrow for the other person' (Miller and Eisenber 1988:325), in response to the 'emotional state or situation of the other person' (Miller and Eisenber 1988:325). Shlien (1997:67) argues that psychological techniques have played a particular role in undermining and even 'obliterat[ing] the positive values of sympathy and understanding'. Here Shlien's argument, and Miller and Eisenber's observations, draw our attention to the diverse ways in which the corporealities of contemporary individuals operate in relation to particular regimes of knowledge, which are connected up with vocabularies, judgements and values, and prescriptions of feelings and emotions. Further, Shlien (1997:67) suggests that in treating empathy 'like the Holy Grail, as "received knowledge"', we have slowly lost the vocabularies of compassion. This is evidenced in Hildebran and Pithers (1989) text, in which they make a reference to the offender's ability to 'acquire' compassion, as well as empathy, for sexual abuse victims. However the language and vocabularies of compassion are not rendered visible in the text. Rather, compassion is subverted within the colonization of victim empathy, and transformed into a tool of restraint for the offender, as evidenced in Hildebran and Pithers' (1989:237) argument that the acquisition of compassion and empathy for victims will diminish the 'likelihood of [the offender] enacting fantasies'.

If, however, we choose to deploy Shlien's notion of empathy and understanding, and if we are willing to consider that offenders, as 'bodies-thought', use them both, then the possibility is opened up for us to move beyond the notion of 'empathy deficit'. Further, within such a space of possibility, the incest offender, as an invented self, can choose to invent himself differently, as an ethical subject, for, as Rose (1996:197) observes, we cannot, as yet, 'disinvent ourselves'. He can choose to do so by understanding how the sexual abuse was infolded within his
victim/survivor's genealogy of subjectification, and by infolding an assemblage of feelings for the victim in the form of sympathy and compassion. Whilst such a possibility renders Victim Empathy redundant, it does open up a new space in which to re-claim the aims of the initial feminist intervention, namely, that the offender develop compassion for his victim/survivor and understanding of the impact of the sexual assault. That is to say, albeit without the concomitant notion of the survivor as a unified, psychologically damaged self. This, in turn, enables us to shift beyond the first question as to whether or not the presupposition that all child sexual abuse perpetrators are empathy deficit is misguided. The second question is in regard to where Relapse Prevention would be left, given its reliance on victim empathy as a motivational tool, if perpetrators were not found to be empathy deficit. Here the argument that child molesters and incest offenders use experience of empathy in relation with a certain understanding of their victims, or intended victims, renders Victim Empathy redundant, whilst opening up the possibility for cognitive-behavioral experts to argue that all child molesters/incest perpetrators are now 'sympathy deficit'. This, in turn, could necessitate the construction of a Victim Sympathy scale specifically for child molesters, and the constitution of a Victim Sympathy module to be situated prior to Relapse Prevention. However, within such a strategic move, the incest offender would continue to be attached to his sexually addictive, individualized, perversely asocial self. Furthermore, in focusing upon the offender as sexually perverted, Relapse Prevention would continue to fail to question the exercise of gendering power relations within the familial domain.

However, in arguing that the incest offender as an invented self can choose to invent himself differently, as an ethical subject, I offer an alternative to such a move. What would be required here is an understanding by the father and (if so desired) daughter (or step-daughter, or son, or...), of all the little habits of thought, habits of emotion, injunctions and techniques that were infolded by the daughter within her genealogy of subjectification that included sexual abuse. This offers us an alternative to the understanding that the survivor experienced
'psychological damage' to *self* caused by the sexual assault. It offers an alternative to the strategic necessity that the incest offender gain 'emotional recognition' of his victim's trauma, conceived as being locked within the envelope of the victim's skin. The father thus moves beyond the experiential actuality of empathy to infolding *understanding* and *sympathy*, an infolding that includes an assemblage of his *commitment to feeling for* his daughter. Here, his non-unified, diverse corporealities operate in connection with a regime of knowledge of the particular ways in which his daughter's relations with *self* and others were affected, specifically by the sexual abuse. For, within her genealogy of subjectification, his daughter linked up outside and inside through the visions, sounds, smells, touches of her father, together with her pains, confusions, vulnerabilities, losses, combined with connections with judgements, words, injunctions, habits of thought and emotion. For example, she may have infolded the notion of the loss of a 'normal childhood', a fabrication of subjectivity to which she may have aspired. The reader may recall that Jack's daughter, in her assemblage of her 'thought-body', linked up pains and losses of a failed marriage and her habit of thought that she 'could not help' what happened to her, together with her sexual abuse. Analogously, Jack's granddaughter linked up (outside) touches of her grandfather with (inside) confusions, expressed in tears when her mother said "if you ever, if anybody ever touches you".

However, it is within the space of sympathy, that the language of compassion may emerge, such that a father shifts beyond his 'being-thought' as abuser, expressing a tenderness that makes no demands, has no requirements save 'being there' *for* the other. I suggest that for those willing to engage in such encounters, the possibility opens up for the shared understanding that the incest offender *can* choose to invent himself differently. Jack experienced such possibilities when his wife entered the space of sympathy and expressed the language of compassion by giving her daughter 'full support, full support', whilst continuing to support Jack, even after their separation. Such possibilities have the potential to shift shared understanding.

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4 (Jack 8/12/92 p14)
5 (Jack 8/12/92 p14)
beyond the notion that for evermore, incest offenders are either in remission or in relapse.

IN SUMMARY

This chapter has been about those who have sought to conduct the conduct of sex offenders. It has been about certain claims to expertise, certain institutional spaces, certain technical means for the materialization of theory, and certain practices that locate human beings in regimes of the person. It has also been about certain conceptualizations of the notion of empathy and how those deployed within the discourse of cognitive-behavioral psychology render the child molester/incest offender thinkable as empathy deficit and therefore in need of a certain education. On the other hand, from the perspective of an alternate understanding of empathy, the possibility is opened up to the notion that child molesters/incest offenders, as 'bodies-thought', have experience of empathy and deploy a certain understanding of their (potential/current) victim/survivor. This conceptualization of empathy and its relation with a certain understanding opens up, in turn, the space in which to consider how an incest offender might care to invent himself differently, as an ethical subject. Certain suggestions are offered as to how incest perpetrators, professionals and also survivors (should they so wish) might choose to understand how the victim/survivor's sexual assault was infolded within a genealogy of subjectification, together with, for example, habits of thought, habits of emotion, injunctions and techniques. It is in the exploration of such machinations of 'thought-bodies', and in the infolding of feelings of sympathy and compassion, that a father might choose to invent himself differently in relation with his victim/survivor. In so doing, he shifts beyond a 'project of freedom' that enables him to live his life tied to the project of an identity that includes that of sexual deviant either in remission or relapse.
CONCLUSION

ASSEMBLED OTHERWISE

To account for the capacity to act one needs no theory of the subject prior to and resistant to that which would capture it - such capacities for action emerge out of the specific regimes and technologies that machine humans in diverse ways...
(Rose 1996:186-87)

1. DRAWING THE THREADS TOGETHER

In this thesis I have undertaken two investigations. The first concerned the contemporary incest offender’s genealogy of subjectification. Hence, it was concerned with the relations that the incest offender established with himself, and how he came to relate to himself as what I have termed an invented self. The second investigation was concerned with how the incest offender came to be constituted within the Field of Sex Offender Treatment as a deviant individual. Since this second investigation constituted by far the greater part of this thesis, it is here that I first draw together the threads of my analysis.

In this second investigation, I argued that the Field of Sex Offender Treatment would not have been as it is, had it not been for certain accidental beginnings and emergences that have occurred since the sixteenth century; the historical point of departure chosen for my genealogical analysis. I argued, following Foucault, that it was the debates in regard to the art of government, debates that continued from the middle of the sixteenth century through to the end of the eighteenth century, that led to the establishment of the territorial, administrative and colonial states, that displaced feudalism. Within this gradual shift, capital took priority over the former land and state system of inheritance and the notion of population emerged. This was a critical development since, in the eighteenth century, the family was re-deployed as an element internal to population, thus becoming the privileged instrument for the government of the population. This shift of the family from its former
position as a model for state management enabled the *economy* to become visible both as a distinct dimension of reality and as a field of intervention. This in turn enabled *statistics* to emerge as a major technical factor of the new technology of political economy. The eighteenth century thus marked the transition from an art of government, to a political science. At the same time, the emergence of the Industrial Revolution and changes in industrial development, together with the appearance of *laissez-faire* capitalism brought with them the development of modern industries and the accelerated growth of the modern city. The geographical shift of populations from the country to the city was in turn accompanied by a shift in the rhetoric accounting for life, most significantly in regard to the coupling of mobility with *interiority*, articulated in the vocabularies of *selfhood, individuality* and so forth. The search for *work* was now matched with the psychic search for *self* (Miller 1993). With these new conceptualizations of what it meant to be a modern subject, a culturally trained citizen, critical linkages would emerge with regard to the individualization of criminality and the surveying of deviancy. Eighteenth century social *statistics*, first named moral science, and the psychic *search for self*, were thus critical emergences in terms of creating the possibility for the constitution of the subject that would later come to be named 'sex offender'.

However, it was not only geographical shifts, and shifts in terms of work and identity that emerged in the eighteenth century, for it was at this historical moment that the bourgeois family unit had taken shape. This marked a shift from the 'parent-parent' axis of the aristocratic family, to that of the 'husband-wife' and 'parent-child' axis of the bourgeois family. This shift, in turn, led to the affective intensification of intra-familial relations within the bourgeois family space. A new technology of sex had begun to emerge, exemplified in the eighteenth century campaign against masturbation. It was in this campaign that the deployment of sexuality had the effect of drawing a line between the sexuality of adults and children, thereby constituting *childhood* sexuality. Implicated in this campaign were publications of books on pedagogy and child medicine and manuals for parents, which incited further talk about children's sex, which was spoken about constantly in a diversity of contexts. The
bourgeois family unit was also the site in which the bourgeois woman's body was ordered wholly in terms of the 'wild' workings of her reproductive system, and her sexuality became the object of 'hygienization', such that there was a splitting of pleasure and cleanliness. Sexual pleasure in bourgeois women was now constituted as perverse, and 'good' women were constituted as not having sexual desires. By the end of the century, a completely new technology of sex had emerged.

The eighteenth, early nineteenth century also marked a shift in the exercise of disciplinary power, now exercised over bodies via surveillance rather than over territories by ministerial agents. Both individuals, and populations of individuals, were increasingly governed with a style of political reasoning that Foucault terms *governmentality*. This new style of political reasoning required the management of particular aspects of social and economic existence that, in turn, required the deployment of more or less formalized means of calculation in order to transform the population into numbers. This created the possibility for the emergence of the modern discipline of psychology, and the gradual statisticalization of the morals and pathologies of the population. The emergence of this new mode of exercise of power, and the emergence of the discipline of psychology, were critical for what would later come to be called *behavioral therapy*. Surveillance techniques would be deployed in behavioral therapy as key components of disciplinary power exercised in laboratories in research on sex offenders.

By the nineteenth century, shifts in familial and sexual relations and disciplinary power, when combined with shifts in notions of 'interiority' and 'individuality', enabled a growing understanding to emerge that the criminal was an *individual* that also needed to be *known* in order to both *transform* and *reform* him. The *individualization of criminality* thus started to take shape. The judiciary was now required to take into account psychiatric expertise, necessary in order to evaluate the subject's reason. Wealthy citizens of the industrial society now needed to protect their wealth from a populace that included the criminal as well as the mad, and moral reform and the moral standards of society were at the heart of public debate. Strong social and
political demands for a suppression of criminality encouraged expenditure on institutional solutions and attempts were made to *moralize* the lower classes through immense campaigns to *christianize* workers.

It was in the second half of the nineteenth century, that psychological abnormalities became the object of a system of psychiatric knowledge that had its own particular style of reasoning and argumentation. It was within this new *psychiatric style* of reasoning that *sexuality* became an object of psychological investigation and clinical knowledge and *perversion* was rendered thinkable as a kind of deviation or *disease* category, rather than an *evil act of will* that was contrary to God and nature. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, this new psychiatric style of reasoning rendered it possible to 'identify' different types of people as *perverse adults*, for example the homosexual, such adults becoming the privileged objects of knowledge. This was a critical emergence for the later identification and naming of pedophiles and incest perpetrators as *perverts*, a naming, or way of speaking about certain individuals, that would later enter into everyday discourse, as exemplified in the popular press of the latter twentieth century.

Sex was now seen in a new light that demanded that it speak its truth, thus positioning sexuality at the point of intersection of a *technique of confession* and a *scientific discursivity*. It was through certain confessional techniques that the one was adapted to the other, for example 'listening', deployed through the *clinical codification* of the inducement to speak. Confessional techniques were then combined with techniques of *examination, interrogation, questionnaires* and the *recollection of memories*. The *justification* that authorized the requirement that humankind confess, was the notion of the *causal* power of sex. Sex now appeared as an extremely unstable pathological field, a surface of effect for other sickness, hence the necessity to question everything and to tell everything. Here the technique of confession was required, since the ways of sex were said to be *obscure*, thus requiring the *extraction* of its truth. Further, it was the accidental emergence of the new psychiatric style of reasoning, and the integration of confessional techniques into a field of rationality, that created the possibility for me to deploy
confessional techniques with incest offenders at the SAIF Program in the 1990s.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the emphasis upon criminality, as opposed to the crime, had successfully inscribed the notion of the *dangerous individual* within the awareness of individual citizens. From the 1840s onwards, the favored example of such a dangerous being was the individual who deviated in sexual conduct. By the latter half of the nineteenth century 'sex' had been isolated as both a biological and psychical instinct, capable of presenting pathological processes. Within the discourse of sexology, 'sex' as a biological instinct was constituted as an overpowering natural force, a biological imperative located in the genitals, especially those of the wayward male organs. The notion of wayward, overpowering sexual urges would subsequently inform the problemization of sexual offending within the discourse of psychiatry and the discourse of behavioral and then cognitive-behavioral psychology through to the end of the twentieth century. It was during this period, the latter nineteenth century, that sexual disorders were comprehensively investigated and diagnosed, and through this mapping and charting *techne*, human behavior was transformed into categories and vocabularies that constituted a personage, a specie, that was attracted to sexual deviance. However, it was claimed that only psychiatrists could recognize such individuals, or perverts, who perpetrated these sexual crimes, due to their knowledge and understanding of the diseases that such individuals suffered. These knowledge claims were supported through linkages and connections with criminal anthropology which, since the 1890s, had stressed that it was the danger potentially *inherent in* the individual that needed to be taken into account when deciding what penalty such a criminal should receive for his crime. Further, criminal anthropologists argued that the criminal was a creator of risk and therefore a potentially 'risky' individual and that this necessitated the protection of others against the possible perils posed by such individuals. This, in turn, enabled criminal anthropologists to state that a penalty could be a mechanism for the *defence* of society, as opposed to a punishment. This marked three critical shifts, first from the crime to the criminal, secondly, from the act to the danger potentially inherent in the individual and, thirdly, from
punishment of the guilty party to the protection of others (Foucault 1988c). What emerged from subsequent debates and points of connection between criminal anthropologists, psychiatrists and the judiciary was the necessity for an increasing interaction between the judicial institution and medical or psychological knowledge, whilst the dangerous individual was increasingly sought out, organized and codified within penal law. So it was that the psychiatrist took up the task of protecting others from the potential risk that the dangerous sexual psychopath posed to society as humankind moved into the twentieth century.

However, it was not just those who perpetrated sexual crimes or were drawn to sexual deviance that attracted the clinical gaze of psychiatrists and other 'experts' towards the end of the nineteenth century. This is because the effects of the deployment of sexuality were also being felt within the family unit, thereby necessitating a defence in the face of the affective intensification of the family space. This defence was conceptualized as the *incest prohibition*, a notion that was articulated within anthropological, psychoanalytic, legal, psychological and sociological discourses and thereafter in everyday discourse. This modern way of *speaking about* incest suggested that there had been a universal incest prohibition at all times, both past and present. Further, it was the language and vocabularies and confessional technologies of psychoanalysis that made it possible to keep the deployment of sexuality coupled to the system of alliance, the involved workings of marriage and kinship having been 'rediscovered' in the Oedipus complex. The formation of each individual's sexuality was now tied to her or his familial relationships, within which both incestuous desire and the incest prohibition played a crucial role. Thus the rules of alliance were now saturated with desire and within the bourgeois family the *repression* of incestuous desire was said to be so deep that it was a source of danger to them. On the other hand, middle class 'experts' stated that within the working class incestuous desire was *acted upon* and therefore was far from repressed. These truth claims enabled the bourgeoisie, the middle class, to differentiate themselves from the working class based upon the notion of the intensity of their repression of incestuous desire. This differentiation was in turn bound up in middle class regulation of
the sexual behavior of the working class. Increasingly, urban working class sexuality was policed. For example, by the end of the century, children were being removed from working class families as 'endangered minors', in cases where it was suspected that incest was being practised. 'Sex' literally became a police matter with the surveillance of brothels, such surveillance being enabled by the passing of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 that both provided for the suppression of brothels and further entrenched middle class norms within legislation. By the end of the nineteenth century a 'normalizing society' had thus emerged that qualified, measured, appraised and hierarchized. This was the outcome of a technology of power centered on life; a power that effected distributions around the norm. By the end of the nineteenth century, beginning of the twentieth century, Western society thus had a 'sexuality' that enabled all behavior to be classified along a scale of normalization and pathologization in terms of a mysterious sexual instinct. It was therefore the emergence in the nineteenth century of the population, economy and statistics, notions of 'dangerous' and 'risky' individuals, a biological and a psychical instinct, and a 'normalizing' society that created the possibility for certain individuals to be rendered thinkable as sex offenders in the twentieth century. However, for this possibility to emerge as it did, psychiatry would first be required take up a different position within the discourse of medicine and this, in turn, required shifts in the concept of mental disorder.

It was not until after World War I that psychiatry shifted beyond the confines of the asylum, to take up a quite different position within an expanding field of medicine that had adopted a new conceptualization of the relation between madness and society. Within this broadening of the concept of mental disorder, it became possible to talk about human troubles in psychological terms. Whereas social ills had previously been conceptualized in terms of personal evil, immoral character, or inherited degenerate constitutions, family life and institutional/workplace environments were now spoken about in terms of mental health and normality, which was linked to the proper adjustment to conditions of life and work. In the United States from the late 1930s, the effects of this new approach to mental disorder were felt upon the bodies of
sexual offenders who, if convicted under sexual psychopath statutes and found to be mentally disordered, were committed to 'treatment' institutions for an indeterminate period. The sexual misconduct of these dangerous individuals was said to be indicative of their lack of power to control their sexual impulses, or urges. A diversity of treatment techniques were then deployed in response to the different problem-solution linkages articulated within a diversity of psychologized networks. This, in turn, necessitated that certain conditions be developed in order for such techniques to be operationalized. In Denmark, it was a specific section of the Danish Criminal Code concerning castration that enabled sex offenders to have the 'choice' of castration from 1929 through to the mid-1960s, links having been made between levels of testosterone, the sexual drive in men and their sexual aggressiveness. This linkage was rendered thinkable through the theory of 'biological determinism' and the language and vocabularies of sexology, to include 'urges' and 'drives'. In Europe, the effects of the disciplinary technique of stereotactic neurosurgery were also felt upon the bodies and minds of sex offenders and both castration and psychosurgery were treatment techniques deployed on sex offenders in the United States through to the late 1960s, early 1970s. In the 1960s, medical castration was introduced as an alternative technique to surgical castration in West Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland. A similar form of treatment was used in the United States from the mid-1960s. Psychodynamic approaches, based upon clinical practice, were also deployed with sex offenders in institutional spaces such as 'special hospitals' from the 1940s through to the 1960s/1970s, treatment options including both individual and group psychotherapy.

All of the aforementioned 'treatment' options were deployed based upon an assumption that treatment within an institution would create enduring changes in sex offenders. This assumption was subsequently challenged by behavioral psychology in the 1970s, this being the historical moment that marked the emergence of the Field of Sex Offender Treatment and the implementation of its behavioral treatment techniques. Behavioral psychology now rendered it thinkable that a cure for sexual psychopaths was both an inappropriate and
untenable expectation. This opened up the space within which behavioral psychology could provide the 'appropriate' treatment for the sex offender.

By the latter-1970s early 1980s, the wayward sexual urges of heterosexual 'sexual deviants' were problematized in terms of deviant sexual preferences. This was a problematization that needed both incestuous desire and a prohibition in order to render it thinkable that the child molester/incest offender was a 'pervert', that he was 'perverted', and that his sexually deviant behavior was the expression of a perverted sexual desire. This problematization both tied the child molester/incest offender to the relationship between his self as desiring agent and the object of his desire, and situated him outside 'normal' sexuality. Various behavior modification techniques were deployed in attempts to shock, bore or discipline the offender into developing 'normal', socially acceptable sexual preferences thereby 'transforming' his deviant sexual preferences. These techniques required offenders to variously image their offence regime, to fantasize unpleasant consequences for themselves, and to masturbate to their offence regime or to heterosexually oriented pornography. In order to identify sexual deviance, various gadgets were invented to measure the temperature, volume, circumference, length and diameter of the penis during sexual arousal and the process of engorgement of the penis was also videotaped for experimental and 'faking' detection purposes. To elicit erections, offenders were required to view potentially arousing slides of the body parts of male and female children and adults, and also movies and videotapes. However, despite the subjection of hundreds of penises to the critical gaze of hundreds of male behavioral psychologists/experimenters in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the dominant theoretical construct of deviant sexual arousal failed to 'deliver'. That is, behavioral praxis failed in its endeavor to identify a single cause of sex offending, just as psychiatry had failed in its endeavor to identify a simple hormonal key to sex offending.

By the early 1980s, increasing theoretical challenges from within its own discourse and from feminism and sociology, combined with demands for corporately run treatment programs to accommodate the growing population
of sex offenders, converged to facilitate a shift from behavioral to cognitive-behavioral psychology. By the mid-1980s, cognitive-behavioral psychologists were targeting the sex offender's deviant cognitions, which complemented behavioral techniques that continued to target the offender's bodily betrayal of deviant sexual preferences. Treatment facilities increasingly incorporated multi-modal programmings that covered every conceivable deficit concerning the sex offender's knowledge, skills and cognitions. Two of the key programs to emerge were Relapse Prevention and Victim Empathy. In the early 1980s, cognitive-behavioral psychology made connections with the field of addiction, appropriating addiction theory and its relapse prevention 'model' for deployment within its own Relapse Prevention program for child molesters. The Relapse Prevention self-mastery regime was designed to enable the offender to shape his own conduct. The child molester's 'attraction' to female children was now constituted as 'comparable' to an addict's craving for heroin. Hence there was a continued, unquestioning acceptance of incestuous desire by cognitive-behavioral psychology, now in the guise of a 'craving' for the 'socially unacceptable', prohibited object.

The Relapse Prevention maintenance program was envisioned with the political objective of reducing recidivism rates based upon research findings that previous behavioral techniques had failed to manifest in long-term, post-treatment success in reducing re-offense rates. In other words, once sex offenders had been released from jail and/or had completed treatment, many re-offended. However, the Relapse Prevention program also failed to deliver and child molesters continued to re-offend thereby continuing to 'break the prohibition'. Relapse Prevention experts attributed this to the failure of the men to have the requisite emotional motivation necessary in order to implement the cognitive and behavioral tools of the Relapse Prevention disciplinary regime. Here it was the men's empathy deficit that was problematized, which was said to have led to an offender's lack of emotional recognition of his victim's trauma and, hence, lack of emotional acknowledgement of the harm his sexually abusive acts had inflicted on others. Victim empathy was the designated solution to this problem, to be developed with the technique of Victim Empathy education. Cognitive-
behavioral experts claimed that if men were aware of their victim's pain, they would be able to control their otherwise overwhelming sexual urges. This was because shallow levels of treatment would have been 'penetrated' as a result of the development of empathy for the victim, thereby enabling the offender to become authentically engaged with his self. This 'authenticity' would both enable the offender to block his shift into the part of his consciousness that wanted to re-offend, and would motivate him to deploy the cognitive-behavioral tools of the Relapse Prevention self-governance regime. Hence, there was also an appropriation of a psychoanalytic way of thought, way of seeing, in the endeavor to salvage the efficacy of Relapse Prevention. In order for these desired effects to be achieved Victim Empathy, conceptualized as the essential 'noncognitive' component of the 'intellectual' Relapse Prevention module, had to be placed before the Relapse Prevention module, its positioning after Relapse Prevention having been problematized. The conceptualization that informed the practice of situating Victim Empathy education prior to Relapse Prevention in multi-modal programs was that of mind/body dualism, and the habit of thought that the 'rational' and the 'emotional' could be split, and that the 'intellectual' could override the 'emotional'. The initial intent of the feminist 'victim empathy' intervention strategy, namely, that the offender empathize with and develop compassion for his victim/survivor, was thus colonized and transformed within cognitive-behavioral psychology's territory. Victim empathy was now constituted as a solution for the offenders' empathy deficit and as a motivational tool to keep the offender using the Relapse Prevention self-governance regime. It was also constituted as a tool of restraint, to be deployed by the offender when he felt himself getting 'out-of-control', and could no longer count on 'logic' to pull him back. It was also my participation at the SAIF Program in the Victim Empathy module (as well as one unit of Relapse Prevention), that gave me access to the men and created the possibility for me to invite them to participate in this Ph.D. project.

Here, I have argued that the possibility for the Field of Sex Offender Treatment to emerge when it did, as it did was created by certain accidental emergences and assemblages. These assemblages included certain historically
situated discourses, discursive practices and truth claims, certain regimes and technologies, combined with the invention of specific spaces at functional sites in which technical means for the materialization of theory were deployed. Power was exercised by institutions forming knowledges about available subjectivities, whilst they, as institutions, were at the same time being formed by such knowledges. These knowledges, with their claims to truth, were in turn bound up with ways of seeing and acting and formulas for efficacy. For example, the authoritative function of Marshall et al. was evidenced in the publication of the edited text *Handbook of Sexual Assault: Issues, Theories and Treatment of the Offender*. The publication and utilization of this text was in turn bound up with historically specific regimes of power that had a normalizing and regulatory function upon the objects of knowledge. Such technologies of power *form* subjects, being a means of dominating individuals and bringing them to define themselves in certain ways, in this case, as 'sexual deviants'.

When the incest offenders entered the SAIF Program, the domain of cognitive-behavioral psychology, they entered into practices and regimes of truth that required that they deploy *technologies of the self*. As individuals, they were required to effect upon themselves, with the help of volunteer counselors, certain operations on their own thoughts and conduct, bodies and souls and way of being. Having been incited to ask the question 'why did I do it?' the men were invited to enter into a state of ethical incompleteness and as ethical beings define and regulate themselves. This necessitated that the men engage in an endless process of *self-remedy* that worked through the operation of technologies of governance.

What the above genealogical analysis of the emergence of the Field of Sex Offender Treatment does, therefore, is shift us beyond Marshall's (1996) argument that the 1970s mark the beginning of the history of the field. A critical difference between Marshall's analysis and my genealogical analysis, is that Marshall's conceptualization is founded on a *theory of the object*. Such a theory is concerned with the consciousness of the speaking subject and the will of the sex offender as deviant individual necessitating, in turn, the
allocation of 'causality'. I have offered the reader an alternate conceptualization of the incest offender, namely, that he has been fabricated within a complex of historically situated apparatuses, practices and assemblages that both presuppose and enjoin particular relations with ourselves. It is here, therefore, that I leave my genealogical investigation of the emergence of the deviant individual and the discourse of cognitive-behavioral psychology and my investigation of the historical conditions that motivate conceptualization in the 1990s Field of Sex Offender Treatment. I now turn to my first investigation, undertaken in Chapter One.

My analysis of the storytelling of the men who participated in my research project was informed by a notion of an invented self, rather than being situated within an account of the 'storying forth' of the men as autonomous individuals whose identity would gradually be revealed or discovered. It was concerned with a genealogy of subjectification that necessitated an investigation of how the men had produced a particular relation with themselves, as sexed selves, within a particular time and space. It was concerned with different corporeal regimes, different ways of disciplining the body, such as the placing of a branch down Jack's shorts that required Jack to maintain a certain disciplined mastery exercised by him, over himself. It was concerned with regimes of language such as those used to enjoin in boys a particular relation with self in regard to notions of maleness and manliness. It was these regimes of language, together with their vocabularies, that the research participants had deployed to shape their ways of understanding their existence in the name of these objectives. Within the institutional regime of the family, I chose to investigate how the men, as bodies-thought, had infolded the voice of authority in the form of their fathers and I demonstrated how the men had infolded key injunctions within an assemblage of economic regimes, regimes of education and work practices. I therefore argued that when the men chose to sexually assault their victims, they did so within their respective relatively mundane assemblages of locale, as relatively ordinary male bodies-thought, having inscribed a particular relation with themselves. Their relation with self had enjoined sanctions, seductions and little habits of thought that included rationalizations thought through certain vocabularies such as 'helping to learn'.

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Hence my argument that Jack and Dan were not situated outside normal sexuality and neither Jack nor Dan's daughters were the objects of incestuous desire. Having opened up this analytic space, I argued that Jack and Dan were ordinary men, rather than perverted sexual deviants, who had chosen (rather than been driven) to sexually assault a child.

2. REFLECTIONS AND QUESTIONS

In constituting Jack and Dan as ordinary men, I open up the possibility of asking the question 'how useful has it been to pathologize incest offenders as sexual deviants?' Within this form of power, the incest offender has been categorized, marked by his own individuality and attached to his own identity. A law of truth has been imposed on the incest offender that both he must recognize, and others must recognize in him. Hence my question, 'precisely whose interests have been created by the child molester/incest offender being constituted as other in respect to so-called normal men since the 1970s?'

Here, following Rose (1996), I understand that interests are created through the forging of novel relationships between knowledge and politics, where specific individuals or groups are mobilized around particular objectives.

The treatment territories of sex offenders and those of victim/survivors have, predominantly, been separated over the last three decades by a professional divide. On both sides of this divide, a growth industry has emerged, the underlying sense of vigorous competition being no less evident in the Field of Child Sexual Abuse and Child Protection than in the Field of Sex Offender Treatment. As Armstrong (1987:267) states, at child protection conferences one can 'hear the gears of specialization grinding, the carving-up of victim-populations, the negotiation for turf; the vying for funding, for prestige, for place'. Such battles for turf were also evidenced between those situated on opposite sides of the victim/offender divide when, in the early 1990s those working with survivors challenged the operation of the SAIF Program. In that battle, the Field of Child Sexual Abuse and Child Protection in Western Australia had situated itself on one side of the divide and had situated the SAIF Program, and its treatment of incest offenders, on the other. Once again,
the question can be asked 'whose interests have been created by bringing power relations into play between these two groups?' Whilst sexual assault is a crime, and the survivor must always have the choice of prosecuting the offender, there is still the possibility of asking another question. This question is, 'have separate institutional spaces, separate conceptualizations, separate journals and separate conferences achieved the creation of the interests of those receiving 'treatment' on either side of the divide?' How could we envision a different relationship between these two territories? How might power operate to produce knowledge claims, and how might the deployment of sexuality operate within such knowledges, for such a relationship would not emerge within a free space? Would the notion that offender and victim are *invented selves* be useful in such an endeavor? Could the incest offender's understanding of his own and his victim/survivor's genealogy of subjectification enable him to enter the space of *sympathy* and develop *compassion* for his survivor? Would the victim/survivor's understanding of how she (or he) has constituted her (or his) genealogy of subjectification achieve more for the victim/survivor than an 'emotional recognition' of 'trauma', that locks the trauma within the envelope of the skin? For my part, I argue that an incest offender's project to *invent himself differently*, as an ethical subject, would be more useful, more healing, than a project of *freedom* that enables such men to live their lives tied to an identity of *sexual deviant*. Hence my final question, 'who would have the most to lose from this challenge to the space of interiority and the continued production of the incest offender as a modern, *deviant* subject?'
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