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‘The one person in the world who has the peculiar knowledge and experience necessary …’:

The Life and Career of Morishima Kakufusa

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Abstract
During his lifetime Morishima Kakufusa was closely connected with Japanese expansionist schemes in Mongolia, as a monk, a trader, a lecturer, an author, an escort for academic explorers and a military intelligence officer. The specifics of Morishima’s employers at various points throughout his long career are unclear, but an examination of his career provides some idea of the different groups and individuals in Japanese society who sought to implement either direct or indirect Japanese control over Mongolia during the first four decades of the twentieth century. Moreover, the promotion of Morishima’s career by his hometown of Tokunoshima in the twenty-first century is an example of how some in Japan at the present time are presenting the imperial era in a more positive light.

Keywords
Morishima Kakufusa, Mongolia, military intelligence, tokumu kikan.

Introduction
Studies of Japan’s pre-war imperial expansionist schemes have traditionally focused on the movers and shakers, those individuals who were directly responsible for the drafting and implementation of policy at the higher levels. Among these are Mark Peattie’s study
of Ishiwara Kanji, one of the architects of the September 1931 Manchurian Incident, or David Lu’s study of Matsuoka Yōsuke, Japan’s representative at the League of Nations in 1933 and Foreign Minister at the time of the signing of the 1941 Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact (Peattie; Lu). Little attention has been paid, however, to the third- or fourth-tier functionaries, those individuals in the field who were directly involved in the implementation of the schemes that the centre crafted. Yet the part played by those in the field is just as important, because if they are not up to the task set by those whose devise policy, then there is little hope of implementation. The reason why these third- or fourth-tier functionaries are not studied is that, unfortunately from our perspective, these individuals usually did not keep diaries to justify their actions and nor did they generate the degree of primary source material at the time that allows their lives and actions to be examined. There are instances though where we can trace the career on an individual and see the part that they played in Imperial Japan’s imperial expansionist schemes. One example is Morishima Kakufusa (1886-1946), an individual whose involvement in these schemes stretched for almost forty years and who fulfilled a number of different roles in Imperial Japan’s bid to bring Mongolia under its sway.

From the late nineteenth century until the end of the Second World War, a variety of groups and individuals in Japanese society exhibited an interest in Mongolia. Among them were military officers, business groups, academics, right-wing political activists and Buddhist leaders, all of whom had their own particular agenda, but who often worked together to achieve their disparate aims. Japanese interest in Mongolia was woven from a heady mix of ideas that developed from the belief among some in Japan that ties of race, culture, history, religion and custom bound the Mongols and Japanese closely together (Boyd Japanese-Mongolian Relations).

Almost immediately following the Meiji Restoration in 1868, and the lifting of the government ban on travel abroad by individuals, Japanese visitors to the Chinese
continent penetrated deep into Mongolia. On their return to Japan, a number of these travellers came to hold important positions in the Japanese military, political, academic and religious worlds, and were therefore able to influence Japanese policies and attitudes towards Mongolia in a range of areas. By the 1930s, the cultural ramifications of a close relationship between Japan and Mongolia were at the heart of a project to present Japan as the natural leader of Asia: Mongolia was by then integral to broad Japanese claims of cultural, political and religious solidarity with the peoples of the region.

A closer examination of the networks that supported Japanese actions in Mongolia serves to illustrate the mechanisms through which Japanese expansionism operated more generally. Official Japanese ambitions relating to Mongolia were furthered not just by the military, but also through a variety of civilian agents, both as individuals and in groups. Such agents, however, operated away from the spotlight and received comparatively little international attention, at least prior to the 1930s. In this respect, Japanese actions in Mongolia are distinct from those in Taiwan, Korea or Manchuria, which attracted notice in the West almost from the very beginning. Furthermore, the groups and individuals active in Mongolia were often ‘lone wolves’, operating with less supervision than was the norm in other parts of Japan’s expanding imperial domain. Nevertheless, they were often highly integrated with establishment institutions and figures at home, which sponsored and encouraged their activities.

The career of Morishima Kakufusa is important both because of its length and because of the number of different roles that Morishima held in the course of his life: monk, a trader, an escort for explorers and military intelligence officer. The number of different positions Morishima held in his forty year career, in particular in his capacity as a Japanese Army Special Intelligence Agency (SIA) (tokumu kikan) section chief, a role that will be discussed in more detail later in the article, suggests that there was a far
greater amount of flexibility in the strata of pre-war Japanese society than has previously been realized, especially within the military itself. Although Morishima left no diaries or letters, we can reconstruct periods of his career through what others wrote about him, either at the time or in their own memoirs, giving us another perspective on Japanese-Mongolian relations pre-1945.

The Life of Morishima Kakufusa

Morishima Kakufusa was born in 1886 at Kamezu, Tokunoshima Township in Kagoshima prefecture, one of the four prefectures of Kyushu, the third son of Morishima Kakuzō and Otokane (Uchida *Morishima* 1). After graduating from elementary and middle school, in 1909 Morishima entered Tokyo normal high school (Tōkyō shihan gakkō), a prestigious institution and the forerunner of Tokyo University of Education, to study Japanese and Chinese languages with the intention of becoming an elementary school teacher (‘Tokunoshima’ 10; Uchida *Morishima* 25). Given the distance that separates Kagoshima, situated at the western part of the island of Kyushu, and Tokyo, it appears likely that Morishima’s family was comparatively wealthy, for him to be able afford the cost of studying in Tokyo. While Uchida, Morishima’s post-war biography is vague about the status of his family, a 1938 *Asahi shinbun* article about Morishima states that he was ‘born into a highly reputed family’ (*meibōka ni umare*), with the implication that his family was well off (‘Mōko bōkyō no kagemusha’ 11). Morishima was also, given that he gained entry to Tokyo normal high school, exceptionally bright and thus able to further advance himself through education (Okada 106-7). Becoming a teacher did not appeal to Morishima, however, as he left Tokyo normal high school in 1910 without graduating.

Morishima then travelled to Taiwan where he taught judo at a junior high school on the island, not an unusual occupation, but one that may not have been as innocent as
it first appears. Among the many covers used by the ‘tairiku rōnin’, or right-wing continental adventurer active on the continent, was that of judo teacher. Uchida Ryōhei (1874-1937), one of the founders of the Kokuryūkai (Amur River/Black Dragon Society), for example, spent almost five year living in Vladivostok, where he established a judo school and engaged in intelligence-gathering operations for the Japanese military (Stolberg 46; Stephan 78). The stated purpose of the Kokuryūkai was to expel Russia from the East and ‘then lay the foundation for a grand continental enterprise taking Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia as one region’ (Okamoto 61). While Kuzū Yoshihisa does not include Morishima in the Kokuryūkai’s three-volume hagiography of Japanese ‘patriots’, there is no reason to suspect, from his close connection with Japanese schemes in Mongolia, that Morishima was not a member of the Kokuryūkai (Kuzū). Moreover, it is likely that Morishima received some type of training in intelligence-gathering before he finally made his way to Peking in 1912, where, as an assistant to Banzai Rihachirō (1871-1950), he became involved with the Japanese-backed Mongolian independence movement (‘Tokunoshima’ 10; Uchida Morishima 25). Banzai was an army officer who served as an advisor to a number of Chinese warlords following the fall of the Ch’ing dynasty in 1911 and was closely connected with various schemes to increase Japanese control of Mongolia (Hata 120).

What drew Morishima, at the age of twenty-four, to turn his back on a career as a teacher and to devote himself to the cause of Mongolia independence, albeit ‘independence’ controlled by the Japanese, is unclear, but the 1938 Asahi shinbun story on Morishima’s stated that it was while he was studying to be a teacher that he first became drawn to Mongolia (‘Mōko bōkyō no kagemusha’ 11). There is also Morishima’s close relationship with Banzai, with one recent publication describing Morishima as being Banzai’s ‘disciple’ (monkasei), (‘Tokunoshima’ 10) something that would support the idea of a strong bond between the two men. At this point, prior to the
overthrow of the Ch’ing dynasty in 1911, Japanese elements were only indirectly involved in the promotion of Mongolia independence. It would not be until 1912 that there was more direct Japanese military involvement in a scheme to detach parts of Inner Mongolia from Chinese control (Boyd Japanese-Mongolian Relations 76-80).

According to Nakajima Manzō, an army officer who knew Morishima in the 1930s and 1940s, it was from around this time, prior to the fall of the Ch’ing dynasty, that Morishima began to travel widely throughout both Inner and Outer Mongolia, whereby he became well known by the Inner Mongolian princes of the Chahar, Silinghol and Ulanchap Leagues. Moreover, Nakajima claimed that Morishima worked for both the Army and the Foreign Ministry and had a ‘deep relationship’ with a number of important military figures, among them Banzai Rihachirō, Doihara Kenji (1883-1948), Matsumuro Takayoshi (1886-1969) and Tanaka Ryūkichi (1893-1972), all of who were subsequently connected with Japanese military schemes connected with furthering Japanese control over Mongolia (Nakajima 123-4).

Among some of the officers whom Nakajima characterises Morishima as having a ‘deep relationship’ with it is likely that these relationships were merely because of the shared interest in Mongolia. While no other source confirms Nakajima’s assertion that Morishima had a ‘deep relationship’ with, for example, such important figures as Doihara or Tanaka, it is probable that, given the connection that these two individuals had with Japanese operations in Mongolia, Morishima was known to them both. Moreover, in the case of Banzai, there is supporting evidence of the close relationship between the two men, which will be discussed in more detail later. Before continuing the examination of Morishima’s life it would be worthwhile to briefly discuss Banzai’s connection with Mongolia as this connection did impact on that of Morishima.

In the early 1920s, Banzai Rihachirō served as military advisor to two of the Han Chinese warlords who had ambitions in Mongolia. In May 1920, Banzai was reported to
be advising the Chinese General Hsü Shu-cheng (1880-1925), after Hsü returned to Urga from Peking and attempted to re-establish Han Chinese control over Outer Mongolia, Chinese rule having formally ended there some nine years earlier, in 1911, when the Outer Mongolians had declared independence. Banzai’s duties as advisor appear to have been more than simply military. The Japanese press reported that Banzai’s role, in part, was to see ‘the farms and ranches in Eastern Mongolia [developed] as a training ground for Japanese experts’ (‘Notes and Comments’ 513). Evidently the military was considering the economic potential of the region. It was also reported that Banzai had been assigned by Marshal Tuan Ch’i-jui (1865-1936) to oversee the training of several Chinese Army divisions, including one to be headquartered at Urga (‘Arming of Mongolia’ 520). Banzai’s appointment as an advisor to Hsü and Tuan was part of ongoing Japanese military schemes to increase Japanese control of Mongolia.

While the postwar source discussed above dates Morishima’s first foray into Mongolia at being around 1908, a 1936 US military attaché’s report reveals that Morishima had been ‘trading in and around Kalgan [in Inner Mongolia] for the past thirty years’ (‘Tokunoshima’ 10; Stilwell ‘Comments of Current Events’ 465). This would effectively date Morishima’s first journey to the region to around 1906 or just following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. It is not known if Morishima served during the war, but as he would have in his late teens in 1905, is cannot be discounted that Morishima did serve and this was when he first travelled to the region. The Japanese military dispatched a number of military and civilian agents to survey Mongolia and Manchuria both prior to and during the early phase of the Russo-Japanese War, and it cannot be discounted that Morishima served in this capacity. Moreover, the list of influential military figures that Nakajima later claimed were associated with Morishima, would indicate that Morishima did serve during the Russo-Japanese War.
and it was at this time that he got to know at least some of those individuals from the military with whom he was later supposed to have been closely associated.

Morishima’s movements for the next few years are not documented but, if the 1936 US military attaché report is reliable, and there is no reason to presume that it is not, Morishima then embarked on a career as a trader, an occupation which would have allowed him to roam freely throughout the region. Writing in the 1930s, a Western observer noted how ‘paid agents’ of the Kokuryūkai were to be found ‘all over the Chinese landscape’ disguised as traders (Utley 286). The presence of Japanese traders in the region was also recorded during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century in the stories and songs of the Mongol vagabond story-tellers and singers who roamed Mongolia prior to the overthrow of the Ch’ing dynasty in 1911. These storytellers and singers reportedly used their ‘fool’s license to spit out bitter and pointed satire against all those, Chinese officials, Mongol nobles, and Japanese traders [emphasis added], who were battenning on to the misery of the people’ (Bawden 192).

Much as Morishima had shied away from becoming a teacher in 1908, however, he soon tired of the life of a trader, as in 1913, at the age of twenty-seven, he decided to embrace a more spiritual path and entered a lamasery in Inner Mongolia to hone his Mongolian language skills (Nakajima 123). After three years in the lamasery, however, Morishima had also seemingly tired of the monastic life; from 1917 until 1921 he was attached to the Japanese Army’s Special Intelligence Agency (SIA) office in Urga (Uchida Uchimōko 72; Baabar 186; Nakajima 123). How Morishima funded his move to Inner Mongolia in 1913 is unknown, but according to Borujigan, from December 1917 Morishima was employed by the Japanese Army as an intelligence operative (chōhō-in) and in receipt of a monthly stipend of two hundred and eighty yen (Borujigan 51). While this may not seem like a large sum it is the equivalent of almost 500,000 yen or A$5300 today (Measuringworth.com).
Exactly how Morishima came to work with the Japanese Army’s Special Intelligence Agency is unknown, but given his association with Banzai in 1912 it is quite likely that he was simply transferred. According to a number of sources it was in either late 1917 or early 1918, around the time that the Japanese Army General Staff dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Matsui Shichio (1880-1943) to Urga to gather intelligence on Russia’s activities in Outer Mongolia, (Uchida, *Morishima* 2-3; Hata 134) that Morishima was dispatched to Kobdo (Khovd) in Western Mongolia on a similar mission (Brown & Onon 752; Baabar 186). This would fit with the date given in the Army Ministry report noted above. Morishima, however, did not remain stationed in Kobdo, but also, according to Nakajima, appears to have spent time in Uliastai, (Nakajima 123) a town situated between Kobdo and Urga. From his posting to more than one place, it is clear that Morishima’s role was one that required him to travel, possibly as either an itinerant trader or monk, both suitable covers for intelligence-gathering operations.

Morishima remained stationed in Outer Mongolia until the defeat by the Bolsheviks of the White Russian leader Baron Roman Nicolaus Feodorovich von Ungern-Sternberg (1885-1921) in 1921 and the Red Army’s occupation of the Outer Mongolia. With Ungern-Sternberg’s defeat in May 1920, the Japanese Army’s SIA officer stationed in Urga, Major Efuku Hamaji, was ordered back to Japan, and Morishima, most likely also on orders from the Japanese Army, relocated to Kalgan, an important trading town in Inner Mongolia situated in the southern part of Chahar province some hundred and forty kilometres northwest of Peking (Uchida *Uchimōko* 72; Hata 379). Morishima again disappeared from view, although it is likely that he remained in Kalgan and resumed his career as a trader.

Then, in July 1926, Morishima was the first Japanese visitor to Outer Mongolia since the Soviet occupation of 1921. Exactly how Morishima was able to do this is
something of a mystery, but his visit was made possible through the mediation of the *Mainichi shinbun* (Daily Newspaper) special correspondent in Peking, Fuse Tatsuji (Matsuo 915-16), who arranged for Morishima to obtain a visa from the Russian Consul in Peking, Lev Mihailovich Karakhan (Uchida *Uchimōko* 72). Given that diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union had only been normalised in the previous year, the granting of a visa to allow Morishima — a private individual with no obvious connection to official circles in Japan — to visit Outer Mongolia, a region that had previously been a point of potential conflict between Japan and the USSR, suggests that Karakhan saw some benefit in granting Morishima a visa. Exactly how Morishima was able to gain this privilege, and the nature of his connection with Fuse or the *Mainichi shinbun*, remain unknown. In any event, Morishima travelled via Manchuli, Ulan Ude and Kiakhta, before arriving in Ulan Bator, as Urga had been re-named (Uchida, *Uchimōko* 72). It is worth noting that the granting of a visa by the Soviets to individual Japanese around this time was not limited to Morishima. For example, a Buddhist monk, Ōta Kakumin (1866-1944), was granted a visa to remain in Vladivostok by the Soviets following the Japanese withdrawal in 1922, with the visa being renewed each year until 1931 (Boyd ‘Undercover Acolyte’).

On Morishima’s return to Japan in July 1926, Lieutenant-General Banzai Rihachirō, his long-time friend, arranged for him to present a report on his visit to Outer Mongolia to Tokugawa Iesato, the president of the House of Peers, the upper house of the Japanese government and at the time the equivalent of the British House of Lords, and other members of the House (Uchida *Uchimōko* 72; Nakajima 123). The fact that Morishima was also invited to present a report to the House of Peers is a further indication that his visit to Outer Mongolia was regarded as significant by important establishment figures. Following his appearance before the House of Peers, Morishima went on to give a series of public lectures at various places across Japan on two topics,
namely ‘Outer Mongolia’s Current Situation and Future’ and ‘The Relationship of Japan, Russia and China with Reference to Outer Mongolia’ (Uchida Uchimōko 72). The lectures were so successful, that Morishima later published two books based on them (Manshū jijō annai sho 91). Morishima published a third book in late 1934, this one examining Outer Mongolia’s relationship with the autonomous part of Inner Mongolia (Morishima). Books of this nature, that is, those dealing with geographical areas that were ‘problematic’ for Japan, were produced with a specific agenda in mind, often in order to lay claim to a region that the author considered should be brought under Japanese control. Morishima’s connection with the military makes it even more likely that he wrote his works with some such purpose in mind (Boyd Japanese-Mongolian Relations 18-21).

Morishima’s residence in Inner Mongolia also brought him in contact with a number of important individuals among the Mongolian nobility, most likely through his contacts as a trader, including with the prince of the West Sunid banner in the Silingol league in central Chahar province, Demchukdongrub, more commonly known as Prince Teh (De) (1902-1966). During the 1930s, the prince was the leader of a group of progressives known as the ‘Young Mongols’ who sought a degree of autonomy from the Nanking government to counteract the influence of Fu Tso-yi, the Chinese governor of Suiyuan province, who actively opposed such a move. This made the prince open to overtures by the Japanese authorities and the Japanese actively wooed him (Boyd Japanese-Mongolian Relations 152, 191). The date of Morishima’s first meeting with the prince varies among the available sources, but there is no doubt that the two were acquainted. According to Uchida it was in 1929 that Morishima, together with Sasame Tsuneo (1902-97), another individual closely connected with Japanese schemes in Mongolia, first paid a visit to the West Sunid Banner Administration (Uchida Uchimōko 71; Boyd Japanese-Mongolian Relations 191-2). Nakajima, however, referring to a
story that appeared in the *Asahi shinbun* at the time of Prince Teh’s first visit to Japan in October 1938, gives the date of the prince’s first meeting with Morishima as 1914 (Nakajima 124-5). The paper also stated that Prince Teh was twenty years old at the time of this meeting, which raises questions about the veracity of the story, given that the prince had, in fact, been born in 1902. On the other hand, Sechin Jagchid, in his biography of Prince Teh, dates Morishima’s first meeting with the prince to around spring of 1932 (Jagchid 49), but this is unlikely given that Morishima is reported to have been travelling throughout the region from at least the fall of the Ch’ing Dynasty in 1911. What is clear though is that, in addition to Morishima’s connection to elements within the Japanese military and political elites, he was also forging links with the elites in Mongolia.

In addition to the various links that he had forged, Morishima found time to serve as a guide to Japanese academics who travelled to Inner Mongolia. For example, in August 1930, when the Far-Eastern Archeological Society (Tō-A kōko gaku) dispatched a group of academics, among whom was Egami Namio (1906-2002), to conduct a number of trips through Inner Mongolia and around the Great Wall region, Morishima was engaged as one of the two guides for the survey. The Far-Eastern Archeological Society subsequently published a record of this series of journeys in April 1935, with Morishima’s assistance being acknowledged in the Foreword (Far Eastern Archeological Society 6). Egami, a historian and archeologist, conducted a number of field trips to Inner Mongolia and, after the war, authored a controversial book entitled *Kiba minzoku kokka: Nihon kodaishi e no apurōchi* (The People of the Horseriding Nation: An Approach to Ancient Japanese History), in which he argued that the Mongols and their horses had played a vital role in the development of prehistoric Japan. Egami postulated an invasion of Japan in the fourth century by a race of ‘horseriding
people’, who defeated the existing regime and founded the current imperial line (Egami; Ledyard 217-54).

Morishima also served in as a guide to other Japanese academic teams. For example, in September 1941, when the Far Eastern Society Mongolian Research Team (Tō-A gakkai Mōko chōsahan) published Mōko kōgen ōdanki (A Record of Crossing the Mongolian Plateau), a record of two field trips undertaken by members of the Far-Eastern Archeological Society in 1931 and 1935, among those who the society thanked for their assistance was Morishima (Tō-A kōko gakkai Mōko chōsahan 3), although it was unclear whether this was for one or both of the field trips. It is clear, however, from Morishima’s connection to the expeditions carried out by the Far Eastern Society Mongolian Research Team and those by the Far-Eastern Archeological Society that if one was a Japanese academic venturing into the ‘wilds’ of Mongolia in the 1930s and 1940s, that Morishima Kakufusa was the guide to engage. In addition to serving as a guide, Morishima assembled his own library of works on the region, with the editors of Mōko jūjō gaiyō (Summary of conditions in Mongolia) noting that one of the largest collections in private hands was Morishima’s and thanking him for allowing others to use the collection (Manshū jūjō annai sho 88)

As well as his links to the academic world via his service as a guide in Mongolia, Morishima also served in a headhunting capacity for the Japanese military at educational institutions in Japan. For example, following graduation from the Osaka School of Foreign Languages Mongolian Department, Ōtsuki Katsura (?-1936) spent time as a Foreign Ministry student in Inner Mongolia, in all likelihood in preparation for a career as a diplomat but changed his career path after meeting Morishima. While Ōtsuki was in Inner Mongolia he met with Morishima, who recommended that Ōtsuki instead consider becoming part of the Kwantung Army’s Mongolian Research Team (Kantōgun sanbōcho Mōko kenkyūjo). The Mongolian Research Team was a Kwantung
Army think-tank, established in September 1932, was a component of the army’s SIA. It was comprised five Mongolian- and two Russian-language specialists, who gathered intelligence and carried out strategic surveys of that part of the Russian Far East that bordered Manchukuo (Nakajima 149).

Ōtsuki took Morishima’s advice and subsequently served under Morishima in several of the SIA offices that were established in Inner Mongolia during the early 1930s (Nakajima 103-5). Ōtsuki decision to switch from the Foreign Ministry, one of the premier ministries in Japan in the pre-war period, to a role with a tiny research section within the Kwantung Army suggests that Morishima was either a persuasive recruitment officer or that Ōtsuki saw the position with the Kwantung Army’s Mongolian Research Team as far more prestigious and likely to lead to greater things career-wise. It is important to note that Ōtsuki was not the only person that Morishima recruited from the Osaka School of Foreign Languages Mongolian Department. Morishima also recruited a number of other students, including Kuranaga Tamotsu (?-1945), Yamamoto Nobuchika and Yoshimoto Fujio, all of whom, after completing their language studies joined the military and served under Morishima in Inner Mongolia (Nakajima 105-8; Nakazawa 273-4).

In addition to recruiting language students from the Osaka School of Foreign Languages Mongolian Department, Morishima also recruited students graduating from other prestigious Japanese universities. For example, Morishima was able to recruit Nakajima Manzō, a graduate of the Law Department of Kansai University, to serve with the Japanese Army SIA in Inner Mongolia through Nakajima’s own university network. Following graduation, Nakajima visited Peking in August 1931, presumably on the traditional graduation trip that so many young Japanese take. In Peking, one of his senior classmates from Kansai University introduced Nakajima to Morishima. On Morishima’s recommendation, Nakajima then travelled to Hsinking, the capital of
‘Manchukuo’, in December 1932, joining the Kwantung Army’s Mongolian Research Team and serving alongside Kuranaga and Yamamoto during the army’s campaign to seize Jehol in the spring of 1933 (Nakajima 109-11). While Nakajima does not explicitly say so, one can infer that his senior already knew Morishima and that this played a part in convincing Nakajima to join the Mongolian Research Team.

**Morishima and the Special Intelligence Agency**

At this point it would probably be advisable to discuss the role of the Special Intelligence Agency, especially as noted above that almost all of those individuals who Morishima recruited in the early 1930s ended up attached to the SIA and served under Morishima. The SIA was an office within the Japanese Army that has received comparatively little scholarly attention, despite the fact that a number of senior army officers served as SIA chiefs in the course of their careers. Among the best known of these is Doihara Kenji, tried by the International Military Tribunal Far East (IMTFE) and executed in 1948, who was the SIA chief of the Mukden and Harbin offices between August 1931 and March 1936 (Hata 98), and was directly implemented by the tribunal in Japan’s expansionist military policies during this period (Brackman 159, 203, 301-2, 327).

Although the Japanese military had established an intelligence-gathering organ early in the Meiji period, the term ‘tokumu kikan’, meaning literally ‘special duty agency’, did not come into common usage until around the time of the 1918-22 Siberian Intervention when Japan, along with a number of other nations, including the United States, Great Britain, France and China, dispatched troops to the Russian Far East to combat the Bolsheviks and shore up the White Russian forces in the region (Humphreys 26-9). To gather intelligence throughout the region that the Japanese army was operational in a series of offices were established in 1919 that then formed the basis for
the SIA (Hata 374-82). According to Ken Kotani, the SIA was the equivalent of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and as such engaged in ‘espionage and conspiracy duties’. Kotani further notes that research into the organization is hampered because of the destruction of documents that occurred in the closing months of the Second World War and shortly after the Japanese surrender in August 1945 (Kotani 1, 8, 58).

While the majority of SIA offices were established in the Russian Far East, the Japanese military also established intelligence offices in Urga, Kiakhta and Sinkiang (Hata 375), no doubt well aware that the Bolsheviks could also threaten these regions. SIA offices were also established in Outer Mongolia because the Siberian Intervention afforded the Japanese military the opportunity to expand its intelligence network into areas where they had not previously been unable to operate because these areas were deemed to be part of Russia’s sphere of influence in the region (Paine 272-6). The length of time that these offices remained in operations depended on circumstances and, as noted earlier, the Urga office was eventually forced to cease operations in 1921 following the defeat of Ungern-Sternberg and the entry of the Red Army into Outer Mongolia (Uchida Uchimōko 72).

The defeat of Ungern-Sternberg did not spell the end of the SIA offices in this area, and following the September 1931 Manchurian Incident and the Kwantung Army seizure of the three northeastern provinces of China, the Kwantung Army established offices throughout Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Initially the offices were in the region directly under the control of the Kwantung Army, with offices in Mukden, Harbin, Tsitsihar, Jehol city and Tungliao. As the Kwantung Army sought to extend Japanese control over Inner Mongolia, however, offices were later established well across the region. Places in Inner Mongolia known to have had SIA offices include Dolun, Kalgan, Changpei, West Ujuchumin, Abagar, West Sunid, Tehua, Tatung,
Suiyuan, Pailingmiao, Alashan and Ochina (Hata 375). No complete list of Inner Mongolian SIA offices has survived, either because of the deliberate destruction of military records that occurred shortly after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, or from losses incurred in other ways, including during the fire-bombing of Tokyo in the last months of the war, but a partial list does exist (Hata 379-80). This list makes no mention that Morishima Kakufusa ever served as the chief of an SIA office in Inner Mongolia, but contemporary observers note that he filled this role.

According to Sechin Jagchid, who during the 1930s served as secretary to Prince Teh, Morishima appeared at Kalgan at some point in 1932, having been ordered to establish contact with the Mongol leaders, especially Prince Teh. Jagchid further notes that in the summer of 1933, when the first ‘Special Service Office’ was established that it was Morishima who headed this office (Jagchid 49, 57-8). Morishima’s appointment to the Abaga office in August 1933 is confirmed in the history of the Uchimōko Apakakai (Inner Mongolian Abaga Association), a group for personnel who served at the office, but gives Morishima’s position as that of an advisor to the office charged with working with the Mongol Prince So, head of the Silingol League (Uchimōko Apakakai 32). Nakajima, on the other hand, states that when the first SIA offices were established at Ujumuchin in August 1933, it was Morishima who commanded the office, an office that was charged with gathering information on the situation in Outer Mongolia (Nakajima 150; Rakudakai honbu 11-12), no doubt because of Morishima’s earlier service in Outer Mongolia (Uchida Morishima 14). Uchida also confirms Morishima’s appointment as chief of the Ujumuchin SIA office. While the actual office he was assigned at is unclear, the evidence shows that Morishima was actively connected with the SIA at this point in time, although in what capacity is open to question.
In addition to gathering intelligence on Outer Mongolia, Morishima also toured Inner Mongolia from late 1933 until early 1934, meeting with as many influential Mongol figures as possible, presumably to engender good relations between the Japanese military and the local rulers. For example, in November 1933, Morishima, accompanied by Nakajima, travelled from Dolun and made his way through Chahar province, visiting each of the Mongol banners in the Silinghol League and meeting with a number of Mongol leaders, among them Prince Teh (Nakajima 110). Prince Teh, according to Nakajima, was quite pleased to meet with Morishima, as he wanted to know how the visit by the representatives of the Silinghol and Ulanchab Leagues to offer congratulations to Puyi on his enthronement had gone (Nakajima 150). After he returned from this tour, in June 1934 Morishima was appointed chief of the Abaga SIA office (Nakajima 103-5, 151-2; Jagchid 154-5), where it can be assumed that his duties continued to be focused on intelligence gathering.

As well as being involved with intelligence gathering, Morishima was also involved in the work of the Zenrin kyōkai (Good Neighbour Association) as it sought to foster better relations between the Japanese and Mongols. The association was a semi-official humanitarian organisation that provided medical assistance and educational opportunities to the Mongols and Hui (Han Chinese Muslims) living on the fringe of the Chinese Republic (Boyd ‘Japanese Cultural Diplomacy’ 266-88). For example, in November 1935 when the first Zenrin kyōkai-sponsored school opened at Silingol, Morishima was among those attending the ceremony, representing the Kwantung Army and leading the three cheers for Japan, Mongolia and the Zenrin kyōkai at the end of the ceremony (Hōga 78).

That Morishima was clearly highly regarded by the Japanese military, given his appointment to a number of important posts in Inner Mongolia during the period in which the military sought to extend its influence over the region, is clear. Jagchid,
however, contradicts this impression in his postwar writings, where he dismisses Morishima out of hand, stating that Morishima was despised by most Mongol leaders and could only speak some ‘imperfect Mongolian’ (Jagchid 49, 57-8). This assessment of Morishima is, however, in stark contrast to the reports filed by the United States military attachés during the 1930s and may have been motivated by Jagchid seeking to denigrate Morishima’s linguistic ability and thereby imply that the Japanese were less effective at wooing the Mongols than it appeared at the time.

The first report, filed in June 1936, was written by then Colonel Joseph W. Stilwell (Stilwell ‘Comments on Current Events’ 461-8). Stilwell was an old China hand, having visited China briefly in 1911 before being stationed in Peking as language student from September 1920 to July 1923. Stilwell returned to the States but was dispatched to China in 1926, when he was appointed to command the American infantry regiment stationed there under the Boxer Protocols, a command he held until early 1929. After serving as an instructor at Fort Benning, Stilwell was again dispatched to China, this time to serve as military attaché in the Peking Legation, a post he held from July 1935 until May 1939. During this last assignment, it was Stilwell’s responsibility to keep the US military and civilian government appraised of developments in China (Tuchman).

In his June 1936 report, Stilwell detailed the ongoing Japanese military encroachments of Inner Mongolia that had resulted in the Chinese losing control of practically most of the region. Part of the reason for the success of the Japanese military in ousting the Chinese was, according to Stilwell, because of Morishima. The section of Stilwell’s report dealing with Morishima deserves a close scrutiny, as it paints a very different picture of him compared to the one given by Jagchid. Stilwell begins the section on Morishima by noting that he is ‘a well known Japanese who has been trading in and around Kalgan for the past thirty years’ and who ‘speaks both Chinese and
Mongol fluently’ (Stilwell ‘Comments on Current Events’ 0465). Stilwell then goes on
to describe Morishima’s appearance and character; albeit in the rather racist terms that
reflect the thinking of the period. According to Stilwell, Morishima was a ‘small,
slightly built individual with a distinct Jewish cast to his features and a stringy fringe of
whiskers which give him a rather ludicrous appearance’. Stilwell added, however, that
‘behind this disarming exterior there is one of the brightest minds that exist in this part
of the country’ (Stilwell ‘Comments on Current Events’ 0465). Stilwell further qualifies
this statement by declaring that ‘Fortified by nearly thirty years of residence, travel and
contact with the Chinese and Mongols, he [Morishima] is clearly one of the key men for
the Japanese effort in Inner Mongolia’, before declaring that there is ‘certainly reason to
believe that he [Morishima] was planted in Kalgan by the Japanese Army, and if this is
not the case then they have chanced upon the one person in the world who has the
peculiar knowledge and experience necessary for them’ (Stilwell ‘Comments on Current
Events’ 0465). Stilwell was not known to give praise easily, and his diary is filled with
disapproving observations and assessments of those he worked, including Chiang Kai-shek,
the Chinese Republican leader (Tuchman xvi-xvii, 363, 631), making his praise for
Morishima’s ability all the more surprising.

A second report pertaining to Morishima, filed a month later in July 1936, was
written by the assistant military attaché, Major S. V. Constant, and was based on his
personal observations following a journey through the region (Constant 375-80).
Constant’s report was a summary of the developments in Sino-Mongol relations since
March 1935 and focused on how the Japanese military had been able to extend its
influence into a large part of Inner Mongolia because of the deteriorating nature of Sino-
Mongol relations. Much of the report dealt with the methods by which the Japanese had
infiltrated parties of ‘medical men, radio operators and army officers in disguise’ who
had established offices at important Mongol banners including Ujumuchin, Abagar and
West Sunid, the last being the where Prince Teh maintained his administration (Constant 376). Towards the end of his report, Major Constant specifically mentions that the Japanese ‘military mission in Pailingmiao is under Kukubo [Kakufusa] Morishima, a well known Japanese who has been trading in and around Kalgan for the past thirty years’ and who speaks ‘both Chinese and Mongol fluently’ (Constant 379). The report mentions no other Japanese by name, suggesting that Morishima was regarded, at least by the US military intelligence officers in the region as the most important Japanese individual in the region at this point in time and one of whom Washington should be aware.

Following the outbreak of full-scale war in July 1937 and the implementation of direct Japanese military control over much of Inner Mongolia, Morishima moved from an intelligence-gathering role to that of an advisor the Japanese-backed Inner Mongolian government. For example, in October 1938, when Prince Teh visited Japan for the first time, Morishima was one of the Japanese officials who accompanied the prince on this visit. In a photo of the prince, other Mongol notables and their Japanese escort, taken after the party arrived in the capital, the diminutive Morishima with his, as Stilwell had described him, ‘stringy fringe of whiskers … [giving him] … a rather ludicrous appearance’ appears almost out of place (Figure 1) (Rakudakai honbu frontispiece). It is likely, however, given how the party is dressed, that this photo was taken on the occasion of Prince Teh’s audience with the Japanese emperor, an event that was widely reported in both the Japanese- and English-language press at the time (‘Mōkyō daihyō kansha no nyūkyō’ 1; ‘Imperial Court News’ 472; ‘Mongol Mission’ 482; ‘Emperor Receives Mongolian Prince’ 9). Moreover, as Ba Maw, the Burmese independence leader, would write after his own presentation to the Japanese emperor, this was ‘the highest honour they [the Japanese] could bestow upon a visitor’ (Ba Maw 312-13), and would have been one of, if not the grandest moments of Morishima’s life.
As well as serving as an advisor to the prince, Morishima also continued his connection with Japanese-backed education schemes in Inner Mongolia, including attending a conference held in Kalgan in August 1940 at the Mongolian Development Academy, as a consultant to the Japanese Army in Mongolia (Jagchid 236).

Figure 1: Morishima Kakufusa (back row, third from left) with Prince Teh, other Mongol notables and Japanese officials, Japan, October 1938, reproduced in Kōgen senri (Mōko kaikoroku). Ed. Rakudakai honbu. Tōkyō: Rakudakai honbu, 1973, frontispiece.

Morishima also continued his association with the Zenrin kyōkai, with the association’s official history noting that from March 1944 Morishima acted as an advisor to the association (Rakudakai honbu 22; Nakajima 165-6). It is probable that Morishima was connected with the Northwest Research Institute (Seihoku kenkyūjo), a research facility established by the Zenrin kyōkai the same month. The institute played host to a number of important individuals from the Japanese academic world, including Egami Namio who was part of a project surveying the Moslem community of Inner Mongolia in the months just prior to the end of the war (Fujieda 79). Given their earlier
association it is likely that Morishima and Egami would have renewed their acquaintance with one another.

With his death in 1946, at the comparatively young age of sixty, Morishima did not survive as long after the war as some of his contemporaries did, and so did not pen his memoirs. Moreover, in the decades that followed Japan’s resounding defeat in August 1945, memories of the war were pushed into the background as Japanese society sought to escape the horrors of war that it had suffered, as well as those that it had inflicted on the rest of Asia during its imperial age. Thus Morishima’s career was largely forgotten, with mention of him only appearing in books written by former military associates, such as those by Nakajima Manzō and the former members of the Inner Mongolian Abaga Association, works that were unlikely to reach a wider audience.

Following the 1990 Gulf War and the negative international reaction to the decision by the Japanese government of the time to only contribute financially to the coalition assembled to defeat Saddam Hussein, however, there was a noticeable increase in nationalist sentiment in Japan. One manifestation of this was the call by conservatives in both political and academic circles for a re-assessment of Japan’s past and the establishment of the ‘Tsukuru-kai’ (Society for History Textbook Reform) (Nathan 139-45, 164). Along with the school textbooks that the ‘Tsukuru-kai’ has since authored and sought to have adopted in Japanese schools, the society also produced a book with the provocative title *The History that isn’t taught in textbooks* (Kyōkasho ga oshienai rekishi), a collection of short pieces about individuals and events in pre-1945 Japanese society which the society believed had been deliberately ignored. In some instances this meant the re-discovery of individuals whose pre-1945 activities could be presented to a twenty-first century Japanese audience in a way as to suggest that what these individuals had been engaged in was either benign or has been misunderstood post-1945.
For example, among the pieces was a recounting of the career of Kawahara Misako (1875-1945), a Japanese woman who had worked as a teacher in Inner Mongolia at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. Much was made in the piece of Japan’s supposedly benign pre-Second World War relationship with Asia and the part that Kawahara played in this relationship as a teacher in the ‘wilds of Mongolia’ (Irikawa 230-2). It overlooked, however, that in addition to being a teacher, Kawahara was also placed in Inner Mongolia by the Japanese Army General Staff as a military intelligence operative, a role that she willingly fulfilled (Boyd ‘A Forgotten Hero’). It is in the context of the changes that took place after 1990 and the desire among some conservative Japanese to redefine Japan’s imperial era that the rediscovery of Morishima’s career and the promotion of this career with a degree of pride by his birthplace in Tokunoshima needs to be considered.

In May 2009, the Tokunoshima kōhō, a local newsletter produced by officials of the township’s government office, featured Morishima in the section of the newsletter entitled ‘Tokunoshima no ijin shōkai’, which translates literally as ‘introducing the great men of Tokunoshima’ (‘Tokunoshima’ 10). The purpose of the newsletter is to highlight people and events within the area that are regarded as important. Among the events highlighted in May 2009 was the ‘Twentieth Brown Sugar Festival’ (dai-20kai kurozatō matsuri), a festival celebrating sugar, one of Tokunoshima’s major products.

The short, seventeen-line summary of Morishima’s life appeared on the final page of the May 2009 newsletter, on the same page as the birth and marriage announcements, a positioning that almost guaranteed that it would be read. Drawing on a work entitled A Record of Kagoshima’s Pioneers (Kagoshima senkusha no kiroku), the summary suggested that Morishima’s career is now coming to the attention of a larger audience and that the part he played in Japanese-Mongolian relations is becoming better known. Indeed, in the course of the short piece about Morishima, the Tokunoshima kōhō
ments Mongolia or Mongolian independence nine times, emphasizing time and time again Morishima’s connection to the region and implying that he also had a connection to Mongolian independence. The piece also mentions Prince Teh’s 1938 audience with the emperor and implies that Morishima had been in attendance. Then, in a suitably touching ending to the piece, it is mentioned that Morishima visited the Kamezu elementary school in 1942 at which he presented the students with a stuffed toy camel and admonished them to remember that ‘wherever they were that they were not to forget home’ (doko ni ite mo shima o wasurenai yō ni). Along with the horse, Japanese often sees the camel as an animal that symbolises Mongolia, with the association of former Japanese residents of Inner Mongolia known as the ‘Rakudakai’ or ‘Camel Association’. It is hard not to imagine the school’s teachers in 1942 stressing the links that existed between Japan and Mongolia and Morishima’s role in establishing and promoting this links.

**Conclusion**

In the grand scheme of things, Morishima Kakufusa’s career may not appear to be that important. He was not one of those who devised policy, but was rather one of those who implemented it. He was, in many respects, one of those ‘lone wolves’ who operated in Mongolia with considerably less supervision than was the norm in other parts of Japan’s expanding imperial domain, but also was one whom was highly integrated with establishment institutions and figures at home. For this reason alone, however, his career is important as it gives another perspective on how Japan’s imperial adventures played out in one part of its expanding domain. Moreover, during the first half of the twentieth century, Morishima was closely associated with a number of important individuals from the military, political and academic spheres of Japanese society who exhibited an interest in Mongolia and played an active part of the implementation of
Japanese control over parts of the region. Furthermore, through his association with these individuals Morishima subsequently gained entry to the wider network of those who were interested in the region, such as occurred in 1927 when Banzai Rihachirō arranged for Morishima to speak before the House of Peers following his visit to Outer Mongolia. Through tracing Morishima’s career we can get a better understanding of how seemingly unconnected groups and individuals could be connected through certain individuals, in this instance Morishima

In postwar examinations of Japanese imperialism, emphasis has been placed on studying those who devised policy, but it is equally important that the part played by those who were responsible for the implementation of that policy is examined, for if these third or fourth-tier individuals, lone wolves such as Morishima, are not up to the task set by those whose devise policy, then there is little hope of implementation. There are still gaps in what we know about Morishima’s forty-year career in Inner and Outer Mongolia, but from what is known we can see how this one individual was able to move between a number of different groups who shared a similar purpose and helped to bring often previously unrelated groups into closer contact. Hopefully, the rediscovery of Morishima by his home town of Tokunoshima will lead to further research that will yield more about his career and will allow a fuller understanding of the networks that supported Japanese actions in Mongolia and will allow for a better understanding of the mechanisms through which Japanese expansionism operated in the first half of the twentieth century.

References


