SWM6171 Supervised Research Thesis

Displacement and Power: To what extent is development-induced displacement a consequence of uneven power relationships and how do ADB safeguard policies attempt to redress the negative implications?

Masters Thesis

Supervisor: Dr Rochelle Spencer

Student: Gabriel Essack

Student No. 32094779

Murdoch University

Sir Walter Murdoch School of Public Policy and International Affairs

Western Australia

Submitted November 2014

I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research. It contains as its main content work which has not been previously submitted for a degree at any university.

Gabriel Essack.................................................

Date ..............................................
“If you are to suffer, you should suffer in the interest of the country”

- Jawaharlal Nehru

(Speaking to villagers who were to be displaced by the Hirakud Dam, 1948)
Abstract

This research study is about the impact of development-induced displacement on poor people who are usually displaced due to unequal power relations, usually the consequence of the State’s modernisation and development agenda. Two case studies, one from Pakistan and the other from Cambodia are examined in the light of the post-development debate, gender inequality, structural violence, and social disarticulation within the Asian Development Bank’s resettlement framework. This research argues that involuntary forced eviction is based on unequal power relationships between the State and project affected people as most of the displaced are usually marginalised people who are already devoid of social, political, and economic power in society.

Keywords:

Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction

• Introduction 5
• Background 5
• Theoretical Framework 7
• The Key Research Questions 7
• Justification 8
• Table no.1: Increase in RP’s Submitted to the ADB Between 2001 and 2013 9
• Research Objectives 9
• Research Methodology 10

Chapter Two: Literature Review 12

Chapter Three: Findings

Case no.1: The Cambodian Railway Rehabilitation Project 22

• Project Background 22
• Photo no.1: The Cambodian Railway Community 24
• Pre-Resettlement Planning 24
• Pre-Resettlement Challenges 25
• Table no.2: Control Mechanism Employed by the Authorities to obtain Compliance from the Project-Affected people 26
• Table no.3: Different Tools Employed in the Struggle by the Project-Affected vis-a-vis the Authorities 27
• Table no.4: Major Disparities between the Powerless and the Powerful 28
• Photo no.2: The “Post- it” note 30
• Post-Resettlement Challenges in the Host Community 30
• Table no.5: Facility Issue at the new Resettlement Site 31
• Table no.6: The Major Issue at the New Resettlement Site 33
**Case no.2: The Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Canal (Stage III) Project in Pakistan**

- Project Background 35
- Pre-Relocation Issues 36
- The Negative Outcome 37
- Photo no 3: Showing Flooding High Mark 38
- Photo no.4: Showing Community Members Discussing the Chashma Project 38
- State Power; Intimidation and Information Control 39
- Post-Relocation 40
- Compensation of the Project-Affected People 40
- The Traditional Tribunal the *Lok Sath* 42
- Filling Complaints with the ADB 43

**Chapter Four: Discussion** 46

**Chapter Five: Conclusion** 53

**References** 55
Chapter One

Introduction

Thesis Question: Displacement and Power: To what extent is development-induced displacement a consequence of uneven power relationships and how do ADB’s safeguards policies attempt to redress the negative implications?

Introduction

Development-induced displacement is the result of the prevailing neo-liberal economic development agenda, combined with the power disparity between the poor and the State culminating in the manifestation of societal structural violence. This thesis critically analyses two large-scale development projects funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which resulted in the displacement of thousands of people due to uneven power relationships between the State (representing the powerful) and the poor (the powerless). The two case studies are the Railway Rehabilitation Project of Cambodia in 2006 and the Chashma Canal Irrigation Project of 1993 in Pakistan. The two cases, which resulted in the social disarticulation of thousands of poor people, are analysed using the lenses of post-development, social disarticulation and displacement, and structural violence. The discussions will also examine the ensuing gender issues resulting from the marginalisation of women in the displacement process, drawing on the “feminisation of poverty” (Pearce 1978; Tyskerud and Lindstrom 2013). The ADB’s safeguard policies provide the backdrop from which the whole dilemma of resettlement occurs.

Background

Post-development theorists argue that development as the magic formulae for the Third World lost its lustre because it has not delivered on its promises (Escobar 1995, vii). The development era ushered in by US President Truman’s speech of 1949, considered the transfer of First World technology and science to the Third World as a solution for its
underdevelopment (Escobar 1995, 3). Development can be perceived as a western cultural construct that has been poorly transplanted into the Third World; a collision of different cultural universe (Latouche 1993, 6). This lead to the mobilisation of considerable resources and as well as the hopes of millions of people in the Third World of achieving Frist World standards, but eventually the prospect receded on the horizon (Rist 2008, 1). The end result was impoverishment, exploitation and the oppression of the people in the Third World (Escobar 1995, 4). Development as an ideology has now been replaced by globalisation, as we have come to terms with the fact that the development promised was unrealisable due to the persisting inequalities and unequal power relations between developed and developing countries (Rist 2008, 226).

Some development practices, such as displacement and resettlement programs, happen via a process of structural violence enforced through the four pillars of control - penetration, segmentation, marginalisation and fragmentation (Galtung 1990, 294). Structural violence is defined as immutable natural structures, which unintentionally and indirectly impede people from their self-realisation (Parsons 2007, 175). Involuntary forced displacement resulting from project-induced displacement is a form of structural violence typically visited upon the poor people of the Third World in the name of development. The whole process is enforced through neo-liberal policies, which was accompanied by the consistent use of terror and brutal coercion (Oksala 2011, 474). Coercion, brutality and intimidation are the hallmark techniques of displacement and resettlement, which are inflicted on poor people in developing countries. Cernna (2000, 3659) observed in 2000 that approximately 200 million people had been displaced globally. State institutions responsible for this predicament typically justify the involuntary displacement of a few for serving the greater good of the majority (Cernna 2000, 3659). Research has shown however that characteristically the displaced population falls into abject poverty and experiences landlessness, joblessness, marginalisation, and morbidity resulting in social disarticulation (Cernna 2000, 3661). Despite these research findings, governments supported by big development agencies such as the Asia Development Bank continue to implement development projects that displace entire villages.
The Vulnerable

The process of involuntary displacement has particular negative impacts on Indigenous people, the poor, the elderly and women (Downing 2002, 3). In this case women who were already marginalised in some societies spiral further into poverty (Downing 2002, 11). This leads to a heightened level of gender-based violence especially among single women and unaccompanied women as well as women who are heads of households (Mooney 2005, 17). The prevalent gender inequalities are further accentuated by large infrastructure development projects that displace people from their homes and livelihoods (Thukral 1996, 1500). During socio-economic crises women are relegated to passive roles of victims and they are ill equipped to deal with demanding situations, but have at the same time been praised for their resilience (Daley 1991, 248). This thesis will also examine gender issues in the Cambodian case in relation to the ADB’s gender policy.

Theoretical Framework

The displacement phenomenon is argued within post-development theory where proponents argue that the prevailing hegemonic Eurocentric development paradigm has brought about increased hardship to the poor communities of the Third World. Robinson (2003, 13) and Kumar (2013, 95) argue that it is usually the poor, those who lack power, that are displaced. Post-development scholars have argued that the discourse of development has had negative impact on the poorer segment of the population (Peralta 2013, 466). The thesis will also investigate the claim that the poorer segments of the population are the usual victims in most development-induced displacement by the elitists and the authorities. The development discourse acts to further entrench unequal power relations between the state and the poor and we see this being played out in the context of big infrastructure development projects displacing poor folks.

The Key Research Problems and Questions

1. Is displacement ever justified when it infringes the basic human rights of the few for the greater good of the mass?
2. To what extent is the local economic and political context a determining factor in the displacement-resettlement process?

3. How do uneven power relations contribute to the high incidence of involuntary forced displacement?

4. How significant are involuntary forced displacement processes in sustaining gender inequalities in project-affected communities?

5. How do the combined forces of the national development agenda, structural violence and existing social inequalities contribute to the social disarticulation of displaced people?

6. To what extent do the safeguards and resettlement policies of the Asian Development Bank really protect project-affected people?

**Justification for the Research**

Table 1 below indicates a sharp increase in the amount of resettlement plans submitted to the ADB by Asian countries between 2001 and 2013. This indicates rather alarmingly that development projects requiring the resettlement of parts of the community is increasing, despite considerable negative resettlement outcomes. This is translated into the continuous disenfranchisement of indigenous people, minority groups, poorer segments of the population, the destruction of cultures and traditional ways of life in developing countries in the pursuit of modernity. The data in Table 1 also signifies the increasing infringement on the human rights of displacees, where politically and economically motivated projects take place for profit or political mileage and economic gains over the rights of poor citizens. This is often achieved with complete disregard and disrespect for the rights of the less powerful in the community. There is also a need to analyse the resettlement issues within the context of unequal power relations so as to understand how effectively the ADB attempts to mitigate or at least allay the impacts of displacement on project-affected people.
Table 1 shows the sharp increase in resettlement plans submitted to the ADB between 2001 and 2013. Data Source: ADB 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount of Resettlement Plans Submitted to the ADB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Research Objectives**

1. To offer further insight into the complex world of involuntary forced displacement sustained by social inequalities, structural violence within the broader debate of development and modernity.

2. Through the dual lenses of post-development and structural violence analyse, how the State’s development agenda can jeopardise the welfare of vulnerable communities who are sacrificed through questionable measures, sustained by existing uneven power relations.

3. To contribute to the post-development debate because far too often development efforts in Third World countries entrench communities further into poverty.
4. To demonstrate that despite elaborated resettlement plans and policies, involuntary forced displacement is a complex and sensitive operation that often results in the social disarticulation of project-affected people.

5. To explore the relationship between involuntary forced displacement and structural violence as a social condition, which disadvantages already marginalised people.

6. To examine the impact of forced displacement on women due to gender inequality, despite existing gender policies from development organisations such as the Asian Development Bank.

7. To demonstrate that local culture and traditions suffer significant distortion and destruction through the process of forced displacement in the name of modernity and development.

8. To contextualise development agencies such as the Asian Development Bank within the broader debate of poverty reduction, social justice, safeguards and remedial actions.

Research Methodology
The study was conducted through a qualitative approach accessing online data to select the two cases. The research objectives were narrowed down into key topical research questions, which were then methodologically answered in the discussion section of the thesis. In the process the objectives were all addressed systematically in the findings and discussions as well as in the findings. This study was limited to desk-based research with neither fieldwork nor interviews conducted for data collection due to time and budget constraints. An extensive review of projects on the ADB website was initially undertaken. A long list was compiled of projects that involved negative resettlement outcomes. The two cases were selected from a refined list as they also represent two distinct periods in ADB’s resettlement policy – the pre-1995 resettlement period and the post-1995 resettlement period to analyse the effects of its policies (if any) on the two cases.
The two cases were selected from a purposive approach, which is a non-probability approach (Bryman 2012,417) as there was no attempt to establish a co-relationship between the variables, but rather the two cases offered insight into the catastrophic outcomes of forced displacement. The two cases are not samples but rather opportunities to shed empirical light (Yin 2014, 40), on the power relationship at play in the development process. They are a unit of analysis (Yin 2014, 31), which allows the interpretation of the emerging issues. The cases are presented through the linear-analytical structure (Yin 2014, 188), which is the basic level for presenting case studies. Information from the two cases formed the basis of the data collection process in an attempt to construct a representation of the relationship (Neuman 1997, 29) between other issues. The data sources for the study were scholarly publications and reports, relevant documentaries, online transcripts of broadcasts, blogs, government reports, press releases, resettlement plans and NGO reports, publications related to development-induced displacement, online newspapers, magazines, online fora and the ADB website.
Chapter Two

Literature Review

It is believed that around 200 million people have been displaced globally due to the construction of infrastructure such as irrigation projects, transportation highways and power generation for urban development (Cernea 2000, 3659). This has led to the social disarticulation of those displaced by big infrastructure projects as they become landless, homeless, jobless, marginalised and experience increased morbidity in their ranks (Cernea 2000, 3661). Kumar (2013, 95) adds to this list with losses of ancestral heritage, a scattering of family, environmental damages and loss of kinship. The stress associated with involuntary forced displacement is known to have very serious impacts on both the mental and the physical health of those forcefully displaced (Cao 2010).

Gellert and Lynch (2003, 16) define displacement as the change in the landscape between human and bio-geographical elements as mega-projects are introduced. Mega-projects are described by Gellert and Lynch (2003, 15) as inherently displacing, through “creative destruction” as it brings about “rapid and radical” transformation of the landscapes, by “displacing mountain tops, rivers, flora, fauna, humans and their communities”. The three main contributing factors to development-induced displacement according to Gellert and Lynch (2003, 23) are capital accumulation, State interest, and modernising ideology that act through epistemic communities, which in turn support the proliferation of mega-projects.

There is considerable literature on the issue of development-induced displacement, ranging from the consequences of displacement (Kumar 2013; Young et al 2009; Wilmsen et al 2011; Robinson 2003; Cernea 1996; Fernando et al 2009; McDowell 1996) as well as guidelines written by international organisations aiming to prescribe the best practice in resettlement efforts (World Bank OP 4.12 2001; OCHA Handbook 1999; World Bank Involuntary Resettlement Sourcebook 2004). Apart from the handbooks, which are mostly prescriptive, most of the literature identifies three main processes of displacement, which are displacement
itself, resettlement and consequences, as well as hardships endured by displaces. On the
prescriptive side of the resettlement debate, Perera (2009, IV) insists on respect for the
cultural uniqueness of Indigenous people by providing them with culturally and socially
appropriate economic benefits. The literature also reveals that resettlement programs are very
hard to implement as they create dissension between the affected people and the
implementers of the program (Fernando et al 2009, 1).

The guidelines for the implementation of resettlement programs are comprehensive,
 systematic and detailed and are aimed at the best possible practice of resettlement, based on
the philosophy that prevention is better than cure (OCHA 1999, 15). The idea of prevention is
reiterated as a leitmotif throughout the literature, arguing that displacement and relocation
should be undertaken as a last resort and that governments should respect human rights and
proposes that the displacement process should be conceived and executed as part of the
overall project and addressed as a development opportunity (World Bank Involuntary
Resettlement Sourcebook 2004, XVII). The argument is that the resettlement program should
be conceived and integrated in the development program and not addressed as an externality.
Furthermore, the World Bank has developed guidelines for assessing the costs and impacts of
displacement on both the host population and the displaces (World Bank Guidelines for
Assessing the Impacts and Costs of Forced Displacement 2012). The approach is to have a
comprehensive socio-economic assessment of the impacts to determine long-term
implications.

The Asian Development Bank as a funding organisation has several safeguards, which
provide guidelines in different areas of the displacement and resettlement process,
particularly ADB funded projects. They are the ADB Gender Policy of 1998, the ADB
Involuntary Resettlement Policy of 1995, the ADB Public Communication Policy of 2005,
The ADB policies are geared towards the protection of people affected by its projects. The
fundamental principle of its Involuntary Resettlement Policy is that resettlement should be
avoided whenever possible (ADB 1995,9), while its Gender Policy prescribes that women
should be involved in the project’s life cycle including project identification, preparation,
appraisal, implementation and evaluation (ADB 1998b viii). The Communication Policy aims to ensure that significant information exchange takes place between the stakeholders and the ADB, while fostering accountability and transparency (ADB 2005, i). The Indigenous People Policy was designed to ensure that Indigenous people have opportunities to participate and benefit fully from development (ADB 1998c, 7) as well as providing special attention to the traditional rights of Indigenous people on their ancestral land and territories (Perera 2009, IV). The Indigenous Policy was further updated in 2009, through a comprehensive framework to improve its relevance and effectiveness (Perera 2009, IV). The ADB Resettlement Handbook of 1998 provides guideline for resettlement processes and operations for ADB’s projects (ADB 1998a, iii).

Despite its policy efforts in safeguards, the ADB is described in some literature as advocating a neo-liberal agenda which aggravates the condition of already marginalised communities in countries where projects are funded by the ADB (Manahan and Chavez cited in Forum on Global South 2005; Guttal cited in Forum on Global South 2005; Saito and Ishida 2007). It is argued that ADB invests its resources in high yielding projects guaranteeing maximum returns on its investments for its shareholders (Manahan and Chavez cited in Forum on Global South 2005, 24). The ADB creates wealth by funding large-scale projects, which frequently necessitate the involuntary displacement of marginalised people at the project site, causing irreparable devastation to the relocated communities (Kent and Simon 2007, 14). The ADB staff members are not accountable to any government as they have immunity (Ransley et al 2008, 41) and hence are not liable to be prosecuted by any organisations or governments. Despite its Communication Policy, the ADB has been accused of circulating documents that are too lengthy, too technical and only written in English and that the average stakeholders involved in the projects have difficulty comprehending to their disadvantage (International Rivers Network cited in Forum on Global South 2005, 57).

Numerous policy papers have been produced with the aim of providing the best approach to displacement and resettlement (Perera 2009; Fernando et al 2009). The policy reports address numerous issues such as international law and Indigenous people’s rights, land development policies and tribal land issues (Perera 2009, iv), as well as common policy on resettlement, restoration of livelihoods and the vulnerabilities of the displaced (Fernando et al 2009, 5).
Since displacement is inherently disastrous for the displaced people, the preventative aspects to it have also been explored (Downing 2002; World Bank OP 4.12 2001; OCHA Handbook 1999; Cernea 2000). Through his risk and reconstruction model, Cernea (2000, 3660) suggests that the process is reversible through four basic functions – prediction, diagnosis, problem-solution approach and a research strategy. These functions could address the displacement process through its main multifaceted components, which are landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of access to property resources, and community disarticulation (Cernea 2000, 3660). An understanding of the connections between the variables could assist the decision-makers to “trigger chain effects”, which could mitigate the negative outcomes and impacts of displacement (Cernea 2000, 3660).

A broad swath of the displacement literature is about the resettlement phase of the displacement process. The general consensus is that resettlement is costly, complicated and should be avoided at all cost, but despite this, displacement is on the rise (Downing 2002; Couldrey and Morris 2002; McDowell 1996; Kumar 2013; Fernando et al 2009; Wilmsen et al 2011; Cook 1994). Displacement and resettlement have been described as “disruptive” (McDowell 1996, 9) and “profoundly dramatic and painful” (Cook 1994, 17). Research indicates that resettlement is despite fair warning have always been destructive and impacts heavily on the lives of the displaced to the extent that they never fully recover, and eventually fall into abject poverty. Some authors argue that the failure of resettlement is the result of poor planning (Kumar 2013; Young et al 2009; Fernando et al 2009). Fernando et al (2009, 1) argue that the State struggles to implement the displacement process, which is rife with contradictions, has very limited funds, inadequate human resources and that lessons learnt in one resettlement effort are never utilised to improve future projects.

A raft of literature raises the salient, ever pressing and fundamental issue of human rights in development-induced displacement and forced resettlement (Downing 2002; Young et al 2009; OCHA Handbook 1999; Couldrey and Morris 2002; Perera 2009; Robinson 2003). According to the literature, development-induced internal displacement is perceived as a violation of the human rights of marginalised and already powerless people for national
benefit (Young et al, 2009, 221). The process causes “enormous trauma” in the country (Downing 2002, 6). Couldrey and Morris (2002, 6) argue that the millions of people displaced annually entail enormous socio-economic impacts and constitutes horrendous violations of human rights. The issue of human rights according to Robinson (2003, 10) forms part of the new paradigm shift where the development process is supposed to reduce poverty, protect the environment, facilitate social justice as well as protect human rights while the poor are experiencing the opposite.

Most literature on gender and displacement argues that development –induced displacement has had very negative impact on the lives of women as well as their dependents as they become marginalised and spiral into poverty (Tan et al 2005; Mehta and Srinivasan 2000; Bisht 2009; Thukral 1996; Mooney 2005). Since 1993 the World Bank has already alluded to the fact that women “bear the brunt” of displacement, especially those that are caused by large dams (Mehta and Srinivasan 2000, 2). The impact of displacement on women usually results in the loss of authority, which leads to the breaking up of families, weakening of kinship ties, loss of security as well as the social support and network that are provided by familial relationship (Downing 2002, 11). Despite their resilience and their ability to cope with adversity (Daley 1991, 248), women face considerable hardship, because they are marginalised and disempowered as their economic independence and social autonomy are taken from them through the displacement process (Bisht 2009, 314). The process feeds into the concept of “feminisation of poverty” (Pearce 1978; Chant 2008; Angeles 2009), which is exacerbated through the State’s pursuit of neo-liberal economic growth and persistent inequalities (Angeles 2009, 293). The “feminisation of poverty” first coined in the 1970’s has been responsible for drawing attention to the plight of a great number of women living in poverty, as well as the impact of macro-economic policies on women (Pearce 1978; Chant 2008).

Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India is quoted as saying that people displaced by dams for hydroelectricity, must make sacrifices for the greater good of the country (Couldrey and Morris, 2002, 4). The quote still epitomises the philosophy and general principles behind mega-structure development in Third World countries today. The subject of scarifying the few for the greater common good is captured by Gellert and Lynch (2003),
Perera (2009), Couldrey and Morris (2002), and Wilmsen et al (2011). The general debate is that it is usually the poor and marginalised who are displaced and resettled into impoverishment for the public good (Gellert and Lynch 2003, 20). Mega projects are known to serve powerful actors, as well as the modernising ambition of the State at the expense of the powerless (Gellert and Lynch 2003, 20). The common development trend is that the needs and aspiration of the majority takes precedence over the needs of the minority (Wilmsen et al 2011, 361). However, the general tone in the literature is the condemnation of the practice of prioritising the needs of the masses over the livelihoods of the minority.

Analysis of the literature reveals that displacement processes are embedded within uneven power relations between the marginalised and powerless versus the State system (Hall and Brandford 2012; Gaventa 1980; Crewe and Harrison 2002; Parfitt 2002; Syagga and Olima 1996; Kumar 2013; Wilmsen et al 2011; Gellert and Lynch 2003; Perera 2009; Downing 2002). It is clear that the displaced are typically poor people who are forced out of their homes to allow development projects to take place. This is especially the case among Indigenous populations who are rarely consulted in order to accelerate the national development process (Hall and Brandford 2012, 851). In the case of mega-dams for hydroelectricity, the power struggle is mostly between the powerful pro-dam lobby consisting of groups with commercial interests, which represent the symbol of modernisation and typically with State support, while on the other side is the local community often with the support of global NGOs, which fortunately step in to defend the rights of those under threat of displacement (Hall and Brandford 2012, 852). Downing (2002, 6) has rightly pointed out that it is extremely unlikely for the residents of Avondale and Peoria in Arizona to be displaced as they are affluent, politically powerful, highly populated, non-Indigenous urban communities and that even if they reside on top of resource rich sites; displacing those residents for mining purposes he argued is not viable politically nor economically.

The status quo between the powerful and the powerless is maintained through the internalisation and institutionalisation of structural violence (Galtung 1990, 302). The main characteristic of structural violence is inequality (Galtung 1990; Farmer 2004; Wilkinson 2004; Farmer et al 2006). Inequality is systemised by the elitists through processes of penetration, segmentation, marginalisation, and fragmentation (Galtung 1990, 294). This
system reinforces the components of the structure and impedes possible resistance from exploitation by the “underdogs” (Galtung 1990, 294). The authors on the topic generally agree that structural violence is about deprivation (Parsons 2007, 175), coercion (Oksala 2011, 474), that resources are concentrated in the upper class (Galtung and Hoivik 1971, 73) and that the poor are the main victims of structural violence (Farmer 1996, 280). Structural violence is a concept developed by Johan Galtung dating back to 1969 as well by Latin American theologians, and it is characterised by social inequality, racism and gender inequality (Farmer 2004, 307). Structural violence has also been linked to neo-liberalism, which has at times been accompanied by terror and coercion, leaving the poorer segment of the population worse off (Farmer 2004, 307). Structural violence is the social, economic, cultural, political and legal structure that prevents people from achieving their full potential (Farmer et al 2006, 1686). The abominable conditions within the structure such as the lack of access to political power, health care, legal aid, which are all aspects of the injustice and the machinery of oppression, is so pervasively embedded and normalised by institutions and regular experience that it becomes acceptable (Farmer 2004, 397). Despite Galtung’s pessimism regarding the ability to resist structural violence, some authors maintain that communities can actively resist military and economic occupation, through non-compliance as well as non-participation (Parsons 2007; Farmer 2004; Farmer et al 2006; Parsons 2007).

Those deprived of their livelihood through the development process are the powerless (Kumar 2013, 95). The power differences are also obvious in the geographical location of the actors, for example between rural and urban dwellers. Typically (but not always) the needs of urban dwellers take precedence over those of rural dwellers. A case in point is the Nairobi Water Project that displaced rural farmers to facilitate the construction of a dam for the urban residents of Nairobi (Syagga and Olima 1996, 61). Wilmsen et al (2011, 356) argue that the political economy literature has paid very little attention to the displacement of rural people due to infrastructure development, except for Escobar (2003), Oliver-Smith (2006), and for the political ecology of dams Forsyth (2003), and Hirsch and Warren (1998). Wilmsen et al (2011, 358) further argue that impoverishment is not only the outcome of poor planning, but also due to State objectives and the unequal distribution of power within society.
Arturo Escobar (1995, 3) a prominent post-development theorist assumes a very pessimistic view of the development process in the Third World, which he believes has further entrenched Third World countries into irreconcilable debts. The phenomenon of development has transformed man from “homo sapiens to homo miserabilis” (Illich cited in Sachs 1995, 88). Illich describes the concept of basic needs in the Third World as the most “insidious legacy” left to man (Illich cited in Sachs 1995, 88). Development is generally perceived as a phenomenon, which leads to much suffering in the Third World (Corbridge 1998, 138). Post-development theorists argue that development has failed and that there is an urgent need for alternatives (Matthews 2007, 373).

Culture is one of the dominant themes in the post-development debate whereby the intervention of First World countries in the development of Third World countries has had devastating impacts on local cultures (Sbert cited in Sachs 1995; Alvarez cited in Sachs 1995; Escobar cited in Sachs 1995; Illich cited in Sachs 1995; Escobar 2004, 15). The concept of development is primarily perceived as a notion of Western culture (Latouche 1993, 3) and one of the reasons that development (according to a Western concept of it) has failed in the Third World is because the Third World was wrongly perceived as one homogenous group (Schuurman 2000, 7). In order to be developed it was imperative that the locals “jettison” the traditional cultural bonds and assimilate new cultural values, mainly that of the West (Sbert cited in Sachs 1995). Development has cracked the “cultural bedrock of poverty” and the “cultural hammock”, which used to support traditional poverty (Illich cited in Sachs 1995), leaving people in the Third World exposed and vulnerable.

Other recurrent themes of the post-development debate are the issue of power relations (Brigg 2002; Rapley 2004; Mohan and Stokke 2000; Rist 2008). Development is believed to be the agenda of the modernising and powerful elites imposed on the Third World, enforced through the existing inequities (Rapley 2004, 351). Rist (2008, 1) argues that development has seductive power, which makes it appealing to all despite its failures. On the other hand Mohan and Stokk (2000, 247), believe that development could have worked had the local people been appropriately empowered. This can be achieved through more localised participation and collective action at the grassroots level through the process of participatory development (Mohan and Stokk 2000, 247).
Peralta (2013, 466) maintains Escobar’s stance that Truman’s speech represents the start of development discourse, which precipitated an avalanche of development programming across the Third World, with policy makers, institutions, scholars, planners and academics promoting the idea of development. According to Peralta (2013, 466), this development discourse eventually turned into a nightmare for developing countries. Development is therefore perceived as a paradox in Third World countries, as these states are often undermined through the development effort, leading to the oppression of their people through the rise of authoritarian regimes (Przeworski 2000; Kothari and Minogue 2002; Peralta 2013; Weiss 1998; De Rivero 2010). Weiss (1998, 2) argues that development discourse has “hallowed out” and “toppled” nation states, which led to an era of “state denial”. Likewise, De Rivero (2010, 1) remarked that development efforts by what he calls “quasi-nation states” is almost futile, as it is not easy to replicate the accomplishment of democratic and capitalist nations. The effects of globalisation have further reduced the power of State authority to implement proper strategies for national development imperatives, as governments are pressured into multi-layered systems (Kothari and Minogue 2002, 19). Kothari and Minogue (2002, 1) further argue that while there has been some measure of development in some Third World countries, relative poverty and inequality have increased.

The literature generally takes a very pessimistic view of the development processes in Third World countries to date. The modernising ideologies, which were the catalysts for development after World War II, may have done more harm than good to people living in the Third World, as they attempt to emulate North America and Europe (Gellert and Lynch 2003; Robinson 2003; Escobar cited in Peralta 2013). In the process Third World nations became indebted, authoritarian regimes settled in, corruption and oppression have been on the rise. De Rivero (2010, 1) maintained that after more than sixty years of development theories and policies, some one hundred and fifty six countries are still developing, with only two city-states, Singapore and Hong Kong and two small countries Taiwan and South Korean having achieved development and not by following the Washington Consensus but developing through alternatives. In their attempt at modernisation, Third World countries have embarked on a series of mega-projects, which have consequently displaced the poor and the powerless.
The post-development literature provides the backdrop by which to understand displacement and resettlement processes and relationships of power that enable them in the Third World.

The literature does not sufficiently discuss the issue of power between the displaced and those implementing the displacement process. Analysis of the displacement context and process reveals that there is a consistent pattern in the displacement process; it is always poor people who are the targets and victims of displacement and resettlement efforts (Kumar 2013, 95). The Three Gorges Dam (Wilmsen et al 2011), the Nairobi Water Supply Project (Syagga and Olima 1996) and the Monte Bello controversy (Hall and Bradford 2012) depict a consistent pattern of the poor being displaced and resettled by the authorities in the name of development and the public good (Gellert and Lynch 2003, 20). Other research carried out on development-induced displacement by authors around the world such as in India (Nayak, 2013; Mohanty 2011; Kabra 2009), Viet Nam (Ty et al 2013), Lesotho, South Africa and the upper Mekong River in South Western China (Tilt et al 2009) and Cambodia (Bugalski and Medallo 2012) reveal that poor people displaced by the powerful in the pursuit of large development projects typically fall into impoverishment.

The pattern is consistent with the struggle between the power and the powerless in the development context globally. The issue of power is also present at other levels, between the State and major international investors, between Third World States and industrialised nations. There are also conflicts and power struggles between different ethnic groups, differences within the State system itself, as well as Third World State’s struggle to be at par with developed countries in the name of development.
Chapter Three

Findings

Case Study Number One: The Cambodia Railway Rehabilitation Project 2006

The case study will first provide contextual descriptive information, which will be the backdrop of the case, based on information from the resettlement plan (RP) prepared by the Republic of Cambodia and submitted to the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The presentation will then evolve into a comparative account of what transpired in reality during the resettlement process despite the promises laid out in the RP.

Project Background

The Cambodian Railway Rehabilitation Project was deemed necessary after a significant part of Cambodia’s transport infrastructure had been affected during the Cambodian strife of the 1970’s and 1980’s (Kem et al 2011, 3). The US $143 million project managed by the ADB aimed to raise the dilapidated infrastructure to international standards, promote economic growth and help reduce poverty (Australian Government Aid Program 2013, 1). The total length of the railway system to be rehabilitated was 650km (Bugalski and Medallo 2012, 1). Once rehabilitated, the railway would be operated by a private company called Toll Holdings (Bugalski, The Age 2014). Several factors gave impetus to the project such as border traffic congestions due to the export-driven economic growth in Cambodia, the rise in energy prices, demand for a more efficient use of energy, the escalation of road casualties, resettlement and permanent loss of land due to road construction (ADB 2009b, 2). The ADB believed that these factors combined would make the rehabilitation of the Cambodian railway system a more viable option, as it would be safer, “space-frugal” and more attractive (ADB 2009b, 2).
Project Principles vis-a-vis the Resettlement of the Project-Affected People

Cambodia did not have a resettlement policy during the resettlement of the project-affected people by the railway rehabilitation project. Sub-Decree No. 19 ANK/BK dated 19 March 2003 (Art 3) provides condition under which landless families may be relocated by the State for public development projects (Resettlement Plan 2007, p. 34). The project resettlement plan stipulated that the affected people would not incur any loss in the whole process of resettlement, but that their lives would ultimately be improved as a result of the resettlement process, or at least would be maintained to the same status prior to resettlement (Resettlement Plan 2007, p. 38). In cases of loss of physical and non-physical assets, including loss of income and businesses, they would be replaced thereby enabling people to build an improved house or at least maintain their “pre-project” living standards (Resettlement Plan 2007, p. 38). The lack of a formal legal right to the land being occupied by the affected person prior to the project would not be a barrier to compensation and benefits from the rehabilitation measures (Resettlement Plan 2007, p. 38).

Cambodia Land Reform and Poverty Reduction Policy

The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) expressed its commitment to land reforms for the purpose of economic development and socio-economic development in line with its poverty reduction program (Stiftung 2014, p. 21). The government accorded the security of land ownership for both private and the State as part of its poverty reduction strategy (RGC National Development Plan Update 2009-2013, p. 31). The Land Dispute Resolution Committee was established to resolve land conflicts as part of the program (RGC National Development Plan Update 2009-2013, p. 31). The RGC also established a program called the Social Land Concession program to provide land to the landless. The National Strategic Plan of 2006-2010 aimed to distribute land to 10,000 landless families under that program (RGC National Development Plan Update 2009-2013, p. 31). The RGC has urged each province to make available land for at least 416 families (RGC National Development Plan Update 2009-2013, p. 32).
Pre-Resettlement Planning

*Budget for the Resettlement Program within the Resettlement Plan (RP) Submitted to the ADB in 2006*

An executive agency was established to implement the land acquisition, compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation process for the project-affected people (Resettlement Plan 2006, 38). Relevant resources were promised for the resettlement process, comprising of adequate funds and manpower to manage the resettlement program (Resettlement Plan 2006, 39). Construction work on the resettlement sites would only commence once the Inter-Ministerial Resettlement Committee (IRC) had properly inspected the sites and once all rehabilitation assistance was in place (Resettlement Plan 2006, 39). The resettlement sites would be equipped with the necessary facilities such as water supply, access roads, electricity, drainage and toilet facilities (pit latrine) before the arrival of those people being resettled (Resettlement Plan 2006, 52).

Photo no.1: *The Cambodian railway community prior to relocation (Source: Bridges Across Borders Cambodia 2012 in Bugalski and Medallo 2012).*

*(Photo removed in respect of copyright)*
Gender Strategy and Input in the Resettlement Process and Complaint Mechanism

The RP stated that women would participate in the consultation, implementation and the monitoring of the resettlement process while additional consultations would be held with female-headed households to determine the level of impact and address issues related to relocation of housing, selection of replacement land, choice and design of the resettlement site, especially on sensitive issues such as toilets, sanitation, water and house plans (Resettlement Plan 2006, 63). Consideration would be given to special assistance that may be required to address their specific needs, enabling them to restore or improve their livelihoods (Resettlement Plan 2006, 63). A compensation and livelihood restoration plan was included in the RP to ensure that women maintained their present income-earning activities and also had access to the market and special considerations would be given to poor women-headed households (Resettlement Plan 2006, 64). The RP stated that affected people would have an input in the resettlement process; their concerns and suggestions would be factored into the design and implementation phases and they could express any issues through the grievance and complaint mechanism (Resettlement Plan 2006, 38). The complaints would be processed through two stages before reaching a court of law as a last resort and any expenses incurred would be absorbed by the project.

Pre-Resettlement Challenges

The Reality: Intimidation, Coercion, Threat and Bulldozer as a result of Social Inequality and Structural Violence

“The absence of a formal legal title to land by some affected groups should not be a bar to compensation; particular attention should be paid to households headed by women and other vulnerable groups, such as Indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities, and appropriate assistance provided to help them improve their status”

(ADB Resettlement Handbook, 1998a, 2)

Contrary to the resettlement plan that was elaborated and submitted to the ADB, the resettlement process was rife with allegations of threat, intimidation, fear and coercion of the
project-affected people by the authorities responsible for undertaking the resettlement process (Pred 2012, 4). According to the Bridges Across Borders Cambodia (BABC) report, the highest proportion of threat occurred in Poipet, Phnom Penh and Battambang (Pred 2012, 4). The project-affected people at those locations claimed that they were coerced from their homes by the authorities threatening to bulldoze and burn their houses, if they refused the few hundred dollars as compensation (Zoe Daniel, ABC 2011). The two tables below compare the mechanisms employed by the authorities to control the project-affected people and the limited resources available to the projected-affected people to respond to the significant power disparity. They also illustrate the complexities of involuntary forced displacement despite resettlement plans and policies, which lead to the social disarticulation of the project-affected people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Mechanism used by the Authorities</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Post-it” notes</td>
<td>Minimum documentation - the chance of the affected people losing the small yellow piece of paper is high, hence no plot would be allocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thumb print</td>
<td>Evidence of compliance /acceptance of inadequate compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detail measurement survey (DMS)</td>
<td>Controlling the compensation outcome as the actual size of the structure is reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut -off dates to provide the thumb prints</td>
<td>Affected people not informed are left out of the resettlement loop for not complying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat and coercion</td>
<td>Intimidation to obtain obedience and compliance from the affected people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table No.2 above shows the various controls mechanism employed by the authorities to obtain compliance from the people they intend to displace.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tools (Support) Available to the Affected People (the Powerless)</th>
<th>Tools of the Displacers (the Powerful) Utilised against the Affected People (the Powerless)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistance from the Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
<td>The land law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activism e.g. Ros Bopha</td>
<td>Intimidation, threat and coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certain level of assistance from AusAID</td>
<td>Promises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal response from the Asian Development Bank</td>
<td>Threat of illegal eviction, bulldozers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate of compensation reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of cut-off dates to accept terms and condition for resettlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arbitrary detention of vulnerable people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table No. 3 above show the different tools/instruments employed in the struggle between the affected people and the authorities.

Households located in the “corridor of impact” (COI) in Poi Pet were served with three eviction notices while twenty-two other households were given ten days to move or their homes would be demolished according to the law, informing residents that the authorities would not be responsible for any loss or damage to property (Pred 2012,4). The demolition notice did not provide justification for the eviction nor allude to any legal recourse to arbitrate the matter, leaving the people in a high state of anxiety due to inadequate information, fear of complaining, intimidation and being coerced into accepting the inadequate compensation (Pred 2012, 4). Due to threats from the authorities, affected families refrained from using the grievance mechanism that was eventually established to process complaints (Bugalski and Medello 2012, 60). In some cases the threats were quite explicit as reported by a 47-year-old woman who claimed that the authorities informed them that their house would be bulldozed if they refused to accept the compensation (Bugalski and Medello 2012, 63). The sizes of the houses were also systematically reduced during the detailed
measurement survey (DMS), hence drastically reducing the compensation amount to affected people (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut 2011, 6). In a similar incident, a 22-year-old woman claimed that the resettlement officers informed her after her mother refused the unfair compensation, that even if they complained, it would be of no use as they were mere citizens (Bugalski and Medello 2012, 62). The testimonies are evidence of the unwillingness of the authorities to address the issues and concerns expressed by the affected people (Bugalski and Medello 2012, 63), despite the resettlement plan, which was simply a coercive development tool utilised by the authorities against the poor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of the Affected People (the powerless) in the Cambodian Railway Case</th>
<th>Characteristics of the Displacers (those holding power) in the Cambodian Railway Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiteracy (or low level of education)</td>
<td>Has access to the judicial system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited legal aid</td>
<td>Have access to the parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reliable communication system</td>
<td>Have control over the police force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No voices</td>
<td>Village chief hostile to the resettled people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No land title</td>
<td>Have powerful financial backings (ADB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being ordinary citizens</td>
<td>Land laws in their favour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fearful, intimidated, coerced</td>
<td>Have justifiable economic development agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very limited social power</td>
<td>Have justifiable national development plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of lodging complaints due to possible reprisal or being sidelined from the resettlement process</td>
<td>Political connections and motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female-headed households</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widows</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landless excluded from social life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too poor for a proper bank loan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers to access remedies for the resettlement issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuck in a poverty cycle (poor people least able to deal with displacement)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table no.4 above shows the major disparities between the powerless (the displacees) and the powerful (the displacers).*
The “Post-it” Note and Thumb Print as Symbols of Uneven Power Relationship

“People affected should be informed fully and consulted on resettlement and compensation options”.

(ADB Resettlement Handbook 1998a, 2)

Small yellow “post-it” notes (measuring around 8cm x 7cm) were used for various aspects of resettlement operations of the affected people. Information obtained from the detailed measurement survey (DMS), which consisted of a detailed measurement and evaluation of the structure to be demolished and compensated, were all “squeezed” onto a small yellow “post-it” note, accompanied by the thumb print of the affected people, as evidence that they have accepted the sum calculated for the compensation on the “post-it” note (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut 2011, 3). In some cases, the affected people refused to “thumb print’ the “post-it” note as they disagreed with the sum calculated for their compensation (Pred 2012, 4). The affected people who refused to “thumb print” the “post-it” note did not receive a copy of the “post-it”, and were consequently left out of the resettlement process altogether (Pred 2012, 4; Bugalski and Medallo 2012, 17). There were accounts of affected people being woken up in the middle of the night by government officials to “thumb print” documents without much explanation, in effect practically signing away their rights to complain and appeal the compensation and resettlement options offered by the authorities (Bugalski and Medallo 2012, 29). There is no account however if the use of thumb print as signature was only limited to affected people who were illiterate or if it was common practice in such circumstances. It may be assumed that it was common practice or used as a matter of expediency. Public Information Booklets (PIBs) were also distributed among the affected people, but they were inappropriate as a method of communication as according to Bridges Across Borders Cambodia 2012 report, 20% of men and almost 40% of women in the project were reported to be illiterate (Pred 2012,4). It would seem that attempts at communicating as per the RP were simply an exercise in public relation and not really aimed at informing the project-affected people.
(Photo removed in respect of copyright)

Photo no. 2 “The post-it note (photo above) was the main form of pre-contract disclosure about household entitlements in all but one community visited for this study” (Source: Bridges Across Borders Cambodia 2012, in Bugalski and Medallo 2012).

Post-Resettlement Challenges in the Host Community

Hostilities in the new Communities and Tragedies as Examples of the State Jeopardising the Welfare of its Citizens in the name of Development

“Existing social and cultural institutions of resettlers and their hosts should be supported and used to the greatest extent possible, and resettlers should be integrated economically and socially into host communities”

(ADB Resettlement Handbook, 1998a 2)

The newly resettled affected people at the Trapeang AnhChanh resettlement site were refused medical assistance from the local human rights NGO LICADHO in April 2012 (Pred 2012,12). The matter was further complicated when the local village chief denied the medical team access to the site, hence denying the residents much needed medical treatment (Pred 2012, 12). The resettled families had difficulties accessing the basic necessities such as water
and electricity and also faced mounting financial debt due to inadequate compensation and limited work opportunities (Amnesty International 2012).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilities</th>
<th>Situation /Status/Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water &amp; electricity</td>
<td>Not connected, very expensive (use of paid water trucks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The house</td>
<td>Too small or cannot be constructed from the compensation payment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>Have to take out loan to buy food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>Jobs not available at new location, the skill set not useable at the new location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>Very far away, incurring additional funds to travel to school, parents choose to leave the children at home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health facilities</td>
<td>Too far away, incur additional cost to travel to health centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plot of land</td>
<td>Flood prone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table no.5 shows the facility issue at the new location after resettlement (Source: Bridges Across Borders Cambodia 2010).

The newly resettled households in Trapeang AnhChanh Boun were defrauded of electricity and water by the local village chief (Pred 2012, 15), and ensuing complaints of their situation lead to unprovoked attacks on them organised by the village chief (Pred 2012, 14). The village chief armed with a gun lead a group of 30 to 40 villagers and security guards in a violent assault on the resettled people and singled out Ros Bopha, an activist for the resettled railway community, intending to shoot her (Amnesty International 2012). These attacks exemplify the hardship and hostility experienced by the resettled people, as a result of inadequate preparation of the basic facilities on the resettlement sites, developing into dangerous confrontations when they sought redress (Pred 2012,15). Furthermore, attempts at resisting the inadequate compensation by the affected people were met with accusations of inciting the communities or hindering the development process of Cambodia (Bugalski and Medallo 2012, 64). Amnesty International requested assurances from the authorities that the resettled community representatives including Ros Bopha, were able to act peacefully for their rights without threats or violence from the authorities and also requested an independent investigation in alleged threats and physical attacks on affected people in the Trapeang AnhChanh resettlement (Amnesty International 2012). The attacks underscore the attempts...
by the authorities to repress dissension in the ranks of the resettled people through both intimidation and organised physical attacks.

The resettled environment was also relatively physically unsafe as two children drowned in the Battambang province in May 2010 (Carteret, Phnom Penh Post, 2014). Stories differed as to the actual cause of their deaths, with the villagers claiming that the children were fetching water from a deep pond (as no running water was available at the resettlement site), while the police claimed that the children were collecting snails (Carteret, the Phnom Penh Post, 2014). The incident was brought to the attention of the ADB and AusAID by Bridges Across Borders Cambodia urging them to launch an investigation into the circumstances of the double tragedy (Bugalski and Medallo 2012, 41). This incident and lack of accountability in the reporting of it, highlights the low level of consideration being accorded to the resettled people by the authorities.

**Loans from the Informal Money Lender as an Illustration of Development Efforts Entrenching Communities into Further Poverty**

“*The full costs of resettlement and compensation should be included in the presentation of project costs and benefits*”


Since most of the resettled people did not qualify for formal bank loans nor were they given the option of accessing housing finance, they had to borrow money from informal moneylenders at 6% to 7% interest rates to carry out many activities among which was the purchasing of food (Lindstrom 2012,1). The affected people had to surrender their land receipts (received from the authorities for the resettled plot of land) to the informal moneylender as collateral for the loan and failing to pay back the loan would result in them losing their plot to the moneylender (Lindstrom 2012, 1). The signed and witnessed loan agreement with the money lender allows the money lender to take the matter to court in case of non-repayment and this placed the affected households in a very precarious situation (Lindstrom 2012, 1). This binding agreement between the moneylender and the resettled people is one aspect of the power relations in the displacement debacle. The moneylender has power over the resettled people through the loan agreement, which further entrenched the
resettled people deeper into poverty due to their already precarious condition in Cambodia’s development process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community and New Environment Insertion</th>
<th>Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Hostility, isolation, victimisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours</td>
<td>Hostile attacks from village chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical environment</td>
<td>Unsafe (two children drowned at Battambang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds</td>
<td>Have to borrow money from scheming moneylender or village chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Precarious condition, land as collateral</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table no.6 above shows the major issues at the new relocation site.*

**The Feminisation of Poverty - the Impact of Displacement on Women**

“People unavoidably displaced should be compensated and assisted, so that their economic and social future would be generally as favourable as it would have been in the absence of the project”

(ADB Resettlement Handbook, 1998, 2)

A survey carried out among the displaced people who lost their jobs through the resettlement process revealed that 62% of them were women and this lead to their eventual economic marginalisation (Tyskerud and Lindsrom 2013, ii). The project-affected women reported various types of hardships such as accessing school for their children and health facilities (Bugalski and Medallo 2012, 37). These women also had a lower level of education compared to men. Men had stopped studying after secondary level while 42% of the women had stopped studying after primary school level (Bugalski and Medallo 2012, 74). These women faced great difficulties to find jobs and in some cases as in the Trapeang AnhChanh province, some had stopped working altogether after being relocated (Pred 2012, 8). This situation was referred to as the “feminisation of poverty”, whereby a large number of
unemployed women who were heads of households with dependent children increased the dependency ratio on the system and became extremely vulnerable (Tyskerud and Lindsrom 2013, 9). Despite the fact that the resettlement plan stipulated that provision would be made for the vulnerable to be assisted in the resettlement process, it was doubtful if they actually received any support that was pledged by the IRC, particularly to women and widows (Bugalski and Medallo 2012, 18). The brunt of this miscalculation and the decline of women into abject poverty were particularly felt by children and young people (Tyskerud and Lindsrom 2013, 10). Widows were particularly unfairly treated in most cases, as they were sometimes not even allocated a separate plot of land (Bugalski 2011). In cases where they were given compensation and a plot of land, they could not afford to pay for the labour to relocate nor rebuild, which would have been an additional US $ 265 (Bridges Across Borders Cambodia 2012). The situation for widows was so precarious that some expressed a deep sense of total “abandonment” by the government (Bugalski and Medallo 2012, 25). The absolute decline into poverty of project-affected women still occurs despite gender being factored in the RP submitted to the ADB by Cambodia.

Post-Resettlement Challenges with the Authority

Barriers to the Grievance Mechanism and the Fear of Complaining - Structural Violence as a Social Condition which Disadvantages the poor

The complaint mechanism was ineffective, inaccessible and intimidating. One woman explained that it was too difficult to complain, unless you have “relatives who worked for the sangkat or the IRC” (Bugalski and Medalo 2012, 60). Other displaced people were fearful of complaining as they believed it would jeopardise their chance of a plot on the resettlement site and there was also limited awareness on how to access the mechanism due to ineffective communication (Bugalski and Medalo 2012, 60). This situation was further aggravated by fear of reprisal, low level of education among the affected people as well as failure by the local authorities to endorse the complaints, as they themselves were fearful of antagonising the higher echelons in the government hierarchy (Bugalski and Medalo 2012, 60). Despite the complications, several affected households were until May 2011 still bravely lodging
complaints through the local grievance mechanism, as they were not satisfied with the compensation for their demolished homes by the authorities (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut 2011, 3). Households that refused to accept the compensation were not provided with any documentation, hence making it difficult to prove their case (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut 2011, 3). The complaints started bottlenecking at the first stage of the local grievance mechanism which was at the commune authority level in the first half of 2011, leading to the ADB agreeing to fund a capacity building workshop with the IRC to process the complaints (Bugalski and Medalo 2012 62). It was noted that despite ADB’s safeguards, it had not anticipated the need for the capacity building workshop in spite of the risks of resettled people falling into poverty due to Cambodia’s poor resettlement record (Bugalski and Medalo 2012, 62).

**Case Study Number Two: The Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Canal (Stage III) in Pakistan**

**Project Background**

The Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project (Stage III), funded by the ADB in December 1991 was the third and final component of an irrigation project designed to irrigate 230,000 acres of semiarid land in the North-West Frontier and Punjab provinces of Pakistan, by redirecting water from the Indus River at the Chashma barrage (Serrat and Duenas 2010). Stages I and II of the project were completed in 1986 and 1992 respectively, while stage III commenced in September 1993 (Serrat and Duenas 2010). The 144 km canal would cost the ADB US $185 (ADB 2010, 2).

**Water as Power - The Former British Colonial Legacy of Social Control and Structural Violence**

Pakistan had a history of social control through the use of water. This seems to be a historical legacy of the British colonial system some 150 years ago when water was used to control the communities (Memon 2013). It was part of the British irrigation policy of the time designed
for social engineering. The construction of the Sukkur barrage in 1920 was used to control the “savages” and settle the “nomads”; “we control the water, we control them” (Memon 2013). The practice of water control by the colonial regime was symptomatic of the prevailing structural violence of that time. Despite numerous irrigation experiments, the Chashma Right Bank was never tempered with by the colonial system, as the British recognised that it was better not to alter the hydrology of the area and they also formalised the traditional rowed-kohi agriculture system (Memon 2013).

Pre-Relocation - Land Acquisition Absence of Resettlement Policy

Absence of Resettlement Policy

The Chashma project was being appraised by the ADB at a time when the ADB did not have a resettlement policy in place (ADB 2004c, 27). The tool for appraisal was based on the 1986 Staff Instruction on Socio-Cultural Impact of the Bank Project (ADB 2004c, 27). Due also to the absence of a national resettlement policy in Pakistan, displacement and compensation for the Chashma project were addressed in an ad-hoc manner, resulting in the impoverishment of the affected people (Rana, The Express Tribune 2013). The end results were social disarticulation, exclusion of the perceived untitled people from development support and a general lack of attention to gender issues and vulnerable groups (Rana, The Express Tribune 2013).

A resettlement plan was eventually prepared in retrospect by consultants in May 2001, but the Pakistani Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) refused to implement it (Chashma Inspection Request 2002, 26). This is despite eleven villages out of twelve preferring to be resettled, when consultants presented them with resettlement options in February 2001 (Inspection Panel Final Report 2004, 13). The makeshift resettlement process was carried out through a “crash program”, which did not meet the basic requirements of an “informed and participatory” approach (Inspection Panel Final Report 2004, 51). The authorities failed to design and implement a proper resettlement plan for the displaced people
as well as twenty-two other villages threatened with displacement (Chashma Inspection Request 2002, 25). The displacement was described as the “amputation of an arm of the tribe”, especially after the flooding that inundated the fertile land considered as the “granary of the entire district” (DAWN.com 2005). Consequently, the ADB Operation Manual on resettlement was violated since no resettlement plan was prepared and implemented (Kent and Simon 2007, 19).

**The Negative Outcomes**

The poorly executed project resulted in an environmental and resettlement fiasco, due to inappropriate and untimely response to the project-induced flooding, interference with the traditional *rowed-kohi* irrigation system and associated livelihoods (ADB 2004a, 6). The consequences were restricted mobility and access to grazing land and fuel wood, inadequacy of compensation, poor asset valuation and rehabilitation, violation of the affected people’s rights to be informed and participate in the decision-making and resettlement process (ADB 2004a, 6). The project-induced flooding, which was one of the main threats, affecting eight villages and caused the death of two people as well as destroyed property and livelihood assets, but despite that, the communities were deemed ineligible for compensation (Chashma Inspection Request 2002, 20). It was believed that some 22,400 people were displaced, amounting to around thirty-four villages and that was considered to be a conservative figure still (DAWN.com 2005). The project resulted in involuntary displacement and compensation dispute due to severe lack of transparency in the whole process (International Rivers Network 2003). Oxfam believes that some fifty thousand people may have been negatively impacted by the Chashma project (Kent and Simon 2007, 19).
Photo no 3: Flooding high water mark attributed to changes in natural hill torrents due to the Chashma project. Source: Bank Information Centre.

Photo no.4: Community members discuss Chashma project. Source: JACSES
State Power, Intimidation and Information Control

In order to ensure that the designated areas for the irrigation canal project were cleared in time for the project to commence, affected people who refused to leave their homes were forced from their homes by the police (International Rivers Network 2003). The affected people were not informed nor consulted of the impending displacement and were coerced and intimidated out of their home and hence their ancestral land, without a resettlement plan by the State and the ADB (Chashma Inspection Request 2002, 25). The intimidation tactic was combined with an information control strategy by the authorities, which left the affected people disorientated. For example seven affected villages were not informed of the Grievance Redress and Settlement Committee’s (GRSC) visit to Chashma because no information system had been established (JACSES 2003, 6). There was a severe lack of transparency by the authorities regarding the project, which lead to the exclusion of the affected people in the decision making process (International Rivers Network 2003). The information centre as stipulated in the terms of reference was also not established (JACSES 2003, 6). The local authorities implementing the project refused to share information and relevant documents with the affected people and other communities despite repeated requests from the local NGOs (DAWN.com 2007). The crucial information could only be accessed by the powerful and the affluent and was used to control the project’s outcome in their favour (DAWN.com 2007).

The State’s approach to the Chashma project was perceived by the supporters of the affected community as a manoeuvre by the State and the elitists for wealth “accumulation by dispossession”, which they believed to be the first wave of capitalist growth, as poor people were displaced and their lands forcefully acquired (Memon 2013). In order to achieve its objectives, the State makes use of its resources (namely the police apparatus) on numerous occasions in the displacement process. The police have been utilised by the Pakistani government to threaten and coerce the villagers from their homes without resettlement and a compensation plan (Chashma Inspection Request 2002, 25). The staging of a hunger strike by the villagers protesting eviction also lead to confrontation with the police, but the determination of the protestors prevailed (Bank Information Centre 2005a). In a similar vein, the villagers from Chotiari who were protesting against the failure of the Pakistani government to distribute compensation to the displaced, expressed that they would prefer
death rather than to leave their village (DAWN.com 2002). The State also established its presence along the canal through police patrol and irrigation officers as well as water officers, which significantly altered and restructured the communities in the area (Memon 2013). The development effort, which the Chashma project represents, also brings to the forefront the glaring power disparity in that particular society, which is underpinned by structural inequality.

The amount of land acquired under the project was deemed unnecessary, as half of the amount would have sufficed for the purpose of the project (Chashma Inspection Request 2002, 27). The natural streams, the nullahs could have been utilised instead to direct the water flow (Chashma Inspection Request 2002, 27). In fact the Indigenous rowed-kohi, the ancestral irrigation system, was sacrificed by the project’s engineers to ensure the integrity of the canal and flooding the homes of poor farmers in the process (Chashma Inspection Request 2002, 25). The State and its elites exerted considerable power over the poor people to ensure that the Chashma project, which was part of its development program is implemented despite the hardship experienced by the powerless and the sacrifice of ancestral cultural practices. The destruction of the rowed-kohi system also demonstrates that the canal project had negative impact on the local culture –traditional practices are sacrificed for the sake of modernity.

Post- Relocation

Compensation of the Affected People – the Power Struggle

Despite numerous hardships suffered by the affected people from project-induced flooding and resettlement, they were perceived as ineligible for compensation by the authorities (Chashma Inspection Request 2002, 20). The WAPDA decided to pay nominal cash compensation or provided flood protection bunds (embankments) for the affected villages (Chashma Inspection Request 2002, 26). During a social survey among twelve affected villages conducted by the ADB, all but one village had opted to be resettled on higher grounds, but one month later, WAPDA officials informed the ADB that the villagers would accept cash compensation and were therefore nominally compensated (International Rivers
Network, 2003). Around 80% of the small farmers who lost their lands, resulting in the
destruction of their livelihood system, were not properly compensated (Chashma Inspection
Request 2002, 27). The loss of livelihood and cultural impacts were not factored in the
compensation package for land acquisition, which was in violation of the ADB’s resettlement
policy of the time (Chashma Inspection Request 2002, 27). Section 17 of the Pakistan Land
Acquisition Act of 1894, which states that land may be acquired by the government in
emergency for State projects, was invoked retrospectively after the acquisition of the land by
the government (Chashma Inspection Request 2002, 27). This was an attempt by the State to
minimise the compensation cost to the affected villagers as well as to block their right to
appeal the inadequate compensation package (Chashma Inspection Request 2002, 27). The
payment of compensation was fraught with allegations of corrupt government officers and as
a result most villagers had not received compensation (JACSES 2003, 10). The whole
compensation was a charade fraught with corruption and intimidation due to the unequal
power relation.

Some 19,000 acres of land were acquired for the project, and yet the majority of the people
had not been compensated for their loss (Kent and Simon 2007, 19). The Inspection Panel
appointed by the ADB discovered that some farmers who lost their lands to the project had to
wait from seven to eight years to be compensated (Kent and Simon 2007, 19). Villagers who
opted for the land-for-land compensation option were not included in the decision-making
process and were coerced into accepting the inadequate cash compensation and unsatisfactory
flood control measures (Kent and Simon 2007, 19). The ADB Panel Report recognised that
the ADB had failed to make provision for compensation to protect the affected and
vulnerable people (Lawrence and Zaman 2008). Up until 2008, the Complaint Centre, which
was eventually established by the ADB and the government of Pakistan in 2005, upon
recommendation by the Grievance Redress and Settlement Committee (GRSC), was still
receiving complaints such as requests for land among other complaints that kept streaming in
(ADB 2009a, 16).

The Pakistani authorities refused to compensate the farmers for the loss of their land at the
market rates; they calculated the rate at the time of the land acquisition, even though land
prices had significantly increased since then (DAWN.com 2007). The market rate at the time
of compensation was around Rs 100,000 per acre, but the compensation offered was only a quarter of that amount (DAWN.com 2007). The whole compensation process suffered from a lack of transparency (DAWN.com 2007). The GRSC set up by the ADB recommended that the affected villagers be compensated for the loss of their land at the current market rate at the time of payment and not at the rate during the time of the land acquisition (ADB 2009a, 5). The unequal power relations are evident in this context as the State invokes land laws in retrospect to block the rights of the affected people as well as dictate the compensation rate, while WAPDA officials as part of the State apparatus dispense the terms and conditions of compensation.

The Traditional Tribunal - the Lok Sath as Symbol of Resistance and People’s Power

The Lok Sath is the traditional “tribunal of the people” in Pakistan, which occasionally convenes to pass judgement on issues (Memon 2013). The Lok Sath is conducted in the Sairaki language, which is not recognised by the government of Pakistan, which had also shown very little interest in developing it (Memon 2013). In the Chashma case, there was no judgement, but simply a “sense of controlling the judgement”, and in the process the affected communities symbolically become authors of their livelihood (Memon 2013). The Lok Sath allowed the affected communities to assemble and discard State authority (Memon 2013). One of the tangible outcomes of the Lok Sath was the decision not to pay irrigation taxes on the third stage of the Chashma irrigation project (Memon 2013). The communities were also encouraged to breach the canal when there were obvious threats of flooding. The tribunal had empowered constant resistance and it was a forum that rejected State authority as it had the power and authority to craft its own traditional laws (Memon 2013). In March 2004, the affected community of the Chashma Right Bank irrigation project organised a Lok Sath to coincide with the official visit of the ADB’s Inspection Panel officials. The members of the panel were “unable” to attend the Lok Sath, despite the invitation from the community and the Inspection Requesters as well as the local organiser (Bank Information Centre 2004). The presence of the ADB at the Lok Sath would have somehow been immaterial anyway as it was purposely conducted in Sairaki and ADB’s understanding or lack of it would have been inconsequential to the process (Memon 2013). Eventually the ADB attended the Lok Sath with two representatives (Bank Information Centre 2005b). It was a form of symbolical rejection of the authorities, both the State and the ADB and the values they imposed on the
affected community (Memon 2013). Despite the onslaught of development, pockets of cultural practices as part of the community’s identity offer symbolic and sometimes tangible resistance to modernity.

**Filing of Complaints to the ADB; an Insight into ADB’s Complaints and Social Justice Mechanism**

In November 2002, several non-governmental organisations representing the people affected by Stage III of the Chashma project filed a request with the ADB’s Board of Inspection. The requesters claimed that the ADB had breached its operational policies and procedures in formulating and processing the Chashma project resulting in adverse material loss for the Chashma people (Serrat and Duenas 2010). The requesters also complained of project-induced flooding and involuntary resettlement, inadequate compensation for loss of land as well as loss of assets and livelihood, which created adverse impacts on the traditional *rowed-kohi* farmers, as well as social and environmental problems due to lack of information sharing and consultation and the participation of affected people (ADB 2009a, 2). The chairman of the ADB’s Board of Inspection Committee (BIC) received the written request for the inspection of the Chashma project in Pakistan on the 25th of November 2002 (ADB 2004a, 3). The requesters also complained that they were not satisfied with the remedial value of the ADB’s Grievance Redress and Settlement Committee (GRSC) and also proposed specific remedies for adverse project impact (ADB 2004a, 3). The BIC decided that the request had merits and warranted further attention (ADB 2004a, 3). Subsequently the BIC recommended that an inspection of the project begin after the GRSC had submitted its report (ADB 2010, 3).

**The Grievance Redress and Settlement Committee (GRSC) – Controversy**

The Grievance Redress and Settlement Committee (GRSC) officially set up by the ADB and the Government of Pakistan had its first meeting on the 3rd March 2003 (JACSES 2003, 6). The GRSC members selected were mostly powerful elites from the Pakistani government and were not really representatives of the affected people (JACSES 2003, 2). The selection process was flawed and the method of selection proposed by the affected people was completely ignored by both the resident ADB staff members in Pakistan and the government
The members of the GRSC were mostly powerful landlords with strong alliances with the government, with one of them being a staunch opponent of the affected people’s campaign for redress (JACSES 2003, 2). The affected people had no confidence in the GRSC as they felt that they were not being represented and disapproved of the GRSC composition (JACSES 2003, 2). They also believed that the members of the GRSC were a group of corrupt and powerful elite, directly benefiting from the Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project (JACSES 2003, 8). On the other hand the ADB resident officials believed that the GRSC composition was legitimate and that poor people were inappropriate on the committee as they “cannot read and cannot write and cannot say a word” and that only two affected people would suffice to represent the villagers on the GRSC (JACSES 2003, 9). The selection and composition of the GRSC is a further attempt by the State and its elites to control the outcome of the committee’s findings and deliberation in their favour by embedding their members into the committee.

**The ADB Inspection Panel**

The ADB Board of Directors approved the inspection of the project-affected area in Chashma Pakistan (ADB 2010, 3). It must be noted that the Inspection Panel had certain privileges under Paragraph 42 of the ADB Inspection Policy, which states that the panel members enjoy the same privileges and immunities that are accorded to any experts performing missions for the ADB (ADB 2004b, 14). The government’s consent is required to conduct missions in the project affected area (Para 52 of the Inspection Procedure), and also to meet the stakeholders such as the requesters, the local communities, organisations and groups, project managers, and government officers (ADB 2004b, 15). The Inspection Panel conducted its investigation early 2004 and a final report was submitted to the BIC.

The Inspection Panel made a series of “project specific” recommendations to the BIC, which would bring the project in compliance with ADB’s regulations and guidelines and also made a series of recommendations to ADB for future management of what it called large-scale irrigation projects (ADB 2010, 3). The Board of Directors mandated the Compliance Review Panel (CRP) to monitor the implementation of the project-specific remedial actions based upon the recommendations of the Inspection Panel (ADB 2010, 3). The Compliance Review Panel is a 3-member independent body, which is appointed by the ADB Board of Directors
(ADB 2009a, iii). The panel is part of the ADB Accountability Mechanism, which monitors and ensures compliance with recommendations from ADB’s project (ADB 2009a, iii).

**The Main Findings of the Inspection Panel**

The inspection panel reported that farmers, who lost their land to the Chashma irrigation project, received their compensation some seven to eight years later (Kent and Simon 2007, 19). The affected people were not properly informed and consulted about the irrigation project and villagers who demanded a land-for-land resettlement option were removed from the decision-making process (Kent and Simon 2007, 19). The Inspection Panel concluded that the implementation of the Chashma project, violated ADB’s Operation Manual on resettlement, especially since no resettlement plan had been prepared (Kent and Simon 2007, 19). The findings were submitted in a report to the BIC on the 10th of June 2004 (ADB 2004a, 1). In order to fulfil its mandate as compliance monitor for the Chashma case, the CRP submitted from 2005 up to 2009 an annual monitoring report to the ADB (ADB 2010, 3). After five years of monitoring the recommendations of the Inspection Panel to the ADB Board of Directors, the CRP declared that the ADB had complied with 24 of the original 29 recommendations from the Chashma project and had partially complied with 4 recommendations (ADB 2010, 3).
Chapter Four

Discussion

The findings from the two cases reveal on multiple levels how poor people are the typical victims of development-induced displacement in Third World countries. The people displaced in these two case studies are mostly villagers in the Chashma case and poor people living along the railway track in the Cambodian case. Both cases display strong elements of structural violence as the authorities forcefully utilised intimidation, coercion, and threat to evict the project-affected people from their homes (Pred 2012, 4) in the name of development. In both cases the project-affected people were inadequately compensated if at all, and the authorities would attempt to pay the minimum compensation by scaling down of the compensation cost, through the detailed measurement survey in the Cambodian case (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut 2011, 6) and the retrospective application of the land law in the Chasma case (Chashma Inspection Request 2002, 27). The Cambodian case distinctly highlights gender inequality as women were marginalised in the compensation and resettlement process, despite ADB’s stated gender policy. Widows were for example not allocated a plot at the resettlement site and in instances where they were allocated they could not afford the relocation cost (Bridges Across Borders Cambodia 2012). Both cases demonstrate poor implementation of the resettlement process, and that is despite an ADB endorsed resettlement plan in the Cambodian case. There was particular loss of local cultural practices in the Chashma case with the destruction of the rowed-kohi agriculture system. However there was evidence of resurgence and affirmation of the cultural identity through the lok sath. This was a form of symbolic resistance against embedded structural violence perpetrated against the community by the powerful elites, through the use of the “weapon of the weak” (Farmer 2004, 307). This is resistance against the dominant social structure and its support, be it symbolic or material through the creation of “social space” for “spirited resistance” (Farmer 2004, 307). There was also resistance by the resettled people in the Cambodian case despite the violence visited upon them as they were defrauded by the village chief.
Similar studies have been conducted about forced displacement including in India (Nayak 2013; Mohanty 2011; Kabra 2009), Viet Nam (Ty et al 2013), Lesotho, South Africa and the Upper Mekong River in South Western China (Tilt et al 2009). The general conclusion from these studies strongly indicates that displacement has negative impacts on the rural economy, employment structure, culture, community health, and gender relations (Tilt et al 2009, 250). Conflict has also been noticed over land resources between resettlers and neighbouring villages (Tilt et al 2009, 255). In the study of the displaced in the Madhya Pradesh region of India, Kabra (2009, 249) points out that the displaced were already marginalised socially, politically, economically and that these factors were not taken into consideration in the rehabilitation package. Further studies of development-induced displacement in India reveal the so called “backwash effects”, after the local population has been sacrificed at great social cost for the good of the nation (Mohanty 2011, 67). It is usually the “weaker section, particularly the tribals”, which is displaced (Mohanty 2001, 68). On examining the case of the Hirakud dam in India, Nayak (2013, 397) remarked that dams albeit useful, also raise the issue of social justice and equity as the “oustees” loose social goods such as liberty, opportunity and self-respect. In the Vietnamese study, the poor implementation of the land laws for development purposes result in ineffective compensation measures and lack of livelihood alternatives (Ty et al 2013, 678). The findings from these studies resonate strongly with the findings from this desktop study of ADB resettlement projects as they have very similar outcome.

The two cases illustrate development efforts by the State to build new infrastructure or improve existing ones, in very critical areas such as agriculture (Chashma) and transportation (Cambodia). The two projects would inevitably benefit the vast majority of the population in terms of food production and transportation facilities but it also involves the displacement of thousands of poor people in the process. This is an infringement of human rights (Young et 2009, 221; Couldrey and Maurice 2002, 6) of displaced people as they fall into abject poverty precisely because the resettlement process is poorly conducted resulting in “enormous trauma” (Downing 2002,6). Forced resettlement has also been described as “disruptive” (McDowell 1996, 9) and “profoundly dramatic and painful” (Cook 1994, 17). Mega projects are known to take precedence over the few as the needs and aspiration of the majority take priority over that of the minority (Wilmsen et al 2011, 361). Most of the time the people displaced by large infrastructure development never benefit from the project. Syagga and
Olima (1996, 61) reported the case of rural farmers in Kenya being displaced for the construction of a large water supply system for the Nairobi [city] people. The Three Gorges Dam in China is another example where the political economy sets the agenda in total disregard for the rural minorities (Wilmsen et al 2011, 356).

In both cases displacement took place for the pursuit of development projects based on the national development agenda. The Cambodian project took place within the context of the rehabilitation and construction of the transport network (ADB 2009b, 2), which was deemed necessary for Cambodia’s economic development. The rehabilitation of the railway was referred to as becoming safer, “space frugal” and more attractive, which would assist in Cambodia’s rapid economic development (ADB 2009b, 2). The Chashma project was for a vast irrigation program for agriculture (Serrat and Duenas 2010). The projects were therefore economically driven to improve the quality of services in both countries. The fact that the projects were State owned and economically driven seems to legitimise the use of force against the people to be displaced. Gellert and Lynch (2003, 23) identified three main underlying factors that contribute to development-induced displacement: capital accumulation, State interest and modernisation ideology. The modernising ambitions of the State coupled with the material interest of the powerful actors takes precedence over the welfare of those people being displaced (Gellert and Lynch 2003, 20). The process is further facilitated by the unequal distribution of power within society, which entrench the displaced into further poverty (Wilmsen et al 2011, 358). Forced eviction is therefore the result of the modernising agenda of the powerful elites imposed on communities and enforced through existing structural inequality (Rapley 2004, 351).

Third World governments are also perceived to be victims of global power disparities (Kothari and Minogue 2002, 19), with the domino effect experienced by its citizens through oppression by authoritarian regimes (Przeworski 2000,78; De Rivero 2010,1). Victims of the displacement process are in effect partly victims of the global world system due to ineffective and “toppled” Third World States (Weiss 1998, 2), which translate the development process into a “nightmare” especially for the poor (Peralta 2013, 466). Development involves the sacrifices and the “negation” of others (Latouche 1993, 8), by both the State and the world system. The genesis of the development paradoxes may therefore be attributed to unequal power relations within the global world system.
The power disparity between the project-affected people and the State are obvious in both cases. For example the State has access to various resources such as the judicial system, the police force and bureaucratic support as well as access to powerful multilateral partners such as the ADB. Often project-affected people are illiterate and in the Chashma case they are deemed incapable of representing themselves, as they could not read and write (JACSES 2003, 9). In the Cambodian case, project-affected people were issued with flimsy “post-it” notes on which critical information was recorded for the resettlement process (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut 2011, 3). It is therefore easy for the State to manipulate and manage forced eviction through information control (JACSES 2003, 6). The Cambodian authorities used intimidation to prevent people from complaining and accessing the ADB’s grievance mechanism (Bugalski and Medallo 2012, 60). In the process the ADB grievance mechanism is simply tokenistic in the resettlement process rather than being genuine resource from which the displaced people could seek support. Since the displacement process resides entirely on the structural relationships of power between the marginalised and the powerful (Hall and Brandford 2012; Gaventa 1980; Crewe and Harrison 2002; Parfit 2000), project-affected people are disadvantaged as they have very limited control over the resettlement process. Hall and Bradford (2012, 851) remarked that in order to accelerate the development process there is usually very poor consultation, which accentuates the power disparity. The displaced then fall into social disarticulation characterised by landlessness, homelessness, joblessness, marginalisation, and experience increased morbidity (Cernea 2000, 366).

The displacement process particularly in the Cambodian case is replete with gender bias and the relegation of women in the compensation process (Bugalski and Medallo 2012, 18). A significant percentage of the women in the Cambodian case were uneducated hence they were already at a disadvantage in the job market (Bugalski and Medallo 2012, 74) and less likely to challenge the authorities about compensation or relocation. Women were particularly disadvantaged when it came to the compensation process, particularly female-headed households and widows (Bugalski and Medallo 2012, 18). Women were also the subjects of attacks in the case of activist Ros Bopha, a woman fighting against the inadequate living conditions of the resettled people. Thousands of women lost their jobs through displacement (Pred 2012, 8). This is despite the ADB gender policy, which stipulated that women would be consulted and included in all stages of the resettlement process (Resettlement Plan 2006, 63). The Cambodian case in particular highlights how displacement
has severe impacts on women. The World Bank has admitted that women “bear the brunt” of displacement (Mehta and Srinivasan 2000, 2). Several authors have alluded to the fact that displacement entrenches women into further poverty (Tan et al 2005; Bisht 2009; Thukral 1996). The marginalisation of women leads to further deterioration of the fabric of society as families break up, the kinship system is weakened, women lose their jobs, and the loss of security is experienced, because the social networks and support systems break down through displacement (Downing 2002, 11). The process of women’s disempowerment is referred to as the “feminisation of poverty” (Pearce 1978; Chant 2008; Angeles 2009), as it is believed that the State’s pursuit of economic growth through the neo-liberal economic model compounded by social inequalities further sinks women into abject poverty (Angeles 2009, 293). It is therefore evident that the pursuit of development and modernity, which at times necessitates the forced displacement of the powerless by the State, enforced by existing structural violence leads to social disarticulation resulting in women’s disempowerment and poverty.

The Cambodian and the Pakistan projects both testify to the fact that inherent structural violence embedded in both societies has resulted in negative impacts on the resettlement outcome and the compensation process. Inadvertent agents of structural violence in the Cambodian case include local power brokers such as the village chief and the moneylender, as well as the officials carrying out the detailed measurement survey (DMS) on behalf of the State. The forceful acquisition of project-affected people’s thumbprints, the use of the yellow “post-it” and the denial of medical attention to the resettled people in Cambodia are also manifestations of institutionalised power relations (Escobar 106, 1995). Similarly, the insensitive manner in which the compensation process was dealt with in both cases is a manifestation of inherent structural violence in both societies. The compensation rate is set by the State, and compensation is used to manipulate and control project-affected people. The difficult access to the ADB’s grievance mechanism is also a manifestation of the inner workings of the structure, which disadvantages the poor. Other expressions of existing structural violence are the control of information by the authorities, the use of legislation and the development agenda to justify and enforce the involuntary eviction of the poor as well as the State’s practice of what is referred to as “accumulation by dispossession” (Memon 2013), which leads to further impoverishment of the powerless. Structural violence has been linked to neo-liberalism and associated with terror and coercion leaving the poorer segment of the population marginalised (Framer 2001, 307). Structural violence has also been described as the social, economic, cultural, political and legal structures, which prevent a segment of the
population from achieving its full potential due to unequal power relations (Farmer et al 2006, 1686). The unequal power relationship is so systemised and internalised that it becomes acceptable in society (Galtung 1990, 302). The system is maintained through the process of “penetration”, “segmentation”, “marginalisation”, and “fragmentation” (Galtung 1990, 294). The four components of the method as listed by Galtung are evident in the two case studies whereby the poor are already “marginalised”, then “segmented” through the detailed measurement survey, threat of non-compensation and use of thumbprints in the Cambodian case. The “penetration” into the community takes place through the use of the ADB endorsed resettlement plan, which acts as a tool to galvanise local support and acceptance of the project through promises that are not kept. The Chashma people are “fragmented” through the destruction of their cultures and what was referred to as the “amputation of an arm of the tribe” (DAWN.com 2005). The structure is thorough and effectively controls the poor people through coercion and false promises.

The ADB policies are designed to protect the project-affected people particularly during the time of displacement (Resettlement Handbook ADB 1998a, 28). The ADB safeguards provide guidelines for the resettlement process, gender challenges, Indigenous people and the communication strategies. In the Chashma case for example, the ADB had set up a grievance mechanism for complaints to be heard and investigations to be carried out if required (ADB 2009a, 27). However, the reality of displaced people being able to access this mechanism proved ineffective. The ADB operates in both a preventive and remedial manner, that is attempting to control the outcome of the resettlement process, but at the same time it tries to offer redress in situations where the people have been affected (ADB 2009a, iii). However accessing the ADB grievance mechanism requires power and substantial formalities. It takes years to obtain justice. This is exemplified in the long process of the Chashma case, whereby the request for investigation has to be duly approved and processed while people on the ground are suffering (ADB 2009a, iii). Also of note was that, ADB staff members have immunity (Ransley et al 2008, 41); the powerful protect their own. The structure ensures that the powerful are cushioned, protected, and guarded. The ADB represents one layer of development power over developing Asian countries, which inevitably leads to a form of “depoliticised poverty” (Escobar 1995, 142) to conform to the ADB agenda. In the process, the State is “hallowed out”, “carved up” (Weiss 1998, 2), which leads its poorer citizens into further poverty. The ADB’s neo-liberal approach to its projects has also been linked to the
demise of the already marginalised in various Asian countries (Manahan and Chavez 2005, 24 cited in Forum on Global South; Guttal 2005, 3 cited in Forum on Global South; Saito and Ishida 2007, 15). The ADB declared a fight against poverty and its highly developed safeguards can be considered unrealistic because the ADB focuses on profit making for its shareholders rather than the effective resettlement of displaced people from its projects (Kent and Simon 2007, 14). It must also be noted that the increased submission of resettlement plans to the ADB is indicative of the continued potential displacement of poor people by ADB funded projects.

The Chashma case illustrates the State’s attempt at adopting modern technology to the detriment of the traditional knowledge system and also an example of the project-affected people’s attempt at resisting the State system, hence modernity. The rowed-kohi, which is the traditional agriculture system in Chashma is marginalised and sacrificed to sustain the Chashma irrigation project to the detriment of the small farmers and local cultural practices (Chashma Inspection Request 2002, 25). On the other hand the lok sath, the traditional people’s tribunal was activated to hear the Chashma canal issues and passed judgement, albeit symbolical (Memon 2013). The resistance is symbolic action against the “infernal machinery” (Farmer 2004, 397) of structural violence and development by the poor farmers to keep the behemoth at bay. In its attempt to replicate the First World in the Third World, the developers have always perceived local culture as a hindrance to modernity (Escobar 1994, 4). This leads to the reconceptualization of local culture, which makes it more palatable and attractive, ready for local consumption (Escobar 1995, 46). The assimilation of development into the Third World requires the “jettison of the tribal bonds” described as the capricious obstacles to universal redemption (Sbert cited in Sachs 1995, 196). Escobar (2014, 16) argues that by strengthening people through the defence of their culture and territory, they may stand against the onslaught of modernity, hence the lok sath. The process of development removes the people from their “traditional common” and culture by transferring rural people to the mega cities for production purposes (Illich cited in Sachs 1995, 96), which destroys local culture in the process.
Chapter Five

Conclusion

This study has analysed two ADB funded projects from Pakistan and Cambodia revealing the power relations underpinning involuntary forced displacement and focusing on the internal dynamics and structural agency embedded in the processes of displacement and resettlement. The findings were analysed through the lenses of post-development, structural violence, and the feminisation of poverty, to uncover the failures characteristic in resettlement projects, which too often have led to social disarticulation. The findings support the hypothesis that the poor and the marginalised are the usual victims of forced displacement in State efforts towards modernisation and economic development within the neo-liberal approach to economic development (Hall and Branford 2012, 146). Too often in large infrastructure development projects, the neo-liberal economic agenda takes precedence over the welfare of poor people, which is justified through “objective violence” at the cost of the marginalised (Oksala 2011, 474). The existing inequality structures within society inevitably and almost instinctively support the status quo of the powerful elite to the detriment of the powerless. The Cambodian and the Pakistani governments’ efforts at modernising the economy are supported by other powerful structures such as the ADB arguably pursuing its own profit-making agenda for its shareholders (Kent and Simon 2007, 14), which is a willing funding partner in the process of major infrastructure development projects. The ADB, an integral part of the power structure, can at the same time protect itself and for the sake of public relations design policies that would exempt it from accusations and prosecution. The implementation of ADB funded projects is the responsibility of the national government. However, the ADB grievance mechanism is usually only accessed after persistent lobbying by project-affected people and eventually efforts are made, albeit painstakingly, towards remedial actions by ADB. On the other hand, Third World States in their efforts at replicating the First World are willing to sacrifice the few for the good of the mass (Couldrey and Morris 2002, 4). The “few” are usually the powerless that live on the fringe of society who have internalised the well-established system of structural violence; they hold no political power or legal resources (Galtung 1990, 302) and are easily coerced, intimidated, marginalised and controlled. The outcome has seen further entrenchment of millions of people into poverty over decades in developing countries, particularly women through ongoing gender inequality.
(Angeles 2009, 293). Global power structures promote development and modernity within the Third World but this often inadvertently perpetuates structures of inequality (Farmer 2004, 6) tinged with a neo-liberal agenda and enforced through existing structural violence and sustained through inequality. One of the negative outcomes of this chain reaction is the forced displacement of the powerless that are at the losing end of the structure along with their local culture. The weight of development cracks the traditional support of the poor, leaving them to survive on the “fragile crust” which is full of uncertainty and under which “lurks” something new [modernity] and “inhuman” (Illich cited in Sachs 1995, 96).

The study clearly has some limitations and there is scope to expand on this initial research. It could further explore the neo-liberalism of displacement and the role of the ADB as an agent of the prevailing neoliberal development agenda and how this has impacted poor people in the Asian region. The two cases may be insufficient to draw a general conclusion, but the dynamic and linkages between the various agencies within the power structure are palpable if not measurable. It would also be critical to examine the feasibility of Cernea’s risk mitigation model within the complex understanding of Galtung’s structural violence as it stands. There may be a necessity to revisit the model in the light of new dynamics within the structure itself, such as empowering information technology namely the role of social media as well as the increasing pulling power of globalisation on the State system.

Through an analysis of ADB large infrastructure and resettlement projects this study has utilised two case studies to draw attention to the power relations underpinning involuntary displacement and resettlement. The study has brought together three key theoretical areas to critically understand the forces at play in this particular development process: post-development, structural violence and the feminisation of poverty. The final argument is that development programs undertaken in the Third World within the context of existing structural violence, based on social inequality are bound to generate hardship for the poor due to power inequality particularly for women. This is the result the structural inequality and power disparity between the authorities and poor people. Paradoxically, funding agencies such as the ADB, which is allegedly involved in poverty reduction, may inadvertently induce hardship in communities through its projects undertaken within an environment of major social disparity.
References


Cao, Yue. 2010. PROJECT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT, SECONDARY STRESSORS, AND HEALTH, Graduate Faculty of the University of Alabama at Birmingham, University of Alabama Birmingham Alabama.


Focus on the Global South. 2005. The ADB and Policy (Mis) Governance in Asia. Phyathai Road Bangkok 10330 Thailand: Chulalongkorn University.


JACSES (Japan Centre for a Sustainable Environment and Society), 2003. Report on Facts and Concerns Regarding Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project -Stage III (CRBIP-III) and Grievance Redress and Settlement Committee (GRSC). JACSES.


Saito, Tomoyo. and Ishida, Kyoko. 2007. ADB and Japan. edited by Yuki Tanabe, Gupta, Rupa. Philippines: NGO Forum on ADB.


