Heidegger’s Concept of Truth
Reconsidered in the Light of
Tugendhat’s Critique

A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for an Honours degree in Philosophy, Murdoch University, 2015.

Gracie Holliday Beck, B.A., Murdoch University
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Author:  Gracie Holliday Beck

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Abstract

In this dissertation, I argue that it is problematic to assess Martin Heidegger’s concept of truth in isolation from his larger project. I suggest that Ernst Tugendhat’s famous critique of Heidegger’s account of truth is emblematic of such an approach. Central to Heidegger’s project was the attempt to question the tradition of Western metaphysics and the presuppositions that we inherited from this tradition. In Heidegger’s view, the concept of truth as no more than correctness is fundamentally rooted in this tradition. Truth as correctness is precisely the notion of truth that Tugendhat advocates.

I revisit Heidegger’s account of truth by reflecting upon Tugendhat’s famous critique. I argue that Tugendhat and his followers do not take into account Heidegger’s general philosophical project and the way it led him to question the concept of truth as correctness. In the end, they reinstate presuppositions that are precisely what Heidegger is bringing under question. In some respects, these were the very presuppositions Heidegger was trying to call into question through his investigation into the concept of truth. At the same time, I suggest that thinking through Tugendhat’s critique and attempting to formulate an adequate Heideggerian response gives us a richer understanding of both Heidegger’s account of truth and his general philosophical project.
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φύσις χρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ
phusis kruptesthai philei

*Nature loves to hide*

Heraclitus

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Introduction

My aim in this dissertation is to reconsider Martin Heidegger’s notion of truth as *αληθεία* in light of Ernst Tugendhat’s critique. The central focus will be an analysis of Heidegger’s rethinking of the traditional concept of truth as correctness, Tugendhat’s response to Heidegger and the commentary this encounter has generated.

I suggest that thinking through the encounter between Heidegger and Tugendhat allows for a richer understanding of both Heidegger’s account of truth and his general philosophical project. I will draw attention to some problems with Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s account of truth. I claim that by considering Heidegger’s account of truth in the context of his general philosophical approach we not only clarify the Heideggerian understanding of truth, but also elucidate the fundamental differences between Tugendhat’s and Heidegger’s approaches to philosophical problems.

I aim to clarify Heidegger’s notion of truth as *αληθεία*\(^2\) in order to assess the trenchancy of Tugendhat’s criticisms. This will allow me to defend Heidegger against criticisms made by Tugendhat and other scholars who make a similar interpretation of Heidegger’s understanding of truth. Making sense of Heidegger’s account of truth requires seeing how it is situated within his broader philosophical project. I argue that it is necessary to understand Heidegger’s phenomenological-hermeneutic approach because it shapes his critique of the traditional concept of truth as correctness.

In order to elucidate Heidegger’s interpretation of truth, I offer a textual analysis of Heidegger’s account of truth in *Being and Time*, Tugendhat’s critique as he formulates it in “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” as well as commentaries from the secondary literature. In order to present a fuller account of Heidegger’s analysis of truth, I will draw upon Heidegger’s later works.\(^3\) As noted, I will suggest there are

\(^2\) Throughout this dissertation I will refer to truth as *αληθεία* and truth as disclosedness interchangeably.

\(^3\) Martin Heidegger, “*Αλήθεια* (Heraclitus, Fragment B 16),” in *Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy*, translated by David Farrell & Frank Capuzzi, (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984), 102-123; Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, translated by Richard Rojcewicz & Daniela Vallega-Neu, edited by John Sallis, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
some weaknesses in Tugendhat’s critique. However, whether or not Tugendhat’s criticisms undermine Heidegger’s analysis, consideration of these criticisms is fruitful since, I argue, it brings to the forefront Heidegger’s own critique of the Western philosophical tradition.

Heidegger’s treatment of the problem of truth has been much disputed in the secondary literature. In an influential contribution to this literature, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” Tugendhat famously critiques Heidegger’s specific treatment of the concept of truth in *Being and Time*, §44. Although Tugendhat here directs his criticisms at §44 in particular, he claims that the objections he raises are pertinent to discussions of truth throughout Heidegger’s corpus. From Tugendhat’s perspective, it is in §44 that Heidegger first lays the untenable foundations for his understanding of truth, which carry through to his later works.

In broad strokes, Tugendhat argues that Heidegger’s determination of truth as disclosedness (*alētheia*) rests on an ambiguous use of the word “uncovering,” and fails to account for the agreement (*adaequatio*) relation specific to the concept of truth. For Tugendhat, Heidegger’s determination of truth as disclosedness offers no criterion for distinguishing true from false statements. Put differently, Heidegger’s definition fails to specify the meaning of truth in a sense distinct from falsity. Moreover, Tugendhat argues, it is on the basis of this ambiguity that Heidegger extends the concept of truth beyond the domain of the statement to any and every disclosure, ultimately forfeiting the notion of justificatory grounds (*certitūdō*) on the basis of which we might, according to Tugendhat, engage in critical questioning.

The trenchancy of Tugendhat’s critique has been a controversial discussion point for Heideggerian scholarship since Tugendhat first raised these objections


during a lecture in 1964.\(^6\) An assessment of the extent to which Tugendhat’s critique undermines Heidegger’s interpretation of the concept of truth becomes all the more pressing in light of Heidegger’s lecture, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,”\(^7\) (delivered only months after Tugendhat’s initial lecture of 1964), in which Heidegger seemingly retreats from his account of truth in *Being and Time*.

In chapter one, then, I will outline Heidegger’s phenomenological-hermeneutic approach before explicating his analysis of the traditional concept of truth. Recognising the importance of his phenomenological-hermeneutic approach sheds light on Heidegger’s discussion of the meaning of truth and his particular way of framing this discussion. An understanding of Heidegger’s “framework” will enable us to better understand Heidegger’s critique of the traditional concept of truth and his suggestion that we need to re-think truth in its most original, that is, primordial sense, namely, what he refers to as truth as disclosedness.

Then, in chapter two, in order to later formulate a response to Tugendhat and show that thinking through Tugendhat’s criticisms allows us to better understand Heidegger’s interpretation of truth, I turn to Tugendhat’s critique. I explicate the criticisms he raises with respect to Heidegger’s account of truth as disclosedness. In this chapter I also examine arguments put forth in a selection of the secondary literature from both defenders of Heidegger and proponents of Tugendhat’s critique.

In the third and final chapter, drawing upon Heidegger’s account of truth and method in *Being and Time* (outlined in chapter one), as well as some of his later works, I show why – from Heidegger’s perspective – these commentaries are problematic and sketch what I argue is a possible response to Tugendhat’s criticisms. In order to clarify what Tugendhat finds problematic with Heidegger’s analysis of the traditional concept of truth, I will draw attention to Tugendhat’s commitment to a conception of truth conceived strictly in terms of correctness, an untenable position according to Heidegger’s account of truth. I will close this chapter by reflecting upon the challenge Heidegger puts to his readers. The task, as he stresses, is to question the prevalent notion of truth as correctness and attempt to rethink truth in a more original sense.

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\(^6\) Daniel Dahlstrom, "The Clearing and Its Truth: Reflections on Tugendhat's Criticisms and Heidegger's Concessions." *Études Phénoménologiques* 37-38 (2003), 3-4

I will show that, if we properly grasp Heidegger’s position, Tugendhat and his followers do not take into account Heidegger’s general philosophical project and the way it led him to question the concept of truth as correctness. In the end, they reinstate presuppositions in their account of truth that are precisely what Heidegger is bringing under question.

I conclude by suggesting that some of the fundamental differences between the philosophical approaches of Heidegger and Tugendhat have remained obscure in the commentary on this topic. These differences are unlikely to be reconciled by convincing arguments from either side because there is strong disagreement about what is to count as “convincing.” Moreover it is difficult to grasp the problems Heidegger poses and the presuppositions he wants us to question. Yet, as I suggested at the beginning, revisiting these debates allows for a better understanding of Heidegger’s hermeneutic project and his reflections upon the traditional concept of truth. Furthermore, we can only properly grasp Heidegger’s account of truth by situating it within the context of his general philosophical approach. It is by considering Heidegger’s more general approach that we also bring to the fore the fundamentally different philosophical approaches of Tugendhat and Heidegger and some of the limitations of Tugendhat’s critique.
Heidegger on Method and Truth in *Being and Time*

In order to use Tugendhat’s critique to better understand Heidegger’s concept of truth, we first have to explicate two things. First, I will explain the phenomenological-hermeneutic character of Heidegger’s investigations in *Being and Time* to contextualise his account of truth. As I have already noted in the introduction, Heidegger’s discussions of truth are better understood by considering within his broader interpretive approach to philosophy. Second, I sketch Heidegger’s treatment of the concept of truth in *Being and Time*, §44. This sketch will bring to the fore the key objections of Tugendhat’s critique. In the final chapter, I will refer back to this initial sketch of Heidegger position and his philosophical approach in order to suggest possible presuppositions upon which Tugendhat’s critique rests.

In order to achieve the first of these two aims, I outline what Heidegger means by phenomenology and why, according to Heidegger, his investigations in *Being and Time* are phenomenological. Then, I explicate Heidegger’s account of the hermeneutic-interpretive way he carries out his phenomenological investigations. Understanding the broader context of Heidegger’s thought and the way he carries out his questioning allows us to approach his specific treatment of the concept of truth with some preliminary insight. We will be in a better position to understand why and how Heidegger formulates the problem of truth and to clarify what he finds problematic in the modern conception.

Having outlined Heidegger’s broader project and the manner in which he carries out his investigations I embark upon the second task of this chapter, that is, an explication of Heidegger’s treatment of truth in *Being and Time*. I begin this second task by laying out Heidegger’s inquiry into the traditional concept of truth and the ontological presuppositions it entails, before clarifying Heidegger’s interpretation of the most original phenomenon of truth as disclosedness.

With the first aim in view, I now turn to Heidegger’s explication of his method of philosophical investigation as he lays it out in *Being and Time*. As already suggested, without properly understanding Heidegger’s philosophical approach, his
reasons for and method of exploring such traditional philosophical problems – such as the problem of truth – will remain obscure.

§1 Method

In the introduction of Being and Time Heidegger proposes to treat the question of the meaning of Being\textsuperscript{8} phenomenologically. Phenomenology, he explains, is letting what shows be seen from itself just as it shows itself. To clarify what it means to carry out phenomenological inquiry, Heidegger sketches the meaning of phenomenology as a formal concept of method.\textsuperscript{9} In this sense, phenomenology is a formal method disregarding particular content. Heidegger accepts this general concept of a formal phenomenological method but derives from it his hermeneutic approach.

§1.1 Phenomenology as a Formal Concept of Method

Heidegger delineates the formal concept of phenomenology, that is, phenomenology understood strictly as a method without reference to content, by clarifying the meaning of the words “phenomenon” and “logos,” in terms of their etymological origins. According to Heidegger, the word phenomenon originally derives from the ancient Greek term \textit{phainomenon} [φαινόµενον].\textsuperscript{10} The word \textit{phainomenon}, he explains, is itself drawn from the verb \textit{phainesthai} [φαίνεσϑαι], which means, ‘to show itself.’\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Phainomenon} means, ‘what shows itself, the self-showing, the manifest.’\textsuperscript{12} Heidegger interprets the term \textit{phainesthai} as an appropriation of the verb \textit{phainō} [φαίνω], which means to bring or place into the light – the root of this word is pha- [φα-], or phos [φῶς], which means “light.”\textsuperscript{13} Light illuminates a place where something can show itself. While beings can, on the one hand, manifest as they are themselves, they can, on the other, manifest as something they are not, that is, manifest as something other than they themselves are.

\textsuperscript{8} For the sake of clarity and ease of expression, throughout this dissertation I capitalise the word “Being” when I use it in the sense of “the Being of beings” [Sein], and refrain from capitalising, keeping with “being,” when I use the word in the sense of particular beings [seiendes].

\textsuperscript{9} Edmund Husserl first developed this formal concept of phenomenological method.


\textsuperscript{11} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 27 [28]

\textsuperscript{12} ibid.

\textsuperscript{13} ibid.
something other than what it is.\textsuperscript{14} This self-showing, seeming like, Heidegger calls “semblance.”\textsuperscript{15} Semblance is a privative modification (and thus not the opposite) of phenomenon.\textsuperscript{16} In other words, semblance is still a self-showing, only not self-showing in the original sense Heidegger means when he speaks of phenomenon.

Heidegger further distinguishes between appearances and phenomena: an appearance is not a phenomenon, although what appears does so only on the basis of some phenomenon. Heidegger differentiates his account of the relationship between appearance, phenomenon and the thing itself from those of his philosophical predecessors. He warns against the tendency to collapse the distinction between self-showing and appearing and points to Immanuel Kant’s account of appearances and phenomena as an example of such a collapse.\textsuperscript{17} Similar to what Heidegger takes to be Kant’s account, and in contrast to Heidegger himself, Tugendhat understands “what shows” as appearances that emanate from the things themselves.\textsuperscript{18} In other words, in opposition to Heidegger, he aligns appearances and phenomena while separating phenomena from the things themselves.

Heidegger, by contrast, precisely identifies the things themselves as what shows, that is, as phenomena. Thus, Heidegger does not accept the separation of phenomena from things themselves. In addition, for Heidegger, a phenomenon does not appear, rather, it indicates what appears; nor does what appear self-show, rather, it announces itself through what shows itself.\textsuperscript{19} With the formal concept of phenomenon clarified and given in its distinction from and relation with semblance, appearance, and things themselves, Heidegger then turns to the task of clarifying the meaning of the formal concept of logos.

According to Heidegger, in ancient Greece the word logos [λόγος] was used in a variety of senses. However, in the works of Plato and Aristotle, he claims that the different meanings of logos converge in a primary meaning: logos as discourse.

\textsuperscript{14} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 27 [29]
\textsuperscript{15} ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} For Heidegger’s interpretation of the relation between appearance, phenomena and things-in-themselves in Kant, see 28-30 [30-31]
\textsuperscript{18} In this sense, Heidegger’s discussion of Kant is relevant to Tugendhat’s position. Heidegger describes Kant’s account of the relation between appearances, phenomena, and the things themselves in the following fashion: ‘[w]hat does the announcing and is brought forward indeed shows itself in such a way that, as the emanation of what it announces, it precisely and continually veils what it is in itself” (Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 29 [30]).
\textsuperscript{19} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 28 [29]
This basic sense of logos means “letting be seen,” making beings manifest through speech and is evident in Aristotle’s account of discourse as apophainesthai. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, apophantic speech lets something be seen, makes it manifest, specifically by indicating it; that is, by letting it be seen (apart from itself and together with something else) as something. That is, when we speak about things around us and far away, we make these things manifest for others by showing them through speech. In this way, Heidegger explains:

… λόγος [logos] lets something be seen, it can therefore be true or false. But everything depends on staying clear of any concept of truth construed in the sense of "correspondence" or "accordance" [Übereinstimmung]. This idea is by no means the primary one in the concept of ἀλήθεια [aletheia]. The "being true" of λόγος as ἀληθεύειν [aletheuein] means: to take beings that are being talked about in λέγειν [legein] as apophainesthai [apophainesthai] out of their concealment; to let them be seen as something unconcealed (ἀλήθες [alethes]); to discover them. Similarly "being false," ψευδεσθαι [pseudesthai], is tantamount to deceiving in the sense of covering up: putting something in front of something else (by way of letting it be seen) and thereby passing it off as something it is not.

In other words, and as I will further explicate below, true assertion uncovers what is being spoken about just as it shows itself as unconcealed, in contrast to the false assertion that covers over what shows, letting it manifest as something it does not show itself as and therefore passing it off for something it is not.

In accord with the account of logos just outlined, Heidegger defines the meaning of the formal concept of logos with respect to phenomenology as a formal concept of method. Logos is to be understood in the sense of logos as apophansis. That is, Heidegger proposes to let the phenomenon of phenomenological investigation be seen by others through apophantic speech. In light of the discussion to follow, it is important to note that Heidegger explicitly identifies apophantic speech as being either true or false in the sense of “discovering” beings and “covering over” beings respectively.

20 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 30 [32]
21 See also: Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, translated by Daniel Dahlstrom, (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005), 9-31
24 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 31 [33], German in square brackets in Stambaugh’s translation.
25 See also: Heidegger, *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, 23-29
With the meaning of the formal concept of phenomenon clarified as self-showing and that of logos as a mode of letting-be-seen, Heidegger establishes the formal concept of phenomenology as, *apophainesthai ta phainomena* [ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὰ φανόμενα].\(^{26}\) That is, for Heidegger, phenomenology as a formal concept of method means, 'to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself.'\(^{27}\) In other words, the kind of investigations Heidegger intends to carry out will involve in the first place, a particular manner of encountering things so as to let them show as they are themselves. Second, it entails a way of letting what shows be seen by others, that is, Heidegger will make the phenomenon of his phenomenological investigations manifest for others through apophantic speech.

### §1.2 Deformalising the Formal Concept of Phenomenology

According to Heidegger, there are two distinct ways in which one can go about deformalising the formal concept of phenomenology. The distinction between the two ways lies in whether one takes up particular beings or the Being of beings itself as that which is under investigation, as what is to be encountered as phenomenon.\(^{28}\) Heidegger wants to distance himself from the “vulgar,” common concept of phenomenon. If we take manifesting in the most original sense to pertain to beings, then we arrive at the common concept of phenomenon.\(^{29}\) Whereas if we understand manifesting in the most original sense as pertaining to the Being of beings then we arrive at the phenomenological concept of phenomenon.\(^{30}\) The common concept construes phenomenon as beings given for apprehension in empirical experience.\(^{31}\) However, empirical experience does not mean beings as they initially show themselves in everyday, pretheoretical experience; rather, it is precisely this everyday pretheoretical experience that is passed over by the common concept of phenomenon. This theoretical standpoint founded upon the common concept of phenomenon determines (a priori) what is to be encountered as phenomenon and investigated as such.\(^{32}\)

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\(^{26}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 32 [34]

\(^{27}\) ibid.

\(^{28}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 29-30 [31]

\(^{29}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 33 [35]

\(^{30}\) ibid.

\(^{31}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 29 [31]

By contrast, genuine phenomenological concepts are distinguishable from other common concepts precisely in terms of their autochthonous condition, that is, the condition of remaining explicitly bound to the context in which they arose. Thus phenomenological concepts are drawn from what shows and do not determine in advance what is to be encountered as phenomenon. This context-bound character of phenomenological concepts grants these concepts an inherent flexibility. However, despite this flexibility, Heidegger claims there is a risk that phenomenological concepts will be interpreted rigidly, as static and unchanging. That is, they will be understood regard for the historical ground on the basis of which they were first conceived. The potential inflexibility of a phenomenological concept, Heidegger explains, renders the concept open to the possibility of losing its autochthony and becoming a ‘free-floating thesis.’ Accordingly, anyone genuinely practicing phenomenology must remain ‘self-critical in a positive sense.’ In other words, the genuine phenomenologist remains open to rethinking even the most clear and distinct concepts. The phenomenological concept of phenomenon in contrast to the common one is not absolutely defined, ready for application in any and every context; rather, it is determinable only in terms of and as bound to the unique context in which it is sought.

Having clarified the deformalised concept of phenomenon, Heidegger then clarifies the concept of logos he will follow in his hermeneutical investigations. For Heidegger, the meaning of the deformalised phenomenological concept of logos must be drawn from the phenomenon of phenomenological inquiry. That is, it is the phenomenon itself which shapes the way it will be encountered. In the context of Being and Time, the phenomenon is the Being of beings. In order to clarify the appropriate way of encountering the Being of beings, Heidegger explains, we will first bring to view the Being of a particular being. Specifically, the being who asks after the meaning of Being.

Heidegger takes as his point of departure an analysis of the Being of that being who asks after Being, or as he calls it, an existential analysis of Dasein. Dasein is

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33 Heidegger, Being and Time, 34 [36]
34 ibid.
35 Heidegger, Being and Time, 34-35 [36-37]
36 Heidegger, Being and Time, 35 [37]
Heidegger’s term for the structure of human existence. From his existential analysis we will come to grasp the specific sense of logos (mode of making manifest) as interpretation. Thus, the analysis itself is “hermeneutics” in the original sense of the word, which names the task of interpretation. From the existential analysis we arrive at the fundamentally interpretive character of our Being. Hence, interpretation becomes the proper method of approaching the question of Being.

For Heidegger, going back to the genuine phenomenal origins of our concepts and reinterpreting them, reinterpreting prior understandings that have been covered over by subsequent attempts to interpret Being as a particular being allows us a ‘passage through’ the ruling dogmas. As we will see, this is precisely the manner in which Heidegger approaches the concept of truth.

So far in this chapter, I have sketched the overarching inquiry in terms of which Heidegger carries out his specific investigation into the meaning of truth and the manner in which Heidegger conducts his investigations as phenomenological hermeneutics. An important step on the way to Heidegger’s rethinking of the meaning of Being is clarification of the meaning of truth. Heidegger argues that the traditional concept of truth as agreement, although accepted by the Western tradition, is already defined by certain ontological presuppositions. Heidegger devotes §44 of Being and Time to analysing the traditional concept of truth and exposing the ontological presuppositions it entails.

For the remainder of this chapter, I will lay out Heidegger’s treatment of the concept of truth in Being and Time. Here we will see Heidegger’s phenomenological-hermeneutic approach at play. I will first sketch Heidegger’s inquiry into the grounds of the traditional concept of truth as correctness, before explicating Heidegger’s interpretation of the most original phenomenon of truth as disclosedness.

37 Dasein is often translated into English by scholars, and formulated in reverse, as “being-here” or “there.” For this dissertation I have chosen not to translate this technical term of Heidegger’s; preferring, rather to leave it in its original German voice which captures both the “here” and “there” in “Da.” That the meaning of Dasein remains obscure is not a problem for Heidegger nor should it be for us.
38 Heidegger, Being and Time, 35 [37]
39 ibid.
40 Heidegger, Being and Time, 34 [37]
§2 Truth

§2.1 Questioning the Grounds of the Traditional Concept of Truth

Heidegger contends that according to the present way of thinking, which we have inherited from the Western philosophical tradition, truth is a property of statements. To say that a statement is true means it is in agreement with whatever it is about. Heidegger notes that those who align themselves with this traditional concept of truth as agreement often point to Aristotle as the first philosopher to locate truth in judgment. However, according to Heidegger, this is already a re-interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of truth. This reinterpretation, he explains, finds its classic articulation in Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas defines the essence of truth as *adaequatio et rei*, in other words, the essence of truth consists in agreement of knowledge with thing. However, for Aquinas and the theological tradition more generally God is the guarantor of this relation. In the Christian theological framework the human intellect (*ens creatum*) is fundamentally linked with the ideas preconceived in the mind of God (*intellectus divinus*). Heidegger contends that Kant must also be situated in this tradition of characterising truth in terms of the agreement of knowledge with its object. For example, Heidegger quotes as stating the following: ‘[t]he explanation of the name of truth – namely, that it is the agreement of knowledge with its object – will be here granted and presupposed.’ By Heidegger’s account, this tradition of construing truth in terms of agreement of knowledge with its object, expressed in propositional terms, is characteristic of modern epistemological approaches to truth.

From the standpoint of modern epistemology, as Heidegger understands it, truth is construed as a relation between a knowing subject and a known object. The major problem of the modern inquiry concerning the possibility of truth becomes the nature of the relation between two distinct beings, understood as two distinct substances: *intellectus et res*. Heidegger’s criticism of the attempt to render the meaning of truth as a mere relation that bridges the gap between these two

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41 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 206 [214]
43 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 206 [214]
46 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 208 [217]
47 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 215 [225]
substances makes clear that bridged this gap for Aquinas – namely, God – is no longer considered a satisfactory solution to this problem and thus the gap continues to haunt the modern epistemological project.\textsuperscript{48} From Heidegger’s perspective, modern epistemological inquiry does not seek out the grounds of the agreement relation; rather, it presupposes the relation and then takes this as a basis for an investigation into how and whether we can bridge the gap, that is, know, and attain truth.\textsuperscript{49}

Having briefly outlined some of the history of this relation between statement and thing Heidegger now explores this relation in more detail. “Agreement” designates a kind of relation of something with something. Heidegger clarifies the specific agreement relation of knowledge or statement and thing.\textsuperscript{50} And yet there are various modes of agreement, not all of which are suited to the task of characterising that specific relation between statement and thing.\textsuperscript{51} For example, as Heidegger notes, agreement can mean equality.\textsuperscript{52} In the case of two blue lighters of the same make and colour, we can say that they are equal to each other. However, the issue for Heidegger is how a statement and a thing can be equal with each other, since they are not of the same kind. For Heidegger, the blue lighter and the statement, “this is a blue lighter,” cannot be in agreement in the same way as the two lighters are, since the lighter and the statement about it are essentially different.\textsuperscript{53} The lighter there on the table in front of me is material but my statement is nothing material. How can they be in agreement with each other? Thus Heidegger’s task is to inquire into the possibility of grasping this relational agreement in a phenomenological way.

Heidegger inquires into how a thing and a statement can be said to agree with each other. According to Heidegger, my statement can agree with the thing when my assertion makes visible the thing as the very thing before me. For example, I say to my friend, “the picture hanging on the back of the door is crooked.” We go to the door to look, and see that the picture is, indeed, hung crooked. By stating that the picture on the wall is crooked, I make visible this “being-crooked” to my friend. We

\textsuperscript{48} For further discussion of this point, see: Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth,” 138-139; Heidegger, \textit{Introduction to Phenomenological Research}, 137-142 & 168-174
\textsuperscript{49} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 208 [217]
\textsuperscript{50} Although we are addressing the agreement of knowledge or statement with thing, for the sake of clarity I will use the word statement in place of “knowledge or statement.”
\textsuperscript{51} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 207 [215-216]
\textsuperscript{52} ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 207 [216]
look at the picture and the picture shows itself as crooked. My seeing the painting hanging there demonstrates ‘that this being is the very being [Seiende] that was meant in the statement.’ This demonstration confirms that the statement does in fact discover that which it points out. It is only on the basis of the thing showing itself that the possibility of confirmation arises. In seeing the picture hanging there, Heidegger explains, the thing I was originally directed toward in making the statement, ‘shows that it, in its selfsameness, is just as it is discovered or pointed out in the statement.’ That is, the picture shows just as it is pointed out and determined by my statement. The phrase “just as,” indicates the relational agreement of statement with thing. The agreement relation comes to the fore with the confirmation that the statement discovers the thing.

As we noted above, true assertion shows things just as they show themselves for us. In other words, the truth of assertion is not a mere relation between two objectively present things (i.e., intellectus et res). Rather, assertion is a mode of Being of Dasein. That is, it is something that we do in our meaningful engagements and in our shared world. Since assertion is, as shown above, a manner of letting things be seen specifically by indicating, we have two possibilities open to us with respect to the manner in which we make assertions and make the things we talk about manifest to others. The two possibilities pertain to the distinction between true and false assertion. On the one hand, as Heidegger explains, ‘[t]o say that a statement is true means that it discovers the being in itself. It asserts, it shows, it lets beings “be seen” (ἀποφανσις) in their discoveredness.’ That is, we can let something be seen as it shows itself to us (letting it be seen in its “discoveredness”). On the other hand, however, we can also let it be seen as something other than what it shows itself to be, thereby covering it up and passing it off as something it is not. In this way, by making a false statement about a thing, I am covering it over, whereas by making a true statement about a thing, I am discovering it. As Heidegger writes, ‘[t]he being true [Wahrsein] (truth) of the statement must be understood as discovering.’

54 Heidegger, Being and Time, 209 [218]  
55 ibid.  
56 ibid.  
57 Heidegger, Being and Time, 207 [216]  
58 Heidegger, Being and Time, 210 [218]  
59 ibid, square brackets in Stambaugh’s translation.
§2.2 The Most Original Phenomenon of Truth as Disclosedness

Heidegger asks if by defining truth (in the sense of the being-true of the statement) as discovering, do we not shake off the tried-and-true tradition and eliminate the agreement relation from the concept of truth? No, he says, there is no omission here; rather, truth as discovering is a more original interpretation of the traditional concept of truth. A conception of truth construed merely as adaequatio is limited to judgment inasmuch as it does not take into account the original self-showing on the basis of which such a conception of agreement could in the first place arise. After all, only when something is discovered in its showing, can we speak about it. The true assertion derives its manner of showing from the things as they are discovered. That is, the true assertion lets ‘beings be seen in their unconcealment (disclosedness), taking them out of their concealment.’ To judge that something is as it is, we must be able first to encounter it, or, as Heidegger says, only if ‘a being is discovered in its [B]eing,’ we can speak about it.

The idea of the disclosedness of beings relates to the Heideggerian concept of understanding. Heidegger speaks about understanding with respect to the disclosedness of beings, whereby ‘Dasein is the ontic condition of the possibility of the discovery of beings.’ Dasein ‘is cleared in itself as being-in-the-world, not by another being, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing.’ As Heidegger writes, ‘Dasein is its disclosedness.’ Without being open to things in the world, which show themselves, without the possibility of Dasein discovering them and so being able to speak about them, there cannot be propositions concerning them.

Heidegger explains that things must be first disclosed in order for them to be discovered. As Heidegger makes clear, ‘disclosedness [Entdecktheit] [is] the term for a possibility of [B]eing of all beings unlike Dasein.’ Yet, in order for beings to be discovered, they have to be freed and disclosed. Dasein frees beings by encountering and discovering them in terms of our meaningful projects, that is, as letting them be relevant for a “totality of relevance.” Only because Dasein is that

60 Heidegger, Being and Time, 210 [219]
61 ibid.
62 ibid.
63 Heidegger, Being and Time, 84 [85]
64 Heidegger, Being and Time, 85 [87]
65 Heidegger, Being and Time, 129 [133]
66 ibid.
67 Heidegger, Being and Time, 84 [85]
disclosedness that makes possible an encounter with things, can speak about something as something. Without disclosure, no discovery is possible; without discovery, there is no possibility of propositions.

Let us now turn to §44 and in particular the part of this section in which he draws together the various threads of his discussion of truth. Truth for him is tied to this possibility of discovering and discoveredness of things, which is grounded in a more original phenomenon. As noted above, we discover things in the world on the basis of our being-in-the-world. The being that has this fundamental structure is Dasein. As Heidegger makes clear, “[t]hrough disclosedness this being (Dasein) is “there” for itself together with the there-being [Da-sein] of the world.” Accordingly, for Heidegger, ‘the discoveredness of innerworldly beings is grounded in the disclosedness of the world.’ In other words, we are always thrown into the world ahead of ourselves. We encounter, that is, discover the things and people around us on the basis of the prior disclosure of the world, that is, we understand things in terms of our prior engagement with them in terms of our projects. Only by being-in-the-world, Dasein discloses the world and only through disclosure is the discoveredness of beings possible.

For Heidegger Dasein is fundamentally “in truth.” This means, as Heidegger explains, that ‘the disclosedness of its ownmost [B]eing belongs to…[Dasein’s] existential constitution.’ Thus, for Heidegger, truth in the most original sense means disclosedness. This interpretation pertains to the most original phenomenon of truth as the disclosure of the world, of the “there,” which is the original ground on the basis of which truth as discovering is in the first place possible.

Hence, for Heidegger, ‘Dasein is “in the truth.”’ This is an ontological and not an ontic statement. To be “in truth” does not mean that Dasein is always truthful in the sense of correctness. Part of Dasein’s fundamental structure involves thrownness, project and falling prey. That is to say, Dasein is disclosed as thrown.

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68 Heidegger, Being and Time, 211 [220]
69 Heidegger, Being and Time, 85-86 [87]
70 Heidegger, Being and Time, 129 [132]
71 Heidegger, Being and Time, 212 [220], square brackets in Stambaugh’s translation.
72 Heidegger, Being and Time, 212 [221]
73 Heidegger, Being and Time, 211 [220]
74 Heidegger, Being and Time, 212 [221]
fallen, project.\textsuperscript{75} All of them are constitutive of the everydayness of Dasein. For Heidegger, then, “Dasein is in the truth,” and “Dasein is in untruth.”\textsuperscript{76} We are “thrown” into the world and already find ourselves situated in the world and entangled in our relations with things and others. Everydayness is constituted by idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity.\textsuperscript{77} Initially and for the most part we understand ourselves in terms of ready-made theses, handed down by the public anonym, the “they.” We have always already “fallen prey” to the world. Our original, truthful relation to beings, which is constitutive of our existence is ‘essentially closed off and covered over.’\textsuperscript{78} Falling prey ‘reveals an essential, ontological structure of Dasein itself. Far from determining its nocturnal side, it constitutes all of its days in their everydayness.’\textsuperscript{79}

**Conclusion**

As already suggested, understanding the broader context of Heidegger’s thought and the way he understands his philosophical inquiry allows us to approach his treatment of the concept of truth. Without properly understanding Heidegger’s philosophical approach, his reasons for and method of exploring traditional philosophical problems, such as the problem of truth, will remain obscure.

In light of the significance of Heidegger’s phenomenological-hermeneutic framework, in this chapter, I have explicated the way Heidegger’s particular approach informs his inquiry into the traditional concept of truth. I explained what Heidegger means by phenomenology and why, according to Heidegger, his investigations in *Being and Time* are phenomenological. Then, I unpacked Heidegger’s account of his own hermeneutic-interpretive manner of engaging in phenomenological analysis. With an understanding of Heidegger’s broader project and the manner in which he carries out his investigations I then explicated Heidegger’s treatment of truth in *Being and Time*. I first considered Heidegger’s inquiry into the traditional concept of truth and the ontological presuppositions it entails, before clarifying Heidegger’s interpretation of the most original phenomenon of truth as disclosedness.

\textsuperscript{75} Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 212–213 [221]
\textsuperscript{76} Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 213 [222]
\textsuperscript{77} Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 169 [175]
\textsuperscript{78} Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 213 [222]
\textsuperscript{79} Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 172 [179]
In the following chapter, in order to address and clarify Tugendhat’s critique, I will give a detailed exposition of the objections Tugendhat raises against Heidegger’s account of truth. It is important to clarify Tugendhat’s objections before moving on to examine some of the ways Tugendhat’s critique has been taken up in the secondary literature. When I further discuss these commentaries in the final chapter, I will return to some of the points raised in the present chapter in order to show how they problematise certain criticisms directed at Heidegger’s account of truth as disclosedness. For now, however, we turn our attention to Tugendhat and afford him the attention we have so far only given to Heidegger.
Tugendhat’s Critique of §44

In this chapter I address Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s account of truth and consider some of the ways Tugendhat’s critique has been taken up in the secondary literature. In the previous chapter, I have offered an explanation of Heidegger’s phenomenological-hermeneutic account of the concept of truth. To extend my discussion of Heidegger’s account, in this chapter I will unpack Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s interpretation of truth as presented in his paper, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth.” This particular critique has been taken up by a number of scholars and is often mentioned in discussions of Heidegger’s thought. It would be difficult to find many commentaries on Heidegger’s concept of truth that do not at least in passing make reference to Tugendhat’s critique. I will here explore this critique to make clear the problems Tugendhat finds in Heidegger’s concept of truth. As I claimed above, a proper analysis of Tugendhat’s critique will enable us to better understand Heidegger’s project. I will return to this claim in chapter three when I offer a possible Heideggerian response to these criticisms.

Firstly, I will explicate Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s account of truth as disclosedness (αλήθεια) in order to make clear what Tugendhat finds problematic in Heidegger’s account. Following an exposition of Tugendhat’s critique, I will turn to some of the ways Tugendhat’s objections against Heidegger’s interpretation of truth have been taken up and dealt with in the secondary literature. As they bring to the fore some of the key elements of Tugendhat’s critique and the problems therein, I focus on the accounts put forth by Karl-Otto Apel, Cristina Lafont, Daniel Dahlstrom, and William Smith. I have selected these particular commentaries

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because they bring to the fore Tugendhat’s main concerns with respect to Heidegger’s interpretation of truth as disclosedness. Additionally, these contributions will help frame the discussion in my final chapter, where I problematise Tugendhat’s critique.

§3 Tugendhat’s Critique

Tugendhat enjoyed a privileged position from which to familiarise himself with the phenomenological tradition and, in particular, Heidegger’s contribution to this tradition. He was Heidegger’s student. In 1967 he wrote his habilitation thesis on the concept of truth in Husserl and Heidegger. In his paper “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” (1969) Tugendhat proposes that Heidegger’s determination of truth as disclosedness (alētheia) undermines what is essential to the usual concept of truth as correctness which allows us to speak of true statements as distinct from false ones. Accordingly, Tugendhat inquires into the significance of Heidegger’s interpretation of truth as disclosedness by assessing it in terms of the usual everyday concept of truth. He also assesses the implications for critical questioning that follow from Heidegger’s concept of truth. As already mentioned, Tugendhat claims that his critique is relevant to all Heidegger’s works that deal with truth. According to his reading, in §44 Heidegger makes ‘decisions, which remain fundamental for everything that follows.’

Tugendhat notes that the significant features of Heidegger’s determination of truth as disclosedness emerge in the first two thirds of §44, where Heidegger argues for two theses: first, the truth of assertion means uncovering (discovering); second, truth in the most original sense means disclosedness. For the sake of clarity, I will follow Tugendhat’s division of his critique into two sections. Tugendhat’s critique is

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82 Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 80
83 In this chapter only, I use the term “uncovering” to designate what is referred to in the other chapters as “discovering” (of beings). This is because “uncovering” is used in the English translation of Tugendhat’s text, whereas in Stambaugh’s authoritative translation of Being and Time (which is the text I am referring to in all other chapters) the term “discovering” is used. (In Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of Being and Time, like Macann’s translation of Tugendhat’s text, “uncovering” is the term used).
84 Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 80
not straightforward. Thus in order to avoid reducing it to a caricature, I unpack its main points in detail.

§3.1 The Truth of Assertion as Being-Discovering

§3.11 Agreement

With respect to the first thesis, namely that the truth of assertion means uncovering, Tugendhat contends that despite Heidegger’s claim to discuss the usual concept of truth, he does not account for the agreement relation of statement with thing that is specific to truth. As he explains, Heidegger’s understanding of truth as agreement, expressed in terms of the truth of assertion, is that a statement is ‘true when it shows the state of affairs “as it is in itself,” whereby the state of affairs is discovered to be “in itself just as it is pointed out in the assertion.”’ To clarify, for Tugendhat, as he explains in Traditional and Analytical Philosophy: Lectures on the Philosophy of Language, the agreement of statement with thing characteristic of correct propositions is a relation between the meaning of a statement and “reality.”

“Reality” for him is the “actual” state of affairs in which the thing is situated. That is, statements cannot be about some isolated thing, but are necessarily about a state of affairs in terms of which the thing is. To put it differently, a true judgment is that which “captures” this state of affairs just as it is itself. This understanding needs to be kept in mind when we consider Tugendhat’s description of Heidegger’s account.

Tugendhat takes the formulation of “just-as” in Heidegger’s definition of the truth of assertion to express the agreement relation. However, Tugendhat also claims that in Heidegger’s account, there are two more determinations of the truth of assertion that are different but equivalent to the one outlined above (a statement is ‘true when it shows the state of affairs “as it is in itself,” whereby the state of affairs is discovered to be “in itself just as it is pointed out in the assertion.”’)

Tugendhat condenses and reinterprets Heidegger’s notion of the truth of assertion to three formulations. He lays them out as follows:

The assertion is true when it so indicates or discloses the state of affairs as it is in itself.

The assertion is true, means: it discloses the state of affairs in itself.

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86 Ernst Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy: Lectures on the Philosophy of Language, translated by P.A. Gorner, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 71; 401-402
87 Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 81, my italics
88 Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 82
The truthfulness (truth) of assertion must be understood as its disclosedness. As Tugendhat interprets Heidegger, the main difference between these three “determinations of truth” turn on Heidegger’s use of the phrase “as it is in itself.” It is important to note that it is Tugendhat who draws these three formulations from Heidegger’s text and proposes that they are equivalent definitions. For Tugendhat, there is no problem with the first two formulations since both maintain the agreement relation between statement and a state of affairs. As noted above, Tugendhat maintains that “agreement between the statement and the thing” is essential to the concept of truth. According to Tugendhat’s interpretation, Heidegger explicitly accounts for agreement in the first formulation, and does so also in the second formulation even though, Tugendhat notes, he discards the qualifying “so-as.” Tugendhat claims that despite discarding the just/so-as, Heidegger maintains the agreement relation by including the “in-itself,” which implicitly suggests agreement of the statement with the thing precisely as it is in-itself. That is, by Tugendhat’s account, in the second formulation he proposes, agreement is indicated implicitly inasmuch as the assertion is said to uncover the entity, specifically, in-itself. Nevertheless, the third and final formulation, as formulated by Tugendhat, is problematic. There, allegedly Heidegger has altogether dropped any qualification that might indicate agreement between the statement and the thing, and therefore any reference to the manner of uncovering things that is specific to the true assertion. According to Tugendhat, Heidegger gives no reasons for ‘this small, but yet decisive, step.’

Tugendhat speculates that the reason for Heidegger’s omission of the “as it is itself,” without further justification, is what he takes to be Heidegger’s commitment to a dynamic conception of assertion. In Tugendhat’s words:

As long as one understands the assertion statically, as a representation or meaning, one is, of course, not entitled to say: an assertion is true if and only if it means the entity in question; for the way in which it means the entity can also be false. One is therefore already obliged to say: it is true if and only if it means the entity as it is itself. If, on the other hand, we understand the assertion as a pointing out and an uncovering, it then seems to be sufficient if we say without further qualification: the assertion is true if it uncovers the entity, for, if it is false, it does not uncover the entity at all but

90 ibid.
91 Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 83
92 Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 82
93 Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 82-83
94 ibid.
‘covers it up’ or ‘conceals’ it. It therefore already lies in the nature of uncovering as such that it must be true if it really is an uncovering.\(^{95}\)

Thus Tugendhat’s claim is that Heidegger’s distinction between true and false assertion is in terms of whether or not the assertion “really,” or perhaps, genuinely, uncovers the thing. Since a true assertion, supposedly, uncovers things in accordance with the nature of assertion as uncovering (as I explicate below), Tugendhat is claiming, Heidegger does not provide any justification or explanation for leaving out the qualifying “as it is itself” in what Tugendhat formulates as Heidegger’s final definition of the truth of assertion. In other words, Tugendhat thinks that Heidegger understands the being-true of an assertion as genuineness. Heidegger eliminates the “in itself” in his definition of the truth of assertion, Tugendhat claims, on the grounds that in accordance with the structure of assertion (as pointing out, determining something in speech, making it manifest for others to see) any and every assertion is an uncovering of things. Tugendhat objects to Heidegger’s use of uncovering, claiming it leads to important yet untenable consequences for the concept of truth.

§3.12 Ambiguity, Uncovering, and Givenness

According to Tugendhat, Heidegger’s definition of the truth of assertion relies on an ambiguous use of the word “uncovering,” leading to a failure to account for what is proper to the phenomenon of truth. On the one hand, Heidegger accounts for the distinction between true and false statements in terms of whether the statement uncovers or covers over the state of affairs. According to this account, the true statement uncovers while the false covers over. Yet, on the other hand, in the light of Heidegger’s description of the structure of assertion as a pointing out and uncovering of things, every assertion, whether true or false, uncovers. That is, in accord with Heidegger’s determination of the structure of statement, both true and false statements must be understood as uncovering. This uncovering characteristic of statements generally is what Tugendhat refers to as uncovering in the “broad sense.”

When Heidegger defines the truth of assertion as uncovering, Tugendhat claims, Heidegger conflates uncovering in the broad sense, which is proper to the structure of statements generally, with the “narrow sense” of uncovering proper to

\(^{95}\) Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 84
the true assertion. Tugendhat contends that Heidegger never explicitly distinguishes between – what Tugendhat refers to as – the broad sense of uncovering (which includes both true and false assertion) and – what he refers to as – the narrow (and pregnant) sense of uncovering, which is reserved for true assertion alone. Since both true and false assertions are both said to uncover something, Tugendhat argues, when defining truth we need to specify the manner of uncovering that allows us to distinguish between truth and falsity. Hence, Tugendhat’s problem is that Heidegger’s definition of the truth of assertion as uncovering fails to provide a criterion in terms of which we can differentiate true from false statements.

In Tugendhat’s view, there is a particular manner of uncovering things and of the givenness of things, that must be specified in any adequate account of what truth means. For Tugendhat, Heidegger neglects what is at stake in the specific sense of truth; namely, uncovering something specifically “as it is itself.” This neglect, Tugendhat claims, is maintained in later works such as “On the Essence of Truth,” and “The Origin of the Work of Art.” In these two papers, Tugendhat contends, as in Being and Time, Heidegger claims that the true statement shows things according to the manner in which we encounter them. In other words, true assertion lets something be seen just as it shows itself for us and is therefore only possible on the basis of things self-showing. However, Tugendhat notes that ‘one simply cannot see that towards which the true assertion is directed as merely consisting in the self-showing, in un-concealment as such. For the false assertion is also directed towards something that shows itself.’ That is, self-showing, unconcealment, is not sufficient to account for the idea of truth. The thing must show as it is itself if we are to maintain that an assertion can be true.

One might want to say that true assertion genuinely uncovers, whereas false assertion does not and is therefore not directed toward genuine self-showing. However, Tugendhat explains, inasmuch as true and false assertion alike are directed toward the self-showing of things, one has ‘to say that the true assertion is precisely not directed toward the entity as it manifests itself immediately but toward the entity

96 ibid.
97 ibid.
98 Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 84-85
99 Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 85
100 ibid.
as it is itself.’\textsuperscript{101} Therefore, Tugendhat asserts, with Heidegger’s determination of the truth of assertion as uncovering, he abandons the distinction ‘within the self-showing, between an immediate and, as it were, obtrusive givenness and [the givenness proper to] the thing itself.’\textsuperscript{102} This is untenable for Tugendhat insofar as it is precisely the givenness of the “thing itself” which corresponds with the manner of uncovering peculiar to the true assertion. Heidegger’s abandonment of the distinction between the specific manner of givenness (of the thing itself) and givenness as such, Tugendhat claims, entails a renouncement of a sense of truth that is distinct from that of falsity.

\textbf{§3.2 The Most Original Sense of Truth as Disclosedness}

The second thesis Tugendhat examines is Heidegger’s claim that truth in the most original sense means disclosedness. According to Tugendhat, Heidegger’s first thesis – namely, his definition of the truth of assertion as uncovering – provides the foundation for his extension of the concept of truth beyond the domain of assertion to any and every discovering of things in the world.\textsuperscript{103} Tugendhat contends that the concept of truth is extended even further, beyond things that our statements “reveal” to “discoveredness” as such. The issue is thus that truth means “any and every discovering of things,” while also referring to “the disclosure of the world.” The disclosure of the world – or, the horizon which is the prethematic disclosure of things, letting them show up as meaningful – is, according to Tugendhat, simply pronounced by Heidegger as ‘the ‘most original phenomenon of truth.’\textsuperscript{104} In short, from the definition of truth related to statements that allows us to uncover meaningful things, Heidegger – according to Tugendhat’s claim – extends the concept of truth beyond the domain of assertion to disclosedness, that is, to the horizon of meaning that defines how we encounter particular beings as meaningful.

What is problematic by Tugendhat’s account is that Heidegger establishes a definition of truth that passes over what is specific to truth (uncovering of things as they are themselves in our propositions), and then on the basis of this definition, carries the name “truth” over to the condition of possibility of uncovering as such,

\textsuperscript{101} Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 86
\textsuperscript{102} ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 80-81
\textsuperscript{104} Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 80
which he terms uncovering in the broad sense.\footnote{Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 87-88} In Tugendhat’s words, ‘Heidegger holds on to the word truth but then deforms its meaning.’\footnote{Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 87} Once Heidegger concedes that the truth of assertion means uncovering, Tugendhat explains, ‘everything else follows almost deductively.’\footnote{Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 80-81} According to this logic, since the truth of a statement lies in the uncovering of entities – our encountering them as meaningful enables us to make statements about them, revealing them as such by pointing them out – this uncovering is only possible on the basis of our prior discovering of entities. Now, Tugendhat claims, it follows that any discovering of things in the world, any “encounter with them,” ‘is ‘true.’’\footnote{Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 87-88}

Yet Heidegger does not stop here, Tugendhat remarks, for what first makes the discovering and discoveredness of things in the world possible, is ‘the disclosure of Dasein as being-in-the-world, the disclosure of its world.’\footnote{Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 88} Yet for Tugendhat, inasmuch as Heidegger already understands truth in terms of uncovering and givenness generally, what now shows as the ‘most original truth,’ is the most basic unconcealment which makes discovering entities and speaking with others about them possible, that is, the disclosure of Dasein’s world, which is framed by the historical horizon.\footnote{ibid.}

Tugendhat refers to this original disclosure, or ‘opening up’ of the world, as ‘the understanding of our historical horizon of meaning.’\footnote{Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 89} Tugendhat agrees with (what he thinks is) Heidegger’s notion of disclosedness as the “pregiven” meaning horizon of our encounters with things in the world. As he sees it, Heidegger’s account of the truth of assertion as grounded in disclosedness adequately takes account of the “mediated” nature of our access to things themselves.\footnote{Heidegger himself does not use the term mediated. As I will argue below Tugendhat’s use of the term mediated is based on a possible misunderstanding of Heidegger. However, I use it here so as to be consistent with Tugendhat’s account.} In other words, the meaning of what things “really” are is unattainable to us since our access to the things as they are themselves is mediated by a historical meaning horizon. Hence, Tugendhat endorses Heidegger’s position on disclosedness as the horizon, the “there,” in which things show up as meaningful. Yet, Tugendhat disagrees with the
definition of truth as disclosedness, which he interprets as Heidegger’s “equation” of disclosedness with truth.

Since by Heidegger’s account, every true assertion is relative to a particular historical meaning horizon, Tugendhat insists that the crucial question with respect to the problem of truth comes to the fore. He asks, ‘in what manner can one inquire into the truth of this horizon, or is it not rather the case that the question of truth can no longer be applied to the horizon itself?’

Anticipating points I will expand upon in the following chapter, I will simply note here that it is one thing to ask about the condition of possibility for a meaningful disclosure of things within the “framework” of a historical horizon; it is altogether different to inquire into the “truth of the horizon.” Tugendhat can only ask after the truth or falsity of the horizon only if he takes truth as disclosedness as equivalent to truth as correctness. However, for Heidegger such a conception of truth as disclosedness is not possible. The issue of the truth or falsity of the horizon is misguided and misleading, as I will show in the following chapter.

Yet, Tugendhat suggests, this question regarding the “truth of the horizon” is closed off for Heidegger since he already understands the disclosure of world as ‘a truth in and for itself.’ In other words, since the meaning horizon is already understood as a truth, any inquiry into the truth of the horizon is rendered superfluous inasmuch as it becomes an inquiry ‘into the truth of a truth.”

Tugendhat claims that it makes sense to inquire into the truth of a meaning, or of an assertion, but not of a truth. By Tugendhat’s account, to inquire into the truth of an assertion means to pursue verification that the assertion ‘correctly comprehends’ the in-itself of that which it points out. To inquire into the “truth” of meaning, or what Tugendhat also conceives of as the “in-itself” of meaning, means to pursue clarification. In terms of the pursuit of clarification of meaning, ‘the in itself of truth, the ‘as it is itself,” Tugendhat claims, ‘is only a regulative idea of the process of critical questioning.”

For the “truth” of meaning, Tugendhat explains, is characterised by evidence and certainty. It ‘emerges in the evidence of

113 Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 89
114 ibid.
115 ibid.
116 Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 89-90
117 Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 90
complete transparency,’ yet as finite historical beings, such truth is beyond our reach.\textsuperscript{118}

For Tugendhat, inasmuch as Heidegger interprets truth as disclosedness, the import of his insight into our mediated access to things as they “really” are is left by the wayside in preference of a notion of the true meaning of things as something “immediately given” and into which we have “direct” access.\textsuperscript{119} As far as Tugendhat is concerned, no such access is possible. Here emerges a difference, which I touched upon in chapter one and shall return to in chapter three, between Heidegger and Tugendhat with respect to their conception of the relation between appearances, phenomena (what shows), and the things themselves. For in opposition to Heidegger, Tugendhat aligns appearances and phenomena, separating phenomena from the things themselves. It is on the basis of this separation that Tugendhat speak of “mediated” access.

From his different approach to phenomena and things themselves, we can understand Tugendhat’s claim that there is no in-itself of meaning that we can go to and check our interpretations against. However for Tugendhat, that we have no access to “true meaning” does not entail the superfluity of the critical enterprise. In his view, we can posit the in-itself of meaning, that is, “the truth,” as a regulative idea and as an objective ground in terms of which we can all measure our understandings in our struggle for clarity. By Tugendhat’s account, a conception of truth as a regulative idea of self-evidence and certainty supposedly maintains Heidegger’s insight regarding our access to the true meaning of things as mediated by a historical horizon of meaning.\textsuperscript{120} At the same time, Tugendhat contends that the conception of truth, as a regulative idea, additionally allows for the possibility of critical engagement with interpretations shared by others, spanning different finite cultural and historical situations. Tugendhat thinks that this allows for critical engagement at both the level of disclosedness (critical engagement with our historical meaning horizon) and at the level of assertion (for example, critically engaging with the Heidegger’s account of truth).

\textsuperscript{118} ibid.
\textsuperscript{119} Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 90-92
\textsuperscript{120} Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 90-91
From this perspective, Tugendhat objects, Heidegger’s determination of truth as disclosedness means that ‘an understanding of world in general is opened up but not that it is put to the test.’¹²¹ That is, if we accept Heidegger’s own determination of truth as disclosedness, as Tugendhat interprets it, then his entire account becomes immune from critique because any and every disclosure is true. Given his interpretation of Heidegger’s account of assertion as disclosure, he believes that Heidegger also “discloses” his interpretation of the world. Consequently, insofar as all disclosure is true, as Tugendhat takes Heidegger to be saying, Heidegger’s account must be true. Therefore, Tugendhat argues, because Heidegger abandons the “in itself” of truth by “equating” truth with disclosedness, he lets go of the notion of truth as a regulative idea. Hence, in Tugendhat’s view, Heidegger forgoes the possibility of critical engagement with one’s own understanding of the surrounding world and that of others.¹²²

To sum up my previous discussion, Tugendhat finds Heidegger’s definition of the truth of assertion problematic inasmuch as it leaves us with no means for distinguishing what we would normally take to be true assertions from false ones; effectively doing away with the agreement relation between statements and things and the principle of non-contradiction (that a statement is either true or false). Tugendhat claims that defining the truth of assertion as uncovering and foregoing the concept of truth in the specific sense, that is, as opposed to falsity, enables Heidegger to extend the concept of truth beyond the domain of assertion to disclosedness. This extension is untenable for Tugendhat. In his view, as already noted, it is precisely because our access to things themselves is mediated, that absolute evidence and truth as certainty are unattainable for finite historical human beings. On his account, evidence, certainty and truth must remain only “regulative ideas” that will guide us in the process of critical questioning.¹²³ Since Heidegger equates truth with disclosedness, Tugendhat claims, Heidegger also gives up the possibility of critical questioning.

For the remainder of this chapter I examine some ways Tugendhat’s criticisms have been taken up in the secondary literature. I focus on the particular interpretations put forth by Apel and Lafont in support of Tugendhat’s critique and

¹²¹ Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 90
¹²² ibid.
¹²³ Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 90-92
those put forth by Dahlstrom and Smith in defence of Heidegger. Doing so will allow for a richer account of what is at stake in Tugendhat’s disagreement with Heidegger, and will lay the ground for my discussion and a possible Heideggerian response (that differs from Dahlstrom’s and Smith’s) in the third chapter. To enable me to formulate a different response to Tugendhat’s critique, I will discuss the secondary literature that deals with this problem.

§4 Responses to Tugendhat: Apel, Lafont, Dahlstrom, and Smith

Apel supports Tugendhat’s critique in his paper “Regulative Ideas or Truth-Happening?: An Attempt to Answer the Question of the Conditions of the Possibility of Valid Understanding.”124 In his paper, Apel interprets Heidegger’s determination of truth as \( \alpha l\,\theta\,h\,i\,a \) in terms of a rejection and replacement of the concept of truth as correctness.125 Similar to Tugendhat, he argues that by defining truth as \( \alpha l\,\theta\,h\,i\,a \), Heidegger gives an account of truth that fails to provide a criterion for distinguishing correctness from incorrectness. Apel contends that contrary to Heidegger’s account of truth, \( \alpha l\,\theta\,h\,i\,a \), as the historical event of the disclosure of Being is not the only determining standard with respect to correctness.126 As Apel is primarily concerned with securing a foundation for knowledge, or as he otherwise puts it, the progress of understanding, such an abandonment of truth in the sense of correctness and its replacement by truth as \( \alpha l\,\theta\,h\,i\,a \) is problematic.

In Apel’s view, Heidegger’s determination of truth as \( \alpha l\,\theta\,h\,i\,a \) renders any talk about the “progress” of understanding meaningless. While Apel accepts that as finite historically situated human beings we make sense of our surrounding world in terms of our particular historical context, it is precisely our historical-situatedness that demands a time-independent criterion in terms of which we can distinguish correct from incorrect “understandings.”127 For Apel, it is not enough to merely note that there different understanding. He wants to be able to evaluate understandings and designate some as better than others. Supposedly, only with an absolute and universally binding criterion can we have an objective ground in terms of which we

125 Apel, “Regulative Ideas or Truth-Happening?” 68
126 Apel, “Regulative Ideas or Truth-Happening?” 72
127 Apel, “Regulative Ideas or Truth-Happening?” 69
can critically engage with our own historically contingent interpretations as well as those of others. Insofar as truth is taken to mean *alētheia*, for Apel, we are left without such an objective, justificatory ground, leading to relativism.

It is Apel’s contention that Heidegger “corrects” himself in a lecture, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” he delivered only months after Tugendhat first voiced his critique in 1964. Heidegger’s correction, Apel contends, takes the form of a retreat from the position he had been committed to since *Being and Time*; namely, that truth in the most original sense means *alētheia*. I quote at length Heidegger’s passage that Apel refers to:

Insofar as truth is understood in the traditional “natural” sense as the correspondence of knowledge with beings demonstrated in beings, but also insofar as truth is interpreted as the certainty of the knowledge of Being, *alētheia*, unconcealment in the sense of the opening may not be equated with truth. Rather, *alētheia*, unconcealment thought as opening, first grants the possibility of truth. For truth itself, just as Being and thinking, can only be what it is in the element of the opening. Evidence, certainty in every degree, every kind of verification of *veritas* already move with that *veritas* in the realm of the prevalent opening. *Alētheia*, unconcealment thought as the opening of presence, is not yet truth.

According to Apel’s interpretation, Heidegger here acknowledges the necessity of a determining standard other than *alētheia* and, in turn, the inadequacy of an interpretation of truth construed merely as *alētheia*. A few lines down, Apel claims, Heidegger is explicitly critical of the position he has held since *Being and Time*. To support his claim, he cites Heidegger: ‘[t]o raise the question of *alētheia* of unconcealment as such, is not the same as raising the question of truth. For this reason, it was inadequate and misleading to call *alētheia* in the sense of opening, truth.’

Lafont, in reference to the same passage from “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” also makes this point in her book *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*. She claims that in this passage, Heidegger concedes that *alētheia* is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of truth as correctness.

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128 Apel, “Regulative Ideas or Truth-Happening?” 72
129 Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” 69, quoted in Apel, “Regulative Ideas or Truth-Happening?” 72
130 Apel, “Regulative Ideas or Truth-Happening?” 72
131 Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” 70, quoted in Apel, “Regulative Ideas or Truth-Happening?” 72
133 Lafont, *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*, 141-143
Lafont too interprets Heidegger as retreating from the account of truth under fire from Tugendhat, going as far as to attribute ‘the motive force behind Heidegger’s retreat’ to Heidegger’s alleged appreciation of Tugendhat’s critique.\textsuperscript{134}

Rather than focusing his attention around Heidegger’s supposed retraction, Dahlstrom returns to \textit{Being and Time}, §44. Contrary to Tugendhat, Apel and Lafont, in his book \textit{Heidegger’s Concept of Truth}, Dahlstrom argues that Heidegger’s interpretation of truth as \textit{alētheia} entails no abandonment of truth as correctness. Furthermore, he defends Heidegger against Apel’s claim (essentially Tugendhat’s too) that a definition of truth as \textit{alētheia} results in the impossibility of critical engagement with others. For Dahlstrom, Heidegger articulates his interpretation of truth as \textit{alētheia} by providing reasons expressed in statements and thus attempts to argue for the \textit{truth} of these \textit{statements}. In this way, Dahlstrom claims that Heidegger bears a commitment to the bivalence of assertions. According to this interpretation, the principle of contradiction, according to which a statement is either true or false, is affirmed by Heidegger.\textsuperscript{135}

For Dahlstrom moreover, Heidegger cannot give up truth as correctness because of the transcendental character of his investigation.\textsuperscript{136} That is, truth as correctness is precisely that for which Heidegger is seeking transcendental grounds. It would make no sense to offer grounding for something one intends to abandon. The truth of assertion presupposes, as its condition of possibility, the most original phenomenon of truth, as \textit{alētheia}. Yet, Dahlstrom explains, Heidegger’s arrival at, and articulation of, truth in the sense of \textit{alētheia} presupposes truth in the sense of correctness of statements.\textsuperscript{137} For Dahlstrom, these two senses of truth are “equiprimordial” insofar as they presuppose one another.\textsuperscript{138} From the perspective of Heidegger’s commitment to the equiprimordiality of the truth of statements and truth as \textit{alētheia}, Tugendhat’s claim, that Heidegger sacrifices truth as correctness with his definition of truth as \textit{alētheia} appears unfounded.

However, in his paper "Why Tugendhat's Critique of Heidegger's Concept of Truth Remains a Critical Problem," Smith criticises Dahlstrom’s defence of

\textsuperscript{134} Lafont, \textit{Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure}, 115
\textsuperscript{135} Dahlstrom, \textit{Heidegger’s Concept of Truth}, (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 404-407
\textsuperscript{136} Dahlstrom, \textit{Heidegger’s Concept of Truth}, 419-423
\textsuperscript{137} Dahlstrom, \textit{Heidegger’s Concept of Truth}, 451
\textsuperscript{138} ibid.
Heidegger (primarily, Dahlstrom’s defence against the charge that Heidegger’s account of truth as *alētheia* renders the concept of truth as correctness redundant). For Smith, Dahlstrom’s defence is an inadequate response to Tugendhat’s critique, and commonplace amongst defenders of Heidegger.\(^{139}\) Smith draws upon Lafont’s formulation of the “standard response” made by Heideggerian scholars against Tugendhat. Smith and Lafont claim that this common Heideggerian response has two parts.

First, they suggest that according to Heideggerians, Tugendhat’s commitment to an understanding of truth conceived strictly in terms of correctness is dogmatic.\(^ {140}\) In contrast to this dogmatism, Heidegger’s interpretation of truth as *alētheia* is not meant to replace truth as correctness; rather, there are two distinct senses of truth at play in Heidegger’s account of truth.\(^ {141}\)

The second part of the common response to Tugendhat is to point out that the more primordial phenomenon of truth, truth as *alētheia*, is the basis that in the first place makes truth as correctness possible.\(^ {142}\) However, both Lafont and Smith suggest that this response does not sufficiently answer Tugendhat’s criticism. Merely pointing out that Heidegger retains the concept of truth as correctness while grounding it in a more primordial sense of truth does not address the central aspect of Tugendhat’s objections.\(^ {143}\) Smith claims that a response such as Dahlstrom’s fails to address Tugendhat’s central objection; namely, Heidegger’s definition of truth as *alētheia* does not maintain the critical dimension specific to our usual understanding of truth as truth in opposition to falsity.\(^ {144}\) As we already noted, from Tugendhat’s perspective, an adequate account of truth must provide a criterion in terms of which we can distinguish truth from falsity. Inasmuch as Heidegger’s definition fails to provide this criterion, Smith stresses what he considers to be Tugendhat’s crucial

\(^{141}\) ibid.
\(^{143}\) ibid.
\(^{144}\) Smith, “Why Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger’s Concept of Truth Remains a Critical Problem,” 169
question: ‘with what right and what meaning Heidegger chooses the word ‘truth’’ to characterise \textit{alētheia}?\textsuperscript{145}

Dahlstrom is aware of the question Tugendhat raises and to which Lafont and Smith appeal. Indeed, Dahlstrom notes that by Tugendhat’s account, the idea that \textit{alētheia} is a ‘type of truth’ does not necessarily follow from the fact that \textit{alētheia} is the condition of possibility of true assertion.\textsuperscript{146} As Dahlstrom explains, there must be ‘something further’ that warrants Heidegger’s determination of \textit{alētheia} ‘as the original truth.’\textsuperscript{147}

First, Dahlstrom claims that Heidegger is justified in speaking of \textit{alētheia} ‘as a ‘truth’ because…[Dasein] discloses itself and, indeed, as it is in itself.’\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Alētheia} is that which makes possible any standard for showing in terms of which we might speak of something manifesting or of a statement showing things as they are in their uncoveredness. Dahlstrom explains, ‘[a]s its original and authentic horizon, being-here’s future is disclosed to it or, better, being-here discloses its future to itself with existential certainty (\textit{Gewißheit}) that conscience (\textit{Gewissen}) alone can convey.’\textsuperscript{149} Second, Heidegger’s designation of this truth as the ‘most original’ is legitimate, Dahlstrom claims, since as ‘the horizon for every other “truth,”’ it is ‘presupposed by (posited with) every other truth.’\textsuperscript{150} That is, by Dahlstrom’s account, the horizon is the most original truth insofar as it makes possible and co-constitutes the discovering of entities and the possibility of making true assertions about them.

However, I suggest that this explanation is problematic insofar as Dahlstrom is appealing to Heidegger’s notion of \textit{authentic} disclosure in order to justify Heidegger’s determination of truth as \textit{alētheia}. This is important to note insofar as the condition of possibility of our discovering things and making statements about them is not, by Heidegger’s account, the “authentic disclosure of existence” or as Dahlstrom elsewhere refers to it, the “truth of existence,” but rather it is \textit{alētheia} as such.

Moreover, Dahlstrom argues, truth as \textit{alētheia} is \textit{necessary} inasmuch as \textit{alētheia} is presupposed as the condition of possibility for making or questioning

\textsuperscript{145} Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 80
\textsuperscript{146} Dahlstrom, \textit{Heidegger’s Concept of Truth}, 395
\textsuperscript{147} Dahlstrom, \textit{Heidegger’s Concept of Truth}, 399
\textsuperscript{148} Dahlstrom, \textit{Heidegger’s Concept of Truth}, 402
\textsuperscript{149} ibid.
\textsuperscript{150} ibid.
claims. Asking whether alētheia is true or false is meaningless, according to Dahlstrom’s interpretation, since any rejection of alētheia takes its stand on the basis of alētheia and is therefore self-contradictory. In other words, Dahlstrom argues for the immunity of alētheia from rational doubt on the grounds that the idea of alētheia being false is itself dependent on truth as alētheia. Although we cannot meaningfully question the horizon with respect to its truth or falsity, it does not necessarily follow, according to Dahlstrom, that the question of truth cannot be raised with regard to statements. It is significant to note that it seems as though Dahlstrom does not address the problematic notion of the “truth of the horizon” that I touched upon above in my exposition of Tugendhat’s critique and to which we will return in the following chapter. As noted, Dahlstrom claims, Heidegger adheres to the principle of bivalence in his articulation of his interpretation of truth as alētheia. Therefore, Dahlstrom argues, Heidegger maintains the possibility of critique at the level of assertion. Thus Heidegger’s position is not closed off to the possibility of critical engagement with particular interpretations of particular states of affairs.

If we recall Dahlstrom’s earlier point with respect to the equiprimordiality of truth as correctness and truth as alētheia, the fact that Heidegger justifies speaking of truth as alētheia by appealing to its primordial character is problematic. By Dahlstrom’s interpretation, alētheia is not open to question with respect to being true or false precisely because it is the condition that first grants the possibility of correctness. Nonetheless, inasmuch as alētheia and correctness presuppose each other and are in this sense equiprimordial, Dahlstrom claims that Heidegger gives us no means for distinguishing the “authentic truth of existence” from other derivative truths, and from this perspective, he argues, Heidegger is left open to Tugendhat’s critique regarding the impossibility of critical engagement with one’s own understanding. However, as noted above, it is important to point out that this is a problematic reading of Heidegger insofar as the “authentic truth of existence” is not the alētheia that Heidegger designates as the “most original phenomenon of truth” and on which all particular truths are grounded.

Smith in turn, responds to Dahlstrom’s attempt to justify Heidegger’s notion of truth as alētheia (disclosedness) by showing ‘that disclosedness can be understood as

151 Dahlstrom, Heidegger’s Concept of Truth, 420
152 Dahlstrom, Heidegger’s Concept of Truth, 419-423
153 Dahlstrom, Heidegger’s Concept of Truth, 451-454
the “original truth,” a sense of truth distinct from and presupposed by’ correctness.\textsuperscript{154} Smith thinks that Dahlstrom fails in this attempt. As Smith writes, ‘Dahlstrom never describes how disclosedness itself can be understood and justified as truth in a sense distinct from correctness.’\textsuperscript{155} Smith argues that Dahlstrom merely appropriates the criterion for truth as correctness, that is, the uncovering and showing of something just as it is itself, and applies it to Heidegger’s notion of \textit{alētheia}. From Smith’s perspective, such a response to Tugendhat is inadequate, because:

…if Dahlstrom intends to call disclosedness the ‘original truth’ based on the criteria specified by correctness, then he undercuts his own reply to Tugendhat…we have not really been supplied with some new sense of truth after all: rather, what we encounter is a curious extension of the norms of \textit{propositional} truth into the very phenomenon that was supposed to ground it.\textsuperscript{156}

That is, despite Dahlstrom thinking otherwise, he is really only speaking of one sense of truth but attributing it to both correctness and \textit{alētheia}. It is significant to note that Tugendhat, in a way, also makes this move, that is, and as I will further explicate in the next chapter, he subsumes \textit{alētheia} under correctness. As already mentioned, Tugendhat claims that Heidegger’s definition of truth as \textit{alētheia} leaves us with no means for distinguishing true from false statements. An adequate response, from Smith’s perspective, must therefore account for the manner in which Heidegger’s notion of truth as \textit{alētheia} provides a criterion for distinguishing truth from falsity.

Having shown Smith’s dissatisfaction with Dahlstrom’s defence of Heidegger, I will now turn to the Heideggerian defence Smith himself offers. In response to the problem Tugendhat raises with respect to Heidegger’s determination of truth as \textit{alētheia} as an unjustified deformation of the meaning of truth, Smith claims to show the manner in which Heidegger maintains the specifically critical dimension of truth with his notion of truth as \textit{alētheia}. According to Smith, Heidegger does \textit{not} deform the concept of truth. Additionally, Smith contends that even from the notion of truth as \textit{alētheia} we are still able to draw out a specific sense of truth as distinct from falsity. Smith wants to show that Heidegger’s determination of truth as \textit{alētheia} (that is, disclosedness) maintains the critical dimension, specific to the phenomenon of truth; that is, Heidegger’s definition of truth provides a criterion in terms of which

\textsuperscript{154} Smith, “Why Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger’s Concept of Truth Remains a Critical Problem,” 171
\textsuperscript{155} ibid.
\textsuperscript{156} Smith, “Why Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger’s Concept of Truth Remains a Critical Problem,” 170
we can distinguish “true disclosedness” from “false disclosedness.” Although not explicitly articulated by Heidegger, Smith believes such a criterion can be found in Heidegger’s concept of resoluteness. In Smith’s words:

It is only as resolute that Dasein can make the modes of authenticity and inauthenticity normative for itself in a critical sense. That is, it is only through resoluteness that Dasein binds itself to authenticity, and through this self-transparency about breakdown, resolves to work out the inconsistencies in its skills and standards in light of the things themselves...resoluteness is not only, as Heidegger calls it, the “primordial truth of existence”: it is the normative fulcrum of truth as disclosedness as well.

In other words, Smith argues that Heidegger’s notion of resoluteness accounts for the criterion in terms of which we can distinguish correct (authentic) from incorrect (inauthentic) alētheia. Therefore, he claims, Heidegger is justified in speaking of alētheia as a sense of truth distinct from and presupposed by truth as correctness only to the extent that Dasein is understood as resolute. However, this way of responding to Tugendhat’s critique is problematic from a Heideggerian perspective inasmuch as it entails the subordination of alētheia to correctness, which is ironically the very point Smith makes with regard to the inadequacy of Dahlstrom’s account of the meaning of alētheia as the most original phenomenon of truth.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have explained Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of truth as presented in “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth.” In order to suggest a possible response to Tugendhat’s objections, it was first necessary to be clear about what those objections entailed.

Firstly, I elucidated Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s conception of truth as alētheia. Having clarified Tugendhat’s account, I turned my attention to some of the ways Tugendhat’s objections against Heidegger’s account of truth have been taken up and dealt with in the secondary literature. In particular, I focused on the accounts put forth by Apel, Lafont, Dahlstrom, and Smith. These accounts have extended and complicated my discussion. Firstly, they have shown several ways in which one can

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158 Smith, “Why Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger’s Concept of Truth Remains a Critical Problem,” 176
159 ibid.
160 Smith, “Why Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger’s Concept of Truth Remains a Critical Problem,” 176-177
respond to Tugendhat and the limitations of such responses. I suggest that, in part at least, some of the objections made to Heidegger from Tugendhat and his followers, as well as certain aspects of those intervening in the debate to defend Heidegger, are in fact based on a misreading of Heidegger’s account of truth. Moreover, as I stressed in chapter one, they do not always account for the broader philosophical framework or phenomenological-hermeneutic approach employed by Heidegger.

Nevertheless, it was necessary to consider this literature to bring to the fore the main points of contention between Heidegger and Tugendhat, thus allowing me the possibility to address what I consider to be the main points of contention, namely, (1) whether by defining truth as *alētheia*, Heidegger discards the agreement relation of statement with thing, (2) the connection of certainty and evidence with truth, thereby abandoning the usual concept of truth as correctness, and (3) forgoing the possibility of engaging in critical questioning.

I now turn to this task in the third and final chapter, in which I propose a possible response to Tugendhat’s critique and an inquiry into the presuppositions of Tugendhat’s criticisms. This allows me to make clear my general claim that Tugendhat relies on certain presuppositions in his critique of Heidegger that Heidegger would not accept.
A Possible Heideggerian Response

In the previous chapter, I outlined Tugendhat’s criticisms and examined different ways the criticisms have been taken up and dealt in a selection of the secondary literature to. I focused on the particular interpretations put forth by Apel and Lafont in support of Tugendhat’s critique and those put forth by Dahlstrom and Smith in defence of Heidegger. Now, after laying out the details of these commentaries, in this third and final chapter, I will attempt to show that the responses put forth by Dahlstrom and Smith are inadequate. Despite attempting to defend Heidegger, I argue that they do not do so on Heidegger’s own terms. I will draw upon a number of Heidegger’s works to show why this is the case, and sketch a more likely Heideggerian response to Tugendhat’s criticisms.

I devote the final section of this chapter to a consideration of the different, and incompatible, methodological starting points taken up by Heidegger and Tugendhat. I show that Tugendhat’s critique is derived from his commitment to the very presuppositions that Heidegger is trying to call into question through his inquiry into the meaning of truth. From this vantage point we can also make sense of Heidegger’s supposed retractions regarding his early concept of truth. Contrary to the view of both Apel and Lafont, I suggest that this supposed retraction could be read differently. That is, Heidegger’s remarks regarding his earlier account is not to be taken as a disavowal but as a recognition of the difficulty of the challenge that Heidegger sets before his readers to rethink the concept of truth.

§5 A Heideggerian Response to Tugendhat’s Critique

As noted above and as hinted at in the previous chapter, I suggest that both Smith and Dahlstrom defend Heidegger on terms that Heidegger himself would not accept. In the following section I show why this is the case and sketch a way we can respond to Tugendhat’s criticisms without compromising Heidegger’s project. First, I will outline some of the problems with Smith’s and Dahlstrom’s defences of Heidegger.
§5.1 On the Meaning of Truth as Alētheia

For Smith, Heidegger is justified in speaking of truth as alētheia only insofar as alētheia is understood in terms of the authentic disclosure to which resolute Dasein binds itself. However, Smith’s interpretation of resoluteness as the criterion in terms of which we can distinguish correct (authentic) from incorrect (inauthentic) alētheia rests on the unquestioned assumption that we can subject alētheia to critical evaluation in terms of correctness and incorrectness. As already noted, Smith’s response to Tugendhat ultimately rests on the subordination of truth as alētheia to truth as correctness. Such a response does not do justice to Heidegger’s standpoint, since for Heidegger an understanding of truth strictly in terms of correctness overlooks the original essence of truth.161 As Heidegger writes in Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), “correctness” is a “species” of truth which falls short of the originary essence, since it is a consequence of that essence and therefore already is not enough for grasping the original truth.162 In other words, and as we saw in chapter one, truth as correctness is grounded in the most original phenomenon of truth, where the essence of truth is understood not as adaequatio but rather as alētheia. Thus Smith’s defence actually abandons the very distinction Heidegger’s account upholds between particular truths (something being-true, knowledge or a statement) and the essence of truth.

§5.11 The Essence of Truth as Truth in the Most Original Sense

We can see further problems with both Smith’s and Dahlstrom’s accounts by considering Heidegger’s comments on the relationship between truth and essence. What Heidegger means by “originary essence” can be clarified in light of the distinction he makes in “The Origin of the Work of Art” between the inessential sense of essence on the one hand, and the essential sense on the other. According to the ordinary concept of essence, Heidegger claims, essence is understood in the sense of ‘generic and universal concepts which represent the one that holds indifferently for the many.’163 This in-different essence is, in Heidegger’s view, the inessential essence. By contrast, the originary essential essence lies ‘in that which a being, in truth, is. The true essence of something is determined by its true being, by the truth

161 Apart from the consequences for his account of truth, it is questionable whether Heidegger’s notion of resoluteness can be interpreted in this way. Unfortunately I do not have the space to explore this issue in this dissertation.
162 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 259
of each being.'\textsuperscript{164} Here Heidegger notes, ‘[a] curious entanglement reveals itself.’\textsuperscript{165} That is, the question of the essence of truth leads back to the question of the truth of essence.

In his paper, “On the Essence of Truth,” Heidegger addresses the essential belonging together of truth and essence. He claims to demonstrate that the question of the essence of truth leads back to the question of the truth of essence.\textsuperscript{166} Here too Heidegger distinguishes between the essence of truth in the sense of the usual concept of essence from the essence of truth in the most original, essential sense.\textsuperscript{167} Yet, he offers further details concerning this entanglement. He claims that ‘[t]he question of the essence of truth finds its answer in the proposition \textit{the essence of truth is the truth of essence.’}\textsuperscript{168} He clarifies the meaning of “essence” in the first part of his claim, which speaks of the \textit{essence of truth}, where essence should be understood ‘in the sense of whatness (\textit{quidditas}) or material content (\textit{realitas}).’\textsuperscript{169} Put differently, the essence of truth in this case ‘is understood as a characteristic of knowledge.’\textsuperscript{170} In other words, truth in this sense is particular, related to the propositional character of truth of statements that correspond with the “whatness” of a thing. That is, truth is here understood in the sense of being-true.

With respect to the second part of his claim regarding the \textit{truth of essence}, Heidegger explains that in this formulation, essence is understood as Being, and ‘[t]ruth signifies sheltering that clears \textit{lichtendes Bergen} as the fundamental trait of Being.’\textsuperscript{171} To put it differently, here he speaks of the “beingness” of truth, what makes truth to be truth. So, in the first formulation we have the \textit{essence of truth}, which is the being-true of particular statements, established by agreement of statements with the “whatness” of things. With respect to the \textit{truth of essence}, which the question of the essence of truth leads back to, truth is conceived of as what in Heidegger’s discussion in \textit{Being and Time} is the opening, the clearing, that is, the

\textsuperscript{164} Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 28
\textsuperscript{165} ibid.
\textsuperscript{166} Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," 153
\textsuperscript{167} Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," 153-154
\textsuperscript{168} Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," 153
\textsuperscript{169} ibid.
\textsuperscript{170} ibid.
disclosedness, which Dasein as being-in-the-world is. ‘The name of this clearing [Lichtung],’ he explains, ‘is ἀλήθεια.’

Thus with respect to the notion that the essence of truth is the truth of essence, Heidegger writes, ‘[s]heltering that clears is – i.e., lets essentially unfold – accordance between knowledge and beings.’ It is important to note that Heidegger is not equating alêtheia and agreement, rather the “is” used above is explained further as an “is,” which is not static but ‘lets [meaningful things] essentially unfold,’ that is, it is related to what Heidegger also calls the historical horizon that allows beings to unfold and show themselves. Put differently, the essence of truth is the clearing, the “there,” which is grounded in our being-in-the-world and which first grants the possibility of things showing up as meaningful, and thus allowing us to make particular statements about them.

In short, speaking of truth as alêtheia does not entail sacrificing truth in the sense of correctness but shows that correctness rests on something else than mere agreement between a statement and a state of affairs. For Heidegger, truth as alêtheia refers to the essence of truth and reveals to us something about the truth of essence. The Being of truth lets particular truths be what they are, corresponding to the “whatness” of things. For Heidegger, the essence of truth is not an indifferent criterion to which all particular truths adhere. That is, essence is not meant as an essential feature or abstract generality; rather, essence comes to the fore as an unceasing struggle of presencing with absencing, in which ‘historical human beings’ and their understanding unfolds.

Heidegger’s account of truth as alêtheia as the essence of truth is not captured in Smith’s defence of Heidegger. For in his attempt to account for Heidegger’s determination of truth as alêtheia, Smith construes alêtheia as a particular truth, that

172 Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," 154
173 ibid.
174 ibid. In Heidegger’s words: ‘Self-hiding belongs to the predilection (Vor-liebe) of [B]eing; i.e., it belongs to that wherein [B]eing has secured its essence. And the essence of [B]eing is to unconceal itself, to emerge, to come out into the unhidden – φύσις [phusis]. Only what in its very essence unconceals and must unconceal itself, can love to conceal itself...Unhiddenness is called ἀ-λήθεια [alêtheia]. Truth, as we translate this word, is of the origin, i.e., it is essentially not a characteristic of human knowing and asserting, and still less a mere value or an “idea” that human beings (although they really do not know why) are supposed to strive to realize. Rather, truth as self-revealing belongs to [B]eing itself. Φύσις is ἀλήθεια, unconcealing, and therefore χρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ [kruptesthai philei: loves to hide].’ (“On the Essence and Concept of Φύσις in Aristotle’s Physics B, I” In Pathmarks, 229-230).
is, as something that is true (as authentic) rather than the essence of truth. However, as I have just discussed, *αληθεία* as the essence of truth cannot itself be a particular truth. From Heidegger’s perspective, such an understanding of *αληθεία* as a particular truth ignores *αληθεία* as the essence of truth, that is, the clearing that first grants the possibility of agreement of statement with thing characteristic of correctness.

Similarly, Dahlstrom also comes dangerously close to using a conception of truth as certainty in order to assess truth as *αληθεία* as certainty. Dahlstrom does not think *αληθεία* can be subject to critical evaluation. In this respect, his position differs from Smith’s. For as I showed in chapter two, Dahlstrom argues that we cannot meaningfully question whether *αληθεία* is true or false insofar as *αληθεία* is presupposed in the very act of posing questions. However, upon closer inspection, we see that Dahlstrom also construes *αληθεία* as a particular truth, as something that is true. Dahlstrom defends the legitimacy of truth as *αληθεία* on the grounds that any inquiry into the “truth of *αληθεία*” is self-contradictory, since entertaining the possibility of *αληθεία* being fails to take into consideration the very ground upon which such a question would be based. In other words, Dahlstrom argues, *αληθεία* is indubitable, that is, immune from rational doubt. Dahlstrom is here arguing that Heidegger is justified in speaking of truth as *αληθεία*, that is, by providing reasons for why *αληθεία* is certain. However, taking *αληθεία* to be true because doubting its truth entails self-contradiction, risks reducing truth as *αληθεία* to something that can be expressed in propositional form. That is, as a particular truth. Thus, like Smith he makes a defence of truth as *αληθεία* that risks collapsing the distinction at the heart of Heidegger’s account of truth. Heidegger would agree that it does not make sense to question the “truth of the horizon” but not because it entails a self-contradiction.

To reiterate, Smith and Dahlstrom construe truth in the sense of *αληθεία* as a particular truth, as something that is true. In his attempt to justify Heidegger’s determination of truth as *αληθεία*, Smith thinks truth merely in the sense of correctness. Dahlstrom’s account of why Heidegger is justified in speaking of truth as *αληθεία* is misguided insofar as it could be suggested that he assesses *αληθεία* in terms of truth as certainty by appealing to non-contradiction. Both render *αληθεία* as a particular truth and not the ground and essence of any and every particular truth.

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175 Dahlstrom, *Heidegger’s Concept of Truth*, 420
Hence, I suggest, these defences of Heidegger are not in accord with Heidegger’s reasons for exploring the concept of truth in the first place.

§5.2 On the Problem of Critical Questioning

By analysing Smith’s and Dahlstrom’s defences of Heidegger, we come to see that Tugendhat’s question regarding the manner in which, if at all, we can inquire into the “truth of alētheia,” is misguided (and misleading). In other words, Dahlstrom and Smith accept Tugendhat’s challenge and attempt to show (in Smith’s case) that the truth of the horizon of meaning can be true and (in Dahlstrom’s case) that alētheia is itself true. As noted in chapter two, Tugendhat understands Heidegger’s account of truth as alētheia in terms of alētheia being-true. In other words, only particular truths can be affirmed or denied. It is on the basis of such a presupposition that Tugendhat raises the question as to whether and how we can inquire into the “truth of alētheia.” As we also saw in chapter two, the claim that alētheia is immune from critique is the basis for Tugendhat’s criticism of Heidegger; namely, that Heidegger’s determination of truth as alētheia lets go of the possibility of critical engagement altogether. For Tugendhat, as it was also shown in chapter two, it is only by positing truth as a regulative idea that we maintain the possibility of critical questioning.

Smith and Dahlstrom accept Tugendhat’s assertion that the possibility of critical questioning in Heidegger depends upon whether or not alētheia can be true or false. For Dahlstrom, the fact that the notion of alētheia cannot be questioned means that Heidegger fails, at the level of alētheia, to provide a means for critical engagement with our own understanding. Smith, on the other hand, argues that the critical function of truth remains at play in Heidegger’s interpretation of truth as alētheia on the basis of the supposition that we can legitimately subject alētheia to critical evaluation in terms of correctness and incorrectness via the concept of resoluteness.

§5.21 Heidegger’s Critical Standpoint: Hermeneutics and Phenomenology

However, as Jeff Malpas points out in his paper “The Twofold Character of Truth: Heidegger, Davidson, Tugendhat,” it does not follow from the fact that Heidegger’s account excludes the evaluation of alētheia in terms of correctness and incorrectness that Heidegger’s position excludes the possibility of critical
questioning altogether. As discussed in chapter one, Heidegger approaches philosophical problems in a specifically hermeneutic (interpretive) fashion. Malpas also emphasises the hermeneutic character of Heidegger’s thought. As Malpas underlines, hermeneutic inquiry is interpretive. It does not rest content with what immediately and initially shows, but looks beyond and asks after the broader horizon in terms of which things manifest as they do. We saw Heidegger’s hermeneutic questioning at play in chapter one when I considered his inquiry into the possibility of truth as correctness, highlighting its origin as alētheia. Thus it is important to keep in mind that Heidegger’s account of truth is framed by his hermeneutic approach.

As Malpas observes, ‘[t]he idea of truth as unconcealment is not an idea arrived at merely by some sort of unquestioned revelation, but arises out of an original questioning of the possibility of truth as correctness.’ With respect to Heidegger’s hermeneutic questioning, Malpas explains:

…an essential circularity [is] at work here, since it is only through the immediacy of the presentation that the larger framework becomes at all evident (for the most part it remains withdrawn) at the same time as the presentation is itself dependent on that larger framework – a circularity that, in traditional hermeneutics, is understood in terms of the mutual dependence of whole and part.

Hermeneutic inquiry is founded upon this insight into the circularity of understanding. Understanding is never complete, but always partial. It is on the basis of this founding insight into understanding as circular and incomplete that Heidegger’s hermeneutics can be considered to take a critical stance. As Ingo Farin explains in his paper, “Heidegger: Transformation of Hermeneutics”:

Heidegger’s hermeneutical stance is critical. It has nothing to do with the submission to anonymous forces of history, or the blind advocacy of relativism. The task of understanding one’s own current philosophical hermeneutical situation comes with the critical insight that one cannot transcend one’s historical situation.

Since we can only understand the particular in terms of the whole and the whole in terms of the particular, we must be content with oscillating back and forth between

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177 Malpas, “The Twofold Character of Truth: Heidegger, Davidson, Tugendhat,” 250

178 Malpas, “The Twofold Character of Truth: Heidegger, Davidson, Tugendhat,” 263

179 Malpas, “The Twofold Character of Truth: Heidegger, Davidson, Tugendhat,” 250

part and whole. As Heidegger writes in “On the Essence of Truth,” ‘[p]hilosophical thinking is gentle releasement that does not renounce the concealment of beings as a whole [Being].’\(^{181}\) In other words, our understanding is always partial, framed by \(a\ell\varepsilon\theta\varepsilon\iota\alpha\), by the historical horizon.

In contrast to Tugendhat’s claim and those who endorse his position, Heidegger’s philosophy is fundamentally critically engaged. For a start, Heidegger invites critical engagement with his own position from the very beginning of \emph{Being and Time}. In the section on method (§7) Heidegger explains he will let the phenomenon under investigation be seen by others through apophantic speech. For Heidegger, apophantic speech entails the possibility of either discovering things or covering them up precisely because logos as \emph{apophansis} is a mode of making manifest by indicating, that is, the statement indicates that which it points out, letting it be seen apart from itself (\emph{diairesis}) together with something else (\emph{synthesis}).\(^{182}\) That is, this particular mode of making manifest, logos as \emph{apophansis}, also brings with it, according to Heidegger, the possibility of covering over what shows inasmuch as it is a manner of showing something \emph{apart} from itself and \emph{together} with something else, that is, the statement makes something manifest \emph{as} something. By this account, a statement that shows something \emph{just as} it shows itself is true, whereas a false statement shows something \emph{as} something other than what the thing shows itself as. In this way Heidegger explicitly acknowledges his interpretation could be either true or false and is therefore open to critique and invites others to critically engage with his ideas.

Likewise, Heidegger’s understanding of the phenomenological standpoint is also essentially critical. Practicing phenomenology means remaining ‘self-critical in a positive sense,’\(^{183}\) that is, open to rethinking even the most clear and distinct concepts. For only as autochthonous can concepts be phenomenological. In other words, as we saw in chapter one, phenomenological concepts are meaningful only in terms of the unique historical context in which they arise. If a phenomenological concept loses its autochthony and becomes a free-floating thesis, severed from the original historical context, then it is no longer phenomenological but rather has become theoretical, stagnant and “common” in accord with the predominance of the

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\(^{181}\) Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," 152

\(^{182}\) Heidegger, \emph{Being and Time}, 149 [159]

\(^{183}\) Heidegger, \emph{Being and Time}, 34 [36]
theoretical standpoint that Heidegger bemoans. In this way, a concept that was possible to account for in regard to actual situations becomes taken as some kind of unchanging concept. Consequently, a kind of critical engagement is written into the very way Heidegger thinks philosophical investigation should unfold.

Thus, contrary to Tugendhat, I argue that Heidegger does maintain the possibility of critical engagement with his own thinking and that of others. I suggest this for a number of reasons. Firstly because, as already noted, for Heidegger, correctness still functions at the level of assertion. Secondly, and in addition to what I have just noted above, we can engage with Heidegger’s account critically, but not by merely subjecting statements to scrutiny with respect to the formal rules of logic. Rather, Heidegger demands of us that we follow the movement of showing and see for ourselves whether Heidegger brings to light the phenomenon he considers in his particular practice of phenomenological-hermeneutics.

From Heidegger’s perspective, the truth of the statements offered in his own philosophical works, like any statements, cannot be grasped in isolation from their context, or from the movement of showing peculiar to these works. This is how Heidegger thinks we ought to engage with each other’s interpretations. Additionally, as I pointed out in chapter one, the phenomenological-hermeneutic method involves an interrogation of the concepts in terms of which we understand ourselves and our surrounding world, which in turn, requires a consistently self-critical attitude.

As part of this general philosophical project, we can also critically engage with our own understanding by directing ourselves toward the concepts we have been handed down by tradition. These concepts are so familiar and self-evident that their meaning often goes unnoticed, while, at the same time failing to speak to our unique historical situation.

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Finally, Heidegger’s account of *āletheia* as the essence of truth cannot be collapsed back into the concept of truth as correctness. Such a collapse is entirely at odds with the fundamental finding of Heidegger’s exploration of truth. From the account of *āletheia* as the essence of truth and Heidegger’s understanding of the relationship between “method” and phenomena, we can formulate a response to Tugendhat’s critique that differs from those offered by Smith and Dahlstrom.

§6 Tugendhat and Heidegger on Certainty, Method, and the Things Themselves

Both the account of *āletheia* as the essence of truth and phenomenological-hermeneutics as a critical approach not only show that Tugendhat’s criticisms are problematic but also that the problems Tugendhat formulates bear a commitment to presuppositions that Heidegger explicitly opposes, and, in fact, is trying to call into question through his investigation into the meaning of truth. If Heidegger’s approach is critical in the sense outlined above, then we can assume that Tugendhat understands something different by “critical engagement” when he claims that Heidegger’s account of truth makes such critical engagement impossible. As we saw in chapter two, Tugendhat argues that Heidegger gives up the notion of truth as certainty that in Tugendhat’s view must remain as a regulative idea.186 It is this notion of truth as a regulative idea that for Tugendhat guides the process of critical questioning. Heidegger gives up this regulative idea, according to Tugendhat, by equating truth and *āletheia*. However, as I have shown, Heidegger does not abandon the notion of truth as certainty but rather attempts to ground it in the essence of truth as *āletheia*.

Moreover, Heidegger is critical of accounts of truth such as Tugendhat’s that bind truth to the confines of certainty. According to Heidegger, the ‘precedence of certainty over truth leads to conceiving truth itself as certainty. Here the precedence of procedure (method) over content is at stake.’187 That is to say, Heidegger would suggest that Tugendhat’s understanding of truth as a regulative idea reduces truth to a methodological procedure that can be applied in all manner of investigations. This is untenable from a Heideggerian perspective. In Heidegger’s view, and as we saw

186 Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 90
in chapter one, we must first have an understanding of what it is we are investigating before we can say with confidence what method is most appropriate to this investigation. Heidegger’s conception of method entails an acknowledgement of the historical situatedness of our inquiries. To give method precedence over content means to decide what shows \textit{a priori}. Tugendhat’s understanding of truth is such a way of limiting what can show up in philosophical investigation because it demands in advance a criterion in terms of which all phenomena must be examined.

I suggest that from Tugendhat’s perspective, the notion that his commitment to a concept of truth – limited to certainty – leads to a precedence of method over content would not be problematic. It is precisely his aim to uphold it. As we saw in chapter two, Tugendhat thinks that Heidegger is correct to emphasise that our access to things themselves is mediated by a historical meaning horizon. However, as was also shown in chapter two, Tugendhat believes that Heidegger does not properly incorporate this insight into his account of truth because, by his account, Heidegger’s interpretation of truth as \textit{alētheia} assumes immediate and direct access to things themselves.

Tugendhat would claim that without some method for properly assessing different claims, the method derived solely from our historical situatedness leads to relativism. In Tugendhat’s view, the method cannot be made to adapt to different kinds of “historical content” precisely because he believes we do not have access to things themselves. Only a correct method – in this instance a proper understanding of truth – allows for the distinction between truth and falsity and thus overcomes, to some limited extent, the fact that we always interpret phenomena within a historical meaning horizon.

However, as we have already seen with respect to Heidegger’s phenomenological-hermeneutic approach, Heidegger does not rest content with what initially shows. Nor does he claim to have a kind of exhaustive insight into what

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188 Tugendhat also makes this point in \textit{Traditional and Analytic Philosophy: Lectures on the Philosophy of Language}. Tugendhat is critical of what he takes to phenomenology’s appropriation of the Greek notion of \textit{noein} as “intellectual intuition.” For Tugendhat, we engage in no such “simple seeing,” rather our perception/understanding is always mediated by a linguistic horizon. It is in this vein that he speaks of language-analysis as clarifying what has already been understood; that is, he writes, ‘here it is a question of making clear what is unclearly sensed; and for this I have no intuition at my disposal - only linguistic usage.’ Heidegger also speaks of explicating what has already been understood, yet what constitutes and characterises this pre-understanding according to Heidegger is at odds with the manner Tugendhat conceives of it. See: Tugendhat, \textit{Traditional and Analytical Philosophy: Lectures on the Philosophy of Language}, 71
things “really” are. In this light, an interpretation of truth as *alētheia* does not entail an immediate access to some notion of the “true meaning” of things. What initially shows, that is, our everyday and average understanding, is not the point at which Heidegger is happy to end his philosophical investigation. It is precisely our common and unquestioned understanding of things that, in Heidegger’s view, require phenomenological-hermeneutic questioning and analysis. Heidegger wants to bring into view and make explicit the presupposed grounds in terms of which our concepts are meaningful. Tugendhat interpretation of the notion of truth as *alētheia*, implying a direct access to things themselves, that is, things as they “actually” or “really” are, attributes to Heidegger a philosophical contentment with what constitutes our everyday understanding. On the contrary, as I have suggested, this is precisely where Heidegger believes phenomenological-hermeneutic analysis must commence.

Tugendhat’s preference for method over content, his contention that one must first start with a particular notion of truth (even as only a regulative idea) that can be universally applied, is grounded upon a presupposed separation of what shows (phenomena) from things themselves. For Tugendhat what shows are not things as they “really” are, that is, the things themselves; rather, what shows are mere outward appearances, *emanating* from the thing themselves. The things themselves remain forever veiled. The question arises as to how we can account for these “mere appearances.”

By contrast and as I already explained in chapter one, Heidegger contends that there is a necessary distinction between phenomena and appearance and that phenomena must be aligned with things themselves. As noted above, it is the opposite for Tugendhat: he aligns appearance and phenomena, and separates phenomena from things themselves. Heidegger would be fundamentally opposed to these divisions and alignments made by Tugendhat. In Heidegger’s view, a concept of what things “really” are as something separate from what shows is itself a presupposition that originates in a particular historical context. To start out from this concept of things as they show themselves, as somehow separate from things as they “really” are, without first looking back into the origins of this thesis is from Heidegger’s perspective precisely to pass over things as they “really” are. As noted in chapter one, concepts that have become detached from the original context are no longer autochthonous but rather theoretical. In this way, inquiry that takes the
separation of what shows from the things themselves as its point of departure assumes a theoretical standpoint, which Heidegger calls into question.

Any notion of correct method presupposes an understanding of that which it is to provide appropriate access to. For Heidegger, the distinction between what things “really” are and what shows is bound to a methodological approach and assumes a particular theoretical standpoint. In “Alētheia (Heraclitus, Fragment B 16),” he writes:

We are too quick to believe that the mystery of what is to be thought always lies distant and deeply hidden under a hardly penetrable layer of strangeness. On the contrary, it has its essential abode in what is near by, which approaches what is coming into presence and preserves what has drawn near. 189

For Heidegger, the proper (phenomenological) concept of method must be drawn out of what shows and not be presupposed in advance (dictating and limiting what shows). This is what Tugendhat does when he starts out from a notion of phenomena as separate from things themselves and assumes a position according to which truth is understood merely in terms of correctness. In this instance the method determines the object of investigation. Therefore, from a Heideggerian perspective, Tugendhat’s theoretical starting point is precisely that which Heidegger questions through his critical engagement with the traditional concept of truth.

§7 The Task of Thinking

Having shown the problems with Tugendhat’s critique and Dahlstrom’s and Smith’s defences of Heidegger’s concept of truth, I now return to Heidegger’s remarks in “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.” I quote the passage again:

Insofar as truth is understood in the traditional “natural” sense as the correspondence of knowledge with beings demonstrated in beings, but also insofar as truth is interpreted as the certainty of the knowledge of Being, alētheia, unconcealment in the sense of the opening may not be equated with truth. Rather, alētheia, unconcealment thought as opening, first grants the possibility of truth. For truth itself, just as Being and thinking, can only be what it is in the element of the opening. Evidence, certainty in every degree, every kind of verification of veritas already move with that veritas in the realm of the prevalent opening. Alētheia, unconcealment thought as the opening of presence, is not yet truth. 190

As noted in chapter two, both Apel and Lafont claim that Heidegger acknowledges the power of Tugendhat’s critique and in turn retracts the position he has held since

189 Heidegger, “Aletheia (Heraclitus, Fragment B 16),” 121
190 Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” 69
Being and Time, denying that \textit{alētheia} is truth in the most original sense. However, their claim does not do justice to Heidegger. I suggest that Heidegger does not seem to make any such retraction of his earlier account of truth. For he is clear when he specifies that it is truth ‘understood in the traditional “natural” sense’ that is, in the sense of ‘correspondence’ or ‘certainty’ which cannot be understood as \textit{alētheia}.\footnote{ibid.} In other words, Heidegger is not retreating his earlier position with respect to \textit{alētheia} as the essence and ground of the particular truths understood in the sense of agreement and certainty. For as he continues:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Alētheia}, unconcealment thought as the opening of presence, is not yet truth. \textit{Is alētheia} then less than truth? Or is it more because it first grants truth as \textit{adequatio} and \textit{certitudo}, because there can be no presence and presenting outside of the realm of the opening? This question we leave to thinking as a task.\footnote{ibid.}
\end{quote}

The clearing, \textit{alētheia}, as was shown in chapter one and reiterated throughout this dissertation, is not a particular truth; it is not something that is true. Rather, \textit{alētheia} grants the possibility of particular truths taking the form of agreement or certainty; \textit{alētheia} is the clearing that allows the accordance of statements and things to essentially unfold. Thus, when Heidegger claims that truth as \textit{alētheia} cannot be equated with truth understood as agreement or certainty, he is not disavowing his earlier position with respect to the essence of truth, truth as \textit{alētheia}. Instead, he affirms his commitment to question the ground on which our concepts rest.\footnote{To contest the notion that Heidegger retracts his account of truth as \textit{alētheia} (that his later position contradicts his earlier one) is one claim, but to assume a linear narrative of Heidegger’s work is another and much more dubious one at that. We pass over the significance of Heidegger’s journey if we say that \textit{Being and Time} was merely the foundation for his later thought.}\footnote{ibid.} We cannot understand let alone accept Heidegger’s determination of truth as \textit{alētheia} if we remain within the tradition of thinking that accepts the concept of truth merely in terms of correctness.\footnote{For similar points made by Dahlstrom and Malpas, see: Daniel Dahlstrom, “The Clearing and Its Truth: Reflections on Tugendhat's Criticisms and Heidegger's Concessions,” 18-19; Malpas, “The Twofold Character of Truth: Heidegger, Davidson, Tugendhat,” 256.} To rethink this traditional concept of truth, this is the task of thinking Heidegger leaves us with.

\section*{Conclusion}

In this chapter I have argued that Heidegger’s idea of truth as \textit{alētheia} does not entail giving up the possibility of critical inquiry. Furthermore, I have shown that what Tugendhat finds lacking in Heidegger’s interpretation (truth as \textit{adaequatio} and...
as certītūdō) is in fact maintained in Heidegger’s account, albeit grounded in the essence of truth as alētheia. However, my purpose was not merely to suggest that Tugendhat’s critique is somehow misguided or misleading, though I argue that it is. Rather, Tugendhat’s engagement with Heidegger and the response it prompts results in a richer understanding of both Heidegger’s account of truth and his general approach to philosophical problems. This latter aspect is often forgotten in debates about particular topics in Heidegger’s works.\(^\text{195}\)

By bringing Tugendhat’s presuppositions into view, we clarified why Heidegger’s account does not suffer from Tugendhat’s criticisms. We also saw that Tugendhat’s presuppositions are precisely those that Heidegger seeks to unsettle in his critical engagement with the concept of truth. Foremost among these presuppositions are his theoretical starting point, his privileging of method, and his separation of phenomenon from the thing itself.

\(^{195}\) Malpas and Kockelmans are exceptions to this tendency to overlook the significance of the hermeneutic aspect of Heidegger’s philosophy and the role it plays in his analysis of truth. See: Malpas, "The Twofold Character of Truth: Heidegger, Davidson, Tugendhat"; Joseph Kockelmans, On the Truth of Being: Reflections on Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984)
Conclusion

In this dissertation my aim was to show the problems that arise when assessing Heidegger’s concept of truth in isolation from his larger project. Central to this larger project was the attempt to question the tradition of Western metaphysics and the presuppositions that we inherited from this tradition. In Heidegger’s view, the concept of truth as no more than correctness is fundamentally rooted in this tradition.

I argued that Tugendhat and his followers do not take into account Heidegger’s general philosophical project and the way it led him to question the concept of truth as correctness. In the end, they reinstate presuppositions in their account of truth that are precisely what Heidegger is bringing under question. In some respects, these were the very presuppositions Heidegger was trying to call into question through his investigation into the concept of truth. At the same time, I suggested that thinking through Tugendhat’s critique and attempting to formulate an adequate Heideggerian response gives us a richer understanding of both Heidegger’s account of truth and his general philosophical project.

I drew upon Heidegger’s account of truth and method in Being and Time, as well as some of his later works, to show why – from Heidegger’s perspective – the secondary commentary contains some of the same limitations as Tugendhat’s critique. Finally, in light of these limitations, I formulated what I argue is an alternative response to Tugendhat’s criticisms.

I showed that Heidegger’s idea of truth as alētheia does not entail giving up the possibility of critical inquiry. For Heidegger, phenomenological-hermeneutical philosophy is fundamentally critical. Acknowledging alētheia as the ground of truth (as the essence of any and every particular truth) in no way precludes critical questioning. Furthermore, I showed that contrary to Tugendhat’s contention that truth as adaequatio and as certitūdō is abandoned in Heidegger. Heidegger in fact maintains the concept of truth as adaequatio and as certitūdō but grounds this concept of truth in the most original sense of truth as alētheia. In order to clarify what Tugendhat finds problematic with Heidegger’s analysis of the traditional concept of truth, I drew attention to Tugendhat’s commitment to a conception of truth conceived strictly in terms of correctness, a position that Heidegger is trying to
call into question with his account of truth as \textit{alētheia}. However, I also stressed that Tugendhat’s engagement with Heidegger and the response it prompts results in a richer understanding of both Heidegger’s account of truth and his general approach to philosophical problems.

I contend that criticisms of Heidegger’s account of truth are often made without a full appreciation of his broader philosophical approach. That does not mean that those criticisms are without force. It is also quite possible that should a defender of Heidegger raise this broader framework, someone critical of Heidegger’s account of truth might very well also take issue with his broader philosophical approach. Nonetheless, if we want to adequately understand Heidegger’s discussion of truth then we need to be clear about how this issue fits within his larger philosophical project.

However, I have tried to do more here than simply make a Heideggerian response to Tugendhat. By outlining Tugendhat’s presuppositions, namely, his theoretical starting point, his privileging of method, and his separation of phenomena from the things themselves, I suggest that Tugendhat’s criticisms of Heidegger (because they are founded upon these presuppositions) are not the last word in this debate. Tugendhat’s presuppositions are precisely those that Heidegger seeks to unsettle. Heidegger considers these presuppositions to be typical of many philosophical positions.

Nonetheless, it was necessary to think through Tugendhat’s critique since his account of Heidegger, at least to some extent, has set the terms for the debate in the secondary literature. For example, and as I have shown, even certain defenders of Heidegger (in this case Smith and Dahlstrom) make certain concessions to Tugendhat that Heidegger would not accept.

I have framed the discussion so as to draw out of Heidegger certain criticisms of Tugendhat’s position. That is, I have not merely attempted to defend Heidegger’s conception of truth, but have also shown how Tugendhat’s criticisms are themselves vulnerable to Heideggerian objections drawn from both his account of truth and his broader philosophical project.
List of References


