The European Union, the Fight Against Terrorism and its Impact on Democracy Building in Africa

Samuel M. Makinda, Security, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Program, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Faculty of Arts and Education, Murdoch University, Perth, Australia
The European Union, the Fight Against Terrorism and its Impact on Democracy Building in Africa

Abstract
Despite their differing approaches to counterterrorism, virtually all African states endorsed the adoption of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (the Algiers Convention) in July 1999. The Algiers Convention was the first continental legislative instrument to provide a definition of terrorism. Thus, Africa had a common approach to counterterrorism at least two years before the events of 11 September 2001 and the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1373.

The EU has the capacity to pursue counterterrorism effectively while enhancing development and social justice, and building democracy in Africa. This paper examines the nature of the EU’s counterterrorism policies and strategies. It discusses the implementation of these policies with a focus on how their implementation has affected democracy building processes in Africa. It explores attitudes in Africa to global, including EU, counterterrorism strategies, and provides options for the EU in combating terrorism in Africa effectively while at the same time enhancing human rights and building democracy there. On the basis of the analysis, it concludes that many people in Africa believe the best way to tackle terrorism on the continent is to alleviate poverty, eliminate social injustice and assist with building democracy.

Summary of Recommendations
The EU would make a great difference in Africa if it adopted the view that building democracy and enhancing social justice are preconditions for the reduction or elimination of the factors that generate terrorism.

In Africa, the fight against terrorism is primarily a governance issue. The EU should encourage the promotion of good and responsible governance as a way of tackling the root causes of terrorism. Terrorism emerges from, and thrives in, conditions in which democracy, human rights and social justice are perceived to be absent. Bad governance, corruption or a lack of professionalism in the security forces make it easier for foreign-trained terrorists to carry out their activities.
The EU needs to focus on working with governments as well as civil society organizations to strengthen democratic processes. For example, the EU could train young Africans in proper processes of governance so that they can provide leadership at the governmental or civil society level. The EU could also help fund weak, but non-corrupt, civil society organizations so that they can scrutinize and stand up to their governments. Above all, the EU could help African states and societies to nurture an independent media and ensure that corrupt politicians do not pass legislation that muzzles the media.

The EU needs to undertake targeted capacity-building to ensure that the goals of prevention, protection, pursuit and response are replicated in Africa. It needs to help African states train personnel capable of detecting terrorists. It also needs to retrain and sensitize African security personnel to human rights and democratic norms so they can protect their societies, and pursue the terrorists, without undermining democratic principles.

However, in pursuing its goals, the EU needs to be aware of the political and cultural sensitivities of the African people.

1. Introduction

Transnational terrorism, whatever its causes or bases, seeks to intimidate people, societies and governments. It also threatens security and undermines both human rights and democratic processes. While some security analysts have attempted to portray the current wave of terrorism as a struggle between Islam and the West, such a portrait is misleading and counterproductive. Terrorists have threatened all types of societies and states, from the United States, India, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to Spain, the United Kingdom and Kenya. For this reason, all societies and states, irrespective of religious or cultural orientation, have an obligation to take appropriate measures to eliminate the root causes of terrorism and to prevent terrorists from achieving their political goals.

However, it is generally acknowledged that an effective fight against transnational terrorism is beyond the capacity of a single state and, therefore, requires cooperation between various countries and organizations. It is largely for this reason that the European Union’s counterterrorism policies and strategies are predicated on cooperation within the EU as well as cooperation between the EU and other states, the United Nations and regional organizations around the world (Council of the European Union, 2003).

It is also recognized that democracy has become a global entitlement, which must be enjoyed by all societies and states. Governments all over the world, irrespective of their historical conditions, have an obligation to build democracy. It is partly for this reason that Thomas Franck has claimed that human rights and democracy have become ‘a normative rule of the international system’. He has posited that democracy ‘is on the way to becoming a global entitlement, one that increasingly will be promoted and protected by collective international processes’ (Franck 1992).

Therefore, it is expected that all public policies, including defence and security policies, must respect human rights and adhere to democratic norms. Indeed, one leading counterterrorism scholar, Paul Wilkinson, has argued that liberal democracy
is so important that there can be no justification for undermining it in pursuit of counterterrorism (Wilkinson 2006). Wilkinson has postulated that the ‘primary objective of counterterrorist strategy must be the protection and maintenance of liberal democracy and the rule of law’. He has argued that ‘this aim overrides in importance even the objective of eliminating terrorism and political violence’ (Wilkinson 1977).

On the basis of the above understandings, this paper examines the nature of the EU’s counterterrorism policies and strategies. It discusses the implementation of these policies with a focus on how their implementation has affected democracy building processes in Africa. It explores attitudes in Africa to global, including EU, counterterrorism strategies, and provides options for the EU in combating terrorism in Africa effectively while at the same time enhancing human rights and building democracy there.

The main message of this paper is that the EU has the capacity to pursue counterterrorism effectively while enhancing development and social justice and building democracy in Africa.

2. The European Union’s Counterterrorism Policies

What are the policies that guide the EU in the fight against terrorism? To what extent do these policies reinforce or undermine human rights and the principles on which democracy is based? Some EU member states, such as Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK, passed counterterrorism laws and formulated strategies decades ago, but many of these were not conceived in a framework that would enhance human rights and promote democracy (Martin 2006). This paper is concerned with the policies enunciated by the EU that came into effect in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the USA of 11 September 2001. The Administration of US President George W. Bush promoted counterterrorism measures that ignored or undermined human rights, international law and international norms, and the world was curious to see whether the EU would follow the US example or design its own template. As it turned out, the EU template on counterterrorism was grounded in respect for human rights and democratic principles and processes.

While it is plausible to associate the recent EU focus on counterterrorism with the events of 11 September 2001, and the subsequent UN Security Council resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, the EU strategy can also be explained by the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005, and other threats that EU member states have faced or foiled in recent years. All the principal decision-making organs of the EU – the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament and the European Commission – have been involved in shaping EU counterterrorism strategies.

The EU counterterrorism policy documents claim that the EU is committed to combating terrorism locally and globally while respecting human rights and democratic principles. This is a clear refutation of US strategy under George W. Bush, which undermined the Geneva conventions and condoned the torture of suspected terrorists.
to providing the best possible protection for its citizens. While proclaiming its global ambition, the EU strategy is primarily continental. Its main purpose is to ‘make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice’. The main document that guides EU counterterrorism strategy is the ‘Action Plan to Combat Terrorism’, which was adopted by the Council in June 2004.

In December 2005, the EU announced that its efforts in the fight against terrorism would focus on four main goals: prevention, protection, pursuit and response. To differentiate itself from the USA, and in the hope of providing alternative leadership worldwide, the EU proclaimed that it was committed to pursuing these goals ‘in a democratic and accountable way’. The EU counterterrorism strategy, like its security policy, is subject to political oversight.

With regard to prevention, the EU aims to address the root causes of terrorism or tackle the factors that lead to radicalization and recruitment not only in Europe, but also globally. These factors include the lack of democracy, the flagrant abuse of human rights and rampant corruption. These underlying causes of terrorism are also prevalent outside Africa, but in some African states the situation is deteriorating and they are being exacerbated. The post-election violence in Kenya in 2008; the drastic deterioration in economic, political and social conditions in Zimbabwe in recent years; the military coup in Guinea in late 2008; and the continuing conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia are just the main examples. The prevention of terrorism in Africa requires strategies that aim to engender development and empower the people as well as to build and enhance democracy. The term development is used here to refer to self-sustained economic growth as well as the provision of basic needs, such as shelter, water, sanitation, health services and education.

In terms of protection, the EU seeks to improve the security of borders, transport systems and critical infrastructure, and thereby reduce the vulnerability of its member states and their citizens to terrorist attacks. This stems from the fact that in the majority of the recent attacks in Western countries, terrorists have targeted the critical infrastructure, and especially the transport network. For example, the Madrid and London attacks of 2004 and 2005, respectively, targeted vital transport systems, and the then vulnerable air transport system in the USA was targeted in 2001. Unfortunately, public transport systems in most countries cannot be fully protected against every possible terrorist attack.

With regard to the goal of pursuit, the EU aims to go after and investigate terrorists in Europe and globally, and to bring them to justice. It also plans to disrupt their networks, cut off their funding and impede their planning, travel and communications. Controlling the financing for terrorism requires considerable cooperation across boundaries, and between government and non-government entities. Given the porous nature of the borders of many African states and the lack of the capacity to control or monitor those who enter or leave these countries, the fight against terrorism will require the commitment of resources and capacity-building on a grand scale. For example, it would take many years and huge amounts of resources for countries such as Mozambique and Tanzania to be able to patrol their long and exposed Indian Ocean coastlines effectively.

The final component of the EU counterterrorism policy focuses on response. The EU
aims to minimize the consequences of terrorist attacks by coordinating responses to such attacks within the EU and across the world, and by improving capabilities for dealing with the aftermath – including the needs of victims. An effective response to terrorist attacks calls for greater cooperation across borders and for highly trained personnel in security agencies and the law enforcement sector within the EU. It also requires trained and competent personnel in the countries that are expected to cooperate with the EU.

3. The Implementation of the EU’s Counterterrorism Policies

The implementation of the EU’s counterterrorism policies takes place in the four areas represented by its main goals. As part of its implementation arrangements, the Council of the European Union requires the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to report every six months on how the ‘Action Plan to Combat Terrorism’ is progressing.

Implementation takes place on three levels: at the member state level; at the collective EU level; and through EU interaction with the rest of the world. At the first level, the EU assumes that the primary responsibility for combating terrorism rests with the individual member states. Therefore, a lot of activity takes place at the state level. However, at the next level, the EU has sought to add value to these efforts by strengthening the capabilities of some member states and by facilitating cooperation among them. For example, it has encouraged collective responses through various EU organs, including Europol, Eurojust and Frontex.

The implementation of EU policies at the third level has considerable relevance for Africa. At this level, the EU and its member states have sought international partnerships through the United Nations and with other countries, such as the USA and Canada as well as various Middle East and Asian states. In Africa, the EU and its member states deal simultaneously with the African Union (AU), the regional economic communities, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), and individual states.

The Africa-EU strategic partnership calls for cooperation in many areas, including politics, development and security (European Commission/African Union Commission 2007). This partnership provides multiple avenues through which the EU and African states can explore how to pursue counterterrorism while enhancing democracy. The push for democracy building, however, will have the greatest impact at the state level and the least impact at the AU and the regional economic community levels. It is relatively easy for the AU and the regional economic communities to endorse radical change because they know they are not responsible for implementing it at the state level.

One way of assessing the EU’s implementation of its counterterrorism strategy is to

Implementation takes place on three levels: at the member state level; at the collective EU level; and through EU interaction with the rest of the world. At the first level, the EU assumes that the primary responsibility for combating terrorism rests with the individual member states. Therefore, a lot of activity takes place at the state level. However, at the next level, the EU has sought to add value to these efforts by strengthening the capabilities of some member states and by facilitating cooperation among them.

The push for democracy building will have the greatest impact at the state level and the least impact at the AU and the regional economic community levels. It is relatively easy for the AU and the regional economic communities to endorse radical change because they know they are not responsible for implementing it at the state level.
Violent radicalization is not just an aid to terrorism, but also a threat to democracy in developing countries. For this reason, the findings of these studies on radicalization could be applied to Africa where they could ‘kill two birds with one stone’. As African state institutions are still relatively new, weak and fragile, radicalization is likely to have a greater political impact in Africa than in much of Europe. For example, according to the latest report of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to the Council of the EU dated 19 November 2008, most activities in relation to prevention were concentrated in Europe. Earlier in 2006, the EU Commission had set up an expert group on violent radicalization. The expert group’s final report entitled, *Radicalization processes leading to acts of terrorism*, was presented to member states in September 2008. In the same month, the Commission published a series of studies that tackle the issue of radicalization. This followed the fact that several member states, including Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK had coordinated counter-terrorism policies on different aspects of radicalization.

On protection, the latest report from the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator demonstrates that most activities revolve around such issues as border security, critical infrastructure protection, the security of explosives and transport security. For understandable reasons, most of these activities are confined to Europe. For example, on border security the focus is on proposals relating to the implementation of the second Schengen Information System (SIS II) and other immigration issues. Knowledge taken from these activities, such as the enhancement of transport security and critical infrastructure security, could be modified and applied to Africa, where it would have positive effects on development, democracy building and counterterrorism.

Implementation of the third goal of the European strategy against terrorism – the pursuit and investigation of terrorists across borders – goes beyond Europe into Africa and other places. For example, on the question of operational cooperation, a Joint Customs Operation, ATHENA, focusing on money laundering linked to financing terrorism and other illicit activities took place in September 2008. Those participating included the customs administrations of 22 EU member states, together with three African countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) as well as Croatia and Norway. Other initiatives have touched on cooperation in the areas of cybercrime and cyberterrorism, as well as proposals on improved data sharing.

**The EU’s Counterterrorism Activity in Africa and its Impact on Democracy Building**

Much of what the EU does in Africa is undertaken within the framework of The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (European Commission/African Union Commission 2007). The first paragraph of this document states: ‘Africa and Europe are bound together by history, culture, geography, a common future, as well as by a community of values: the respect for human rights, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, the rule of law and democracy as enshrined in the relevant international agreements and in the constitutive texts of our respective Unions’. The document also states that the EU and
its member states ‘are well placed to provide continued and increased support for the [African Union] in its efforts to … operationalize the [African Peace and Security Architecture], including through long-term capacity building for the various structures provided therein’ (Paragraph 17).

Under the partnership, the two sides commit themselves ‘to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 on Women in Peace and Security and 1612 on Children in Armed Conflicts’ (Paragraph 22). The EU and the AU are therefore interested in engaging in activities that protect children in wars, empower women, and offer protection to women in situations of war and conflict. Accordingly, the EU has participated in capacity-building in Africa through the AU, the regional economic communities and national governments. At the continental level, for example, most AU organs are modelled on those of the EU. The first impression gained from an examination of the structure and organs of the AU is that the two organizations are quite similar – but appearances can be deceptive. The goals of the EU emanate from deeply rooted European values and traditions, and although many of these are regarded as global, some African leaders have not fully internalized them. This partly explains why the practices of the AU have not caught up with those of the EU, despite the fact that the two organizations have similar organs. However, there is a possibility that sustained EU-AU engagement could, in the long-term, result in a convergence of practices.

In the domain of security, the EU Political and Security Committee (EU-PSC) and the AU Peace and Security Council (AU-PSC) have held regular consultations on security matters, including the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture, especially as it relates to the Continental Early Warning System and the African Standby Force. The EU has also funded the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism, which was established in Algiers in 2004. The purpose of this centre is to centralize information on terrorism and terrorist organizations in Africa, initiate research and organize training programmes and symposia with a view to raising awareness of the threat of terrorism on the continent. The main weakness of this initiative is that its activities are not adequately located within the framework of building or promoting democracy.

The EU has also funded a counterterrorism programme through IGAD. The IGAD Capacity Building Programme Against Terrorism (ICPAT) was established in 2006 and is based in Addis Ababa. ICPAT is currently guided by a Steering Committee made up of local ministerial representatives of IGAD member states (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda, Eritrea is not a participant). The six donor countries (Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden) sit on the steering committee as non-voting members. This is also a venue in which the fight against terrorism should be viewed in terms of development and democracy building, but ICPAT is not sufficiently equipped to do so.

International efforts to combat terrorism in Africa, including EU activities, have helped to raise awareness of the dangers of transnational terrorism, but they have not paid sufficient attention to the need to respect human rights and build democracy. As a result, some African leaders have used the bogey of terrorism to halt progress towards genuine democracy on the continent.
genuine democracy on the continent. Other African leaders, especially those who are keen to consolidate democracy, have been frustrated by the global pressure to experiment with new counterterrorism measures, which could constrain political and civil liberties and eventually serve as an aid to the goals of the terrorists. What has taken place in Africa in relation to terrorism, counterterrorism and human security in the past decade suggests that there are many perspectives.

4. Africa’s Perspectives on Global Counterterrorism Strategies

Most African analysts and policymakers are concerned about a number of issues relating to the fight against transnational terrorism. Some of their grievances can be explained in terms of a lack of a sense of ownership and a negative perception of the global flow of knowledge. The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership document states that ‘EU support to Africa has been and continues to be guided by the principle of African ownership’ (Paragraph 18). However, some African policymakers and analysts believe that they do not have ownership of the counterterrorism programmes and policies that they are required to implement, because these policies and programmes are based on the priorities of the donor community. They believe they would only genuinely own these policies and programmes if they were underpinned by African priorities.

On the issue of knowledge flows, some African analysts and policymakers believe that much of the knowledge that is consumed in Africa, including ideas about development, democratic reform and security, is generated from non-African sources. As a result, Africa continues to apply knowledge that is determined in and shaped by non-African contexts. Whether this knowledge has relevance for African conditions is a different matter. Moreover, they argue that the African voice has not been adequately represented in global debates on security matters in general, and on terrorism and counterterrorism in particular (see Okumu and Botha 2007).

Therefore, some African thinkers and policymakers argue that the counterterrorism agenda that African states are required to implement does not take account of some of Africa’s pressing needs, especially those related to human development. Even the EU approach to counterterrorism does not address African concerns in the way that Africans would like them to be addressed.

However, it could be argued that Africa’s lack of participation in the shaping of global knowledge flows can be blamed partly on African leaders and their misguided political and macro-economic policies. African states, which are rich in natural resources, have squandered their wealth and failed to invest adequately in education. This has, in turn, compelled many competent African thinkers and researchers to go to the West in search of adequate working conditions. By failing to fund education and research, African states have disadvantaged themselves when it comes to the generation of the knowledge they need. Even in the fields of development and security studies, there are many African

Other African leaders, especially those who are keen to consolidate democracy, have been frustrated by the global pressure to experiment with new counterterrorism measures, which could constrain political and civil liberties and eventually serve as an aid to the goals of the terrorists. What has taken place in Africa in relation to terrorism, counterterrorism and human security in the past decade suggests that there are many perspectives.

Some African policymakers and analysts believe that they do not have ownership of the counterterrorism programmes and policies that they are required to implement because these are based on the priorities of the donor community.
researchers in the West who would be willing to return to their countries of origin if better working conditions were established.

Due to the lack of a common pool of knowledge on the causes of terrorism in Africa, each African state has developed its own unique approach to domestic terrorism. However, this has not prevented Africa, as a collective entity, from adopting a common position on global counterterrorism strategies. African states and sub-regions have huge differences over the nature and causes of terrorism on the continent and the way it should be tackled, but they have also arrived at common positions on how to prevent and combat terrorism. Algeria, Egypt, Kenya and Uganda, which have experienced different forms of terrorism in the past decade, have taken different approaches to it. Perhaps one common thread running through these states is their failure to establish competent, open, accountable and responsive governments.

Despite their differing approaches to counterterrorism, virtually all African states endorsed the adoption of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (the Algiers Convention) in July 1999. The Algiers Convention was the first continental legislative instrument to provide a definition of terrorism. Thus, Africa had a common approach to counterterrorism at least two years before the events of 11 September 2001 and the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1373. Resolution 1373 and the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) compelled Africa, like the rest of the world, to adopt certain mandatory anti-terrorism measures. The transformation of the OAU into the AU took place in 2002 when the world was focusing on transnational terrorism as a common threat to humankind. In subsequent years, the AU was required to play an important role in reinforcing and implementing the counterterrorism measures adopted at both the continental level and the global level.

The irony of the African position on terrorism and counterterrorism is that the AU selected the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, as its chairperson in January 2009. Gaddafi, who has participated in clandestine nuclear activities and has been accused repeatedly of funding terrorists, has become Africa’s spokesperson on global issues, including transnational terrorism. It is noteworthy in this context that in August 2003, Libya accepted responsibility for the terrorist bombing of the US passenger aircraft, Pan Am 103, over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988. The fact that Gaddafi’s hands are tainted as far as terrorism is concerned could weaken Africa’s claim that its different approaches to terrorism should be respected by international society.

African approaches to counterterrorism have had negative implications for democracy building on the continent. Even the genesis of the Algiers Convention was underpinned by efforts to deny African people their democratic rights. Algeria was the main driving force to the lack of a common pool of knowledge on the causes of terrorism in Africa, each African state has developed its own unique approach to domestic terrorism. However, this has not prevented Africa, as a collective entity, from adopting a common position on global counterterrorism strategies.
force behind the Algiers Convention as a result of the terrorist problems it experienced from 1992. However, the rise of terrorism and political extremism in Algeria in the early 1990s was due partly to the nullification of general elections there, which the Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) was poised to win. Having been denied the chance to take power through the ballot box, FIS resorted to violence, together with other insurgent groups such as the Armed Islamic Group (Groupement Islamique Armé, GIA). Algeria could be cited as a case where frustration of the democratic system led to terrorism and political extremism. For many years, there has been no distinction between legitimate opposition and terrorism in the eyes of some African political leaders, and this has not been good for building democracy. It is plausible to argue that the lack of adequate knowledge on the part of some African leaders has constrained development and led to the poor state of democracy on the continent.

Since September 2001, some progressive forces in Africa have argued that the global counterterrorism policies that African states are required to implement also threaten democracy because they do not pay adequate attention to respect for individual liberties. In a paper on terrorism and global governance in 2003, I argued: ‘The events of 11 September 2001 have been used by the US, major Western states and other important international actors as an excuse to undermine international rules, norms and institutions, including human rights, democracy and the laws of war. This has the potential to weaken the pillars on which global governance is constructed’ (Makinda 2003). This has been the case in Africa and other parts of the world.

In much of Africa, the domestic causes of terrorism have been associated with a lack of development, social justice and democracy. Development has the potential to reduce the chances of terrorism by eliminating or modifying the conditions that produce discontent. As the former World Bank president, James Wolfensohn, argued in March 2002:

We must recognise that while there is social injustice on a global scale – both between states and within them; while the fight against poverty is barely begun in too many parts of the world; while the link between progress in development and progress toward peace is not recognised – we may win a battle against terror but we will not conclude a war that will yield enduring peace (Wolfensohn 2002).

It is important to bear in mind that poverty or the lack of development per se does not cause terrorism, but it might combine with other factors to ignite political violence. For example, extreme poverty, combined with the politics of identity, can be a factor in fuelling terror.
ideas, standards, institutions, norms and techniques for overcoming obstacles to human progress. For this reason, development can help people to redefine their identities and refocus their interests and energies away from terrorism and political violence.

The absence of development, or the adoption of a distorted approach to development, often gives rise to perceptions of social injustice. Social justice has been defined as ‘a morally justifiable distribution of material and social rewards, notably wealth, income and social status’ (Heywood 2000). A country in which most of the wealth, income and social rewards are concentrated in the hands of a few ethnic groups or in one geographic region to the exclusion of other ethnic groups or geographical regions is considered socially unjust, and can easily ignite political violence. For example, the magnitude of the post-election violence in Kenya in early 2008 was partly due to the perception by people from various ethnic groups that the Kikuyu, President Mwai Kibaki’s ethnic group, had amassed most of the country’s wealth to the detriment of other groups. Thus, perceptions of social injustice can be a factor in causing political violence and terrorism.

On the basis of the above analysis, it is possible to conclude that many people in Africa believe that the best way to tackle terrorism on the continent is to alleviate poverty, eliminate social injustice and assist with building democracy.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

In its Statement on Strengthening International Security, published on 11 December 2008, the Council of the European Union proclaimed:

   an unremitting determination to combat all manifestations of terrorism, in particular the threat posed by international terrorist organizations. We shall pursue this aim, with due regard for human rights, international humanitarian law and the right of asylum, by building a Europe safe from terrorism, cooperating on criminal matters and sharing information between European authorities more effectively’ (Council of the European Union 2008 (c), paragraph 3).

This statement of intent is encouraging, but it needs to be followed up by concrete action. Moreover, the EU would make a great difference in Africa if it adopted the view that building democracy and enhancing social justice are preconditions for the reduction or elimination of the factors that generate terrorism.

Following the inauguration of Barack Obama as President of the USA on 20 January 2009, and his decisions to sign executive orders closing the Guantanamo Bay detention facility and prohibiting the torture of suspects, the global political and legal environments appear to favour those who would combat terrorism while respecting liberal democratic principles. The EU should build on the momentum generated by President Obama and support democracy building as part of the struggle against transnational terrorism.

The fight against terrorism is primarily a governance issue

In efforts to cooperate with Africa in the fight against terrorism, the EU needs, first,
to recognize that in Africa, the fight against terrorism is primarily a governance issue. Therefore, it should encourage the promotion of good and responsible governance as a way of tackling the root causes of terrorism. This is because terrorism emerges from, and thrives in, conditions in which democracy, human rights and social justice are perceived to be absent. Even where terrorism is not ‘home grown’, bad governance, corruption or a lack of professionalism in the security forces might make it easier for foreign-trained terrorists to carry out their activities. However, in pursuing its goals, the EU needs to be aware of the political and cultural sensitivities of the African people.

Focus on strengthening democratic processes

Second, and flowing from the first point, the EU needs to focus on working with governments as well as civil society organizations to strengthen democratic processes. This requires a number of things. For example, the EU could train young Africans in proper processes of governance so that they can provide leadership at the governmental or civil society level. The EU could also help fund weak, but non-corrupt, civil society organizations so that they can scrutinize and stand up to their governments. Above all, the EU could help African states and societies to nurture an independent media and ensure that corrupt politicians do not pass legislation that muzzles the media. It is through such measures that the EU could help to build the foundations for democracy and accountability in Africa. These activities could be undertaken as part of the efforts to undermine or eliminate the root causes of terrorism.

Undertake targeted capacity-building

Third, to ensure that the goals of prevention, protection, pursuit and response are replicated in Africa, the EU needs to undertake targeted capacity-building. It needs to help African states train personnel capable of detecting terrorists before they carry out their activities. It also needs to retrain and sensitize African security personnel to human rights and democratic norms so that they can protect their societies, and pursue the terrorists, without undermining democratic principles.

Fight against terrorism and democracy building are two sides of the same coin

Finally, the EU needs to view the fight against terrorism and democracy building in Africa as two sides of the same coin. If the fight against terrorism neglects the need for democracy and social justice, it could produce more terrorists and thereby undermine its ultimate goal of creating peace and security in Africa.

References


Council of the European Union, Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, a Note from the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Brussels, 19 November 2008 (a)


Council of the European Union, Statement on Strengthening International Security, Brussels, 11 December 2008 (c)

Council of the European Union, Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities, Brussels, 11 December 2008 (d)

European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, Brussels 11 April 2001

European Commission, (DG-External relations), Furthering Human Rights and Democracy Across the Globe (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007 (a)


EU-Africa Ministerial Meeting, Communiqué, Dublin, 1 April 2004

EU-Africa Ministerial Meeting, Communiqué, Bamako (Mali), 2 December 2005


Joint statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy, The European Consensus on Development, Brussels 24 February 2006


Okumu, Wafula and Botha, Anneli (eds), Understanding Terrorism in Africa: In Search for an African Voice (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007)


About the Author

Samuel M. Makinda is Professor of International Relations and Security Studies, and the Founding Chair of the Security, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Programme at Murdoch University in Perth, Australia.

He writes a weekly column in the Nairobi-based Business Daily, and is a member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. He served on the Australian Foreign Minister’s National Consultative Committee for International Security Issues from 2001 to 2008. In 2007 and 2009, Professor Makinda was invited by the Kenyan Government to serve as a consultant to the biennial conference of Kenya’s ambassadors and high commissioners. He also helped to establish a new Foreign Service Institute for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nairobi. He previously worked as a Foreign Affairs Specialist in the Parliamentary Research Service at the Australian Federal Parliament in the 1980s.

Professor Makinda has research experience in transnational terrorism, arms control, and the changing nature of security in Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. He has been a researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. He has also been a Visiting Fellow at Cambridge University’s Global Security Programme, and a Senior Associate Member of St. Antony’s College at the University of Oxford. He is co-author of The African Union: Challenges of globalization, security and governance (2008). His other publications include ‘Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Norms in Africa’, African Security Review, 15(3), 2006; ‘Global Governance and Terrorism’, Global Change, Peace and Security, 15(1), 2003; Seeking Peace From Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia (1993); Security in the Horn of Africa, Adelphi Paper No. 269 (1992); and Superpower Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa (1987). He has also published more than 100 articles in academic journals, including Survival, Security Dialogue, Global Governance, Futures and The World Today.