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National Interests and Altruism in Australian Foreign Policy
Towards Africa

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Australia’s relations with Africa have tended to develop on a largely ad hoc basis, often as a consequence of policies on other issues, such as human rights, the Commonwealth and, especially, apartheid. However, it would be wrong for Australia to ignore Africa, or to allow our relations to drift without substance. African nations are able to exert considerable influence internationally; in the United Nations and its various agencies, and in the Commonwealth, the African group is the largest and the Africans have shown cohesiveness and discipline on issues of importance to them.

Introduction

Australia’s foreign policy towards Africa, like its policy towards any other country or region of the world, is primarily driven by self-interest. Australian foreign ministers, diplomats and other political leaders have admitted on various occasions that their goal in Africa is, and has always been, to promote Australia’s national interests while at the same time helping some African states to meet some of their needs. While there is no single definition of the national interest, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) defined it in a 2003 White Paper as “the security and prosperity of Australia and Australians”. DFAT further claimed that the Australian national interest could be understood broadly to include humanitarian assistance as well as the promotion of “good governance, human rights and development”. Indeed, the Australian government believes that the “improvement of governance around the world can help create an environment that contributes to the security and prosperity of Australia”. This approach to national interest in Australia has been critiqued by several academics. For instance, Joseph Camilleri argues that the “national interest” rhetoric assumes many issues, which should not be accepted at face value. In relation to Africa between 2008 and 2012, Australia’s national interests included a desire to win a two-year UN Security Council seat, which was secured in October 2012.

As implied in the definition of the national interest above, Australia has not pursued self-interests to the exclusion of global values and norms. The concept of good international citizenship, which former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans
popularised in the 1990s, suggested that Australia’s foreign policy takes seriously global values, rules and norms. Indeed, Australian government officials have declared frequently that part of their purpose in Africa is to help African states realise several Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The overriding objective of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) program is to assist African countries in their efforts to meet some of their MDGs and tackle other problems in sectors in which “Australia has expertise and experience, and is best able to make a difference”, such as agriculture and food security (MDG1), water and sanitation (MDG7), maternal and child health (MDG 4 and 5), public policy, and mining services. The significance of these areas in Australia’s policy towards Africa was underlined by the fact that in mid-July 2012, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) announced it had set aside up to $8 million for which Australian and international researchers could apply in order to study aspects of these themes.

Based on Australia’s concrete actions in Africa over the past few decades, it is plausible to argue that the Australian government’s aim is to try to align national interests with altruism. There is no clinical definition of altruism in foreign policy, but for purposes of this chapter, it will be treated as an “other-regarding”, as opposed to a “self-regarding”, approach to foreign relations. It does not amount to self-denial, but it implies that decision-makers have designed mechanisms or structures within which they can genuinely consider the interests of those they seek to interact with. Another way of putting it is that by trying to align national interests with altruism, Australia strives to balance principle with values in its policy towards Africa. It is generally assumed that the pursuit of principle requires a focus on the preservation and promotion of self-interests while the pursuit of global values requires adequate attention to such matters as human development, gender and racial equality as well as ecological sustainability. But, such an argument gives rise to several questions. When there is, for example, a clash between principles and values or between the national interest and humanitarianism, which side of the ledger prevails? Is there a transparent formula through which Australia can resolve the differences between principle and values? And, has there been any time when values have triumphed over principle or vice versa?

The aim of this chapter is to explain the relationship between national interests and altruism in Australia’s policy towards Africa since the 1980s. Over the years, Australia’s foreign policy across the board has been shaped by three broad considerations: identity, security and economic/commercial interests. Its engagement with Africa has to be
understood in the context of these considerations. However, the tools that Australian agencies use to execute foreign policy varies from one country to another. In the case of Africa, the main tool has been aid, and within this, the dominant element has been education aid or scholarships, most recently the Australian Awards for Africa.

To the extent that Australia’s policy towards Africa is dominated by aid, this chapter revolves around Australia’s aid policy towards African states. It is based largely on an analysis of Australian government documents relating to aid in general, and assistance to Africa in particular. It also examines secondary sources on Australian-African relations. While my argument is not based on structured interviews with Australian or African government representatives, I have participated in several quasi-government forums through which I have exchanged views with African and Australian government officials on relations between the two continents.

The remaining part of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section explains the conceptual framework. The second provides a brief historical context that illustrates the persistence of the national interest in the formulation of Australia’s aid policy. The third examines the evolution of Australia’s engagement with Africa. The fourth section is the conclusion.

**Conceptual Framework**

This conceptual framework is derived from two sources, which complement each other. The first source of the conceptual framework is Alexander George’s (1980) piece, “Domestic constraints on regime change in US foreign policy: The need for policy legitimacy”. Seen through Robert Cox’s work, George’s chapter is closer to the critical than it is to the problem-solving perspective. George argued that for the American president to be in a position to conduct “a coherent, consistent, and reasonably effective long-range policy”, he needed to “achieve a fundamental and stable national consensus, one that encompasses members of his own administration, of Congress and of the interested public”. He argued that the president could not “develop such a consensus merely by invoking the ‘national interest’” or “the requirements of ‘national security’”. Expressing skepticism in relation to the invocation of the national interest, George argued: “In practice, … ‘national interest’ has become so elastic and ambiguous a concept that its role as a guide to foreign policy is highly problematical and controversial”. He concluded that skeptical “sectors of the public and of Congress have come to view the
‘national interest’ phrase as part of the shopworn political rhetoric that every administration … has employed in order to justify questionable or arbitrary policies and decisions”.

George also looked at bipartisanship in foreign policy and argued that it was “the result, not the cause, of policy legitimacy”.

George argued that foreign policy legitimacy in the US, and by implication in any democracy, requires two bases. The first is that a government needs to demonstrate that its foreign policy “is consistent with fundamental national values and contributes to their enhancement”. He describes this as “the normative or moral component of policy legitimacy”. Commenting on George’s thesis fourteen years later, Richard Smoke argued that any country’s foreign policy “must ultimately be rooted in the country’s political values and norms”. The second base of legitimacy is that the government ought to demonstrate that it “knows how to achieve these long-range objectives”. George argues that the government must convince the public that it “understands other national actors and the evolving world situation well enough to enable [it] to influence the course of events in the desired direction with the means and resources at [its] disposal”.

George’s thesis ultimately is that policy legitimacy stems from a consensus among the executive, the legislature and the public. Such policy legitimacy has, in turn, to be understood in terms of two criteria: desirability and feasibility. George posits that the “normative component establishes the desirability of policy; the cognitive component its feasibility”. It is this conceptual framework that I plan to apply to Australia’s foreign policy towards Africa. However, George’s thesis is only one of the two conceptual frameworks that I plan to apply.

The second source of my conceptual framework is a 2011 report for the Australian government entitled Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness and prepared by a panel led by Sandy Hollway (hereafter Hollway Review). If George’s approach seems closer to the critical perspective, that of the Hollway Review appears to be closer to problem-solving theory. The Hollway Review accepts the rhetoric about the national interest, but it seeks to deal with particular sources of trouble by, for example, drawing attention to the lack of clarity given to the role of national interest in the current Australian aid program. In what looks like a modified version of the aid eligibility scheme used by the 1984 Jackson Report on overseas aid, the Hollway Review has suggested an interesting approach to resource allocation. Three criteria against which countries or regions are measured in the Hollway Review comprise: “poverty, national interest, and Australia’s capacity to make a significant difference”. Countries, such as Indonesia, which score
highly against all three criteria receive the greatest proportion of aid. Sub-Saharan Africa only scores highly on one of the criteria: poverty. National interest is rated “medium”, most likely driven by Australia’s decision to lobby for African support in its bid for the UN Security Council seat.

Finally, Australia’s capacity to make a significant difference in Africa is rated “low”. Influential factors in this rating include the strength of partner governments, the degree of “donor-crowding”, Australia’s relationship with – and diplomatic reach in – the region, donor accountability for the funding received, whether or not Australia has the capacity and expertise to offer what is needed, and Australia’s desire to “stay the course”. The framework adopted by the Hollway Review divides countries and regions into five “focus” categories with the countries in the top two categories allocated the lion’s share of the aid program. Sub-Saharan Africa is deemed to be category three. As of late 2012, only 0.3% of Australian bilateral aid went to Africa and the Hollway Review recommended an increase in the aid allocated to it. However, it was recommended that most of this aid be delivered through partnerships with multilateral institutions and NGOs with wide representation on the ground, owing to the perception that Australia has a limited ability to effect change. The Hollway Review also argues that aid has to meet at least two criteria. It claims that “an effective Australian aid program must be sustainable over the long term, and this means that it must be firmly based on a public consensus”. It also argues that “aid is not just about efficient delivery of services to clients. It is an expression of human values. It is about helping people living in deplorable conditions to overcome poverty”.

I agree with some of the recommendations of the Hollway Review, but I am also sceptical about others. For example, I accept that for the Australian aid program in Africa to be sustained, it ought to reflect the values and norms of the Australian people. This is similar to what Alexander George called “normative” legitimacy. The second criterion basically means that the aid program must achieve value for money, and it can do so only if the projects on which it is spent are feasible. This is similar to what George described as “cognitive” legitimacy. By combining George’s and Hollway’s approaches, this conceptual framework suggests that understanding Australia’s engagement with Africa requires the utilisation of elements of both critical and problem-solving theories. In other words, it calls for theoretical eclecticism.

Taken together, George and the Hollway Review imply two issues, which are crucial in both foreign policy broadly and aid policy more specifically. The first is that
both foreign and aid policies, which need to be based on public consensus, reflect national identity. The second is that both policies are about feasibility, which means they have to be justified in terms of actual changes they bring about in the target countries, regions or systems. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I will apply these understandings to Australia’s foreign policy towards Africa.

**Historical Context: the persisting national interest**

The Australian aid program in Africa is partly a product of Australian foreign policy thinking that goes back more than sixty years. It reflects Australia’s evolving national identity, which, in turn, tells us how Australia’s past and present have shaped its future aspirations. It is about Australia’s self-image and its role in the world. Therefore, the Africa aid program needs to be placed in the context of Australia’s historical provision of aid to developing countries, which has been driven by an assessment of Australia’s strategic, political and economic interests. These interests may be determined by Australia’s identity, but they, in turn, continue to re-shape the identity. Given space constraints, I will highlight only four initiatives to illustrate the manner in which Australian policy towards Africa has been constructed: the Colombo Plan in the 1950s; the 1984 Jackson Report; the 1997 Simons Report; and the 2011 Hollway Review.

The first major Australian aid initiative was the Colombo Plan for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (hereafter the Colombo Plan), which was an outcome of the Commonwealth Foreign Minister’s meeting in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 1950. In the course of the 1950s, the Colombo Plan expanded to include non-Commonwealth donors, such as the US, and non-Commonwealth recipients, such as Indonesia, Thailand and South Vietnam. This particular aid program had two components. There was the economic development part, involving “financial support for development projects” such as dams and roads; and the technical assistance part, involving “the promotion of technical expertise, education and training”. As a result, Australia provided more than 20,000 scholarships to Asian students between 1951 and 1980. There is no evidence of African students being involved in this scheme. The Colombo Plan continues and has about twenty six member countries, including Australia, but its program has been extensively revised in the past three decades.

An important dimension of the Colombo Plan is that Australia and its fellow donors used the aid program to try to shape the post-World War II regional order in South
and Southeast Asia. As a former Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, has acknowledged, Australia’s participation in the Colombo Plan was underpinned by “economic, political and cultural motivations”. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has observed that Australia hoped to use “the aid program to involve the United States in regional affairs, cultivate diplomatic and commercial relations, assist the rehabilitation of Japan and play a part in the Cold War”. Thus, through its first international aid program, Australia ensured that aid served the national interest.

Between the early 1980s and 2010, Australian federal governments set up various committees to advise them on the effectiveness of Australian overseas aid, and some of their findings bear relevance to my analysis of Australia’s policy towards Africa. Indeed, some of the debates that underpinned shifts in Australia’s policy towards Africa revolved around claims of policy legitimacy, although the terms normative and cognitive legitimacy were not employed. For example, the 1984 Report of the Committee to Review the Australian Overseas Aid Program (hereafter the Jackson Report, after Gordon Jackson, the committee chair) proposed an eligibility framework for foreign aid. At the top was the Asia-Pacific region, followed by Papua New Guinea and the Pacific and Indian Ocean islands. China and India came in the third category, while Africa was placed in the fourth. As one critic argued at the time: “The stated reasons for the consigning of Africa to category four were essentially that Australian bilateral aid was unlikely to be cost-effective in Africa, or sufficient in scale to make any worthwhile contribution”. Gordon Jackson maintained that: “an aid program can serve three ends: the humanitarian one of bettering the lot of people less fortunate than ourselves; and the two more self-interested of strategic and economic benefit to Australia”.

Jackson suggested three other guidelines to go with his recommendations. The first was that if a conflict emerged between the needs of the aid recipients and Australia’s national interests, “the interests of the aided should prevail”. The second guideline was that “forms of aid which assist real development are to be preferred to those which give only transitory relief”. The third guideline was that “whatever other considerations are taken into account, Australian aid should always be given effectively and efficiently”. Some of Jackson’s recommendations undermined these guidelines, and there is no evidence of the guidelines having been upheld in relation to Africa. Moreover, following the Jackson Report, Australia closed its diplomatic missions in Ghana and Tanzania in the mid-1980s (with the mission in Ghana only re-opening in 2004 following a surge in mining interests).
More than twelve years after the Jackson Report, the Australian government set up another committee to review Australia’s overseas assistance in 1997, which published a report entitled *One Clear Objective: Poverty Reduction Through Sustainable Development* (hereafter the Simons Report, after Paul Simons, the committee chair). The Simons Report declared: “The objective of the Australian aid program should be to assist developing countries to reduce poverty through sustained economic and social development”. The Simons Report clearly emphasised global values, namely poverty reduction and sustainable development. However, in responding to the Report, the Australian government emphasised principle over values. It was partly for this reason that AusAID, in its response to the Simons Report, suggested that the aim of the aid was: “To advance Australia’s national interest by assisting developing countries reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development”. Like the Jackson Report, the Simons Report insisted that aid should be effective. And, again, like the Jackson Report, the Simons Report recommended a focus on the Asia-Pacific region and was not Africa-friendly.

Thus, from the mid-1980s until 2008/2009, various Australian government committees on overseas aid recommended a focus on the Asia-Pacific region and a move away from Africa. The reports also argued that aid should be effective, but the word “effective” appeared to convey shifting meanings. Sometimes it meant a policy that was capable of advancing Australia’s national interest, while at other times it referred to a policy that could lead directly to the alleviation of poverty in the recipient country. The latest report on this theme is the Hollway Review, which emphasises many of the sentiments contained in the 1984 Jackson Report. Like the Jackson Report, the Hollway Review has provided an eligibility framework for Australian overseas aid, but it places Africa in the third category. Like the Jackson Report, this report believes aid would be more effective if it was geographically focused. Again, like the Jackson Report, the Hollway Review suggests that Australia should provide aid to African states through the UN and other multilateral agencies as well as through successful NGOs, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. If implemented, this report would have a significant negative impact on Australia’s current engagement with Africa, including the Australia Awards for Africa.

**Evolution of Australian Engagement with Africa**
Australia’s engagement with Africa has been influenced by various factors in Africa, Australia and the global system. For instance, the needs of particular African states, changes in Australian domestic politics, the Cold War, and the Millennium Development Goals have had an effect on Australia’s approach to Africa. The needs of Australia’s export and mining sectors, including the tertiary education sector, have also played a role in shaping the breadth of Australia’s diplomatic presence in Africa. One of the issues that drove Australia’s diplomacy in Africa between 2008 and 2012 was Australia’s desire to win a two-year rotating UN Security Council seat for the 2013-14 period. While it would be an exaggeration to argue that the Security Council seat was the main determinant of the engagement, it played a major role in shaping the tactics and strategies of three Australian foreign ministers: Stephen Smith (2007-10), Kevin Rudd (2010-12) and Bob Carr (since 2012).

Apart from Australia’s failed attempt to mediate in the Suez crisis of 1956 between the UK, Egypt and Israel, its involvement in Africa may be traced back to the 1960s. Most of this engagement has been limited to southern African states and the former British colonies in East and West Africa. As Lyons argues, in the immediate “post-colonial period in Africa, Australia was represented by only four diplomatic missions – in Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania- and by an embassy in Pretoria, South Africa”. However, Australia’s policies have not always been consistent. Changes in the perception of Australia’s national interest have particularly affected the level of Australian support to Africa. For example, while approximately 6 percent of Australian aid went to Africa in the mid-1980s, by the early 2000s Africa was receiving only about 2 percent of Australia’s ODA. Nonetheless, this generalisation glosses over the fact that most of Australia’s development assistance has been going to just a few African states in southern Africa and eastern Africa.

In southern Africa, for example, Australia has moved from a supporter of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the Ian Smith rebel government in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to a strident opponent of apartheid and supporter of African nationalists in Zimbabwe in the 1970s, and to a supporter of the post-apartheid regime in the 1990s. Following the end of apartheid in the mid-1990s, South Africa rejoined the Commonwealth and subsequently became Australia’s largest recipient of aid and scholarships in Africa. According to AusAID sources, “Australia began providing development assistance to the newly independent states of southern, eastern and west Africa in the 1960s and 1970s”. This aid, which comprised a few scholarships and
modest project aid, was provided under a scheme called the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Program. By the early 1980s, Australia’s diplomatic presence in Africa had increased, and its scholarships as well as other forms of development assistance had increased to about 6 percent of the total.

However, as mentioned earlier, the 1984 Jackson Report drastically altered Australia’s aid policy towards Africa. Australia not only discontinued project aid, but it concentrated its remaining bilateral aid programs on fewer countries. Two years before the transition to a non-racial government in South Africa, Australia had to make another policy shift because the anti-apartheid rationale that underpinned its approach to Africa was becoming outdated. Accordingly, in 1992, Australia expanded its bilateral aid beyond southern Africa, to eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa. Australia decided to concentrate on “specific sectors where Africa had a need and where Australia could best deploy its expertise” such as agriculture and food production, health and human resource development. The main elements of the new program included support for South Africa, an expanded role for Australian NGOs, support for democracy-building efforts, and assistance through international agencies.

By the mid-1990s, Australia had clearly established that its interest in Africa was three-fold: humanitarian; strategic and political; and trade and commercial. Again, by pursuing these three-dimensional interests, Australia was proclaiming its evolving identity as a country that was keen to balance principle with values. AusAID repeatedly claims that its primary motivation for involvement in Africa is humanitarian, and this includes issues such as poverty, malnutrition, poor health conditions, illiteracy and maternal as well as child mortality rates. The other two considerations, namely strategic/political and trade/commercial may not be primary, but they often override the primary consideration. As AusAID itself argued in the mid-1990s:

In place of a narrow focus on ending apartheid and easing suffering, there is now a more complex objective of promoting economic and social reform with the dual aim of improving the material conditions of Africans as well as encouraging the development of viable export and investment markets for Australia. Intertwined with these efforts will be an Australian interest in promoting global security through peace building and preventive diplomacy.

It is these goals that continue to underpin Australia’s engagement with Africa.
The Australian Awards for Africa program appears to have been designed within the context of the above goals. Moreover, the Australian government’s support for the Australian mining companies operating in Africa also fits into this scheme. The International Mining Centre for Development, which is a partnership between AusAID, the University of Western Australia and the University of Queensland, was launched by Prime Minister Julia Gillard in October 2011 and has already trained some African personnel on how to understand, negotiate and analyse the complex financial, legal and environmental aspects of mining agreements. Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr told the “Africa Down Under” conference in Perth on 30 August 2012 that by 2015, the centre will have trained 2000 people in the management of mineral resources. Carr also announced that Australia would commit $5 million “over the next two years to support the establishment of the African Minerals Development Centre”.

The dual objective of the provision of Australian aid, including the Australian Awards for Africa, is: (1) to achieve “country and regional program development outcomes through strengthened individual and institutional skills and knowledge, and by supporting leadership”, and (2) to support “Australia’s broader foreign policy agenda through long-term linkages and partnerships”. Nevertheless, the Hollway Review has highlighted a need for careful analysis if humanitarian objectives are to take precedence over the national interest. It argues that if clarity is not prioritised, there is a risk of oversimplification and confusion about the role of the national interest. In the Hollway Review, the national interest is conceptualised as covering “economic, security and foreign policy interests; from the commercial interests of individual companies, to the safety of Australian citizens and Australia’s international image and reputation”.

The Hollway Review maintains that the national interest should never take the place of the alleviation of poverty, but the two will sometimes be complementary. National interest should be principally apparent in the geographical allocation of aid: “[f]oreign policy, security and economic interests should figure mainly in focusing Australia’s geographical effort”.

This is reflected in Australia’s emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region and also in the recent increase in aid to Afghanistan. The Hollway Review claims that “choosing aid activities because of specific national interests is, and should remain, the exception”. The Hollway Review also argues that “Australian industry will benefit from the aid expansion, but it should be on the basis of a level playing field and not preferential treatment”.

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As indicated above, Australia's engagement with Africa is further driven by wider strategic goals, especially its interest in securing a two-year rotating UN Security Council seat, which it won in October 2012. Up until 2013, Australia had not served on the Security Council since 1985-86.\textsuperscript{51} While some critics have viewed Australia's engagement in Africa as a cynical move that would largely benefit Australia, Africa's stability can easily be linked with debates in the Security Council. In the past two decades, more than half of the Security Council resolutions have been on Africa, and the majority of UN peacekeeping forces have been deployed to this region. In this respect, it is logical for any country that wants to serve on the Security Council to familiarise itself with the political, economic and social dynamics in Africa. This coincidence between Australia’s national interest and Africa’s struggles to achieve stability is important. Combining Australia’s foreign policy agenda with delivering effective aid to Africa reflects this desire to achieve an outcome that is beneficial to all parties involved.

The above developments and debates suggest that the parameters within which Australia provides development assistance to Africa have remained virtually unchanged since the mid-1990s. For example, the definition of aid effectiveness, which Negin and Denning refer to, was announced in the 1992 review of aid to Africa.\textsuperscript{52} These developments illustrate the context within which Australia’s policy towards Africa has been designed.

**Conclusions**

Australia’s policy towards Africa is shaped primarily by self-interest, which can be split into three issues: identity, security and commerce. When the Australian government claims that it is committed to humanitarian objectives and would like to help African states meet some of their MDGs, it is right. However, this commitment is about projecting Australia’s identity beyond its borders. It is about Australia demonstrating that it is a good international citizen. Therefore, it should not be surprising that Australia also often seeks to align these global values with its wider security, commercial and diplomatic interests. For example, the AusAID education aid program to Africa, which is the largest component of Australian aid to Africa, is as much about Australia’s interests as it is about Africa’s needs. If executed appropriately, it is likely to deliver a win-win situation for both African states and Australia. In this sense, Australia’s policy towards Africa provides a few lessons for Africa’s other international partners.
First, given the requirements of normative legitimacy, it is possible, and perhaps desirable, to design a foreign policy or an aid package that is both consistent with global values and the national interests of the aid donor. Such a foreign policy or aid package would satisfy the international requirements for effective assistance that benefits the recipients while at the same time promoting the national interests of the international partner. This approach may be more sustainable in that the public in the donor state would have a vested interest in continuing the provision of aid.

Second, given the requirements of cognitive legitimacy or feasibility, if Australia’s interest in promoting respect for human rights, the rule of law and good governance policies in Africa were successful, it would help cement the country’s international position as a middle power country. Such a success would receive public support, which would, in turn, help to integrate these values into the national interest. This also helps underline the view that the promotion of these global values is as much about Australia as it is about African states or any other countries that Australia may target.

Third, most of the funds that benefit African recipients are spent in Australia and therefore end up benefitting the Australian economy and various Australian institutions. For example, the Australian Awards for Africa would not work in the current form were it not for the fact that Australian tertiary institutions provide the training facilities. It is believed that about ninety cents of every dollar donated to Africa is spent in Australia, thereby benefitting tertiary institutions, the tourism industry, the retail sector and other parts of the Australian society.

Finally, and most importantly, in an era in which African countries seek knowledge and capacity building in various sectors of society, education aid of the type provided by Australia can be an effective long-term tool for the achievement of several MDGs, including poverty alleviation, gender equality, reduction of child mortality, improvement in maternal health, and the realisation of environmental sustainability. In targeting these issues, Australia is helping some African states meet their MDGs. However, to the extent that Australia is participating in only those areas where it has expertise and the capacity to make a significant difference, AusAID’s funding of these projects is as much about helping Africa as it is about asserting Australia’s identity beyond its borders.

Thus, while Australia’s policy towards Africa has the potential to have a positive impact on African economic, political and social conditions, its presence there is as much about Africa as it is about Australia.
Endnotes

1 Although I refer to Australia’s relations with Africa, it should be noted that there are 55 in Africa, 54 of which make up the African Union (AU). Morocco is the only African country that remains outside the AU. Australia has diplomatic relations with virtually all countries, including the newest, South Sudan.


3 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), *Advancing the National Interest* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2003), p. vii.

4 DFAT, *Advancing the National Interest*, p. xviii.

5 DFAT, *Advancing the National Interest*, p. xviii.


8 See, for instance, the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Inquiry into Australia’s relationship with the countries of Africa* (Canberra: The Parliament of Australia, 2011), chap 3.


12 George, “Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in US Foreign Policy, p. 234.
George, “Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in US Foreign Policy, p. 234.

George, “Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in US Foreign Policy, p. 234. For similar sentiments regarding Australia’s national interest, see Camilleri, “A leap into the past”.

George, “Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in US Foreign Policy, p. 235.

George, “Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in US Foreign Policy, p. 235.

George, “Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in US Foreign Policy, p. 235.


George, “Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in US Foreign Policy, p. 235.

George, “Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in US Foreign Policy, p. 235.


The Hollway Report, p. 124.


The Hollway Report, p. 3.

The Hollway Report, p. 3.

For more on identity and foreign policy, see Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas and Benjamin Frankel (eds.), The Origins of National Interests (London: Frank Cass, 1999).


Lowe and Oakman, Australia and the Colombo Plan 1949-1957.

Lowe and Oakman, Australia and the Colombo Plan 1949-1957, p.xxv.

Lowe and Oakman, Australia and the Colombo Plan 1949-1957, p.v

DFAT website: accessed on 6 July 2012.


37 The Simons Report, p. 12.


44 AusAID, *Australian Aid to Africa: A New Framework*, p.27.


46 Bob Carr, “Africa Down Under”.

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47 AusAID, “Annual scholarships update 2010”

48 The Hollway Report.

49 The Hollway Report, p. 105.

50 The Hollway Report, p. 8.

51 See Samuel M. Makinda, “Why ‘Good Citizen’ Australia Lost the Global Power Play”, 