Interrogating Masculinities: Regimes Of Practice

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Theorising and Reviewing Masculinities

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CHAPTER ONE
Theorising Masculinities

Introduction

This thesis maps a typology of the ways in which 'masculinity' has emerged as a particular object of analysis and scrutiny within the social sciences. Its aim is to explore the normalising practices that regulate forms of masculinity in adolescent boys' lives at school and in the literacy classroom. This involves examining certain strategies and 'techniques of the self' that adolescent boys use to enact specific masculinities and the occasions on which this occurs at one particular school. 'Masculinity', within this theoretical frame, is conceptualised as an ensemble of practices and techniques which are irreducible to a theorisation of subjectivity as grounded in discourse or a discursive configuration of power relations (Davies, 1991; 1992; 1993; 1994; Weedon, 1987; Henriques et al, 1984). Instead, a theorisation of masculinities is proposed as an historically contingent and variable set of practices and rules for thinking, behaving and acting as 'a man'.

In drawing on the interpretative analytics of Foucault (1988a; 1988b; 1991; 1993) and Hunter (1984a; 1991a; 1994a), it is argued that gendered practices and techniques are established through the deployment of various social apparatuses and regulatory 'technologies of the self' within which the limits of an internal logics of desire are marked out for adolescent boys (Foucault, 1988a; Hutton, 1988). In other words, particular modes of relating and feeling are circumscribed within a regime of normalising practices through which specific gendered discourses become mobilised. It is argued here that capacities for understanding such practices are often proscribed by the deployment of the apparatuses of psychology and psychoanalysis which produce 'surfaces' upon which 'masculinity' appears as a particular object of social analysis (see Rose, 1989).
This thesis maps some of the surfaces upon which 'masculinity' has emerged as a particular object of scrutiny. Attention is drawn to the ways in which certain 'truths' about 'masculinity' have become established within disciplinary regimes for theorising and researching masculinities. Within a Foucauldian framework, these claims about the formation of masculinities, which have gained the status of 'truth' within normalising regimes of practice, are placed under investigation.

The concept of 'regimes of practice', in its application to investigating the ways in which adolescent boys enact various masculinities, is informed by a Foucauldian analytics of self-fashioning techniques and modalities of power involved in the production of subjectivity (See Foucault, 1978; 1980a; 1985; 1986; 1988a). It is argued that boys learn to fashion masculinity for themselves by following specific rules on particular occasions, according to an assemblage of quite specific norms for governing their conduct. However, masculinities are not established in a mechanical and deterministic fashion. Rather, the routinised and variable behaviours and practices of adolescent boys are formed within and across various 'departments of existence' or intersecting social sites. This involves, it is argued, learning a dispersed array of rules for guiding specific forms of gendered conduct on particular occasions.

Thus, it is argued that the ways in which boys acquire the status of 'masculinity', or fail to do so, cannot be accounted for in terms of merely following a set of rules for governing their situationally specific conduct as males. These normalising practices are explained in terms of the processes and techniques of subjectification (See Foucault, 1978; 1985). This notion of the culturally specific occasion, therefore, is important in a discussion of the variable and contradictory forms of masculinity that are established under particular social conditions and, at certain times, in the daily lives of adolescent boys.
Beyond Poststructuralism

This thesis assumes a non-subject centred approach to theorising and researching adolescent masculinities, which is informed by the interpretive analytics of Foucault (1991; 1993) and Hunter (1984a; 1991a; 1994a; 1995). Such an approach does not necessarily preclude a discussion of subjectivity or an analysis of the role of the subject in taking up particular forms of masculinity. The point is, rather, that subjectivity is irreducible to the subject as actor or to a general principle of language or discourse as the basis for constituting identity or making meaning (see also Hindess, 1989; Moon, 1993). That is, the limits of accounting for the production of adolescent masculinities by grounding the formation of subjectivity in the discursive space of consciousness are specified (see Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). Thus, no attempt is made to appeal to discourse as a foundational basis for understanding the ways in which adolescent boys enact their masculinities. It is in this sense that an alternative theorisation of masculinities, which deviates from current poststructuralist modes of thinking, is proposed.

Weedon (1987) provides an example of a poststructuralist mode of theorisation which appeals to the discursive space of consciousness as the privileged site for the formation of subjectivity:

For post-structuralist theory the common factor in the analysis of social organisation, social meanings, power and individual consciousness is language. Language is the place where actual and possible forms of social organisation and their likely social and political consequences are defined and contested. Yet it is also the place where our sense of ourselves, our subjectivity, is constructed. The assumption that subjectivity is constructed implies that it is not innate, not genetically determined, but socially produced. Subjectivity is produced in a whole range of discursive practices - economic, social and political - the meanings of which are a constant site of struggle over power. Language is not the expression of unique individuality; it constructs the individual's subjectivity in ways which
are socially specific. Moreover for poststructuralism, subjectivity is neither unified nor fixed. Unlike humanism, which implies a conscious, knowing, unified, rational subject, poststructuralism theorises subjectivity as a site of disunity and conflict, central to the process of political change and to preserving the status quo (p 21).

Veeland’s poststructuralist theory of subjectivity proposes language as the foundation for making meaning and establishing identity (see also Gutman, 1994; Martino, 1993; Davies, 1994). Meaning, it is assumed, ‘is constituted within language and is not guaranteed by the subject which speaks’ (22). This approach, which theorises the subject as an effect of language that is socially and culturally constituted, however, is limited in its capacity to explain the complexity of the social, cultural and historical forces at play in the emergence of particular categories of the self (see Mauss, 1973; 1985). Poststructuralist theory is unable to theorise adequately the historically emergent forms of rationality that govern the conduct of the self and the relation of the self to the self (see Foucault, 1988i; 1993).

Veeland focuses on a deconstructive emancipatory politics grounded in the realm of the discursive and which is dependent on Althusserian notions of ideology:

Language in the form of what Althusser calls ‘ideology in general’, is the means by which individuals are governed by the ideological state apparatuses in the interests of the ruling class (gender, or racial group). The way in which ideology functions for the individual, according to Althusser, is by interpelling her as a subject, that is constituting her subjectivity for her in language. Whereas subjectivity appears obvious to the individual, it is an effect of ideology.....This process relies on a structure of recognition by the individual of herself as the subject of ideology which is also a process of misrecognition. It is misrecognition in the sense that the individual, on assuming the position of subject in ideology,
assumes that she is the author of the ideology which constructs her subjectivity (pp 30-31).

By regarding the subject as an effect of ideology, a political agenda is set as a consequence. The subject is conceived of as blinded, but through a deconstructive cultural analytics of the self, critical awareness will be restored, granting the ability to see through the ideological distortions of society. There is a fundamental circularity built into this mode of rationality. Language, which is ideological, constructs subjectivity, but subjectivity is the ground on which critical consciousness is achieved. In other words, as Hunter (1994b) argues, the poststructuralist concept of critical consciousness promises the formation of a critically aware individual who, as a consequence of engaging in a deconstructive discursive analytics of the self, will be able to freely choose which values to adopt and which course of action to take in life. This rests on the assumption that the formation of specific capacities are already there to begin with - but blocked in some way. Thus, in Weedon's case, subjectivity is produced in and through language, but the subject is also suffering from misrecognition. However, this position relies on the premise that once such ideological distortions are recognised, the emergence of an alternative subjectivity becomes a possibility.

This critical emphasis on Weedon' account of subjectivity, in which normalising regimes of practice are subordinated to the formation of the subject in language, has implications for the theorisation of adolescent masculinities as it is proposed in this thesis. Here, 'masculinity' is theorised as an effect of a specific ensemble of practices and imperatives for behaving and acting which vary according to the requirements of specific social occasions in their 'complex mundanity'.

The Limits of Discourse Analysis

Poststructuralism's focus on the centrality of language in the formation of subjectivity, as illustrated by Weedon, necessitates a focus on analysing the ways in which particular
discourses are implicated in knowledge/power relations (Cherryholmes, 1987). Discourse, as a central category of analysis, is defined by many poststructuralists as a particular way of seeing, talking, thinking and writing about the world which involves questions of power and ideology that are ultimately grounded in the capacity of discursive formations to both determine and reconstruct subjectivity (see Kress, 1985; Davies, 1992; 1994; Janks, 1997). Discourse analysis, therefore, involves identifying the capacity of specific discursive formations to construct particular versions of reality and, hence, subjectivities. The relations of power involved are seen as mediated via language as a semiotic system which organises human experience (Kress, 1985). However, the limits of such an approach to theorising and researching masculinities are highlighted in this thesis in terms of addressing the various ways in which norms become implanted within the specifiable regimes of practice in which adolescent boys learn to conduct themselves as particular incumbents of the category of 'masculinity' on certain occasions (Coleman, 1990).

Hunter's (1991a) work is useful in this regard because it draws attention to a problematic circularity in which the subject is proposed as both determined by language, but also self-determining via access to particular empowering discourses. Hunter's discussion of discourse analysis, as it is framed within the interdisciplinary field of cultural and literary studies, forms the basis for drawing attention to an alternative mode of theorising masculinities, one which attempts to avoid grounding subjectivity in a dialectical bind involving the oscillation between the poles of culture-determining subject and self-determining subject. Within a regime which deploys such forms of rationality the theorisation of subjectivity is often driven by an imperative to reconcile the oppositional categories of self and society in the discursive space of consciousness.

Hunter (1991a) draws attention to 'the moment in which the formal structure of language enters into a fundamental yet ambivalent relation with the subject who speaks it or with the context in which it is spoken' by focussing on Todorov's (1968) structural analysis of
literary discourses. This forms a basis for exploring the 'grey area between structuralism and post-structuralism':

At the most general level it is assumed that the various kinds of human agency and capacity are local adumbrations of a single general (epistemic) capacity or process, subjectivity. And it is held that language has a fundamental relation to subjectivity, whether the relation is that of expression, determination or (typically) mutual constitution. The project to reconstruct our understanding of subjectivity by tying it to a theoretical description of language or language-like processes is what is generally meant by the term 'structuralism'. Todorov's (formalist) version of this project is centred in the claim that theoretical semiotics and linguistics, having discovered the structures of signification common to all language use, can provide a general account of the relation between language and subjectivity (p 36).

Hunter's discussion of the structuralist appropriation of the category of literature as discourse by Todorov enables attention to be drawn to the remarkable similarity in the ways in which literature - and by implication it is argued here masculinity - emerges within the field of poststructuralism. In fact, he claims that poststructuralism is not 'post-discursive'. Instead, it reasserts a fundamental relation between subjectivity and language.

Hunter claims that such a reconceptualisation of the link between language and subjectivity is misconceived:

Two closely related questions are at issue: first, whether there is a general domain of discourse (or 'discursive formations') of which 'literary discourse' might form a part or from which it might emerge as a special form; second, whether literature is understandable in terms of its discursive character or by virtue of belonging to a particular discursive formation (p 37).
These comments are pertinent to the argument elaborated in this thesis regarding poststructuralist conceptualisations of gender and masculinity as domains of discourse. Firstly, this thesis does not treat masculinity as an effect of discourse or as emerging from a general discursive domain. Furthermore, it does not treat masculinity as comprehensible in terms of its discursive formation or constitution within discourse (see Martino, 1993; Davies, 1993). In analysing the ways in which adolescent boys establish their masculinities, no attempt will be made to take discourse as a privileged domain or surface of emergence for the formation of subjectivities. In following Hunter's (1991a) line of argument, an alternative theorisation of masculinities and gender is elaborated, one which does not treat subjectivity as manifest in the structure of language (see also Moon, 1993; Mellor, 1992). Nor does it treat the structure of language as providing some privileged access to the subjectivity of adolescent boys. It is argued, alternatively, that forms of masculinity are tied to the deployment of an ensemble of institutional practices and techniques of the self which cannot be subordinated to a regime of discursive practices in which subjectivity emerges as a teleological foundation.

In short, the analytic focus in this thesis is on investigating the various techniques and strategies that adolescent boys use to establish their masculinities on certain occasions. Moreover, it is emphasised that this can be achieved without raising general questions about subjectivity and thereby grounding an analysis of masculinities in a fundamental relation between language and subjectivity (see Hunter, 1991: 51). Thus, it is the deployment of particular forms of rationality and the mobilisation of particular discourses around the category of 'masculinity' within specific regimes and ensembles of practices that is the object of analysis in this thesis (see Hearn, 1996). The aim, therefore, is to explore the various strategies that adolescent boys use to enact particular forms of masculinity and the occasions on which they do so.

Hunter draws on the work of Wittgenstein (1958) to offer an alternative theorisation of language as a tool which is used according to the regimes within which it is deployed. He
argues that language is not linked to that moment in which the subject speaks or writes him/herself into existence (see Weedon, 1988). In fact, Wittgenstein, like Mauss (1973; 1985), attempts to disengage or unhinge that fundamental relationship between human capacities and the structure of language (see Greenfield, 1990; McHoul & O'Regan, 1990). However, it is a welding of thought to structural language processes and, hence, to the formation of a fundamental subjectivity as constituted within discourse that Hunter wants to dismantle:

I begin by mobilising Wittgenstein's argument that there is no general set of relations linking the structure of language and the phenomenon of subjectivity; that is, no general domain of discourse in the sense required by structuralist and post-structuralist theories of discourse and writing. Wittgenstein's disengagement of the organisation of human capacities from the structure of language suggests that there is no single privileged surface - discourse, text, writing - on which the various technologies of subjectivity can be revealed to linguistic or literary analysis (p 37).

What this suggests, for the purposes of the argument proposed in this thesis about adolescent masculinities, is that the characteristics or forms of masculinity as they are described within specific fields of analysis in the social sciences and cultural studies, cannot be treated merely as an effect of discourse. 'Masculinity' cannot derive its status as an object of analysis that is grounded in discourse or discursive formations. To continue to undertake lines of inquiry which assume a link between language and subjectivity is to limit understanding of the ways in which masculinities are enacted and tied to a historically contingent ensemble of techniques that are deployed according to the situationally specific requirements of particular social occasions. In short, it is by shifting frames of analysis to a focus on technologies of subjectivity and the notion of the apparatus or dispositif that Hunter elaborates a Foucauldian field of inquiry which makes available a different way of thinking about subjectivity.
It is within this frame that it is possible to link particular inherited forms of masculinity to regimes of practices and imperatives for self-problematisation that are variations of earlier technologies of the self. In other words, particular forms of subjectivity or categories of the person (Mauss, 1985) have been reworked within Christian pastoral and psychoanalytic models for investigating the self which require a type of self-questioning and moral invigilation (see Foucault, 1993; 1985; 1986; Rose, 1989; Hutton, 1988). This involves individuals learning to regulate themselves according to a specific assemblage of norms for governing their conduct. Thus, in these terms, the formation of subjectivity is tied to specific kinds of technologies of the self in which individualising and normalising practices have a significant role to play.

Hunter’s discussion of discourse and its role as a fundamental category of analysis in the human sciences is worth pursuing because it provides a theoretical basis for the position taken in this thesis regarding the attribution and establishment of various forms of masculinity in the lives of adolescent boys. He undertakes an analysis of Benveniste’s (1971) solipsistic account of subjectivity which is situated within the framework of discourse. Hunter argues that, for Benveniste, language, as a notation or symbolic system for making meaning, becomes the putative source of subjectivity. According to Benveniste, the subject is realised or expressed through language. Moreover, such a theory is grounded in a fundamental dialectics in which ‘man inhabits language and language inhabits man (sic)’ (Hunter, 1991: 38):

It is in and through language that man (sic) constitutes himself as a subject, because language alone establishes the concept of ‘ego’ in reality which is that of the being...Now we hold that ‘subjectivity’...is only the emergence in the being of a fundamental property of language. Ego is he who says ‘ego’. That is where we see the foundation of ‘subjectivity’ which is determined by the linguistic status of ‘person’ (Benveniste, 1971, quoted in Hunter, 1991: 38).
This discussion by Benveniste is undertaken in relation to the referential capacity of the first person pronoun to bring into being the speaking subject. On the one hand, language is accorded the privileged status of realising the possibility of subjectivity, and on the other, subjectivity or personhood is guaranteed expression in and through language. It is in this sense that the first person pronoun remains an abstract entity until it is spoken by the speaking subject and thereby called into discourse as an expression of individual personhood:

Language is accordingly the possibility of subjectivity because it always contains the linguistic forms appropriate to the expression of subjectivity ... In the same way language puts forth "empty" forms which each speaker, in the exercise of discourse, appropriates to himself and which he relates to his person, at the same time defining himself as I and a partner as you (Benveniste quoted in Hunter, 1991a: 38).

The circularity of such a dialectical theorisation of the subject, as both constituted by language and as language constituting subjectivity, is highlighted by Hunter (1991a). Furthermore, he argues that the limitations of Benveniste's argument can be explained in terms of a fundamental oscillation between two poles ie. the subject as designated in language and the language which is an expression of that subjectivity. Hunter claims that it is this relation between the 'subject of enunciation' and the 'subject of the enounced' which is brought to bear on the language-subject nexus:

In the first place, the oscillation between subjectivity as an effect of language and as the point where language is realised means that language and subjectivity come to mirror each other as complementary, exhaustive and essential totalities. On the one hand, the subject forms a totality because it inherits the systemic whole of language: 'Language is so organised that it permits each speaker to appropriate to himself an entire language by designating himself as I.' On the other hand, language forms a totality because the subject is indeed the unity-in-consciousness
of all its capacities and therefore requires an appropriately integral and holistic means of expression (Hunter, 1991a: 39).

It is precisely this mirroring of language and subjectivity which is at the basis of current poststructuralist conceptualisations of subjectivity (see Davies, 1993; 1994; 1996; 1997). Weedon (1987), for example, argues that it is through language as 'conflicting discourses' that we are constructed as subjects, but adds that there is also a sense of the subject drawing on a range of discourses to construct him/herself as a particular kind of subject. Built into such a dialectical theorisation of subjectivity are notions of agency at the basis of which is an emancipatory practice:

Like Althusserian Marxism, feminist poststructuralism makes the primary assumption that it is language which enables us to think, speak and give meaning to the world around us. Meaning and consciousness do not exist outside language. Stated in this way, poststructuralist theory may seem to resemble a range of humanist discourses which take consciousness and language as fundamental human attributes. Yet in all poststructuralist discourses, subjectivity and rational consciousness are themselves put into question. We are neither the authors of the ways in which we understand our lives, nor are we unified rational beings. For feminist poststructuralism, it is language in the form of conflicting discourses which constitutes us as conscious thinking subjects and enables us to give meaning to the world. (Weedon, 1987: 32)

The subject is constituted in discourse, but can also construct meaning by his/her very location in a field of conflicting discourses in which meaning cannot be fixed, but is always slippery and contradictory. This point is taken up further by Weedon in relation to discourses on gender:

Language, in the form of an historically specific range of ways of giving meaning to social reality, offers us various discursive positions, including modes of
femininity and masculinity, through which we can consciously live our lives. A glance at women's magazines, for example, reveals a range of often competing subject positions offered to women readers, from career woman to romantic heroine, from successful wife and mother to irresistible sexual object. These different positions which magazines construct in their various features, advertising and fiction are part of the battle to determine the day to day practices of family life, education work and leisure. How women understand the sexual division of labour, for example, whether in the home or in paid work, is crucial to its maintenance or transformation. Discourses of femininity and masculinity bear centrally on this understanding and it is in this sense that language in the form of various discourses is, in Louis Althusser's terms, the place in which we represent to ourselves our 'lived relation' to our material conditions of existence (Althusser, 1971). (Weedon, 1987: 25-26).

The effects and limitations of such a dialectical theorisation of gender as discourse are once again evident. While masculinity and femininity, on the one hand, are treated as effects of discourses which determine subject positions, we as subjects, on the other hand, are in a position 'to represent to ourselves the 'lived relation' to our material conditions of existence'. Thus, since we are 'conscious thinking subjects' (Weedon, 1987: 26), we are able to constitute alternative forms of gendered subjectivity which are not fixed in anatomical biological differences between males and females. Hence, the elaboration of gender as socially constructed in discourse serves as a precondition for an emancipatory politics. In this way, a threshold is established around the language-subject relation (of which Hunter, 1991a, speaks in relation to Benveniste, 1971) as a means of setting the political agenda of feminism. This, of course, is expressed in the capacity to elaborate alternative discourses of femininity and masculinity so that breaking free from the chains of the ideological bonds which fix masculinity and femininity in biological sex differences can be realised:
Experience is not something which language reflects. In so far as it is meaningful experience is constituted in language. Language offers a range of ways of interpreting our lives which imply different versions of experience. In the process of interacting with the world, we give meaning to things by learning linguistic processes of thought and speech, drawing on the ways of understanding the world to which we have access. Yet it is possible to transform the meaning of experience by bringing a different set of assumptions to bear on it ... The recognition that experience is open to contradictory and conflicting interpretations puts into question the ideas that language is transparent and expresses already fixed meanings...Poststructuralism also necessarily questions the sovereignty of subjectivity as the guarantee of meaning. Meaning can have no external guarantee and subjectivity itself is an effect of discourse. If language is the site where meaningful experience is constituted, then language also determines how we perceive possibilities of change. Language in this sense consists of a range of discourses which offer different versions of the meaning of social relations and their effects on the individual. The way in which we interpret these social relations has important political consequences (Weedon, 1987: 85-86).

The point is that, for Weedon, gender enters this language-subject relation within the framework of discourse analysis which leads her (and other poststructuralists) into a dialectical mode of inquiry that is essentially discursive and, it is argued here, limited in its capacity to theorise the complex mundanity of everyday life in terms of gender (see also Gutterman, 1994). The oscillation between language and subject, which characterises Weedon's argument, is informed by a particular form of rationality that works to reconcile opposite poles of dialectical discourse. In the above instance, the shifting between a totalising subject on the one hand, and a deterministic view of language as discourse on the other, is reconciled in the space created by poststructuralism whereby meaning, as a linguistic phenomenon, becomes conceptualised as indeterminate and contradictory according to specific cultural, social and historical contingencies. In this way, subjectivity as an effect of discourse is welded to the notion that subjects
themselves have the capacity to reconstruct and constitute their subjectivity by accessing alternative discourses (see also Sawicki, 1994).

It is this dialecticism and circularity which Hunter targets in his criticism of Benveniste's (1971) treatment of language and subjectivity:

... this circular mirroring of language and subjectivity gives a kind of necessity to the organisation of a particular notation or symbol system and to the organisation of subjectivity. After all, if the referential peculiarities of I are indeed responsible for the formation of subjectivity in language, then we cannot imagine a language without this notation, or some version of it.: 'It is a remarkable fact ... that the 'personal pronouns' are never missing from among signs of a language, no matter what its type, epoch, or region may be. A language without the expression of person cannot be imagined'. If this were the case, then we could be assured that in describing a particular notation or text we were not just describing a merely scriptorial, grammatical, lexical or rhetorical artefact. We would be assured of capturing the very contours of human subjectivity as these have been realised in language. It is this assurance that makes Benveniste's account of enunciation into a representative instance of discourse analysis (Hunter, 1991a: 39).

These observations may be applied to Weedon's conceptualisation of the subject as realised in discourse. Language as discourse not only constitutes the subject, but the subject is able to constitute itself through access to discourse, thereby ensuring that the 'very contours of human subjectivity' are captured and realised in language. Poststructuralism, therefore, becomes in a sense, a variant of the structuralist conceptualisation of the language-subject relation in that it treats language as the privileged site where 'the expression of the person can be imagined' (Benveniste, 1971, quoted in Hunter, 1991a: 39)
Hunter (1984a: 1991a) draws on the work of Wittgenstein (1953; 1958; 1980) to propose quite a different theorisation of subjectivity from that presented by Weedon (1987) and Benveniste (1971) - one which is not tied to language in its fundamental representational capacity to realise the subject in consciousness. For instance, Wittgenstein reconceptualises the first person pronoun in terms of the variety of uses that can be made of the word. Language is presented as a *tool* which is deployed in its functional capacity within specific regimes of practice. Thus, 'I' depending on its use does not necessarily have to refer to the subject of experience in a reflexive way. In fact, Wittgenstein (1958) challenges the notion that language provides some privileged epistemic access to the subject of consciousness:

The word 'I' does not mean the same as 'L.W.' [i.e., Ludwig Wittgenstein] even if I am L.W., nor does it mean the same as the expression 'the person who is now speaking'. But that doesn't mean: that 'L.W.' and 'I' mean different things. All that it means is that these words are different instruments in our language (Wittgenstein, 1958: 67) (my emphasis).

Wittgenstein (1953;1969) also writes that we must be wary of confusing a name that is given to a person with the meaning of a name:

When Mr N.N. dies, one says that the bearer of a name dies, not that the meaning dies (1953: I, 40).

In the light of such philosophical investigations into language use, Hunter (1991a) argues that it is misguided to treat language as referring, in some privileged way, to the subject of consciousness. He writes that the use of the pronoun 'I' is not referential in its capacity to guarantee access to the consciousness of the subject who speaks it:
Wittgenstein’s argument is that when we privilege the word *I* we implicitly compare expressions like ‘I have a toothache’ with ones like ‘I have a dollar in my pocket’. These expressions are similar, we feel like saying, except for the fact that in the former case only I can discover whether the statement is true; hence such statements must refer in a privileged way - in the ‘instance of discourse’ - to the experience of the person who utters them. But this is misguided. The fact that - unlike ‘I have a dollar in my pocket’ - the use of the expression ‘I have a toothache’ is not determined by (dis)confirmatory techniques and practices shows that these expressions are not both instances of ‘referring’. The toothache is not hidden in me like the coins are hidden in my pocket; and my expression of pain is not a referential statement that anyone - me included - might later discover to be true or false. The use of expressions like ‘I have a toothache’ is closer to that of cries and other expressions of pain, which is not to make referential statements about the person who utters them (Hunter, 1991: 40).

The point that Hunter makes is that language can provide no guaranteed access to a putative consciousness, which is buried within the hermeneutic subject, as a means of accounting for his/her experience. Similarly, this thesis argues that language, in the ‘instance of discourse’, provides no privileged access to the consciousness of adolescent boys. Rather, it is conceptualised as a tool or instrument in what Hunter (1991a) terms ‘a patchwork of techniques of living’ (p40). It is this focus on techniques and regimes of practices in which adolescent boys are implicated that becomes the focus of analysis in the construction of adolescent masculinities. Language use or discourse within this analytical frame is not tied to a fundamental grounding of meaning in consciousness. Rather, discourses are mobilised and deployed within specific regimes of practice which are related to governmental strategies and apparatuses (See Hunter 1994a).

The notion of a ‘patchwork’ is important in this theorisation of masculinities because the techniques and strategies that are used by adolescent boys in establishing various masculinities are variable and linked to specific social occasions and historical
contingencies which need not be welded to the founding of the subject in consciousness. In other words, it is argued here, there is no general theory of masculinities as grounded in the representational capacities of language as a privileged site for the emergence and constitution of subjectivity. In short, the 'patchwork of techniques' which are deployed by adolescent boys in their day to day lives are irreducible to language as an instance of discourse and, therefore, no general claims about masculinities as founded in consciousness can be supported (see also Moon, 1993).

'Departments of Existence' and the Formation of Masculinities

The concept of 'departments of existence' is useful in further developing an understanding of this 'patchwork of techniques' and the role of language in the formation of subjectivity:

... if we consider the various uses of the word I - to conclude an algebraic equation, to confess a sin, to plead or convict in a court of law, to enunciate in a lyric poem - there is no general reason to assume that a common foundation (subjectivity) underlies the different utilisations, or that such a foundation is provided by the notational system to which the word belongs. The algebraic calculus, the apparatus of the confession, the procedures of the court room, the techniques of lyrical address are autonomous techniques of living belonging to what Weber calls different departments of existence. Each such department is responsible for forming, inculcating and preserving particular kinds of human capacity and agency. For Wittgenstein these different forms of agency and capacity have no unified (nor indeed 'dispersed') home in the human subject, person or consciousness, because they are formed and maintained elsewhere, in the underground practices and techniques of autonomous 'forms of living' (Lebensformen). Thus Wittgenstein rejects the notion that language might provide a philosophically privileged surface or form - such as Benveniste's instance of
enunciation - where the contents of subjectivity might be inspected through the
structure that forms them (Hunter, 1991: 41).

In appropriating Wittgenstein, Hunter argues that since language use is tied to particular
spheres of life or departments of existence; it cannot be understood in its referential
capacity to ground subjectivity in consciousness. Subjectivity, therefore, can have no
general form which is realised through language in the consciousness of the individual:

Subjectivity on Wittgenstein's accounting can have no general form and find no
home in the consciousness of the individual person because it is simply a tag for a
disconnected motley of historical techniques of living, forms of
calculation, institutes of personal and social organisation, and so on. But neither
can 'discourse' or 'language' - in the sense of a notation shaping and expressing
subjectivity - have a general form or a single theoretical description, for the same
reason. The form of a notation, its way of referring to subjects, its use by
individuals, will vary with its instrumental role in a particular form of calculation
or technique of living (Hunter, 1991: 41) (my emphasis).

Hunter's reference to the 'disconnected motley of historical techniques of living' is
important in that it highlights the variegated and haphazard ways in which certain
techniques are deployed as conditions of possibility for the emergence of historically
contingent and socially specific forms of subjectivity. That is, there is no general form of
subjectivity. Rather, certain techniques and strategies, which are not necessarily instances
of discourse, operate under certain conditions of possibility that are determined by their
attachment to a specific department of existence and to a range of ad hoc historical
contingencies and practices. Within such a framework, the focus is on attempting to
identify the strategies that adolescent boys use in enacting particular forms of masculinity
according to the imperatives for behaving, thinking and acting as 'a man' that are specific
to particular social occasions.
It is argued here that capacities for enacting masculinities are formed, not within the individual or grounded in consciousness, but maintained through the deployment of a motley of techniques of the self which are linked to a range of 'departments of existence'. Hence, while boys' language is focused on in this thesis and used as data, it is not treated as an instance of discourse in the general explanatory sense of the word and, hence, as the privileged site for the emergence of subjectivity. Rather, it is treated as a tool which is used according to the dictates of specific imperatives and requirements for behaving which are related to and vary according to the particular social occasion or context. It is in this sense, it is argued, that the behaviour of adolescent boys and the strategies they use in the construction of their masculinities have a practical and contingent role in that they are 'variously formed in a patchwork of techniques' (Hunter, 1991: 42).

Thus, the focus in this thesis is on identifying specific capacities that boys have acquired in establishing their masculinities and exploring the techniques and strategies that they use to do so. Rather than conceptualising such strategies and techniques as discursive formations, they are treated as social practices which are maintained and developed within and across particular departments of existence. It is argued that gendered capacities are formed and maintained through involvement in a regime of practices and techniques of the self for conducting oneself according to the assemblage of quite specific and historically variable norms.

It is Hunter's (1984a; 1991a) use of Wittgenstein which provides the basis for his shift from a critique of a discursive subject-centred interpretative analytics to a post-discursive appropriation of the dispositif or apparatus. However, he is careful not to propose the dispositif as a new foundation for analysis of the subject which merely replaces the instance of discourse as the moment of the self-realising subject in language. In fact, Hunter (1991) undertakes a critical appraisal of Foucault's (1972) formulation of discourse in The Archaeology of Knowledge. Despite the fact that Foucault is careful not to identify discourse - ie. the statements and the relations that exist between them - with language by linking it to the non-linguistic domain of the technical, economic and
political, Hunter claims that Foucault cannot escape the ghosts of structuralism (see Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). This is because discursive formations appear as the privileged site of analysis whereby the positivity and contingency of historical relations in the formation of objects of knowledge become submerged under a single point of realisation in language. The sorts of historical relations, contingencies and grids of specification which allow particular objects such as madness to appear on specific surfaces of emergence are subordinated to a single register of discursive formations. The effect of this, according to Hunter (1991a), is to reinvoke the 'language' and 'subject' relation in the instance of the discursive formation as the a priori for describing the positivity and contingency of various groups of historical relations in which objects are given to knowledge. In other words, Foucault subordinates a patchwork set of descriptions of various historical domains to their conditions of possibility as discursive formations. In this way, a synthetic systematicity and uniformity are bestowed upon complex and contingent relations that lead to the formation and emergence of specific objects within particular apparatuses such as psychiatry.

In response to our imagined objection, then, we can reject the thesis that the historical motley of techniques of living - those unimaginably diverse forms of 'civilisation and its institutions' - are fundamentally 'discursive' and occupy a single theoretical space, the 'archive'. The idea that the various fields addressed by Foucault - psychiatry, police and prisons, government, personal ethics - can all be included in the domain of discourse is the result of a misconceived programme of philosophical reflection: one that meretriciously problematises positive groups of historical relations; attempts to recast them as a priori 'rules' or conditions of possibility; falsely privileges 'discourse' as the synthetic articulation of these relations; and consequently collapses the most diverse organisations of agency into a single surface or organon, speech and the human speaker (Hunter, 1991: 46).
This thesis, therefore, argues that discourse analysis, as it is framed within the field of poststructuralism, is inadequate as a tool for analysing the emergent forms of masculinities in the lives of adolescent boys. The 'heterogeneous techniques of living' associated with the various departments of existence in which boys' lives and practices are situated cannot be allowed to collapse into the single privileged surface of the discursive formation. Rather, the ensemble of instruments, techniques and regimes of practice, put to work within the various apparatuses and departments of existence in which adolescent boys find themselves, need to be traced in relation to the specific occasion of behaviour that becomes the object of scrutiny. In short, this is to assert the following in relation to how an analysis of adolescent masculinities is treated in this thesis:

... that 'subjectivity' has no general form and instead functions as a tag for a dispersed array of 'techniques of living' (groups of historical relations, dispositifs) which form objects of knowledge and human capacities in a whole host of different ways; and that the role of linguistic notations among these techniques is not fundamental and general but contingent and variable depending on the organisation of the ensemble of techniques itself (Hunter, 1991: 51).

Hence, the focus in this thesis is not to ask the question why in accounting for the conduct of adolescent boys on particular occasions. Rather, the focus is on exploring how they deploy specific techniques of the self-formed and maintained elsewhere - for enacting stylised modes of behaviour which become identifiable as instances of enacting masculinity according to the assemblage of quite specific norms (see Nayak & Kehily, 1996; Redman, 1996; Epstein, 1997; Dixon, 1997). Hence, attention is drawn to identifying the strategies boys use to establish their masculinities and the occasion for doing so. Such an approach attempts to avoid the theoretical cul de sac which culminates in a circularity that is tied to oscillating between the two poles of 'subject' and 'language'. This swinging pendulum, which constitutes the subject-language relation, is ultimately reconciled in a synthetic realisation of the subject in language as an instance of discourse.
In refusing to treat masculinity as an effect of discourse, this thesis avoids a repetitive thematics that has characterised both structuralist and poststructuralist accounts of the subject.

**Representation and Subjectivity**

Hunter's (1984a) discussions about the role that is accorded to the representational capacities of language in the formation of subjectivity are also significant in terms of their application to developing the argument elaborated in this thesis with regards to theorising masculinities. His comments on aesthetic-moral and formalist approaches to reading literature are used as a further basis for articulating a post-discursive approach to theorising and researching masculinities (see Hunter, 1988a). He claims, in fact, that in both approaches literary representation of human experience is an effect of a body of techniques formed inside the apparatus of literary pedagogy. He moves away from grounding meaning in a discursive relation between reader, text, context by focussing on the uses of texts inside such an apparatus. Hunter claims that English teaching borrows a body of techniques derived from 'those of the seminar of conscience' which permit students to read the text as representing not only the inner life of the author and but also the outer life of the society. In this way, pedagogical practices are deployed to enable a particular kind of work on the self, involving moral self-problematisation, to be undertaken.

The point of such a post-discursive analysis of reading practices, for the purposes of the argument elaborated in this thesis about the formation of masculinities, is that an approach which grounds representation in an instance of discourse or discursive formations is severely limited in its capacity to account for the processes of subjectification. The experience of adolescent boys, it is argued here, cannot be grounded in the discursive formation of subjectivity. Boys' social practices and learning cannot be discussed without paying attention to the imposition, regulation and maintenance of norms which are established through the relations formed inside various apparatuses and
technologies of living. Within this framework of the *dispositif*, it is possible to examine the 'language games', to use Wittgenstein's (1958) term, that are played according to the techniques and rules that are established within such apparatuses and in which the lives of boys are enmeshed:

Think of words as instruments characterised by their use, and then think of the use of a hammer, the use of a chisel, the use of a square, of a glue pot, and of glue. (Also, all that we say here can be understood only if one understands that a great variety of games is played with the sentences of our language: giving and obeying orders; asking questions and answering them; describing an event; telling a fictitious story; telling a joke; describing an immediate experience; making conjectures about events in the physical world, making hypotheses and theories; greeting someone, etc., etc. (Wittgenstein, 1958: 67-68).

The effect of such philosophical investigations undertaken by Wittgenstein into the nature of language use is to unhinge the relation between language and thought processes or meaning. He does this by introducing the metaphor of the game and its accompanying notion of following rules or orders which are not necessarily instigated in discourse, but rather brought into play within the context of the *dispositif*.

Hunter (1984a) also takes up this line of argument and calls into question the notion that individuals are connected to the social domain through the representational capacity of language to render experience in consciousness. Experience, he claims, cannot be accessed via a single universal process grounded in the capacity of language to represent reality:

In other words, there is no single form of relation to social reality forming a continuous backdrop against which different norms, pleasures and political judgements can be measured. (Hunter, 1984: 406)
Thus, what counts as reality or experience cannot be subordinated to the discursive, but must be described according to the specific deployment of particular techniques and technologies in the formation of particular subjectivities.

This view of subjectivity relates to the treatment of masculinities in this thesis. It is argued here that the kinds of relations existing between adolescent boys and the various institutions in which their learning takes place cannot be explained in terms of their capacity to represent their experiences via the single register of discursive formations. An attempt is made to explore the complexity of boys' instrumental use of language within specific apparatuses and the rules for governing their conduct in terms of gender. The emphasis is placed on demonstrating that specific norms governing the behaviour of adolescent boys on specific occasions are not founded in language or its representational capacities, but are deployed within a regime of normalising practices for regulating and policing sex/gender boundaries (see Epstein, 1994; 1997; Nayak & Kehily, 1996).

'Masculinity' as a 'Dispersed Array' of Practical Capacities

Central to the position argued in this thesis is the notion that there is no general relation between the experience of adolescent boys and the world or social contexts in which they are situated (see Hunter, 1984a). Rather, to behave as a man is an occasional matter (Coleman, 1990). Moreover, it requires learning quite specific capacities which are built up in a piecemeal fashion depending on the forms of training and relations embodied in specific social technologies and apparatuses such as the family and school. Mac an Ghaill (1994), however, in appropriating a feminist deconstructivist approach, accounts for the formation of masculinities quite differently:

Feminist deconstruction theory has been important in moving beyond social reproduction models that assume that teachers and subjects are unitary subjects occupying predictable power positions. Walkerdine (1990a: 3) has developed Foucault's work within a school context and describes how (female) teachers and
students 'are not unitary subjects uniquely positioned, but are produced as a
nexus of subjectivities in relations of power which are constantly shifting,
rendering them at one moment powerful and at another powerless' (see Henriques
et al. 1984: 225). This suggestion that there are a range of positions that may be
occupied within different contradictory discourses is useful in understanding the
contextual specificity of young heterosexual males learning to be male within a
school arena (11).

Once again, what characterises this approach to theorising masculinities is a rejection of
the totalising subject of humanist discourse in favour of the fundamental oscillation
between the subject as constituted by discourse and subject as agent with the capacity to
constitute him/herself through language as discourse. It is in this way, as Hunter (1984a)
argues, that the language-society equation is allowed to 'enter into a relation of circular
causality' (415). In other words, agency and an emancipatory politics become tied to a
discursive grounding of subjectivity as both constituted by and constitutive of a range of
discourses (see Gutterman, 1994).

Such a position, however, fails to take into consideration the complex mundanity of the
subject's relation to the social world (see Hindess, 1986; 1989; Cousins & Hussain,
1986; Hunter, 1994a). In fact, the point that Cousins and Hussain make about the
relation between social structure and agency, which becomes reconciled in
representations within Marxist theories of ideology, is pertinent to this critique of the
poststructuralist conceptualisation of agency implicit in the Mac an Ghaill passage quoted
above:

The precise point at which Marxist theories of ideology are completely embedded
in sociology is in the problem which may be called that of representations. For
arguments about the relation of social structure and human agency crystallise
around the issue of representations. Representations are the point of juncture
between social structure and human agency, which may be variously conceived as
a distinction between the society and the individual, or between the social and the
psychical, or between the mode of production and the subject. All such
dichotomies require a space in which the action of such elements work their way
into that product we call society. In this sense what Foucault has called the human
sciences since their inception have been centrally concerned with the issue of
representations, the realm in which the elements of structure and agency combine
to form that particular object of social totality (159).

What Cousins and Hussain point to here is another instance in sociological Marxist
theory of the oscillation between the two poles of subject as determined by social
structures and the subject as agent, both of which are reconciled in the subject's capacity
to represent her/himself in discourse. This point about the reconciliation of such
dichotomies in discourse is important, both for the purposes of the argument elaborated
in this thesis about the formation of masculinities, and in light of feminist postructuralist
accounts of subjectivity and agency (see Weedon, 1987; Henriques et al, 1984; Davies,
1993; Mac an Ghaill, 1994).

Sawicki (1994), in fact, provides an exemplary form of this circularity in her grounding
of feminist politics in the relation between subjectivity and society which becomes
coeextensive with language:

Of course, to claim that the subject and its identifications are mere effects of
practices of signification is not to claim that these effects are not real or that
identity is artificial and arbitrary. Discursive practices that construct gender are
rule-governed structures of intelligibility that both constrain and enable identity
formation. Seeing identity as neither wholly determined nor wholly arbitrary, the
view promulgated here attempts to move beyond the dichotomy of free will
versus determinism and to recognise the possibilities for critical and
transformative agency that do not require us to establish an absolute and
incontestable ground of knowledge and experience beyond relations of power
(300).

Here Sawicki, in struggling to come to terms with the problems of determination versus
agency, is forced to criticise and then rehabilitate each side of an equation in a seemingly
endless argument. This, however, is an effect her particular mode of theorising (see also
Weedon, 1987; Davies & Banks, 1992). In light of the investigations undertaken by
Hunter (1984a;1991a; 1994a), Cousins & Hussain (1986) and Foucault (1988i; 1988a;
1988b) it would appear erroneous to ground subjectivity and, by extension, masculinities
in the discursive space guaranteed by the subject's capacity to represent himself in
consciousness as the basis for elaborating an emancipatory politics.

Hunter (1984a) extends this point by drawing attention to the critical practices deployed
by Belsey (1980). By highlighting such practices, certain understandings about the ways
in which a general relation between language and subjectivity become established within a
specifiable dialectical framework can be applied to the theorisation of masculinities
elaborated in this thesis. In this way, it is possible to draw attention, not only to the limits
of a critical practice that collapses into a fundamental circularity involving the interplay
between social structure and agency, which are reconciled in the discursive space of
consciousness, but also to the pitfalls of applying such a critical practice to theorising and
researching masculinities.

Hunter critiques Belsey's post-Saussurean position precisely on this account of
reconciling the dichotomies between structure and agency in her treatment of subjectivity.
According to Hunter, Belsey, in her critique of structuralist accounts of expressive realist
discourse, is merely invoking a variant of the structuralist account of the relation between
subjectivity and language from which she claims to be escaping. At the basis of her
advocacy of a new critical practice within the field of literary studies is the assumption
that there is a general linguistic structure which is coextensive with thought or experience
of which expressive realism is but one instance. She identifies an approach to reading
which, she argues, treats the literary text as providing unmediated access to experience or reality since it is grounded in the discourse of expressive realism. To treat the text in this way, she argues, is to be blind to the effects of ideology. Thus, she advocates a *critical practice* which will draw the subject’s attention to her/his implication in such a discourse and the plural meanings that are possible within the relational chain of linguistic signifiers.

It is this critical practice which informs many poststructuralist accounts of theorising subjectivity (see Weedon, 1987; Davies, 1992; Sawicki, 1994). Once the subject realises that language is not transparent in its capacity to represent human experience, the possibility of multiple readings or subject positions is established as a basis for elaborating an emancipatory political agenda. Such an approach, however, is based on the notion that experience cannot be fixed within a linguistic system for making meaning. It is in this sense, according to Hunter, that Belsey merely appropriates the Althusserian concept of ideology in invoking the relation between subjectivity and language and grounding it in a general discursive frame or linguistic system in which desire becomes caught up with a chain of linguistic signifiers. Thus, the conception of a liberatory politics, centred on textuality and reading, becomes possible because the subject is now *free* to explore other meanings that are waiting to be discovered in the linguistic chain of signifiers. Hence, desire, like thought, in a Lacanian fashion, becomes coextensive with language as an instance of discourse:

In ideology the subject emerges from ... the double misrecognition (of structure and of other possible positions) involved in the recognition of experience, which thus serves as the general mechanism for ‘the subject’s entry into language’. Belsey’s specification of realism thus produces this huge category more or less identical to ideology, which is in turn more or less identical to representation as such. Everything from perfume advertisements and political speeches to the nineteenth-century novel fall under its sway. All involve the occlusion of linguistic conditions of possibility by the staging of experiences through which
subjects emerge in language at the price of misrecognising how they got there ...

It only remains to identify the plurality of other meanings in the chain with desire
and we can start to imagine that this new critical practice will overcome the fixing
of the subject in representation and ideology through a liberation of desire
(Hunter, 1984a: 415-416).

Thus, what Belsey (1980) provides is merely another example of what Cousins and
Hussain (1986) identify as the crystallisation of social structure and agency around
representations. Hunter, through his critique of Belsey, illustrates that forms of agency
and the subject's capacity for self-realisation have no general foundation in discourse or
in the signifying potentialities of language. Rather, he turns to a conceptualisation of
human subjects 'as bearers of a dispersed array of practical capacities' that are built up in
a piecemeal fashion through regimes of practices and techniques mobilised within a
patchwork of social apparatuses. In other words, he concludes it is limited to ground
'experience' in a single generalised linguistic structure.

Thus, it is argued here that there is no general discursive structure underlying the array of
capacities that adolescent boys build up in order to establish their masculinities. These
capacities are much too varied and piecemeal to be grounded in a signifying system
within which it is possible to situate boys' experiences of masculinity in all its variant
forms. That is, in drawing on a Hunterian theorisation of subjectivity, masculinities in
this thesis are presented as an effect of a dispersed array of capacities and social practices
which are tied to various departments of existence or technologies of living rather than to
general socio-linguistic conditions of possibility (see Kress, 1985; Halliday, 1989; Veel,
1995; Smith, 1996).

This concept of capacities is developed further in Wittgenstein's discussion of the role of
language games in identifying certain colour schemes. The point Wittgenstein (1977)
makes is that the capacity to identify or differentiate specific colours is not reducible to a
linguistic system in all its signifying and relational capacities. Rather, we are able to
identify specific colours as a result of learning particular rules that have been established within specific apparatuses. If we are unable to identify a particular colour combination such as 'bluish yellow' it is not that we are blinded by all possible colour combinations available within a linguistic system that offers unlimited possibilities for making meaning. It is that this organisation of colour schemes is not available and, therefore, cannot be deployed. Thus, our ability to identify such colours is linked to the practical mastery of a limited number of techniques as opposed to the realisation of all possible colours within a linguistic chain of signifiers (see Hunter, 1984: 419). Wittgenstein (1980) makes this point:

Let us imagine men who express an intermediate colour, between red and yellow, e.g. by means of a binary decimal fraction like this: R,LLRL and like, where, e.g yellow stands to the right, and red to the left. - already in their nursery school these people learn how to choose colours according to such descriptions, and they learn to mix them etc. They would stand to us in the relation of people with absolute pitch to people in whom this is wanting. They can do what we can't.

(112)

In other words, capacities for identifying colours and understanding colour concepts have no general conditions of possibility in language or discourse (see Hunter, 1984a). This applies equally to boys' gendered capacities for behaving, acting and thinking which are tied to establishing particular forms of masculinity. Boys act, think and behave in particular ways on specific occasions because they have learnt to do so according to the rules for manly conduct which are formed within various social apparatuses and technologies that are embodied in the institutions of the school and family. In this sense, boys learn how to behave in a particular way and acquire specific capacities 'to know their deviation from a norm':

No general account of representation is possible ... it makes no sense to imagine that the immense variety of techniques, procedures, notations and institutions
grouped under this heading have a single point of synthesis in what some individual or class thinks or experiences. Quite the reverse. The sort of things that we are prepared to call 'thinking' or 'experiencing' are wholly dependent on the partial, practical mastery we have of some elements of this variety. On the other hand, it is equally misleading to suppose a single opaque surface of experience (a surface in which all the possible forms of experience exist in some sort of undifferentiated and virtual state) and then to posit an equally general linguistic mechanism through which these forms are made available to subjects as so many instances of recognition. Capacities are not called into being in order to solve philosophical doubts about how experience is possible! All our discussions begin from our actual familiarity with some differentiated and limited capacities, with such and such a procedure, notation or technique. There is no single 'logic' or mechanism, for example, that of misrecognition, through which individuals become bearers of capacities (Hunter, 1984a: 426-27).

Thus, Hunter stresses that no general relation exists between the representational capacities of language and the formation of subjectivity in consciousness or within the realm of human experience. In light of such an account of subjectivity, the task of this thesis is to explore the piecemeal way in which adolescent boys' capacities for behaving in gender-specific ways are built up and deployed on specific occasions and in accordance with available forms of social organisation (See Hirst & Woolley, 1982).

Mauss: Gendered Attributes and Bodily Capacities

The conceptualisation of masculinities in this thesis is tied to a particular theorisation of the category of the person or notion of the self as it is elaborated by Mauss (1973; 1985). Mauss, like Hunter (1984; 1991; 1994; 1993; 1995), elaborates a theorisation of subjectivity which introduces notions of 'techniques of the body' and the production of desire. However, these concepts are not tied to drawing the category of the self into a language-subject relation as a foundational basis for the individual's entry into the social
domain of organised and politicised gendered relations (see Lacan, 1949; 1953; 1977; Owens, 1983; Jameson, 1984; Cixous & Clement, 1986; Grosz, 1986; Flax 1987; Scott, 1988; Felski, 1989/90). Mauss (1973; 1985) departs from such an attempt to situate the formation of subjectivity in its discursive relation to general social organisational structures such as patriarchy (see also Hirst & Woolley, 1982). In elaborating a theorisation of subjectivity which is irreducible to the discursive domain of identity politics, he focuses on the formation of human attributes and bodily capacities which are tied to categories of person and repertoires of conduct that are implicated in specific regimes of social practices, organisations and institutions. In this sense he avoids treating subjectivity as founded in the 'discursive space' of consciousness or experience.

Mauss's (1973) account of 'techniques of the body' has significant implications for the study of masculinities and their formation in the lives of adolescent boys. The shift to a domain of inquiry into the subject's relation to the social world which is not predicated on a linguistic system for making meaning is indicated by the use of the word techniques. Mauss, like Hirst and Woolley, emphasises that bodily and mental capacities are not naturally given, but are contingent upon social practices, cultural beliefs and the deployment of quite specific techniques which fall under the rubric of 'miscellaneous social phenomena' (Mauss, 1973: 71):

I deliberately say techniques of the body in the plural because it is possible to produce a theory of the technique of the body in the singular on the basis of a study, an exposition, a description pure and simple of techniques of the body in the plural. By this expression I mean the ways in which from society to society men know how to use their bodies (70).

In other words, Mauss does not propose a general or reductive theory of techniques of the body which is predicated on the notion of conduct as a mere extension or reflection of cultural beliefs. Rather, he points to the very specific ways in which such techniques are deployed across different cultures that are characterised by various systems of social
organisation and structures of thought. Moreover, his theorisation of subjectivity in these terms does not collapse into an oppositional relation between a deterministic social structure and a self-realising subject (see Cousins & Hussain, 1986). As Hirst and Woolley (1982) claim:

belief systems are not 'representations' with a logic of ideas which is revealed in 'consciousness', nor is that 'consciousness' itself a mere reflection of social beliefs ... we must be careful not to reduce conduct to an extension of belief systems and socially sanctioned requirements of action (28).

Mauss does not fall into this trap as he proceeds to provide a catalogue of the various ways in which the body is deployed across various cultural contexts and sites of social organisation. He provides a descriptive analysis of the ways in which particular capacities and attributes such as styles of walking, running, swimming, sitting, digging are bodily dispositions that are culturally acquired through 'prestigious imitation' and specific techniques of social training.

In all these elements of the art of using the human body, the facts of education were dominant. The notion of education could be superimposed on that of imitation. For there are particular children with very strong imitative faculties, others with very weak ones, but all of them go through the same education, such that we can understand the continuity of the concatenations. What takes place is prestigious imitation. The child, the adult, imitates actions which have succeeded and which he has seen successfully performed by people in whom he has confidence and who have authority over him. The action is imposed from without, from above, even if it is an exclusively biological action, involving his body. The individual borrows the series of movements which constitute it from the action executed in front of him or with him by others (73).
Such practices involving 'the art of using the human body' are forms of social training ('education' and 'imitation') that lead to building a repertoire of skills and capacities which cannot be conceptualised, according to Mauss, as given in nature:

To sum up there is no 'natural way' for the adult (74).

something we think of as normal, like giving birth lying on one's back, is no more normal than doing so in other positions, e.g. on all fours (79).

Mauss is careful not to fall into a circular mode of argumentation in which a theorisation of subjectivity and social relations becomes caught in a dialectical trap of oscillating between two poles. This mode of rationality is characterised by the interplay between a deterministic social structure which organises forms of training, on the one hand, and the self-realising subject who can resist such an imposition, on the other:

These habits [bodily dispositions and capacities] do not just vary with individuals and their imitations, they vary especially between societies, educations, proprieties and fashions, prestiges. In them we should see the techniques and work of collective and individual practical reason rather than, in the ordinary way, merely the soul and its repetitive faculties (73).

The point that Mauss is making here is that the formation of human attributes and capacities cannot be confined to social, biological or psychological functions per se, but is the effect of an ensemble of practices in which all 'three elements [are] indissolubly mixed' (74):

What emerges very clearly ... is the fact that we are everywhere faced with physio-psychological-sociological assemblages of series of actions (85).
Moreover, Mauss, in his classification of techniques of the body according to efficiency, highlights how such techniques and social forms of training are tied to a regime of normalising practices. In other words, norms are formed within specific social apparatuses and technologies through an ensemble of techniques and practices that make possible particular uses of the body and the formation of certain mental capacities (see Hirst & Woolley, 1982; Hunter, 1991a):

The techniques of the body can be classified according to their efficiency, i.e. according to the results of training. Training like the assembly of a machine, is the search for, the acquisition of an efficiency. Here it is a human efficiency. These techniques are thus human norms of human training. These procedures that we apply to animals, men voluntarily apply to themselves and to their children. The latter are probably the first beings to have been trained in this way, before all the animals, which first had to be tamed. As a result I could to a certain extent compare these techniques, them and their transmissions, to training systems, and rank them in the order of their effectiveness (Mauss, 1973: 78) (my emphasis).

It is important to note that Mauss conceptualises human beings as voluntarily applying specific techniques to themselves and their children. This is important because he does not present trainings and techniques at the level of what Foucault (1980; 1991) would term the juridical-legal or sovereign. In other words, techniques are not merely imposed upon individuals; they work on the self in such a way that the individual is located in a regime of self-regulation and monitoring which leads to voluntary implication in specific procedures and techniques of the self (see also Foucault, 1985; 1986). This point is important because Mauss escapes the kind of circularity of argument which is at the basis of dialectical theories of subjectivity by refusing to impute a general relation between structure and agency in his analysis and theorisation of cultural practices and systems of belief (see Hunter & Saunders, 1995).
This work clearly has implications for theorising the ways in which adolescent boys and men use their bodies as instruments within specific regimes of practice. 'What specific forms of social training confer certain bodily capacities and skills within particular gendered regimes of practice?' is a question which is informed by Mauss' theorisation of the link between social techniques and the formation of bodily capacities and skills. This raises questions about the ways in which adolescent boys learn to walk, talk and to use their bodies in very specific ways. Posture and particular styles of using their bodies on specific occasions must be conceptualised as socially acquired bodily attributes that have been developed through their involvement in a range and ensemble of social practices and through 'prestigious imitation' (Mauss, 1973: 73). Thus, this focus on bodily techniques and capacities is useful in elaborating a theorisation of masculinities which attempts to account for the various ways in which adolescent boys establish a 'stylised' masculinity.

Hirst and Woolley (1982) extend Mauss's analysis by illustrating how social beliefs, practices and techniques shape not only bodily capacities but also other human capacities such as mental functioning:

"Faculties like memory are dependent on techniques and training. These techniques relate directly to forms of social organisation, types of technology, and conceptions of the role of knowledge (31)."

This approach to the formation of human capacities and attributes departs from structuralist and poststructuralist accounts of subjectivity in that the *techniques* which make possible particular modes of thinking and complex mental operations are emphasised. It is claimed in this thesis, moreover, that such techniques are deployed within a regime of gendered practices which make possible particular forms of masculinity and femininity. Furthermore, such a theorisation at the level of *techniques* and *training* departs from accounts of subjectivity which situate consciousness and experience in the representational capacities of language.
The notion of the gendered self as an effect of a repertoire of conducts differentially formed within particular regimes of social practices in their cultural and historical specificity is informed further by the work of Mauss (1985) and Hirst and Wooley (1982: Chapter 6) in their attempt to dislodge the 'category of person' from its discursive foundation in consciousness. In fact, as is illustrated in chapter five, specific categories of masculinity, which are formed within disciplinary apparatuses such as psychoanalysis, sociology and feminist poststructuralism and their hybrid forms, delimit and demarcate the possibilities for theorising masculinities. That is, certain theories about gender are built up and organised around specific norms within such disciplinary fields of inquiry in which particular categories of masculinity are established (see Hearn, 1996). This is not to imply that there is a non-normative space from which to elaborate a theory of masculinity, only that the categories which are established within such disciplines are limited in their capacity to account for the complex mundanity of adolescent boys' social practices and the formation of masculinities outside of dialectical or circular frames of reference (see Coleman, 1990).

Mauss (1985) establishes a sound theoretical basis for the above argument about the specification of categories of masculinity within a specific ensemble of practices, techniques, social institutions and systems of thought. He elaborates a theorisation of the category of the person as a status that is conferred by society on an individual and whose specific forms vary according to the particular cultural practices and techniques within which the assemblage of roles, rules, attributes and capacities are formed. In other words, individuation is a normalising process which cannot be dissociated from a set of socio-cultural practices which mobilise systems of thought in the formation of a repertoire of conduct. It is in this sense, that Mauss does not conceive the subject or social agent as given in consciousness or the representational capacities of language. The concept of self or person is not given in consciousness in the form of human experience in its discursive constitution, but rather forms of individuals are specified and exist in all societies. Individuals do not have a unique sense of self concomitant with a distinct consciousness or will.
Mauss argues that individuals are formed as particular kinds of people or subjects according to grids of specification that confer particular statuses and which involve culturally specific rules and techniques such as naming and other rituals. In this way, 'categories of the human mind' and 'the notion of person' are embedded in an ensemble of normalising practices and systems of thought which are historically and culturally contingent:

Over the centuries, in numerous societies, how has it slowly evolved - not the sense of 'self (moi)' - but the notion or concept men in different ages have of it? What I wish to show you is the succession of forms that this concept has taken on in the life of men in different societies, according to their systems of law, religion, customs, social structures and mentality (Mauss, 1985: 3).

For Mauss, subjectivity, therefore, becomes dislodged from the dialectical bind in which agency is identified with consciousness (see also Hirst & Woolley, 1982: 118). This is addressed by Mauss in his discussion of the naming and ritual practices of the Pueblo Indians. The practice of naming confers and specifies a particular status for individuals within a social system in which subjectivity or notions of the self are established according to an assemblage of norms:

... the names do not merely correspond to the organisation of the clan, its processions and ceremonies, whether private or public. They correspond principally to ranks in fraternities ... Moreover let us add that these lives of individuals, the driving force of clans and of the societies superimposed upon them, not only sustain the life of things and of the gods, but the propriety of things. They not only sustain the life of men, both here and in the after-life, but also the rebirth of individuals (men), sole heirs of those that bear their forenames (the reincarnation of women is completely a different matter). Thus, in short, you will understand that with the Pueblo we already see a notion of the 'person'
(personne) or individual, absorbed in his clan, but already detached from it in the ceremonial of the mask, his title, his rank, his role, his survival and his reappearance on earth in one of his descendants endowed with the same status, forenames, titles, rights and functions (Mauss, 1985: 6).

The point here is that the notion of the person is tied to specific practices and cultural systems of social organisation in which individuals are named and behave according to the operation of an assemblage of norms that are instituted through the above mentioned rituals as particular forms of social practice. It is in this sense that names do not 'individualise' as Hirst and Woolley (1982) indicate; they do not function in this capacity within such a system of social organisation. Rather, rules for naming are governed by culturally specific norms for conferring particular statuses, roles, titles and ranks amongst individuals in the clan:

Yet we must understand that a large part of the Americans of the prairies, in particular the Sioux, possess institutions of this kind. Thus the Winnebago ... have in point of fact these successions of forenames, which are determined by clans and families, who distribute them according to a certain order, but always following precisely a kind of logical distribution of attributes or powers or natures, founded upon the myth of the origin of the clan, and legitimating the right of some person or another to assume the role (Mauss, 1985: 10).

The fact remains that all these Indians, and in particular the Kwakiutl, installed in their settlements a whole social and religious system where, in a vast exchange of rights, goods services, property, dances, ceremonies, privileges and ranks, persons as well as groups give satisfaction to one another. We see very clearly how, from classes and clans, 'human persons' adjust to one another and how, from these, the gestures of the actors in a drama fit together (Mauss, 1985: 6).
These illustrations provide the basis for Mauss' discussion of the emergence and development of the modern Western concept of the person in Graeco-Christian civilisation. He argues that a particular concept of the person developed in antiquity which centred around the formation of a moral conscience and, hence, an individual who was able to be self-governed emerges:

Everything about the classical Latin and Greek Moralists (200 B.C. to 400 A.D.) has a different ring to it. προσωπον is no longer only a persona, and - a matter of capital importance - to its juridical meaning is moreover added a moral one, a sense of being conscious, independent autonomous, free and responsible. Moral conscience introduces consciousness into juridical conception of law. To functions, honours, obligations and rights is added the conscious moral 'person' (persona) ... For me words designating first consciousness and then psychological consciousness, the συνειδητος to συνειδος are really Stoic, seem technical and clearly translate conscious, conscientia in Roman law. We may even perceive, between the early phase of Stoicism and that of the Greco-Latin era, the progress and changes definitely accomplished by the age of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. In one of the original meanings of accomplice, 'he who has seen with one', συνοιδος, as a witness, we have passed on to the meaning of the 'consciousness of good and evil'. In current use in Latin, the word finally takes on this meaning with the Greeks, with Diodorus of Sicily, Lucian and Dionysus of Halycarnassus, and self-consciousness (conscience de soi) has become the attribute of the moral person. Epictetus still keeps the meaning of the two images which this civilisation had worked on, when he writes what Marcus Aurelius quotes, 'carve out your mask, put on your 'role' (personnage), your 'type', your 'character', when he suggested to him what has become with us the examination of conscience ... But the notion of 'person' still lacked any sure metaphysical foundation. This foundation it owes to Christianity. (Mauss, 1985: 18-19)
Here, as Mauss indicates, it was the Christians who invested this moral persona with metaphysical attributes. Within such a system, in which the individual becomes invested with a moral conscience, human conduct is tied to a relation with the immortal soul through the proliferation of techniques for self-problematisation (see Foucault, 1978; 1985; 1986; 1988). In other words, through the apparatuses of Christianity a particular concept of the person as founded in consciousness and conscience is produced and, as Mauss (1985: 21) indicates, becomes dislodged from a social domain in which such a category of the self is specified. It was only after the Reformation, however, that such a category of the person, with the emergence of the soul, became linked to self-consciousness, thereby forming the basis for moral conduct and self-regulation of the individual (see also Rose, 1989). Christian practice, in this sense, becomes tied up in a fundamental relation between the individual and God which is made possible through the deployment of specific techniques of the self designed to train individuals to examine their conscience:

We cannot exaggerate the importance of sectarian movements throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for the formation of political and philosophical thought. There it was that were posed the questions regarding individual liberty, regarding the individual conscience and the right to communicate directly with God, to be one's own priest, to have an inner God. The ideas of the Moravian Brothers, the Puritans, the Wesleyans and the Pietists are those which form the basis on which is established the notion: the person (personne) equals the 'self' (moi); the 'self' (moi) equals consciousness, and it is primordial category (Mauss, 1985: 21).

And it is precisely the formation of this category of the self that Foucault draws attention to in highlighting the Christian confessional practices and techniques of the self in the systematisation and regulation of conduct. Moreover, like Foucault (1988), Mauss alludes to how such a category of the self, as founded in the moral self-problematisation of conscience and which becomes equated with consciousness and a privileged self-
awareness, is transformed within a different *economy* or system. In other words, these *Christianising* techniques of the self are deployed at a later point in history within the apparatus of Freudian psychoanalysis as the locus for a secular *economy* of assembled rules and normative practices for self-regulation and governance:

...the notion of the 'person' (*personne*) was still to undergo a further transformation to become what it has become over less than one and a half centuries, the 'category of 'self'' (*moi*). Far from existing as the primordial innate idea, clearly engraved since Adam in the innermost depths of our being, it continues here slowly, and almost right up to our own time, to be built upon, to be made clearer and more specific, becoming identified with self-knowledge and the psychological consciousness (Mauss, 1985: 20).

These theorisations of the self as elaborated by Mauss have certain implications for thinking about the formation of adolescent masculinities and the categories of the self that are embedded in poststructuralist and feminist psychoanalytical accounts of gender. Moreover, such an approach opens up new possibilities for exploring the policing of masculinity as it is manifested in the 'category boundary maintenance' work of adolescent boys (of which Davies speaks, 1993). Insight into the ways in which adolescent boys establish and police masculinities, therefore, can be gained by focussing on the various techniques and strategies that they deploy on specific occasions and under certain conditions.

It is argued in this thesis, however, that the anxieties some boys experience with regards to establishing and maintaining a desirable form of masculinity are linked to techniques of self-problematisation within a particular heterosexual *economy* of normative rules and codes of behaviour (See Lehne, 1989; Thompson, 1991; Frank, 1990; 1993; Martino, 1993; 1994; 1995; Epstein, 1994; 1997; Ward, 1995; Butler, 1996; Redman, 1996; Nayak & Kehily, 1996; Kehily & Nayak, 1997). It is not that homophobic practices are implicated in discourses or expressed in the symbolic spaces of the subconscious and
manifested as effects of repressive mechanisms in the behaviour of adolescent boys. Rather, through an ensemble of normalising techniques, social practices, and social rules for governing gendered and manly conduct, boys have acquired a specific repertoire of skills and capacities for establishing desirable forms of masculinity. However, amongst boys, and for a range of reasons, these capacities vary since, as Hirst and Wooley (1982) claim, 'subjects or social agents are the differentiated terminals of the varied capacities and practices they engage in' (120).

A Non-Dialectical Frame for Theorising Masculinities

Hunter (1993a) and Hunter and Saunders (1995) draw on Mauss (1973; 1985) to establish a non-dialectical frame for locating a post-discursive analytics of the self. It is in this sense that their work is pertinent and applicable to the theorisation of masculinities as it is elaborated in this thesis. For instance, they are critical of Levi-Strauss's appropriation of Mauss to theorise the problem of the subject:

The subject itself - once the object-subject distinction is posited - can be split and duplicated in the same way and so on without end, without ever being reduced to nothing. Sociological investigation, sentenced by the insurmountable antinomy that we isolated in the last paragraph [how it is possible to fulfil that ambition of grasping an object from outside and inside simultaneously] extricates itself by dint of the subject's capacity for indefinite self-objectification, that is to say (without ever quite abolishing itself as subject) for projecting outside itself ever diminishing fractions of itself. Theoretically, at least, this fragmentation is limitless, except for the persistent implication of the existence of the two extremes as the condition of its possibility. (Levi-Strauss, 1987: 31-2) (quoted in Hunter & Saunders, 1995: 6)

Levi-Strauss, they claim, attempts to solve this problem of the relation between ethnographer and the object of ethnographic knowledge by reconciling this subject-object
relation in the discursive space of the unconscious (see Willis, 1977; Mac an Ghaill, 1994; Walker, 1988; Jordan, 1995a; 1995b; Cornwall & Lindisfarne, 1994; Woods & Hammersley, 1993). In other words, a psychoanalytical category is deployed to reconcile a fundamental dialectic in language as the locus of unconscious mental structures in which the fragmented subject is realised. Moreover, Levi-Strauss appropriates Mauss's techniques of the body and mind within such anthropological and psychoanalytic frames and recasts them as effects of an underlying structure (ie. the unconscious) which is mediated via a linguistic system of floating signifiers. At the basis of such a formulation of the subject-object relation, as reconciled in the discursive space of the unconscious, is a neo-Kantian rationality which is predicated on a conceptualisation of the subject as split according to a body-mind dichotomy.

It is such a dichotomy at the basis of the concept of the person, as formulated by Kant, which preempts an emancipatory politics based on a later Romantic invocation of the pleasures and desires of the body. Furthermore, it is also a position which is reworked later within feminist-poststructuralist and psychoanalytic theories (see Henriques et al, 1984; Cixous, 1986; Gross, 1986; Wright, 1989; Seidler, 1990). Nye (1987), in her discussion of Kristeva, provides an exemplary instance of this reinvocation of desires which is tied to a concept of the self as necessarily split between body and mind:

The split in Kristeva's subject that corresponds to the split between sun and wilderness is a variant of the familiar philosophical distinction between what is subjective and what is objective. But for Kristeva, what is objective is so not because it refers to some independent reality. Rather, what is objective represents an internalised patriarchal order to which all are expected to conform. Patriarchal objectivity is then contrasted with subjective drives, the expression of which is identified with a child's fusional relation to its mother. The 'I' of logical order confronts the feeling, out-of-order, maternally identified 'me' where 'pulsions' according to Kristeva, are also formalisable, although in a different logic. Even if, as Kristeva suggests, such 'drives' are modulated by physiological processes and
environmental pressures, they are essentially personal and private. Thus, for her, conflict and process remain subjective, a matter of conflict within a subject, between a feeling self and the internalised logic of social order ... It is [...] to be the battleground for the feminist scholar and for Kristeva, who will accept the internalised rationality of her discipline but point to the inexpressive underside of feeling. It is, in fact, the only battleground conceivable in the space defined by the metaphysics of the sun and wilderness. (681-82) ... If logic is a variety of practices, so is the wilderness, that dark rejected realm of feeling. Kristeva cites such heterogeneous items as groans, childish babbling, rhythm and rhyme in poetry, delirium, psychotic construction. All this, Kristeva says, is the language of desire, evidence of the pressing up of drives that can never be expressed logically, never be represented in objective language (684) (my emphasis).

This Kantian dialectic of the split subject in terms of a bipolarisation of the subjective and objective realms is reconciled in a return to a psychic space where the battle to realise the 'inexpressible underside of feeling' may be fought by feminists (see also Cixous & Clement, 1986; Grosz, 1986; 1990). Moreover, such a theorisation of feminist politics, involving an oscillation between subjective and objective poles, is reconciled in a fundamental discursive logics of desire which is inexpressible within a patriarchal symbolic system of signification. However, the point that Hunter and Saunders (1995) make is that a conceptualisation of the 'split' self around the body/mind dichotomy had its inception in Kantian intellectualism and is merely reinvoked in variant forms, but in similar ways, by theorists such as Levi-Strauss and, in the above instance, Nye:

Perhaps the single most important lesson ... one that continues to elude many modern commentators and, indeed, flies in the face of the entire tradition of Christian philosophy, including its post-Kantian offshoot - is that those human attributes we call bodily and mental have no essential relation to each other. No
relation of identity or opposition, of unity or difference. (Hunter & Saunders, 1995: 7)

This point is most clearly elaborated by Mauss (1973; 1985) in that he treats such attributes as formed within specific apparatuses and social institutions. In other words, particular techniques of subject formation are tied to specific technologies of the self which have their own histories. Furthermore, Hunter and Saunders argue that such bodily and mental capacities - which, as we have seen, are often drawn together in a fundamental dialectics and circularity - cannot be dislodged from their implication in biological, social and spiritual systems of social organisation that are tied to specific departments of existence:

For this reason the relation between bodily and mental attributes has no single dialectic form, organised by the polarities of the subject, and must be approached as a series of historically specific assemblages, put together by 'civilisation and its institutions'. (Hunter & Saunders, 1995: 7)

And it is to Mauss (1973) that Hunter and Saunders turn as the basis for formulating a non-dialectic approach to the theorisation of subjectivity. Since for Mauss, bodily attributes are conceptualised as effects of a particular ensemble of techniques formed within specific technologies for living, subjectivity becomes unhinged from its dialectical chains. In other words, such techniques are not treated as 'the dialectical expression of subjectivity', nor is the body conceptualised as 'the site of unconscious pulsions directed against the coherence of the subject' which is exemplified by Nye (1987) in her discussion of Kristeva (see Hunter and Saunders, 1995: 10).

Such techniques cannot be understood in terms of expressing or repressing subjectivity in consciousness. Rather, they are tied to historically contingent domains of social organisation and specific regimes of practice. Furthermore, Mauss's conceptualisation of the person as self, which is linked to particular cultural techniques and practices for
elaborating and distributing personhood to individuals, helps to reinforce this point. As Mauss (1985) explicates, the emergence of the subject, with its attributes of consciousness and conscience, is organised around transformations within the apparatuses of law and morality at a particular historical moment. It is through such transformations at the level of the dispositif, therefore, that it is possible to trace the historical juncture at which consciousness becomes tied to a particular conceptualisation of the self.

Hunter and Saunders (1995) use Mauss to illustrate that there can be no general relation between bodily and mental attributes as located in consciousness or as reconciled in the discursive space of the unconscious. This is because categories such as consciousness and the unconscious are themselves produced within particular apparatuses at the level of historically specific cultural techniques. It is in this sense that Mauss's theorisation of subjectivity is anti-Kantian in that it rejects notions of the self as occupying a single point of reference in the reasoning subject. Rather, concepts of personhood are tied to 'loose fields composed of a dispersed array of intellectual techniques and forms of life' (Hunter & Saunders, 1995: 14):

...there are no grounds for positing a single general relation between attributes that might be identified as bodily or mental. These will of course be various kinds of interaction between body and mind techniques but there is no reason why these interactions should be construed in terms of a general form or function, for instance a relation between the conscious and the unconscious. (Hunter & Saunders, 1995: 15).

What is important about Mauss's non-dialectical account of subjectivity is his attempt to resist creating a threshold at which the establishment of bipolarised attributes, organised around the body and mind, are reconciled in the discursive space of the unconscious. However, this is the very dialectical bind into which feminist politics and accounts of gendered subjectivity are transposed. For instance, as is the case with Cixoux (1986) and
Kristeva (1986), the body becomes a site for the expression of a subjectivity that can be unearthed from the depths of the subconscious through the force of unconscious drives (see also Kuhn, 1981; Nye, 1987; Brennan, 1989; Shiach, 1989). In this way, the body becomes constituted as a privileged site in which oppositions between body and mind, the private and the public, the rational and the expressive may be reconciled to enable a 'true image' of the human being to be realised 'in all its fullness' (Hunter & Saunders, 1995: 18). And it is at this interface of the body that society is introduced into a fundamental dialectics grounded in the subject's capacity to engage in an emancipatory politics which holds the promise of escape from oppressive phallocentric symbolic systems of thought. Such a theorisation of agency is once again caught up in a dialectical circularity involving mediation between two poles - the oppressive social structure on the one hand and the self-realising subject on the other (see Cousins & Hussain, 1986) - which becomes reconciled in 'bodily desire with its scope for resistance and promise of emancipation' (Hunter & Saunders, 1995: 19):

On the one side, lies 'society' with its instrumental repression of our thoughts, politics and sexuality. On the other, bodily desire with its scope for resistance and its promise of emancipation. Mediating between this rationalistic repression and this corporeal desire, 'emerging on the surface of the body', are phantasms - 'ethereal bodies, embodied meanings. Here, all the exemplary moral struggles of humanist sociology - between structure and agency, repression and resistance, rationality and being - are played out 'at the interface where society meets human bodies' (19).

It is such a dialectical theorisation of the body that enables the complex mundanity of human existence to be organised around mutually exclusive categories such as expression and repression which then become reconciled in the discursive space of the unconscious - a space where corporeal desire can be expressed in all its political force. Thus, this 'splintering of consciousness into unconscious fragments, drives and pulsions' is grounded in a general relation between subjectivity and the body as the basis for
theorising a flight from the repressive power of instrumental reason and patriarchal symbolic systems for making meaning and sense of the world. And, according to Hunter and Saunders (1995), it is essentially the scope of this dialectical mode of thinking which informs what they term a neo-Kantian cultural theory and which is itself an effect of a particular technology which has its own lineage and cultural limits.

Conclusion

The rejection of a dialectical frame is central to the theorisation of masculinities in this thesis. In addition, 'masculinity' is not treated as an instance of a position in discursive formations. Moreover, it is not located at the juncture of the split or fragmented subject organised around the reconciliation of mutually exclusive categories which are formed in discourse. Rather, 'masculinity' is proposed as an effect of a set of techniques and regimes of practices which are tied to particular categories of the self in their historical and cultural specificity. Thus, this thesis departs from feminist-poststructuralist accounts of the split or fragmented subject that treat gender as organised around a threshold at which the binary oppositional categories of masculinity and femininity can be reconciled in a discursive space in which male/female dualisms can be dismantled (see Davies, 1989; 1993).

Within this dialectical equation, masculinity and femininity are assumed as mutually exclusive attributes and a need to move beyond such binaries is posited. The effect is that the application of such critical frames and techniques for analysing or deconstructing gender have already built into them a predisposition for reading masculinity and femininity as binary oppositional categories which then need to be reconciled. This thesis, however, argues that to treat masculinity as tied to a general relation between subject and language, and to insert a political agenda into such a dialectical frame as a reconciliatory tactic, is to limit the possibilities for theorising the complex ways in which adolescent masculinities are formed. The way adolescent boys act and behave - in short their capacity for specific modes of conduct and ways of thinking - is tied to the
deployment of specific techniques within an ensemble of practices that are variable according to situationally specific contingencies and imperatives. It is within such a non-dialectical frame that a post-discursive analytics of enacting masculinities is conceptualised.
CHAPTER TWO
Towards a Post-discursive Politics of Masculinities (I): Practices of Normalisation

Introduction

In this chapter the theoretical basis for analysing masculinities, developed in the previous chapter, is extended primarily through a strategic deployment of Foucault's later work on techniques and practices of subjectification (1978; 1985a; 1986; 1988i; 1988a; 1988b; 1991a; 1991b; 1993). It is appropriated here in a discussion of the various ways in which adolescent boys establish their masculinities and learn to relate to themselves and to others as gendered subjects. The Foucauldian analysis of modes of subjectification and the focus on the formation of gendered attributes and capacities within specific normalising regimes of practice, enables an interpretative focus on the performative dimension of enacting masculinities (Nayak & Kehily, 1996; Dixon, 1997; Butler, 1990). Moreover, it avoids both a fundamental dialectical mode of theorisation and an appeal to a general language-subject relation that is grounded in a putative consciousness of social actors (see Weedon, 1987; Davies, 1992; 1994; Mac an Ghaill, 1994; Nye, 1987; Willis, 1977; Walker, 1988; Seidler, 1989; 1991; Easthope, 1986; Gutterman, 1994; Kaufman, 1987). Hence, such an approach enables attention to be drawn to categories of masculinity (Hearn, 1996) and the forms of rationality which are imbricated in the social practices of adolescent boys in their everyday lives at school.

By using Foucault as a tool (see Hunter, 1994c), it is possible to shift ground in developing a theorisation of gender - and, hence, of masculinities - that is not caught in a dialectical and circular mode of argumentation at the centre of which is the split, gendered subject (See Hunter & Saunders, 1995). In other words, this thesis is sceptical of using an interpretive analytic frame that presupposes a binary oppositional split - between masculinity and femininity conceived of as sets of socially differentiated gender capacities - which, as a consequence, has built into it the imperative to reconcile such a bind (See
Davies, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996; Martino, 1993; 1994; Armstrong, 1988; Theobald, 1987; MacDonald, 1980; Thomas, 1990; Kelly, 1987; Weinreich-Haste, 1986; Weedon, 1987). Rather, it is argued that attempts to reconcile binary oppositional categories of masculinity and femininity are based on a supposition that these categories are necessarily dualistically opposed. The problem with such a poststructuralist theorisation of gender, and hence of masculinities, is that it does not acknowledge that the ability to read gender as diametrically opposed opposites is itself an effect of a particular set of practices and techniques in which the split subject emerges as divided upon itself (See Weedon, 1987; Davies 1992; 1993; 1994; Mac an Ghaill, 1994). While acknowledging that the ability to read gender as anything in particular is always an effect of deploying a set of quite specific practices, attention here is drawn to the limits of one particular regime for understanding the basis on which attributions of gender are made.

It is in this sense that feminist-poststructuralist theories of gender are an instance of this fundamental dialectics in which the theorisation of subjectivity is caught (see Weedon, 1987; Davies, 1993; 1994). Examples of a similar dialectical theorisation of masculinities emerge within the fields of sociology, psychology and psychoanalysis, which are informed by cultural and feminist theories of gender (See Brod & Kaufman, 1994; Kaufman, 1994; Gutterman, 1994; Horowitz & Kaufman, 1987; Wood, 1987; Wernick, 1987; Easthope, 1986; Buchbinder, 1995) and which will be explored in greater detail in chapter five. This thesis argues that it is Foucault's later work which can be used to elaborate further a non-dialectical theory of masculinities. In this way, it is possible to develop an interpretive analytics that is not caught in an oscillation between two diametrically opposed poles of an equation in which an imperative to reconcile such a split is built into the elaboration of an emancipatory politics (See Davies, 1993; Kaufman, 1987; Walker, 1988; Mac an Ghaill, 1994; Frank, 1993).

Such a politics may be expressed in terms of an equation which involves either (i) the reconciliation of masculinity and femininity in the attempt to move beyond the gender bind (See Martino, 1994; Davies, 1993; 1992; Armstrong, 1988), or (ii) the attempt to
reconcile the poles of agentic subject and determinist social structure in a space, discursive or otherwise, in which the individual is both subjected to external social forces, but also able to engage in a liberatory and transformative practice (see Brod, 1987c; Ochberg, 1987; Sherod, 1987; Hammond & Jablok, 1987; Treadwell, 1987; Reimer, 1987; Messner & Sabo, 1990; Hull, 1990; Askew and Ross, 1988: 106; Frank, 1993; Walker, 1988). It is important to stress, however, in light of such a critique, that a non-dialectical approach to theorising masculinities - or gender for that matter - does not necessarily translate into an abnegation of politics. Rather, it opens up a possibility - outside of the expressive-repressive bind in which psychoanalytical and poststructuralist accounts of gendered subjectivity are located - for thinking about different ways of relating to ourselves and others.

Foucault (1984a; 1984b; 1985a), for example, draws attention to the technologies of the self and self-fashioning techniques which produce particular forms of subjectivity (see Simons, 1995). In this way, he suggests, through the elaboration of a genealogical approach, alternative ways of thinking about relating to ourselves and to others as particular kinds of subjects. In other words, by tracing the modes of subjectification that have enabled us to acquire a particular form of personhood, the possibility for developing alternative ways of relating to ourselves and others according to the assemblage of different norms becomes a distinct possibility. However, Foucault does not situate such techniques of self-formation outside of the socio-political context in which they are developed:

... there was a practice of the self very different from our present culture of the self. In the Californian cult of the self, one is supposed to discover one's true self, to separate it from that which might obscure or alienate it, to decipher its truth thanks to psychological or psychoanalytical science, which is supposed to be able to tell you what your true self is (1984b: 362).
Here Foucault resists appealing to the hermeneutic subject through deploying a set of practices of self-decipherment formed within the apparatuses of psychology and psychoanalysis (see Rose, 1989). He rejects such techniques of self-formation which are grounded in the humanist quest for discovering the truth about one's self. However, he does stress that it is possible to think in ways other than those defined within such Kantian-humanist regimes of knowledge/power relations (Hunter & Saunders, 1995) which have the capacity to lead to the development of new modes of subjectification. It is in this sense that Foucault refuses to appeal to a psychic interiority embedded in consciousness as the source for discovering the truth about one's self. Rather, he elaborates a political strategy for analysing the contingencies of modes of subjectification by tracing their historical and cultural specificity within particular technologies of self-fashioning practices (1984a; 1984b; 1988a; 1988c; 1985; 1986,1988d). In this way, he draws attention to the historical specificity of such practices, and their transformation over time, which enables one to understand the modes by which individuals in the present learn to behave, act and think as particular kinds of subjects according to the assemblage of quite specific norms for governing their conduct.

This is important because Foucault is careful not to establish another epistemological and teleological standpoint which is a variant of the limits imposed by humanism. Rather, he elaborates a critique which is descriptive in its attempt to trace the motley techniques of subjectification which are tied to a historically specific ensemble of practices. It is in this sense that he resists appealing to universalist rules or to a general theory of subjectivity as an 'instance of discourse'.

Using Foucault to Develop a Non-dialectical Theory of Masculinities

Foucault (1978; 1982b; 1985a; 1987) develops an analytics of the self as the basis for formulating a politics which does not collapse into a dialectical circularity involving the emancipatory potentialities of language. In fact, in his later works, he promotes 'new forms of subjectivity' that are not tied to a fundamental language-subject relation in which
an emancipatory politics or critical practice is enshrined (see Derrida, 1976; Grosz, 1990; Lacan, 1977; Weedon, 1987). It is in this sense that he abandons one of the main tenets of poststructuralism: he rejects the a priori claims that thought is a linguistic phenomena in its representational capacity as an instance of discourses circulating in a given culture (see Norris, 1994: 186; Hunter, 1991):

The work of philosophical and historical reflection is put back into the field of the work of thought only on condition that one clearly grasps problematisation not as an arrangement of representations but as a work of thought (Foucault, 1984c: 390).

Thus, for Foucault, language cannot be treated as a vehicle for thought - discourse is not 'the ultimate horizon of intelligibility' (Norris, 1994: 186). Through his genealogical analyses of the history of sexuality, he elaborates a critical inquiry which requires the tactical manoeuvre of stepping back from or to the side of the phenomenon under investigation so that thought can be established as an object in itself:

For a long time I have been trying to see if it would be possible to describe the history of thought as distinct both from the history of ideas - by which I mean the analysis of systems of representation - and from the history of mentalities - by which I mean the analysis of attitudes and types of action (schemas de comportement). It seemed to me there was one element that was capable of describing the history of thought: this was what one would call the element of problems, or more exactly, problematisations. What distinguishes thought is that it is something quite different from the set of representations that underlies a certain behaviour; it is also something quite different from the domain of attitudes that can determine this behaviour. Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and question it as to its meaning, its conditions and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion
by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem (Foucault, 1984c: 388) (my emphasis).

Foucault here refuses to treat thought as an interpretive act which is tied to identifying a set of beliefs or ideologies that determine specifiable modes of conduct. Moreover, he argues that it does not involve appealing to a discursive consciousness through tracing the set of representations that underlie certain behaviours. Rather, he conceives of thought in terms of a practice which is turned upon itself as a political and subversive act which 'enables one to get free of oneself' (Foucault, 1984a: 34). It is in this way, he implies, that the prisons of thought which shape our conduct, practices and our relation to ourselves can be placed under an investigation which escapes a dialectical problematic. In other words, Foucault (1984a) is concerned to 'investigate how individuals were led to practice, on themselves and on others, a hermeneutics of desire' and, hence, draws attention to a set of historically contingent modes of subjectification in which we are implicated (46).

It is precisely these self-fashioning practices which Foucault (1985a; 1986) targets in his genealogical analyses of the deployment of sexuality within Christian and Freudian psychoanalytic technologies of self-formation (see also Rose, 1989; Hutton, 1988). Within such normalising regimes of practice particular techniques and capacities for governing and fashioning our conduct are formed and maintained. In this sense, Foucault argues that we are incited to subject ourselves to a particular hermeneutic practice of the self in an attempt to arrive at an understanding of 'who we are'.

Thus, Foucault (1984a) proposes a critical inquiry that is committed to a descriptive analysis of the historically contingent regimes of normalising practices within which the limits of particular modes of subjectification are circumscribed. And in this way, he claims that it is possible to constitute an 'historical ontology of ourselves' as a basis for creating a politics or practice of freedom in which new forms of subjectivity can be produced (46). Moreover, such a political practice is not dependant upon a dialectical bind
in which language or consciousness, as an instance of discourse, provides the key to an emancipatory politics.

This overall conceptualisation of thought as a tactical manoeuvre or practice is explained in the preface to *The History of Sexuality, Volume 11*, in which Foucault explains his treatment of sexuality:

I wanted to undertake a history in which sexuality would not be conceived as a general type of behaviour whose particular elements might vary according to demographic, economic, social, or ideological conditions, any more than it would be seen as a collection of (scientific, religious, moral) representations which, though diverse and changeable, are joined to an invariant reality ... an effort [is made] to treat sexuality as the correlation of a domain of knowledge, a **type of normativity and a mode of relation to the self**; it means trying to decipher how in Western societies, a complex experience is constituted from and around certain forms of behaviour: an experience which conjoins a field of study (connaissance) (with its own concepts, theories, diverse disciplines), a collection of rules (which differentiate the permissible from the forbidden, natural from monstrous, normal from pathological, what is decent from what is not, etc.), a **mode of relation between the individual and himself** (which enables him to recognise himself as a sexual subject amid others.) (Foucault, 1984d: 333-34) (my emphasis).

Here, Foucault emphasises that he is concerned to investigate the deployment of sexuality within a normalising regime of practices in which the individual is incited to relate to him/herself as a particular kind of subject. It is in this sense that the specification of sexual behaviour is tied to disciplinary regimens and apparatuses in which certain concepts, theories and rules for governing conduct are formed according to an assemblage of historically contingent norms.

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Thus, Foucault proceeds to elaborate a post-discursive analytics of experience by refusing to tie thought, as an interpretive practice, to the representational capacities of language:

To study forms of experience in this way [as a collection of rules, a mode of relation between the individual and himself] - in their history - is an idea that originated with an earlier project, in which I made use of the methods of existential analysis in the field of psychiatry and in the domain of 'mental illness'. For two reasons, not unrelated to each other, this project left me unsatisfied: its theoretical weakness in elaborating the notion of experience, and its ambiguous link with psychiatric practice which it simultaneously ignored and took for granted. One could deal with the first problem by referring to a general theory of the human being, and treat the second altogether differently by turning, as is often done, to the 'economic and the social context'; one could choose, by doing so, to accept the resulting dilemma of a philosophical anthropology and a social history. But I wondered whether, rather than playing on this alternative, it would not be possible to consider the very historicity of forms of experience ... the task was to bring to light the domain where the formation, development, and transformation of forms of experience can situate themselves: that is, a history of thought. By thought, I mean what establishes, in a variety of possible forms, the play of true and false, and which as a consequence constitutes the human being as a subject of learning (connaissance); in other words, it is the basis for accepting or refusing rules, and constitutes human beings as social and juridical subjects; it is what establishes the relation with oneself and with others, and constitutes the human being as ethical subject (Foucault, 1984d: 334).

Firstly, Foucault refuses to appeal to a general theory of the human subject or to overarching social or economic structures to account for certain forms of experience. Secondly, he wants to describe domains of knowledge/power relations in which individuals are constituted as particular kinds of subjects. Thirdly, he is concerned to
investigate the ethical dimension of such relations in terms of how individuals are incited to relate to themselves according to the deployment of quite specific norms for governing their conduct. In short, for Foucault, studying human experience involves describing a collection of rules that are related to establishing a type of normalising relation to the self within a regime of practices in which sexuality functions as a means of self-regulating individuals and placing them under a particular kind of surveillance. It is in this sense that experience, for Foucault, cannot be treated as an effect of discourse, which in its cultural specificity and historical variability, is linked to a set representations or beliefs underlying certain behaviours. Moreover, it is not located in the anthropological subject, but in a regime of practices - in their historical and cultural deployment - within which particular forms of subjectivity are established and transformed.

Rajchman (1986) also draws attention to such a post-discursive and non-dialectical analytics of the self as it is characterised by Foucault:

There is no reason to think that the subject has always been constituted in the same way. Sartre said the subject was constituted by the glance of the Other. Lacan taught that, more fundamentally, the subject is constituted in language. We find a similar idea in Pierce almost a century earlier. But Foucault stresses the sheer variety of the ways in which we are constituted. No theory of language can contain or explain it. Language may be essential in the ways we are constituted, but the analysis of constitution is not an analysis of language. It is a problem not simply in what we say about ourselves but in what we do to ourselves and our bodies. The constitution of the disciplined individual is the constitution of the disciplined body: of his soul or identity as the prison of his body. We can constitute ourselves by what we wear, where we live and what we eat (Rajchman, 1986: 169) (my emphasis).

Here attention is drawn to the practices of the self at the level of bodily enacting forms of subjectivity (see Butler, 1990; Nayak & Kehily, 1996; Epstein, 1997; Dixon, 1997;
Connell, 1987; 1995). It is such a non-dialectical approach to the analysis of experience that informs the treatment of masculinity in this thesis as 'a type of normativity and a mode of relation to the self' which is not reducible to a field of discursive relations or the space of consciousness. Thus, in this thesis, masculinities are treated as an ensemble of self-fashioning practices which are linked to normalising judgements and techniques that are formed within various apparatuses in their cultural and historical specificity. Such a theorisation of subjectivity, as informed by a Foucauldian analytics of the self, therefore, leads one to pose different questions regarding the formation of masculinities for adolescent boys.

Rather than treating masculinities as effects of particular discourses in their cultural specificity and variability or as expressed or repressed in consciousness, attention is drawn to how adolescent boys use techniques and strategies available to them, within specific regimes of practice, to constitute themselves as males of particular types. Moreover, in focusing on the ways in which boys learn to relate to themselves, consideration is given to the techniques that boys adopt and apply to themselves in fashioning a particular style of masculinity.

This leads to the formulation of particular kinds of questions regarding the enactment of masculinity such as: How do adolescent boys fashion for themselves a particular form of subjectivity or masculinity? What practices do they engage in to decipher 'who they are'? How are certain desires formed within a regime of knowledge-power relations which serve as an index of their masculinity? In other words, what enables the adolescent boy to recognise himself as a proper incumbent of certain categories of masculinity? (see also Coleman, 1990). These are some of the questions which are informed by what may be termed a Foucauldian ethics of the self. It is to this concept, proposed as a post-discursive politics of the self, that attention is drawn in an attempt to develop a theoretical basis for elaborating a critical practice which enables 'one to get free of oneself' by working at the limits of current normalising regimes and techniques of the self.
Ethics and Practices of Freedom

In developing a theorisation of masculinities within a post-discursive Foucauldian framework of ethics, it is possible to draw attention to the self-fashioning practices of adolescent boys and the potentialities for adjusting and working at the limits of specific norms around which particular versions of masculinity are organised. In this sense, 'masculinity' is treated as a stylised practice of the self that is organised around a particular normalising relation of the self to the self (see Nayak & Kehily, 1996; Epstein, 1997). Such modes of subjectification are formed within specific apparatuses and regimes of practice in which adolescent boys are incited to enact particular forms of heterosexual masculinity. Foucault (1985a; 1986), in focussing on this relationship of the self to the self, creates the possibility for theorising masculinities in terms of a particular stylised relation which shapes the way adolescent boys conduct themselves and relate to others according to an assemblage of quite specific norms. Moreover, it is Foucault's attention to the deployment of sexuality within such regimes of ethical practices and knowledge/power relations that shifts the focus from the discursive space, in which poststructuralist theoretical accounts of subjectivity and consciousness are located, to the ensemble of techniques and homophobic strategies that boys are incited to apply on the occasions of enacting a particular form of heterosexual masculinity (see Epstein, 1997; Ward, 1995; Butler, 1996; Kehily & Nayak, 1997). However, in order to understand the political implications of Foucault's ethics of the self for adjusting norms around which particular versions of masculinity are organised and how this might relate to a 'practice of freedom' for adolescent boys, it is important to consider, in greater detail, both Foucault's own comments about working at the limits of existing regimes of practice, and those of other scholars (see Foucault, 1987; 1993; 1984b; 1984c; Rajchman, 1986; Bernauer, 1987; Sawicki, 1991; Davidson, 1994; Simons, 1995.)

Many contemporary critical commentaries and reviews have drawn attention to the development of a political practice centred on the ethic of care for the self in Foucault's (1985a; 1986) later work (see Simons, 1995; Gutting, 1994). Rajchman (1986), for
instance, claims that Foucault's 'way of questioning 'anthropologism' led him to a kind of practical or ethical philosophy whose fundamental category was the category of freedom' (165). Blasius (1993), moreover, draws attention to the shift in Foucault's later work to a focus on 'studying the creation of ethical agency' (198). Bernauer (1987) and Bernauer & Mahon (1994) also comment on the implications of Foucault's ethics for creating possibilities for inventing new subjectivities and ways of relating to ourselves. However, in discussing the potentialities for reinventing ourselves, Foucault (1987) is careful not to fall into the trap of simply reinventing an emancipatory politics on the basis of a repressive mechanism which is grounded in a fundamental anthropologism. In other words, he refuses to invoke categories of the unconscious as a means of elaborating a practice of freedom designed to remove the ideological chains of repression blocking the subject's conscious awareness of a reality which is misrecognised (see Willis, 1977; Simpson, 1994; Kaufman, 1987; Horowitz & Kaufman, 1987; Chapman & Rutherford, 1988; Silverstein & Rashbaum, 1994; Easthope, 1986).

When asked in an interview if he conceives of a work of self upon self as 'a mode of liberation', Foucault replies:

I've always been a little distrustful of the general theme of liberation, to the extent, that, if one does not treat it with a certain number of safeguards and within certain limits, there is danger that it will refer back to the idea that there is a nature or a human foundation which, as a result of a certain number of historical, social or economic processes, found itself concealed, alienated or imprisoned in and by some repressive mechanism. In that hypothesis it would suffice to unloosen these repressive locks so that man can be reconciled with himself, once again find this nature or renew contact with his roots and restore a full and positive relationship with himself. ... That is why I insist on the practices of freedom rather than on the processes which indeed have their place, but which by
themselves, do not seem to me to be able to decide all the practical forms of liberty (Foucault, 1987: 113).

Foucault is careful about using the term liberation because it brings into play the notion of a repressive, sovereign power from which the individual must escape. He wants to avoid using what may be termed a logics of cultural completion in which the subject is guaranteed full consciousness and is restored to 'a full and positive relationship with himself' once the ideological chains of repression have been removed (see Hunter, 1994a). Thus, Foucault is concerned to work at the limits of existing regimes of practice to invent alternative modes of relating to ourselves, particularly with regards to determining the limits of sexual pleasure:

I encountered that exact same problem in dealing with sexuality: does the expression 'let us liberate our sexuality' have a meaning? Isn't the problem rather to try to decide the practices of freedom through which we could determine what is sexual pleasure and what are our erotic, loving, passionate relationships with others. It seems to me that to use this ethical problem of the definition of practices of freedom is more important than the affirmation (and repetitious, at that) that sexuality or desire must be set free (Foucault, 1987: 114).

In discussing the political implications of his work, Foucault, therefore, is careful to avoid getting caught in a fundamental dialectics which is grounded in the practices of ideology critique. In fact, he avoids deploying explanatory concepts such as ideology and repression which he claims 'continue to act as a screen and an obstacle':

All history comes to be thought of within these categories which serve to assign a meaning to such diverse phenomena as normalisation, sexuality and power. And regardless of whether these two concepts are explicitly utilised, in the end one always comes back, on the one hand to ideology - where it is easy to make reference back to
Marx - and on the other hand to repression, which is a concept often and readily employed by Freud...Behind these concepts and among those who employ them, there is a kind of nostalgia for a quasi-transparent form of knowledge, free from all error and illusion, and behind the concept of repression, the longing for a form of power innocent of all coercion, discipline, and normalisation (Foucault, 1984e: 59).

Here, he identifies the limits of a logic of cultural completion that is operationalised through the explanatory categories of repression and ideology offered as a basis for elaborating an emancipatory politics. However, Foucault emphasises the limits of conceiving the individual as caught in an ideological trap and blind to the effects of a repressive power. Built into the repressive hypothesis driving such conceptualisations of power is the imperative to raise consciousness as the basis for elaborating an emancipatory politics designed to free the individual from the ideological chains of oppression.

**Conceptualising Power Relations**

For Foucault (1978: 94), power relations cannot be understood in binary terms as 'an all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled'. Furthermore, power is not essentially an oppressive force that emanates from top down and whose effects operate on the individual at the level of the unconscious or subconscious. Foucault avoids applying such a deconstructive analytics of power through the use of the word *liberation* which signals freedom from a repressive mechanism. Rather, power is exercised and 'deployed and given concrete expression' outside of the limits of dialectical frames of reference for understanding its effects (see Foucault, 1978b: 90). In other words, it is understood in terms of its productive potentialities:

By power, I do not mean 'Power' as a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state. By power, I do not mean, either a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the form of the
rule. Finally, I do not have in mind a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body. The analysis, made in terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination are given at the outset; rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes. It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organisation; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly as the strategies which they take effect, which general design or institutional crystallisation is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law in the various social hegemonies ... [the exercise of power] must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of sovereignty ... power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is in the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society (Foucault, 1978: 92-93) (my emphasis).

Thus, in claiming that power is not merely imposed as a violence, he implies that it can be strategically deployed to achieve certain outcomes. It is within a regime of power/knowledge relations, therefore, that Foucault situates practices of freedom. This focus on practices is important because it draws attention to the productive rather than the repressive nature of the workings of power within specifiable regimes for governing the conduct of individuals. Furthermore, it is a strategic attempt to dispel the notion that there is a fundamental human nature that can be retrieved, or a space that can be inhabited, outside of power/knowledge relations. And it is in this sense that he is sceptical of
developing a political practice which is centred around notions of liberation or emancipation.

In light of this conceptualisation of power, attempts to adjust the norms, which are implicated in the everyday practices of adolescent boys, must necessarily involve the strategic use of techniques in the social fields in which the latter enact what become recognisable as specific instances of masculinity (Coleman, 1990). The development of *practices of freedom*, therefore, can be argued to operate at the level of developing techniques designed to incite individuals to relate to themselves and to others according to a different set of designated norms for governing conduct. Such a position is clarified and can be developed by further reference to and discussion of Foucault’s formulation of a politics of the self in his later interviews and work (see Foucault, 1987; 1982; 1985b;1993).

‘Truth Games’

What is particularly useful about Foucault’s later work in terms of its application to developing a post-discursive politics of masculinities is the way in which he theorises subjectivity in terms of the subject’s entry into ‘a certain game of truth’. It is Foucault’s refusal to treat the subject’s insertion into a regime of practices, analysable in terms of a deconstructive analysis centred on ideology or the unconscious, that enables him to formulate a ‘practice of freedom’ which does not presuppose the workings of a repressive mechanism:

My problem has always been ... the problem of the relationship between subject and truth. How does the subject enter into a certain game of truth? My first problem was, how is it, for example, that beginning at a certain point in time, madness was considered a problem and the result of a certain number of processes - an illness dependent upon a certain medicine? How has the mad subject been placed in this game of truth defined by knowledge or a medical model? And it is in doing this
analysis that I noticed that, contrary to what had been somewhat the custom at that time - around the sixties - it was not by talking simply about ideology that we could really explain that phenomenon. In fact, there were practices - essentially the major practice or confinement which had been developed at the beginning of the seventeenth century and which had been the condition for the insertion of the mad subject in this game of truth - which sent me back to the problem of institutions of power, much more than to the problem of ideology. So it was that I was led to pose the problem knowledge/power, which is not for me the problem of relationships between subject and games of truth. (1987: 120-21)

Foucault here points to the limitations of ideology critique as a tool for examining the subject's relation to the truth by drawing attention, in his study of madness, to a historical field of play and ensemble of practices which are irreducible to a repressive mechanism of power. It is the use of such an interpretive analytics that enables one to think about the various ways in which adolescent boys are inserted into a game of truth in which they learn about what it means to be male. Within a complex field of social practices, boys are incited to adopt certain practices of 'masculinity' and, hence, to display themselves as incumbents of certain categories of masculinity on particular occasions (Coleman, 1990). In this way, an a priori theory of the subject, which presupposes that there is a knowledge about masculinity waiting to be freed from the ideological mechanisms of power at play within the social field, is refused:

What I refused was precisely that you first of all set up a theory of the subject - as could be done in phenomenology and in existentialism - and that, beginning from the theory of the subject, you come to pose the question of knowing, for example, how such and such a form of knowledge was possible. What I wanted to know was how the subject constituted himself, in such and such a determined form, as a mad subject or as a normal subject, through a certain number of practices which were games of truth, applications of power, etc. I had to reject a certain a priori theory of the subject in order to make this analysis of the relationships which
can exist between the constitution of the subject or different forms of the subject and games of truth, practices of power and so forth (Foucault, 1987: 121) (my emphasis).

Foucault is careful to situate this focus on 'how the subject constitute[s] himself' within a field or game of truth/power relations. Hence, different forms of the subject, cannot be separated from a regime of practices through which power is channelled and particular truths established. In short, the formation of subjectivity is not understood in terms which rely on the explanatory category of ideology. Rather, the cultural techniques for working on and fashioning the gendered self, which are made available within existing regimes of practice, are deployed by boys to enact particular stylised forms of masculinity. This, therefore, leads to an investigation of what Foucault (1978) terms 'polymorphous techniques of power' in relation to examining the formation of adolescent masculinities. The ways in which modalities of power are channelled through normalising regimes of practice to permeate individual modes of behaviour and to incite particular forms of desire cannot be separated from the technologies of the self within which such relations to the self and to others are established:

... my main concern will be to locate the forms of power, the channels, and the discourses it permeates in order to reach the most tenuous and individual modes of behaviour, the paths that give it access to the rare or scarcely perceivable forms of desire, how it penetrates and controls everyday pleasure - all this entailing effects that may be those of refusal, blockage, and invalidation, but also incitement and intensification: in short the "polymorphous techniques of power." (Foucault, 1978: 11).

It is this intensification and incitement of particular forms of desire within specific regimes of practice which shape the way adolescent boys relate, not only to themselves as gendered subjects, but to one another. However, Foucault (1987) is careful to avoid
reducing the constitution of the subject to a general theory of practices with *practice* taking the place of *discourse* as a privileged tool of analysis:

[The subject] is not a substance; it is a form and this form is not above all or always identical to itself. You do not have towards yourself the same kind of relationships when you constitute yourself as a political subject who goes and votes or speaks up in a meeting, and when you try to fulfil your desires in a sexual relationship. There are no doubt some relationships and some interferences between these different kinds of subject but we are not in the presence of the same kind of subject. In each case, we play, we establish with one's self some different form of relationship. And it is precisely the **historical constitution of these different forms of subject relating to games of truth that interest me** (121) (my emphasis).

Here, Foucault emphasises the *occasions* for conducting ourselves as particular kinds of subjects. In other words, the way subjects conduct and relate to themselves is tied both to an instance of the situationally specific constraints in which they find themselves and the historical specificity of particular technologies of the self in which the imperatives to relate to oneself as a particular kind of person are formed (see Mauss, 1985). It is in this sense that Foucault (1987) is careful to emphasise that, even though one may take an active role in engaging in self-fashioning practices, the individual is not free to invent a form of subjectivity on his/her own accord:

I would say that if now I am interested, in fact, in the way in which the subject constitutes himself in an active fashion, by the practices of the self, these practices are nevertheless not something that the individual invents by himself. They are patterns that he finds in his culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, his society and his social group (122).

However, this does not mean that strategies cannot be developed to modify relations of power at the level at which the individual conducts him/herself in his/her relationships
with others. This leads Foucault (1987) to argue that since there is no absolute or general form of power, freedom, as a correlative of power, is also dispersed throughout every social field:

... in human relations, whatever they are - whether it be a question of a love relationship, an institutional or economic relationship - power is always present: I mean the relationships in which one wishes to direct the behaviour of another. These are the relationships that one can find at different levels, under different forms: these relationships of power are changeable relations, ie., they can modify themselves, they are not given once and for all ... these relations of power are then changeable, reversible and unstable. One must observe also that there cannot be relations of power unless the subjects are free. If one or the other were completely at the disposition of the other and became his thing, an object on which he can exercise an infinite and unlimited violence, there would be no relations of power. In order to exercise a relation of power, there must be on both sides at least a certain form of liberty ... This means that in the relations of power, there is necessarily the possibility of resistance - of violent resistance, for if there were no possibility of resistance - of violent resistance, of escape, of ruse, of strategies that reverse the situation - there would be no relations of power ... if there are relations of power throughout every social field it is because there is freedom everywhere (122-123) (my emphasis).

The point is, however, that the individual can use a range of strategies or techniques to modify or alter his/her relations with others. There is always the possibility of 'directing the behaviour of another' within the limits of historically specific regimes of practice. In other words, no relation of power remains necessarily fixed or stable and, because of this, there is always the possibility of developing strategies or practices of freedom which have the potential to modify such relations. But, as Hunter (1991a) has argued, such practices and relations of the self cannot be operationalised outside of historically contingent technologies of living and the motley techniques and practices of thinking,
acting and behaving that are made available within the limits of such regimes (see Mauss, 1973; 1985).

**Practices of the Self**

It is important to emphasise that Foucault frames such potentialities for practices of freedom in the present within the context of his genealogy of technologies of the self deployed in Antiquity. This is important because he does not speak of such practices of freedom in terms of the possibilities that individuals have at their disposal for modifying the way they relate to themselves and to others outside of historically specific and variable regimes of practice. However, since he conceptualises power and freedom as dispersed and multifarious relations, operationalised through an ensemble of practices which are formed within specific apparatuses, he is careful not to elaborate a politics of the self which collapses into a general theory of liberation of the self from the self. It is precisely because of the workings of power and freedom as practices which are deployed within particular regimes of thinking and behaving that it is possible, at the local site, to introduce and to develop a set of techniques or strategies designed to incite individuals to adopt alternative ways of relating to the self and others according to a set of designated norms.

Because there is no space outside of which power relations are at play, Foucault argues that the possibility of freedom always exists. And it is on this basis that he rejects a Habermasian conceptualisation of power:

I am interested in what Habermas is doing ... he assigns a very important place to relations of communication and also a function that I would call 'utopian'. The thought that there could be a state of communication which would be such that the games of truth could circulate freely, without obstacles, without constraint and without coercive effects, seems to me to be Utopia. It is being blind to the fact that relations of power are not something bad in themselves, from which one must free
one's self. I don't believe there can be a society without relations of power, if you understand them as means by which individuals try to conduct, to determine the behaviour of others. The problem is not of trying to dissolve them in the utopia of a perfectly transparent communication, but to give one's self the rules of law, the techniques of management, and also the ethics, the ethos, the practice of the self, which would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination (Foucault, 1987: 129).

So Foucault argues for a very different concept of agency from that of the poststructuralists, one which departs from the putative emancipatory potential of a deconstructive analytics grounded in ideology critique (See Weedon, 1987; Davies, 1993; 1995; Mac an Ghaill, 1994; Gutterman, 1994). Rather, he seems to conceptualise a form of agency in terms of the strategic development and deployment of specific techniques designed to alter the ways in which individuals relate to and conduct themselves and which depart from a Christian and Freudian problematics of the self:

Power is not an evil. Power is strategic games. We know very well indeed that power is not an evil. Take for example, sexual relationship or love relationships. To exercise power over another, in a sort of open strategic game, where things could be reversed, that is not evil. That is part of love, passion, of sexual pleasure. Let us also take something that has been the object of criticism, often justified: the pedagogical institution. I don't see where evil is in the practice of someone who, in a given game of truth, knowing more than another, tells him what he must do, teaches him, transmits knowledge to him, communicates skills to him. The problem is to know how you are to avoid in these practices - where power cannot play and where it is not evil in itself - the effects of domination which will make a child subject to the arbitrary and useless authority of a teacher, or put the student under the power of an abusively authoritarian professor, and so forth. I think these problems should be
posed in terms of rules of law, of relational techniques of government and of ethos, of practice of self and of freedom (Foucault, 1987: 130) (my emphasis).

Thus, for Foucault, it would seem that practices of freedom entail not an escape from power, but the strategic deployment of techniques designed to modify the effects of domination in certain abusive relationships. In short, it involves equipping individuals with techniques and strategies for modifying relations of power on certain occasions. This relates to adopting pedagogical techniques and practices within the institutional site of the school designed to teach adolescent boys skills - and to develop capacities - which will enable them to relate to themselves and to others in ways which would not require them to demonstrate, for example, that they are powerful, strong, heterosexual etc. And this would represent an instance of what Foucault would term a strategic deployment of a 'governmental technology', which in its productive potential for inserting boys into a game of learning to relate to themselves and others differently, would be distinguishable from 'a state of domination':

It seems to me that we must distinguish the relationships of power as strategic games between liberties - strategic games that result in the fact that some people try to determine the conduct of others - and states of domination, which are what we ordinarily call power. And between the two, between the games of power and the states of domination, you have governmental technologies ... The analysis of these techniques is necessary because it is often through this kind of technique that states of domination are established and maintain themselves. In my analysis of power there are three levels: the strategic relationships, the techniques of government, and the levels of domination (Foucault, 1987: 130).

Hence, for Foucault, governmental technologies are at the nexus of a network of power relations in which both the ethical relation of the self to the self and states of domination are situated. In fact, it is Foucault's focus, in his later work, on an ethics of the self as a political practice of freedom which creates the possibility for exploring the links between
individual conduct at the local micro-level and governmental technologies in their historical deployment:

I do not think that the only point of possible resistance to political power - understood of course, as a state of domination - lies in the relationship of the self to self. I say that governmentality implies the relationship of self to self, which means exactly that, in the idea of governmentality, I am aiming at a totality of practices, by which one can constitute, define, organise, instrumentalise the strategies which individuals in their liberty can have in regard to each other. It is free individuals who try to control, to determine, to delimit the liberty of others and, in order to do that, they dispose of certain instruments to govern others. That rests indeed on freedom, on the relationship of self to self and relationship to the other. But if you try to analyse power not from the point of view of liberty, of strategies and of governmentality, but from the point of view of a political institution, you cannot consider the subject as a subject of rights. We have a subject who was endowed with rights or who was not and who, by the institution of a political society, has received or has lost rights. You are then thrown back to a juridical concept of the subject. On the other hand, the notion of governmentality allows one, I believe, to set off the freedom of the subject and the relationship to others, ie. that which constitutes the very matter of ethics. (Foucault, 1987: 131)

Here Foucault draws attention to the limits of conceptualising the subject as endowed with certain rights that can be either denied or conferred by a political institution. Rather, he is concerned to highlight the role of governmental power in terms of regulating and determining certain modes of relating to the self within normalising regimes of practice. It is in this sense that it is not possible to treat Foucault's comments about individual conduct and relations of the self to the self and to others outside of a genealogy of specific forms of subjectivity that we have inherited and which are produced within a regime of hermeneutic practices for establishing such relations. And, according to Foucault, it is precisely by working at the limits of such systems of thought and categories of the self
which are tied to Christianity and Freudian psychoanalysis that certain techniques and strategies can be developed for adjusting particular norms for governing our conduct.

Technologies of the Self and the Formation of Masculinities

Through Foucault's discussion of historically specific technologies of the self, attention is drawn to how certain practices of self-decipherment are implicated in current normalising frameworks in which boys learn to monitor and police their sexuality as a means of proscribing the limits of a desirable masculinity. He highlights the historically contingent role of confessional practices of self-disclosure and surveillance within a regime of truth in which sexuality functions as an index of subjectivity in the mobilisation of a productive and individualising form of power. In his lectures delivered at Dartmouth and in his later works, Foucault (1993; 1985a, 1986) presents such a genealogy of the self in which he traces a particular 'policing of ourselves' to a hermeneutic principle developed within Christianising regimes of practice. Within such regimes the individual learns to relate to her/himself in a particular way through adopting an ensemble of techniques of self-decipherment and self-problematisation. The ways in which sexuality is deployed within such a regime, Foucault argues, inaugurated a new ethical code of conduct which shifted the way people related to themselves. Through the development of such confessional techniques, individuals were incited to discover the truth about their sexuality as an index of their subjectivity and then to verbalise this truth to others.

What is interesting is that Foucault uses such a genealogy of the self to illustrate that we are still bound by similar forms of subjectivity which are organised around practices of self-disclosure. For example, technologies of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy are dependent upon normalising procedures and practices of self-disclosure which are not dissimilar to those employed within the space of the confessional (see Rose, 1989). To illustrate this point, Foucault (1993) takes the example of a French psychiatrist, Leuret, whose therapy was based on the dictum that if a patient could admit that he was indeed insane then he could be cured:
Leuret wishes to obtain a precise act: the explicit affirmation, "I am mad". It is easy to recognise here the transposition within psychiatric therapy of procedures which have been used for a long time in judicial and religious institutions. To declare aloud and intelligibly the truth about oneself - I mean, to confess - has in the Western world been considered for a long time either as a condition for redemption for one's sins or as an essential item in the condemnation of the guilty. The bizarre therapy of Leuret may be read as an episode in the progressive culpabilisation of madness. But, I would wish, rather, to take it as a point of departure for a more general reflection on this practice of confession, and on the postulate, which is generally accepted in Western Societies, that one needs for his own salvation to know exactly as possible who he is and also, which is rather something different, that he needs to tell it as explicitly as possible to some other people. The anecdote of Leuret is here only as an example of the strange and complex relationships developed in our societies between individuality, discourse, truth and coercion (201).

Hence, for Foucault, it is through such normalising regimes of practice, as those outlined above, that certain categories of the person are formed and to which particular forms of subjectivity become tied (see also Mauss, 1985). Through genealogical analysis, Foucault advocates the need to rid ourselves of the imposition of such forms of subjectivity which are tied to a particular hermeneutics of the self. In other words, it is this incitement to tell the truth about oneself that Foucault rejects in his call for inventing new subjectivities. And he claims that this can be achieved through what he terms "a critical ontology of ourselves":

The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the
limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them ... These inquiries have their methodological coherence in the at once archaeological and genealogical study of practices envisaged simultaneously as a technological type of rationality and as strategic games of liberties; they have their theoretical coherence in the definition of the historically unique forms in which the generalities of our relations to things, to others, to ourselves, have been problematised. They have their practical coherence in the care brought to the process of putting historico-critical reflection to the test of concrete practices (Foucault, 1984f: 50) (my emphasis).

Thus, for Foucault, it is a practice of thinking which informs the tactical deployment of strategies designed to rid oneself of the imposition of particular forms of subjectivity. Or as Blasius (1993) argues:

A politics of our selves would entail a recognition that if the self is "nothing else than the historical correlation of a technology" that has come to create it, then the aim would be to get rid of the "sacrifice which is linked to those technologies." (Foucault, 1993: 200).

It is in this sense that Foucault (1993) develops a critical practice or way of thinking which does not 'set as its task par excellence the foundation of all knowledge and the principle of all signification as stemming from the meaningful subject' (201). His approach is directed to the question of the 'historicity of the subject' in considering those forms of self-understanding and practices of self-disclosure that he believes are so much a part of our constitution as modern subjects. In doing so, he draws attention to how techniques of the self are tied to technologies of domination in the way that individuals are incited to act upon themselves and others:

since my project was concerned with the knowledge of the subject, I thought that the techniques of domination were the most important, without any exclusion of the
rest. But, analysing the experience of sexuality, I became more and more aware that there is in all societies, I think, in all societies whatever they are, another type of techniques: techniques which permit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a certain state of perfection, of happiness, of purity, of supernatural power, and so on. Let's call this kind of techniques a techniques or technology of the self ... Let's say [if one wants to analyse the genealogy of the subject in Western civilisation]: he has to take into account the interaction between those two types of techniques - techniques of domination and techniques of the self. He has to take into account the points where the technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself. And conversely, he has to take into account the points where the techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion or domination. The contact point, where the individuals are driven by others is tied to the way they conduct themselves, is what we can call, I think, government (Foucault, 1993: 203) (my emphasis).

Foucault elaborates on this juncture at which techniques of the self merge with those of domination by tracing the ways in which confession and self-examination were conceived by pagan philosophers of classical antiquity and how they were transformed and modified in early Christianity. In ancient Greece and Rome, for example, Foucault (1985a, 1986) argues that sexual practices were not governed by a rigid moral code in which an intrinsic form of evil became attached to sexual pleasure (see McHoul & Grace, 1994: 97). Rather governing one's self with regard to engaging in sexual practices was tied up in an ethical regime of care for the self which was based on the need to maintain good health and to avoid excess. In other words, sexuality functioned in such a way as to determine a particular aesthetics of existence rather than to normalise a population:
You see, what I wanted to do in Volume II of the *History of Sexuality* was to show that you have nearly the same restrictive, the same prohibition code in the fourth century B.C and in the moralists and doctors at the beginning of the Empire. But I think that the way they integrate those prohibitions in relation to oneself is completely different. I don't think one can find any normalisation in, for instance, the Stoic ethics. **The reason is, I think, that the principal aim, the principal target of this kind of ethics was an aesthetic one.** First, this kind of ethics was only a problem of personal choice. Second, it was reserved for a few people in the population; it was not a question of giving a pattern of behaviour for everybody. It was a personal choice for a small elite. The reason for making this choice was the will to live a beautiful life, and to leave to others memories of a beautiful existence. I don't think we can say that this kind of ethics was an attempt to normalise the population. (Foucault, 1984b: 341)

Thus, self-mastery or self-control was not predicated on a moral prescription for attaining spiritual salvation, but was linked to the ethical question of how best to use pleasure and the body to ensure general good health. For instance, modes of subjection in Antiquity were not so much regulated according to the imposition of moral norms, but rather depended on an aesthetic choice (see Racevskis, 1987: 140). In short, care of the self in classical Antiquity was tied to an 'aesthetics of existence' and it was only with Christian technologies of the self that moral injunctions entered into the field of social and sexual relations:

From antiquity to Christianity, we pass from a morality that was essentially the search for a personal ethics to a morality of obedience to a system of rules. And if I was interested in Antiquity it was because, for a whole series of reasons, the idea of a morality as obedience to a code of rules is now disappearing, has already disappeared. And to this absence of morality corresponds, must correspond, the search for an aesthetics of existence (1988e: 49).
Foucault here is not advocating a return to an idealised past which he presents as a model for the way we should conduct ourselves in the present. Rather, he uses such a genealogical analysis to illustrate the point that we have not always behaved and conducted ourselves according to a moral hermeneutic practice of the self at the basis of which sexuality functions as a normalising tendency. Implicit in such a mode of analysis, therefore, is the possibility of creating alternative practices of the self. It is in this way, as Bernauer (1987) points out, that Foucault is able to call for the abandonment of a particular ethical practice involving an 'ecstatic renunciation of the modern relation to the self' (159).

It is by examining further the implications of such a practice of freedom in relation to Foucault's discussion of Christian practices of the self that the role of this genealogical analysis for elaborating a post-discursive politics of masculinity becomes more explicit. For instance, in considering the historical deployment of such techniques and practices, the field of play in which such stylised relations of the self inform the way adolescent boys establish their masculinity can be examined outside of a dialectical theoretical framework. In other words, it enables a focus for analysis that departs from current gender studies perspectives which are grounded in a deconstructive analytics of the self and which are limited by their attention to the inherited forms of subjectivity that we live by (see Mac an Ghaill, 1994; Gutterman, 1994; Davies, 1993). It is in this capacity that the role of sexuality, and its deployment within the specific regimes of practice in which boys enact a publicly validated masculinity, can be placed under a particular kind of investigation. Thus, the homophobic strategies that boys use are understood as linked to a technology of the self in which techniques of self-decipherment are tied to certain normalising regimes of practice with sexuality functioning as an index of subjectivity.

Once such a position has been established it becomes possible to map a strategic plan of action designed to adjust the norms around which particular versions of masculinity are organised. This is in line with Deleuze's (1977: 206-7) claims that 'there is no longer any representation, there is only action, theory's action, the action of practice in the
relationships of networks'. Thus, the conduct of adolescent boys, in its bodily and mental enactment, readily becomes a target for strategic intervention at the level of the development of techniques designed to alter or modify the ways in which they relate to themselves according to specific norms for governing their conduct. And this constitutes 'an action of practice' or a governmental strategy which may be operationalised at a pedagogical level in various institutional sites such as schools. In other words, strategic attempts at the level of pedagogic techniques can be deployed to assist adolescent boys to develop skills and capacities for conducting themselves within alternative normative frames in which sexuality does not necessarily function as an index of truth of who they really are.

What is particularly useful about applying Foucault's work to an analysis of the practices of adolescent boys is that (i) it provides an interpretive analytics which enables one to treat masculinity as a category which is historically and situationally contingent; (ii) it highlights that the determining factors influencing the various statuses of masculinity in a culture cannot be understood outside of the ensemble of practices and technologies of the self in which they are formed; (iii) it points to an analysis of the ways in which the desires of adolescent boys are channelled via the deployment of 'polymorphous techniques of power'; (iv) it illustrates that the establishment of certain forms of masculinity in the lives of adolescent boys is tied to a particular system or economy of desire which is formed within an ensemble of apparatuses in which sexuality is deployed; (v) it draws attention to the normalising regimes of practice in which various forms of masculinity are produced and; (vi) it enables a focus on adjusting norms around which certain forms of masculinity and relations to the self and others are organised, as the basis for elaborating a political practice.

It is the necessity to declare who we really are, which becomes caught up in a normalising regime in which the imperative to avow a particular sexual identity is operationalised, with which Foucault takes issue. And it is precisely at such a threshold that a politics of masculinity, situated at the level of the concrete bodily and mental practices of adolescent
boys, can be envisaged. This is not to imply that a non-normative space can be provided for boys in schools. This is often the presupposition in gender studies perspectives which advocate elaborating forms of subjectivity which move beyond the 'oppressive binary oppositional structuring of gender identity' (see Martino, 1993; Davies, 1992; 1993; Armstrong, 1988; Weinreich-Haste, 1986). The point is, however, that, by drawing on Foucault (1987; 1982a; 1982b; 1978; 1985a; 1986) it is possible to envisage governmental strategies for forming different ways of thinking and relating to one's self and others outside of the normalising framework in which current forms of subjectivity, which we have inherited, are situated.

In other words, Foucault wants to raise questions about how we have been constituted as particular kinds of subjects, as the basis for posing practical questions about how we might define or relate to ourselves differently (see Rajchman, 1986: 169). He wants to break with a long tradition in which categories of ourselves as certain kinds of moral and ethical sorts of being have been established. And it is in this sense that he points to the Christian experience as an exemplary instance of this 'etho-poetic' constitution of subjectivity which involves not only the insertion of the individual into systems of disciplinary categories, but also the incitement to conduct oneself according to the adherence of strict moral precepts.

With the development of Christian technologies of the self, a new form of productive and individualising power, Foucault argues, emerged under the guise of pastoral care and spiritual guidance. The shepherd whose duty was to guide and watch over his flock became central to the hermeneutic practices of the self within Christian experience (see Foucault, 1988f). Within such a regime of surveillance, the practices of self-examination and self-decipherment have their place in a relation that is established between pastor and penitent in which the latter is incited to submit to the former. And such a practice is instituted within the disciplinary space of the confessional.
According to Foucault, such practices involve specific forms of power and knowledge in the emergence of new forms of subjectivity. For instance, the pastor in assuming the responsibility of directing and guiding the soul to a state of redemption, is adopting a strategy within a specific domain in which certain truths about each person's soul have been established. It is, therefore, at this nexus of power-knowledge-truth relations that a particular form of subjectivity emerges. And it is into this regime of truth that sexuality is inserted and deployed in a hermeneutic practice of the self in which self-knowledge is predicated on an imperative for self-disclosure. Furthermore, it is through this practice of work on the self, which entailed a rigorous form of self-analysis, that a particular form of morality was imputed to sexual practices and desires:

If sexuality was constituted as an area of investigation, this was only because relations of power had established it as a possible object; and conversely, if power was able to take it as a target, this was because techniques of knowledge and procedures of discourse were capable of investing it. Between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority, even if they have specific roles and are linked together on the basis of their difference. We will start, therefore, from what might be called 'local centres' of power-knowledge: for example, the relations that obtain between penitents and confessors, or the faithful and their directors of conscience. Here, guided by the theme of the 'flesh' that must be mastered, different forms of discourse - self-examination, admissions, interpretations, interviews - were the vehicle of a kind of incessant back-and-forth movement of forms of subjugation and schemas of knowledge. Similarly, the body of the child, under surveillance, surrounded in his cradle, his bed, or his room by an entire watch crew of parents, nurses, servants educators, and doctors, all attentive to the manifestations of his sex, has constituted, particularly since the eighteen century, another 'local centre' of power-knowledge (Foucault, 1978: 98).

And as Foucault moves from a Christian hermeneutic tradition to the deployment of modern technologies of the self, he demonstrates that modern forms of subjectivity are
still bound up with specific power-knowledge relations in which not dissimilar hermeneutic practices of self-analysis and surveillance are operationalised. This juncture where past and present merge, therefore, constitutes a threshold for the development of what Foucault terms 'a politics of our selves':

We must not look for who has power in the order of sexuality (men, adults, parents, doctors) and who is deprived of it (women, adolescents, children, patients); nor for who has the right to know and who is forced to remain ignorant. We must seek rather the **pattern of the modifications** which the relationships of force imply by the very nature of their process. The 'distributions of power' and the "appropriations of knowledge" never represent only instantaneous slices taken from processes involving, for example, a cumulative reinforcement of the strongest factor, or a reversal of relationship, or again, a simultaneous increase of two terms. **Relations of power-knowledge are not static forms of distribution, they are 'matrices of transformation'** (Foucault, 1978: 99).

Hence, for Foucault a politics involves a critical interrogation of the regimes of practice in which power-knowledge relations are dispersed. And it is precisely because of the multifarious distribution of such power relations that Foucault situates political practices of freedom at the localised site of the work of the self on the self as a matrix of transformation or modification of self-fashioning practices. In other words, sexuality, subjectivity and truth merge within a field of hermeneutic practices in which self-discovery becomes the object. Thus, it is through an investigation into 'how individuals were led to practice, on themselves and others, a hermeneutics of desire [and analysing] the practices by which individuals were led to focus their attention on themselves as subjects of desire, bringing into play between themselves and themselves a certain relationship that allows them to discover, in desire, the truth of their being, be it natural or fallen' that Foucault (1985a: 251) formulates a politics organised around inventing new subjectivities.
It is within such a regime of hermeneutic practices that Foucault locates Freudian psychology and psychoanalysis. Once again techniques of self-disclosure are employed to incite the individual in a relentless pursuit of the truth about him/herself which is masked from consciousness. Furthermore, the work of psychoanalysis involves a search for an identity that is accessed via knowledge of repressed desires buried deep within the subconscious. Hence, the truth of one's identity becomes tied once again to the dimension of desire and sexuality. Thus both Christian and Freudian work on the self is tied to a regime of hermeneutic practices in which subjectivity becomes intertwined with truth and sexuality (see Foucault, 1988a; Hutton, 1988). In this way, the incitement to identify with a particular form of subjectivity becomes bound up with the intensification of sexual desire as an index of 'who we are'. And it is precisely in this sense that the capacity of sexual desires and acts to reveal the truth about who we are has an historical fusion in the legacy of Christian experience (Bernauer, 1987: 169).

In light of this, it is possible to understand Foucault's call to 'refuse what we are' and to promote 'new forms of subjectivity', not so much in terms of an emancipatory practice, but as a strategic deployment of techniques designed to break with a regime of hermeneutic practices in which sexuality functions as index of subjectivity. Once such a historical framework of the genealogy of the modern subject is established in these terms, it is possible to consider possibilities for developing strategies to adjust the norms governing the practices of adolescent boys. Even though such norms are tied to particular technologies, power does not necessarily emanate from a sovereign source, but as Foucault (1978; 1988c; 1988g; 1988h) argues, can be operationalised at the micro-level of ethical relations of the self. In this way, the homophobic practices of adolescent boys, which are predicated on a hermeneutic relation to the self, with sexuality as its matrix, can be modified or altered so that sexuality no longer necessarily functions as the index of boys' identity or a measure of their masculinity (see Frank, 1990; Messner & Sabo, 1990; Thompson, 1991; Martino, 1995; 1993; Ward, 1995; Butler, 1996).
Working at the Limits of Current Regimes of Practice

This critical practice, as exemplified by Foucault (1978; 1984a; 1985a) and which is adopted in this thesis with regards to analysing masculinities, does have political implications for inventing different ways of relating to ourselves and to others. Foucault is concerned to question and to analyse the limits of humanist practices (and their variants) which subjectify or individualise us. He undertakes historical investigations into the events which have led us to constitute ourselves as particular kinds of subjects, who are incited to act, think and behave according to certain norms which are themselves formed within specific apparatuses and regimes of practice (1984a: 46). Such investigations have drawn attention to the effects of historico-cultural practices in their capacity to determine the ontological limits of who we are. And it is at this threshold that Foucault believes there are possibilities for 'promoting new forms of subjectivity' (1982b: 212):

... this work done at the limits of ourselves must, on the one hand, open up a realm of historical inquiry and, on the other, put itself to the test of reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take. This means that the historical ontology of ourselves must turn away from all projects that claim to be global or radical. In fact we know from experience that the claim to escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions (Foucault, 1984a: 46) (my emphasis).

Foucault is sceptical of a political practice which is grounded in claims or attempts to escape from some global or overarching system of power. The danger with such an oppositional politics is that it runs the risk of being incorporated into existing regimes of domination. Elsewhere, he talks of 'the destruction of the subject as a pseudosovereign' and of the need for the 'suppression of taboos and the limitations and divisions imposed
upon the sexes' (Foucault, 1977: 222). In other words, he rejects a form of politics or resistance organised at the level of violating the law or trespassing taboos (See Simons, 1995: 96). Rather, Foucault directs attention to the role of ethical practices of the self which are implicated in wider social networks of knowledge/power relations. In fact, he conceives of an 'ethic of permanent resistance' which involves continuous agonistic struggle and attempts to 'modify the rules of the game'. And it is in this sense that the forms of rationality which organise the ways individuals act and relate to themselves can be modified through a consideration or invention of an alternative set of practices of the self:

Here we are taking as a homogeneous domain of reference not the representations that men give of themselves, not the conditions that determine them without their knowledge, but rather what they do and the way they do it. That is, the forms of rationality that organise their ways of doing things (this might be called the technological aspect) and the freedom with which they act within these practical systems, reacting to what others do, modifying the rules of the game, up to a certain point (this might be called the strategic side of these practices). The homogeneity of these historico-critical analyses is thus ensured by this realm of practices, with their technological side and their strategic side (1984a: 48).

So for Foucault, individuals do indeed act within a regime of practices in which certain forms of rationality are mobilised around the organisation of particular modes of subjection. Within such a domain of practices, Foucault appears to be arguing that possibilities exist for working at the limits of who we are. And it is such a conceptualisation of resistance which informs the elaboration of a politics of the self that is organised around creating ways of or developing strategies for acting and thinking differently about the way we relate to ourselves and others.

The focus for analysis of such forms of resistance involving this work at the limits of the self, converges around three axes of interconnected relations of knowledge, power and
ethics (Foucault, 1984a: 48; 1984b: 352; Bernauer, 1987: 185). It is in this sense that possible ways of relating to the self are tied to the deployment of particular/knowledge power regimes in which certain truths or categories of the self are circumscribed (see Mauss, 1985). Furthermore, Foucault asserts that 'power is co-extensive with the social body' and that 'there are no primal spaces of liberty' or 'relations of power without resistances' (Foucault, 1980c: 141-2). However, he argues that the impossibility of being outside of power relations does not necessarily mean that one is trapped (1980c: 141-142).

Foucault, therefore, does not conceptualise a form of resistance which anticipates a society without power (see Simons, 1995: 81). He emphasises that since power is productive, strategic attempts can be made to prevent power relations from solidifying into states of complete domination and it is in this sense that forms of resistance can be organised around the growth of capabilities which are 'disconnected from the intensification of power relations' (1984a: 48). In other words, one needs to pursue games of power with a minimum of domination (see Foucault, 1987: 129). Thus, Foucault poses the question 'whether the system of constraints in which a society functions leaves individuals the liberty to transform the system' (1983: 16). He appears to be advocating an approach to resistance, therefore, which encourages a form of permanent agonistic struggle:

The ethico-political choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the main danger ... My main point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous ... If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism (1984b: 343).

Hence, Foucault advocates continuous struggle involving work at the limits of the self. However, he does not do so in anticipation of realising some state or space outside of which power is operationalised. Rather he wants to encourage individuals to engage in a
permanent critical practice which draws attention to the interconnectedness of power, knowledge and ethical relations in the constitution of particular forms of subjectivity. Such a conceptualisation of resistance is based on the notion that we can never know our limits or go fully beyond them (see Simons, 1995: 93). It is in this sense that critical work at the limits of the self is never ending (see Foucault, 1984a: 47).

Foucault (1988k: 267) also refers to such a critical practice, involving games of truth telling, as 'an endless labour'. Within the field of power relations in which games of truth are perpetually being played out, possibilities exist for resistance and for inventing alternative ways of fashioning ourselves. This is illustrated particularly in his references to the transgressive practices of 'becoming gay' which involve a refusal to be defined or to define oneself according to the norms established by a science of sexuality which presupposes an inherent sexual nature (see also Foucault, 1984g). In this way, Foucault believes that definite decisions can be made to live one's life differently by refusing to tie one's identity to a specific category such as 'homosexual'. Thus, he believes that gay people can engage in a particular work on the self or askesis:

... to advance into a homosexual askesis that would make us work on ourselves and invent...a manner of being that is still improbable ... To be 'gay', I think, is to try to develop a way of life ... [and to] yield a culture and an ethics (1989: 206-7).

This ethical task of working at the limits of the self, of course, does not just relate to becoming gay. For instance, becoming male for adolescent boys is tied to particular concepts of masculinity and sexuality which limit possibilities for developing alternative ways of thinking, acting and behaving. And what this points to is that there is no fundamental nature, consciousness or set of interests - homosexual or otherwise - which determines human attributes, as Hindess (1989) also stipulates. Such categories are themselves produced within regimes of practice and deployed as explanatory categories to account for the formation of subjectivity and the development of political practices.
The implications of such a conceptualisation of resistance have already been alluded to in this thesis in relation to the development of specific strategies designed to encourage boys to think and to relate to themselves differently within already existing systems of constraint. Educators can always find ways to develop techniques and strategies, within the existing constraints and regimes of practice in which boys enact their masculinities, for encouraging the latter to engage in a critical examination of the limits of such gendered practices. In this way, possibilities can be created for assisting boys to develop specific capacities for relating to themselves and to others differently according to the assemblage of quite specific norms for governing their conduct.

Masculinity, Psychoanalysis and Technologies of Gender

Foucault's later works and interviews, then, make available the possibility of treating masculinities, not so much as an effect of discourse or of the body as constituted within discourse, or even of a repressive or ideological mechanism of interpellation (Althusser, 1971), but rather as produced within a regime of normalising practices in which sexuality functions as an index of subjectivity. In fact, a Foucauldian analytics of modes of subjectification lends itself to a conceptualisation of masculinities as the 'set of effects produced in bodies, behaviours, and social relations' through the deployment of a political technology (Foucault, 1978: 127; 1988a). It is in this sense, that attention is directed in this thesis to the practices and techniques that are deployed within particular technologies of the self that enable adolescent boys to fashion particular forms of masculinity and, hence, to turn themselves into particular kinds of gendered subjects. The issues raised in this thesis, therefore, relate to an investigation of the practices by which adolescent boys learn to act on their own bodies, thoughts, conducts and ways of being to enable them to achieve or acquire a desirable form of masculinity. And it is in this sense that no attempt is made to attribute the behaviour of adolescent boys, their forms of desire and their ways of thinking to 'a single causal principal' which is founded on a repressive mechanism that works at the level of the subconscious (see Hirst and Woolley, 1982: 134; Donald, 1992). In other words, it is inadequate to treat the behaviours and
practices of adolescent boys as related to the effects of desires and drives which are submerged beneath the level of conscious awareness.

However, the point that Foucault (1988a; 1988b) and Hutton (1988) make is that both our conception of the psyche and what we understand about the desires and motivations of individuals have been shaped through the deployment of technologies of psychoanalysis. Within such disciplinary technologies certain gender categories are established around a set of normative criteria and normalising judgements which inform our understanding of what constitutes masculinity, femininity, desire and our sexuality. Moreover, the techniques of self-analysis and self-decipherment, which are adopted as a means by which we may discover the truth about ourselves within such psychoanalytic regimes of practice, have their antecedents in earlier times:

Freud believed that his psychoanalytic technique was a new invention, made possible by his discovery of the dynamics of the unconscious mind. Foucault, however, wishes to expose its hidden ancestry. He reveals a Freud who, however inventive, borrowed tools of self-analysis with a long genealogy. As he did in tracing the antecedents of modern asylums, Foucault seeks to establish connections between modern psychoanalytic techniques and well-established, if theoretically different, practices of self-analysis in the past. The psychoanalytic method, Foucault contends, is derived from sometimes ancient remedies of self-help, now camouflaged in a medical vocabulary. Although the purposes of self-analysis have changed, he explains, the techniques have not. All of them are devices for enhancing our capacity to assert power over own behaviour. Whereas Freud's accent is on the way in which psychoanalysis enables us to recover lost memories of past experiences, Foucault's concern is with the way in which psychoanalysis appropriates forms of self-help developed and then discarded in earlier times (Hutton, 1988: 132).
The point of such a Foucauldian analytics of psychoanalysis is that it is futile to locate the formation of gender identity at the level of psychic processes and categories such as the subconscious. This is because the latter are themselves the effects of particular disciplinary regimes and practices associated with a particular field of psychoanalytic inquiry:

To search the psyche for the truth about ourselves is a futile task because the psyche can only reflect the images we have conjured up to describe ourselves. Looking into the psyche, therefore, is like looking into the mirror image of a mirror. One sees oneself reflected in an image of infinite regress. Our gaze is led not toward the substance of our beginnings but rather into the meaninglessness of previously discarded images of the self. In the end, the meaning of the self for Foucault is less important than the methods we employ to understand it (Hutton, 1988: 139).

Thus, attention is drawn not so much to the meaning of masculinity, but to the methods that are employed to understand its formation. It is in this capacity that certain disciplinary practices are placed under a particular investigation in this thesis in terms of mapping a typology of masculinities. For instance, psychoanalytic interpretations of the constitution of subjectivity, it is argued here, can only be understood in accordance with the categories and criteria that are formed within such disciplinary regimens of analysis.

Within these regimes of practice, 'masculinity' emerges as an object which becomes tied to a fundamental rationality regarding the pivotal significance of the subconscious. Moreover, subjectivity becomes caught up in a general 'logic of consistency' in which work on the self is undertaken in a therapeutic encounter to restore the psyche to a state in which repressive mechanisms are no longer at play. In other words, broken connections between forgotten, painful past memories, which remain submerged in the subconscious, are restored to consciousness as an outcome of such a psychotherapeutic encounter (see Rose, 1989; Fogel et al, 1986; Green, 1987; Seidler, 1989; 1991). And in this way,
learning to decipher the self in terms of identifying repressed sexual desire becomes synonymous with discovering the truth about ourselves. It is in this capacity that masculinity and femininity, as split categories, are inserted into this regimen in which repression is accorded a pivotal explanatory role accounting for the gendered patterns of behaviour and thinking:

Psychoanalysis offers a universal theory of the psychic construction of gender identity on the basis of repression. In doing so, it gives specific answers to the question of what constitutes subjectivity, how we acquire gendered subjectivity and internalise certain norms and values. It offers a framework within which femininity and masculinity can be understood and a theory of consciousness, language and meaning (Weedon, 1987: 43).

Moreover, Lacan's (1977) appropriation of such a psychoanalytic frame is an exemplary instance of a dialectical problematics, as outlined by Hunter (1991a) and Hunter and Saunders (1995), in which language and subjectivity come to mirror each other as complementary totalities (Hunter, 1991: 38). This is made explicit in his account of gendered subjectivity which concurs with the individual's acquisition and mastery of language. Furthermore, Lacan inserts desire into such a fundamental relation between language and subjectivity which is linked to symbolic processes functioning at the level of the unconscious.

According to Lacan, needs can be satisfied and fulfilled, whereas desires are based on needs which have once known satisfaction and are inextricably linked to memory traces and specifically to the child's original experience of satisfaction with the mother. Any subsequent fulfilment of needs, therefore, is mediated through the hallucinatory reproduction of perceptions, which in themselves, become signs that are symbolic of the satisfaction that is desired. In other words, desire for the fulfilment of such needs is represented in terms of a system of signs - a series of relations between signifiers and signified existing in the subconscious. And it is in this sense that the functioning of
language as a complex system of signs is central to a Lacanian conceptualisation of the unconscious and the workings of desire. Hence, according to Lacan, the subject is produced through symbolic relations at the basis of which are desires that are represented as a chain of signifiers in the individual's unconscious. Whereas Freud's Oedipus Complex reduces gendered difference to possessing a penis, Lacan highlights the symbolic significance of the phallus as a sign which represents the patriarchal power of the male (See Easthope, 1986: 11-16; Henriques et al, 1984; Weedon, 1987). For instance, the child uses his or her first words to come to terms with the initial experience of satisfaction received from the mother and which has been lost. Through language, control is gained over this sense of loss and the object of satisfaction is thereby displaced via the symbolic order of relations embodied in language as a system of signs consisting of a chain of signifiers through which desire is unconsciously channelled. In this initial experience of language use, the initial loss of satisfaction received from the mother is repressed and any subsequent satisfaction will always be linked in the unconscious to desire for the original source of satisfaction which cannot be retrieved.

Hence, it is essentially Lacan's insertion of repressed desire into the language-subject relation, which he grounds in unconscious psychic processes, that makes his theory amenable to the development of a feminist political practice. Since entry into language initiates the child into the order of symbolic relations, this becomes a site for political intervention based on an attempt to invent a feminine subjectivity which can escape the phallus as transcendental signifier:

While many women may wish to see the emergence of a female sexuality which is not constructed by and in the interests of men, to make such a sexuality the basis for women's language is politically dangerous, since it reduces women to a version of their sexuality. This theory marks one possible conclusion to the psychoanalytic assumption that language is motivated by sexual desire and that subjectivity, acquired in language, is no more than an effect of sexual identity. Irigaray is much more explicit about the link between biology and identity than
Lacan. The shift to emphasis from the positionality of the Oedipus complex, organised around the phallus, the signifier of male desire, to female sexual pleasure offers women a positive interpretation of their bodies. They are no longer defined in terms of lack. It is, however, the meanings given to female desire which are particularly worrying for a feminism anxious to transform existing social relations rather than to live alongside them in separation from them in a social order that remains patriarchal (Weedon, 1987: 65).

However, feminist adaptations of Lacanian psychoanalysis are still thrust into a fundamental oscillation between subjectivity as an effect of language and language as constitutive of subjectivity. It is in this sense that language is reinscribed as a fundamental political tool for reinventing feminine subjectivity:

By writing her self, woman will return to the body which has been more than confiscated from her, which has been turned into the uncanny stranger on display - the ailing or dead figure, which so often turns out to be the nasty companion, the cause and location of inhibitions. Censor the body and you censor breath and speech at the same time.

Write your self. Your body must be heard. Only then will the immense resources of the unconscious spring forth. Our naphtha will spread, throughout the world, without dollars - black or gold - non assessed values that will change the rules of the old game (Cixous & Clement, 1986: 250).

Thus, for Cixous the materiality of the female body must not be lost in writing into existence alternative female subjectivities which are not organised around the phallus. In other words, transforming the patriarchal symbolic order is tied to a fundamental subject-language relation which is formed within a psychoanalytic apparatus. The significance of such an analysis is that it points to the limitation of using psychoanalytic categories as the basis for analysing gender.
Moreover, within such regimes, masculinity emerges as a general, fixed category of oppression at the basis of which is the repression of a feminine consciousness. Such a theorisation of gender, which is still informed by a political imperative to free the subject from the repressive chains of a patriarchal symbolic order, is the product of a technology of the hermeneutic self whose legacy, as Foucault (1988a) illustrates, has a long history. And as Sawicki (1991) claims, Foucault's critique of essentialist categories can be applied to feminist approaches which appeal to an 'essential feminine desire repressed within patriarchal society' (11).

The point of using Lacan is to demonstrate that psychoanalytic theories operate within a disciplinary space in which knowledge about gender is produced and mobilised around a set of normalising judgements and criteria that always risk collapsing into a totalising account of domination and oppression. In this sense, masculinities are reduced to an effect of patriarchy organised around the principle of a repressed femininity. Moreover, once again such theories of gender are predicated on the foundational principle of the split subject which is operationalised at the symbolic level of the subject's induction into language as a child, where desire for the other is built into a repressive hypothesis. Thus, the common elements of language, desire and subjectivity are inserted into a game of truth in which relations between masculinity and femininity are explained as emerging through the subject's entry into language at the level of the symbolic space of the psyche.

Furthermore, within such a disciplinary regime of knowledge-power relations predicated on a repressive mechanism, an emancipatory politics enters the field as an attempt to move beyond the structuring of masculinity and femininity as dualistic categories. In so doing, an attempt is made to create a space in which freedom from a repressive and oppressive phallic symbolic order may be realised (see Grosz, 1990; Cixous & Clement, 1986). And so a problematic fundamental dialectics informs a theorising of gender and masculinity which becomes caught in a swinging pendulum between the two poles of subject and society. The imperative to reconcile such a tension between the female
subject, as not only a passive object of deterministic symbolic, social forces beyond her control, but also an active participant in the constitution of her own subjectivity informs this particular mode of rationality (see Hunter, 1993b). This emerges in an equation organised around an emancipatory politics in which an alternative symbolic space can be created - one which would allow for the formation of a feminine identity that is not structured around the phallus as transcendental signifier.

Attention is drawn to the appropriation and adaptation of Lacanian psychoanalysis within the field of feminist-poststructuralism because it helps to demonstrate how a particular technology of gender has emerged. Furthermore, it points to the deployment of a political rationality within a regime of practices in which the gender categories of masculinity and femininity are constituted as split and divided against themselves. The point, however, that needs to be emphasised is that the gender categories and concepts that we have inherited cannot be understood outside of a consideration of the use and development of such technologies. Herein lies the value of a post-Foucauldian analytics of power and modes of subjectification in terms of highlighting historically contingent regimes of individualising practices.

The work of Rose (1989) is particularly useful in explicating this point about the role of psychoanalytic technologies in establishing particular categories of the person, around which a set of self-fashioning hermeneutic practices is clustered. For instance, he draws attention to the illusion that we are the subjects of our own personal desires and feelings. Moreover, he illustrates the various ways in which psychotherapeutic techniques have been deployed to incite and enhance our desires and modes of thinking. In so doing, he challenges the notion that we are free to behave, act and think outside of a regime of governmental practices and techniques of the self. Thus, he explicates how the 'inner life of the individual' is infiltrated by social and political power in the form of a political rationality which is channelled via an ensemble of psychotherapeutic practices.
In this sense, his work has implications for formulating a politics which does not treat notions of agency as grounded in discourse or the symbolic dimensions of psychic processes. In other words, it is by focussing on the powers that have come to impinge upon the subjective experience of adolescent boys and their relations with one another that the role of governmental technologies in the production of masculinities can be targeted for specific analysis. Moreover, within such psychotherapeutic apparatuses and disciplinary technologies certain categories are established which render masculinity knowable and thinkable in certain terms. In other words, within such regimes the experience of adolescent boys can only be understood in terms of the limits of these categories for framing our understanding of the way boys act, think and behave as gendered subjects. It is in this sense that Rose’s work on the role of psychology in rendering knowable and thinkable a particular conceptualisation of the human person is applicable to a study of adolescent masculinities and the formulation of a post-discursive politics.

Rose argues that psychological theories have played a significant role in the emergence of a new concept of the self in western democracies. He claims that notions of the free, autonomous, rational, conscious and choosing individual are a product of an ensemble of practices and techniques formed within psychoanalytic technologies of the self:

Anthropologists and historians long ago recognised that the category of ‘the self’ was not universal, that different cultures and different historical periods specified human capacities differently and individualised humans in ways foreign to our own. Sociologists too have suggested that the free, rational, conscious, choosing, autonomous self is a creation of western capitalist democracies. Two features of the history and anthropology of the self have, however, been less studied. The first concerns the relations between cultural categories and beliefs and the actual existence of individuals as selves. The second concerns the emergence of new conceptions and techniques of the self in the recent period: the desiring, relating, actualising self is an invention of the second half of the twentieth century.
Psychological theories have played a key role in the birth of this new concept of the self, and psychological techniques have had a crucial role in the development of these practices and techniques through which modern selves are constructed, sustained and remodelled (Rose, 1989, Preface: xii-xiii).

This point about the development and proliferation of a new concept of self, organised around the principle of the autonomous, self-actualising individual who has the capacity to choose, is one which emerges in the interdisciplinary field of gender and cultural studies (see Weedon, 1987; Mac an Gáill, 1994; Davies, 1994; 1996; Askew & Ross, 1988; Walker, 1988). In fact, it has already been demonstrated in this thesis that such a concept of self is deployed in the articulation of an emancipatory politics within a field of analysis in which gender emerges as an object (see also Davies, 1996; Gilbert, 1989, 1991; Grosz, 1986; Kaufman, 1987; Haywood, 1993; Walkerdine, 1984). Moreover, this conceptualisation of the autonomous individual is worked into the reconciliation of an equation involving the poles of both subject and society as totalising entities. And, as Hunter (1994a) argues, it is this 'image of the moral personality' which has built in to it the notion of free choice that informs such a reconciliation:

This is an image that establishes a reciprocal relation between the perfection or complete development of the faculties and their free exercise in moral judgement. In short, it is the famous image of the person as a self-reflective and self-realising moral agent (2).

Thus, both Hunter and Rose argue that the self-determining and self-realising individual is a product of a particular ensemble of technologies and apparatuses. In other words, within such regimes of practice a particular relation to the self, involving the capacity of the individual to act as a responsible moral agent of their own conduct, is formed. However, within the interdisciplinary field of cultural studies in which gender is targeted as an object of analysis, a particular conceptualisation of the self-realising subject emerges in the symbolic space of consciousness as the basis for elaborating an emancipatory
politics (see Davies, 1996; Giroux, 1988; 1989; Flynn, 1990; Gabriel & Smithson, 1990; Chapman & Rutherford, 1988; Seidler, 1989; 1991; Buchbinder, 1994; Fogel et al, 1986; Pleck, 1980; 1987b; Silverstein & Rashbaum, 1990). The point of convergence here with technologies of psychotherapy and psychology relates to the fact that a similar conceptualisation of the individual, as a self-formative moral agent, capable of transforming her/himself, informs the techniques which are developed within these regimes for reshaping subjectivity:

Psychological expertise now holds out the promise not of curing pathology but of reshaping subjectivity. On every subject from sexual satisfaction to career promotion, psychologists offer their advice and assistance both privately and through the press, radio, and television. The apostles of these techniques proffer images of what we could become, and we are urged to seek them out, to help fulfil the dream of realigning what we are with what we want to be. Our selves are defined and constructed and governed in psychological terms, constantly subject to psychologically inspired techniques of self-inspection and self-examination. And the problems of defining and living a good life have been transposed from an ethical to a psychological register (Rose, 1989, Preface: xiii).

It is in light of such analysis that the problematic of formulating a politics of masculinities, which is dependent upon this notion of the self-determining agent, is highlighted. This is because such a politics is based on the pre-existence of categories of the self which are themselves an effect of a complex ensemble of techniques formed within governmental technologies and apparatuses that shape the way we live our lives and relate to ourselves and others:

'The self' does not pre-exist the forms of its social recognition; it is a heterogeneous and shifting resultant of the social expectations targeted upon it, the social duties accorded it, the norms according to which it is judged, the pleasures and pains that entice and coerce it, the forms of self-inspection inculcated in it, the
languages according to which it is spoken about and about which it learns to account for itself in thought and speech. Thus 'belief systems' concerning the self should not be construed as inhabiting a diffuse field of 'culture', but as embodied in institutional and technical practices - spiritual, medical, political, economic - through which forms of individuality are specified and governed. The history of the self should be written at this 'technological' level, in terms of the techniques and evaluations for developing, evaluating, perfecting, managing the self, the ways it is rendered into words, made visible, inspected, judged, and reformed (Rose, 1989: 218).

It is in this sense, it is argued in this thesis, that the study of masculinities must be treated at the 'technological level' in terms of examining the techniques and methods by which they are rendered visible and policed, both in relation to the micro-practices of adolescent boys in their everyday lives, and the disciplinary practices deployed within the academic fields of socio-cultural analysis. By linking the personal and subjective capacities of adolescent boys to the deployment of governmental technologies, a different form of analysis or way of thinking about masculinities becomes possible. A conceptualisation of subjectivity at the level of hitorically contingent political strategies, institutions and administrative bureaucracies is made available. In other words, a non-dialectical frame of analysis is adopted to enable researchers to investigate the complex ways in which adolescent boys are incited to think, act and behave within the machinery of administrative apparatuses and regulatory technologies of living (see Hunter, 1994a). Moreover, it enables particular modes of rationality and forms of cultural critique to be placed under investigation in theorising and researching masculinities. This non-dialectical frame of analysis and its application to the study of masculinities are developed further in the following chapter.
CHAPTER THREE
Towards a Post-discursive Politics of Masculinities (II): Exploring the Links Between Subjectivity and Government.

In this chapter an analysis of the relations between 'culture' and the production of subjectivities is extended in relation to elaborating a post-discursive politics of masculinities. The work of Rose (1989), Foucault (1979; 1978; 1985a, 1986) and Hunter (1993b;1994a; 1995) is used to develop further a theorisation of masculinities which draws attention to the significant role that governmental power and the historically contingent practices of normalisation play in the formation of the gendered subject.

Through the linking of subjectivity and government, both Rose (1989) and Hunter (1993b;1994a; 1995) argue that it is not possible to consider the shaping or reshaping of our subjectivities outside of the historically contingent technologies in which they are framed:

Our personalities, subjectivities, and 'relationships' are not private matters, if this implies that they are not the objects of power. On the contrary, they are intensely governed. Perhaps they always have been. Social conventions, community scrutiny, legal norms, familial obligations and religious injunctions have exercised an intense power over the human soul in past times and other cultures. Conduct, speech and emotion have been examined and evaluated in terms of the inner states that they manifest, and attempts have been made to alter the visible person by acting upon this invisible inner world. Thoughts, feelings and actions may appear as the very fabric and constitution of the intimate self, but they are socially organised and managed in minute particulars (Rose, 1989: 1).

Rose emphasises the extent to which the *inner or private* world is produced within a regime of practices in which the conduct of individuals is *managed* according to 'social conventions, community scrutiny, legal norms, familial obligations and religious
injunctions'. In fact, he emphasises that the machinery of the administrative bureaucracy, in which new technologies of the self emerge, act upon the way we think, feel and conduct ourselves in our everyday lives:

Governments and parties of all political complexions have formulated policies, set up machinery, established bureaucracies and promoted initiatives to regulate the conduct of citizens by acting upon their mental capacities and propensities. The most obvious manifestation has been the complex apparatus targeted upon the child: the child welfare system, the school, the juvenile justice system and the education and surveillance of parents. But the regulation of subjective capacities has infiltrated wide and deep into our social existence ... These new ways of thinking and acting do not just concern the authorities. They affect each of us, our personal beliefs, wishes and aspirations, in other words, our ethics ... Our thought worlds have been reconstructed, our ways of thinking about and talking about our personal feelings, our secret hopes, our ambitions and disappointments. Our techniques for managing our emotions have been reshaped. Our very sense of ourselves has been revolutionised. We have become intensely subjective beings (Rose, 1989: 2-3) (my emphases).

Hence, Rose argues that specific capacities for conducting and managing one's self have been formed within a social machinery of political technologies of the self and administrative bureaucracies in which particular norms are assembled for regulating and acting upon the way one thinks, feels and relates. And it is such a conceptualisation of the formation of human capacities within a regime of self-governing practices that informs the theorisation of masculinities elaborated in this thesis. In this sense, masculinities, conceived as a regime of practices of self-decipherment, enter the field in which subjectivity and government meet within a framework for developing a post-discursive analysis of the conduct of adolescent boys on specific occasions. Such an approach to the study of masculinities avoids adopting a set of interpretive and critical tropes associated
with ideology critique and poststructuralist accounts of gender which are founded on the concept of the self-reflective and self-realising moral agent (see Hunter, 1994a).

Rose, in fact, is sceptical of an interpretive analytics founded on such a concept of the person. He claims that this form of 'socio-critique' evaluates knowledge in epistemological terms and treats the knowing subject as grounded in an ideological state of false consciousness who has to be restored to full critical awareness (1989: 3-4). Rather, he emphasises that he is concerned to explore the ways in which regimes of truth are established:

My concern is different. It is not with truth in some philosophical sense, but with the ways in which systems of truth are established, the ways in which true statements are produced and evaluated, within the 'apparatus' of truth - the concepts, rules, authorities, procedures, methods and techniques through which truths are realised. My concern is with the new regimes of truth installed by the knowledge of subjectivity, the new ways of saying plausible things about other human beings and ourselves, the new dispensation of those who can speak the truth and those who are subject to it, the new ways of thinking about what might be done to them and to us (4).

This form of analysis at the level of the apparatus, as Hunter (1991a) points out, escapes the fundamental problematics of grounding subjectivity in a dialectical bind. In this way, it is possible to explore the role played by the various apparatuses deployed within the institutional site of the school and the family in the formation and stylisation of adolescent masculinities (see Nayak & Kehily, 1996; Kehily & Nayak, 1997; Epstein, 1997; Dixon, 1997). Attention is directed to an examination of the rules, concepts, techniques and methods through which boys are incited to establish particular forms of masculinity and which involve a stylisation of the body and ways of acting, thinking, talking etc. Within particular regimes of practice, such as those involving peer group networks and relations (Walker, 1988; Mac an Ghaill, 1994; Willis, 1977), as well as sport, adolescent boys are
incited to behave in particular ways and to develop specific capacities for policing and 
establishing desirable forms of masculinity.

Examining the Normalising Practices of the Psychological Sciences

This level of analysis, however, also permits attention to be directed at the various ways 
in which categories of masculinity have been established by experts within the field of the 
psychological sciences. The use of an array of techniques for inscribing masculinity and 
the application of normalising judgement involved in these procedures can be examined. 
Scales for measuring masculinity and femininity (see Bem 1974; Pleck, 1987b; Green, 
1987), for example, provided a mechanism for rendering such categories into thought as 
'a calculable force' (see Rose, 1989: 7). In this way, a normalising space was created for 
the proliferation of the inscription of gendered attributes in accordance with the 
establishment of masculinity and femininity as diametrically opposed categories:

The psychological sciences played another key role, for they provided the means 
for the inscription of the properties, energies, and capacities of the human soul. 
They enabled human powers to be transformed into material that could provide the 
basis for calculation. The examination formed the model for all psychological 
inscription devices. The examination combined the exercise of surveillance, the 
application of normalising judgement and the technique of material 
inscription to produce calculable traces of individuality. The 
examining mechanisms of the psychological sciences ... each 
provided a mechanism for rendering subjectivity into thought as a 
calculable force. The examination not only makes human individuality visible, it 
locates it in a web of writing, transcribing attributes and variations into 
codified forms, enabling them to be accumulated, summated, averaged and 
normalised - in short, documented. Such a documentation of the psyche enabled the 
elements of any individual life that were pertinent to the authorities to be assembled 
into a dossier, enshrined in an archive, or transmitted to a central place where the
traces of individuals can be compared evaluated and judged. Traces can be amalgamated into a knowledge of the psychological characteristics of the population as a whole, which can in turn be utilised to calibrate the individual in relation to that population (Rose, 1989: 7) (my emphases).

Hence, Rose argues that psychological assessment and evaluation cannot be treated merely as epistemological phenomena. These devices are developed within such a technology for rendering subjectivity calculable and enabled government to act upon subjectivity according to the application of normalising judgements. It is in this way, it is argued here, that technologies of gender are established: the development of theoretical knowledge renders masculinity and femininity thinkable according to a set of normative criteria. Through a range of techniques and devices for rendering gender calculable or measurable, it becomes possible to link a set of generalised actions and behaviour to a particular gendered category. Thus, in this sense, the psychological sciences become intimately bound up with governmental techniques in which gender is targeted as an object of scrutiny which permits it to be rendered visible and amenable to strategies of power:

Thus the psychological sciences are intimately bound up with programmes, calculations, and techniques for the government of the soul. The twentieth century development of the psychological sciences has opened up new dimensions for our thought. Simultaneously, it has made possible new techniques of structuring our reality to produce the phenomena and effects that can now be imagined. The translation of the human psyche into the sphere of knowledge and the ambit of technology makes it possible to govern subjectivity according to norms and criteria that ground their authority in an esoteric but objective knowledge (Rose, 1989: 9).

As well as rejecting socio-critique on the basis that it treats knowledge in fundamentally epistemological terms, Rose is also concerned about the emergence of subjectivity within such analytic regimes. Society is conceptualised as a dominating force and is presented in
terms of its capacity to repress or enable the subjectivity of individuals. Power and subjectivity are thereby caught up in a dialectical problematic in which the mechanism of repression figures as a force limiting the freedom of the individual:

Subjectivity, here, appears as an essential datum; societies are to be evaluated according to the extent to which they repress it or respect it. I would like to pose the question the other way round: How has subjectivity become, in its different guises and conceptions, the measure of political systems and power relations? The relations between power and subjectivity are, from this perspective, not confined to those of constraint or repression of the freedom of the individual. Indeed, the distinctive features of the modern knowledge and expertise of the psyche have to do with their role and stimulation of subjectivity, promoting self-inspection and self-consciousness, shaping desires ... They are fundamental to the production of individuals 'free to choose', whose lives become worthwhile to the extent that they are imbued with subjective feelings of meaningful pleasure (Rose, 1989: 4).

Hence, Rose paves the way for a consideration of the forging of new alignments that are established between forms of governmental techniques of power and the personal lives of individuals. This provides an overall framework for analysing the various ways in which adolescent boys can shape their lives through the decisions they make, while at the same time drawing attention to the ways in which government acts upon these decisions. Herein lies a key to understanding what a post-discursive politics of masculinities might look like:

Technologies of subjectivity thus exist in a kind of symbiotic relationship with what one might term 'techniques of the self': the ways in which we are enabled, by means of the languages, criteria, and techniques offered to us, to act upon our bodies, souls, thoughts, and conduct in order to achieve happiness, wisdom, health, and fulfilment. Through self-inspection, self-problematisation, self-monitoring, and confession, we evaluate ourselves according to
the criteria provided by others. Through self-reformation, therapy, techniques of body alteration, and calculated reshaping of speech and emotion, we adjust ourselves by means of the techniques propounded by the experts of the soul.

The government of the soul depends upon our recognition of ourselves as ideally and potentially certain sorts of person ... (Rose, 1989: 10) (my emphases).

What needs to be emphasised here is that such techniques of self-decipherment are not so much provided by others as deployed governmentally within a regime of normalising practices for regulating the conduct of individuals. It is in this sense that the ways in which adolescent boys establish their masculinities are dependent upon a recognition of themselves as certain kinds of gendered subjects and, hence, as potentially certain sorts or types of men (see Coleman, 1990). In other words, in order to acquire a particular form of masculinity, they must accept the normalising judgement built into the imperative to act, think and behave as a certain sort of person (see Mauss, 1985):

However constrained by external or internal factors, the modern self is institutionally required to construct a life through the exercise of choice from among alternatives. Every aspect of life, like every commodity, is imbued with a self-referential meaning; every choice we make is an emblem of our identity, a mark of our individuality, each is a message to ourselves and others as to the sort of person we are ... The self is not merely enabled to choose, but obliged to construe a life in terms of its choices, its powers, and its values ... Each of the attributes of the person is to be realised through decisions, justified in terms of motives, needs and aspirations, made intelligible to the self and others in terms of the unique but universal search to find meaning and satisfaction through the construction of a life for oneself (Rose, 1989: 227).

Thus, a theorisation of subjectivity and government is important in that it signals an alternative form of social criticism and politics, one which does not rely on the category
of person as a self-realising moral agent (see Hunter, 1994a). The point is that the notion of the autonomous self who is free to determine the course of his/her own life in reshaping subjectivities is itself an effect of certain techniques or modes of subjectification (see Foucault, 1986: 25-32).

Such an analysis is concerned to examine the different ways in which adolescent boys have been incited to define and regulate themselves according to moral precepts for conducting themselves. By concentrating on the attributes that they have been incited to identify with and the apparatuses and contexts in which such capacities are formed - in the school, family, the practices of social work and medicine, in the psychotherapeutic encounter, in the act of reading and viewing etc. - it is possible to develop a set of techniques at the local micro-level which are organised around installing an alternative set of norms for governing the way boys relate to themselves and to others. However, these practices may not be successful or may have only limited effects because the moral codifications embodied in governmental technologies of the self are deployed within a diffuse network of power-knowledge relations which intersect at various sites in which adolescent boys live their lives. As Hunter (1994a) and Foucault (1978; 1986, 1988a) argue, the historical contingency of such techniques of the self and the diversity of procedures which have been invented for managing our conduct are better understood at the level of governmental apparatuses and technologies of the self.

What is important about Rose's work is that like Foucault and Hunter, he interrogates the shaping and formation of subjectivities at the level of psychotherapeutic techniques of the self in all their complexity and historical contingency (Rose, 1989; 240-258). By drawing on his analysis of such techniques for examining and evaluating the self, a space is created for investigating the various ways in which adolescent boys relate to themselves and others across a range of situations - their thoughts, feelings, postures, ways of talking and expressing themselves are understood as learned capacities which they have acquired through their insertion into a regime of governmental practices.
Rose, in fact, speaks of 'algorithms of interaction' and 'narratives of feeling which instruct us through the mechanisms of identification' that developed within psychotherapeutic regimes of practice (248). This opens up an investigation of the mechanisms of identification that are operationalised for boys within normalising regimes of practice in which they are incited to identify with particular forms of masculinity. Moreover, it raises questions about the occasions on which boys are compelled to engage in such practices of identification. This creates a possibility for treating the narrativisation of masculinity in the everyday lives of adolescent boys, not so much as a discursive matter, but as operating at the technical level of interlocking procedures for instructing boys on how to behave, act and conduct themselves as proper incumbents of certain categories of masculinity.

The fact that many boys are drawn to particular genres such as adventure, war, violence may be linked to such mechanisms of identification (see Martino, 1993). These mechanisms are organised around the installation of norms which incite boys to relate, act, think and behave in certain ways in order to establish a desirable form of masculinity. In other words, boys learn to identify particular ways of thinking, acting and feeling as indicators of a desirable form of masculinity through their insertion and involvement in a regime of normalising practices which cannot be reduced to the level of discourse. Through their involvement in a range of practices across various departments of existence, 'algorithms of interaction' and 'narratives of feelings' are established for boys to follow within the specific normalising regimes in which their lives are imbricated.

It is in this sense that technologies of gender are established within the psychological sciences and the field of cultural studies as disciplinary sites for the surface of emergence of particular knowledge/power relations. Within certain normalising regimes of truth, therefore, categories of masculinity have been established and function to determine specifiable limits for understanding the formation of gendered subjectivities. However, both Rose (1989) and Hunter (1993b; 1994a) draw our attention to such limits by reiterating the link between subjectivity and government. This enables a post-discursive
politics to be elaborated in this thesis and leads to an emphasis on treating the formation of subjectivity in terms of the deployment of available techniques and strategies for governing conduct which are maintained within historically specific regimes of practice and regulatory technologies of the self. In short, a consideration of how such self-fashioning techniques may be re-deployed as part of educational programs designed to target specific forms of masculinity underscores an alternative conceptualisation of politics which informs the approach to theorising and researching masculinities in this thesis. Hence, strategic intervention is understood in terms of attempting to alter the ways in which boys relate to themselves and to others in localised sites of social interaction. Moreover, this politicised practice, it is argued, must necessarily involve mobilising already existing governmental apparatuses in terms of adjusting norms around which particular models of masculinity are organised (see chapters thirteen and fourteen).

From Discourse to Dispositif: Retheorising the Links Between Masculinity and Subjectivity

Such a post-discursive theorisation of masculinities deploys an interpretive analytics, derived from the work of Foucault (1988a; 1988b; 1991a; 1993), which offers an alternative to a poststructuralist/psychoanalytic hermeneutics of the self. It is argued in this thesis that a fundamental hermeneutic principle underlies certain critical perspectives on the analysis of gender, and more specifically masculinity, within the interdisciplinary site of cultural studies and the social sciences (see Mac an Ghaill, 1994a; Davies, 1993; Easthope, 1986; Willis, 1977; Walker, 1988; Haywood, 1993; Frank, 1999; Chapman & Rutherford, 1988; Buchbinder, 1994; Kimmel & Messner, 1989; Berger et al, 1995; Brod & Kaufman, 1994; Cornwall & Lindisfarne, 1994; Segal, 1990). Foucault makes a shift from an archaeological method of analysis, with its focus on discursive formations, to a genealogical interpretive analytics which draws attention to the historical deployment of the dispositif within a contingent and complex network of power relations (Hunter, 1991a). This makes it possible to develop a greater understanding of the role of governmental technologies in the formation and constitution of particular modes of
subjectification in which truth, power and knowledge relations are inextricably linked to culturally specific social practices. In this way, it is possible to explicate further the implications of such an interpretive analytics for developing an understanding of the mechanisms of power at work in the lives of adolescent boys through which they are incited to decipher the truth about themselves as gendered subjects.

The theoretical development evident in Foucault's work 'from discourse to dispositif' (see Hunter, 1991a) provides an exemplary tracing of both the problems of a discursive theorisation of gender and the possibilities of a post-discursive analysis of masculinities in terms of reconfiguring agency. In an attempt to transcend the Kantian subject/object division which is grounded in a phenomenological hermeneutics of the meaning-giving subject, Foucault, in his earlier work, developed a theorisation of the subject as an effect of discourse (see Foucault, 1972). He articulated a theory of discourse as 'an autonomous rule-governed system' in an attempt to develop a theoretical frame which did not collapse into a fundamental hermeneutics or transcendental phenomenology (see Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: xiii-xxiii):

The analysis of statements, then, is a historical analysis, but one that avoids all interpretation: it does not question things said as to what they are hiding, what they were 'really' saying, in spite of themselves, the unspoken element that they contain...; but on the contrary, it questions them as to their mode of existence...what it means for them to have appeared when and where they did - they and no others.” (Foucault, 1972: 109).

Thus, he avoided all recourse to the interiority of the meaning-giving subject by privileging discourse as a system of formation in which objects and subjects are governed according to a general set of rules:

Groups of verbal performances are linked at the statement level...which implies that one can define the general set of rules that govern their objects,...the system of their
That one defines the general set of rules that govern the different modes of enunciation, the possible distribution of the subject positions, and the system that defines and prescribes them;... that one defines the set of rules common to all their associated domains, the forms of succession, of simultaneity...of which they are capable, and the system that links all these fields of coexistence together; lastly...that one can define the general set of rules that govern the status of these statements, the way in which they are institutionalised, received, used, reused, combined together, the mode according to which they become objects of appropriation, instruments for desire or interest, elements for a strategy (Foucault, 1972: 115).

However, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) emphasise that in abandoning a phenomenological hermeneutic position, Foucault attributed causal efficacy to the very rules which describe the systematicity of discursive formations. In this way, the archaeologist places him/herself outside of the discursive formation and provides a description of the bracketing of the truth and meaning of serious statements:

The archaeologist should discover 'the play of rules which determine the appearance and the disappearance of statements in a culture' (quoted in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 84).

The result, according to Dreyfus and Rabinow, however, is to resort to a priori descriptive categories at the basis of which is the presupposition that an underlying principle governs the formation of discursive configurations. It is in this sense that they argue that Foucault's archaeological method is still caught within a structuralist analytic bind and is, therefore, limited in its inability to account for how discursive formations are shaped by the social practices in which they and the researcher are enmeshed.

However, the point which needs to be emphasised is that it is precisely this conception of Foucauldian discourse analysis which is selectively appropriated by many cultural
theorists working within the paradigm of poststructuralism. These theorists treat
discursive formations, in their socio-cultural and institutional specificity, as the privileged
locus for meaning-making and transformative/emancipatory social practices (see Weedon,
1986). Subjectivity, therefore, emerges within such fields of analysis as a product of
multiple discourses which exist in any society as a result of the different kinds of
institutions and discursive practices in which they take shape. Kress (1985), for instance,
claims that 'institutions and social groupings have specific meanings and values which are
articulated in language in systematic ways' (6). He proceeds to provide a definition of
discourse which is derivative of Foucault's explication of the concept in The Archaeology
of Knowledge:

[Discourses are] systematically organised sets of statements which give expression
to the meaning and values of an institution ... A discourse organises and gives
structure to the manner in which a particular object, topic, process is to be talked
about in that it provides descriptions, rules, permission and prohibitions of social
and individual actions" (Kress, 1985: 7).

Language as discourse is therefore accorded a privileged status by Kress in the
organisation and expression of meaning. In short, Kress argues that discourses, as
systematically organised statements, enable certain kinds of meaning and values to be
expressed, thereby structuring the manner in which we are able to talk about a particular
object or topic and, thus implicitly defining rules for the individual and social conduct.
Kress's argument is based on a Foucauldian archaeological analytics which, as Dreyfus
and Rabinow (1982: 79-100) argue, is methodologically flawed because it grants an a
priori foundation to discourse as an autonomous system which is incorporated into an
interpretive frame for analysing meaning making practices in their discursive specificity.

For Foucault (1972), a prediscursive consciousness does not exist - only the specificity
of discursive practices which make available 'various statuses, various sites, various
positions' that an individual can occupy. It is in this sense that a particular conceptualisation of the subject, as dispersed within multiple discourses, emerges in Foucault's archaeological analysis of knowledge:

...discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject but, on the contrary, a totality in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined (Foucault, 1972: 55).

That is, in this early work, discourse is not treated as revealing the inner consciousness of the speaker, but rather is understood as formed within specific formations or apparatuses. Consciousness, therefore, is implicated in culture and emerges within discursive fields or discourses in their institutional specificity. Discourses, for instance, are defined by Foucault at this time as 'not [the] slender surface of contact, or confrontation between a reality and a language, the intrication of a lexicon and an experience [but] practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak' (Foucault, 1972: 49). In this way he attempts to eliminate the originative role of the subject as centred in an empirico-transcendental teleology. He stresses the discontinuities, regularities, irregularities and shifting organisations of 'systems of dispersal' which he defines as discursive formations or sets of statements that are organised in particular ways as a result of certain kinds of rules operating to produce specific 'knowledge effects':

When we describe between a number of statements a system of dispersion - whenever between objects, assertions, concepts or themes, one can define a regularity (an order, correlation, position, transformation) we will call this a transformation (Foucault, 1972: 38).

Given the systematic dispersion of the subject within discursive fields, discourse analysis, as a particular methodology, aims to account for the various positions made available to an individual within a specific institutional site, while also focussing on how particular subject positions within discourse limit and define the possibilities for making
meaning. However, it would appear that a particular form of discourse analysis has emerged as a field which selectively draws on Foucault's work, and that of others, to support its assumptions about the language/subjectivity nexus. Moreover, it is such an approach which serves as a methodological basis for research particularly within cultural studies and poststructuralist paradigms in academic educational studies (see Cherryholmes, 1988). This is substantiated by Hunter (1994c) who claims:

The manner in which the critical pedagogues have used Foucault - that is, as a handy supplement to pre-existing theoretical and historical approaches - turns out to be fairly typical; although there are of course important differences in the approaches to which Foucault is harnessed, and in the degree to which the distinctiveness of his work remains visible in these other uses. This is not an implied criticism of these approaches to be true to some sort of Foucauldian canon. On the contrary, Foucault's work is best respected by refusing to sacralise it - by treating it as a tool box to be used to the degree that it helps to solve particular historical and theoretical problems. If there is a criticism implied of some current uses of Foucault in academic educational studies it is that they have sometimes not used Foucauldian tool box to reformulate problems, and that they have often drawn from Foucault's work only those bits useful for reinforcing long-standing and repetitive thematics (1).

It would appear from the work undertaken within poststructuralist fields of inquiry that discourse analysis, with its privileging of the language-subject relation, is an exemplary instance of one of these 'long-standing repetitive thematics'. In fact, Hunter even goes as far as to claim that Foucault's genealogical method and reconceptualisation of government has been largely ignored in educational research (1994c: 1).

Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) document the shift in Foucault's work from his attempt to develop a theory of discourse to a method which enables him to analyse the historically
contingent network of social practices in which relations between knowledge, power, subjectivity and truth emerge. This enables a theorisation of subjectivity that is irreducible to a fundamental or general rule-governed system which takes language or consciousness as a privileged locus for making meaning and effecting critical transformation. Rather, subjectivity is reformulated as an effect of a range of historically contingent social practices and relations which are formed within specific apparatuses and moral technologies for managing and securing the well-being of populations and for shaping one's relations with oneself and others (see Foucault 1988a; 1988b; 1987; 1993). An attempt is made in this thesis to retheorise gender, and more specifically adolescent masculinities, by refusing to treat subjectivity as an effect of discourse which presupposes an ideological mechanism or repressive hypothesis (see Foucault, 1978).

In this thesis reformulating problems around the theorisation of masculinities does not entail merely substituting dispositif for discourse or practice as an explanatory category. Rather than just focussing on making intelligible the rules which govern the discursive formations in which the human sciences are enmeshed and which remain hidden from the actors involved, Foucault draws our attention to the wider set of historically contingent practices and technologies imbricated in the production of knowledge, power and truth relations. Theory, thus, does not become subordinated to an underlying structure of rules, systematically organised within a discursive space as a locus for the intelligibility and horizon of meaning (see Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 102-103). Moreover, it needs to be emphasised that it is not the rules themselves that are important, but how they are deployed and how they operate within historically specific regimes of normalising practices.

For the genealogist, the development of an interpretive analytics is irreducible to uncovering a hidden truth or meaning which is somehow implicit or buried in the practices themselves. Rather, the genealogist is interested in studying the emergence of agonistic and localised power relations at the interstices of which is deployed an ensemble of techniques within a specific regime of truth and subjectification:
This relationship of domination is no more a 'relationship' than the place where it occurs is a place; and, precisely for this reason, it is fixed, throughout its history, in rituals, in meticulous procedures that impose rights and obligations (Foucault, 1971: 150).

The isolation of such rituals of power or techniques that are deployed within specific institutional sites is at the basis of Foucault's later inquiries into specific modes of subjectification and regimes of practice (see Foucault, 1979; 1978; 1985; 1986; 1988f; 1988a). In these studies, Foucault focuses on Bentham's Panopticon and the confessional as localised instances of the historical use of specific techniques of power which are developed within particular technologies and apparatuses for establishing normalising regimes of practice. Within such regimes, individuals are incited to relate to themselves and to others according to a specific set of norms. And Foucault demonstrates how the body is taken up within a field of political relations in which it is invested, marked, trained and, in short, deployed:

[individuals are] caught up in a system of subjectification (in which need is also a political instrument meticulously prepared, calculated and used); the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive and a subjected body (Foucault, 1979: 26).

What is significant about this account is that it highlights the ways in which the body is inscribed within political technologies and calls into play the strategic deployment of techniques of power/knowledge relations which converge around the body. Moreover, such a focus on technologies of power enables a particular theorisation of masculinities to be elaborated, which does not treat the body as an effect of discourse or as a surface for the emergence of a gendered subjectivity. The body is deployed within specific regimes of practices in which boys are incited to enact particular forms of masculinity that are organised around a set of norms for behaving, thinking and acting in certain ways. It is
within institutions, such as the school, that mechanisms of power are operationalised through specific administrative apparatuses and pedagogical, social and disciplinary practices organised around norms for enacting particular forms of masculinity. Furthermore, such normalising practices and techniques cannot be examined without investigating the ways in which the body is strategically deployed in conferring a particular masculine status and acquiring a stylised bodily disposition/posture (see Nayak & Kehily, 1996; Epstein, 1997; Martino, 1994; Dixon, 1997; Canaan, 1991; Back, 1994).

Such an interpretive analytic approach to theorising masculinities draws attention to the role of historically contingent technologies and enables one to map a terrain and to investigate the formation of the gendered subjectivity of adolescent boys without resorting to the 'tyranny of the referent'. For instance, Foucault (1984e) argues:

we must rid ourselves of the constituting subject, rid ourselves of the subject itself, which is to say arrive at an analysis which can account for the subject within an historical account. (59).

Furthermore, by tracing the historical emergence of particular technologies of the self in which sexuality was deployed, it is possible to develop an understanding of the categories of the self which we have inherited and by which we live. Herein, lies a key to the elaboration of a political 'practice of freedom' which is centred on working at the limits circumscribed by a long history of governmental technologies in which a particular form of individuality or category of the self is organised around humanist and hermeneutic practices of the self. It is not that a non-normative position or space can be established. Rather, in following Foucault, it is argued that the limits of a particular category of the self, understood in terms of the reflective moral agent, need to be placed under a particular kind of investigation. This enables one to examine the norms governing the deployment of sexuality in its capacity to function as an index of who we are.
And this is precisely what Foucault does in his analysis of the role of sexuality in the practices of classical antiquity and during Christian times and the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries (see Foucault, 1978; 1985a; 1986). He examines those historico-cultural practices which have been instrumental in the formation and development of particular modes of subjectification. Through his focus on what he terms the *dispositif*, he elaborates a *grid of analysis* which enables the historian/researcher to investigate the cultural practices and technologies in which particular modes of subjectification are formed without having recourse to a teleology grounded either in the subject or a system of rules. He defines *dispositif* as a heterogeneous ensemble of 'discourses, institutions, architectural arrangements, regulations, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophic propositions, morality, philanthropy, etc.' (1980c: 194).

This technical term, therefore, encompasses a range of discursive and non-discursive practices which are drawn together and which, as Hunter (1988; 1994a) argues, are sometimes brought together in an ad hoc, unpredictable and chance-like way to establish a set of power relationships which are coordinated and lodged within historically specific emergent institutional apparatuses. It is in this capacity that an account of the mutually generative role of knowledge/power relations within a specific historical grid of analysis can be isolated and subjected to scrutiny in terms of their localised effects and strategic deployment. In this way, Foucault avoids grounding meaning in universalist categories governing either thought or experience. Rather, as Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) argue, 'Foucault replaces ontology with a special kind of history that focuses on the cultural practices that have made us what we are' (122).

Foucault, thus, does not construct a general theory or attempt to reveal an intrinsic meaning in cultural practices. Rather, he attempts to develop 'a grid of intelligibility' which enables him to *describe* some of the cultural practices and techniques of power which embody, in their materiality, historically contingent forms of life or categories of the person (see Mauss, 1985). Overall, his approach may be summarised as follows:
Foucault is offering us [in his later works] an interpretation ... which is not a
theory, nor is it an interpretation based on deep meaning, a unified subject,
signification rooted in nature, privileged access of the interpreter. If we label the
misguided kind of interpretive method 'hermeneutics', then we can call Foucault's
current method 'interpretive analytics'. Interpretive analytics avoids the pitfalls of
structuralism or hermeneutics by proceeding to analyse human seriousness and
meaning without resort to theory or deep hidden significance (Dreyfus & Rabinow,
1982: 183).

He opposes a theory of power in favour of an approach which treats it as a strategic
relational force which is operationalised and infiltrated through the entire social body at
the level of political technologies. Moreover, Foucault's aim is to isolate a specific
domain which is formed by relations of power and to undertake an analysis of the
mechanisms and techniques through which such relations are strategically operationalised
(Foucault, 1978: 82).

If one tries to erect a theory of power one will always be obliged to view it as
emerging at a given place and time and hence to deduce it, to reconstruct its
genesis. But if power is in reality an open, more-or-less coordinated (in the event,
no doubt, ill coordinated) cluster of relations, then the only problem is to provide
oneself with a grid of analysis which makes possible an analytic of relations of
power (1980c: 199).

Thus, for Foucault, power relations are 'intentional and non-subjective ... they are
imbued through and through, with calculation: there is no power that is exercised without
a series of aims and objectives' (1978: 95). However, the fact that social actors make
decisions about how to act and behave, for example, does not mean that Foucault is
grounding such intentionality in the subject (see Hindess, 1989). Rather, he draws
attention to the fact that such capacities for making certain decisions are themselves effects
of the historical deployment of wider social practices and technologies in which social actors are implicated.

In this sense, Foucault is interested in exploring how political and governmental technologies are implicated in the micropractices of social subjects at the local site. It is at this level that he locates the workings of power in the lives of individuals:

[the goal of my work during the last twenty years] has not been to analyse the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. My objective instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects (Foucault, 1982b: 208).

This does not mean that he is not interested in how an individual turns himself or herself into a particular kind of subject (Foucault, 1982b: 208). In fact, he draws attention to the fact that the ways in which we relate to one another and to ourselves are indeed effects of particular social practices and techniques of the self that have been formed within particular technologies (Foucault, 1988a; 1988b; 1991a; 1991b; 1993). His focus, therefore, is on an analytics of power which converges on the specific modes of subjectification that are implicated in political technologies.

This is important for the study of masculinities that is undertaken in this thesis. It emphasises the need to locate both the social practices of adolescent boys and the strategies/techniques that they employ to enact their masculinities or relations with themselves and others, within a wider field or network of social practices and regulatory technologies of the self. In this way, it is possible to analyse the role of specific rationalities that are implicated in the political technologies which impinge on the lives of adolescent boys (see Foucault, 1982b: 210-11). For instance, what forms of rationality are produced within an economy of power relations in which adolescent boys' social practices are enmeshed? How are particular understandings of 'masculinity' articulated in our culture? How do adolescent boys articulate particular understandings of
'masculinity'? How do they interpret their own experiences of 'masculinity'? How do particular understandings or ways of thinking about 'masculinity', conceived of as a set of normalising practices, relate to the deployment of particular political technologies of the gendered self?

These questions, it is argued here, need to be applied to studying the ways in which various masculinities are established and taken up by adolescent boys within the specific localised site of the school. Moreover, what needs to be stressed is that the particular forms of rationality, which inform the practices of these boys, need to be linked to a wider social network of historically contingent political technologies of the self if, in Foucault's words, we are to develop a better understanding of 'how we have been trapped in our own history' (1982b: 210).

Thus, Foucault (1982b) elaborates an interpretive analytics which focuses on examining 'power relations through the antagonism of strategies' (211). Such an analytics of power enables a theorisation of the practices and struggles deployed by those individuals who refuse to be tied to or constrained by particular subjectivities. Foucault, in fact, argues for the need to investigate the power relations which converge around forms of resistance and attempts to challenge these relations as a basis for elaborating a political practice or what he terms a 'critical ontology of ourselves'. For instance, he directs our attention to those 'struggles which question the status of the individual':

These struggles are not exactly for or against the 'individual', but rather they are struggles against the 'government of individualisation'... They are an opposition to the effects of power which are linked with knowledge, competence, and qualification: struggles against the privileges of knowledge. But they are also an opposition against secrecy, deformation, and mystifying representations imposed on people. There is nothing 'scientistic' in this (that is, a dogmatic belief in the value of scientific knowledge), but neither is it a sceptical or relativistic refusal of all verified truth. What is questioned is the way in which knowledge
circulates and functions, its relations to power ... all these present struggles revolve around the question: Who are we? They are a refusal of these abstractions, of economic and ideological state violence which ignore who we are individually, and also a refusal of a scientific or administrative inquisition which determines who one is... the main objective of these struggles is to attack not so much 'such and such' an institution of power, a group, or elite, or class, but rather a technique, a form of power (211-12).

This focus on the 'governmentalisation of individuals' is important because it draws attention to a form of power which is implicated in those modes or practices of subjectification which determine particular relations with the self and others.

It is at this level that Foucault can be used to elaborate a post-discursive politics of masculinities. This involves the strategic and tactical deployment of strategies and techniques designed to equip boys with capacities for developing alternative ways of relating to themselves and to others. It also draws attention to the political intervention of individuals in their capacity to work at the limits of who they are by adopting certain techniques and practices of the self (see Foucault, 1987; Simons, 1995). In other words, what is highlighted is the possibility of engaging in a set of self-fashioning practices which are not necessarily tied to normalising regimes of individualisation in which sexuality functions as an index of the truth of who we are. It is in this capacity that Foucault encourages us to alter our thinking and to invent new subjectivities or ways of relating to ourselves which are tied to an aesthetics of existence rather than to a rigid code of moral norms (see Foucault, 1984g; 1987; Ratchman, 1986; Racevskis, 1987; Bernauer, 1987). It needs to be stated, however, that such an aesthetics of existence is not necessarily outside of the operationalisation of specific norms for governing conduct.

Foucault (1982b), in fact, goes on to explore the role of government as a form of power which individualises and subjectifies human beings:
This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise and which others have to recognise in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. These are two meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to... there are three types of struggles: either against forms of domination (ethnic, social, and religious); against forms of exploitation which separate individuals from what they produce; or against that which ties the individual to himself and submits him to others in this way (struggles against subjection, against forms of subjectivity and submission) (212).

He draws attention to a particular form of power which is tied to the deployment of an ensemble of normalising techniques and self-fashioning practices that determine the ways individuals think, feel and relate to themselves as particular kinds of subjects. He is, in this sense, delineating and isolating certain forms of struggle which are tied to either mechanisms of subjection or mechanisms of exploitation and domination. However, he is careful to highlight that such axes of power relations do not function independently of one another but 'entertain complex and circular relations with other forms' (Foucault, 1982b: 213).

This is further highlighted in the definition of 'government' that Foucault (1991a) provides:

... the definition of government in no way refers to territory. One governs things. But what does this mean. I do not think this is a matter of opposing things to men, but rather of showing that what government has to do with is not territory but rather a sort of complex composed of men and things. The things with which in this sense government is to be concerned with are in fact men, but men in their relations, their
links, their imbrication with those other things which are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility etc.; men in their relation to that other kind of things, customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking etc.; lastly men in their relation to that other kind of things, accidents and misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death, etc. (93-94).

Here, Foucault points out that government was not so much an instance of a struggle for power in which the self-determining subject was pitted against the state. Rather a particular form of power developed with the emergence of 'an historically specific machinery of social administration' (Hunter, 1993b: 131). That is, a particular technology and ethos of government emerged and an amalgam of political instruments and techniques were developed to support specific objectives for ensuring the well-being and security of growing populations. Thus, administrative apparatuses formed part of growing bureaucracies which were established to ensure the well-being and security of the population. Tied to the emergence of such governmental apparatuses were a set of analytical practices and forms of knowledge which were linked to the development and elaboration of polymorphous techniques and instruments of power (Foucault, 1991a: 96). For instance, particular forms of expertise and rationality were implicated in the development of systems of economic management, public health, welfare, and state education.

Such a genealogical analysis highlights the point that government was exercised through polymorphous techniques and instruments of power, the effects of which cannot be reduced, for example, to the staging of representations in consciousness. It is in this sense that both Foucault and Hunter treat government as anything but a totalising force motivated by a 'unifying sovereign will':

... government was exercised through a diverse range of instruments behind which there was no one sovereign will and no unifying moral or intellectual rationale (Hunter, 1993b: 131).
... with government it is a question not of imposing law on men, but of disposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics - to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved ... the finality of government resides in the things it manages and in the pursuit of the perfection and intensification of the processes which it directs; and the instruments of government, instead of being laws, now come to be a range of multiform tactics. Within the perspective of government, law is not what is important ... it is not through law that the aims of government are to be reached. (Foucault, 1991a: 95-96) (my emphases)

Thus what needs to be emphasised, in what may be termed a post-discursive or post-Foucauldian politics, is that it is not possible to work with a notion of power as a totalising force which imposes its will in an act of violence. Moreover, it is such a conceptualisation of power which underpins notions of resistance and the elaboration of an oppositional politics within cultural and critical theoretical frames (see Davies, 1993; Seidler, 1987; 1990; Brod, 1987c; Willis, 1977; Walker, 1988; Mac an Ghaill, 1994). In fact, both Foucault (1982a; 1991a) and Hunter (1993b) help to demonstrate how the familiar tropes of cultural critique are organised around a fundamental binarism involving society versus agency, oppressive power versus oppositional politics, state-determining subject versus self-determining subject and, in so doing, draw attention to the limits of ideology critique in favour of a genealogical approach.

**Pastoral Power and Government: Further Implications For Theorising Masculinities**

A focus on pastoral power and governmental technologies of the self, therefore, can further aid a particular theorisation of masculinities, conceived of as a set of normalising practices in which sexuality is deployed to police gender boundaries (see Epstein, 1994;
1997; Steinberg, Epstein & Johnson, 1997; Nayak & Kehily, 1996; Kehily & Nayak, 1997; Hite, 1981; 1994; Ward, 1995; Butler, 1996; McLean, 1996; Walker, 1994; Mac an Ghaill, 1994; Redman, 1996; Connell, 1987; 1995; Haywood, 1993). It is in this sense that masculinity, as an enacted and performative practice, involves both individualising and totalising forms of power. Through institutional regimes of practice, certain norms are assembled for governing the conduct of adolescent boys, but the latter are also engaged in regulating and governing themselves as particular incumbents of certain categories of masculinity.

Foucault links the development of pastoral forms of power and governmental technologies to the political structure of the state which emerged in the sixteenth century. He claims that the state is often identified with a political form of power 'which ignores individuals, looking only at the interests of the totality'. In fact, he argues that the state's power is both an individualising and totalising form of power. Moreover, he indicates that, at the interstices of such political structures of individualisation techniques and totalisation procedures, a different form or technique of power, borrowed from the Christian hermeneutic tradition, has emerged and been integrated into the modern Western state (Foucault, 1982b: 213). This form or modality of power is called pastoral power and is central to developing an understanding the role that governmental technologies have played in the formation of particular subjectivities.

Pastoral power was developed, it is argued, within the Christian Church in the form of confessional techniques designed to direct the conduct and behaviour of individuals by encouraging them to monitor and govern themselves. Within such an economy of power relations, the ultimate aim was to assure salvation in the next world. In this way, the individual became implicated in a specific regime of individualisation. It is in this sense that Foucault opposes this form of individualising power to legal power which is based on the principal of sovereignty. However, it is a form of power that is linked to the production of truth within a regime of normalising practices in which the individual is incited to discover the truth about him/herself. And, according to Foucault (1982b), it is a
variant of such a form of pastoral power which is at the matrix of individualisation within the modern state:

It was no longer a question of leading people to their salvation in the next world, but rather ensuring it in this world. And in this context, the word *salvation* takes on different meanings: health, well-being (that is, sufficient wealth, standard of living), security, protection against accidents. A series of 'worldly' aims took the place of the religious aims of the traditional pastorale, all the more easily because the latter, for various reasons, had followed in an accessory way a certain number of these aims; we only have to think of the role of medicine and its welfare function assured for a long time by the Catholic and Protestant Churches. (215)

Foucault seems to be drawing attention to the role of pastoral power and its historical emergence and deployment within administrative technologies of the state as a tactics for managing populations (see Foucault, 1988b; 1988f; Hunter, 1988a; 1993b; 1994a). And it is by analysing the role of this form of power within regimes of practice, in which certain ways of relating to the self are regulated, that certain strategies or a tactical manoeuvre aimed at reinventing ourselves can be proposed:

But the task of philosophy as a critical analysis of our world is something which is more and more important. Maybe the most certain of all philosophical problems is the problem of the present time, and of what we are, in this very moment.

Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of this kind of political "double bind", which is the simultaneous individualisation and totalisation of modern power structures... the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualisation which is linked to the state. We
have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries (Foucault, 1982b: 216) (my emphasis).

Foucault is emphatic about elaborating a political practice of freedom designed to dismantle a particular form of individualisation which is tied to the state and whose historical emergence and deployment he has traced (Foucault, 1978, 1985a, 1986). In fact, elsewhere he argues that it is by undertaking an historical analysis of the limits that have been imposed on us within particular normalising regimes of practice, that alternative techniques of the self and modes of stylisation can be invented:

The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them (Foucault, 1984a: 50).

In this sense, through his analysis of the emergence of historically contingent political technologies of normalisation, Foucault elaborates a basis for the development of a critical practice involving work on ourselves. However, it is argued in this thesis that we already have the means to undertake this kind of critical work on ourselves and that these 'means' are guaranteed by existing norms of self-surveillance. In light of this, it would appear that existing social norms about what constitutes desirable heterosexual masculinities need to be adjusted in setting 'new' limits around the production and fashioning of gendered subjectivities. Thus, a consideration of the limits that have been imposed on us within specifiable regimes of normalising practices becomes the focus in the redeployment of already existing techniques of self-surveillance (see chapters thirteen and fourteen). These are mobilised to undertake a path to freedom which lies in adjusting these limits (see Foucault, 1987).
Some Methodological Considerations For Researching Masculinities

Foucault's investigation into the workings of power is important because it provides a methodological basis for an exploration of how such relations are embedded in the everyday social practices of adolescent boys. Foucault (1982b) indicates that he is more interested in asking the question of how in relation to undertaking a 'critical investigation into the thematics of power' (217). This is not to claim, he argues, that what and why questions are irrelevant:

If, for the time being, I grant a certain privileged position to the question of 'how' it is not because I would wish to eliminate the questions of 'what' and 'why'. Rather it is that I wish to present these questions in a different way; better still, to know if it is legitimate to imagine a power which unites in itself a what, a why, and a how. To put it bluntly, I would say that to begin the analysis with a 'how' is to suggest that power as such does not exist. At the very least it is to ask oneself what contents one has in mind when using this all-embracing and reifying term; it is to suspect that an extremely complex configuration of realities is allowed to escape when one treads endlessly in the double question: What is power? and Where does power come from? The little question, What happens? although flat and empirical, once it is scrutinised is seen to avoid accusing a metaphysics or an ontology of power of being fraudulent; rather it attempts a critical investigation into a thematics of power (217) (my emphasis).

Foucault appears to be arguing that posing questions about power in terms of how it is exercised will inevitably lead to addressing what and why questions:

'How', not in the sense of 'How does it manifest itself?' but 'By what means is it exercised?' and 'What happens when individuals exert (as they say) power over others?' (217)
These questions are pertinent in their application to a study which deals with analysing adolescent masculinities. For instance, the focus in this thesis is not to try to define what masculinity is, but rather to undertake an analysis of how boys come to establish themselves as proper incumbents of certain sorts or types of potential men (see Coleman, 1990). This inevitably leads to investigating the ways in which 'masculinity', as a nexus of shifting and variable social practices, is caught in a network of power relations. Moreover, such a focus provides the basis for exploring further questions about how instances of masculinity manifest themselves in the lives of adolescent boys, not as some kind of essence or discursively constructed identity formation which is implicated in culture, but rather in terms of the cultural practices and techniques of the self that are adopted by boys across a range of intersecting, shifting and interconnecting sites of social interaction.

**Exercising Power**

Informing such an approach is Foucault's emphasis that an analytics of power involves investigating those relations between individuals which involve the exercise of power over others:

> For let us not deceive ourselves; if we speak of the structures or the mechanisms of power, it is only insofar as we suppose that certain persons exercise power over others. The term 'power' designates relationships between partners ... (1982b: 217).

Foucault proceeds to elaborate a sophisticated analysis of power relations which cannot be reduced to a fundamental language-subject relation or understood in terms of deploying a dialectical theorisation of subjectivity:
It is necessary to distinguish power relations from relationships of communication which transmit information by means of a language, a system of signs, or any other symbolic medium. No doubt communicating is always a certain way of acting upon another person or persons. But the production and circulation of elements of meaning can have as their objective or as their consequence certain results in the realm of power; the latter are not simply an aspect of the former (1982b: 217).

He presents power relations, relationships of communication and objective capacities, which he defines as bodily and/or mental aptitudes, as three interconnected domains involving mutual reciprocity (see Mauss, 1973). In other words, it is not possible to discuss the techniques deployed in the formation of specific bodily and mental capacities without considering the domain of relations of communication which, according to Foucault, are also tied to power relations:

It is a question of three types of relationships which in fact always overlap one another, support one another reciprocally, and use each other mutually as a means to an end. The application of objective capacities in their most elementary forms implies relationships of communication (whether in the form of previously acquired information or of shared work): it is tied also to power relations (whether they consist of obligatory tasks, of gestures imposed by tradition or apprenticeship, of subdivisions and the more or less obligatory distribution of labour). Relationships of communication imply finalised activities (even if only the correct putting into operation of elements of meaning) and, by virtue of the modifying the field of information between partners, produce effects of power. They can scarcely be dissociated from activities brought to their final term, be they those which permit the exercise of this power (such as training techniques, processes of domination, the means by which obedience is obtained) or those which in order to develop their potential call upon relations of power (the division of labour and the hierarchy of tasks) (218).
The implication is that techniques of training and subject formation, in their deployment within specific apparatuses, cannot be dissociated from the circulation and production of meaning in its communicative capacity between individuals in a culture. Modes of communication between individuals involve the use of power which is channelled via regimes of practice which constantly shift and overlap:

Of course the coordination between these three types of relationships is neither uniform nor constant. In a given society there is no general type of equilibrium between finalised activities, systems of communication, and power relations. Rather there are diverse forms, diverse places, diverse circumstances or occasions in which these interrelationships establish themselves according to a specific model (218).

However, such relations of power can also be localised in what Foucault terms 'blocks' in which 'the adjustment of abilities, the resources of communication, and power relations constitute regulated and concerted systems' (218). And this is exactly the case, as Foucault points out, with the school as a purpose-built milieu for the formation of specific civic capacities and attributes related to the management and distribution of individuals (see also Hunter, 1994a):

Take for example an educational institution: the disposal of its space, the meticulous regulations which govern its internal life, the different activities which are organised there, the diverse persons who live there or meet one another, each with his own function, his well-defined character - all these things constitute a block of capacity-communication-power. The activity which ensures apprenticeship and the acquisition of aptitudes or types of behaviour is developed there by means of a whole ensemble of regulated communications (lessons, questions and answers, orders, exhortations, coded signs of obedience, differentiation marks of the 'value' of each person and of the levels of knowledge) and by the means of a whole series
of power processes (enclosure, surveillance, reward and punishment, the pyramidal hierarchy) (Foucault, 1982b: 218-219).

Thus, the school is one of the many institutional sites in which disciplinary and individualising mechanisms of power are operationalised. This is why it is important to focus on how 'masculinity' is marked for adolescent boys through the normalising procedures and practices in which they are involved through compulsory attendance at school. Moreover, in such institutions, gendered spaces are carved out for these boys in their day to day lives within constantly shifting and overlapping sites of social relations involving the exercise of power.

Foucault, therefore, is careful not to construct the exercise of power in terms of a violence which is imposed upon individuals in a top down fashion. On the other hand, it does not merely involve consent either. Rather:

It is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions (Foucault, 1982b: 220).

And this focus on power relations involving reciprocal practices of acting and acting upon others characterises what Foucault terms a governmental form of power:

Perhaps the equivocal nature of the term conduct is one of the best aids for coming to terms with the specificity of power relations. For to 'conduct' is at the same time to 'lead' others (according to mechanisms of coercion which are, to varying degrees, strict) and a way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities. The exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome. Basically power is less a
confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government. This word must be allowed the very broad meaning which it had in the sixteenth century. 'Government' did not refer only to political structures or to management of states; rather it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed; the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick. It did not only cover the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection, but also modes of action, more or less considered and calculated, which were destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others. The relationship proper to power would not therefore be sought on the side of violence or of struggle, nor on that of voluntary linking (all of which can, at best, only be the instruments of power), but rather in the area of the singular mode of action, neither warlike nor juridical, which is government (221) (my emphases).

Foucault's analytics of power in terms of 'government', therefore, enables one to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the role of such a form of power in the way that boys learn to establish their masculinities. It draws attention to the role of governmental technologies in the way that boys learn to relate to themselves and to others as gendered subjects. Foucault departs from an analysis of power which is warlike or juridical and focuses on how techniques and practices, formed within particular normalising apparatuses and technologies, are deployed to 'structure the possible field of actions on others' and in turn to influence the way individuals relate to themselves:

The exercise of power is not a naked fact, an institutional right, nor is it a structure which holds out or is smashed: it is elaborated, transformed, organised; it endows itself with processes which are more or less adjusted to the situation...power relations within a society cannot be reduced to the study of a series of institutions,
not even to the study of all those institutions which would merit the name "political." Power relations are rooted in social networks (Foucault, 1982b: 224).

In this way, Foucault creates the possibility for elaborating a strategic politics which involves the role of individuals as free subjects who must discover, within a field of possibilities determined by historically specific and definable limits, alternative ways of relating to themselves and others:

When one defines the exercise of power as a mode of action upon the action of others, when one characterises these actions by the government of men by other men - in the broadest sense of the term - one includes an important element: freedom. Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments must be realised ... At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom. Rather than speaking of an essential freedom, it would be better to speak of an 'agonism' - of a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face to face confrontation which paralyses both sides than a permanent provocation (Foucault, 1982b: 222).

Thus, Foucault's genealogical approach to the study of power relations as an object of analysis does not ignore the possibility of strategic resistance or an elaboration of an alternative politics of the self.

One may also speak of a strategy proper to power relations insofar as they constitute modes of action upon possible action, the action of others. One can therefore interpret the mechanisms brought into play in power relations in terms of strategies. But most important is obviously the relationship between power relations
and confrontation strategies. For if it is true that at the heart of power relations and as a permanent condition of their existence there is an insubordination and a certain essential obstinacy on the part of the principles of freedom, then there is no relationship of power without the means of escape or possible flight. (Foucault, 1982: 225)

However, by drawing on Foucault's later work, it has already been demonstrated that it is not possible to develop such a politics without addressing the historical deployment of an ensemble of normalising techniques of the self in their situational specificity within a network of overlapping social relations and practices (see Foucault, 1991a; 1991b; 1991c).

Foucault (1991b) elaborates a mode of critical inquiry which emphasises discontinuity. In other words, he is interested in analysing how discourses become mobilised and is concerned to map a typology of their threshold of transformation within historically specific regimes of practice. In this sense, the role of discursive formations is not ignored or simply displaced with another technical term such as the dispositif, but rather attention is drawn to investigating 'the changes which affect the discursive formations themselves.' (Foucault, 1991: 56). Hence, Foucault is not concerned to seek within discourse itself a consciousness which is buried and can be revived through a particular mode of deconstructive analysis. Rather, his focus is on the play of transformations in the mobilisation of ensembles of discourses in terms of:

(i) the regimes of practice which define the field and limits of the formation of possible objects;
(ii) the grid of perception which is established for the subject within such regimes of practice;
(iii) how language is deployed within such regimes;
(iv) how such discourses are produced, circulated and deployed at historically specific junctures within society.
In this way, Foucault (1991b) rejects a conceptualisation of the interpreting, deciphering subject which converges around a dialectic in which consciousness is reduced to a fundamental subject-language relation or signifying practice (see Hunter, 1984a; 1991a). He is more concerned to 'describe the field of possibilities, the forms of operations, the types of transformation which characterise the person's discursive practice' (58). It is in this sense that subjectivity cannot be reduced to a mere effect of discourse:

Discourse is not a place into which subjectivity irrupts; it is a space of differential subject-positions and subject functions (Foucault, 1991b: 58).

Rather Foucault stipulates the need to examine the play of dependencies between intradiscursive, interdiscursive and extradiscursive elements of discourse:

... what I am analysing in discourse is not the system of its language, nor, in a general sense, its formal rules of construction: for I am not concerned about knowing what makes it legitimate, or makes it intelligible, or allows it to serve in communication. The question which I ask is not about codes but about events: the law of existence of statements, that which rendered them possible - them and none other in their place: the conditions of their singular emergence; their correlation with other previous or simultaneous events, discursive or otherwise. But I try to answer this question without referring to the consciousness, obscure or explicit, of speaking subjects; without referring the facts of discourse to the will - perhaps involuntary - of their authors; without having recourse to that intention of saying which always goes beyond what is actually said; without trying to capture the fugitive unheard subtlety of a word which has no text (59) (my emphasis).

It is in this sense that Foucault refuses to treat discourse as a discursive site for the expression or repression of consciousness. The task of analysing discourse, therefore,
does not involve linking meaning to the consciousness of the speaking/writing subject. Rather, Foucault (1991b) draws attention 'to the practical field in which it [discourse] is deployed' (61).

I would object that discourse is not nothing or almost nothing. And what it is - what defines its intrinsic consistence, what makes it available to historical analysis - is not what was 'meant' (that obscure and heavy charge of intentions, imagined as carrying far more weight, in its shadowy way, than what is said); it is not what has remained mute (those imposing things which do not speak, but leave their traceable marks, their dark profile set off against the light surface of what is said): discourse is constituted by the difference between what one could say correctly at one period (under the rules of grammar and logic) and what is actually said. The discursive field is, at a specific moment, the law of this difference. It thus defines a certain number of operations which are not of the order of linguistic construction or formal construction ... It consists of a whole group of regulated practices which do not merely involve giving a visible outward embodiment to the agile inwardness of thought, or providing the solidity of things with a surface of manifestation capable of duplicating them. At the bottom of this denigration imposed on discourse (in favour of the polarities of thought and language, history and truth, speech and writing, words and things), there was the refusal to recognise that in discourse something was formed, according to clearly definable rules; that this something exists, subsists, changes, disappears, according to equally definable rules; in short, that alongside everything a society can produce (alongside: that is to say, in a determinate relationship with) there is the formation and transformation of 'things said'. It is the history of these 'things said' that I have undertaken to write (63) (my emphasis).

By analysing what boys say and how they behave/act, an attempt is made in this thesis to elaborate a theorisation of adolescent masculinities at the level of political practices which have the effect of transforming, not so much the meaning of what constitutes masculinity
for boys in schools, but the conditions of its emergence, insertion and functioning within specific domains of social existence. In this way, the limits of the conditions of emergence of specific forms of masculinity within schools can be described and in this way made to function as a threshold for imagining alternative ways of relating to others and to themselves.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter attention has been drawn to the links between the production of subjectivity and forms of government within a Foucauldian analytic framework for theorising a post-discursive politics of masculinities. The work of Rose (1989) was used to highlight the role that the psychological sciences, as disciplinary sites for the emergence of particular knowledge/power relations, have played in the application of normalising judgements in 'rendering subjectivity into thought as a calculable force' (7). This formed the basis for investigating how particular technologies are implicated in the constitution of specific gender categories. The implications of this for theorising masculinities were spelt out and extended through further reference to Foucault's (1982b; 1984a; 1991b) work on pastoral power and governmental technologies of the self.
CHAPTER FOUR
Reconceptualising Agency: Reconfiguring the Links Between Culture, Politics and Masculinities

In this chapter the links between government and the formation of subjectivity are further developed with the aim of reconfiguring agency within a post-Foucauldian analytic framework for theorising masculinities. The work of both Hunter (1993b)'s and Hindess (1989) is particularly useful in this regard. It is deployed here to emphasise the limits within which an alternative politics of masculinities can be reconceptualised. Attention is drawn to the possibilities of reconceptualising agency outside of dialectical frames of reference in which the self-determining moral subject is posited in an antithetical relation to oppressive social structures (see Hindess, 1989; Cousins & Hussain, 1986; Coleman, 1990). In this sense, the chapter builds on the theoretical perspectives developed in previous chapters.

Hunter (1993b) proposes that a dialectical form of cultural critique undertaken by Donald (1992), and which, it is argued here, is representative of a particular style of theoretical argument and commentary undertaken within the inderdisciplinary field of cultural and gender studies, is inadequate. He claims that such a critique is organised around notions of an oppositional politics in which human agency assumes a single general form that is realised in the subject's capacity for resistance to political regimes. It is important to highlight, however, that Hunter does not necessarily reject or deny the need for an oppositional politics or the role of the subject as social agent. Rather he is concerned to draw attention to the pitfalls of a particular form of cultural critique which presupposes that human agency can be freed from the chains of governmental power. Such forms of argument which centre on investigating relations between subjectivity and government are grounded in a fundamental dialectics that is organised around binary concepts such as social agency and social structure.
Donald (1992), for instance, claims that subjectivity and community are effects of the deployment of governmental technologies and objectives in their normalising capacities. However, his argument seems to collapse into a fundamental dialectics when he reinvokes the hermeneutic subject as a site for political resistance. He argues that social and governmental processes can have effects at the level of unconscious fears and desires. In this way, he appears to be claiming that the effects of government may be unavailable to consciousness and, as a consequence, remerge in the unconscious or subconscious as repressed desires or fears. Hence, Donald grounds relations between subjectivity and government in what Foucault (1978) terms a repressive hypothesis. It is argued here that the heterogenous ensembles of techniques and instruments of government cannot be reduced to a general logic of repressive power which irrupts at the level of the unconscious self as an extra-governmental site.

Hunter (1993b) reiterates that there are problems with such forms of argument which swing between the oppositional poles of the 'self-formative subject' and 'subject-determining state' (126):

[Dialectical theory and] critique cannot escape the orbit of the binary concepts that it seeks to problematise because critique is itself nothing more than a theoretical oscillation between these concepts. Thus we have seen that Donald calls the notion of the self-formative subject into question by subordinating this figure to governmental technologies and objectives. But he then problematises the governmental side of the equation by insisting on the autonomy of the process of subject-formation; that is, by asserting that this is an unconscious process, resistant to the strategies and norms of apparatuses like the education system. Thus each term is temporarily held in suspension, while its oppositional partner is affirmed, and then reaffirmed as the pendulum of critique reverses its swing. The result of this theoretical movement is that neither side of the binarism - not the notion of the self-formative subject nor that of the subject-determining state - is decisively criticised or permanently renounced. To the contrary, the problematisation of a
concept in dialectical critique is always a prelude to its reaffirmation as, with the reversal in the axis of critique, the dubious concept takes its turn as self-evident ground for another round of problematisation. Radical doubt and programmatic adherence are thus curiously interdependent in this style of critique. Concepts are not so much interrogated and transformed as tormented and rehabilitated (125-26) (my emphasis)

And it is argued in this thesis that theorisations of 'masculinity' and gender within the field of cultural studies and the social sciences are caught up in the problems of dialectical critique.

Hunter's discussion of Donald's work has implications for theorising a politics of masculinities which attempts to avoid the pitfalls of such a dialectical form of cultural critique and its inevitable resort to an extra-governmental space of dehistoricised consciousness:

Donald reuniversalises and dehistoricises the concept of the subject and its 'formation'. The problem here is that this detour transmutes cultural technologies into 'representations', by transforming them into that which the individual fails to know; that is, into representations that bring the individual into being as the subject of (failed) consciousness. The cost of carving out an extra-governmental space for desire is therefore to a single general theoretical model of subject-formation, grounded in the play of conscious and unconscious representations (Hunter, 1993b: 126).

Thus, forms of cultural critique, which presuppose an emancipatory politics, are organised around targeting relations of power in terms of a fundamental mechanism of repression. However, as Hunter (1993b: 127) points out, such mechanisms of repression are themselves formed within a regime of cultural practices and techniques of the self that have a historical legacy which predates modern technologies of government. (see Brown,
1988; Foucault, 1978; 1985a; 1986). Hunter (1993b: 127) thus argues, following Brown (1988) and Foucault (1993; 1987; 1982b), that certain historical contingencies have made us what we are. For instance, Brown claims that it is an historical contingency that we have come to constitute ourselves as particular kinds of desiring subjects involving practices of sexual introspection rather than those centred on vegetarianism. In this sense, it is important to situate particular practices and ways of relating to the self, such as those involving the 'repression-intensification ascesis', in terms of their historically specific deployment and distribution within religious and secular technologies of Western cultures (Hunter, 1993b: 127).

Another problem with such forms of cultural critique is that they are caught in a fundamental dialectical problematics in which consciousness re-emerges as a privileged site for the formation of subjectivity. The notion that the subject can be realised through the staging of 'representations', designed to remove the chains of repression which have driven the effects of governmental processes to the depths of the unconscious, is to ignore that capacities to engage in moral self-problematisation are themselves an outcome of an array of 'techniques of living' and governmental technologies. It is in this sense that Hunter (1993b) refuses to treat individual capacities and attributes as 'founded in consciousness' or hidden 'in the form of unconscious representations' (127, 128) (see also Mauss, 1973; 1985; Wittgenstein, 1978):

[Techniques and individual capacities] are neither rationally controlled by the 'mind' nor presented to it in the form of unconscious representations. It is not that we 'fail to know' these techniques; it is that they fall within a sphere of existence - 'prestigious imitation', the training of the young - not governed by those practices (verification, disconfirmation) that we call 'knowledge'... To 'think' of the next number in the expansion of a number series is not the result of an abstract formula, inscribed on or beneath the surface of consciousness. It is the outcome of our training in a particular formulaic device or routine of calculation...which is not itself subject to the procedures that we call 'knowing' (128).
Hunter here provides the researcher with critical tools for elaborating a post-Foucauldian interpretive analytics which operates at the level of investigating the role of governmental technologies and regimes of practice in the formation of certain attributes and capacities. In this way, it is possible to develop an analysis of adolescent masculinities at the level of examining the role of governmental technologies in the acquisition of gender specific capacities and attributes. In other words:

to be a subject means to have mastered a particular conduct of life; it is not something that all individuals pursue at all times or with equal intensity. Most important, it remains the distinctive achievement of the special sphere of ethical self-cultivation, not the foundation of all other spheres in which life is conducted, via other means to other ends (Hunter, 1993b: 129).

This is significant because Hunter emphasises the need to consider the occasion on which the subject acts/thinks/behaves and the particular contingencies operating in such circumstances. It is important, however, to stress that mastering a particular conduct for enacting masculinities is dependent on the historically contingent techniques of the self for fashioning subjectivity. For instance, factors such as sexual orientation, race and ethnicity may influence the category of masculinity that is tied to mastering a particular conduct. However, it is argued that the capacity of individuals to make decisions and to think cannot be reduced to an extra-governmental site in which the play of conscious and unconscious desires is caught in a repressive mechanism of power (see Rose, 1989). Rather such capacities are themselves formed within a range and variety of apparatuses and technologies of living:

If by agency we mean human capacities for thought and action then, given the irreducible positivity, variety and dispersion of the technologies of existence and conducts of life in which such capacities are formed, it is implausible to assume that agency has a general form; and it is even more implausible to identify this
general form with that special Western conduct that we call the formation of the subject (Hunter, 1993b: 129).

Thus, capacities to think, act, and behave are not treated as freed in some way from government, and nor is a general logic of power attributed to government in terms of its capacity to determine specific bodily and mental attributes. The heterogeneity of instruments of government which are responsible for producing different forms of human agency are irreducible to a single or general form of power:

...we have already observed that the conducts of life and departments of existence responsible for different kinds of agency are too autonomous and too various to be the pure effect of any single general form of power. Indeed, this total determination only appears after the human capacities have been unified as 'representations' and ascribed to the self-governing subject of consciousness (Hunter, 1993b: 129-30).

According to Hunter, it is only under such theoretical circumstances involving a fundamental dialectics, which is reconciled in the 'self-governing subject of consciousness', that the problem of a 'free' or 'determined' human agency emerges. It is in this sense that a post-Foucauldian analytics departs from such a treatment of the subject as social agent. Rather such an approach is concerned to investigate how under particular historical and cultural circumstances, certain practices of ethical self-problematisation emerged and have been transformed or deployed by bureaucratic states through their incorporation into modern governmental technologies (Hunter, 1993: 130):

[Such studies] are centrally preoccupied with the question of the limits imposed on modern government by the fact that it relies on instruments - such as the available instruments of ethical self-regulation - which it did not invent and whose consequences it cannot fully control (130).
However, Hunter argues that there is tendency to totalise government, in its capacity to determine the subject. This, he claims, is an effect of a particular kind of critical practice which is grounded in a fundamental dialectics. A binarism is set up between total government on the one hand, and the self-determining subject on the other. As a consequence, the oppositional concepts of determination and freedom are built into adopting such a critical frame. In this way, government becomes conceptualised as an intrinsically repressive force embodied in the state and which the subject must oppose, once the hidden effects of its power have been made available to consciousness.

Reconceptualising Culture and Politics

A particular conceptualisation of culture and politics has been argued to inform the post-Foucauldian theorisation of masculinities elaborated in this thesis - one which refuses to treat subjectivity as a locus for the reconciliation of a dialectical bind involving the interplay between state-determining subject and self-determining subject. It is in this sense that a particular conceptualisation of agency, as linked to freedom from repression and the ideological constraints of institutionalised discourses, is refuted. Instead, it is argued that the study of culture has a political dimension which is irreducible to the effects of ideology or repressive mechanisms of power.

Greenfield's (1995) definition of culture is relevant in this respect:

The sense of culture involved here is that of historically developed, institutional arrangements which organise material practices and capacities [of populations] that produce meanings and wider social outcomes (158).

Cultural activities and practices thus are argued to be imbricated in a network of power relations involving ongoing negotiation and the deployment of particular techniques and knowledges. Therefore, Greenfield's conceptualisation of culture as a set of historically
contingent practices and institutional arrangements leads her to elaborate a post-
Foucauldian theorisation of politics along the lines that have been developed in this thesis:

Politics and its operation in modern Western nation-states is the strategic practices
of assessment, decision and action through which individuals or groups negotiate,
always in relation to some specific substantive concern, the social relations of
power in which they find themselves in a host of institutions involved in the
government of populations. Politics here is to do with decisions and struggles
around and through power relations; decisions and struggles which are perhaps not
necessarily conscious, occur in shifting circumstances not limited to parliaments
and political parties, and involve changing and particular practices, actors,
institutions, calculations and outcomes ... a view of politics as a definite set of
activities organising social relations of power in particular institutions ... a concept
of politics drawing on the historically modern form of governmental power rather
than the classic formulation of power as capacity (that is, power as the capacity of
an actor to secure his or her will, interests or objectives) and its correlative
determinism of cause and effect. This last feature of this working definition of
politics - that it entails governmental power - brings with it a conceptualisation of
political situations as always potentially, if not always actually, unstable and
outcomes things which can be calculated but not known in advance (158-59).

These readings of culture and politics relate directly to the argument developed in this
thesis regarding the pivotal role of governmental power and technologies of normalisation
in the ways that adolescent boys learn to relate to themselves and to others as gendered
subjects. Greenfield refuses to use ideology as an explanatory trope for investigating the
links between cultural practices and relations of power. Moreover, she claims that this is
the dominant paradigm informing cultural studies' analyses and that such approaches are
limited in their capacity to describe the relations between cultural practices and the effects
of power relations:
what is argued for in the rubric 'the politics of culture' is their mutual constitution. This has remained an under worked area for political studies and, in cultural and media studies' dominant paradigms, been subsumed by varying foci on ideology. In other words, while 'culture' is very often considered in relation to 'ideology', its relation to politics is not so often discussed. The relations of cultural practices to the institutional sites, the conditions and effects of power relations remain frequently overlooked in favour of a consideration of the way cultural practices embody or are shaped by an individual or class consciousness or recognition of social structures. That is, while cultural studies' dominant paradigms conceptualise cultural forms within a problematic of recognition (or misrecognition), cultural-political relations go unremarked and unanalysed. As well as identifying cultural activities in terms of ideologies or the social knowledges by which people make sense of the world, cultural activities need also to be thought in terms of how they tie into other institutional practices, not simply as a way of representing or understanding power relations, but in the way these cultural practices and products are part of the means of negotiating and renegotiating power-knowledge relations. Cultural practices and products can be considered not only for what they mean, but also for what they do, or are used to do by actors in the field of power relations (159) (my emphases).

Thus, Greenfield appears to be arguing for a more sophisticated analysis of the links between cultural practices and political relations which does not reduce the effects of power to ideology or consciousness. However, she emphasises that such explanatory tropes are deployed within cultural studies models of analysis, a point which is also made by Tolson (1986) who claims that teachers and researchers in this field:

have always privileged a particular definition of 'culture'. In the universalist discourse, 'culture' is equated with 'consciousness/conscience', ie. with an ideological struggle over meanings. But in the new leisure industries ... technique
(skills and practices) has the potential to displace 'meaning' as a privileged focus for development. It is what people do with these technologies (in terms of rules, models, calculations, etc.) that is important (153).

Similarly, such a conceptualisation of culture and its associative explanatory categories of ideology or consciousness are rejected in this thesis in theorising the links between the cultural practices of adolescent boys and their relation to politics. Moreover, it is argued that the working definitions of politics and culture proposed by Greenfield and Tolson are traceable directly to a Foucauldian interpretive analytics of power. What is valuable about such a conceptualisation of politics is that it enables a reconceptualisation of agency, not in terms of how political relations or meanings are represented in consciousness, but in terms of the techniques and practices deployed by social actors in the field of power relations.

**Hindess and the Social Actor**

Hindess (1989) provides such a conceptualisation of the social actor which informs the post-discursive approach to the study of adolescent masculinities argued here. He defines an actor as 'a locus of decision and action' which does not necessarily refer just to human individuals but also includes collectivities such as corporations etc. (3). While he acknowledges and emphasises the individual's capacity for making choices and for acting on them, Hindess refuses to treat such capacities as reducible to some overarching social structure or to a stable portfolio of beliefs and desires (167-184). Instead, he develops an alternative approach to social theory which builds on a conceptualisation of politics and agency as elaborated by Greenfield (1995), Mauss (1973; 1985), Hunter (1984; 1991; 1993b) and Foucault (1978; 1980a; 1982b; 1984b; 1984g; 1988f; 1988i; 1991b), one which:

- treats social phenomena as dependent on definite and specifiable conditions of diverse kinds. These conditions may include decisions and actions, and also social
conditions that are external to any one individual and not themselves reducible to any general principle of explanation. In contrast to any thorough-going structuralism, it is important to recognise that actors do indeed reach decisions and act on some of them, and that their actions are, in part, a consequence of their decisions. Decisions themselves are reached through processes that are internal to the actor in question - that is, they are not simply expressions of the actor's position within a system of social relations (Hindess, 1989: 2).

In this way, Hindess conceptualises the human individual as an actor who is able to make decisions, but whose decision-making capacities are themselves dependent upon specifiable conditions which are irreducible to a general explanatory theory of power. That is, he refuses to treat agency as tied to an emancipatory politics involving the actor's awareness of and attempt to break free of the ideological chains of repression. However, he is careful not to treat the social conditions in which actors find themselves as 'mere effects of their structural location' (4). Rather, Hindess directs our attention to the techniques and forms of thought that are employed by social actors in making decisions and acting on them:

The trouble with the account of human action as resulting from belief and desire is that it says nothing about those processes of deliberation that sometimes play an important part in actors' decisions. More precisely, by treating them as transparent intermediaries between belief and desire on the one hand and the action that results on the other, it effectively takes for granted the rationality of those processes. I argue, on the contrary, that once the possibility of deliberation is admitted as an element in actors' decisions then the techniques and forms of thought employed in actors' deliberations must themselves be regarded as objects of investigation (170).

Thus like Foucault (1982b; 1984d) and Hunter (1993b), Hindess is not so much interested in what decisions social actors make but in the acquisition of specific capacities
which enable them to make certain decisions in the first place. For instance, Foucault (1988j) claims that:

we can't study power without what you call, strategies of power ... the strategies, the networks, the mechanisms, all those techniques by which a decision is accepted and by which that decision could not be taken in the way it was (104) (my emphasis).

It is in this sense that the techniques and forms of rationality used by actors in their deliberations are made the object of investigation. Moreover, like Mauss, 1985), Hindess argues that 'societies differ in the range and variety of conceptual and other tools which their members are able to use in their deliberations' (170). In following Hacking (1982: 64) and Foucault (1972; 1982b), Hindess draws attention to the deployment of particular styles of reasoning that are developed within specific domains in which certain claims to knowledge and truth are formulated:

Styles of reasoning, then differ according to what may be candidates for truth or falsity and how they may be investigated. They do not confront reality in the way that conceptual schemes or paradigms are described as doing. They do not present us with radically different perceptions of the world or collections of untranslatable sentences held to be true. What they do offer are different ways of proposing, investigating and arguing about propositions. Hacking is concerned with claims to knowledge and the different ways in which they may be proposed or defended. His differences are differences between cultures (174) (my emphasis).

While Hindess's account is useful in drawing attention to the techniques and strategies that actors use in their deliberations, it is limited in its capacity to address the historical contingencies of such practices. This is why the work of Foucault (1978, 1985a, 1986, 1988, 1991), Mauss (1973; 1985) and Hunter (1988; 1993b; 1994) is so important.
However, Hindess provides a conceptualisation of agency which informs the argument developed in this thesis about the techniques, strategies and practices that are deployed by adolescent boys in enacting particular versions of masculinity. It is not suggested here that boys are denied the capacity to make decisions about the way they conduct themselves, behave, act and think. On the contrary, it is argued that they have developed specific capacities for doing so. In other words, they have learned or acquired specific capacities and styles of reasoning which cannot be reducible to either the social and institutional location in which they find themselves or to a portfolio of beliefs or values. Such specialised techniques and ways of thinking are historically contingent practices which are not necessarily grounded in a fundamental subject-language relation. In short, these practices are developed within specific technologies and apparatuses which are themselves deployed within what may be termed specific "departments of existence" (Hunter, 1991). Hindess (1989) also makes this point:

... the problem for the analysis of action is to identify the specialised techniques employed in actors' deliberations - not to pass judgement on their rationality. The point to notice here is a rather different one. Since many of the specialised ways of thinking available to actors relate to limited areas of social life, there is no reason to suppose that they will be consistent with each other or that the actor employing them will be particularly concerned if they are not. The academic social scientist may have learned to apply the norms of non-sexist behaviour at work, but behave very differently at home and yet not be aware of any inconsistency. Actors may think differently about different spheres of activity, and there is no need to assume either that their thinking within any one of these spheres is particularly rational or that it takes place within an overall rationality and consistency (177).

Thus, Hindess is emphasising that it is problematic to treat social action, decisions and behaviour as an effect of a portfolio of certain beliefs and desires. Since specialised techniques and ways of thinking may be involved in the decisions that actors make, and since such practices themselves are related to limited spheres of social life, it is not
possible to posit some general relation between subject and society, action and belief, freedom and determination, power and self-determination etc (see Hunter, 1993b: 130):

... many of the arguments in this book are directed against one or other of the two most common starting points for a general social theory. They undermine both the idea that social life as a functioning whole on the one hand and the idea that social life is irreducible to the constitutive actions of human individuals on the other. If these arguments hold, then the analysis of social life refers us to an irreducible variety of agencies, practices and conditions and there is no reason to suppose that their interrelations can or indeed should be brought together into a unified general theory (Hindess, 1989: 23).

In this way, Hindess is able to raise questions about the techniques and ways of thinking that are made available to social actors and the social conditions in which such practices are enacted, without resorting to a general explanatory theory organised around the concepts of consciousness and ideology. In fact, he draws attention to the variations in the techniques or forms of thought that are employed by or made available to social actors as a result of the complex interrelations between a range of cultural practices, contingencies and social conditions. However, he is careful to stress that differences in the forms of thought and techniques employed by actors cannot be reduced to a mere reflection of their social location or to their membership of a particular social group:

We may begin by disposing of the idea that such differences in actors' forms of thought can be accounted for simply as a reflection of their social location - for example membership of a class, ethnic group or gender category. The derivation of ideas from social location is usually done in terms of interests (or norms and values) which then operate as transmissions between social structure and actors' decisions. The difficulty with such an argument is that the mechanism connecting social location to the motivations of actors remains thoroughly obscure ... interests (or norms and values) have consequences only insofar as they provide actors with
reasons for action. In other words, they have to be formulated by those who act on
them - which is to say that the existence of interests as effective elements of actor’s
motivations depends on the forms of thought available to those actors. There is
therefore a significant element of circularity in any suggestion that actors’ forms of
thought reflect their interests (178).

Hindess thus rejects a 'general mechanism of determination' in accounting for the
techniques and strategies used by social actors on particular social occasions. To claim
that social actors are motivated by a generalised set of interests derived from their
membership of a particular class or gender category is to fail to understand that these
interests are dependent upon specific forms of thought which are themselves formed
within particular apparatuses and regimes of practices that are irreducible to a general
explanatory principle such as patriarchy or capitalism. In other words, it is inadequate to
resort to 'interests' in the sense of 'acknowledged objectives' as a general explanation for
the ways actors conduct themselves in social situations. Rather, the focus is directed to
investigating the factors and social conditions influencing the mobilisation of discourses
which lead to actors formulating a specific set of objectives or interests in the first place.
Hindess does not reject the fact that agents have 'real' interests, but he refuses to treat
them as inherent in the agents themselves. It is in this sense that he rejects Gramscian
conceptualisations of hegemony:

... the attribution of 'real' but unrecognised interests to agents is generally by virtue
of their sharing some particular conditions with other members of a category: class,
sex, being victims of monopoly power or multinational companies, or whatever.
Here interests are thought to inhere in agents as a direct result of their membership
of a category which specifies certain of the conditions in which they find
themselves. The problem is that some further explanation is required of why the
conditions shared by agents in that category should be considered effective in
determining real interests, while other conditions which are not shared by all agents
in that category are considered ineffective. Why, for example, should conditions
that are supposed to be common to those of the same gender or same class entail equally common interests that are real, unlike interests pertaining to conditions not shared within these categories (39).

It is such an approach or conceptualisation of agency which, Hindess argues, revolves around a problematic of domination in which certain interests are singled out as ontologically privileged and, in this way, serve as a basis for the formulation of an emancipatory politics (40). Within such a paradigm ideological mechanisms provide the explanatory key for social actors' 'failure to see' or to recognise the effects of domination/oppression, and it becomes the moral responsibility of an enlightened few to remove the blinkers. The problem with such an approach, Hindess suggests, is that it reduces multifarious and specific social conditions, practices and struggles involving social actors to a general explanatory mechanism of power in terms of its repressive/expressive capacities:

... this conception of interests and the related conceptions of power, domination and hegemony are at best misleading guides to analysis. If we are concerned with arenas of struggle and the relations between them, then the problem is not so much why certain objectives - the real 'interests' - are not pursued but rather the identification of the determinants of those that are pursued: what means of posing objectives are available to agents and forces in particular arenas and how are they deployed in the mobilisation of agents; how are these forces constituted and what means of action are available to them; in what respect are these forces, possible strategies and means of mobilising support, dependent on conditions set in other arenas; and so on (40).

Hindess stresses that the link between the techniques and strategies employed by social agents and their social location cannot be reduced to a general explanatory principle involving the dialectical interplay between social actor and social structure with each determining the other. As Foucault (1982b;1980a) has demonstrated there is no general
mechanism of power which operates from a sovereign source. Rather power is everywhere and is operationalised within a complex ensemble of historically contingent practices and technologies of normalisation which may or may not be linked with social structure.

Hindess' conceptualisation of agency is useful in the context of this thesis in which it is argued that the strategies, techniques and forms of thought that adolescent boys employ in enacting various forms of masculinity are irreducible to a general theory of power in which the concept of ideology functions as a fundamental explanatory category. Furthermore, the limits of appealing to a bourgeois hegemony or a general structure of patriarchy, as the basis for the formulation of an oppositional politics, are also highlighted. Attention is drawn to the problematic circularity involved in invoking the interests of a particular group as a motivational force to drive the elaboration of a political practice that is designed to free the subject from the ideological constraints of an oppressive social structure. The effect of this is to reduce a complex array of practices and specific social conditions to a general theory of power which invokes a fundamental dialectic involving a significant element of circularity. This is brought out most clearly in the tendency to treat the forms of thought and the techniques deployed by social actors as merely a reflection of their interests.

Conclusion

Hunter (1993b), Greenfield (1995) and Hindess (1989) have been used in this chapter to elaborate a political practice which does not resort to reinvoking a fundamental dialectic between the self-formative subject and a totalising form of governmental power as a basis for reconceptualising agency. For instance, as Foucault (1991b) claims:

[There is a need] to challenge the idea of a sovereign subject which arrives from elsewhere to enliven the inertia of linguistic codes, and sets down in discourse the
indelible trace of its freedom; to challenge the idea of a subjectivity which constitutes meanings and transcribes them into discourse (61-62).

And it is precisely such an imperative which informs the post-Foucauldian approach undertaken in this thesis with regards to analysing the social practices of adolescent boys. This is why the notion of government, as it is explicated by Foucault, Rose and Hunter, is so important. Such an interpretive analytics enables the formation of masculinities in the lives of adolescent boys to be investigated in terms other than those which tie subjectivity and experience to a fundamental or general logic of power. As Hunter (1993b) argues, cultural critique reinvokes consciousness as an explanatory category which is deployed to reconcile a fundamental opposition between deterministic social structures and self-determining subject. In this thesis, however, masculinities and their formation in the lives of adolescent boys are not treated in such terms. Rather, subjectivity is presented as an effect of governmental techniques and instruments of power which have a historical specificity and contingency that are irreducible to general unifying principles such as consciousness or the process of signification (see Hodge & Kress, 1988; Bhabha, 1990; 1994; Kress, 1985; Lacan, 1977; Cixous & Clement, 1986; Nye, 1987; Grosz, 1990; Henriques et al, 1984).

Thus, since government is not 'the uniform or omnipotent expression of a sovereign political will, but an amalgam of diverse political and intellectual instruments and objectives, incapable of either expressing or repressing the 'people'', a political practice organised around elaborating alternative versions of masculinity is not grounded in an oppositional logics of resistance (Hunter, 1993b: 133). Rather, a post-discursive politics of masculinities is concerned to investigate those dispersed and non-subjective practices through which power is channelled and a particular form of human agency created (see Foucault, 1987; 1984g).
CHAPTER FIVE

Reviewing Masculinities: Psychoanalytic, Sociological and Cultural Studies Perspectives

Introduction

In the last decade there has been a surge of interest in research into 'masculinities', particularly within the fields of sociology, anthropology, psychoanalysis, cultural, feminist, social policy and communication studies (see Connell, 1987; 1989; 1992; 1994; 1995; 1996; Connell, Davis & Dowsett, 1993; Frank, 1987; Horrocks, 1995; Brod, 1987c; Brod & Kaufman, 1994; Kaufman, 1987; Hearn & Morgan, 1990; Hearn, 1992; Chapman & Rutherford, 1988; Kimmel & Messner, 1989; Messner & Sabo, 1990b; Middleton, 1992; Buchbinder, 1994; Burger, Wallis & Watson, 1995; Segal, 1990; Miedzian, 1992; Mac an Ghaill, 1994; Cohen, 1990; Seidler, 1989; 1991; Cornwall & Lindisfarne, 1994; Frank, 1990; Askew and Ross, 1988; Kessler et al, 1985; Martino, 1993; Jordan, 1995a; 1995b; Walker, 1988; Parker, 1996; Skelton, 1996; Wood, 1994; Canaan, 1991; Haywood, 1993; Holland Ramazangolu & Sharpe, 1993; Skeggs, 1991; Clatterbaugh, 1990; Metcalf & Humphries, 1985; Easthope, 1986; Porter, 1992; Jardine & Smith, 1987; Gender Equity Taskforce, 1995; 1996; Clark, 1995; 1996; Kenway, 1995; Pallotta-Chiarolli, 1997; Redman, 1996; Skelton, 1997; Mills, 1997). However, while such studies have contributed significantly to elaborating a theorisation of masculinities as socially and culturally constructed, it is illustrated in this chapter that many approaches to treating masculinity are grounded in dialectic forms of rationality or modes of argumentation which are caught in a problematic circularity (see Hunter, 1993b; Hunter & Saunders, 1995). These forms of rationality are identifiable by their elaboration of an account of subjectivity which involves reconciling dichotomies such as: (i) social structure and agency (Brod, 1987; Messner & Sabo, 1990) (ii) culture and biology (Treadwell, 1987; Miedzian, 1992), (iii) state-determining subject and self-determining subject (iv) private and public domains of human experience (Seidler, 1989; 1990; Cohen, 1990). Reconciliation of these dichotomies often involves the use of explanatory tropes such as discourse, ideology, consciousness, the unconscious and/or the
subconscious - categories, which are elaborated within specific disciplinary fields of social inquiry, such as, psychoanalysis, sociology, feminist poststructuralism and cultural studies.

Certain psychoanalytic accounts of gender theorise masculinity as an effect of socio-cultural and symbolic practices experienced at the level of the unconscious or subconscious in the form of repressed desires and fears. Thus, the task of the psychoanalyst, or the cultural theorist deploying psychoanalytic theory, is to make available a knowledge about the formation of the masculinity/sexuality nexus which remains unavailable to consciousness due to the effects of repressive psychic processes operating at the level of the subconscious (see Easthope, 1986; Fogel et al, 1986; Simpson, 1994; 1996; Green, 1987; Horowitz & Kaufman, 1987; Wernick, 1987; Wood, 1987; Former, 1994). In this way, the category of the unconscious is used in an attempt to reconcile the dichotomy between what the subject knows at a conscious level and that which remains hidden or repressed at a deeper psychic level. Often built into this fundamental dialectical theorisation of sexuality and masculinity are concepts of discourse and representation as a basis for introducing the role of culture in the formation of sexual identity and gendered subjectivity. In this way, cultural and regulatory technologies are reduced to representations at the level of consciousness with the formation of the subject caught in the play of unconscious desires or fears, which can be accessed via the elaboration of specific discourses (see Weedon, 1987, Cixous & Clement, 1986). Moreover, it is often within such a framework that appeals are made to a general structure of power, in the form of capitalist patriarchy, to account for the emergence and formation of subjectivity.

As already indicated in the previous chapters, such an account of masculinity and sexuality, as it emerges within the fields of psychoanalysis, sociology and cultural studies, assumes concepts such as the unconscious and consciousness, as specific explanatory categories, which are themselves effects of certain governmental practices and technologies (see Rose, 1989; Foucault, 1988a; 1988b; Hutton, 1988). Thus, the
normalising practices and technologies, which produce the very categories and regimens of analysis for elaborating specific theorisations of masculinity within particular disciplinary and interdisciplinary fields of social inquiry, are not subject to critical scrutiny. Furthermore, their capacity to establish normative benchmarks for marking out what constitutes masculinity and femininity, consequently, is left unexamined.

**Structure versus Agency Dialectic**

Coleman (1990) elaborates specifically on the nature of this problematic circularity in the modes of argumentation that characterise approaches to theorising masculinities and sexuality undertaken by some sociologists. He claims that the 'structure versus agency' debate, underpinning much of the theorising in sociology, is grounded in a fundamental dialectic which, he argues, is unsatisfactory. He draws attention to the circularity involved in theorisations of masculinity and sexuality elaborated by certain social theorists, who mark out the morphology of the body as *invariant*, while claiming that the ways in which the body is understood are open to *variation* according to the availability of particular discourses for specifying the meanings that are attributed to bodies (Coleman, 1991: 187). In this way, the distinction between sex and gender is opposed and then reconciled through the deployment of explanatory tropes such as discourse and ideology and a space is carved out for conceptualising masculinity and sexuality as socially constructed. Thus, a causal link is established between the masculine subject and the social structure or culture in which the former finds himself.

This link, Coleman argues, is theorised as mediated via ideology (see Althusser, 1971). The effect of this is to resort to elaborating conceptualisations of 'false consciousness' which are underscored by a form of rationality that is deployed to account for the subject being blinded to social and cultural forces responsible for determining one's behaviour/thinking/practices. Coleman highlights how such an approach to theorising masculinities, which uses ideology as an explanatory trope for investigating the links between cultural practices and relations of power, is limited in its capacity to describe the
effects of specific power relations in the formation of particular styles of masculinity. Such approaches are informed by a theorisation of power which is grounded in what Foucault (1978) terms the 'repressive hypothesis' (see chapters two and three).

However, Coleman argues that a sociological model of analysis that privileges the role of the human actor as agent, as opposed to one which foregrounds the workings of hidden structures, is equally problematic. He refers to such a focus as a 'dramaturgical version' because the stress is laid upon the capacity of the human subject to act out a particular form of masculinity. In shifting the focus to the human subject, who is conceptualised as an agent with the capacity to effect change in his own behaviour or social situation, what is reinvoked in sociological analysis is a dialectical argument which collapses into a problematic circularity. This involves the theorist oscillating between two poles - structure versus agency - with the imperative ultimately to achieve some form of balance or reconciliation between the two. This is built into the form of rationality established within such dialectical frames of reference:

On the one hand, then we have the dramaturgical version wherein masculinity is sustained by a continuous and ongoing performance and display. On the other we have a version of masculinity that treats it as sustained by hidden yet discoverable determinants ... We are caught between the Scylla of agency and the Charybdis of structure; a familiar dilemma (Coleman, 1990: 193).

Thus, Coleman is careful not to reinvoke the dialectic that he criticised by privileging the role of social actor/theorist as agent and to effect a fundamental reconciliation between deterministic social structure and self-determining subject, which he claims is at the basis of much sociological theorisation of masculinities. He argues, therefore, that theorists should avoid the circularity involved in treating masculinities 'as constructed by hidden but discoverable forces, discourses, ideologies, structures' whose effects for the actor are sustained at the level of the unconscious (197). Similarly, to shift the focus to the self-determining actor who can effect some sort of change or emancipation from such
oppressive structures, he claims, is equally problematic. Coleman rejects such a circularity in favour of an approach which requires researchers to attend to the norms governing their practices of social inquiry (see Wittgenstein, 1958). In this sense, the activities of the social theorist are treated as objects of critical scrutiny (see chapter seven).

Coleman, thus, provides a basis for elaborating a grid of specification for mapping a typology of masculinity in terms of the way it is theorised across various disciplinary sites. In fact, his discussion can serve as a grid of intelligibility for describing the specific forms of rationality underpinning the various theorisations of masculinity presented in the range of studies that are reviewed in this chapter. Moreover, his approach is consistent with a post-discursive theorisation of masculinities that is grounded in a Foucauldian interpretive analytics which privileges description over causal analysis (see Foucault, 1978; 1985; 1986).

Mapping Typologies of Masculinity

In this section the question of how 'masculinity' emerges as a particular object of inquiry is addressed with reference to specific studies and theorisations of this category. Attention is also drawn to how certain claims about the nature of masculinity have gained the status of truth in their deployment within specific disciplinary apparatuses of the social sciences. It is demonstrated that the modes of argumentation used by many theorists and researchers of 'masculinity' collapse into a dialectical circularity, in which the subject as agent is caught in a fundamental repressive-expressive bind from which he needs to be liberated. Such forms of rationality, it is argued, are predicated on the attempt to reconcile the poles of subject as agent and totalising social structure as oppressive. This is achieved by marking out a space in which the individual is both subjected to external social forces, but also able to engage in a liberatory and transformative practice. The problem with such accounts of 'masculinity' is that they rely on notions of a repressive, sovereign power from which the individual must escape (see Foucault, 1978:
92-93; 1984e; 1987: 113-114). Thus, such dialectical theorisations of masculinity depend heavily on the use of explanatory concepts such as ideology, repression and consciousness as the basis for elaborating a political agenda.

**Interrogating the 'Personal is Political'**

The kind of dialectical theorising outlined above is clearly recognisable in the work of Seidler (1989; 1991) and Easthope (1986). In drawing on feminist theory, Seidler (1991) argues for a focus on masculinities, which acknowledges that the 'personal is political' (see also Cohen, 1990). This forms the basis for his elaboration of a neo-Kantian cultural critique in which subjectivity is conceptualised as split according to the public/private domains of experience with their respective clusters of gendered attributes (see Hunter & Saunders, 1995). For example, Seidler makes a series of claims about men and their experiences in a 'rationalist culture of self-denial', which leads him to advocate a form of emancipatory politics organised around the practices of consciousness raising and the therapeutic encounter (Seidler, 1990: 13-25, 165-191).

One aspect of such a form of politics may be a conceptualisation of men as an oppressed group, who are also afflicted by the adverse effects of the public/private split manifested in the gendered opposition of reason and emotion. As a consequence, Seidler argues that we have inherited an Enlightenment tradition in which masculinity has become associated with a denial of emotion and an identification with independence and self-sufficiency. Moreover, such identity formations, he claims, are sustained by capitalist and patriarchal structures.

Immediately identifiable in the mode of rationality deployed by Seidler's theorisation of masculinity is a dialectic which invokes the interplay between individual social actor and oppressive social structure. This emerges, according to Coleman (1990), as the familiar dilemma of 'being caught between the Scylla of agency and the Charybdis of structure' which presupposes the need to effect some form of reconciliation between the two (193).
And this is exactly what Seidler does. By claiming that men are also alienated from themselves and oppressed as a group, he argues that their interests can be mobilised as a motivational force designed to free them from the constraints of social structures which bind them to an inhibiting form of rationalism. This leads him to reiterate that 'the personal is political', as a basis for elaborating an emancipatory politics for men. It is in this way that he carves out a space in which a reconciliation can be effected between the self-realising subject and the oppressive social structure in which both men and women live out their lives:

It has been a strength of feminist theory and practice to assert that 'the personal is political'. This is not simply a comment about the workings of power and subordination within our personal relations that have traditionally been taken as an arena of love and individual choice, but a radical challenge to the terms of a rationalist modernity that has insisted on separating private from public relations. In this sense, feminism provides an enduring challenge to our moral and political traditions that continue to be largely moulded within the terms set by the Enlightenment (Seidler, 1990, Preface: x).

In the same way that women came together and formed consciousness-raising groups founded on the basis of shared oppression, Seidler reclaims such an experience for men. In this way, he believes that men will be able to redefine their masculinity. He emphasises the need for men to become conscious of and to explore the tension between the power they have 'within the larger society and the ways they might individually experience themselves as powerless' (17). Moreover, he indicates that within the space of the consciousness-raising group, men can begin to examine the impact of differing class, ethnic and racial backgrounds in terms of how they come to experience their masculinity. In this sense, Seidler maps a conceptualisation of masculinity as 'lived experience' which emerges as a general explanatory category organised around connections among identity, ideology and consciousness. Thus, implicit in Seidler's theorisation of masculinity is the belief that all men, regardless of their differences in
terms of class, race, sexual orientation, ethnic and social background, are motivated by a
generalised set of interests derived from their membership of a particular gender category:

We have done a great deal of damage to ourselves but we are barely conscious of
this nor able to identify it, because we have learnt to identify 'happiness' with
'success'. If we are 'successful', then we think we must be happy. Or we can
think that happiness does not matter in the world of individual achievement. The
nature of our gendered identity as men is rendered invisible as we learn to speak in
the universal language of reason (18).

As men become aware of the workings of patriarchy not only as it affects women,
but also as it affects the lives of men and their relationships as partners, friends,
lovers, fathers and workers, so it can be important carefully to consider and make
demands for ending violence against women, ending the pervasiveness of
pornographic and degrading images, for paternity leave, for time off to collect
children from school, to end shift work and night work, for part-time work on full
pay so we can be equally involved in the lives of our children (23).

Thus, Seidler reduces the effects of power to ideology and treats agency as tied to an
emancipatory politics, which is realised at the level of consciousness. In other words, he
argues that it is necessary for men as social actors to become aware of and to break free
from the ideological chains of repression, self-denial and false consciousness imposed
upon them by a rationalist culture institutionalised in patriarchal and capitalist structures.
Hence, the complex and diverse set of practices and techniques of self-formation
implicated in the construction of specific masculinities in their historical and occasioned
specificity become reducible to overarching social structures and to a somewhat stable
portfolio of beliefs and desires (see Hindess, 1989: 39). For instance, Seidler claims that:
It is not that men are competitive or ambitious by nature. Rather, the institutions of capitalist society are essentially competitive and hierarchical, forcing men to be competitive to survive (22).

For Seidler, therefore, consciousness-raising provides the means by which men can learn to redefine their masculinity and, in so doing, 'come to see' some of the ways in which power is infiltrated in the everyday organisation of their relationships with others (31):

... we live out our ideology in the very form of our relationships. Feminism learnt that even our personal relationships are inevitably power relationships, forming the very structure of our experience. It is the workings of power in our relationships that feminism implicitly used to challenge the assumptions of liberal moral theory. Power forms so much of our everyday experience, though we remain largely unconscious of its workings in the organisation of our inherited conceptions of masculinity (51) (my emphasis).

However, built into this self-reflective practice is the need to develop the capacity for ethical self-problematisation which, for Seidler, is to be understood in terms of a subjectivity being expressed or realised in consciousness (see also Metcalf and Humphries, 1985). He provides exemplars of such a practice throughout his texts by presenting 'personal' accounts of his own experiences of masculinity to explicate the need for men to engage in a form of moral self-problematisation (see also Cohen, 1990):

I was brought up to be intellectual and rational. This was the way that I protected myself in the world. I had continually to prove that I was good enough to be a man. Because I was not big and strong, I became clever and quick. I could smell danger, and I was always ready and alert. I was not much in touch with my own anger and sexuality because I was too concerned with being accepted and liked by others. I had asserted considerable control over myself, which largely meant killing off my softer and warmer feelings, so that I could 'do well' at school. My identity
was closely identified with 'getting on' in a situation that was alien to the refugee Jewish family I had grown up in (35).

However, what Seidler does not acknowledge is that this form of moral self-problematisation, which he presents as a necessary and 'natural' part of engaging in consciousness-raising practices, is itself an effect of the deployment of a range of confessional strategies and techniques for working on the self (see also Cohen, 1990: 39-72). Such self-fashioning practices, as both Foucault (1978; 1986; 1987; 1988a; 1993) and Hunter (1994a) argue, are effects of particular governmental technologies, which are borrowed from the Christian hermeneutic tradition and which have emerged as modalities of power in the Western modern state (see Foucault, 1982b: 213; Rose, 1989). It is in this sense that Seidler reinvoques the hermeneutic subject as a site for political resistance (see Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). In other words, he elaborates an emancipatory politics which insists on the role of the self-realising subject through engaging in the hermeneutic practice of moral self-problematisation.

This is also evident in the claims he makes about men being turned against their emotions:

A rationalistic culture is always trying to turn our emotions against us - thereby estranging us as men from our emotional lives. We take this so much for granted that we do not realise how this undermines our sense of self and our sense of the 'reality' of our everyday experience. We also do not appreciate how this denies us the personal power we might otherwise have, if we did not denigrate our emotionality as an integral part of our masculinity, to challenge the structures of power and domination which form our everyday experience at work and in the family. Nor is this simply a matter of allowing men to extend the range of our emotional lives, as role theory has it, but of rediscovering the painful knowledge of ways our identities as men have been injured, contracted and distorted, along with our experience (53) (my emphasis).
A tactics of self-disclosure in the form of an act of moral self-problematisation, therefore, becomes the means by which a 'truth' about the experience of masculinity, grounded in a repressive mechanism, can be restored to consciousness. It is in this sense that Seidler develops an analytics of liberation for men, which presupposes that there is a form of masculinity that is somehow outside of the deployment of specific governmental technologies of the self.

The limitations of the neo-kantian critique of masculinity grounded in the split subject of consciousness is further illustrated by Seidler's rejection of dominant modes of thinking perpetuated within a liberal moral culture:

Our political thinking is deeply influenced by the dominant modes of thinking and feeling in our society. This means that within a liberal moral culture, as I argue later, we more naturally think in terms of 'oppositions', rather than dialectically. So, for instance, we think we must either love someone or hate them, that we cannot love and hate them at the same time. Our experience is often more dialectical, if we know how to bring ourselves into fuller contact with it. But this is why people feel threatened when they begin to admit their resentments against their friends. We have been taught to think that 'if she's my friend, then I should like her, and shouldn't feel resentment towards her.' We can learn from experience the ways our relationships get limited to a more superficial level, because we refuse to admit resentments and so bring an unreality into our relationships. We very much want to think and feel the way we 'ought to' - the way we can intellectually justify - and we deny any feelings that interfere (41).

Thus, Seidler uses a general category of experience as a basis for elaborating a theory of masculinity in which consciousness emerges as a privileged site for the development of a transformative politics. However, alongside consciousness-raising, he advocates the need for many men, who have been forced to hide their vulnerability and to deny their feelings, to enter therapy (164-191). In this way, the process of healing the splitting of
consciousness that has been imposed on them as a result of the inherited effects of an oppressive form of rationality, can be realised:

Therapy could be an important practice for men brought up to identify strongly with their reason and intellect...Therapy can help us to a recognition of the centrality of our emotions and feelings within our experience (179).

Hence, therapy provides the means by which the split subject can be reconciled in a return to a psychic space where the battle to realise 'the inexpressible underside of feeling' is to be accessed and mobilised in the elaboration of an emancipatory politics for men. This is emphasised in his explicit reference to psychoanalysis:

Psychoanalysis recognises a connection between the systematic suppression of emotions and the place of fantasy and 'ideals' in our lives. (90)

Thus, for Seidler, an emancipatory politics for men is ultimately grounded in psychoanalysis.

Brod (1987a; 1987b), like Seidler (1989; 1991), also elaborates a dialectical theory of masculinity, which revolves around invoking a reconciliation of the self-realising subject and an oppressive social structure. In marking out a disciplinary space for the intellectual enterprise of men's studies, he advocates the need for what he terms 'a more social constructionist perspective' on analysing masculinities:

What was and is needed are analyses that show how men both form and are formed by their conditions, or as, Marx put it, how men make their own history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing (1987a: 13).

Within this dialectical frame for theorising masculinities, he claims that socialist feminism and Freudian psychoanalysis can provide the basis for the development of social
constructionist accounts of masculinities. And in a manner which is exemplified by the approach undertaken by Seidler, he advocates a socialist feminist conceptualisation of masculinity which uses the explanatory categories of patriarchy and capitalism to account for the experiences of men:

The starting point for any socialist feminist conceptualisation of masculinity lies in the distinction between precapitalist and capitalist patriarchy. A transfer of power from the hands of individual patriarchs to the institutions of capitalist patriarchy is an essential component of this shift. This transfer is part of the widening depersonalisation and bureaucratisation of human relationships in the development of capitalism, which individuals experience in and as various forms of alienation. Capitalism increasingly creates a gap between institutional and personal power. For men, this creates a distinction between the facts of public male power and the feelings of men's private powerlessness (1987a: 14) (my emphasis).

In this way, Brod invokes a reconciliation of the split subject as an effect of capitalist patriarchy along the same lines as Seidler (1989;1991). The interplay of the public and private dichotomy, which informs Brod's theorisation above, is one which characterises socialist feminist accounts of masculinity. It leads him to elaborate an emancipatory politics for men grounded in profeminist consciousness and action:

The greater emphasis on 'the personal as political' of more radical feminisms also renders them more suited to male feminist politics than liberal feminism, which more readily accepts the public-private distinction at the core of liberal political theory, since such politics must emphasise issues of personal life more than issues of public access because men already have access to public power. If men's studies is to advance significantly the search for gender justice, arguments addressed only to men's interests or to their altruism, though essential and valid as far as they go, are ultimately insufficient. Arguments must also be advanced that more directly and
broadly address more sweeping goals of feminist transformation (Brod, 1987b: 56).

Thus, Brod emphasises that men's lives cannot remain unexamined and that a profeminist men's studies perspective on analysing masculinities can restore to consciousness a fundamental 'truth' about the impact and effect of masculine power on the lives of both men and women (see also Filene, 1987):

Leaving men's lives unexamined leaves male privilege unexamined, and hence more powerful precisely because more secretive ... Men's studies de-powers the masculine mystique by shedding light on its true nature, revealing it to be vulnerable and mutable, perhaps not a paper tiger but not a roaring one either (1987b: 57).

In this way, Brod argues that a men's studies initiative can prompt 'significant groups of men and women toward profeminist consciousness and action'. He indicates that 'female-identified perspectives' on masculinity would complement those provided by men by allowing for a more comprehensive coverage of issues of power:

For example, male-identified perspectives might concentrate on documenting how male role constraints on emotional display inhibit and repress men, while female-identified perspectives would add to this an analysis of how these restraints also confer power on men, in large part by effectively withholding information about oneself, and showing the interrelationships of both sides of the question (1987b: 58).

Thus, the problematic dialectic theorisation of masculinity, which is characteristic of much cultural critique, is once again brought into play with the reconciliation of male-identified and female-identified perspectives on the impact and effect of masculinity.
Easthope's (1986) work provides another exemplary instance of dialectical cultural critique applied to a theorisation of masculinities. He draws mainly on psychoanalysis to offer a theorisation of masculinity as it is represented in popular cultural media texts. Texts produced and circulated within culture are treated as 'surfaces' on which the experience of masculinity is analysable in terms of the mutually exclusive categories of expression and repression. It is in this sense, through deploying the apparatus of psychoanalysis, that Easthope invokes the unconscious to account for various representations of masculinity in popular culture. He treats masculinity as having a repressed underside which can be unmasked through a deconstructive analysis grounded in ideology critique. For instance, he asserts that 'masculinity has to be unmasked' (2) and that 'masculinity tries to stay invisible by passing itself off as normal and universal' (1). Such statements presuppose that there is a 'truth' about masculinity, which is hidden from consciousness. Easthope argues that this is because we are not always aware of the processes involved in the internalisation of particular gender roles:

The process of internalising is both conscious and unconscious. To understand it fully we need to be able to analyse the unconscious (5).

Easthope goes on to claim that due to the unequivocal 'constitutional bisexuality of each individual' there is a 'mixture of masculine and feminine' in everyone (5,6) and at this juncture he introduces the concept of the Masculine Myth:

If everyone is a mixture of masculine and feminine there is no single such thing as male, a female, a man, a woman. The Masculine Myth argues that at present masculinity is defined mainly in the way the individual deals with his femininity and his desire for other men. The forms and images of contemporary popular culture lay on a man the burden of having to be one sex all the way through. So his struggle to be masculine is the struggle to cope with his own femininity. From
the versions of masculinity examined here it seems that men are really more concerned about other men than about women at all. In the dominant myth it looks as though - as some feminist writing has suggested - women take on more value for men in terms of the game of masculinity than in their own right (6).

By deploying a logic which conflates gender and sexuality in a monocular way, Easthope proceeds to demonstrate how the masculine myth is underscored by a homosexual subtext in which homoerotic desire is either repressed or sublimated (see also Simpson, 1994; 1996; Buchbinder, 1995; Horrocks, 1995; 54). For example, he argues that, in the television series 'Minder', banter between the two central male actors functions on a symbolic level as a sublimated form of homosexual desire (87-92):

Banter or repartee as a masculine style is effective because it operates a double bluff. Because it is comic and relies on the joke form it appears to be genial, permissive and open. It is not in fact genial because it actually works with the aggression of the masculine ego. And it is not open because it sets out to protect and reassert the male bond - sublimated homosexual desire (92).

He also marks out the arenas of sport and war as the loci for the expression of a dominant form of masculinity in which homoerotic desire is sublimated in the intensity of the male bond (69-73). Later in his book he provides an analysis of the 'Chinaman Joke' from the film, Chinatown, to explicate how the dirty joke involving a form of exchange of women between men is a means for them to reassert the male bond. Such joke telling, he argues, represents a return of repressed homosexual desire which is forbidden and cannot otherwise be spoken of. Thus, through psychoanalysis combined with deconstructive cultural critique, Easthope reveals the underside of heterosexual desire which otherwise would remain hidden in the unconscious:

The male dirty joke is a particular way of talking about women. In this version of masculinity men are to master women by talking about them and affirming together
a male bond which overrides heterosexual desire. Desire, however, has always got more than one side (126).

This form of sexist joke telling for Easthope, therefore, functions as a symbolic representation of a sublimated male homosexual desire which is activated through the expression of the idea of a woman being exchanged between two men. This leads to his assertion that modern patriarchal society, which has its basis in institutionalised marriage and a phallic symbolic order, is based on a sublimation of male homosexual desire:

Clearly enough male heterosexual desire can be led to cooperate with the social order through the institution of marriage. But this does not account for the other side of masculinity, for male homosexual desire. Desexualised, sublimated love for other men becomes available to form the male bond, enabling men to work together for each other (15) (my emphasis).

The return of this repressed desire is analysable in psychoanalytic terms and Easthope implies that it is predicated on the bisexual nature inherent in each individual, which the dominant culture supposedly refuses to acknowledge (5-7).

In reviewing Easthope's theorisation of subjectivity what emerges is the role of psychoanalysis in elaborating a form of cultural critique by which masculinity is treated as a representational instance of discourse whose underside is masked by the repressive effects of ideology. Popular cultural media texts, therefore, function as a surface for learning to decipher the self in terms of identifying repressed sexual desire which becomes synonymous with discovering a truth about ourselves that remains hidden in the unconscious. Moreover, representation as the nexus between subjectivity and culture becomes the privileged site for analysing the effects of desires and drives submerged beneath the level of conscious awareness.
The limits of such socio-cultural critique, as pointed out by both Foucault (1988a; 1988b) and Hutton (1988), are that the category of the unconscious and its conception of the psyche have themselves been shaped through the deployment of a particular disciplinary technology in which normalising judgements about what constitutes masculinity and femininity are established. Within such regimes, gender emerges as an object, which becomes tied to a fundamental rationality regarding the pivotal significance of the subconscious as a site of symbolic representation. In this way, subjectivity becomes caught up in a 'general logic of consistency' which is driven by an imperative to restore the psyche to a state in which repressive mechanisms are no longer operative (see also, Green, 1987; Silverstein & Rashbaum, 1994; Fogel, 1986; Cooper, 1986; Lane, 1986; Isay, 1986; Meyers & Schore, 1986; Middleton, 1992: 122). For Easthope (1986), this imperative is inserted into an emancipatory politics operationalised through a deconstructive analytic approach which invokes a return to the repressed as an instance of unmasking the effects of ideology:

Social change is necessary and a precondition of such change is an attempt to understand masculinity, to make it visible (7).

The point is that cultural critique, which treats subjectivity as an effect of an ideological mechanism grounded in a repressive hypothesis, presupposes that the subject who 'fails to know' can be brought to a fuller awareness of the effects of culture through consciousness-raising. Within such theoretical frames consciousness not only has to be achieved, but is also the site where this achievement can take place. It is in this sense, that Easthope, like Seidler (1989; 1991) and Brod (1987a; 1987b), privileges 'consciousness' as a site for social change and the emergence of an alternative subjectivity for men, while ignoring the very significant ways in which specific technologies of the self are implicated in his deconstructive analytic practice.

Other theorists also use popular cultural or literary texts as surfaces on which to read off the effects of masculinity (see Horrocks, 1995; Buchbinder, 1994; Simpson, 1994; 1996;
Middleton, 1992; Crompton, 1987; Berger, 1994; Reimer, 1987; Hammond & Jablow, 1987; Wood, 1987; Wernick, 1987; Fitting, 1987; Forman, 1994). Crompton (1987), for instance, argues that Byron's use of allusions to classical Greek literature with its culture of sexual relations between males, masked his own homoerotic desires. In fact, she claims that poetry was a vehicle for Byron to express his ambivalent sexuality. She draws on extra textual information such as biographical detail about the poet's life and knowledge about classical antiquity, to decipher the texts written by Byron as yielding signs of his inherent bisexuality. The point is that she is able to read the texts in this way as a result of engaging in a set of hermeneutic practices which are tied to the deployment of a range of technologies of the self implicated in psychoanalysis and reading practices developed within the disciplinary space of literary studies (see Hunter, 1984a; 1984b; 1987; 1988; 1991b; Mellor & Patterson, 1994).

Simpson (1994; 1996) also argues that it is precisely because men deny the reality of homosexuality in their own lives that it resurfaces in a sublimated form and, hence, operates at the level of the unconscious. He demonstrates that its traces are particularly evident in a range of popular cultural texts and practices. For instance, he undertakes an analysis of the signification of heterosexuality in a range of advertisements which on one level are used to confirm a dominant narcissistic model of masculinity but, on another level, also function as a veil for queer desire (Simpson, 1994: 102):

[The] 'promotion of homosexuality' is framed in such a way as to blur desire into identification, to reassure the boys buying homoeroticism that they are making a heterosexual identification. In Laundrette Nick Kamen is given an audience of giggling girls, marking him as heterosexual, mediating his image, and giving the male viewer an opportunity to enjoy the 'invert's striptease' from a heterosexual perspective, imagining he is viewing the male body through the girl's eyes (100).

Thus, homoerotic desire for the male model is argued to be mediated and masked via a process of heterosexual identification.
The traces of such homoerotic desire which are submerged beneath the level of conscious awareness, Simpson (1996: 133-38) argues, are also evident in practices such as the Stag Party. He identifies the homoerotic undercurrents at a stag party where the groom to be is stripped naked by two female strippers who 'shave his pubes, wank his willie with kitchen tongs and then tie it up with a cord and lead him around the room by it' (138). Then one of the strippers makes him bend over, draws a face on his buttocks and, lighting a cigarette, places it 'where the sun doesn't shine'. Simpson highlights how the men in the audience - the groom's father and friends - laugh and frames their enjoyment and involvement in such practices as evidence of a latent form of homoeroticism. On a conscious level, men may be 'locked into a kind of sulky denial' of homosexuality, Simpson argues, but he uses such experiences and analyses of popular cultural texts to demonstrate that homosexuality looms large in the lives of straight men. However, for men whose disavowal of homosexuality is born out of an anxiety, it remains submerged beneath conscious awareness (7). Thus, informing the theorisation of masculinity and heterosexuality elaborated by Simpson (1994; 1996), as a defense against homosexual feelings, is a fundamental logics grounded in a return of repressed desires and feelings for 'the other'. For Simpson, therefore, learning to decipher the self in terms of identifying repressed or sublimated (homo)sexual desire becomes implicated in a quest for 'truth' about ourselves.

For Wernick (1987), like Simpson (1994; 1996) and Easthope (1986), the popular cultural text, is treated as an indeterminate 'ego site' for constituting and reconstituting the norms around which certain representations of masculinity are organised (283). For instance, he argues that dominant representations of masculinity are no longer fixed according to determinate sex-gender roles:

The detachment of masculinity from fixed cosmological, sexual and family roles has in effect transformed it and other sex-gender terms into what structural linguists
would call floating signifiers, free within any given promotional context to swirl around and substitute for one another at will (294).

He demonstrates this through his analysis of a particular advertisement for aftershave in which a naked man with his back to the audience is shaving in front of a mirror. A woman, who Wernick identifies as his girlfriend, sits looking straight into our eyes. In the corner of the advertisement is small box containing the product which is held by the right hand of a male. Accompanying the advertisement is the slogan 'For the Man who can take care of himself'. Wernick undertakes an analysis which draws attention to the advertisement's narcissistic representation of masculinity whose underside reveals homoerotic desire. Firstly, the product itself which is held by the hand of a male is read as 'the aroused penis of the auto-erotic male'. Secondly, the act of the man staring into the mirror as he shaves is read as a self-indulgent, narcissistic act. Moreover, Wernick claims that this advertisement runs parallel to many of those targeted at women, since the man displaces the woman as narcissistic object of desire:

But this is exactly what is so striking, since narcissism has long been encouraged in women, as the gender defined as objective of a look. To depict men as narcissists, on the other hand, runs altogether counter to a code that has traditionally defined men as the ones who do the looking. In that context, moreover, the ad's treatment of narcissism is especially norm-breaking; for the homo-erotic desire that is always implicit in taking oneself as a sexual object, and which conventional masculinity is largely constituted as a reaction against, is here fully exposed. And not only in a way designed to appeal to gays (though they are doubtless one of the target markets). For as our attention strays to inspect the man's fair ass, it is constantly interrupted by the eyes of the woman, who is herself always looking on. Those eyes at once judge and condone. But above all they also provide a crucial heterosexual cover, both for him and for us (292) (my emphasis).
Wernick provides another exemplary instance of the homosexual subtext underscoring the heterosexual depiction of the attribution of a masculinity in popular cultural texts. Like Simpson (1994; 1996), he engages in a set of self-fashioning practices and hermeneutic techniques that permit him to deploy the text as an object of self-decipherment in which repressed sexuality functions as an index of subjectivity (see Foucault, 1988a; 1988b; Hunter, 1984; Hutton, 1988: 132). Moreover, treating masculinity as a representation that is tied to a fundamental expressive/repressive bind, is to privilege the formation of subjectivity in a symbolic space marked out by a chain of 'floating signifiers' (see Wernick, 1987: 294).

Wood (1987), in his analysis of the film, *Raging Bull*, also draws on Freudian psychoanalysis to discover traces of repressed homosexuality, manifested, it is argued, in the representation of the protagonist's masculinity and obsessive heterosexuality. Once again, overt heterosexuality functions as a disguise or a mask for the disavowal of homoerotic desires. Here Wood provides another example of a theorisation of masculinity in which subjectivity emerges in the space of the unconscious as a return of the repressed:

> What is repressed is never, of course annihilated: it will always strive to return, in disguised forms, in dreams, or as neurotic symptoms. If Freud was correct we should expect to find the traces of repressed homosexuality in every film, just as we should expect to find them in every person, usually lurking beneath the surface, occasionally rupturing it, and informing in various ways the human relationships depicted (274).

The denial of such homosexuality is treated as integral to the social construction of masculinity which is experienced as a constant threat, manifested in the form of homophobia:
The phenomenon of homophobia has no rational explanation: why should anyone fear and hate a social group because of its sexual orientation? In order to explain it I have drawn on psychoanalysis, with its insights into unconscious motivation, in particular the notion of innate bisexuality. The repression of the homosexual side of one's bisexuality is crucial to the social construction of masculinity, but because what is repressed lives on, perhaps deeply buried, it can be experienced as a constant threat. What the homophobe hates is his own precariously repressed homosexuality, which he disowns and projects on to others so that he can denounce, ridicule, and violently repudiate it ... Homophobia is one of the most unfortunate effects of the social construction of masculinity (275).

While not wanting to deny the significant role of homophobia in the social construction of masculinities, attention here is drawn to the problematics involved in its conceptualisation as unconsciously motivated and tied to an innate, repressed bisexuality. This denies the very significant ways in which homophobias, as a set of practices or skills, are learned behaviours marked out by their deployment within technologies of normalisation and self-regulation (see Foucault, 1978; 1985; 1986; 1988a; 1988b).

Former (1994), along the same lines as Wood (1987) and Easthope (1986), uses popular cultural texts to reveal the repressed underside of masculinity. He claims, in fact, that escapist pulp fiction, such as Mickey Spillane’s paperback novels, can be examined in terms of how ‘men’s psychic concerns’ are played out in mass culture (38). Former argues that since World War II provided a significant site for men to establish their masculinity, the post-war period, with its altered landscape of domestic and occupational arrangements, did not allow for such an expression of masculinity. Consequently, other ways had to be discovered to compensate for this lack and it is in this sense that Spillane’s novels are presented as avenues for reworking this dominant model of masculinity:
Masculine insecurity could be temporarily shored up through paperback fantasies of exaggerated heterosexuality and physical violence, particularly in the hands of writers such as Mickey Spillane who were in tune with postwar masculine concerns (38).

In a postwar society with its increased anxiety about masculinity, Former argues that these novels became the psychic site for the expression of 'Rambo-esque fantasies of hypermasculinity' whose repressed underside was a dread of femininity (40):

To speak about weakness was taboo, but to read about it in a safe, private, impersonal format which was clearly heterosexual and hypermasculine was able to see represented men's own worst fears (41).

It is in this sense that Former also treats masculinity as caught in an expressive/repressive bind, mediated via the use of popular cultural texts as sites for the realisation of the inexpressible underside of feeling. He proceeds by engaging in a reading practice in which Hammer, the protagonist of Spillane's novels, becomes an object of moral and ethical self-problematisation (see Mellor & Patterson, 1991). For instance, Hammer's fear of women is presented as the repressed underside of hypermasculine aggression. In this capacity, Former reads character as a foil for the self-identification of men in the post war period whose fears and concerns about masculinity found their expression in Spillane's escapist pulp fiction:

Forced to embody all that men disavow in themselves, the feminine symbolically becomes for men a threatening potential in themselves; their greatest fear is fear of becoming feminine. When being confronted by their disavowed qualities banished to the nondominant gender; no wonder they fear the feminine (43).
Interestingly, Easthope also makes reference to Spillane's novels in these terms. He reads Hammer's fantasised aggression against women as an instance of castration anxiety and, hence, as driven by an unconscious fear of women:

What can begin to explain the description of Gothic horror that closes Spillane's novel? Psychoanalysis can find two ideas very close to the surface of fantasy. One is that feminine sexuality is seen as posing the threat of castration. The body of the significantly named 'Lily Carver' is imagined as mutilated 'from her knees to her neck'. The second idea is deemed to follow immediately from the first. Mike Hammer tries to destroy the threat by destroying the woman. Her body is fantasised as jaws that would bite him unless the flames of his phallic lighter can become 'teeth that ate' her and her scars. So he meets fire with fire. In a familiar mechanism, the fear of castration is projected back on to what seems to cause it. The feminine as good object becomes a bad object for him, unleashing the death drive (162).

Thus, Easthope makes explicit the role of psychoanalysis and its deployment in a deconstructive analytic practice which attempts to reveal 'the repressed underside' of masculinity through a moral reading of character (see Hunter, 1983; Mellor & Patterson, 1991). Moreover, what is highlighted is the extent to which both Easthope and Former treat masculinity as an expression of 'a homogeneous faculty of recognition ('mind') in the form of a general relation between consciousness and things' (Hunter, 1983: 226-227). But as Hunter (1983) argues:

Rather, representations result from diverse practices and techniques, among which we find those resulting in the emergence of literary objects like characters (227).

That Spillane's paperback novels can be treated as a vehicle for the expression of a masculinity whose 'unstable underside' can be revealed to consciousness through the deployment of psychoanalysis, need not then be considered as evidence or even proof of
the existence of the unconscious face of masculinity. Rather such readings are the result of the operation of diverse practices and techniques applied here in quite specific ways.

Culture and Sexuality: The Limits of Reworking Freudian Analytic Categories

Metcalf (1985) and Ryan (1985) also draw significantly on psychoanalysis to mark out a space in which the expression of masculinity in consciousness has a repressed underside. For instance, Metcalf claims that 'beneath the macho posing and the bedroom performance, many men have unsure and conflicting feelings about their sexuality' (1). Moreover, he emphasises that masculinity has become so naturalised in everyday life that it has become invisible. Like Seidler (1989; 1991) and Easthope (1986), therefore, his theorisation of masculinity and its nexus in sexuality is based on an emancipatory politics which is grounded in consciousness raising. This manner of theorising is underscored by a rationality which is built into a deconstructive cultural analytics that draws on feminist theory and psychoanalysis (see Weedon, 1987; Henriques et al, 1984). Within such a frame, critical awareness is restored to the blinded subject to enable him/her to see through the ideological distortions of society operative at the psychic level of repressed consciousness. Such theorisations of masculinity are predicated on the promise of the formation of a critically aware individual, who, as a result of the deconstructive analysis, will come to see the oppressive effects of capitalist patriarchy (see Metcalf & Humphries, 1985; Seidler, 1989; 1991; Hearn & Morgan, 1990; Brod & Kaufman, 1994; Chapman & Rutherford, 1988).

This is clearly detected in Metcalf's attempt to reveal 'the underlying causes of the male model of sexuality [which is] driven not liberated, organised around orgasm, permeated with anxieties about performance and achievement' (5). He proceeds to argue that a fragile male identity is established through the construction of genital sex as a site of affirmation and self-validation for men and then proceeds to account for such behaviour in feminist psychoanalytic terms:
A recent feminist account suggests that masculinity is constructed as a defence against original anger with mothers. As such, much of male sexuality can be understood as shoring up a shaky sense of maleness. From this perspective, the creation of gender identity in the first years of life is the crucial stage in the formation of male sexuality. The subsequent learning of male roles, the playground of bragging, the reliance on porn, all feed upon, and attempt to consolidate, the fragile structure laid down in infancy. The silence of men is a little more understandable in light of these ideas (7).

This is the very perspective on masculinity that Ryan (1985) elaborates:

There is reason to believe that the intersexed nature of the mother-son relationship is a key to the understanding of men's fragile gender identity and the related problems of fear of commitment and intimacy (15).

Ryan draws on Freud to mark out the limits of a masculinity in crisis as a result of boys being forced to sever primary ties with the mother and to identify with the father in order to establish a male gender identity (see Greenson, 1968; Chodorow, 1978; Belenky et al, 1986; Gilligan, 1982). Such a process of dis-identification for boys is an anxiety-ridden process, Ryan argues, whose effects remain submerged in the unconscious. Because the primary identification with the mother is never completely eradicated but 'remains interwoven in the very core of what we call masculinity', it is played out in various forms and motivations which are not always available to consciousness. It is in this sense that masculinity is conceptualised as an effect of unconscious drives and forces operative at the symbolic level of the unconscious where they remain repressed. Ryan points to the effects of this repressive mechanism to account for men's fears of women and machismo behaviour.
Masculinity, then, can be viewed as a defensive construction developed over the early years out of a need to emphasise a difference, a separateness from the mother. In the extreme this is manifested by machismo behaviour with its emphasis on competitiveness, strength, aggressiveness, contempt for women and emotional shallowness, all serving to keep the male secure in his separate identity. It may be that to appear 'weak' which many men wrongly associate with femininity, is also threatening to men because it lessons the psychological gap between the sexes (26).

Hence, masculinity, which is often manifested in exaggerated macho displays of virility, emerges as a defence against femininity. Ryan, however, believes that the precipitation of such a crisis of masculinity can be ameliorated through the active participation of fathers in child rearing practices, which is an argument promulgated by Chodorow (1978):

The active presence and participation of fathers in the early nurturing of their children may provide a less defensive, softer model of masculinity. Primary identification with the mother will exist but rather than being feared and denied, it will come to be accepted and appreciated (27).

Hudson and Jacot (1991: 40-58) develop an identical argument about the crisis of masculinity in their deployment of explanatory tropes which are derivative of Freudian psychoanalysis. Their conceptualisation of the 'male wound' which 'generates needs and tensions in the male mind for which there is no direct female equivalent', like that of Ryan's, is made possible through the mobilisation of a specific regimen of Freudian psychoanalysis (viii). That is, the grammar of explanatory categories deployed by such theorists of masculinity is formed within a technology of gender, which has been built up through the disciplinary structures that mark out psychology as a normalising space for establishing certain truths about men as gendered subjects.

Silverstein and Rashbaum (1994), however, in accounting for this crisis in masculinity, reject the basic tenets of Freudian psychology, which treats the acquisition of gender
identity in terms of a resolution of the Oedipus complex. They mount a critique of such a model of gender identity formation which rests on the premise that 'a boy has to be rescued from his mother to develop his masculinity' (92). Rather, they deploy the explanatory trope of 'culture' as a general category in accounting for the social construction of masculinity in boys' lives:

For better or for worse, what they [boys] do acquire over time, not so much in the Oedipal period but in the latency and adolescent phases, is a social definition of masculinity, an understanding of how to take their place as men in the existing social structure (87) (my emphasis).

Thus, Silverstein and Rashbaum argue that 'culture' is implicated in the process of boys acquiring a socially regulated form of masculinity and that the role of parents in this socialisation process is significant. For instance, they claim that parents reinforce culturally defined stereotypes of masculinity and femininity through their child rearing practices, attitudes and behaviours (29). In other words, it is 'culture' which dictates, from a boy's earliest days, the kind of perception that he will have of himself as male, a perception which is defined in opposition to femininity.

This leads Silverstein and Rashbaum to emphasise the role of parents 'in establishing and adhering to the male/female, instrumental/expressive divide, which is a product of the belief that boys and men are primarily oriented toward activity, achievement, and power, girls and women toward nurturance and relationship' (30). They claim that Freudian notions of the Oedipus complex have been deployed to account for a host of social ills which are inflicted upon boys in their failure to achieve masculinity. For example, such theories are drawn on to highlight the feminising influences of women, and particularly mothers, in emasculating boys. Silverstein and Rashbaum, argue, based on their clinical experience and analysis of popular cultural texts, that most women, like most men, fear that a mother's influence will influence detrimentally a boy's rite of passage into
manhood. At the basis of this fear is the dread of 'producing a sissy' (9) (see also, Green, 1987).

This fear of feminisation is rendered analysable not so much in Freudian terms by the need to resolve the Oedipus complex at the basis of which is the mechanism of castration anxiety, but in terms of the influences of patriarchal culture. This accounts for parents' need, Silverstein and Rashbaum argue, to engage in practices, which reinforce the imperative for boys to deny the 'feminine qualities in themselves' and to separate from their mothers. Hence, 'culture' becomes the explanatory category in accounting for why many boys are encouraged to be tough and why male role models are supposedly required to help boys to establish their masculinity and to counteract the feminising influences of the mother.

However, Silverstein and Rashbaum (81-96) argue that these practices are often rendered explainable in Freudian terms with father absence and overmothering, which are identified as hampering the successful resolution of the Oedipus complex and hence, the acquisition of masculinity (see Biddulph, 1994; West, 1996). What is interesting about the counter position adopted by Silverstein and Rashbaum is that 'culture' replaces the Oedipus complex as a privileged category for explaining the formation of gender identity and becomes, in effect, the flip side of the same coin. In other words, culture instead of the Oedipus complex is used to explain why many mothers feel convinced that 'they are bad for their sons and that fathers are good' (16).

In order to demonstrate the influences of culture on boys' acquisition of masculinity and to challenge the basic dictum of therapists such as Biddulph (1994) and Bly (1990) that only a father can make a boy a man, Silverstein and Rashbaum draw on personal experiences and popular cultural texts. For example, they use references to Greek myths as a vehicle for reading off the effects of a particularly oppressive form of masculinity. Many of the mythic heroes such as Jason, Achilles and Hercules, they argue, were removed from their mothers in early infancy and trained to be men away from any
feminising influences. Thus, Silverstein and Rashbaum use these texts to trace the effects of masculinity which are expressed symbolically, in terms of the need for boys in a patriarchal culture to rid themselves of all feminine influences or 'remnants of the feminine within [their] own psyche' (10). In this way, masculinity is treated as a representation whose effects are traceable at the symbolic level in texts.

In much the same way, they refer to typical fairy tales and popular films as a means by which to explicate the effects of culture in terms of its representation of bad women and a dominant model of masculinity which denigrates the feminine. For instance, they refer to the *Karate Kid* as a typical movie in the 'ever popular 'achievement of masculinity' genre' which presents the warm and loving relationship that a single mother has with her pre-adolescent son as hampering his rite of passage into manhood. Because all the kids at school pick on this boy and think he's a sissy, we are meant to understand, according to Silverstein and Rashbaum, that he needs a 'male role model' (13). And in a manner which is representative of their approach to theorising masculinity, they draw the following conclusion based on their analysis of the text:

> Once again the culture has affirmed the assumption that a woman emasculates a male child, and only a man can lead a boy into manhood (14).

*Boys N the Hood* is also referred to as another example of the 'inadequate-mother story' syndrome in its representation of a divorced black woman who, despite her resilience and strength of character, believes that 'she lacks the authority to discipline her son and to shape him into someone with the inner toughness and self-control to survive in their ghetto neighbourhood' (14). Thus, both films are used to problematise masculinity and to raise consciousness about the influences of culture in shaping gendered identity formations and patterns of behaviour.

Other texts such as Salinger's *Catcher in the Rye* are used to highlight how masculinity is established and enforced in the lives of adolescent boys. Adolescence is presented as a
developmental course in a boy's life in his rite of passage to manhood, a course influenced significantly by the impact of culture. This is reflected significantly, Silverstein and Rashbaum argue, in Holden, who as the central character in the above text, pays the price for rejecting the basic tenets of a particularly oppressive form of masculinity. Such a version of masculinity is predicated on having to prove oneself manly, which is sometimes established through engaging in sport, sexual promiscuity, drug and alcohol abuse, delinquency, school failure and violence. However, Holden's refusal to engage in many of these practices and the problems he experiences in his life are attributed to the effects of a failed mother-son relationship:

In short, I believe it is Holden's closeness to his mother that accounts for his distance from and disdain for conventional male attributes. But it need not have made him such a dropout from life, for boys can prove wonderfully resilient about affirming their own identities, even in the face of a hostile environment, if they feel supported by their parents. The problem, then, is not the bond between Holden and his mother but the apparent severing of that bond in the wake of Allie's death (117).

Thus, the text is used to emphasise the significant and necessary role of the mother in the development of the emotional life of adolescent boys. It is this lack or severing of a bond between mother and son, it is claimed, which can have devastating and harmful psychological consequences for an adolescent boy who risks declining emotionally into a state of clinical depression. And as Silverstein and Rashbaum argue, it is an oppressive patriarchal culture which encourages such a severing of a bond in the mother-son relationship to precipitate the adolescent boy's initiation into manhood:

Hence, much of a boy's energy in his adolescent years is spent in denying his mother - both his connection with and his similarity to her. Given the culturally sanctioned view of masculinity, this is what we expect - indeed - demand of our boys, all in the name of autonomy (126).
Which in turn leads to the imperative that the young man leave home in order 'to achieve greater psychological distance from the family' and thus a satisfactory resolution of the adolescent identity crisis (Silverstein & Rashbaum, 1994: 159-60). However, what is continually emphasised in the work of Silverstein and Rashbaum is the impact and influence of culture in determining such norms.

Silverstein also draws on personal experience as a mother to problematise the effects of her own implication in a culture which denigrates the feminine as the basis for teaching boys to become men:

I had worried about Michael for what seemed to me his excessive tender heartedness. Though he was a strong, sturdy, athletic child, he hated to fight, indeed refused to fight, no matter what the provocation. Unfortunately, because he was also a studious, serious kid who got good grades, he was picked on a lot. I used to say things like "I don't know what's to become of you, you're too soft. How are you going to make it in the world? Everybody takes advantage of you." But then one day he came home and told me he had beaten up one of his tormentors: "Rex finally got to me and I knocked him down," he said, through tears.

'So why are you crying?' I asked, secretly thrilled that he had finally stood up for himself (48).

Silverstein uses experiences such as this one to problematise the role she played as a parent in reinforcing the need for boys 'to be toughened up'. What is significant about this approach to theorising masculinity is that practices of ethical self-problematisation are deployed in a regime which treats subjectivity as decipherable in terms of the inscription of culture in both personal experience and in texts. It is in this sense that the interpretations of culture and masculinity offered by Silverstein and Rashbaum need to be
understood as *effects* of particular techniques which are themselves formed within specific technologies of the hermeneutic self. In their account of masculinity, subjectivity emerges in a textual space and in the realm of *personal experience*, both of which are marked out by culture. Thus a general theory of masculinity, as expressed in or hidden from consciousness, is rendered analysable in terms of the influences and impact of culture. However, what needs to be emphasised is that Silverstein and Rashbaum are using a set of historically specific cultural techniques in their analysis of masculinity which enables them to engage in a practice of moral self-problematisation such as the one outlined above (see Hunter, 1984a).

The limits of deploying a psychoanalytic model for theorising masculinity is also evident in the work of Horowitz and Kaufman (1987). In addressing the site of sexuality in the formation of masculinity, subjectivity is treated as emerging within a socially constructed system of conflict and inner tension whose underside is the repression of an innate polyeffectualism. Thus, the interplay between masculinity and sexuality emerges in the form of a series of conflicts which can be traced to a general mechanism of repression that is implicated in 'culture'. In this sense, their theorisation of male sexuality is underscored by a dialectical problematic in which bodily experience and social structure are treated as mutually constituting subjectivity:

Our reading of psychoanalysis does not start with the individual as abstracted from society. We start with society and the body - but a body that is part of society. The act of creating a human being is itself a profoundly social activity, as are the body's experiences from that moment on. Nor do we start with society as abstracted from the body. Society does not exist only in the structures external to the human but is embedded within the body. Society is embodied. One need look no further than the stance of the soldier or the pose of a model to understand this latter point (83).

Thus, the body is inscribed in the social experience and such experience can be used to read off the effects of the body. That is, to understand society one must be able to
understand bodily experience which can only be fully comprehended in terms of the social. Underscoring such a mode of rationality is an endlessly productive circularity with the poles of body and society being reconciled in the space of the unconscious. In what is becoming a familiar move, the effects of 'culture', which are embodied in human experience, are not always available to consciousness - there is a repressed underside to subjectivity which is founded in the unconscious:

Many of the matters we will discuss are things that each of us has either forgotten of has never consciously known. These things are only uncovered in the course of psychological analysis, and even when uncovered they are subject to interpretation (84).

Hence, Horowitz and Kaufman deploy a deconstructive psychoanalytic practice to reveal the repressed underside of male sexuality. And this serves as a basis for elaborating an emancipatory politics designed to point the way toward freeing men from the ideological chains of an oppressive sexuality whose limits are marked out by the totalising structure of capitalist patriarchy. Thus, like Silverstein and Rashbaum (1994), Horowitz and Kaufman engage in a practice of moral problematisation in which learning to decipher the self, in terms of identifying repressed sexual desires, becomes the key to discovering the 'truth' about male sexuality as embedded in 'culture'.

This particular form of rationality can be traced in their discussion of the gendered split between activity and passivity and the repression of polymorphous sexuality. For instance, they claim that culture imposes an active and passive polarity onto the sex-differentiated body:

[F]rom an early age we bring to our bodies a set of social experiences. We project onto our bodies a whole set of social meanings. In other words, while the vagina is physically a receptive organ and the penis physically an insertive one, it is only
through the work of culture these become passive and active organs. (86)

(my emphasis)

Moreover, they argue, that masculinity and femininity are superimposed onto this polarity as a result of a patriarchal and heterosexist society, which establishes a norm that equates possessing a penis with being active, powerful and desiring women. Phallic power is the corollary of this equation of the penis with activity and, hence, castration anxiety. Passivity, thereby, becomes equated with homosexuality/femininity and leads to anxiety about masculinity:

What occurs, therefore, is a split between activity and passivity and then an imposition on top of it of the phallic/castrated polarity. It is this superimposition that produces 'masculinity' and 'femininity'. ... Even where one's parental figures depart from the patriarchal norms, the boy must experience these superimpositions because of the weight of institutions, the patriarchal family form, and a whole culture that teaches that men = activity (87).

This appeal to patriarchy, as a general explanatory principle, informs the dialectical mode of theorisation that is presented. But Horowitz and Kaufman reject Freud's assumption of an innate bisexuality which is organised around an active/passive binarism. Rather they claim that there is a potential for a polymorphous sexuality or 'polysexuality' which they define as 'a fluid capacity for sexual excitation and discharge through any part of our body including the brain, with its ability to fantasise, and through the various senses, touch, taste, hearing sight, and smell' (89). However, the potential for such forms of sexual excitation is repressed due to the impact of a patriarchal culture which imposes dualistic frames of reference organised around an active/passive split:

The developing child internalises the divisions of society: masculine versus feminine, active versus passive, subject versus object, normal versus abnormal,
class versus class, race versus race, human versus nature, and so on. A number of things happen simultaneously to our sexuality:

1. Polysexuality is narrowed down to bisexuality, which in turn is narrowed down to heterosexuality or homosexuality (with a heterosexual norm).

2. Polysexuality is narrowed down to genital sexuality with a surplus repression of other potential forms of sexual desire and expression.

3. Through the process described above, superimposed onto the natural division between the sexes are masculinity and femininity - surplus aggression and surplus passivity (89-90).

On this basis, Horowitz and Kaufman advocate a liberatory politics predicated on eradicating surplus repression and the invocation of polysexuality which exists as a potential in both men and women.

This psychoanalytic frame of surplus repression and polysexuality is used to explain the conflict and tension that men experience in achieving their masculinity and expressing their sexuality. For instance, Horowitz and Kaufman argue that sexual objectification of women and fetishism of their bodies, is related to the effects of a patriarchal heterosexist culture in which surplus repression of passivity is endorsed. They claim that men's fascination with women's bodies represents, not only a repressed desire to return to the mother, but also relates to castration anxiety. Because women are without a penis they are feared; they become the repressed other within a psychic structure which is organised around a gendered split between activity and passivity. It is within such a patriarchal economy of desire, Horowitz and Kaufman argue, that women become a fetishised object for men in achieving heterosexual masculinity:
The surplus repression of passivity takes with it the repression of softness and receptivity. Part of the fetishistic fascination with the female body is with what we have lost (94).

This sexual objectification and fetishism of women in the form of pornography is also tied to the effects of a capitalist society which 'produces objects for sexual consumption and objectifies the subjects of sexuality in order to sell other products' (95). Men's fascination with pornography is attributed not only to a fixation of the object of sexual desire but to castration anxiety. Horowitz and Kaufman claim that pornography, with its portrayal of women in a passive position, allows men to confirm their own masculinity which is necessitated in a patriarchal surplus repressive society:

Masculinity is inseparable from a projected, adored, despised, and feared femininity that exists as its opposite ... masculinity is a fiction in the sense that it is not what it pretends to be: biological reality. It is the ideology of patriarchal, surplus-repressive society captured in the personality of the individual. Because of its real-life distance from biological reality (that is, maleness), masculinity is an elusive and unobtainable goal. From early childhood, every male has great doubts about his masculine credentials. Because one facet of masculinity is the surplus repression of passivity, the confirmation of masculinity can best be found in the trials of manhood (war, fighting, or more refined forms of competition) and in relation to its mirror opposite, femininity (97) (my emphasis).

Thus, for Horowitz and Kaufman, a general explanatory theory (see Hindess, 1989), organised around concepts such as ideology and repression, emerges in their account of male sexuality. In other words, the nexus of masculinity and sexuality is reduced to a general repressive mechanism, which is treated as an effect of the norms imposed by capitalist patriarchy:
The root of the problem is patriarchal, profit-oriented, commodity-producing, surplus-repressive culture that represses polysexuality and superimposes masculinity and femininity onto the dualism of activity and passivity; such are the ultimate sources of the sexual degradation of women and the surplus repression of all humanity (100).

The problem with such an approach to theorising masculinity and sexuality is that it reduces the complex ensemble of historically contingent practices and technologies of normalisation in the instantiation of gender regimes to a general mechanism of power which operates from a sovereign source. It is in this capacity that Horowitz and Kaufman appeal to capitalist patriarchy to present a general theoretical model of subject formation (see also Brod, 1990).

**Culture versus Biology**

Miedzian (1992) also offers a theorisation of masculinity that collapses into a problematic circularity; one which involves the reconciliation of the oppositional poles of culture and biology. For instance, she claims that both biology and socialisation practices can help to explain the link between masculinity and violence. In fact, she swings between the poles of biological determinism and socialisation practices to explain the link between masculinity and violence which she presents in terms of a dialectical interplay between the two:

*We must begin to move beyond a simplistic view of violence in which one side contends that it is biological and therefore nothing can be done about it, while the other side asserts that human beings are naturally good and violence is caused by socialisation alone.*

Violence is best understood as developing out of an interaction between a biological potential and certain kinds of environments. In comparing males and females, the different treatment of boys and girls from birth makes it difficult to assess what is
due to biology and what is due to socialisation. It is the combination of evidence from such diverse and independent sources - studies in the United States, cross-cultural studies, hormonal and animal studies - which leads me to conclude that the potential for violence appears to be greater in males (72-73).

Thus, while emphasising that biology and individual genetic endowment influence the propensity to learn aggressive behaviour, Miedzian, in deploying such a dialectical frame, is also able to argue that cultural factors may exaggerate or reinforce violent and self-destructive behaviour in boys. This enables her to argue that socialisation for boys can be altered to decrease their tendency to engage in violent practices:

Violence can be very significantly reduced. It is never claimed that it can be completely abolished (xxvi).

However, while her theorisation of the links between masculinity and violence is limited in its capacity to account for the complex array of historically contingent practices and technologies of normalisation in the formation of masculinities, she does outline specific techniques for elaborating alternative versions of masculinity. Moreover, she spells out norms, which need to be adjusted in promoting such forms of masculinity. For instance, she claims that boys need to be (i) encouraged to develop capacities for expressing emotions and for sensitively relating to others; (ii) discouraged from relating to one another in terms of having to prove their toughness and express their desire for dominance (xxiv); (iii) discouraged from accepting violence as a means of resolving conflicts and attaining power (5); (iv) encouraged to develop understanding, compassion and empathy for others in situations different from their own (23); (v) taught to devalue the extreme emphasis on competitiveness, winning and sacrifice in sports (35); (vi) taught to view war not so much as 'a romanticised fantasy' but as 'a grim reality' (36).

Miedzian believes that these norms can be introduced through their insertion into a set of practices within the local sites of the family and school, as well as through bureaucratic
intervention at the level of policy formulation and curriculum development. For example, she argues for more nurturant involvement of fathers in child-rearing and for the need to teach such parenting practices in schools (115-30). In this way, she claims, boys will learn to develop greater capacities to empathise with and relate emotionally to others. While not disputing her advocacy of nurturant involvement of males in the child-rearing and schooling practices of boys, Miedzian’s claims for such involvement are often grounded in too simplistic causal explanations that draw links between particular social practices and specific behaviours. For example, she argues that there is a link between hypermasculinity and single parent mothering:

Studies of delinquent boys have convinced many sociologists that boys raised by mothers alone are particularly prone to violence because of their susceptibility to ‘hypermasculinity’.

Sociologist Walter B. Miller tells us that the extreme concern with toughness in lower class culture probably originates in the fact that for a significant percentage of these boys there is no consistently present male figure whom they can identify and model themselves on. Because of this, they develop an ‘almost obsessive … concern with ‘masculinity’’. A preoccupation with homosexuality is also very prevalent. It manifests itself in the common practice of baiting and often physically attacking gay men (85).

Such a theorisation of the links between masculinity and violence, which reinvokes the ‘absent father syndrome’ as a basis for explaining boys’ susceptibility to violent behaviours, is grounded in what Pallotta-Chiarolli (1997) identifies as ‘middle class, Anglocentric and heterosexist assumptions of universality’ (2). This is also reflected in the claims that Miedzian makes regarding the causal links between viewing simulated violence on the screen/ listening to heavy metal music and violent behaviour:
It makes sense that boys who grow up surrounded by the gore of slasher films, the xenophobia of professional wrestling, the rapist lyrics of some heavy metal and rap groups, not to mention the endless violence on TV and in toys, will become so desensitised that nothing becomes unthinkable in terms of gore and violence (293).

It is such a dialectical mode of rationality, grounded in a moral problematising practice, that leads Miedzian to draw the kinds of simplistic monocausal links between boys' susceptibility to violence and specific socio-cultural practices. The heterosexist, Anglocentric and classist nature of the assumptions, which are built into her mode of theorising, are evident particularly in her linking increases in crime and teenage pregnancy to the impact of increased TV viewing:

While there are undoubtedly other significant contributing factors, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the enormous increases in crime by very young boys and in teenage pregnancy that have taken place in the last forty years, have something to do with our children's spending an average of four hours a day watching TV, much of it adult TV. The highest rates of teenage pregnancy occur among that segment of the population - poor, uneducated minorities - who according to the 1982 NIMH study, watch most TV. A recent study indicates that in 1989, African Americans watched 54 percent more TV than did other Americans (214-15).

And into this frame she inserts boys, reared in such a culture who are without fathers or with inadequate fathers, which she claims, further contributes to their predisposition to violence:

As we saw in the chapter on child-rearing, boys without fathers or with inadequate fathers are more likely to become violent and to commit criminal acts. Most of today's teenager mothers do not have husbands. Because their sons grow up without fathers, they are particularly likely to be influenced by the domineering, violent role models that they see on TV. The fact that "marriage and family are not
important to television's men" just helps perpetuate the cycle of absentee fathers (215).

However, while questioning many of the claims that Miedzian makes regarding the causal links between specific socio-cultural practices and boys' predisposition to violence, this thesis supports her attempt to outline strategies for intervention in terms of the desirability of promoting alternative versions of masculinity. She reiterates that it is through child-rearing practices and teaching students in schools specific capacities for producing critical readings of dominant masculinity and its effects that attempts can be made to adjust particular norms around which boys learn to establish their masculinities. In this way, she argues, active steps can be taken to help boys to develop capacities for expressivity and for empathising with others (90).

Schifellite (1987) raises some important issues around the deployment of a dialectical mode of argumentation involving a reconciliation of the binary poles of biology and culture which is characteristic of Miedzian's approach to theorising masculinity. One of the main tenets of her argument is that all causal arguments, 'to some degree, rely on pre-existing categories and concepts' which are themselves an effect of an ensemble of social and discursive practices (54):

Knowledge is a product. It is produced through the same social and discursive practices and social relations that go into producing and reproducing human society. The social biases that are part of these practices and relations are the filters through which we see and make sense of the events that we experience or that are reported to us. The production of biodeterminism, and in fact the production of any knowledge, whether we call it science, ideology, popular culture, discourse, documentary reality, or superstition, is completely rooted in the social field in which it is produced and shaped (52).
It is in this capacity that Schifellite draws attention to the deployment of specific interpretive analytic frames in the production of knowledge which she situates within the context of a regime of social practices and social relations. With regards to gender, she claims categories have been established within specific regimes of practice in which attributions on the basis of sex are invoked:

For example, 'females' are not automatically 'women'. The transformation of 'female' into the category 'woman' requires an 'ensemble of social practices, of institutions, and discourses' (56).

It is in this sense that Miedzian (1992) invokes the categories of 'gene' and 'culture' which inevitably leads her to invoke a theory of causation in which the links between masculinity and the predisposition to violence are established through a dialectical interplay of both categories:

Harvard professor Edward O. Wislon is the author of Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, perhaps the major work in the field, and On Human Nature, which won the Pulitzer Prize. Wison stresses again and again that while human behaviour is based on biology, and its origins can be traced through evolutionary theory of adaptation, it can only be fully understood through the interaction of biology and culture, and the weight of culture is enormous (47).

It would appear, however, that Schifellite is arguing for a critical examination by researchers of the interpretive frames that they deploy in theorising gender (see Coleman, 1990). She highlights, for instance, that biologically deterministic theories in themselves are not so much the problem, but rather it is the use to which they are put within the larger sociopolitical context of social, legal and public institutions that requires closer examination. She demonstrates this by recounting the 'XYY story' to demonstrate how biodeterminist arguments were taken up in the 1960s to legitimate a causal genetic relation between a specific group of males and their predisposition to violence. She claims that,
with increased tension and violence in cities in the United States in the 1960s, an attempt was made by researchers to link violence to a genetic predisposition to such behaviour. At this time, Schifellite points out, it was discovered that males in prison had an extra Y chromosome and that there was a higher proportion of these kind of males in prisons. Since males are assumed to be more aggressive than females and since females do not have a Y chromosome, it was concluded that there was a link between those men carrying an extra Y chromosome and the tendency towards aggressive behaviour. Other studies flourished which confirmed that there was a correlation between an extra Y chromosome, identifiable in certain males, and deviant, aggressive, anti-social behaviour. This led to a mass murderer being identified initially as being an XYY male when, in fact, it was later discovered that he was an XY male. This information, however, was largely ignored and Schifellite claims that such knowledge about the extra Y chromosome as a genetic indicator of violence was used by some courts and prisons to screen for XYY males with some inmates being treated with female hormones as a cure for such behaviour. This historical account is provided by Schifellite to illustrate that knowledge is used within the framework of a wider socio-political context in which causal models of social behaviour are implicated in the maintenance of structured inequality:

All this serves to demonstrate that what biological determinist debates say, how they say it and the ways in which this information is used in the larger sociopolitical context are all aspects of the same process; it is a process of producing and maintaining structured inequality for women and all other groups that find themselves at the lower end of the socioeconomic ladder ... My aim has not been to say that biology does not matter. Rather I have attempted to show that much of the research conducted to date and the theories constructed and then popularised have little to do with accurate representations of the process of hereditability but much to do with our society, political beliefs, and interpretive practices. Men and women must continue to make the process of social construction visible and a part of the object of study in the hope of rendering the
"observable" more visible. We must constantly analyse the interpretive framework in which we operate as produces of knowledge (61).

Thus, Schifellite draws attention to the need to examine the analytic frames that are adopted by researchers and theorists in their treatment of masculinity as a particular object of study. This is why it is important to consider, as Foucault demonstrates (1978; 1985; 1986), the historically specific regimes of practice in which the deployment of particular explanatory and analytic categories are enmeshed.

Beyond Sex-Role Identity: Toward Multiple Masculinities

The work of Pleck (1987a), Carrigan, Connell & Lee (1987), Connell (1987; 1992; 1995), Kimmel (1990), Hearn and Morgan (1990), Hearn (1992), Segal (1990; 1993), Frank (1987; 1990; 1993), Back (1994) and Canaan (1991) is useful in mapping a particular theorisation of masculinity which emphasises the limits of sex-role socialisation as a conceptual framework for understanding the social construction of various masculinities in their cultural and historical specificity (see also Cornwall & Lindisfarne, 1994; Messner & Sabo, 1990: 6-8). Pleck (1987a) provides a useful historical framing of the deployment of sex-role identity theory since 1936 which he claims 'has been the dominant paradigm in American psychology for understanding male experience' (21) (see also Pleck, 1981). Such historical perspectives can be drawn on to highlight the emergence of specific regimes of practice in the theorisation of masculinity within the apparatuses of psychology (see Rose, 1989).

Within the disciplinary space of psychology particular gender categories became established around specific norms for determining and deciphering the attributions of sex-appropriate traits, attitudes and interests. This was achieved, as Pleck points out, through the development of psychometric scales for measuring masculinity and femininity. The effects of such instruments and their deployment within a specific regimen for analysing gender was to fix normative personality styles for each sex (see Terman & Miles, 1936).
In this way, masculinity and femininity scales formed part of a psychological instrument which was used to establish the normative benchmarks for what constituted the attainment of a healthy sex-role identity. This was specifically the case for males, Pleck argues, with measures of 'too little masculinity' (effeminacy and homosexuality) and 'too much masculinity' (hypermasculinity) being attributed to the degree of influence of male role models on the lives of boys as well as to the impact of women's changing roles. The development of such scales enabled cultural concerns about the feminisation of boys and sex-role strain, which had already gained currency much earlier, to be taken up within specific apparatuses for normalising the population (see Foucault, 1984b: 341; Bernard, 1981; Demos, 1974; Filene, 1975; Suggs, 1974; Dubbert, 1974; Hantover, 1978). Thus, the development of such instruments for measuring masculinity and femininity enabled sex-appropriate traits to be marked out on a normalising continuum in which homosexuality was postulated as an extreme form of deviancy.

Pleck claims, in fact, that homosexuality was of great concern to those psychologists who initially formulated masculinity and femininity scales in the period spanning 1936-1945 and that such scales, which were incorporated later into the California Psychological Inventory, were designed to 'differentiate men from women and sexual deviants from normals' (Gough, 1952, quoted in Pleck, 1987a: 26). Through the use of such normalising techniques developed within the apparatus of psychology, Pleck argues that it became possible 'to screen the male population for homosexuals' (26). Moreover, Pleck points out that the effect of such regimes of practice was to superimpose one dichotomous conceptual frame on to another, with differences between men and women becoming equated with differences between male homosexuals and male heterosexuals (26).

Pleck maps the development of such categories in relation to the historically contingent practices of the Post World War II period rather than to some generalised relation between culture and subject. He proceeds to outline how such scales were deployed in the postwar period with its altered landscape of domestic and occupational arrangements.
He claims that masculinity and femininity scales were used to establish a normative basis for exploring the problems that males were experiencing in acquiring an appropriate sex-role identity. Freudian theory about the role of mothers in the lives of boys and, hence, the resolution of Oedipal processes of dis-identification, informed the basis for arguing that males had more difficulty in acquiring an appropriate sex-role identity (see Parsons & Bales, 1953; 1956; Hartley, 1959). In other words, as Pleck points out, overcoming initial identification with the mother was hypothesised as contributing to problems in the psychological development of males (29). Thus, the acquisition of masculinity and femininity became tied to a process of sex-role identification which had its basis in Freudian psychoanalytic theory (see Franck & Rosen, 1948).

What needs to be emphasised is that, within the deployment of such apparatuses, the concept of hypermasculinity emerged as a defense against the male’s supposed unconscious identification with 'the feminine'. In this way, it was possible to treat masculinity as the conscious expression of overt exaggerated behaviours whose repressed underside had its grounding in the unconscious. Masculinity and femininity scales were developed during this period to measure unconscious sex-role identification (see Stanford, 1966). Through adopting such instruments, a typology of sex-role identity categories and classifications emerged which enabled a correlation between masculine behaviours and repressed femininity to be established. In this way, certain claims about the role of repressed femininity as a defense mechanism in the acquisition of a male sex-role were able to take on the status of 'truth'. This is something that Pleck does not foreground in his analysis.

What is particularly significant about Pleck's study, though, is that it highlights how sex-role identity theory was used to account for the impact of fathers' absence on their sons and the problems experienced by black males. The advent of World War 11 saw the removal of many fathers from their children and, hence, contributed to a breakdown in the traditional parenting structure within families. This was further enhanced, Pleck argues, by the increased divorce rate in the postwar period which was attributable to
changes in male-female relations as a result of the war. Thus these historical contingencies, in collaboration with the deployment of the apparatuses of psychology, enabled 'father absence' and 'mother dominance' to emerge within the normalising spaces of the social sciences and to gain the status of 'truth' in accounting for the problems boys were experiencing.

In the seventies Pleck claims, however, that male identity theory declined with psychologists pointing to deficiencies inherent in its hypothesis about the link between the acquisition of a normative sex-role and the psychological problems experienced by males. This led to the development of the category of 'psychological androgyny' in response to a sex-role identity theory which stipulated that individuals had be either masculine or feminine (see Bem, 1974). Psychologists such as Bem developed the concept of androgyny in response to the limiting effects of a bipolar conceptualisation of masculinity and femininity associated with sex role identity theory. Rather than treating the individual as fixed in a developmental process in which they are compelled to achieve either a masculine or a feminine sex-role identity, Bem argued that individuals may be both masculine and feminine and that this was situationally dependent:

Both in psychology and in society at large, masculinity and femininity have long been conceptualised as bipolar ends of a single continuum; accordingly, a person has had to be either masculine or feminine, but not both. This sex-role dichotomy has served to obscure two very plausible hypotheses: first, that many individuals might be "androgynous"; that is, they might be both masculine and feminine, both assertive and yielding, both instrumental and expressive - depending on the situational appropriateness of these various behaviours; and conversely, that strongly sex-typed individuals might be seriously limited in the range of behaviours available to them as they move from situation to situation (155).

However, while attempting to move beyond a conceptualisation of the development of fixed sex-type identity roles, Bem only serves to reinforce such dichotomies by claiming
that individuals can be both masculine and feminine at the same time. In short, masculinity and femininity are still conceptualised as binary oppositional categories, but they are legitimised by Bem as existing within an individual according to situationally specific contingencies. This points to the very significant ways in which the bipolarised categories of masculinity and femininity and what constitutes masculinity and femininity can become fixed and reworked within specific normalising practices which are formed within the apparatuses of psychology. It is in this way that a technology of gender becomes established.

The effects of such normalising practices associated with sex-role identity theory can also be traced in the work of both Biddulph (1994; 1997) and West (1996) who draw on the category of the 'absent' or 'inadequate' father to account for the problems many boys experience. Biddulph argues that boys need male role models, and particularly a father, to help them establish their masculinity. Displays of either macho behaviour (hypermascularity) or 'sissified' behaviours (supposedly, the effect of over-mothering) are attributed to under-fathering, or an absent father:

Boys who are under-fathered can be diagnosed easily. They fall into two distinct types. One type takes on macho-mania: the wearing of aggressive clothes, collecting violent toys and comics or (if older) carrying knives and studying weapons and war obsessively. This type will usually group in highly competitive and low-quality friendships with other neglected boys or young men.

The other type is underconfident - a 'Mummy's boy' - and is often depressed. Younger boys of this type often have problems with bedwetting or soiling. They tend to get picked on at school, are reluctant to try new things or go to new places and often have irrational fears.

Both these types suffer from the same problem - father-hunger (Biddulph, 1994: 118).
Thus, the very arguments that were established by psychologists in the early thirties are reinvoked by Biddulph within a normalising regime which treats masculinity in terms of a fixed sex-role identity. This is also emphasised in Biddulph's reference to 'whimpish fathers' (with its pejorative overtones of feminisation) who, he claims, are 'everywhere'. It is the failure of such men to enforce discipline in the home and thus to achieve a normative masculinity, Biddulph argues, which is responsible for the problems that their sons are experiencing (119-122). Similar claims are also made by West (1996) who asserts that 'men learn how to be a man from their fathers' (85). Such claims are grounded in static sex-role identity theories whose historical emergence within the normalising apparatuses of psychology has been mapped by Pleck (see also Connell, 1987: 47-54; 1995: 21-27; Frank, 1990: Chapter 2).

A 'New Sociology' of Masculinity

Carrigan, Connell and Lee (1987) offer a critique of sex-role theory along these lines by highlighting its theoretical incoherence and blindness to issues of power (see also Kimmel, 1990: 95-97; Segal, 1990: 65-69). For these theorists, masculinity emerges as an object of analysis, which is mapped on a sociological terrain that is set in opposition to the basic tenets and suppositions of sex-role socialisation theory (see also Messner & Sabo, 1990; Messner, 1990). They claim that sex-role socialisation theory presents a static view of gender role acquisition as a script to be learned and in so doing fails to address the configurations of power and the dynamics involved in relationships between men and women and groups of men. They stress the need to address the interplay of gender relations with other factors such as class and sexual orientation.

It is in this sense that Carrigan et al draw on the research of gay theorists such as Weeks (1981), Mieli (1980) and Plummer (1981), which they claim 'has general implications for our understanding of the historical construction of gender categories' (64). In sketching a 'new sociology of masculinity', therefore, attention is drawn to the interplay
of 'hegemonic' and 'subordinated' forms of masculinity in relations between heterosexual and homosexual men (see Connell, 1992; Frank, 1987; Horowitz & Kaufman, 1987; Kinsman, 1987; Kleinberg, 1987). Thus, masculinity is theorised as a power relation, which is implicated in actual and historically specific regimes of social practice. It is this 'interplay of praxis and structure' which is grasped here in its historicity, Carrigan et al argue, that role theorists are unable to grasp (78).

Carrigan et al also emphasise the normative framework which is adopted by sex role theorists in differentiating specific traits, interests and behaviours for males and females. Such an approach, they argue, presents sex roles as internalised in a much too simplistic way, with those who fail to meet specific gender role expectations or requirements being viewed as deviant. However, while their critique is legitimate in highlighting the inability of such theories to adequately account for the complexity involved in the way that specific gender categories are played out in the lives of individual people, it is based on a presupposition that there is a non-normative, extra-governmental space in which a social analysis of masculinity can be conducted.

In outlining a social analysis of masculinities, which deviates from sex-role socialisation theories, new categories and conceptual frames for understanding gender relations emerge. However, such frameworks, while escaping the pitfalls of dialectical modes of theorisation, already outlined in this thesis, invoke generalised social structures and psychic processes to account for the interplay of masculinities within specific institutional sites. In this way, they give recourse to a hermeneutic subject of consciousness who is implicated in the systematicity of patterned social relations in which a particular gender order is imbricated. Moreover, such practices are accounted for in terms of appeals to an interplay of capitalist patriarchal social structures and generalised psychic processes implicated in the formation of sexuality. For instance, they argue that capitalism and patriarchy are two aspects of the structure of a sex/gender system that are integral to an analysis of masculinity. However, they claim that 'the structure of cathexis, the social organisation of sexuality and attraction' (89) is also a necessary component.
The overall relation between men and women, further, is not a confrontation between homogeneous, undifferentiated blocs ... We would suggest, in fact, that the fissuring of the categories of "men" and "women" is one of the central facts about patriarchal power and the way it works. In the case of men, the crucial division is between hegemonic masculinity and various subordinated masculinities. Even this, however, is too simple a phrasing, as it suggests a masculinity differentiated only by power relations. If the general remarks about the gender system made above are correct, it follows that masculinities are constructed not just by power relations but their interplay with a division of labour and with patterns of emotional attachment (91).

Thus, a psychodynamics of masculinity is elaborated within an overall sociological frame in which patterns of emotional attachment emerge as embedded in the dynamics of institutions:

The differentiation of masculinities is psychological - it bears on the kind of people that men are and become - but it is not only psychological. In an equally important sense it is institutional, an aspect of collective practice ... Accordingly we see social definitions of masculinity as being embedded in the dynamics of institutions - the working of the state, of corporations, of unions, of families - quite as much as in the personality of individuals (91).

In this way, the unconscious emerges as a field of politics at the nexus of a dynamic interplay of social relations which are grounded in patriarchal capitalist structures. They argue, therefore, that patterns of desire are embedded in a social dynamic that is tied to the effects of overarching capitalist/patriarchal social structures:

'Hegemony', then, always refers to a historical situation, a set of circumstances in which power is won and held. The construction of hegemony is not only a matter
of pushing and pulling between ready-formed groupings. To understand the different kinds of masculinity demands, above all, an examination of the practices in which hegemony is constituted and contested - in short, the political techniques of the patriarchal social order (94).

The problem with such theorising is that it is predicated on appeals to the imbrication of generalised structures such as capitalist patriarchy and psychic processes, operationalised beneath levels of conscious awareness, to account for the dynamic interplay of social practices in the formation of masculinities. What is ignored, or rather down played, is the role of governmental technologies of the self and their instantiation in the social practices of men/boys and women/girls, which have a much longer history beyond the growth of urban industrialisation (see Connell, 1993).

However, the contribution of the theorisation of masculinities provided by Carrigan, Connell and Lee is significant because it enables a focus on the range and interplay of various forms of masculinity and the social and historical specificity of such patterns of conduct. Moreover, they highlight the role of concrete social practices and the materiality of the body in the constitution of sexuality and desire within historically specific cultural domains with their injunctions and prohibitions (see Connell, 1987; 1995). Thus, by treating masculinities as constituted within a structure of gender relations in which class and sexuality have a significant role to play, a conceptual framework is elaborated which allows for a more sophisticated analysis of the modalities of power in their historical deployment than the one provided by sex-role theorists. In this sense, a historically grounded analysis of local strategies of power and their implication in wider social structures, such as sexuality and the institutions of corporate capitalism, becomes possible (see Weeks, 1985: 255).

This conceptual framework for analysing masculinity is extended further by Connell (1987; 1995). For Connell, masculinity is treated as a social practice that is enacted within a particular gender order that is historically and institutionally specific. He claims,
therefore, that there are multiple masculinities, which are produced within overlapping social structures, at the nexus of which is a dynamic and variable interplay of social relations:

Taking a dynamic view of the organisation of practice, we arrive at an understanding of masculinity and femininity as gender projects. These are processes of configuring practice through time, which transform their starting points in gender structures ... This is a fact of great importance for the analysis of masculinities. Any one masculinity as a configuration of practice, is simultaneously positioned in a number of structures of relationship, which may be following different historical trajectories (Connell. 1995: 72-73).

In other words, masculinity cannot be conceptualised outside of a particular system of gender relations in their historical specificity. It is in this sense that masculinity emerges as a set of practices which are implicated in specific social structures and configurations of power. This is why, Connell argues, masculinity must be conceived as a dynamic set of historically specific social relations which intersect with a range of social structures in which racial, class and sex based hierarchies are implicated (see also Morgan, 1981). It is in this capacity that he outlines a three part structural model of gender relations as a frame for analysing the gender order of a specific culture and the gender regimes of particular institutions. He identifies the division of labour, the structure of power and the structure of cathexis as key elements of any gender order or gender regime (1987: 91-118). Each of these categories allows a particular social structure to be targeted for specific analysis in terms of how it is implicated in a set of gendered practices. For instance, the first category enables him to draw attention to the gender divisions of the capitalist system with its demarcations between women's and men's work; the second category marks out a patriarchal system of gender relations in which certain groups of men hold power and the subordination of women is sustained; the third category refers to the domain of sexuality and emotional attachment. In fact, Connell defines cathexis as the 'structure that
organises one person's emotional attachment to another' and in this way draws attention to the erotic and emotional dimension of social relationships (1987:111).

Connell stresses that each of these social structures is imbricated, with varying and shifting emphases, in the formation of specific regimes of practice in which forms of masculinity and femininity are produced. Thus, he develops a schema for analysing the pivotal role of capitalist patriarchal social structures and practices in the organisation of specific gender regimes. In this way, 'the social patterning of desire' and, hence, sexuality, as a set of historically specific social relations, can be inserted into an analytic frame for understanding the practices that construct various kinds of masculinity and femininity. In fact, Connell argues that 'hegemonic' and subordinated masculinities, as specific configurations of practice, 'are generated in particular situations in a changing structure of relationships' (1995: 81). It is in this sense that he provides a non-dialectical framework for analysing the interplay of specific masculinities in their historicity and institutional specificity (see Connell, 1989; 1992; 1995: 93-163). However, in deploying such conceptual frames for theorising masculinities, Connell does not escape appealing to the generalised social structures of capitalist patriarchy and psychic processes operative beneath the level of conscious awareness to account for the ways masculinity is embodied and enacted.

Frank (1987; 1990) also emphasises the need to incorporate sexuality into a social analysis of masculinity (see also Kimmel, 1990; Kinsman, 1987; Edwards, 1990). He uses the term 'hegemonic heterosexual masculinity' to draw attention to the nexus between heterosexuality and masculinity within a wider set of political, economic and social relations (162). For instance, he elaborates an approach, which treats heterosexual masculinity as embedded in the social practices of institutions where a range of competing masculinities are organised within the limits of a specific gender regime. Thus, he emphasises the differences in power that exist between men within heterosexist regimes of practice. It is in this sense that he elaborates, along the same lines as Connell (1987; 1995), a 'sociology of practice of masculinity' as a basis for developing an understanding...
of 'how class, racial and sexual struggles within hierarchies of intermale dominance serve to construct men's global subordination of women and of some men over men' (1990: 4). However, like Connell, an appeal is still made to a general explanatory theory organised around the concepts of consciousness and ideology (see Hindess, 1989). It is in this sense that the concept of 'hegemony' becomes problematic in its deployment within such analytic frames.

**Historical Perspectives on the Role of Sexuality and the Interplay of Masculinities**

The historical perspective on the social and historical deployment of sexuality elaborated by Weeks (1985) is useful in its application to theorising masculinities. Such a perspective points to the limits of the work of Frank (1987; 1990), Carrigan, Connell and Lee (1987) and Connell (1987; 1995) in marking out the role of sexuality in the interplay of various forms of masculinity. Weeks claims that ways of thinking about sex and how it is experienced are tied to 'specific categories of thought' and 'inventions of the mind' which are implicated in the historical use of particular technologies of normalisation and their grids of definition and modalities of power (4-5). Thus, defining the self and the practices of self-definition are treated as effects of specific governmental technologies and particular apparatuses:

The history of sexuality is a complex one; its propelling force cannot be reduced to the effects of a single set of relations. Sexuality as a contemporary phenomenon is the product of a host of autonomous and interacting traditions and social practices: religious, moral, economic, familial, medical, juridical. Capitalist social relations do certainly set limits and pressures on sexual relations as on everything else: but a history of capitalism is not a history of sexuality. The exact nature of the relationship - the complex mediations, the partial and ever-changing articulations, the proliferation of social interventions and the intricate forms of resistance - needs
to be understood through concrete historical investigations, not assumed because of
some strict adherence to a macro-historical masterplan (6-7).

Weeks, therefore, draws attention to the categories and concepts of the 'self' that are
deployed within specific normalising practices for constituting what is 'normal' or
'abnormal', 'appropriate' or 'inappropriate' behaviour (see Mauss, 1973; 1985). This, of
course, relates specifically to Coleman's (1990) focus on analysing the categories which
inform various theorists' understanding of what constitutes masculinity. It is in this sense
that masculinity and its formation cannot be reduced to the effects of a generalised set of
relations grouped under the umbrella of capitalism or patriarchy (see Hindess, 1989;
Greenfield, 1995). Because of the heterogeneous and malleable forms of modalities of
power, Weeks claims that 'no search for a founding moment of oppression, nor glory in
past struggles around it, can contribute to an analysis of its current hold on our thought,
action and politics' (10). Rather, in adopting a Foucauldian genealogical approach, he
argues that it is more productive to trace the effects and deployment of historical practices
in 'the present':

The aim is to understand 'the present' as a particular combination of historical
forces, to find out how our current political dilemmas have arisen, and to see the
present as historical (10).

While acknowledging the relationship between capitalism and sexuality, he argues that
theorists have not mapped the complex mediations through which sexual mores are
instantiated in social practice. However, he proceeds to provide a historical account of
how specific categories of sex were formed within legal, medical, scientific and
psychiatric apparatuses in which particular claims to truth about the nature of our
subjectivity and desires became established. Within the context of such power/knowledge
relations, Weeks demonstrates how sex, gender, sexuality became locked together in a
regime of normalising social practices. This is most clearly illustrated in his account of
the practices of sexologists:
But what sexologists could provide were apparently scientific definitions which could be used to justify social differences and changing assumptions and needs. These in turn locked into, and made theoretical sense of, a morass of popular beliefs about proper spheres of men and women, and the demarcation of sexual normality (88).

Thus, Weeks traces how sex-differentiated domains and the specification of a normative sexuality gained the status of 'truth' through the deployment of specific power/knowledge relations within the disciplinary space of sexology. Through such practices and the use of medical, psychiatric and legal apparatuses, the category of the 'homosexual' emerged as a pathologised form of sexuality. So rather than tying the construction of homosexual identity to an effect of discourse or to its symbolic representation in consciousness, it is conceptualised as the product of social categorisation formed within specific technologies and apparatuses employed to regulate and control individuals:

There is an important lesson in this. The sexologists sought to find the truth of our individuality, and subjectivity, in our sex. In doing so they opened the way to a potential subjection of individuals within the confines of narrow definitions. But these definitions could be challenged and transformed as much as accepted and absorbed. This suggests that the forces of regulation and control are never unified in their operations, nor singular in their impact. We are subjected to a variety of restrictive definitions, but this very variety opens the possibility of resistance and change (95).

Weeks, therefore, does not ground agency or a political practice in a fundamental problematic of domination in which certain interests are singled out as ontologically privileged. Rather he appears to advocate an ethical political practice of the self which
involves the possibility of individuals clarifying the criteria which govern the choices they make as sexual subjects:

...what is needed today is a politics around desire which is a politics of choice, which clarifies the criteria by which as sexual subjects we can choose our social and sexual commitments (13).

That is, he draws a link between the techniques and strategies at the disposal of social agents and the socio-historical location in which they find themselves. In short, he refuses to reduce this relation to a fundamental explanatory principle involving the dialectical interplay of structure and agency.

But, as Weeks illustrates, the unconscious and desire are often invoked to bridge the gap between the individual and society. He draws attention to the normalising practices of the psychoanalytic tradition to highlight how the categories of the unconscious and the meanings of desire are themselves formed within the apparatuses of the psychoanalytic institution. He points, for example, to certain techniques of the self, which have been transposed from a Christian tradition of confessional practices of self-regulation and monitoring (see Foucault, 1988a; 1993). Subjectivity, therefore, is argued to be an effect of governmental technologies of the self. Thus, the focus is on how unconscious processes and desires are organised within a specific regime of subjectifying practices of the self (see Weeks, 1985: 176-177). Within such practices the body becomes constituted as a site for the deployment of power/knowledge relations. In this way, masculinity is treated as an effect of governmental modalities of power which are operationalised through the deployment of specific apparatuses within which particular gender/sex categories are defined:

The construction of categories defining what is appropriate sexual behaviour ('normal'/abnormal') or what constitutes the essential gender being (male/female); or where we are placed along the continuum of sexual possibilities ('heterosexual',
'homosexual', 'paedoophile', 'transvestite' or whatever); this endeavour is no neutral, scientific discovery of what was already there. Social institutions which embody these definitions (religion, the law, medicine, the educational system, psychiatry, social welfare, even architecture) are constitutive of the sexual lives of individuals. Struggles around sexuality are, therefore, struggles over meanings - over what is appropriate or not appropriate - meanings which call on the resources of body and the flux of desire, but are not dictated by them (178).

Because such categories are embedded in social institutions such as schools and the Church, Weeks argues for an approach to theorising the interplay between gender and sexuality that is historically grounded in micro-analytic investigations of specific modalities of power. Such an approach is informed by a conceptualisation of power as a multifarious and polymorphous set of agonistic relations in their historical deployment. It is in this sense that Weeks rejects a general mechanism of determination which is reflected in his claim that 'there is no single common enemy [or] identifiable source of all our discontents in either capitalism or patriarchy or racism ...' (257):

It may be that Marxism as a broad and still-developing tradition can meet the challenge. But it is its failure to do so hitherto that has opened the door to alternative modes of analysis, either in the form of alternative universalisms, as in feminist theories of patriarchy, or in microscopic investigations of specific modalities of domination, as in the work inspired by Michel Foucault. The latter approach has produced some of the most productive analyses of sexual subordination: it represents at its best a historically grounded analysis of local strategies of power which in their interlocking have produced the contemporary structures of sexuality. The difficulty has lain not so much in the approach but in the inability of many self-declared Foucauldians to weld the multiplicity of local analyses into a coherent political project. I would argue, however, that such analyses are not incompatible with a broader concept of socialist politics (255).
Thus, according to Weeks, it is this focus on analysing the deployment of specific techniques and practices of subjectification at the local site that may offer a more politically viable project which is not necessarily incompatible with a socialist feminist politics such as that promulgated by theorists such as Connell (1987; 1992; 1995), Hearn and Morgan (1990), Hearn (1992) and Frank (1987; 1990).

At the Limits of Deconstructivist Analytic Frames for Theorising Masculinities

Hearn and Morgan (1990) map a sociological terrain for theorising masculinities that is useful in this respect (see also Hearn & Collinson, 1994). While advocating a deconstructivist analysis grounded in feminist theory and practice, they also draw attention to some of the problems involved in elaborating a cultural critique which is organised around an imperative to reconcile a fundamental binarism of the structure/agency dialectic. For instance, they claim that a critical analysis of masculinities must problematise what men 'routinely take for granted' (7). In other words, it must render visible the framework of male dominance in which men's practices are implicated. Thus, Hearn and Morgan advocate an analytic focus which draws attention to the deployment of local strategies of power and their implication in wider social structures:

[much more work needs to be done] in the analysis of micro-gender processes and the ways in which these might be related to wider structural processes (9).

Within such an analytic frame they claim that attention needs to be directed to the body and bodily processes in the study of men and masculinities. They advocate a sociology of sexuality, which is closely connected to a sociology of the body (see Morgan, 1994; Connell, 1995: 45-66). However, in arguing for a focus on the materiality of the body, they highlight the need to avoid a tendency to treat the relationship between the individual's bodily experiences and society in terms of a problematic dialectic involving the reconciliation of culture and biology:
Any of the central concerns of men and masculinities are directly to do with bodies - war and sport are two obvious examples. We need to elaborate theoretical links between constructions of the body and bodily processes in society ... and constructions of gender and gender identities ... We need to direct the study of gender and masculinities away from the ideological and the cultural, narrowly conceived, and towards the bodily without falling into biological reductionism (10).

It is in this way that Hearn and Morgan highlight the nexus between the body and sexuality in the study of men and masculinities. Inserted into such a framework are notions of 'hegemonic' heterosexual masculinity and the extent to which they are bound up with 'hegemonic' sexualities (see Edwards, 1990; Kimmel, 1990; Kinsman, 1987). For instance, both Edwards (1990) and Kinsman (1987) draw attention to the use of stigmatised labels like 'poof' and 'wanker' in organising social relations between men which involve the interplay between masculinity and sexuality. In this respect the importance of studying the interplay of 'hegemonic' and subordinated masculinities is stressed (see also Connell, 1987; 1995; Hearn, 1992: 4, 69-81):

As has been said, one influential line of argument has been not simply to write of 'masculinities' in the plural but to attempt to examine relationships of dominance and subordination. Generally speaking, the concept of 'hegemonic masculinities' addresses itself to these issues, pointing to the dominance within society of certain forms and practices of masculinity which are historically conditioned and open to change and challenge. Thus today such a model might be white, heterosexist, middle-class, Anglophone, and so on. This implies that men too, within a society that may be characterised as 'patriarchal', may experience subordinations, stigmatisations or marginalisations as a consequence of their sexuality, ethnic identity, class position, religion, or marital status. The interplay between hegemonic and subordinate masculinities is a complex one, but should serve to
underline the fact that experience of masculinity and of being a man are not uniform and that we should develop ways of theorising these differences (Hearn & Morgan, 1990: 11).

Thus, masculinity emerges as a complex interplay of intersecting social practices and regimes involving sexuality, class, ethnic and race relations (see Mercer & Julien, 1987; Astrachan, 1989; Staples, 1989; Majors, 1989; Baca Zinn, 1989; Kimmel, 1989; Kleinberg, 1989; Majors, 1989; Westwood, 1990; Mac an Ghaill, 1994b; Brod, 1994; Hondagneu-Sotelo & Messner, 1994; Margold, 1994; Fung, 1995). However, Hearn and Morgan claim that such an approach, which lends itself to an emphasis on deconstruction, can pose difficulties. This is because such theorisations of masculinity are often caught, as we have seen, in a dialectical circularity involving mediation between two poles such as nature versus nurture, nature versus culture, biology versus culture, structure versus agency, state-determining subject versus self-determining subject (see Hunter 1993b: 125-126). The deployment of such dialectical frames has built into it the imperative to reconcile two opposing categories in a space where subjectivity is realised. Moreover, as Hearn and Morgan point out, the distinctions that inform such dialectical modes of argumentation have a historicity, which is not and can not be taken into consideration in the accounts of masculinity that are provided within these analytic frames:

Linked to this overall emphasis on deconstruction there is a common desire to overcome a variety of dichotomies. These have been widespread within sociology and have their own significance in the development of the discipline. However they can also be seen as misleading and reificatory. Here we would include distinctions between nature and nurture, nature and culture, and between biology and culture; these are all distinctions which inform another central distinction between 'sex' and 'gender'. While this distinction has clearly been important in getting the sociology of gender off the ground, it has also presented further difficulties, particularly in so far as it leaves the 'biological' sex element of the distinction and its links to gender
relatively undertheorised. **An important point of departure is to see these distinctions as being themselves historically situated** (11-12) (my emphasis).

Thus, Hearn and Morgan call for a critical examination of the deployment of dichotomous categories in theorising masculinities and, hence, point to the limits of dialectical cultural critique within the field of sociology (see Coleman, 1990):

This may also apply to other dichotomies as well, for example that between the public and the private, one very much implicated in systems of patriarchy and one which has its own cultural histories ... Another distinction [is] that between agency and structure ... While it can be argued that a major sociological project is to find ways of providing for the interplay between such distinctions, it may also be argued that the very setting up of the problem in these terms is problematic. It may be problematic in that it may perpetrate distinctions which have their own history and which may have their particular impact on the present social and gender order (13).

Furthermore, they draw attention to the problematic theorisation of the masculinity-sexuality nexus in discussions of pornography which are grounded in a distinction between agency and structure (see Brod, 1990; Hanmer, 1990; Kimmel, 1990):

Does the distinction between agency (men as producers and users of pornography) and structure (pornography as a form of gendered speech, pornography as multi-million enterprise exploiting women) help or hinder the analysis of this topic, one which is clearly so crucial in the understanding of the construction of genders and sexualities in contemporary society, and one which is at the heart of the gender/sexual political debate. A critical examination of the distinction between agency and structure may be necessary in order to develop further the critical analysis of masculinities and of the diversity of men's responses ... (13).
Thus, Hearn and Morgan call for a critical examination of dialectical modes of rationality which have already been traced in many of the studies on men and masculinities reviewed in this chapter.

A 'Second Wave' of Men's Studies

Brod and Kaufman (1994) and Hearn and Collinson (1994) extend the theorisation of masculinities as diverse configurations of practice, shifting and interweaving across indeterminate social sites. For instance, Brod and Kaufman identify a 'second wave of men's studies', which emphasises the need (i) to focus on relations of power and (ii) not to treat masculinity as a unitary category:

One aspect of an emerging second wave of critical studies on men and masculinities is the clear recognition that theorisation concerns elaboration and articulation of relations of power ... The second aspect of a new wave of critical men's studies is the ever-growing recognition that we cannot study masculinity in the singular, as if the stuff of man were a homogeneous and unchanging thing. Rather, we wish to emphasise the plurality and diversity of men's experiences, attitudes, beliefs, situations, practices, and institutions, along lines of race, class, sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity, age, region, physical appearance, able-bodiedness, mental ability, and various other categories with which we describe our lives and experiences (4-5).

The emphasis here is on examining configurations of masculinity in terms of their differing social locations and intersection with a range of other factors such as race, class, sexual orientation and so on. However, Brod and Kaufman identify gay studies as having a central place in this second wave of theorising masculinities. This is because gay perspectives, they argue, draw attention to (i) the intersection of masculinity and sexuality, which can be used as a framework for understanding the complexity involved
in the integration of gender with other categories such as race and class and (ii) the structural and historical basis of the social construction of masculinities:

It is important to understand the nature of the special status of gay studies within men's studies and its attendant rationales both because of the importance of gay studies itself and because examining this issue will help to understand the more general problem of what is involved in fully integrating the study of one category, such as gender, with others, for example, race, class, and so forth (5).

The complexities involved in studying this 'interweaving between the categories' are elaborated further by Hearn and Collinson (1994) (see also Pallotta-Chiarolli, 1995). They produce a taxonomy of the differences between men and masculinity which include the following categories: age, appearance, bodily facility, care, economic class, ethnicity, fatherhood and relations to biological reproduction, leisure, marital and kinship status, mind, occupation, place, religion, sexuality, size, violence (109).

While acknowledging that these categories are by no means definitive or unproblematic, Hearn and Collinson argue that such a frame can be used, not only for exploring the diversity of men and masculinities, but also 'the interrelation of gender divisions and other social divisions, by age, bodily facility, economic class, ethnicity, sexuality and so on' (110). It is in this sense that they treat masculinities as a composite set of practices situated within a structured yet changing set of power relations, which cut across more than one social division.

Hearn (1992) further elaborates on such 'pluralising perspectives' in his theorisation of masculinities within the context of 'patriarchies' in their historical and institutional specificity. He strategically deploys the term 'patriarchies' to avoid reducing specific forms of masculinity to an overarching social structure of oppression:
I prefer 'patriarchies' because, while there is certainly societal domination by men, this isn't reducible to one societal system or process; instead there are effectively lots of patriarchies, dominated by different types of men, operating simultaneously, overlapping, interrelating, contradicting (3).

Hearn is careful not to reduce the workings of organisations in public domains to a generalised structure of patriarchy. In pluralising 'patriarchy', therefore, he attempts to draw attention to the different material bases of public domains. Thus, he highlights the historical deployment of specific apparatuses and technologies of the self in the formation of men and masculinities in public and private domains:

Changes in public men, public masculinities, public patriarchies, and public domains are social, economic, political, cultural; they are also matters of the individual. ... What counts as a 'person' is not any kind of given entity, just as what counts as 'personalities' also varies greatly (Hirst & Woolley, 1982). There are no essential 'persons', 'selves', 'psyches', 'senses' - or indeed 'biographies' or 'bodies'. Instead, these are all the products of definite conditions of formation, specific technologies of the 'self' (208).

More specifically, he outlines the deployment of administrative apparatuses and the machinery of governmental technologies in the form of legal interventions addressing marriage and the family in the late nineteen/early twentieth centuries (95-139). In this way, he is able to map publicly defined modes of sexuality and categories of personhood that were implicated in the everyday lives of individuals at this historical juncture. Thus, he outlines the extent of 'state' intervention, at a particular historical point, in defining the limits of the social practices in which specific forms of masculinity were implicated. In this way, he draws attention to the material bases of public patriarchies in the formation of masculinities as historically specific configurations of practice.
However, while Hearn is careful to stress the interrelation of public and private domains of life or spheres of existence as inherent in the very structures of patriarchy his argument at times tends to collapse into a circularity characteristic of dialectical cultural critique (80). For instance, while being careful to steer away from reinforcing a binary categorisation of the public and private domains, he asserts that it is preferable to 'talk of 'public/private difference(s)' rather than the 'public/private division' (41). This leads him to pluralise 'patriarchy' and men's involvement in public domains:

The power of the public domains and their institutions bears on men differentially, in positions of greater and lesser relative power, and they and other men, and women, experience the impacts and effects of those institutions differently. So we can distinguish, in relation to men: institutions dominated by men; different men's different positions therein; and the experience and relation of those and other men to these institutions (41-42).

However, problematising one side of the equation leads to the problematisation of the other:

The concept of public patriarchies may thus be further criticised as suggesting too sharp a divide from private and the public domains, wherein power is supposedly located; as not sufficiently recognising the interrelations of the private and the public domains; as wrongly suggesting a dominant takeover of the family by organisations and organisational powers; as not attending sufficiently to the impact of the powers of private domains on the public domains (79).

The concept of public patriarchies may be further refined by the pluralising of the private domains and the public domains, acknowledging their diversity of meanings, and seeing them as/within discourse (83).
In undertaking what Hearn himself terms 'a dialectical materialist analysis', he deploys a mode of rationality that is organised around a circular frame of reference in which the imperative to reconcile the two opposing poles of public and private spheres of life is instantiated. In other words, pluralising one side of the equation does not always solve the problem of a binary categorisation of gender because it invites the re-deployment of the very dualistic frames from which it hopes to escape. In this way, the very framing of masculinities in terms of the concept of *public* patriarchies and *public* men necessitates in advance a reconciliatory tactic involving the pluralisation of the private and an accompanying emphasis on the interrelatedness of the two spheres of life. The problem lies in the use of explanatory tropes which are themselves locked into binary frames of reference organised around the split between public and private domains of existence.

Through the problematising practices of deconstructive cultural critique, Hearn relies on notions of *difference* and *plurality* to dismantle or reconcile such a binary structuring of gendered domains of existence. However, the application of critical frames for analysing or deconstructing gender, which work with notions of the public and the private, has already built into it a predisposition for reading masculinity and femininity as binary oppositional categories, which need to be reconciled (see Davies, 1992; 1993; 1995). However, Hearn does undertake a historical analysis of gendered social relations and practices, which is useful in pointing to the deployment of specific apparatuses and technologies in the formation of masculinities.

**A Feminist-Socialist and Psychoanalytic Account of Theorising Masculinities**

Segal (1990) also presents a theorisation of masculinity which emphasises its implication in differing relations of power undercut by class, race, skill, ethnicity and sexual orientation (xi) (see also Segal, 1993). Like Connell (1987; 1992; 1995) she claims that it is important to analyse differences between men as the basis for elaborating a 'non-repressive sexual agenda for both women and men' (xiii). She argues that Lacanian
psychoanalytic approaches, which treat masculinity as a symbolic representation embodied in language, are unable to account for the material social, economic and political practices in which specific masculinities are enmeshed:

What we can observe, however, from psychoanalytic studies of the symbolic force of 'masculinity' and the overriding psychic significance of simply being male, we cannot fully explain from within that framework alone. The power and meaning of 'masculinity' derive not just from anatomy or familial interaction, but from wider social relations. They express the cultural reality of women's subordination embodied, not only - as the Lacanians suggest in language, but in the functioning of the State, industry, and every other source of social, economic and political power (xii).

In refusing to rely solely on a psychoanalytic frame for theorising masculinities, Segal undertakes an historical analysis of versions of fatherhood to illustrate the complexities involved in shifting dominant and persistent gender regimes of practice. Thus, by taking an historical perspective on the transformation of the relationship of men to the home and family since the 1950s, she is able to demonstrate that even though a new emphasis on fatherhood has emerged, men have still managed to retain their power in the public sphere. In other words, a dominant model of masculinity has been reworked within a different set of social relations in which an imbalance of power between men and women remains intact (see also Davies, 1995; Nichols, 1994). For example, while men are becoming more emotionally involved in their children's lives and reaping the benefits of this, they still retain the balance of power outside of the home. This is why, Segal argues, attention must be drawn to the wider social and economic structures in elaborating a transformative politics organised around shifting oppressive gender routines.
However, despite the insights provided by Segal regarding the interplay of various masculinities within an hierarchical gender regime, her analysis is caught within the limits of a dialectic cultural critique involving a now familiar circularity:

... the whole nature/nurture framework is conceptually inadequate. Not only is the reduction of gender differences to any set of individual attributes theoretically simplistic but, as I have argued elsewhere, human action and experience are not the product of some simple addition or mix of biological and social components. The one always already contains the other. To insist that how we understand and relate the unfolding containment of biological potential - that is, how we exist as human beings - is always a part of human culture need not, as many critics assert, involve any suppression of the details of biology ... Biological sex difference, especially in relation to reproduction, profoundly influences our lives as women and men. Biology affects culture. But how it influences our lives is a historical and cultural variable. Biology does affect culture, but not in ways that can be specified independently of that culture; not, as sociobiologists would have it, through some fatality inscribed in our genes ... 'masculinity' and 'femininity' become embodied within us, as part of the way we live as men and women within specific cultures. Biological differences in intellectual and emotional capacities, if they exist, are most certainly not of such a magnitude as to override human culture in explaining existing relationships between women and men (64) (my emphases).

Thus, for Segal, biology is reflected in culture and culture is reflected in biology and, in this way, she effects a fundamental reconciliation necessitated by her deployment of an analytic frame in which the 'structure versus agency' polarity is imputed. In other words, for Segal, the biological is 'always already' contained in the social and vice versa. This gives away the opportunity to describe the formation of masculinities by assuming that what it is we are trying to account for is always already present. In fact, it is within such
a dialectical frame that Segal develops a theorisation of masculinities in which the psychic and the social are integrated in their historical 'context':

Once we ask what social processes underlie gender relations and representations, we must move towards a complex integration of psychoanalytic accounts of family dynamics and unconscious motivations, on the one hand, and sociological analyses of social structures, practices and relationships, on the other (94).

In this way, Segal argues, attention can be draw both to the symbolic and material power of the phallus:

[In Lacan's work] 'masculinity' can only be illuminated through study of the relation of language and meanings to subjectivity and consciousness. In my view, however, what we need to explore is how meanings - especially the significance accorded to the phallus - intersect with the historically specific and changing power relations between women and men within wider social structures and practices that produce them (92).

Within such an analytic frame, Segal often appeals to a general theory of repressive power embodied in generalised social structures such as the 'state' and its institutions within the context of capitalist-patriarchal relations. For example, rape and domestic violence are linked to the heterosexual imperative for men to assert power and dominance over women as an expression of their masculinity. However, Segal comments that since most rapes and domestic violence involve poor and black women, she argues that there are intra-class and racial factors involved. This she relates to a specific structuring of exploitation and oppression directed at groups of men in 'a white-dominated racist society' which has deprived them of the conventional means to establish their power and masculinity (246). Thus, rape is treated as an effect of a capitalist, patriarchal culture in which masculinity is equated with power and dominance over others:
In a culture which constructs masculinity around ideas of dominance, social power and control over others, but then denies to some men any access to such prerogatives, it is not surprising that subordinated men may be more likely to resort to violence as the only form of power they can assert over others (266).

Consequently, Segal argues, some men may resort to violence in an attempt ‘to shore up a sense of masculine identity’ (269). For instance, she refers to studies, which assert that violent rapists, such as Peter Sutcliffe, were teased and bullied for their lack of manliness. Such studies are used to establish that Sutcliffe was shy, gentle and refused to fight at school. The conclusion drawn is that he was persecuted and teased because he did not fit a tough, aggressive, working class model of masculinity. Moreover, his father was violent and discouraged any behaviours in his son which were deemed to be feminine. Also, it is claimed, there were religious influences involved in the loathing that he developed for women and their embodied sexuality which was linked to the sin that Eve had brought into the world. All these factors are attributed to the wider effects of a capitalist-patriarchal culture:

The wider causes of men’s violence must be located in societies which construct ‘masculinity’ in terms of the assertion of heterosexual power (in its polarised difference from ‘femininity’), and which continue to see sex as sinful, while locating the object of sexuality in women, and the subject of sexual desire in men (252).

This is also made explicit in the following excerpt in which Segal reduces the complex mundanity of social practices and technologies of the self implicated in the construction of dominant masculinities to ‘contemporary capitalism’:

If feminists are seriously to confront the problem of sexual violence, we shall have to realise that what we are up against is something far worse, something far more destructive, than the power of any man, or group of men - something far worse
even than the mythic qualities of Dworkin's atomic phallus. However old-fashioned it may sound in these 'post-political' days, what we are confronting here is the barbarism of private life reflecting back the increased barbarism of public life, as contemporary capitalism continues to chisel out its hierarchies along the familiar grooves of class, race and gender (271).

It is within such a frame that the formation of subordinated black masculinities is situated within the context of the legacy of colonialism which, she claims, still dominates Western thinking (175). The black man within the colonial narrative is positioned as the sexualised beast that needs to be conquered and civilised and, in psychoanalytic terms, he functions as a site of projection for the white man's repressed fears and impulses (176). Moreover, Segal argues that due to their subordination in a white racist society in which they are denied an array of privileges, many Black men internalise and incorporate aspects of the dominant definitions of masculinity as a defense against the dependency and powerlessness foisted upon them. Thus, it is the mechanisms of dominance within a capitalist patriarchal social order, which lead many Black men 'to resort to the destructive use of violence to shore up a personal sense of masculinity' (188).

Such mechanisms of dominance are also implicated by Segal in a hierarchical structure of power relations in which gay masculinities are subordinated within heterosexist regimes of practice. For instance, Segal argues that compulsory heterosexual masculinity is enacted as a defence against the 'feminine' and the 'homosexual other' within the context of patriarchal structures of dominance and exclusion:

There is nothing at all surprising about homophobia and the reassertion of men's rights and traditional masculinity operating in tandem. Both are a defence of the dominant form of masculinity enshrined in marriage, a 'masculinity' which is - despite its rhetoric - less a state of mind or body, than the various institutionalised routines for preserving men's power over women and over men who deviate from a masculine ideals.
Homophobia, as we have seen, not only keeps all men in line while oppressing gay men; in its contempt for the 'feminine' in men it simultaneously expresses contempt for women. As Gayle Rubin observes, 'The suppression of the homosexual component of human sexuality, and by corollary the oppression of homosexuals is ... a product of the same system whose rules and relations oppress women'. Indeed, the fierce, irrational passion of homophobia in many men ... can be understood only in terms of men's fears of what they see as 'feminine' in themselves - the enemy within. It also relates to fear, envy and anxiety which seems so blatantly flaunted in male gay culture (158).

Thus, it is claimed, dominant masculinity is established and maintained via a repressive mechanism which is institutionalised within patriarchal culture. However, Segal, draws attention to how such a macho model of masculinity is appropriated by gay men to challenge and expose conventional heterosexual masculinity as the institutionalised norm (see also Kinsman, 1987). In this sense, she highlights the interplay of various masculinities and their deployment within specific regimes of practice.

Ultimately, Segal advocates the need to move beyond gender hierarchies. This, however, is an imperative which is built into the dialectical analytic frame that she employs in her theorisation of masculinities. Each side of the equation is 'tormented and rehabilitated' leading to swings of the structure-agency pendulum and pleas for overcoming and moving beyond oppressive forces (see Hunter, 1993b: 126). For example, Segal claims that more is needed than change at the personal level and that men must make 'the links between the public and the private worlds as they attempt to build non-oppressive, loving relationships between all men and women, all men and men' (291). But how men are to develop such capacities is not clearly spelt out. However, Segal does acknowledge 'the accidental effects of historical change' in any attempt to dismantle gender based hierarchies:
Dismantling gender hierarchies necessitates the pursuit of change in the economy, the labour market, social policy and the state, as well as the organisation of domestic life, the nature of sexual encounters and the rhetorics of sexual difference. **Change here is partly a process of conscious collective action in pursuit of equality, and partly the unforseen consequence of technological and economic mutations.** Fortunately for those interested in sexual equality, the accidental effects of historical change as well as the conscious efforts of feminists and their allies, have been constantly destabilising former gender hierarchies, threatening the truths of 'masculine' transcendence (294) (my emphasis).

In elaborating a transformative political agenda, Segal is careful not to ground an emancipatory politics in the process of consciousness raising. In this sense, the socialist feminist perspective which she presents is not entirely at odds with the post-discursive politics of masculinity elaborated in this thesis. Ultimately, though, for Segal, what is necessary is adopting a moral self-problematising practice as the basis for a political agenda which 'could take us nearer to a society free from fear' (318):

Such a world comes into focus only once we can cast off the shackles of gender polarities. We will always live our lives as women and men with our distinctive sexual and reproductive capacities and differences. But as many feminists believe, these differences do not necessarily create the sexual contrasts we have come to expect, and many feel they must demand, in themselves and others (a situation where sexual pleasure can be tolerated only to the extent that it confirms such gendered oppositions). For it is only in a world free from gender hierarchy, where women and men alike participate routinely in the spheres of the home and 'work', that we will finally see an end to the oppressiveness of 'masculinities' as we have known them. For that oppressiveness is precisely men's wretched fear of 'femininity' - and hence of weakness, dependence, intimacy and closeness. At a personal level, most of the crimes against women - and other men - are an aspect of
men's deep fear of, and hence hostility towards, femininity, in societies which tolerate or excuse many forms of male violence (317).

And it would appear that the means to achieving this end lies in the mobilisation and deployment of specific governmental techniques and technologies of the self within the context of bureaucratic and administrative apparatuses. Thus, it is possible to see how Segal (1990), Hearn (1990; 1992) and Connell (1987) who assert the need to think in terms of masculinities rather than any single masculinity, and who refuse to impute any fixed psychological traits to such a category, are useful in attending to the complex social practices, structures and historical contingencies in the elaboration of a political agenda designed to dismantle gender based hierarchies.

Postmodern Perspectives

Coltrane (1994) also draws attention to some of the important issues involved in conducting research into men and masculinity within the context of contemporary social science. He provides the foundations for what he terms a 'microstructural approach to the study of masculinities' which gives priority to patterned systems of social relations in their historical specificity (40). For instance, he argues that researchers need to pay more attention to the specific historical and cultural contexts of social practices:

When one documents cross-cultural and historical variation in gender relations and can isolate the conditions under which various divisions of labour and distributions of wealth and prestige occur, one is better able to understand how gender systems operate and how gender shapes people's everyday lives (48).

However, what emerges in Coltrane's approach to theorising masculinities is a reinvocation of the structure versus agency dialectic in which subjectivity emerges at a matrix of social relations involving the historically specific interplay between structurally
determined and self-determining practices. It is within the ambit of such a dialectical theorisation of masculinities that he situates a transformative gender politics:

Perhaps even more important, with large-scale comparisons and causal explanations, one can argue more convincingly that gender is socially constructed and be in a better position to transform gender relations to make them more equal (48).

However, in advocating a 'sociology of practice', Coltrane does draw attention to some of the problems involved in postmodern approaches to theorising masculinities which prioritise the discursive construction of 'reality'. While not entirely dismissing a deconstructive analysis, he claims that postmodern approaches ignore social structural patterns of causality:

Postmodern approaches are enlightening because they attempt to deconstruct false dualisms of mind/body, culture/nature, man/woman, modern/primitive, reason/emotion, subject/object, and so forth. Images of 'fractured', 'decentred', and 'reflexive' selves that appear in postmodernist writing help to critically evaluate overly simple concepts and categories. In its more extreme forms, however, postmodernism's focus is solely on language and its role in the perception of reality. Discourse and cognition are important, but there is much more than this to social life. If one focuses too much on language as constructing reality, solutions to injustice tend to be clever word games, and the concrete bases of social inequality are slighted. Describing the social world as floating fields of symbols manipulated by reflexive agents probably captures a phenomenological 'reality', but one needs to ground such analyses in patterns of material conditions (Coltrane & Hickman, 1992). By relying too heavily on deconstructionism, one too easily overlooks persistence and oppression in favour of historical, symbolic, and subjective particularity (52) (my emphasis).
Thus, he advocates an approach to researching masculinities which involves 'both regularised similarity and particularised difference'. Hence, he reiterates the need for researchers 'to situate and historicise sociological analyses of gender' (53). In this way, he believes that one can avoid reworking false dichotomies such as those used to define particular approaches to research on the basis of gender. He is particularly critical of adopting dualistic gendered frames to characterise specific 'male' and 'female' research methodologies with 'quantitative/empirical/deductive/explanatory' and 'qualitative/intuitive/inductive/exploratory' approaches being treated as necessarily masculine and feminine respectively:

New false dichotomies are created by branding specific research techniques (i.e., quantitative sociology) as inherently 'male' or 'masculinist' (O'Brien, 1989; Seidler, 1989). Critiques of masculinist science as stemming from Western men's proclivity to objectify and dominate others (Easlea, 1981) provide insights into relationships between knowledge and power, but attributing some essential gendered nature to these specific research practices is misleading (53).

Rather, Coltrane believes that an approach to researching masculinities which focuses on the everyday life experiences of men within the context of specific historically situated regimes of practice is one way that such false dichotomies can be avoided. In this way, the researcher is able to situate specific modalities of power, which are implicated in the network of interweaving social practices at particular local sites such the locker room, classroom, oval, school etc:

Researchers need to document and categorise the microstructures (Risman & Schwartz, 1989) under which men and women use gender in particular ways. Systematic studies are also needed of 'gender strategies' (Hochschild, 1989) to assess the extent to which they are uniquely crafted to identify broad patterns of regularity in their form and use across historical, cultural, geographic, economic, and institutional contexts. By using comparative sociological methods, focusing on
the concept of social structure, and paying attention to gender as an interactional resource, one can better understand how gender is actively constructed by social actors. Documenting how power and material conditions are associated with women's and men's standpoints can counter essentialist claims, contribute to public debates about gender, and ultimately transform society (57).

However, such an approach to researching masculinities in terms of their imbrication in material conditions and social practices is not any closer to achieving a transformation in society than the postmodern descriptive analyses of the social world 'as floating fields of symbols manipulated by reflexive agents' (52) (see Gutterman, 1994). They are, as Hunter (1994a; 1993b) would argue, the flip side of the same coin in the sense that both approaches rely on principled notions of equality and deploy critical frames which have built into them the oppositional concepts of determination and freedom. In short, such approaches ignore the role of governmental technologies of the self in the emergence of particular forms of masculinity and tend to work with a conceptualisation of power in which the self-determining subject is pitted against 'the state' (or some other oppressive forces) in a struggle for power. However, this is not to say that microstructural analyses of masculinities cannot be useful in identifying the effects and uses of specific governmental techniques of surveillance and normalisation in the everyday lives of boys/men on specific occasions and in specific locations such as schools.

Gutterman (1994) provides an exemplary instance of an approach to theorising masculinities which treats subjectivity as discursively constituted and as an effect, in Coltrane's words, of 'floating fields of symbols manipulated by reflexive agents' (Coltrane, 1994: 52). For Gutterman, masculinity is reduced to an effect of a 'multitude of discourses' within a framework of oppositional binarisms which have been marked out by Western culture:

A framework of oppositional binarisms has historically provided the governing logic of identity formation in the West. This framework has grounded identity in a
series of either/or categories within which individuals are expected to exist ... In Western Culture, of course, that which is usually associated with men (activity, culture, reason) is usually held in higher esteem than that which is associated with women (passivity, nature, emotion) (220-21).

Once the binary oppositional framing of gender categories is established as determined by 'Culture', Gutterman is able to elaborate an emancipatory politics which is implicated in a reconciliation of the oppressive social structure and the self-realising subject. For example, he argues that since the subject is multiply constituted within discourse and has a multiplicity of identities to choose from, it is possible to interrogate and rewrite the cultural scripts of masculinity (234). Moreover, he argues, it is precisely because of the instability of the categories of sexuality and gender that the normative standards of masculinity can be subverted. He claims that while productive work has been undertaken by feminist women and gay men who occupy 'culturally ordained positions of the 'other'' to dismantle normative categories of gender and sexuality, heterosexual men also need to be co-opted into such a politically subversive practice:

I believe that engaging heterosexual men in the ongoing discussion concerning the instability of categories of sexuality and gender, as well as the various issues such as rape, sexual harassment, and homophobia, is critical for the continuing success of feminist and gay lesbian movements (229).

In this way, Gutterman argues, normative markers of dominant masculinity, which are grounded in the presupposition that men are straight and that they are not feminist, can be destabilised (230). Thus, for Gutterman, strategies for change are made possible through the mobilisation of identity politics and coalition politics. Since Gutterman sees identity politics as organised around demarcations of difference within the dominant culture, he argues that it is possible to challenge the idea that subjectivity is fixed and stable:
Remember Judith Butler's earlier assertion that the social subject is constituted but not determined by cultural forces. This distinction is critical and cannot be overstated. As a result identity politics is never innocent or complete. For as Donna Harraway (1991) makes clear, 'We are never [even] immediately present to ourselves', and thus any politics grounded predominantly on a presumed stable aspect of individual identity will be limited in its ability to create fundamental changes in social discourse and thus the systems of institutions of social power (p. 192). So the acknowledgment that identities are partial and unstable must be continually foregrounded to avoid an identity politics that remains rooted in value-laden demarcations of self and other. By maintaining an awareness that the self is unstable and partial, one can escape from closing categories of identity and subjectivity definition; rather, a fluidity is maintained that ideally will allow for a pleasurable disunity, a proliferation of difference (233).

Since subjectivity is conceived of as fragmentary and multiply constituted within discourse, a particular conceptualisation of agency, located in consciousness, is elaborated as a site for political resistance (see Hunter, 1993b). It is on this basis, Gutterman suggests, that individuals and groups of social actors with shared interests can come together in their struggle for social change:

This fluidity is crucial for a political strategy that is also central to struggles for social change: coalition politics. Coalition politics is rooted in the capacity of individuals and groups to come together in order to achieve a common goal (233).

The problems with such a conceptualisation of social change is that in appealing to the motivational interests of particular individuals/social groups as the basis for elaborating a political practice, a general theory of power is invoked which involves a dialectical interplay between oppressive social order and self-determining subject (see Hindess, 1989: 40). In other words, the effect of grounding a politics of masculinity in identity formations and a coalition cooperative of various social groups, organised around a
shared set of interests, is to reduce a complex array of practices and specific social conditions to a general mechanism of power.

What is ignored in adopting such postmodern frames for interrogating masculinities is that the interests which motivate social actors are themselves learned capacities tied to historically contingent regimes of practice. Attention, therefore, is deflected from the effects of specific techniques and strategies used by social actors, which are formed within particular apparatuses and regimes of practice that have an historical and material basis. It is in this regard that theorisations of masculinity, such as those elaborated by Connell (1987; 1995), Coltrane (1994) and Hearn (1992), are useful in drawing attention to the interplay of masculinities within the context of a materialist set of practices involving the deployment of techniques of the self, which are irreducible to the discursive constitution of identity grounded in a general set of interests or portfolio of beliefs (see Hindess, 1989).

**Sport and Masculinity**

A corpus of literature has focussed on analysing the construction and shaping of masculinities within the context of sporting practices (see Messner & Sabo, 1990b). While such studies are grounded in the dialectical problematics involving the interplay of structure and agency and/or appeals to general social structures such as capitalist patriarchy, they are useful in drawing attention to the deployment of a materialist set of practices and techniques of the self in the formation of masculinities. For instance, Messner and Sabo (1990a) treat the formation of masculinities within the context of sport in terms of a reconciliation between *structural constraints* and *human agency*:

Sport, Gruneau argues, does reflect capitalist relations, but not in a simplistic or one-dimensional manner. Culture (of which sport is an expression) is a space in which dominant classes attempt to ideologically legitimise their power. But the hegemony established by the dominant classes is always incomplete. Sport may be
a cultural sphere that is dominated by the values and relations of the dominant class, but it does not fully strip working class participants of the abilities to think critically and to reshape (at least in part) and redefine sport in such a way that it meets their needs or even becomes an arena of resistance. Sport, then, is conceptualised as a cultural terrain in which meanings are always subject to context and redefinition. In essence, dominant classes place structural and ideological constraints around people's thoughts and actions, but these constraints do not fully determine the outcome - people retain the ability to act as historical agents, thinking critically and acting transformatively (8).

Here, Messner and Sabo provide another example of the oscillation between the poles of deterministic social structure and self-determining subject. Through their use of a dialectical mode of rationality, Messner and Sabo invoke explanatory categories such as 'culture' and 'ideology' to account for the formation and interplay of masculinities within the context of sport. Other theorists, within this frame, also draw on feminist psychoanalytic theory to account for the production of masculinities in sport (see Messner, 1990; Hall, 1990; Kidd, 1990; White & Vagi, 1990: 73-74). However, while the limits of the studies of sport and masculinities adopting the above approaches are prescribed by such forms of rationality, they nevertheless contribute to building a knowledge about a regime of homophobic and misogynist practices that are involved in the formation of particular heterosexual masculinities (see also Whitson, 1990; Crosset, 1990; Sabo & Panepinto, 1990).

Messner (1990: 99-100), for instance, claims that through the highly competitive and hierarchical system of organised sport boys learn to value an aggressive competition and toughness which are central to establishing a particular form of masculinity. However, he notes differences in the ways that sport functions for those from various class backgrounds. For instance, he argues that through the homosocial practices of sport, ritualistic forms of camaraderie and competition are enacted in which 'higher status' men learn to differentiate themselves from women and 'lower status' men. Furthermore, while
white middle class men often use sport as a badge of masculinity during their high school and college years, Messner claims that they choose not to pursue long term sporting careers. Rather they direct their attention to non-sporting careers, which will guarantee them upward social mobility and status. However, for many 'lower status' men, Messner argues, sport is one of the few arenas in which they are able to achieve a publicly validated masculinity in lieu of the social, structural and institutional constraints implicated in their failure to succeed at school. Thus, Messner highlights the extent to which a racialised and class-based gender hierarchy, involving an interplay of 'hegemonic', marginalised and stigmatised masculinities, is at play within a regime of sporting practices (see also Kidd, 1990: 33, 37-38).

Whitson (1990) also draws attention to the systematic effects of such a hierarchised gender order in relation to boys' involvement in sport. For instance, he argues that historically, sport was deployed in public schools to teach boys to become men (see Mangan, 1981; Mangan & Walvin, 1987; Gathorne-Hardy, 1977; White & Vagi, 1990). Within such institutional sites, it is argued that sport was promoted as a practice, which was central to the formation of a particular 'hegemonic' heterosexual masculinity in that it was used to mitigate against any feminising influences in the boys' lives. And Whitson emphasises that it is through such practices that boys are taught to use their bodies 'to achieve power through practised combinations of force and skill' (23). Moreover, like Messner (1990), he reiterates that the homosocial context of sport provides men with a forum for establishing a form of male bonding through which a normative masculinity is enacted on the basis of its differentiation from anything that smacks of femininity. For example, Whitson (1990: 26) claims that boys learn to objectify women and to demean gay people within the context of such homosocial practices and that a particular form of masculinity is normalised through the deployment of such practices and techniques (see also Fine, 1987; Dunning, 1986). Thus sport functions, within the context of a regime of masculinising practices involving the development of specific skills and capacities, as a particular site for the formation and validation of a particular form of heterosexual masculinity (see also Kidd, 1990: 34-35).
expressed mainly through the structured interplay of power and role relations between coach and players, players and women, or among team mates themselves (124).

Thus the coach-player relationship, Sabo and Panepinto argue, serves as a vehicle for inculcating boys into a hierarchy of intermale dominance within the context of football (see also White & Vagi, 1990).

White and Vagi (1990) also draw attention to the sexualised site of sport in the formation and validation of a particular currency of masculinity. They provide a historical account of the role of rugby as a masculinising practice in British boarding schools in the nineteenth century. In so doing, they emphasise how sexuality functioned within such a regime of practice as a means of bolstering up masculinity through the vilification of homosexuals and the denigration of women. However, on another level, White and Vagi argue that rugby songs about homosexuals and ritualised stripping involving the exhibition of the male body by other males, served as a means by which the players could engage in homoerotic practices (see Simpson, 1994). Moreover, such practices formed part of the postgame socialising where consumption of alcohol permitted players to lower their inhibitions and to relate to one another in ways which, in other circumstances, would be considered taboo.

This link between masculinity, sexuality and sport is also established by Crosset (1990). He also claims that the public schools in Victorian England and in the United States played a major role in socialising men to define themselves as biologically superior to women. He claims that headmasters emphasised the role of sport in enhancing the development of manly or muscular students. Moreover, the link between sport and sex was formed within a normalising space in which weak, intellectual boys were treated as suffering from some kind of illness and perverse thoughts, while the strong athletic boys were considered to be 'in control of their passions' (52). In fact, those boys who were very studious or who preferred to read were often accused of masturbation. Thus, within
such a sexualised context, Crosset argues that sport was considered to generate manliness.

What is interesting is that Crosset claims that such a view was developed within the context of a 19th-century theory about spermatic economy in which 'the human male possessed a limited quantity of sperm which could be invested in various enterprises, ranging from business through sport to copulation and procreation' (Mrozek, 1983: 20, quoted in Crosset, 1990: 52). It was in this sense that many people believed that sport regenerated the body, thereby allowing for more efficient use of sperm. Hence, those boys who depleted their energy levels through engaging in masturbation or sexual relations with women frequently, Crosset argues, were expected to suffer from severe exhaustion. In other words, excessive engagement in sexual practices involving the loss of sperm was thought to result in 'severe illness, physical weakness and even effeminate behaviour' (52). He even quotes a doctor who made the following statement:

The strong, the phlegmatic, the healthy, the well balanced temperaments - those who live out-doors and work with muscle more than mind - are not tormented with sexual desire to the same degree or in the same way as the hysterical, the sensitive, the nervous - those who live in-doors and use the mind much and muscle very little (Barker-Benfield, 1976: 25, quoted in Crosset, 1990: 52).

Thus, boys who did not engage in sport and who were considered 'bookish', Crosset argues, were thought to be susceptible to sexual excesses and to have little or no control over their sexual desires. Within such a context, these boys were often labelled as 'saps' or 'wankers'. The point that Crosset emphasises is that such links between sex, sport and 'manly energy' were actually normalised in the 19th century through the deployment of the apparatuses of psychiatry, family medicine and the criminal justice system (53). That is, a particular model of masculinity became institutionalised within a regime of practices in which sexuality was deployed to establish a normative link between sport and the cultivation of a particular concept of manliness. Such historical accounts emphasise the
extent to which these forms of masculinity have been inherited and perpetuated through current regimes of sporting practices.

What is useful about the studies reviewed in this section, which trace the links between a dominant form of heterosexual masculinity and a regime of sporting practices, is that they provide knowledge about the formation of site specific masculinities. Such knowledge may be deployed in a Foucauldian sense, to develop a greater understanding of the techniques of the self and the modes of subjectification that are operationalised on the specific occasions when boys play sport and in the normalising contexts in which such practices are situated.

Microanalyses of Masculinity

Despite the fact that masculinity does not emerge, in any of the studies reviewed in this thesis, as an effect of governmental technologies in their historical deployment, such studies, however, do provide insights into the specific social and cultural practices in which the interplay of various forms of masculinity is implicated. Consequently, these studies can be used to develop a greater understanding of the situationally specific variables, which come into play on certain occasions for boys/men in establishing particular forms of masculinity.

Canaan (1991), for example, explores the construction of masculinity among white working-class young men aged 16-24. She highlights the significant role of fighting as a practice that is not only linked to protest masculinity against class subordination (Willis, 1977), but also to establishing power in the context of gender relations. She argues that analyses of working class youths' practices such as 'getting into trouble by breaking the law, demonstrating toughness by being strong and brave when physically threatened, and search[ing] for excitement during weekly 'nights on the town' when they drink, listen to music, have sexual adventures and where young men fight over young women' cannot simply be treated as an expression of their class position (111). Rather, the interplay of
various forms of working class masculinity must be situated within the context of power relations, which involve both men and women. What is useful about Canaan's study is that through her interviews with young men from two youth clubs, she is able to draw attention to specific strategies used by these men to establish their masculinity. In this way, the specific occasion on which such techniques of the self are deployed, and the limits that are prescribed within particular regimes of practice, can be highlighted.

One of the important markers of masculinity for working-class youth in Canaan's study is to demonstrate the capacity to fight. Canaan indicates that these boys have learnt about fighting and its centrality to establishing masculinity by witnessing fights as young boys. In this way, she claims, they are able to experience vicariously the excitement of fighting without having to endure any pain. Fighting, Canaan argues, thus emerges as an important practice in these boys' lives as they are growing up.

Canaan also reiterates the significance of fighting as a means of determining who is the most powerful male in the context of peer group relations among boys in schools. Within this social context sexualised labels such as 'cock' and 'wanker' are used respectively as indicators of desirable masculinity (embodied and symbolised hardness) or a lack of masculinity (associated with softness). Moreover, the boys who embody a hard form of masculinity are supposedly desired by young women, which adds to their status. However, Canaan points out that 'maintaining hardness' for these young men is considered to be something which is only important for other young men to recognise in each other. In other words, it is a means by which a particular form of masculinity is extolled within a regime of practices in which these boys learn to relate to one another as males.

For these boys, therefore, the capacity to fight becomes an indicator or marker of hardness. However, there is a range of specific masculinities involving the concept of hardness, not all of which necessarily require the imperative to fight. For instance, refusing to fight, preventing a fight or 'standing your ground' may also be viewed as an
indicator of an esteemed masculinity which extols *manly* self-control. It would appear that such ethnographic research draws attention to the specific *occasion* on which particular masculinities are enacted and the need to analyse the evaluative criteria which boys are deploying in monitoring and policing particular forms of masculinity. For instance, some of the men will fight when they are out with a young woman as a means of demonstrating their masculinity and because they fear the risk of being perceived as 'a bit of a wanker' if they refuse to fight (119). Also, they will fight on the occasion of another man 'trying to get off' with their girlfriend. It is in this sense that establishing masculinity for these men is linked to a regime of practices organised around heterosexual norms. Women are often treated as sex objects and used by men to display their masculinity to other men (121).

Through the sexualised labels that are used by these young men, with 'cock' and 'wanker' marking the extreme poles within which a hierarchy of masculinities is defined, Canaan draws attention to the pivotal role of the male genitals in these young men's construction of masculinity:

As I have suggested, during secondary school Andrew and his mates viewed the hardest or most powerful young men as 'cocks' and now view the softest young men as 'wankers'. This indicates that the male genitals play a central role in these young men's constructions of masculinity. They construct masculinity through two opposing sexual orientations of the male genitals; penetrative sex with a young woman and non-penetrative, masturbatory sex ... The former is preferred and the latter is denigrated. This indicates even more starkly how the preferred form of masculinity of the young men with whom I spoke does not just denigrate young women but constructs the latter only as subordinate objects of sexual desire (121).

Thus, in this way, Canaan emphasises the situationally specific limits within which a hierarchy of working class masculinities is established. What is useful about such a
microanalysis of masculinities is the attention which is drawn to the nexus of gender and sexuality in the regimes of practice involving a group of working class men.

Back (1994) also produces knowledge about specific forms of masculinity among white working-class young men living in south London. Like Canaan (1991), he is concerned to explicate specific registrations of masculinity in particular social contexts, but focuses on the interplay of working class masculinities and racialised hierarchies. For example, Back claims that white men have appropriated a particular version of black heterosexual masculinity which enables young black men to acquire status among white youths. However, he reiterates that such racialised practices constitute a more complex form of racism involving fear and desire in which ‘notions of blackness’ are assimilated into white frames of reference. On the other hand, he argues that Vietnamese youths, who have settled in south London, are typically vilified as weak and effeminate and, generally, are not accepted by white working class men.

Back provides detail about the interplay of masculinities within the peer group context of a Chinese/Vietnamese boy’s relationship with two white boys. The three boys would often come to the youth club to play football and pool. Tanyi (the Chinese/Vietnamese boy) was accepted as part of this particular peer group, but his ethnic origins were often registered by the white boys through ritualistic wind-ups in terms of references to the stereotyped proficiency of Orientals in martial arts. For instance, reference was made to Tanyi showing up Bruce Lee on the occasion of the three boys playing pool. Thus, Tanyi is able to enter a peer relation with these boys in which a particular form of masculinity is used as ‘a common register around which to build friendship’ (180). Moreover, it was clear, Back claims, that Tanyi was only able to enter into peer relations with the two white boys on their terms. Once he refused to do so, the relationship broke down. This was related to the fact that Tanyi refused to tolerate harassment at the hands of the two white boys who would often call him ‘yellow’ and a ‘chink’. This incident leads Back to examine why young Black people are accepted within a configuration of social practices involving the interplay of white working class masculinities, while Vietnamese men are
often excluded. He attributes this racial hierarchy to the association of blackness with hardness and assertiveness which is valorised among white working-class males. Within such gendered and racialised regimes of practice Vietnamese men are feminised and rejected on this basis.

Back also draws attention to the interplay of dominant and subordinated masculinities within the specific local site of the factory where the older workers force the younger apprentices into feminised positions. Through the rituals of wind-ups and verbal play, the older workers are able to establish a dominant masculinity through techniques which work to feminise the young male apprentices. For example, Back claims that sexualised labels like 'wanker', 'poof' and 'fairy' are used within a regime of heterosexist practices in which peer status in social relations among working-class men is continually contested and modified. He draws particular attention to the role of homophobia in the policing of heterosexual masculinities (see Steinberg et al, 1997). Back suggests that this interplay of masculinities can extend to a range of sites in which young working-class men enact their masculinities. For instance, in the social context of a youth club in a predominantly white council estate, young men are categorised as either 'estate kids' or 'homebirds'. The 'estate kids' actively socialise - they are associated with the public sites of the club and the street - whereas the 'homebirds' are associated with the gendered domain of the home and, on this basis, are feminised and attributed a subordinated status. Back's point is that there is a variety of masculinities, which are enacted by young people according to situationally specific regimes of practice.

Connell (1992) also examines the interplay of masculinities but focuses on a group of men who have sex with men. Through interviews, concrete social practices across different social sites are documented in the lives of eight gay men living in Sydney. He highlights the gender dynamics involved in these men's practices and, in so doing, draws attention to the interaction between homosexual and heterosexual masculinities. By focusing on localised social practices of individual men, Connell illustrates their involvement in 'multilateral negotiations' that take place in the home, workplace and in
their relations with other men and women (747). In this way, he is able to point to the complexity of a gender dynamics that is implicated in the social structures and processes in which historically realised configurations of masculinity as practice are constituted. Thus, he dispels myths about gay men being socialised into a stigmatised identity organised around a set of practices in which a link between effeminacy and homosexuality is necessarily established. For example, the men interviewed in Connell’s study all had some engagement with 'hegemonic' masculinity. Moreover, he claims that the institutionalisation of 'hegemonic' masculinity structured the men's perception of gayness with several interviewees either rejecting men who flaunted their gayness or expressing an aversion for 'queens' and effeminate gays (746). It was in this sense that they believed a 'guy should act like a guy'. Thus, Connell argues, sexual object choice for these men involves a sexual/cultural dynamic in which a particular form of masculinity is embodied (see Connell, Davis & Dowset, 1993):

In this sense, most gays are 'very straight'. Being a 'straight gay' is not just a matter of middle-class respectability - similar positions are taken by working-class men outside the gay community (746).

Moreover, many of the gay men interviewed were subjected to masculinising practices in their families as they were growing up. Their mothers dressed them in particular ways, while their fathers initiated them into the world of sport. During their schooling years some of them were inducted into peer group networks involving sex-play, fighting, antagonism towards teachers and poor academic performance. Even in terms of their current working lives, three of the men engage in the construction of a hegemonic masculinity, organised around either entering a set of interpersonal and institutional practices, which connect them to the public world or driving heavy vehicles. For example, one of the men interviewed is a skilful business man who often has to sustain 'the illusion of heterosexual masculinity' when entertaining visiting business associates (745).
In terms of their emerging sexuality many of the men recall engaging in early sexual play with members of both sexes. However, Connell is quick to note that such contact with boys or men does not necessarily disrupt heterosexuality since many adults who identify as heterosexual have also engaged in such sexual practices (see Hite, 1980). In fact, Connell makes the point that adult homosexuality involves sexual-closure of object choice and a narrowing of focus in much the same way that adult heterosexuality does. It is argued that the social processes implicated in the sexual object choice of gay men cannot be reduced to notions of 'homosexual identity' or a 'homosexual role' (743). For instance, such processes involve bodily practices in which pleasure is given and received. One of the men mentions that he likes 'a big muscley man' that he can cuddle up to, whereas another makes no categorical distinction between his erotic practices with men and those that he has experienced with women. The difference, for this man, in having sexual relationships with men, however, is tied to the male body, not in terms of the pleasure that can be derived, but in terms of 'exploring another's body [as a] means of exploring one's own' (743). Moreover, Connell indicates that despite the fact that casual sexual encounters with men in bars, beats and saunas remain an important part of these men's lives, they still prefer long term couple relationships based on mutual commitment. In this sense, they are presented as no different from those men involved in long-term heterosexual relationships.

The point of documenting such practices in the lives of these men is to point to the very significant ways in which they negotiate and establish their masculinities within a social structure and dynamic of gender relations involving three key 'moments' or elements of historical process' which Connell defines in terms of the following:

(1) an engagement with hegemonic masculinity, (2) a closure of sexuality around relationships with men, and (3) participation in the collective practices of a gay community (747).
However, Connell offers a cautionary note about treating such 'moments' as rigidly defining the social processes that are necessarily involved in the formation of a homosexual identity. Gay men can negotiate their engagement in specific practices or they may choose not to become involved in certain communities or social practices. It is in this sense that Connell draws attention to the complex interplay of masculinities across a range of social sites in which the lives of eight gay men are implicated.

Holland, Ramazangolu & Sharpe (1993) and Hite (1981; 1994) also provide a microanalytic focus on masculinities, which is useful in drawing attention to particular strategies and techniques that boys/men deploy within heteronormative regimes of practice. What is particularly useful about these studies is that they draw attention to the deployment of sexuality in an hierarchical interplay of masculinities negotiated by boys and men on specific occasions and within specific social contexts. For instance, Holland et al (1993) argue that the 'successful accomplishment of culturally appropriate versions of masculinity' involves 'a complex process of learning and doing within shifting sets of social constraints' (2). Through their interviews with young men, they are able to trace the situationally specific techniques and strategies by which the latter produce themselves as particular kinds of masculine subjects. Such strategies, they argue, involve young men learning capacities to defend themselves against any form of vulnerability or association with nurturing or effeminacy which, in the context of entering sexual relationships with women, involves mechanisms of subordinating the latter. For example, through using the young men's accounts of their sexuality, Holland et al, are able to identify a number of specific strategies that the former talk about using in exercising power over women and in enacting a dominant model of masculinity. Moreover, they highlight some of the social processes and practices involved in men learning about sex.

Many of the young men in the study conducted by Holland et al expected (and felt that they were expected) to engage in vaginal intercourse and to derive pleasure from this experience. This norm of an 'active, knowing, pleasurable male sexuality' prescribes a regime of practices and social relations with women which has built into it the imperative
for young men to present themselves as sexually knowledgeable (8). It is precisely such a male construction of heterosexual sex with its built-in assumption that men have knowledge about and are the prime actors in sexual relationships, which leads to the perception among the interviewees that 'men just knew about sex' when in fact they may lack considerable knowledge (6). In fact, many of the men interviewed claim that they learned about sex through joking, boasting and 'dirty language' within the context of peer relations. They also used pornographic magazines and videos as a source of sex education. Moreover, they claim to have received little or no sex education from their parents, which Holland et al indicate 'contrasts with the protective discourse and context of surveillance within which young women learn about sex at home and in school' (7).

Holland et al document some of the specific strategies and techniques that boys use to establish their masculinity which involve objectifying women. For instance, many of the young men talk about their sexual exploits and experiences among their friends as a means of demonstrating acceptable masculinity. However, within the competitive context of the peer group in which loss of virginity is the goal, young men are subjected to teasing and verbal put downs, with those who don't measure up being stigmatised and labelled as 'wimps', 'wallies' and 'wankers'. What is significant, though, is that within such a regime of practice a particular form of heterosexual masculinity, which is demarcated in terms of its separation from effeminacy and homosexuality, is sustained (13).

Holland et al claim that boasting, bravado and exaggeration are the ingredients of the performance narratives that many of these young men rehearse in striving to establish a dominant heterosexual masculinity. However, they argue, such practices function as a mechanism for sustaining a collective masculinity which involves young men learning to deny their vulnerability and/or fear of sexual failure to avoid ridicule from their peers. In fact, young men who are perceived as failures in the eyes of their peers believe that they can be redeemed by losing their virginity or by having sex with a girl who is considered to be sexually desirable (see also Hite, 1981: 14). Thus, a particular form of masculinity
is policed and regulated within a regime of practices deployed within the context-specific site of peer group relations. It is in this sense that loss of virginity is perceived by many of the interviewees as a rite of passage into manhood.

Hite (1981; 1994) also emphasises the role of sexuality in the social processes and practices that are implicated in boys learning to establish their masculinities within the context of power relations. While Segal (1990: 277) draws attention to the limits of such studies in terms of their Anglocentric focus, they are still useful in providing knowledge about specific social and sexual practices that involve boys learning to establish particular forms of masculinity and the occasions on which this occurs. Moreover, Hite (1981), through her deployment of the questionnaire as a specific research tool, strategically targets the problematisation of regimes of truth associated with the production of heterosexual masculinities. In this way, she is able to trace the effects of such forms of masculinity on the lives of boys/men, while simultaneously working to adjust the norms around which such models of heterosexual masculinity are organised. Thus, in problematising specific norms and making them the object of analysis in the formation of a dominant model of masculinity, Hite (1981; 1994) is able to work upon the matrices of transformation of specific power/knowledge relations in which a particular gender order is implicated (see Mottier, 1995).

Hite (1981; 1994: 233-253, 281-342) marks out a space in which specific norms that govern the way boys/men relate to themselves and to others as gendered subjects are identified. For instance, growing up male involved learning not be a 'sissy' for many of the men who completed the questionnaire. Furthermore, Hite highlights the role of fathers in teaching their sons to acquire a particular model of masculinity that is defined in opposition to femininity. Moreover, what is emphasised by many of the respondents to the questionnaire is that such a model of masculinity was learnt indirectly from the actions and behaviour of their fathers and significant others on specific occasions. This desirable masculinity was especially made explicit on the occasions when their fathers expressed disapproval, condemnation or ridicule of actions deemed inappropriate. Furthermore, a
few of the men also highlighted that learning to be a man involved a pattern of relating to their fathers, which was organised around 'doing things together' rather than expressive modes of communication (1981: 9). But many men claimed that they had spent very little time 'doing things' with their fathers with some indicating that the media had influenced their concept of what constituted desirable masculinity.

Many of the men recalled being called a 'mamma's boy', a 'sissy' or a 'faggot' on certain occasions as they were growing up (see Lehne, 1989). This often took place within the context of their participation in sports (see also Dunning, 1986; Fine, 1987; Messner, 1987; Kidd, 1988; 1990; Messner & Sabo, 1990; Crosset, 1990; Whitson, 1990; White & Vagi, 1990; Sabo & Panepinto, 1990; Daly, 1996). Many of the men who completed the questionnaire stated that there was great pressure placed on them to be interested and to participate in sport. In this way, they were expected to compete with other boys and to demonstrate their physical strength. While many of the men as boys had resented and resisted this, others actively engaged in sporting practices and ridiculed those who chose not to participate or who performed poorly.

On other occasions involving peer group relations many of the boys felt pressured to have a girlfriend and to be sexually active as a means of displaying a desirable heterosexual masculinity to their friends. However, they claim that there was considerable pressure placed on them not to play with girls or to associate with them as friends. Within such a sexualised social context, where masculinity is clearly defined in opposition to femininity, teasing or humiliating weaker boys often became a staple diet for boys learning to relate to one another. Thus, for many of the respondents of Hite's questionnaire, learning to be a man involved learning to be competitive and, particularly within the context of sport, to value physical aggression and dominance over girls and those boys who were considered to be weaker. In this way, Hite is able to problematise specific norms governing the ways that boys learn to relate to themselves and to others, which are organised around the imperative to act tough and to avoid expressing emotion or any sign of weakness. Moreover, Hite emphasises that it is within the context of
relationships with their fathers and friendships with their peers that boys learn to acquire a particular model of masculinity. Furthermore, she emphasises that the situationally specific demands of such relations are formed within regimes of practice in which boys learn to be men. In this way, she is able to document the normalising practices in the formation of a dominant form of masculinity which cuts across various sites such as school, family, sport and the context of peer and sexual relations.

What is particularly interesting about Hite’s analysis of masculinity is her attempt to problematise the norms of heterosexuality in the account that she provides of sex and physical intimacy between boys (Hite, 1981: 45-53; 1984: 288). She documents that despite men’s emphasis on maintaining physical distance from other men, many boys, most of them ‘heterosexual’ in later life, indicated that they had engaged in some form of sexual play with another boy. Such practices involved mutual masturbation, fellatio and, for some boys, anal intercourse. This leads Hite (1981) to assert:

There was no correlation between whether a boy had sexual experience with other boys and whether he considered himself ‘homosexual’ or ‘heterosexual’ in later life. Many homosexual men had never had relations with other boys in youth, and many heterosexual men had such relationships (45).

In short, Hite uses data, which documents the subjective experience of the men who completed her questionnaire, to formulate alternative ‘truths’ about male sexuality (see Mottier, 1995).

**Mottier: Deploying a Foucauldian Interpretive Analytics**

Mottier’s Foucauldian analysis of the Hite Reports is useful in that it draws attention to three axes of knowledge, power and ethics in the relations between the sexes and the deployment of sexuality within such regimes of practice (see Foucault, 1978; 1984g; 1985; 1986). For instance, while Hite mounts a challenge to the dominant norms of
sexuality within a set of power relations between men and women in which the latter are oppressed, she is concerned to explore the ethical relation of the self to the self - the way men and women relate to their own bodies (see Foucault, 1982b; 1984b). Documenting such ethical relations to the self within the context of a specific regime of power/knowledge relations serves as the basis for mounting a challenge to the dominant definitions of sexuality and existing gender relations. It is in this sense, Mottier argues, that Hite's feminist problematisation of sexuality is linked to 'an attempt to work on the transformation of power relations between the sexes' (521).

Mottier, therefore, is interested in how Hite mounts such a challenge to the dominant norms governing definitions of sexuality and gender. In other words, she is concerned to examine the 'internal logic', which Hite deploys in her problematisation of current regimes of truth that are implicated in a gendered power structure involving the oppression of women. Mottier is concerned to describe the analytic frame that Hite deploys in her attempt to mobilise feminist discourses of resistance against dominant sexual norms. Thus, Mottier is not concerned to evaluate the adequacy of such frames for analysing relations between power and gender. Rather, she aims to describe how Hite establishes particular claims to truth through her investigations of sexuality:

... my aim is to bring into light the discursive logic that the Hite Reports follow, rather than to assess the framework they use in terms of their adequacy for analysing the relations between gender and power. In particular, I want to ask what is the relationship to truth that is involved in this self-claimed resistance discourse (522).

Mottier draws on Foucault's (1978; 1985; 1986) interpretative approach to sexuality as a basis for developing an understanding of the strategies developed by Hite for transforming knowledge/power relations by directing attention to the ways in which men and women relate to themselves and to others. Within such an analytic frame Hite questions 'that which we assume to have always been the case' about sex and relations
between the sexes (Poster, 1986: 208). And as Mottier points out, Foucault (1978; 1984g; 1988g; 1988k) has already drawn attention to the deployment of sexuality within a regime of practices in which it is treated as the index of subjectivity, thereby, acquiring the status of ultimate truth about the self. However, Mottier points out that Foucault (1978) treats power/knowledge relations as unstable and constantly shifting within what he terms 'matrices of transformation' in which power and knowledge are continuously redistributed within specific regimes of practice. Into such an analytics of power, Foucault introduces the ethics axis which corresponds to the historical processes involved in the ways that individuals learn to relate to themselves and their bodies as sexual and gendered subjects (see Foucault, 1984g).

It is at this juncture of the three analytical axes of knowledge, power and ethics that Mottier situates Hite's feminist problematisation of sexuality. In this way, she attempts to explain *how* Hite challenges dominant sexual norms which are implicated in gendered power structures and regimes of practice whose effects can be traced in the accounts of the respondents' subjective experience provided in the reports:

I consider the Hite Reports as a focus of power, or rather counter-power, within the network of power/knowledge relations which, as we have seen, do not correspond to a permanent structure but rather a process of distribution: these relations form matrices of transformation along which power/knowledge positions are remodelled. Feminist discourse acts upon the matrix of transformation of power/knowledge relations concerning sexuality through its problematisation, understood in the sense defined by Foucault (in Kritzman 1988: 257) as 'the totality of discursive or non-discursive practices that introduces something into the play of true and false and constitutes it as an object for thought (whether in the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc.)' (524).

Mottier argues that Hite's problematisation of sexuality is conducted through an investigation into sexual behaviour, which hinges on documenting 'the relationship with
one's body, with the other sex, with the same sex and with truth' (525). This analytic frame, in fact, provides the basis for strategic investigative work into the production of adolescent masculinities conducted in this thesis.

Hite focuses on the relationship with one's body in its various forms. For example, she investigates (i) the capacity to derive pleasure from one's body through practices such as masturbation; (ii) the degrees and intensity of bodily pleasures; (iii) the capacity to control or master one's body through birth control practices; (iv) the relationship between the body and emotions; (v) the influence of aging in influencing the way one relates to one's body (see Mottier, 1995: 525). Hite investigates the ways in which men relate to their bodies through documenting the various techniques that they deploy when masturbating, for example. In this way, she draws attention to the role of pleasure derived from such sexual practices through which many boys learn to relate to their bodies. However, in documenting that many boys engage in mutual masturbation and other forms of sex play in relating to the same sex, she is strategically producing knowledge in an attempt to challenge the heterosexual norms governing the construction of dominant masculinity. This is also the case with regard to the knowledge that is provided about men's relationships with the other sex. While many of the men claimed that they were often frustrated in their sexual relationships with women, because the latter did not seem to want sex as much or as frequently as they did, Hite emphasises men's lack of knowledge about women's orgasms and, hence, poses a challenge to their capacity to sexually satisfy a woman.

Mottier (1995) claims that Hite's conceptualisation of resistance against dominant male definitions of sexuality is organised around a binary oppositional structuring of gender categories involving the interplay of men as oppressors and women as oppressed. While such a strategy is considered to be inadequate in its tendency to simplify the complex dynamic of constantly shifting power/knowledge relations, Mottier claims that the deployment of such binary frames enables Hite to mobilise a counter discourse as a basis for spelling out the dominant male sexual norms against which women must rebel (527).
While the polarising effect of such a strategy is to homogenise both men and women and to downplay intra-gender differences, Mottier argues that such a strategy is useful in highlighting the extent to which women have remained enslaved in their sexual relations with men, concerned to provide sexual pleasure for them, while ignoring their own needs (527). In this way, Hite is able to stress the subordinated position of women within a gender regime in which they are largely disempowered. Thus, women are exhorted to cease relying on men to achieve sexual satisfaction and to regain control over their own bodies. In other words, through problematising women's relationship with the other sex, Hite in turn questions the relationship that women have with their own bodies as a means of encouraging them to discover alternative ways of deriving pleasure. However, there is a sense here that women are somehow blinded to the effects of power and need to be taught how to regain some control over their bodies.

Hite also problematises men's relationship with their own sex. The question of homosexual experiences is a means by which Hite poses questions about the ways in which men have learnt to relate to one another and to their fathers which is based on an avoidance of expressing emotion:

A boy's relationship with his father ... is crucial to the concept a boy learns of masculinity. Most men as a boy had a very distant relationship with their fathers ... Boys, knowing their father from such a distance, seeing them so reserved and unemotional, rarely passionate or 'overly' affectionate, frequently grew up believing that it is not 'masculine' to communicate openly or spontaneously about feelings. We have seen, and will see, that this affects men's relationship with other men and with women very profoundly (Hite, 1981: 85).

Thus, in this way, Hite attempts to challenge the male definition of sexuality:

Men could reach much higher peaks of arousal if they did not feel anxious about how they 'should' behave sexually, and if they did not focus so much on reaching
orgasm. Men's denial of their great sensuality is significant because it is part of the overall denial by men of their feelings and emotions; a 'real' man, it is said, should learn always to be in control of his 'emotions' (477).

What is interesting about Hite's discussion of sexuality, as Mottier points out, is that it is treated as an index of our subjectivity, as the source of truth for discovering who we really are:

To discuss sex is to discuss our most basic views of who we are, what we want life to be, and what kind of a society we believe in (Hite, 1981, preface: xvii).

Thus, in treating sex as the locus of the 'truth' of who we are, the Hite Reports, Mottier argues, make available a particular knowledge, which is strategically deployed in an attempt to challenge dominant cultural norms as a basis for redefining gender relations.

This knowledge serves in fact as counter-knowledge, challenging the dominant model of sexuality. It is through the problematisation of the relationship with the truth that Hite attacks dominant truth claims, opposing 'true sexuality', without domination, to the male-defined model of sexuality (Mottier, 1995: 532).

It is in this way that dominant truth claims are challenged by the knowledge that is provided by Hite about the sexual practices and relations of the men and women whose subjective experiences are documented in her reports. However, the Hite Reports also function as a source of information in offering men and women specific strategies for altering the way they use their bodies and relate to themselves and others:

The Reports do not only mean to challenge current gender relations, but also serve as a tool, as what Foucault (1985) call operators, enabling readers to question their relationship with themselves as well as with others through the problematization of other individuals' sexual experiences, that is, the ethical axis (532).
Thus, Mottier argues, it is through Hite's deployment of 'the confessional techniques of knowledge production' that she is able to facilitate such self-problematising practices for readers of her texts (533):

Within the network of shifting power/knowledge relations, confessional modes of knowledge-production may indeed provide resources of power as well as counter-forces (533).

This point is very important because it highlights the role of confessional techniques of knowledge production, such as the use of questionnaires and interviews, in challenging dominant cultural norms, which delimit specific modes of relating to the self and to others. Mottier claims that through the use of such techniques, Hite does not merely propose a liberation from one regime of truth to another. Rather, Hite is read as arguing for a deployment of sexuality which un hinges the sex-desire relation to create a set of possibilities involving an exploration of an aesthetics of sexual relations in which pleasure is derived from an experimentation of specific uses of the body.

Despite the fact that such research tools as questionnaires and interviews may be considered to be 'quite unfoucauldian' it is clear from both Mottier's discussion of the strategies adopted by Hite and those of other studies reviewed in this section, that such approaches to research can lead to the production of knowledge which can be strategically deployed to alter current power/knowledge relations (Mottier, 1995: 522). Knowledge about masculinity, for example, can be produced through inciting subjects to textual production as the locus for examining practices of the self and current regimes of truth involving the deployment of sexuality:

The research tools that are being used - questionnaires in the case of the Hite Reports - aim to provoke the production of narratives of the sexual self. Through
these confessionary techniques of power/knowledge, the 'truth' with regard to one's own personal sexual experiences is being produced (Mottier, 1995: 535).

It is in this way that Hite, Mottier argues, mounts a challenge to existing regimes of truth associated with the oppression of women. This is because in making specific sexual norms the object of analysis, Hite enters what Foucault (1985) would term a particular 'truth game', involving the interplay of truth and falsity. She uses the strategy of questioning current truth claims by articulating alternative ones. Moreover, she is able to formulate alternative claims to the truth by appealing to the authority of her 'scientific data' as a source of legitimation. In this way, a resistance to male-defined sexuality is legitimated through an appeal to the subjective experience that is documented in the Hite Reports. While Hite (1981; 1994) risks slipping into a theorisation of sexuality and gender which merely replaces one regime of truth for another and, hence, merely providing a counter-discourse which follows the same logic of the oppressive discourses from which they seek to escape, Mottier claims that is not the case. In focusing on the three axes of power, knowledge and ethics, Hite's theorisation of sexuality does not collapse into a general logic of oppression and liberation. Rather she is concerned to elaborate a set of practices which are not so much based on normalising sexual practices as they are on bodily pleasures (see Foucault, 1984g):

In this respect, the discursive strategies which the Hite Reports adopt in their challenge of dominant politics of sex are quite Foucauldian: against the construction of sexuality by dominant discourse, they aim to 'counter the grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges, in their multiplicity and their possibilities of resistance' (Foucault 1978: 157) (537).

Thus, Mottier provides an analysis of the strategies adopted by Hite in her theorisation and treatment of sexuality within the context of specific regimes of truth which are implicated in gender power structures. Her work is useful because she provides an example of a Foucauldian approach to tracing an 'internal logic' that is embedded in a
particular approach to theorising gender and sexuality. Moreover, she draws attention to how research tools, such as questionnaires, which may be considered quite unfoucauldian, can be deployed to incite subjects to produce narratives which can then be used to trace specific effects of knowledge/power and ethical relations implicated in the formation of gendered subjectivity. This is also the case with the use of interviews in the studies conducted by Connell et. al. (1993), Holland et al (1993), Back (1994) and Canaan (1991) which contribute to the production of knowledge about the formation of masculinities and various modalities of power (see also Willis, 1977; Mac an Ghaill, 1994; Walker, 1988; Frank, 1990; Kessler et al, 1985; Ward, 1995; Butler, 1996; Wood, 1984; Parker, 1992; 1996; Haywood, 1993). Such data can then be used to examine the ethical practices of the self, which involve techniques of subjectification that can be traced to their development within specific technologies of normalisation.

Conclusion

In this chapter, a particular typology of masculinity has been mapped in an attempt to develop a grid of analysis for marking out the emergence of masculinity as an object of investigation across specific disciplinary and interdisciplinary sites. However, as Hearn (1989) has noted, it is not possible to survey the vast corpus of literature on masculinity in its entirety (see also McMahon, 1993). This is because the construction of such a taxonomy would be 'almost as large as the classification of all literature' (Hearn, 1989: 671). Consequently, patterns in the ways that many researchers have theorised masculinity have been described. In doing so, attention has been drawn to the limits within which particular conceptualisations of masculinity have emerged.

The work of Foucault (1982b; 1984b; 1978; 1985;1986; 1991b) and Hunter (1993b; 1994a) has driven the particular investigative focus on modes of rationality informing a range of perspectives on theorising and researching masculinities undertaken in this chapter. Foucault's focus on an interpretive analytics of power involving the nexus of knowledge/power/ethical relations and Hunter's attention to the modes of rationality
embedded in pervasive form of cultural critique, which are caught within a problematic dialectic circularity involving the reconciliation of deterministc social structures and self-determining subject, have been useful in this regard. It is in this sense that the work of Hunter (1993b; 1994a) has proved useful in drawing attention to the limits of such practices.

Both Hunter and Foucault draw attention to the role of historically contingent governmental technologies and modes of subjectification which cannot be reduced to the effects of culture, ideology or the repressed psyche. Rather, specific techniques and practices of the self must be situated historically within the context of the deployment of knowledge/power/ethical relations which are constantly shifting within normalising regimes of truth. However, in pointing to the limitations of particular feminist-socialist and psychoanalytic approaches to theorising masculinities, it has been argued that they are not necessarily incompatible in their 'uses' with what may be termed a Foucauldian approach to theorising masculinities.

Thus, while no study reviewed in this chapter attempts to theorise the role of governmental power in the formation of particular models of masculinity, this is not to deny that this research cannot be operationalised in an attempt to identify the specific techniques and practices of the self involved in enacting various masculinities and the specific occasions for doing so. This was brought out particularly by Mottier (1995) in her discussion of the Hite Reports and the research tools that are deployed to formulate knowledge claims about dominant cultural norms governing sexual practices and gender power structures. This is also supported by the reviewing of masculinities and the production of knowledge claims about the formation of masculinities made by researchers such as Connell (1992), Back (1994) and Canaan (1991).

Overall, in this chapter it has been demonstrated that any theorisation of masculinity is an effect of specific practices and protocols for conducting research. In this sense, attention has been directed to the regimes of truth in which 'doing research' is implicated. This has
been achieved by identifying characteristic explanatory tropes and categories informing investigations into the study of masculinities.
CHAPTER SIX

Masculinities and Schooling: A Review

Introduction

In this chapter the focus is on reviewing the research literature on the formation of masculinities in schools. It is demonstrated that much of this research is grounded in a form of ideology critique that brings into play the notion of a repressive or sovereign power from which the individual must escape (see Foucault, 1984e: 59). Such a conceptualisation of power and culture, it has been argued, underscores the imperative to elaborate an emancipatory practice designed to free the individual from the ideological chains of oppression and repression. Within such frames of reference, the insertion of the subject into a regime of normalising practices in which sex/gender boundaries are policed for boys in schools, is rendered analysable in terms of a deconstructivist analysis that characteristically treats discourse as providing privileged epistemic access to consciousness.

However, in this chapter, in following Foucault (1984b; 1984e; 1987; 1978, 1993) and Hunter (1994a; 1993b), the limits of such approaches, which deploy explanatory tropes such as ideology and repression to account for the formation of masculinities or which appeal to the political dimension of culture in these terms, is refuted. It is argued that such cultural studies analyses and approaches to the investigating the formation and interplay of masculinities in schools are limited in their capacity to describe relations between cultural practices and the effects of power.

Reviewing Masculinities in Schools

Local analyses of the social practices of adolescent boys in school have highlighted the interplay of subordinated and ascendant forms of masculinity within a regime of hierarchical power structures (see Connell, 1989; Kessler et al, 1985; Walker, 1988;
Willis, 1977; Mac an Ghaill, 1994; Parker, 1992; Haywood, 1993; Jordan, 1995a; 1995b; Askew & Ross, 1988; Wood, 1984; Arnot, 1984; Davies, 1995; 1997). While such studies have yielded significant insights into the production and effects of the interplay of differentiated masculinities in this institutionalised site, many of them are grounded in a logics of cultural completion which is predicated on the imperative to restore the subject to full critical awareness. Moreover, such accounts are underscored by appeals to consciousness in which power and subjectivity become caught in a dialectical problematic involving repressive and/or oppressive social forces that are pitted against the self-realising moral agent in terms of limiting freedom (Hunter, 1994a). Within the frames of such studies, heterogeneous ensembles of techniques and instruments of government are reduced to a general logic of power. Such a logic, furthermore, drives the elaboration of an emancipatory politics, framed in terms of freeing the human subject from the ideological chains of oppression imposed by the state in the form of capitalist patriarchy.

However, as both Hunter (1993b; 1994a) and Foucault (1978; 1991a: 95-96) have reiterated, power is not a violence which irrits at the level of the unconscious, nor is it imposed necessarily from above. Rather, it is treated in terms of how it is operationalised or deployed via polymorphous techniques formed within specific apparatuses and regulatory technologies for shaping conduct and historically contingent social practices. This is also emphasised by Hindess (1989), who claims that the specialised techniques and ways of thinking that are involved in the decisions that actors make are related to limited social spheres or 'departments of existence'. In this sense, it is argued that it is not possible to posit some general relation between subject and society, action and belief, freedom and determination, power and self-determination. Moreover, it is demonstrated that much of the research conducted into the formation of masculinities in schools invokes such a general theory of power and a particular conceptualisation of culture in drawing links between the social practices of adolescent boys in schools and their relation to politics.
The Limits of Willis's Conceptualisation of the Links Between Culture and Working Class Masculinities

Willis's (1977) seminal work on the impact of working class culture on a group of adolescent boys in school, while providing powerful insights into the class dynamics that are imbricated in the production of masculinities, invokes a general explanatory mechanism of power to account for how working class boys get working class jobs. For instance, he draws attention to 'working class cultural patterns of failure' to account for how these boys are prepared for manual labour in the wider society:

In the sense, therefore, that I argue that it is their own culture which most effectively prepares some working class lads for the manual giving of their labour power we may say that there is an element of self-damnation in the taking on of subordinate roles in Western capitalism. However, this damnation is experienced, paradoxically, as true learning, affirmation, appropriation and as a form of resistance ... there is an objective basis for these subjective feelings and cultural processes. They involve a partial penetration of the really determining conditions of existence of the working class which are definitely superior to those official versions of their reality which are proffered through the school and various state agencies. It is only on the basis of such a real cultural articulation with their conditions that groups of working class lads come to take a hand in their own damnation. The tragedy and the contradiction is that these forms of 'penetration' are limited, distorted and turned back on themselves, often unintentionally, by complex processes ranging from both general ideological processes and those within the school and guidance agencies to the widespread influence of a form of patriarchal male domination and sexism within working class culture itself (3).

Willis's theorisation of working class boys' self-induction into the labour process is underscored by appeals to a general mechanism of power explainable in terms of a complex relationship between 'culture' and 'ideology'. For instance, he argues that these
boys' decisions to actively take up particular forms of manual labour are linked, on the one hand, to an overarching social structure in the form of Western capitalism, which designates such subordinated forms of labour along class differentiated lines in the first place. However, on the other hand, their active self-induction into manual labour is also related to an apparently stable set of patriarchal beliefs, values, interests and desires that are derived from their membership of a particular class, which enables them to enter into such practices as an act of resistance to the imposition of a sovereign power.

Willis argues that the 'lads' establish a particular form of masculinity which is articulated in terms of a personalised opposition to authority as embodied in the institutionalised structures and processes of school. For example, he provides, through interview data, many accounts of the boys' resistance to the formal aims of education and their refusal to support the school institution. He documents their constant disruptive behaviour in class, as well as their derisive 'laffs', overfriendly hellos, coarse language and foot-dragging walks in the corridors as instances of a form of opposition which is considered to be connected to a stylised form of masculinity rooted in working class cultural processes. This is what he means when he refers, in the passage above, to cultural processes 'penetrating' the subjective feelings of these boys. In other words, the formation of the 'lads' subjectivity is linked to ideological processes embodied in the school, which Willis claims determines their conditions of existence, but their resistance to such overarching capitalist structures appears to be motivated by a generalised set of interests derived from their working class location (see Hindess, 1989).

This resistance is further emphasised in the working class lads' rejection and treatment of the school conformists who they refer to as the 'ear'oles'. The latter, in their complicity with the institutionalised authority and support for formal education, become a major target of derision for the former. Willis highlights, however, that the lads not only rejected the 'ear'oles', but felt superior to them (14). This superiority was enacted in terms of having a 'laff', enjoying themselves and securing a form of independence. Such practices were set in opposition to those enacted by the 'ear'oles' who were prepared to
sit in class and 'sweat their bollocks off' (14). The 'lads' also considered themselves superior in terms of their sexual relationships with girls. Chatting up girls was perceived to be a practice which was tied to 'coming out of your shell' and 'losing your timidity', conceived of as rites of passage denied to the 'ear'oles' who were cast into feminised roles of passivity.

Moreover, Willis claims that the lads' resistance to staff at school and their ascendancy over the 'ear'oles' was also effected through their hairstyle, code of dress and engagement in practices such as smoking and drinking alcohol, all of which were tied to a wider system of commercial youth culture. In this way, he claims that they were able to differentiate themselves from the ear'oles in order to make themselves more personally attractive to the opposite sex. In this sense, Willis draws attention to the performative dimension of a stylised form of heterosexual masculinity which is marked out through its differentiation from other forms of masculinity attributed to the 'ear'oles' as passive school conformists.

Practices such as smoking and drinking alcohol for these boys, Willis argues, were associated with the adult working class world and were deployed as a form of resistance at school to institutionalised authority. Involvement in such practices, therefore, entailed cultural processes of differentiation which are explainable, according to Willis, in terms of 'a partial penetration of the really determining conditions of existence of the working class which are definitely superior to those official versions of their reality which are proffered through the school and various state agencies' (3). In other words, these boys establish a form of subjectivity which is articulated in terms of a superiority/inferiority binarism that is informed by cultural processes attributable to their class location (see Hindess, 1989).

What becomes identifiable here is a fundamental dialectical interplay between overarching capitalist social structures, which determine the conditions of existence for these working class boys, and the working class culture itself which penetrates the very forms of
subjectivity the latter establish and which contribute to their self-damnation at the hands of such ideological forces embodied in Western capitalism. It is in this sense that Willis' account is limited in using ideology as an explanatory trope to describe the relations between cultural practices and the effects of power relations in the formation of subjectivity for these working class boys. Moreover, he takes recourse in a general mechanism of determination to account for the techniques and strategies deployed by the boys as social actors in schools. Apparently, they are motivated to behave in anti-social ways as a consequence of a generalised set of interests and beliefs derived from their particular class location.

Willis also draws attention to practices of sexual objectification of women and racial discrimination against ethnic minority groups as instances of the 'lads' enacting an abusive form of heterosexual masculinity (see also Wood, 1984; Easthope, 1986; Holland, Ramazangulu & Sharpe, 1993). However, the formation of a particular 'tough' macho stylised demeanour, which is grounded in racialised and sexualised regimes of practice, is also accounted for in terms of patriarchal cultural processes tied to these boys' working class location. That is, Willis appeals to a working class consciousness as the site for the formation of a particular form of gendered subjectivity. Furthermore, he claims that it is due to such cultural processes, embedded in patriarchy, that a gendered oppositional frame is imposed on the division between mental and manual labour with the latter being deployed to assert an ascendant form of masculinity through its differentiation from the former as associated with femininity:

Manual labour is associated with the social superiority of masculinity, and mental labour with the social inferiority of femininity. In particular manual labour is imbued with a masculine tone and nature which renders it positively expressive of a more than its intrinsic focus in work.

Gender and mental/manual difference provide the atavistic divisions to be worked into contemporary concrete cultural forms and relationships, but it is only learning
that division is not always and automatically to its own disadvantage which prevents sectors of the working class from seeing division as oppression. For the lads, a division in which they take themselves to be favoured (the sexual) overlies, becomes part of, and finally partially changes the valency of a division in they are disadvantaged (mental/manual labour) (148).

Thus, Willis's theorisation of the cultural processes embedded in the 'lads' differentiation and valorisation of manual labour within gendered binary frames of reference is explained in terms of ideology. This is evident when he claims that they 'fail to see' or misrecognise the effects of taking up such positions which secure for them a disadvantaged status within a capitalist system that reinforces their subordination:

What is surprising is that a portion, including such as 'the lads', of those who make up the social whole are content to voluntarily take upon themselves the definition and consequent material outcomes of being manual labourers. This is surprising since in the capitalist mobilisation of the mental/manual distinction it is conventionally, and according to the dominant ideology, the mental labourers who have the legitimised right to superior material and cultural conditions ... the real mechanisms at play in the satisfaction of this need are covered over and mystified, and hidden from view ... Though it is usually misrecognised, one of the things which keeps the capitalist system stable, and is one of its complex wonders, is that an important section of the subordinate class do not accept the proffered reality of the steady diminution of their own capacities. Instead they reverse the valuation of the mental/manual gradient by which they are measured. The lads under study here prefer (for the moment), and affirm themselves through manual labour (148).

What drives the lads' investment in such forms of labour is explainable in terms of the effects of ideology and an appeal to the oppressive overarching structures of capitalism. Moreover, this theorisation is underscored by the notion of a working class consciousness which is imbued with the effects of ideology as manifested in the 'lads'
taking an active part in their own self-damnation. According to Willis, therefore, the lads, in rejecting the superior material and cultural conditions bestowed upon those who engage in mental labour, are caught in the snares of ideological processes and mechanisms which secure their subordinated class position.

Such a view of the mental/manual gendered divide is also used by Willis to account for the vilification of the 'ear'oles' who are regarded as effeminate and called names like 'cissies', 'pouf' and 'wanker' for investing in mental forms of labour. In this way, the 'lads' subjectivity is rendered analysable in terms of the conflation of a particular form of masculinity with manual work:

We see at least why the 'ear'oles' are likely to be regarded as effeminate and cissies by the lads, and why other names for the conformists include 'pouf' or 'poofter', or 'wanker. Despite their greater achievement and conventional hopes for the future, 'ear'oles' and their strategies can be ignored because the mode of their success can be discredited as passive, mental and lacking a robust masculinity (150).

While not disputing that the lads do indeed engage in practices of differentiation which involve the racialisation, sexualisation and feminisation of significant others against whom they define a particular form of masculinity, attention in this thesis is drawn to the limits of the cultural logics deployed by Willis and which informs his theorisation of such practices. His dialectical mode of theorisation is evident in the reconciliation that he achieves between social structural determinants and human agency by using a particular notion of culture as mediated via the consciousness of human subjects.

I suggest that cultural forms provide the materials towards, and the immediate context of, the construction of subjectivities and the confirmation of identity. It provides as it were the most believable and rewarding accounts for the individual, his future and especially for the expression of his/her vital energies. It seems to
'mark' and 'make sense' of things. I suggest in particular that the individual identity is importantly formed by culturally learned sense, and subjective inhabitation, of labour power, and, in the reverse moment, that cultural forms themselves, are importantly articulated, supported and organised by their members' distinctive sense of labour power and collective mode of effectivity in the world (173).

Thus for Willis, 'culture' is understood in terms of its capacity to mediate the 'symbolic power' of deterministic social structures which irrupts in the collective consciousness of individuals as a consequence of their class location, from which is derived a generalised set of interests and beliefs (see Hindess, 1989). It is in this sense that the mediation of culture via consciousness results in the reproduction of specific forms of labour power and subjectivity which maintain the status quo:

We need to understand how structures become sources of meaning and determinants of behaviour in the cultural milieu at its own level. Just because there are what we call structural and economic determinants it does not mean that people unproblematically obey them. In some societies people are forced at the end of a machine gun to behave in a certain way. In our own this is achieved through apparent freedoms. In order to have a satisfying explanation we need to see what the symbolic power of structural determination is within the mediating realm of the human and cultural. It is from the resources of this level that decisions are made which lead to uncoerced outcomes which have the function of maintaining the structure of society and the status quo. Although it is a simplification for our purposes here, and ignoring important forms and forces such as the state, ideology, and various institutions, we can say that macro determinants need to pass through the cultural milieu to reproduce themselves at all (171).

'Culture' for Willis, therefore, apparently functions as some kind of filter for mediating the effects of capitalist social structures in the lives of adolescent boys at a particular
working class school. However, such a theoretical approach to analysing the class
dynamics at play in these boys' construction of masculinity collapses into a familiar
dialectics involving the interplay of 'society' and 'culture'. This involves the reproduction
of oppressive social structures as enacted by individuals via a complex process of cultural
mediation and penetration of social processes which are effected at the symbolic level of
consciousness:

In the first place, outside structures and basic class relationships are taken in as
symbolic and conceptual relations at the specifically cultural level. The form of this,
I suggest, is of cultural (i.e. not centred on the individual or conscious practice)
penetrations of the conditions of existence of the social group who support the
culture. Structural determinations act, not by direct mechanical effect, but by
mediation through the cultural level where their own relationships become subject
to forms of exposure and explanation. In the second 'moment' of the process,
structures which have now become sources of meaning, definition and identity
provide the framework and basis for decisions and choices in life - in our liberal
democracy taken 'freely' - which taken systematically and in the aggregate over
large numbers actually helps to reproduce main structures and functions of society
(173-74).

Built into this logics, therefore, is a circularity in which subjectivity is conceptualised as
irrupting in a state of false consciousness in the symbolic space marked out by the
culturally mediated effects of social structures which in turn determine particular modes
of behaviour and actions that lead individuals to maintain those very social structures.
Attention is drawn here to the limits of Willis' theorisation of the class dynamics that are
implicated in the production of masculinities. In claiming that the 'lads' practices are
motivated by cultural forms which mediate the effects of capitalist patriarchy, Willis
invokes a putative working class consciousness to account for the formation of particular
modes of subjectification.
Legitimate or Illegitimate Inequality?

The research conducted by both Kessler et al (1985) and Connell (1989) into the class dynamics implicated in the production of masculinities is also circumscribed by a logics of 'cultural completion' in which specifiable social practices are framed as obstructing the 'full' development of students as human beings. In this sense, the school is conceptualised as failing to achieve a fundamental ideal or goal of social equality (Hunter, 1994a). For instance, such studies are concerned to target the impact of 'large scale structures' such as capitalism and patriarchy in terms of their capacity to impact upon the social practices of individuals and the formation of gendered subjectivity in schools:

First, we must find ways of talking about large scale structures without reifying them and about personal practices without losing their scale contexts (Kessler et al, 1985: 35).

Thus what is at play once again is the dialectical interplay between deterministic social structures and self-determining subject. Within such a frame, Kessler et al articulate a theory of practice in which class and gender are conceptualised as 'systems of social relations' that have particular histories (see also Connell, 1989):

Both class and gender are systems of social relations, not systems of categories. These relations have both histories on both the large and the small scale: they interweave to form characteristic situations. When we refer to ruling class families or to working class families, we are referring to a particular kind of situation, in which people develop the practices that are the focus of the following discussion (36).

It is within this framework that an analysis of the social practices of boys in schools is situated. While acknowledging the significance of such research in pointing to the very significant ways in which various forms of masculinity are enacted in schools within
normalising regimes of practice, this thesis points to the limitations of such studies in terms of their reliance on concepts of ideology and principles of complete development:

The central fact, perhaps the most important point our interviews have demonstrated, is that the complex of gender inequality and patriarchal ideology is not a smoothly functioning machine. It is a mass of tensions, contradictions, and complexities that always have the potential for change. While there is that potential, there is also possibility for constructive educative work (36).

Despite the fact that Kessler et al draw attention to a complex interplay of constantly shifting social practices and gender regimes in the formation of masculinities in schools, there is a sense that the school must somehow be held accountable for failing to achieve the principle of democratic self-realisation. While acknowledging the productive potentialities of the mobilisation of power (Foucault, 1978; 1982b), this thesis refuses to deploy a logics of cultural completion in which the expression of power is treated as originating in unequal economic relations and generalised structures of patriarchy traceable in all their various forms at the microanalytic level of social relations. As Hunter (1994a) argues, this is to appeal to a particular category of individual which is itself an effect of historically specific moral technologies and governmental apparatuses.

In the current literature dealing with gender reform (Blackmore & Kenway, 1993; Kenway, 1995; 1997; Kenway, Willis et al, 1997; Connell, 1994) schools, as instruments of capitalist patriarchy, are often conceptualised as distorting the interests and capacities of students who then become blinded to all that they can become. Thus, the historical arrangement of the school, as a purpose-built milieu for managing and governing populations, dependent on a range of contingent political technologies for the formation of quite specific attributes and capacities, becomes subordinated to the democratic principle of the self-reflective and self-realising moral agent (Hunter, 1994a: 16). Moreover, it is argued that such modes of theorising are a variant of a Marxian
analysis of schooling in which the school becomes a designated site both for transcending and resisting its role in the social reproduction of inequality (see Hunter, 1994a: 24).

This is most clearly brought out in Kessler et al's discussion of the curriculum as a site for the realisation of the democratic means for assisting students to achieve cultural completion:

We argue then, that what is good in equal opportunity programs has to be placed in a new context and in various ways given new aims. In broad terms, it is a question of directly addressing the issues that equal-opportunity strategies take for granted. The aims should be to empower subordinated groups, rather than give selective access to existing hierarchies: to democratise the curriculum by reorganising knowledge to advantage the disadvantaged; and to mobilise support for democratisation of the schools in relation to gender, as much as other power structures ... The academic curriculum also contains contradictions. The claim to universality that it makes - the attempt to embody the best in human culture is one of the admirable things about it - is plainly at odds with the way it functions to exclude the majority of students from full participation in the culture. That kind of contradiction gives teachers room to move (46) (my emphasis).

Hence, Kessler et al, in pledging themselves to 'culture', make a commitment to an ideal of complete human development by proposing the curriculum as a site both for the reproduction of social inequality and for realising the democratisation of subordinated social groups. It is in this capacity, as Hunter (1994d) argues, that cultural intellectuals 'disavow the socially selective role of modern school systems in the name of a higher universal image of human development' (6).

For cultural intellectuals it is this image that underpins the notion of human equality. It is because human beings share the potential for 'complete development'
that they must be treated as moral and political equals. To do otherwise is to
deprive them of access to that process of becoming that constitutes their humanity
or moral perfection. Cultural intellectuals thus disavow the processes of assessment
and social selection characteristic of modern education systems because these tie
formation to limited social norms and outcomes and hence lead to unequal moral
formation (6).

It is on this basis that the school is condemned as only partially approximating the image
of complete development, an image which is itself the product of a humanist ethical
practice. It is this disavowal of the normative basis for the development and delimitation
of human capacities and rights that is at the basis of charges laid against school systems
for failing to promote equal access to complete human development. What is ignored is
that individuals are ascribed quite limited and specific capacities as a means of achieving
definite administrative ends according to the assemblage of norms within apparatuses for
governing and managing populations:

Looked at from the culturalist end, the capacities and rights made available by
modern systems of school organisation can never be anything more than fragments
of the complete set promised by cultural development. Whether located at the
beginning of history in the organic society or at its end in a post-specialised one, it
is this image of complete development that provides the backdrop of human unity
against which modern dispositions of the person appear as fragmentary. Once,
however, this image has been returned to its rightful place - as a goal confined to
the secularised spiritual discipline of modern humanism - a different view emerges.
Seen from Marshall's perspective the capacities and rights created by modern social
systems represent important instruments for the social unification of previously
disparate modes of existence and social strata. According to Marshall, pre-
administrative societies are characterised by disjoint social strata whose
incommensurate ways of living give them the character of discrete 'islands' of
ethical, social and political existence (Hunter, 1994d: 7).

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However, what Hunter emphasises is that the development of apparatuses and technologies for administering populations according to a specifiable set of norms for governing the conduct of citizens, enabled the systematic distribution of capacities to be formed. It is in this sense that political technologies, as deployed within the disciplinary space of the school, enable certain norms to be internalised as a common standard of living.

It is anachronistic to call [pre-administrative societies] unequal for there is as yet no common standard of living against which inequalities might be registered. When such a standard does start to emerge it is not from a single general source or along a single line of historical development. Instead this happens in a piecemeal fashion as a result of the historical expansion of specific forms of social administration: the common-law system (civil rights); the parliamentary electoral system (political rights); the welfare system (social rights). It is these systems that penetrate the previously discrete islands of social existence, joining their inhabitants via the device of common rights and capacities, and creating the possibility for new kinds of equality and inequality to emerge against a backdrop of a common standard of living... individuals are ascribed standard rights and capacities as a means of achieving definite and limited administrative ends - to organise legal relations, distribute social welfare, and so on - it is clear that these lines will not meet in a single totalising form; indeed the different distributions and logics of rights will often cross-cut and contradict each other. The modern school system is no exception. It is meaningless, therefore, to expect such a system to promote equal access to complete set of human capacities or to condemn it for 'failing' to do so (Hunter, 1994d: 7-8).

Thus, modern school systems are conceptualised by Hunter (1994d), not as a site for transcending and resisting the reproduction of social inequalities, but rather as 'the instruments and artefacts of a particular type of administration' (8). To reinvest the notion
of culture in that of class, as do Kessler et al (1985) and Connell (1989), is to reduce the political structures and organisation of schooling systems to a single totalising form which is reducible to the expression of a subjectivity or consciousness as grounded in a fundamental dialectic of 'culture' and 'society' (see also Willis, 1977; Walker, 1988; Mac an Ghaill, 1994). Hunter (1994d), for instance, argues that the task for educating entire populations emerged not from 'the grand dialectic of culture and class but from the political and intellectual technologies of a new type of national government'. Foucault (1991a; 1993) has identified such forms of government in terms of systems of police, the deployment of social statistics and economic management which are framed by Hunter (1994a) as specific historical contingencies situated in various eighteenth and nineteenth century states.

Schooling systems, therefore, are not conceptualised as oppressive social structures established in the interest of capitalist patriarchy for reinforcing social inequalities. Rather, according to Hunter (1994a; 1994d: 9) the school functions legitimately as an administrative bureaucracy designed to train and select groups for specialised social and economic roles. He argues, through his genealogical investigation of the emergence of schooling systems in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that schools did not emerge in liberal-democratic states, but in absolutist German states in which administrative expertise was combined with pastoral management of populations (1994d: 9). He treats the school system as tied to preparing and training citizens to take up specialised social and economic roles as opposed to treating it as a partial or failed realisation of underlying principles of equality, democracy and liberty which cohere around the notion of the complete or ideal cultural formation of the human person:

As we have seen, it was these technologies - of political arithmetic, pastoral discipline, social statistics - that rendered the pedagogical formation of the population thinkable as an object of government. As autonomous technical faculties, with no necessary or organic home in consciousness or subjectivity, there is no reason to think that these intellectual technologies can or should be rendered
expressive of individuals ... the technical organisation of the school system means that social rights and capacities that it confers belong to a different sphere of reality and obey a different distributional logics ... The school system employs complex techniques of surveillance, care and training whose objective is to enable children to internalise specific norms of social deportment and scholastic performance (1994d:10).

Attention is drawn here to the norms around which particular systems of training, assessment and procedures for selection and differentiation are organised in schools as specific kinds of institutions. Moreover, in this way, it becomes possible to differentiate between what Hunter terms 'legitimately unequal' and 'illegitimate inequalities' in schools. Thus, by directing attention to the deployment in schools of quite complex techniques of surveillance, care and training, which enable individuals to internalise specific norms of social deportment, it is possible to theorise political practice, not in terms of a logics of 'cultural completion', but rather in developing strategies and techniques for adjusting specifiable norms. It is argued here that complex technologies of schooling are irreducible to their failure or partial attempt to democratise entire populations.

Despite the fact that both Kessler et al (1985) and Connell (1989) deploy such a logics in their research into the interplay of masculinities in school contexts, their focus on specific localised practices of adolescent boys in schools does lead to the establishment of certain criteria for judging what is to count as an instance of masculinity. For example, such studies, through their use of confessional techniques of interviewing, document the gender dynamics operating in working and ruling class schools. In one working class school, Kessler et al (1985) draw attention to the ways in which a particular macho model of masculinity is established and reinforced through the boys' resistance to authority. This is effected through enacting anti-social practices, such as smoking and drinking which supports claims made by Willis (1977) that many working class boys' perform their masculinities by adopting a defiant stance and rejecting the formal aims of education.
Kessler et al highlight the role of such a gender dynamics in their discussion of a girl, Heather, who engages in the very practices that enable the boys to enact a particular form of masculinity. For example, she swears, yells at teachers, is disruptive in class and actively involved in athletics - practices which have become identifiable as instances of masculinity (Coleman, 1990). However, it is argued that while boys' engagement in these practices enable them to enact a stylised form of hypermasculinity, demonstrated in terms of a 'don't-push-me-around' attitude, Heather's engagement in the same practices constitutes a violation of conventional femininity (37). This is important because it highlights the extent to which a gender regime is operationalised in schools, as a specific localised social site, in terms of marking out boundaries and norms for designating sex-appropriate conduct (see Connell, 1994).

Attention is also drawn to the role of sport as an active marker of masculinity in ruling-class schools (Messner & Sabo, 1990; Kidd, 1990; Whitson, 1990; Daly, 1996). Kessler et al. highlight that engaging in sports such as football was one of the major ways in which boys were able to enact a particular model of masculinity based on relentless competitiveness, toughness and endurance. Moreover, they indicate that it was through such practices that the school celebrated and endorsed such a model of masculinity. What is particularly significant about the study is that it draws attention to a hierarchy of masculinities, along the same lines as Willis, in which those boys who chose not to engage in the masculinising practice of football were relegated a subordinate status. These boys, like 'the ear'oles' in Willis's study, were used by the 'footballers' to differentiate and celebrate a desirable macho masculinity. This was achieved through practices of labelling those boys who preferred non-violent games or study as 'Cyrils', a term used to designate their effeminacy.

What is significant about this study is that it emphasises how boys engage in a set of practices in which a particular gender regime is imbricated. The role of institutional practices, peer group relations and figures such as teachers and parents in arbitrating
among different types of masculinity in school is also indicated. It is in this sense that such studies contribute to a theorisation of masculinities as an outcome of a regime of practices which 'take hold of bodies', installing various differentiated capacities on the basis of reproductive differences:

In the process of growing up - and this is very clearly shown in the experience of puberty - the bodily process becomes an object of social practice. The social relations of gender become embodied, quite literally, in the construction of masculinity and femininity. The gender regime of a high school is not an expression of sexual biology so much as a social means of dealing with it (Kessler et al, 1985: 44).

It is in this sense, that despite being underpinned by a logics of cultural completion, Kessler et al and Connell conceptualise gender as enacted in a space occupied by ensembles of institutions, practices and knowledges that involve specific modalities of power:

Gender is a complex social structure, not a simple one. It involves a range of institutions, from the family to the state, together with their interactions. It involves different levels of personality, a very wide range of types of social interaction, and it produces a complex differentiation of people around axes of masculinity and femininity. Even apparently very simple examples of conventional masculinity and femininity prove to be underpinned by a complicated network of social practices (44).

Masculinities, therefore, are designated as regimes of practice whose effects are produced in bodies, behaviours and social relations as a consequence of differential skills, capacities and modes of thinking attributed on the basis of biological differences between males and females (see Moon, 1993: 27). Thus, in this thesis, the focus is on examining the differential allocation and distribution of capacities on the basis of gender in these
terms within specific departments of social existence such as school systems (see also Connell, 1989).

**Freedom versus Determination: The limits of Walker's Study**

Walker (1988) also studies the interplay of masculinities in an urban working-class boys' high school. He identifies four friendship groups - 'the footballers', 'the Greeks', 'the three friends' and 'the handballers' - and documents the dynamics of social relations both between and within each of these groups. Attention is drawn to the role that sport, ethnicity, social class and a sex/gender system have to play in the way these boys learn to enact particular stylised forms of masculinity. Once again, one of the effects of such ethnographic studies is to establish the criteria for identifying specifiable instances of what is to count as masculinity (Coleman, 1990). What is significant about the collective process of gender construction, as documented by Walker, is that a particular ascendant form of masculinity was imbricated in a set of normalising peer group relations through which many of the boys strived for the admiration of their friends. In fact, for boys belonging to the 'footballer' group and the 'Greeks', sport was the touchstone for establishing a particular form of heterosexual masculinity grounded in a social dynamic in which sexuality was often deployed as a means of policing and regulating conduct. However, the 'footballer' group is presented as dominant in the sense that it set the 'cultural agenda' by which the 'Greeks', who were also considered powerful, could achieve the status of a 'legend' (29). For instance, being a member of the 'football' group entailed the valorisation, celebration and differentiation of rugby from other sports such as Australian rules and soccer. Also other practices of differentiation involved stigmatising those they considered inferior in masculine terms as 'poofs' and those in ethnic or racial terms as 'wogs', 'chows' or 'coons' (see also Willis, 1977). However, Walker makes the point that such homophobic and racialised practices were not only confined to the 'footballers'. They marked common ground on which a sex/gender system was operationalised by many of the boys from disparate groups for establishing a certain type of heterosexual masculinity (see Connell, 1994).
Despite the usefulness of Walker's research for helping to establish criteria by which to define particular instances of masculinity, his theorisation of the interplay of masculinities is informed by a now familiar cultural logic that is organised around an imperative to reconcile a structure versus agency dialectic:

... the formal, institutionalised power and authority structures of schools mirror the structures of society at large, particularly its economic institutions, no matter how much some teachers might try to be 'progressive' in curricula and teaching. The result, it is said, is that the social relations of each school, in some sense, 'correspond to' society's economic structure and so our school system produces individuals ready fitted to the world of work and adult life. This view, however, seems to leave out the many informal practices and relationships which develop in schools, the personal plans, values, and capacities to choose, which individuals, especially pupils, bring to school, and the conflicts and contests which arise between them, perhaps especially between pupils and teachers. We should not ignore the freedom of individuals to accept or reject, for their own reasons, what schools have to offer or even what they try to enforce (4-5) (my emphasis).

What is at play here is the dialectical interplay of the school as social structure and the student as social actor. Walker appears to be invoking the self-determining subject, who is pitted against the institutionalised structures of the school, as a site for the development of an emancipatory practice. A critical frame is used which has built into it the requirement to reconcile the oppositional concepts of determination and freedom. Hunter (1994a) claims that such theorisations of the relation between social reproduction and social resistance are at the basis of most Marxian analyses of schooling (see Giroux & McLaren, 1989):
The social process on which Marxian analysis bases its theory of schooling - the relation between social reproduction and social resistance - thus looks surprisingly like the dynamic between moral formation and free insight that we found at the heart of liberalism's theory of 'democratic education' ... The imperative to reconcile and transcend the reproductive function of the school and its role as a site of resistance has produced a proliferation of 'fundamental principles. Such is the 'becoming by acting' principle ... which is supposed capable of integrating 'learning (human development) and choosing (human freedom)'. This is also the imperative lying behind projections of 'organic working-class schools'. But we can treat the recently formulated emancipatory authority as typical ... emancipatory authority enables teachers to function as experts who can restructure the school system by penetrating its ideological function, while simultaneously serving as the democratic representatives of their students (24).

Such a form of logic, it is argued here, is traceable in the work of Walker who claims that the school system needs to be restructured so that the freedom and power of students to choose can be enhanced:

...that morally acceptable and practically effective schooling must be directed towards enhancing the freedom and power of pupils to make personally fulfilling and socially beneficial choices about how to live their lives, and that if education is to contribute to social change it will be through taking this direction (156).

Furthermore, Walker reiterates the need for educators and policy makers to engage in a form of 'intercultural articulation' with students. By this he means engaging in a type of dialogue where teacher and student cultures meet. In this way, Walker argues that learning and respecting 'the discourse of the pupil cultures' may form the basis for the elaboration of such an emancipatory practice in which the rights of the self-determining individual can be protected:
An overriding issue for educational philosophy and policy is the determination of equity of opportunity and outcome in actual, concrete conditions of choice. This requires recognition that the relevant choices are *cultural*. Individuals cannot simply be severed from their cultures, though they can change. Unless cultures are running against the common interest of community, which includes the protection of the rights of individuals within the community, individuals may choose options lower as well as higher in the socioeconomic scale. These may or may not be best for them, but it is up to them, not educators or policy makers, to judge what is good for them. Individual students should be treated as responsible and autonomous individuals and their development as such, given their cultural circumstances, is a fundamental principle, to be overridden only by education for the common good. A fundamental value for the individual, given the common good qualification, is to be able and be in a position to judge for him or herself (169-170).

Here Walker provides an exemplary instance of what Mellor and Patterson (1994) identify as tension resulting from the opposition of normativity (which is denied) to freedom. In clearly advocating the need for students, as 'autonomous individuals', to freely choose and for teachers to engage in a form of critical pedagogy which will guarantee such a promise of freedom, Walker's position is grounded in what appear to be claims to non-normativity. On the one hand, he appears to be insisting on the requirement to transform curricula and social relations in schools so that a space will be cleared for rendering students capable of exercising their capacity for decision-making according to the cultural ideal of a 'full democracy'. On the other, he claims that such an emancipatory practice must not 'override the common interest of the community' or the 'protection of the rights of individuals'. Students' learning and active decision-making thus are located *outside* of the effects of government and specific forms of training (see Patterson, 1996). In fact, Walker's theorisation of subjectivity is underscored by the dialectical interplay of 'moral formation' and 'free insight', which is tied to an ethical practice found at the heart
of liberalism's theory of 'democratic education' (see Hunter, 1994a: 24). However, he is not unaware of the possible contradictions of such a position:

Given cultural specificity and individual autonomy, 'equality of outcome' or even 'equality of opportunity' remain rather hollow slogans unless translated into concrete options expanding freedom and power. A better basis for policy and practice would be to apply the criterion: what, consistent with the common good, maximises the opportunity for these pupils to determine their own destinies? What options can be made available to them given the problems they presently face, as they see them and in line of development from their currently understood options? (170).

Walker, here demonstrates the use of a mode of theorisation which posits a general relation between subject and society, freedom and determination, power and self-determination, moral formation and free insight and invokes the student as a self-realising moral agent (see Hunter, 1993b: 130). In a bid to escape claims of normativity, he advocates a practice which will permit students the freedom to 'determine their own destinies', while allowing authority structures and institutionalised power to re-appear in the more benign form of the 'common good' in order to guarantee 'free' democratic outcomes.

Walker thus provides a powerful example of a now familiar oscillation of two sides of an opposition which are not so much critiqued as transformed and rehabilitated. Firstly, formal institutional power and authority structures are critiqued as restrictions on individuals' inherent rights and freedoms. Students' rights to free choice and self-determination are advocated. But then, however, the possibility that individual freedoms may be taken too far or in the wrong direction is entertained - and the other side of the equation is critiqued. Hence, authority, in its bad form as 'institutional power', is elided and reappears in a more benign form as 'the common good' (a concept which is left curiously unexamined) to temper possible excesses of freedom. The 'common good' is
presented as an a-historical, a-cultural concept, the expression, it seems, of collective freely-chosen, individual wills, thus escaping charges of normativity or any suggestion of authority or power. In short, each side of the agency versus structure (or freedom versus authority) opposition is tormented - the dangers of both authority and freedom acknowledged - then rehabilitated allowing authority and freedom to reappear in the guises of the 'common good' and the democratic agent.

Within such dialectical frames the formation of subjectivity becomes tied to general cultural processes which rely on explanatory tropes such as discourse and ideology:

A culture includes the dispositions to produce all kinds and all items of characteristic behaviour: verbal and other symbolic practices, embracing 'style'; the manner of participation in organised or semi-organised activity such as games, school classes, and 'nights out', whether or not the group 'creates' the basic pattern of activity in the first place; and the whole range of ways in which members of that group respond to each other - 'insiders' - and to others - 'outsiders'. Thus 'culture' is an inclusive term: it embraces the economic, the ideological, the kinship, the recreational - all aspects of a group's way of life. Unlike many other writers, I do not contrast culture with ideology, or with economy, for instance (Walker, 1988: 30-31).

The complex interplay of social practices involving adolescent boys enacting particular masculinities, therefore, is reduced to a general mechanism of subject formation which is grounded in 'culture'. It is such a conceptualisation of culture, as synonymous with ideology, that leads Walker to posit that individual social actors draw on discourses made available to them in their culture. In this way, he argues that the assumptions informing a set of behavioural dispositions become welded into a set of materialist and symbolic practices through which social actors learn to establish their identities:
Putting it another way, practices are informed by the assumptions, or working hypotheses, of the group. The group members may, or may not all, be aware of these. The disposition to insult someone by calling them a 'wog' or a 'slanthead', for instance, may be associated with the hypothesis that person is a threat to oneself or one's group. The disposition to compete vigorously in sport may be the result of a particular view of oneself. The disposition to feel revulsion at certain forms of sexual behaviour, real or imagined, may be a function of an implicit conception of masculinity which is hypothesised to be essential, stable, predictable, satisfying relations between people. The disposition to associate, in particular, special ways with a group called 'friends' may be explained by a person's hypothesis that his or her happiness and best interests are well served by that association. When that person places him or herself in a relation to friends and others wherein they act collectively in these and other ways, such views and dispositions are welded into a culture, and action within the group into a set of cultural practices. Members of a cultural group have mastered the discourses of the culture and can locate their personal identities and careers within it; they have become competent in *intracultural articulation* in both senses of 'articulation' able to *communicate* with other members and join their actions to those of others (33).

Hence, Walker's theorisation of collective assumptions informing specific practices and dispositions of certain social groups is grounded in a concept of 'culture' which irrupts in consciousness. And this, apparently, forms the basis for welding such assumptions into a materialist set of practices in which 'masculinity' emerges as a specifiable disposition on certain occasions. Thus culture, as mediated via consciousness, becomes the site for both the formation and the determination of specific subjectivities and, it is in this capacity, that Walker's theorisation of the interplay of masculinities collapses into a fundamental dialectic that is caught up in a problematic circularity.
A Further Critique of Schools As Oppressive Social Structures

Askew and Ross (1988) also offer a theorisation of 'masculinity' which invokes a general mechanism of determination located in oppressive social structures from which boys in schools need to be freed. For instance, they argue that boys and men are 'victims of their socialisation' and that school structures lead to the reproduction of certain oppressive forms of masculinity which perpetrate a type of sexism which impacts upon both boys and girls:

It may seem a contradiction to talk about addressing sexism in boys' schools. However, boyhood is the induction period into manhood. Boys themselves are victims of their socialisation and experience difficulties from the pressures they are put under to prove their masculinity and hide their vulnerability. As adult men it is true in one sense that they are still victims of their socialisation ... It is not our intention in this book to identify boys as 'the problem': rather our aim is to locate boys' behaviour within the context of the social structure. We feel strongly that unless the social structure changes the power relationships between people in terms of race, class and gender will not change (xi).

Thus for Askew and Ross masculinity is conceptualised as an oppressive structure from which boys need to be liberated. They treat the exercise of power in terms of a totalising force which imposes its will in an act of violence. It is a form of power, as Foucault (1982b) argues, that is rendered analysable in terms of 'a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions' (220).

Askew and Ross, thus, invoke a general mechanism of power to account for the role of schooling in the reproduction of oppressive forms of masculinity. This leads them to adopt what Gilbert and Gilbert (1995) term 'the group indicator approach' which is based on defining a designated group, such as boys or girls, according to a single criterion. In this way, the effect of the ideology critique, undertaken by Askew and Ross, is to
homogenise boys as a particular group and to treat power as emanating from a sovereign source through socialisation practices which impose oppressive forms of masculinity on all boys in schools.

There is also a sense in their work that such forms of power operate consistently across all social situations and on all social occasions in terms of the ways in which boys are socialised. For instance, they make the claim that 'much of the behaviour described as 'masculine' is learned (as opposed to being innate) and reinforced by stereotyped ideas about what it means to be male in this society' (5). Thus, boys are encouraged to behave aggressively and to prove that they are tough in order to gain approval from their peers as a result of the effects of socialisation practices. It is the impact of such oppressive stereotypes and sexism, Askew and Ross argue, which prevent men from realising their full potential. Hence, their theorisation of masculinity is underscored by a logics of cultural completion:

Metcalf and Humphries (1985) observe that 'traditionally men have been quite at ease spouting off on any subject under the sun except one: themselves'. We do not regard men as being oppressed by sexism, but we do acknowledge that they may be prevented from reaching their full human potential because of it (14) (my emphasis).

However, while schools are treated as sites for reproducing oppressive stereotypes and forms of sexism, they are also conceptualised as sites for resisting and transcending the effects of such regimes:

As one male teacher put it: 'It is no good saying society makes men behave like that towards women. Men allow themselves to be kept in that role'. We shouldn't deny our ability to change this. Male teachers particularly need to help boys by offering them another model as a way of being and behaving (13).
Thus, Askew and Ross's theorisation of the impact of schooling on the formation of masculinities is informed, as Hunter (1994a) reiterates, by 'the imperative to reconcile and transcend the reproductive function of the school and its role as a site for resistance' (24). However, such a position relies on advocating the moral conversion of the responsible and self-determining subject to be effected through the emancipatory authority of teachers.

Overall, Askew and Ross's position, it is argued here, is grounded in a problematic and dialectical theorisation of the formation of masculinities as situated in socialisation practices which are perpetuated through schools as agents of a wider socio-economic system:

Schools are society in microcosm. Their purpose is to perpetuate the values and ideologies dominant in society, and they are organised to achieve this. These values and ideologies are those of the white, middle-class male. Boys learn to identify with the dominant group and its belief system which rewards achievement in competitive and individualistic, rather than collaborative, collective terms (106).

Askew and Ross appeal to a general mechanism of power to account for the impact of schooling on the formation of masculinities. Moreover, it is within the framework of such a cultural critique that they invoke a fundamental binarism involving the interplay between a series of oppositional categories such as authority and agency, oppressive power and oppositional politics, state-determining subject and self-determining subject. In this way, they elaborate a particular conceptualisation of agency which is linked to freedom from the ideological constraints of institutionalised discourses. What is ignored are the historically specific contingencies of the deployment of particular regulatory technologies of surveillance and techniques of the self formed within apparatuses for the formation of specifiable cultural attributes. Instead, Askew and Ross, like Walker, reduce the political dimension of culture to the effects of ideology embedded in generalised social structures of self-determination.
Mac an Ghaill's (1994) research into the impact of schooling on the formation of masculinities is also underscored by a particular mode of rationality that is governed by an imperative to reconcile the opposite poles of deterministic social structures and self-determining subject. He deploys a notion of subjectivity that draws on poststructuralist and psychoanalytic critiques of the unitary subject (see Weedon, 1987; Henriques et al, 1984). For instance, he rejects sex-role socialisation theories for their failure to 'explain the complex social and psychological processes involved in the development of gendered subjectivities' (8). Furthermore, he argues that:

... schools are sites of historically varying contradictions, ambiguities and tensions. This is most evident in relation to sex/gender social relations. Schools function to prepare students for the sexual division of labour in the home and the workplace. Furthermore, schools do not merely reflect the dominant sexual ideology of the wider society, but actively produce gender and heterosexual divisions. At the same time, schooling may be a potential significant public site that enables individual young people to achieve a degree of social mobility in the labour market and the development of non-traditional gender identities (8-9).

He proceeds to criticise sex-role theory for its failure to incorporate a more dynamic perspective on the formation of gendered subjectivity in schools (see Carrigan et al, 1987) which he see 'as active makers of a range of femininities and masculinities' (Mac an Ghaill, 1994: 8-9). Thus, in claiming that schools do not merely lead to the reproduction of certain forms of gendered subjectivity, Mac an Ghaill argues for a theoretical approach which is able to explain the contradictory ways in which 'fragile constructions' of heterosexual masculinity 'become represented as apparently stable' identity formations in schools (9). It is in this sense that his theorisation of masculinity is informed by a fundamental principle of misrecognition in which ideology functions as a mask, presenting the illusion of a seemingly coherent, stable identity. However, while
Mac an Ghaill argues that institutions attempt to reinforce such a misrecognition in terms of the ways in which they reify unstable sex/gender categories, his theorisation of masculinities assumes a putative consciousness through which culture is mediated, negotiated and manifested by students in schools:

I became interested in the constitutive cultural elements of dominant modes of heterosexual subjectivity that informed male students' learning to act like men within the school arena. These elements consisted of contradictory forms of compulsory heterosexuality, misogyny and homophobia, and were marked by contextual contingency and ambivalence. It is argued in this book that male heterosexual identity is a highly fragile socially constructed phenomenon. The question that emerges here is: How does this fragile construction become represented as an apparently stable, unitary category with fixed meanings? It is suggested that schools alongside other institutions attempt to administer, regulate and reify unstable sex/gender categories. Most particularly, this administration, regulation and reification of sex/gender boundaries is institutionalised through the interrelated material, social and discursive practices of staffroom, classroom and playground microcultures...In shifting from sex-roles to the deconstruction of sex/gender identities, we need to examine the concept of power in relation to social structures and subjectivity (9-10).

In arguing that sex/gender boundaries are institutionalised in such a way that identity is misrecognised as fixed, Mac an Ghaill uses poststructuralist theory to enable him to effect a reconciliation between deterministic social structures and the self-determining subject. In claiming that subjectivity is contradictory and not fixed by deterministic and oppressive social structures, a basis for arguing that the subject can reconstitute himself through discourse is established. It is in this sense that Mac an Ghaill's approach is informed by a deconstructivist interpretive analytics which is grounded in an appeal to the notion of ideology as the basis for explaining the links between the cultural practices of subjectification and relations of power. Hence, in following Epstein, he adopts an
approach which requires analysing boys' positioning within contradictory discourses as the basis for understanding the 'contextual specificity of young heterosexual males learning to be men within a school arena' (11):

Of particular importance here is [Foucault's] work on discourses and discursive practices. As Epstein (1993: 10) makes clear in her recent study on changing classroom cultures:

We are positioned in various discourses as well as taking up positions ourselves. For example, we identify ourselves as heterosexual, lesbian or gay and could not do so if categorising discourses of sexuality did not exist. In this limited sense, we can be said to be 'produced' by discourses and discursive practices.

(Mac an Ghaill, 1994: 11)

This position, which is tied to a fundamental dialectical theorisation of subjectivity, shifts between the oscillating poles of determining social structures and the self-realising subject and in so doing 'enters into a relation of circular causality' (Hunter, 1984a: 415). In other words, what informs Mac an Ghaill's attempt to elaborate an emancipatory practice is a reconciliation of the oppositional categories of determination and freedom through a recognition of the possibility that the subject can determine himself once an alternative set of discourses is made available to him/her within a particular institutional site.

What is significant about Mac an Ghaill's position is that, despite his rejection of totalising deterministic social structures posited by sex role theories of socialisation, he is unable to escape invoking an hermeneutic principle which leads him to trace meaning back to the transcendental subject or to the everyday practices of the social actor. In other words, his theorisation of masculinities within the context of elaborating an emancipatory practice is ultimately grounded in the 'meaning-giving' subject. It is in this sense that he appeals to a putative consciousness in grounding intentionality in the meaning-giving
subject. This is emphasised in terms of his premise that despite the fact that certain limits
are imposed on the formation of subjectivities through the institutionalisation and
reification of sex/gender categories, there is still the possibility for individuals to escape
bipolar gendered ascriptions and heterosexist terms of reference embedded in institutional
regimes:

There is danger in examining the schooling of young gays that by implicitly
adopting a passive concept of subject positioning, the account is over-deterministic
(Walker dine, 1990). As indicated above, the isolation of students at school from
other gays precluded them from adopting collective coping and survival strategies
of sub-cultural affirmation and resistance. However, there is evidence from the
young men of the development of creative strategies that served to challenge the
ascendancy of heterosexism and homophobia (167).

This invoking of the hermeneutic subject who is not entirely powerless against the
oppressive regimes of compulsory heterosexuality and homophobia is situated within a
deconstructive analytic framework in which a shift is effected from 'simple concepts of
power to the complexity of the politics of difference' (171-172):

Young people are active makers of sex/gender identities. A major flaw in much
equal opportunities work, exemplified in the 'positive images approach', has been
a failure to conceptualise the complexity of student identity formation. In this
process, schools can be seen as crucial cultural sites in which material, ideological
and discursive resources serve to affirm hegemonic masculinity, while producing a
range of masculine subject positions that young men come to inhabit (179).

Thus, Mac an Ghaill refuses to adopt a view of students as merely passive victims of
deterministic institutionalised regimes of power. However, he draws on psychoanalytic
concepts of the subconscious, within the limits imposed by poststructuralism, to
understand how institutionalised regimes impact on social actors. For instance, the mechanism of homophobia is understood in the following terms:

Alongside heterosexual male students' practices of compulsory heterosexuality and misogyny, many of them displayed virulent public modes of homophobia. In trying to understand what was going on here, I found Rutherford's (1990) analysis useful. Drawing on the work of Derrida, Rutherford describes the inner logic of the psychic relations of domination:

Binarism operates in the same way as splitting and projection: the centre expels its anxieties, contradictions and irrationalities onto the subordinate term, filling it with the antithesis of its own identity; the Other, in its very alienness, simply mirrors and represents what is deeply familiar to the centre, but projected outside of itself. It is in these processes and representations of marginality that the violence, antagonisms and aversions of the dominant discourses and identities become manifest - racism, homophobia, misogyny and class contempt are the products of this frontier.

(Mac an Ghaill, 1994: 94)

In appropriating Rutherford (1990), Mac an Ghaill conceptualises racist, sexist and classist practices in terms of the irruption of a violence in consciousness which is projected outwards. Rutherford thus is deployed by Mac an Ghaill to present homophobic practices as manifestations of the repressed underside of 'hegemonic heterosexual masculinity'. Thus, homophobia is reduced to the effects of repressive mechanisms that are explained in terms of an 'inner logic' and defensive strategies which are operationalised at the level of psychic and symbolic relations beneath conscious levels of awareness. Such practices, therefore, are understood in terms of the individual expelling what he despises about himself and projecting this self-loathing onto those who mirror and reflect what he refuses to acknowledge about himself. In fact, Mac an Ghaill
argues that homophobic violence is an effect of 'expelling femininity and homosexuality from within themselves' (90). Moreover, such forms of violence apparently are linked to the impact of dominant discourses which are mediated via such repressive psychic relations beneath the level of conscious awareness. However, because such poststructuralist positions are predicated on the imperative to seek within discourse itself a consciousness which is buried and can be revived through a particular mode of deconstructive analysis, Mac an Ghaill posits student perspectives on schooling as the basis for developing an emancipatory curriculum that accommodates the knowledges and experiences of oppressed groups:

Exaggerating student perspectives of schooling can provide teachers, researchers and policy makers with fresh insights into how the curriculum is differentially experienced by different social groups. Furthermore, oppressed groups are in specific material and social locations within schools and colleges from which they can highlight the hidden dynamics that are of central significance to the wider concerns of state schooling (179-180).

Thus, he argues for an emancipatory curriculum in which issues that are central to students' concerns can be targeted within the context of democratising teacher-student relations (see also Walker, 1988; Freire & Shor, 1987). While not refusing Mac an Ghaill's advocacy of the development of such curriculum practices, this thesis rejects framing such initiatives in terms which rely on the principles of emancipation. Rather, attention is drawn to the need to target quite specific norms whose effectivity for achieving particular outcomes, in terms of developing a relevant curriculum for young people in schools, can only be satisfactorily achieved within the context of governmental apparatuses of policy formulation and administrative frameworks. While Mac an Ghaill does acknowledge the role of policy makers, his position is marked by the limits of the poststructuralist frames he uses for understanding the impact of schooling on the formation of masculinities. Such poststructuralist positions are underscored by a characteristic mode of rationality in which the imperative to reconcile the oppositional
poles of determination and freedom is built into the elaboration of an emancipatory practice grounded in an oppositional politics.

Despite these challenges to Mac an Ghaill's theoretical position, his focus on the microcultural level of schooling practices, it is argued here, does provide further examples of what is to count as an instance of masculinity (see Walker, 1988; Kessler et al, 1985; Connell, 1989; Willis, 1977). For example, he provides a typology of masculinities in a working-class school in the United Kingdom. In this way, he is able to explore the interplay of ascendant and subordinated forms of masculinity in this particular institutional site. He categorises groups of boys in terms of (i) Macho Lads (academic 'failures'); (ii) Academic Achievers (academic 'successes'); (iii) Working-Class New Enterprises; (iv) Middle-Class Real Englishmen. In fact, he claims that he is using such categories as 'heuristic devices' for highlighting 'the range of masculinities produced in Parnell school' (54). What is particularly noteworthy about Mac an Ghaill's study is the attention he draws to the role that sexuality, gender, a particular class dynamics and racialised hierarchies play in structuring particular modes of relating for adolescent boys at this particular school (see also Frank, 1990; 1993; Epstein, 1994; 1997; Nayak & Kehily, 1996; Kehily & Nayak, 1997; Butler, 1996; Ward, 1995; McLean, 1996; Measor, Tiffin & Fry, 1996; Fitzclarence, Hickey & Mathews, 1997; Willis, 1977; Kimmel & Messner, 1989; Berger et al, 1995; Fung, 1995; Majors, 1989; Luke, 1997; Segal, 1990; Mercer & Julien, 1988; Westwood, 1990; Hearn & Morgan, 1990; Hearn & Collinson, 1994; Cornwall & Lindisfarne; 1994).

In fact, while drawing attention to the imbrication of gender regimes in a specific class dynamics, Mac an Ghaill's study is particularly useful because it directs attention to the racialised context of student inter-ethnic relations at Parnell school. However, he argues that:

... there was no fixed pattern of white or black inter-ethnic response in the different year groups. Rather, different student sub-groups assigned high status to particular
individuals or peer groups in which different hierarchies of masculinity were competitively negotiated and acted out (86).

Mac an Ghaill claims that English born Asian 'Macho lads' were involved in racist abuse directed at year seven students who had recently arrived from Pakistan. Thus, he emphasises that inter-ethnic relations are implicated in a wider set of social practices involving 'race-specific elements' and particular sex/gender regimes. For example, the white 'Macho Lads' tended to identify strongly with the Asian and African Carribbean 'Macho Lads'. For both groups of boys, sexual prowess and success with women served as a marker of a publicly validated form of masculinity (see also Parker, 1992; 1996). Moreover, Mac an Ghaill highlights that such registers of masculinity were defined in opposition to white and black conformist students who were publicly derided on the basis that they were sexually inexperienced. However, the white 'Macho Lads' disapproved of African Carribbean 'Macho Lads' going out with white girls. They perceived this as illegitimate and, hence, white girls who were seen with the latter risked being stigmatised and labelled as 'slags'. Similarly, the African Carribbean 'Macho Lads', who perceived themselves to be sexually superior, also expressed criticism of the White Macho Lads' demonstration of heterosexuality. They saw themselves as producing a particular form of heterosexual masculinity which, Mac an Ghaill claims, led to 'the highly exaggerated ascription to the black Macho Lads of stylish resistance, sporting skills and 'having a reputation with the girls'' (87) (see also Majors, 1989).

What is particularly useful about Mac an Ghaill's study is that he maps a typology of masculinities in terms of defining key processes involved in the policing and maintenance of sex/gender boundaries for adolescent boys in a particular school (see also Nayak & Kehiley, 1996; Epstein, 1997; Dixon, 1997; Frank, 1993; Steinberg, Epstein & Johnson, 1997; Haywood, 1993). He draws attention to the role of homophobia and the learning of sex/gender codes in which forms of masculinity are defined through processes of disassociation from femininity and an imputed homosexuality. Moreover, he highlights
the peer group dynamics and relations which are built on the imperative for adolescent boys to demonstrate a heterosexual masculinity.

While highlighting the role of peer group networks as cultural sites for the formation of adolescent masculinities in which compulsory heterosexuality, misogyny and homophobia have a part to play, Mac an Ghaill, also indicates that many of the boys expressed a great deal of loneliness and confusion in terms of their relationships with their friends. They talked about how they experienced difficulty in communicating personal feelings with each other as a result of learning to hide what they felt from others. In fact, Mac an Ghaill claims that there appeared to be no safe space for the boys to talk about what they felt which, he suggests is linked to the policing and regulation of sex/gender boundaries. He appears to imply that boys' 'emotional illiteracy' is related to the effects of a sex/gender regime in which learning to express emotion is considered to be sex-inappropriate. Overall, his study is important and useful in that it emphasises the extent to which those boys, who step outside of the normative boundaries marked out for defining acceptable masculinity, are stigmatised and labelled as effeminate or 'poofs' within a regime of practices in which homophobia, misogyny and compulsory heterosexuality are imbricated.

'Fighting Boys' and Fantasy Play

While drawing on poststructuralist theory in much the same way as Mac an Ghaill, Jordan (1995a, 1995b) also describes a regime of practices in which boys learn to establish their masculinities through processes of differentiation and disassociation from anything that counts as femininity. She conducts a study into boys' fantasy play in early schooling and demonstrates that many boys tend to establish a machismo masculinity through their positioning within what she terms a 'warrior discourse'. In other words, many of the macho boys who come to be known as the 'fighting boys' identify with the 'hero' during their fantasy play which is dependent on a corresponding rejection of other characters who are defined as weak or considered to be cowards and against whom a particular form
of masculinity is defined. While this kind of scenario is operative at the level of fantasy play, Jordan argues, however, that it is also played out in 'real life' at school where a hierarchy of ascendant and subordinated masculinities is established (see Connell, 1989; Kessler et al, 1985). The school becomes 'the evil antagonist' against which the hero fights in order to establish a desirable masculinity, with those boys who conform to school standards being typecast as the cowards, the 'wimps' or 'sissies'. Thus, resistance to authority becomes a marker of a 'hegemonic' form of masculinity which is pitted against those boys who conform to the school rules. However, those boys who miss out in this jockeying for the status of a 'warrior' masculinity, Jordan claims, are still able to take up a position or definition of masculinity as 'not female', but do so within different frames of reference. For instance, the conformists, it is argued, define their masculinity against those boys who are considered to be sissies in the sense that the latter are identified with any activity that is associated exclusively with girls.

While usefully drawing attention to the interplay of masculinities within a gender regime of shifting practices in which a definition of masculinity as 'not female' is operationalised for two different groups of boys in the early years of school, Jordan appeals to a general principle of discourse as the basis for explaining the formation of subjectivity:

We must accept that a gender identity is adopted very early and remains for most people stable throughout life, whereas its meaning evolves more slowly through what recent post-structuralist theorists of gender describe as the negotiation of gender discourses and practices (Davies, 1989b, pp. 237-238; Walkerdine, 1990, p. xiii; Thorne, 1990, pp. 110-113). These discourses and practices provide the context in which individuals construct definitions of appropriate gender behaviour, definitions that develop and change throughout the individual's life. Children thus come to school knowing that they are girls or boys and with a strong commitment to being members of a gender group and a potential antagonism towards the other group. On the other hand, they have only a very hazy impression of what sort of
behaviour that membership demands of them, and are still looking to adults and peers to clarify the question (Jordan, 1995a: 73).

Thus in arguing, from a poststructuralist position, that 'gender is not imposed on children but constructed by them in interaction with one another', Jordan's theorisation of gendered subjectivity is conducted using a dialectical mode of inquiry which has built into it a predisposition for reconciling the oppositional poles of freedom and determination. Such a logics, which invokes the emancipatory authority of educators to effect change, informs her elaboration of a political practice designed to redefine masculinity in an attempt to transcend the limits of gender dichotomisation:

Many of us no doubt believe that the ultimate goal of gender policy and in society should be the transcendence of the male/female dualism, that we should be aiming to construct a non-gendered world (Connell, 1987, pp. 286-293; Davies, 1989b, pp. 138-141; Thorne, 1993, p. 159). Nevertheless, it is not a goal that can be easily achieved. The existing dualism is, I have argued in this paper, so deeply entrenched that at the moment the way forward is to modify the gender definitions and practices that result in more inequitable outcomes ... Developing masculinities that do not use femininity as the subordinate term may seem a difficult task, but it should not, I believe, be impossible for charismatic and creative teachers (82-83).

Thus, Jordan argues that an integral part of this political agenda will involve teachers opposing and changing those definitions of masculinity which are framed in opposition to femininity as the subordinate term. It is in this sense that Jordan's position is limited by a theoretical frame which circumscribes the formulation of a political practice in terms of invoking the emancipatory authority of teachers to effect a redefinition of masculinity within the discursive space of consciousness.
Reinvoking the Hermeneutic Subject

Similarly, Frank's (1990; 1993) study of a group of 14 adolescent boys aged 16 to 19, while useful, also is limited by a particular mode of rationality which takes recourse in the hermeneutic subject as the basis for elaborating a political practice (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). For instance, he uses interview data to provide some kind of privileged access to boys' putative consciousness:

[T]hrough their own voices, the fourteen boys allow us to glimpse into their lives which enable us to investigate the interconnections of the practices that continually constitute and reconstitute sexuality. Their talk uncovers the anxiety, the joy, the hurt, the celebration, the fear, the resistance and the struggle around sexuality. In short, the human agency of male sexuality within the everyday experiences of these young men is clearly visible (Frank, 1993: 51).

Thus, it is claimed, through analysing interview data, the hermeneutic self can be accessed and the hidden dynamics of power revealed. Built into Frank's theorisation of 'everyday masculinities' is a dialectical mode of rationality with its imperative to reconcile the opposing poles of freedom and determination in anticipation of realising a transformative practice. While arguing that a gender and sexual regime is imposed, for example, he is careful to emphasise that young men are not merely passively or mechanically socialised into adopting a set of practices:

The idea that young men make their history, including its constraints, has often been neglected. This continues to produce a view of young men as the passive receivers of a monolithic social system through a process which is seen to be mechanical and consensual. This way of theorising lives gives little respect for human agency, including the resistance to the hegemony which is so important for social change, individually and collectively (50).
Here Frank appears to be invoking an oppositional politics in which 'human agency' assumes a single general form that is realised in the subject's capacity to resist 'hegemonic' practices. In this sense, an emancipatory practice is elaborated which reinvokes the self-realising hermeneutic subject as a site for political resistance:

[In the end we must remember that all practices are instances of human agency and because of this, we must allow for the invention of a new language of possibility and a new set of practices; self-creation, mediation, resistance and transformation. In addition, it is this sort of analysis that we can find both a path for change and a hope for a different and better future. At the same time however, this is not to mask or hide the dynamics of power around masculinity and sexuality by reducing it to individualism or attitudes (57).

However, despite the limits of his theorisation of everyday masculinities, which are circumscribed by his deployment of a particular dialectical mode of rationality, his data is useful in further establishing criteria for judging recognisable instances of masculinity. For example, the following pectises are referred to by the boys interviewed by Frank:

(i) the role of sport in proving that 'you're a real man';
(ii) the emphasis on demonstrating heterosexuality and on proving that 'you're not a queer';
(iii) the role of using cars, weights, posturing, fighting and drinking alcohol in establishing 'hegemonic macho masculinity';
(iv) the importance of having a girlfriend and 'hanging around with the bigger guys' in order to avoid sex-based harassment;
(v) the role of teachers and coaches in enforcing a 'hegemonic' model of masculinity grounded in a denigration of females and homosexuals;
(vi) the importance of not allowing yourself to be dominated by girls;
(vii) the significance and use of the body in demonstrating masculinity;
(viii) the importance of dress codes in regulating and policing heterosexuality;
(ix) a particular manner of speaking and walking as markers of homosexuality and, hence, a deviant subordinated form of masculinity;

(x) the overall prevalence of homophobic practices in the policing of hegemonic masculinities.

In this way, interview data can be used to identify the specific techniques and strategies deployed by adolescent boys according to a specifiable set of norms which are mobilised through particular regimes of practice. Moreover, it is argued here, such a mode of analysis can be undertaken without resorting to the invocation of the self-realising hermeneutic subject.

Homophobic Practices and Heterosexist Regimes in Schools

Recent studies into the production and normalisation of heterosexual masculinities in schools have also been conducted within the above frames of reference in which either a particular cultural logics or dialectical mode of rationality is deployed (see Haywood, 1993; Skeggs, 1991; Measor, Tiffin & Fry, 1996; Dixon, 1997; Epstein, 1997; Skelton, 1993; Parker, 1996; Nayak & Kehily, 1996; Kehily & Nayak, 1997). However, while such accounts invoke the hermeneutic subject as a site for both the formation and contestation of subjectivity in 'culture', they are used here to further highlight the shared understandings of what constitutes an instance of masculinity (Coleman, 1990). Haywood, for example, focuses on the ways in which sexuality is deployed by a group of sixth form males to establish a particular hegemonic form of masculinity in educational contexts. He highlights how sex/gender boundaries were delimited by a specific set of practices. These involved:

(i) boasting about having frequent sex with females and, thereby, achieving the status of a 'stud';

(ii) differentiating a particular status masculinity from those subordinated masculinities established through academic achievement;
(iii) denigrating school work/ high achievement and using sport and drug-taking to establish a macho masculinity;

(iv) the achievers being perceived as not having had sex and, therefore, as failing to achieve an adequate heterosexual masculinity;

(v) those boys who chose not to engage in sporting practices such as football or who did not publicly refer to females as potential objects of desire being labelled by other boys as gay and/or effeminate;

(vi) rejecting the values of school as a means of establishing a protest masculinity enacted against institutional authority;

(vi) some of the boys perceived as gay challenging and parodying other males through exaggerating a camp style of masculinity;

(vii) using open and loud sex talk to accomplish a public heterosexual masculinity;

(viii) the obsessive and ritualistic focus on joking, 'piss-taking' and 'having a laugh' at another's expense to establish a particular stylised heterosexual masculinity;

(ix) setting heterosexuality against homosexuality in terms marked out by a natural/unnatural binary categorisation;

(x) disavowing gay people as a means by which to establish a hegemonic heterosexual masculinity;

(xi) ascribing to gay people attributes such as a high voice, a limp wrist and other related feminine features.

Epstein (1997) highlights the extent to which homophobic practices are implicated in the production of conventional heterosexual masculinities. For instance, she mentions that those boys who preferred to take part in the school play rather than play football 'would get a [homophobic] lashing' (109). In fact, she claims that homophobic name calling was directed at non-macho boys as a means by which to establish their similarity to girls (see also Lees, 1987: 180; Ward, 1995):
Insults like 'poof' and 'Nancy-boy' are used, then, to control not only the sexuality of boys but also the forms of masculinity they are likely to adopt, at least within the school context (Epstein, 1997: 110).

Epstein also indicates that many boys, particularly in single sex schools, felt compelled to appear 'hard' and macho. In fact, for both gay students and teachers, the requirement to distance themselves from any form of gay sexuality as a means of self-protection, was often effected by resorting to adopting macho styles of masculinity. In this sense, Epstein illustrates how particular gendered styles for boys are usually coded as heterosexual (108). She supports this by referring to one boy's discussion about having no problem with 'being out' at school. This was related both to his physical build and to the fact that he was captain of the school rugby team. He mentions that his macho behaviour and appearance served to protect him from being victimised for his gay sexuality. Thus, Epstein draws attention to the role that homophobia plays in the formation of normative heterosexual masculinities which lead to some boys actively adopting particular gendered styles of behaviour to avoid sex-based harassment.

Nayak and Kehily (1996) also draw attention to gendered and sexual hierarchies in schools. Like many other social theorists, they adopt a dialectical frame to assert that 'schools can be seen as sites for the production of gendered/sexualised identities, not simply agencies that passively reflect dominant power relations' (212) (see Mac an Ghaill, 1994; Walker, 1988; Askew & Ross, 1988; Jordan, 1995a, 1995b; Redman, 1994b; Johnson, 1996; Frank, 1990,1993). On this basis, they argue that boys are 'engaged in the struggle for masculine identities within schools' as the basis for elaborating an emancipatory politics at the level of invoking the self-realising subject (212). However, what is useful about their research is that they draw attention to the performative dimension of enacting stylised heterosexual masculinities and the pivotal role that homophobias, as physical practices, play in enacting such gendered subjectivities. Thus, they focus on gender performance for adolescent boys in terms of 'the stylisation of the body [and] a set of repeated acts' (Butler, 1990: 33):
Although others have discussed 'queer performativity' (Sontag, 1983; Dyer, 1992; Meyer, 1994), we aim to expose the performativity of heterosexual masculinities, notably those structured through the display of homophobia (213).

Thus, Nayak and Kehily demonstrate how homophobia is embodied in stylised practices of adolescent boys in enacting particular forms of heterosexual masculinity.

In their discussion of the 'gender dynamics of homophobia', attention is drawn to the links between misogyny and homophobia in that those boys who are targeted as gay are feminised. On this basis, it is argued, those boys who step outside of the normative frames of reference for defining heterosexual masculinity, are often labelled as effeminate which becomes a marker of homosexuality. Nayak and Kehily also reiterate how those boys who conform to authority or work hard in school are often stigmatised as homosexual (Willis, 1977; Walker, 1988; Connell, 1989; Kessler et al, 1985). Miles, one of the boys interviewed in Nayak and Kehily's study, claims that he was called gay simply because he was quiet in class. Furthermore, he indicates that the sexual taunting and stigmatisation of him were having an impact on his performance at school. Thus, it is argued that 'inappropriate' gender behaviour can lead to homophobic abuse which can have drastic consequences for those students who are targeted (see Delamont, 1990). This leads Nayak and Kehily, to claim that non-conformity, and by implication being a rebel (Aggleton, 1987), constitutes a particular style for demonstrating a specific heterosexual masculinity. This often involves deploying homophobic insults to police gender behaviours rather than to designate a particular sexual practice in which a stigmatised boy is implicated. Thus, attention is drawn to the way in which 'a young man styles his body through gestures and actions [which] is central to the performance of masculinity, where there is always the threat of being labelled gay' (216).

Certain gestures and behaviours become recognisable as markers of assumed homosexuality, which are often understood in terms of their association with femininity.
Gay men, it is argued, are considered to 'perform sexual identities' through pitch and modulation of voice, camp style of walking and posturing, physical size or slight body build, working hard and being quiet at school. For example, one female interviewee mentions that if a boy crosses his legs or makes a particular comment, 'the rumours spread' (215). Attention is also drawn to how boys often shout out homophobic abuse at certain individuals which forms part of a repertoire of social practices through which they publicly enact their heterosexuality.

Talking loudly about sex and their sexual prowess was also a part of this repertoire within the context of peer group relations at school (see Haywood, 1993, 1995; Parker, 1996). Within such a regime of practices, homophobic performance and sex talk constitute techniques of the self involved in the deployment of sexuality to stylise a publicly validated form of heterosexual masculinity. However, Nayak & Kehily make the point that not all boys have access to sex talk as a means of enhancing their reputations and status within peer group networks at school. Like Connell (1987), they emphasise that there is a hierarchy or a pecking order of masculinities which are regulated through homophobic performance.

Nayak and Kehily also claim that such homophobic practices, learned in school, are performed across other social fields or departments of existence. For instance, they use one student's account of the bodily display of homophobia at her mother's workplace to highlight the ways in which a particular stylised form of heterosexual masculinity is displayed. This student narrates how waiters made jokes about and wouldn't serve the two gay men staying at the hotel her mother managed. This was, they said, because they were afraid to bend down in their presence and of 'having their arses pinched'. They also refused to enter the male toilets at the hotel because they associated a particular currency of gay sexuality with anal sex and public toilets. The point is emphasised that the attempts made by the waiters to physically avoid these two gay men constituted a performative display of a form of heterosexual masculinity.
What is highlighted by Nayak and Kehily’s research are the various strategies that boys use to disassociate themselves from any kind of homoeroticism which is equated with a misogynist expression of femininity. For instance, crude sexual labels such as ‘bum-chum’ are ascribed to those ‘weak’ boys who are considered to be gay and effeminate. Moreover, attention is drawn to how a boy might walk, talk, sit or hold himself as constituting a grammar for understanding simultaneously the designation of gay sexuality and the embodiment of heterosexual masculinity (220). Certain actions, behaviours and postures are coded in gendered and sexualised terms and the body is inscribed within a regime of practices and techniques of the self which are circumscribed by the deployment of technologies of the self in which sexuality functions as ‘an index of who we are’ and the truth about our selves (Foucault, 1978; 1988g; 1988k).

Our research suggests homophobic ‘words, acts, gestures’ and the repertoire of bodily enactments, we have already discussed are the stylistic tropes used to traduce femininity and so fabricate a desired masculinity (221).

Thus, Nayak and Kehily emphasise how heterosexuality functions as a normative benchmark within a regime of performative homophobic practices for policing masculinity. In treating the formation of masculinities at the level of repetitive, stylised, performative practices, attention is drawn to the ritualised exchanges in which sexuality is deployed to establish a bodily enactment of gendered subjectivity.

This focus on the formation of masculinity at the level of performativity is also developed in a study conducted by Dixon (1997) into the sex-play practices of an 11 year old boy in a design and technology classroom. She highlights how this boy, Pete, engages in bodily practices which involve referencing the penis, masturbation and heterosexual penetrative sex. During one particular lesson, Pete takes a mallet and holds it to his body so that it forms a penis. He shows it to his friend, Chas, who takes it from him and ‘masturbates’ it. This results in shared laughter. Then Pete retrieves the mallet and, treating it as a penis, moves his tongue in a performative action imitative of fellatio. He then uses the
mallet as a guitar and begins strumming it. At one point in this scenario, he reverts to using the mallet as a penis and directs his attention towards a girl across the room. While nudging his friend, he raises the mallet to imitate the act of an erection. He also calls to another girl and raises the mallet again to form an erect penis while making a 'verbal ping' (97). He approaches another girl from behind and while holding the mallet to his body thrusts his hips in an imitative act of intercourse. This highly ritualised repetition of performative sequences, involving the bodily enactment of specific sex acts, emphasises how sexuality is deployed to enact an approved masculinity through a range of exaggerated dramatisations and bodily postures. Pete's bodily enactment of a heterosexual model of masculinity, therefore, involves a particular way of relating to himself and to others which, Dixon claims, is centred on 'his capacity to fuck' and, hence, on a developing sense of himself 'as a sexual agent' (102).

While wanting to draw attention to the importance of such studies in highlighting the emphasis that is placed on the bodily enactment of heterosexual masculinities within ritualistic and repetitive regimes of practice, no attempt is made in this thesis to search behind such practices for a repressed underside of a subjectivity grounded in the subconscious. Moreover, there is a refusal to treat homophobic performances as implicated in discourses or as an effect of psychic processes operative beneath the level of conscious awareness. Within such frames, these practices are theorised in terms of 'expelling femininity and homosexuality' from deep within the hermeneutic self (Mac an Ghaill, 1994: 90; Rutherford, 1990: 22). In this thesis, however, the focus is on the insertion and assemblage of norms for governing conduct which are operationalised through the deployment of historically quite specific technologies of the self (Foucault, 1978; 1985a; 1986; 1988a; 1988b).

Conclusion

The purpose of reviewing the literature on boys in schools in this chapter has been twofold. Firstly, the focus has been on identifying the limits of a particular cultural logics
or mode of rationality informing such investigations into the links between schooling and the formation of masculinities. Secondly, the research has been used to undertake what might be termed an audit of specifiable instances of masculinity as they have been established by a range of researchers working in the field. In this way, already established criteria for what is to count as an instance of masculinity are placed under investigation in terms which enable the researcher of this study to attend to the specific rules and categories by which he renders specific practices, behaviours and modes of thinking, attributable to boys, visible as objects of social inquiry.