Risks and Hierarchy within International Society: Liberal Interventionism in the Post-Cold War Era

William Clapton
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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains as its main content work which has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary education institution.

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William Clapton

June 2009
Abstract

Several recent works have emphasised contemporary hierarchical trends within international society. These trends have been most readily demonstrated by the willingness of dominant states, such as the United States, to conduct interventions in support of the promotion of liberal values and political institutions. Yet while many scholars have identified new relations of hierarchy within international society, few have explored what they suggest regarding international society’s normative constitution or what factors have given rise to these new hierarchies. The end of colonialism in the 1960’s resulted in a fundamental reconstitution of international society. The result of decolonisation was that pluralism, the notion that all states have the equal freedom to constitute their internal socio-political and economic institutions as they see fit, was entrenched as the central constitutive principle of the post-colonial international society.

Contemporary hierarchical trends suggest a transition away from this pluralist constitution, with resultant changes in the processes of inclusion and exclusion and modes of interaction between different members of international society. This thesis aims to explore these processes of reconstitution within international society in the post-Cold War era and explain why Western societies have felt compelled to intervene in particular territories in order to promote liberal values. Utilising sociological theories of risk, particularly the work of Ulrich Beck, this thesis suggests that a new ‘liberal social logic of risk’ underpins the emergence of new forms of hierarchy and contemporary constitutional transition within international society. New forms of temporally and spatially de-bounded security
risks (such as terrorism), and Western attempts at managing these risks through intervention and the imposition of liberal values in so-called ‘risky zones’, has altered the constitution of international society in a way that gives rise to various hierarchical and anti-pluralist trends.
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Abbreviations

AFP: Australian Federal Police
ASPI: Australian Strategic Policy Institute
AusAID: Australian Agency for International Development
CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy
CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority
CW: Chemical Weapons
DFAT: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DIO: Defence Intelligence Agency
ECP: Enhanced Cooperation Package
EMP: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy
ESS: European Security Strategy
EU: European Union
FIAA: Facilitation of International Assistance Act
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
IFI: International Financial Institution
IFM: Isatabu Freedom Movement
IMF: International Monetary Fund
JIC: Joint Intelligence Committee
MEF: Malaitan Eagle Front
MT: Metric Tonne
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPE: Normative Power Europe

NSS: National Security Strategy

NSVI: National Strategy for Victory in Iraq

ORHA: Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

ONA: Office of National Assessments

PNG: Papua New Guinea

RAMSI: Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands

RPNGC: Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary

RSIP: Royal Solomon Islands Police Force

TAL: Transitional Administrative Law

SAP: Structural Adjustment Policy

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations


US: United States

WEU: Western European Union

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction
Introduction

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the sudden ending of the Cold War was a critical juncture in the recent history of international society. By 1991, the last vestiges of the Cold War had been swept away. Germany was reunited, the states of Eastern Europe were free from Soviet domination, and scholars and government officials alike viewed the United Nations (UN) with increased optimism now that the Cold War shackles which had previously disabled the Security Council had been broken. Most importantly, the West’s Cold War nemesis, the Soviet Union, had been eliminated. Western political, military and economic power was now unparalleled and Western leaders and academics celebrated the victory of liberalism and capitalism and the supposed coming of a ‘New World Order’.¹ However, in the wake of these momentous events, debate continues as to the ramifications and significance of the end of the Cold War, particularly in regard to its implications for international society.

The question that many scholars still grapple with is what does international society, removed from the bipolar structure of the Cold War, look like? What are its features? Have there been shifts within international society’s constitution? That is, has there been a change in the norms and principles that inform the criteria used to determine which polities are entitled to membership of this society and order social interactions between states? What effect has the relative increase in Western power and influence had on the international conduct of Western societies and their

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interstate relations? These questions have been compounded by further significant events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In short, while many scholars would agree that today’s international society is at least qualitatively different from that of the Cold War era, the nature of the changes that have been wrought and their effects are less clear.

Part of the reason for this lack of clarity has been the multitude of divergent approaches employed and arguments put forth that have sought to contribute to the question of ‘what form of international society’? Realists have emphasised American primacy and the unipolarity of the post-Cold War era. Others, such as Huntington, have focused on new areas of conflict and potential disorder. Within the English School of International Relations (which has attracted high levels of interest since the end of the Cold War), much of the discussion, particularly during the 1990s, has focused on the debate between pluralist and solidarist forms of international society. While these differing approaches have all contributed significantly to the question of what form of international society has emerged in the post-Cold War era, none as of yet have provided an entirely satisfactory answer.

One reason for this is that many scholars have either overlooked or insufficiently theorised two of the main features of the post-Cold War era. The first is an increasing assertiveness on the part of Western societies that liberal values and institutions are the required standard of membership within international society. This assertiveness has manifested in a new ‘liberal interventionism’, demonstrated

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by various Western interventions in previously illiberal or failing (non-Western) states designed to impose liberal values and institutions.\(^5\) The second are continuing processes of globalisation and the emergence of transnational security risks that have led to a radically altered international strategic environment from that which existed during the Cold War. Taken together, these two features of post-Cold War international society provide important insights into its changing constitutional structure, with resulting shifts in prevailing notions of rightful membership and rightful conduct.\(^6\)

The point of this thesis is therefore two-fold. Firstly, it seeks to provide a contribution to the question of ‘what form of international society’. In this regard, the thesis seeks to investigate the effects of recent Western interventions for international society’s constitution. Specifically, it examines how these interventions affect prevailing notions of rightful membership and rightful conduct within international society. Secondly, the thesis seeks to explain the closely-linked question of why these interventions have occurred. What compels Western states to intervene in particular territories in order to promote liberalism? This second question is crucial to the first as it is through an understanding of the factors that underpin these interventions that we can also explain the emergence of a particular type of international society in the post-Cold War era.

This thesis takes as its starting point the English School concept of an international society and incorporates many of the concepts, methods and insights of

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\(^5\) Examples include interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and the European Union’s European Neighbourhood Policy in Northern Africa, Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

\(^6\) These two features of post-Cold War international society are identified by Ikenberry as part of a broader range of factors that have led to a crisis in what he terms the ‘liberal international order 2.0’ that emerged after World War Two. However, as shall be discussed, Ikenberry’s conclusions as to the effects of these changes for international order differ from the conclusions that I make in this thesis. See G. John Ikenberry, ‘Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order’, *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 1 (2009): 71-87.
the School. Like the English School and constructivists, it views interstate relations as inherently social or ideational in nature, informed and underpinned by norms and ideas that constitute state identity and behaviour. Works such as Hedley Bull’s *The Anarchical Society* or Robert Jackson’s *The Global Covenant* have exerted a substantial influence on this thesis. However, unlike Bull or Jackson, this thesis goes beyond simply outlining international society’s core institutions by questioning what informs the construction of these institutions and what explains institutional variation over time. This thesis argues that international society is not a static constitutional construct. Rather, international society is a fluid and dynamic construct of constitutive norms and principles that is regularly reconstituted over time.

Several recent works, particularly those of Reus-Smit, Philpott, Clark and Simpson have also identified international society as a historically contingent set of norms and investigated the ways in which international society has historically been reconstituted. This thesis can be broadly situated within this literature, and seeks to contribute to it in two main ways. Firstly, unlike Philpott and Reus-Smit, this thesis explicitly focuses on international society’s shifting constitution in the post-Cold War era. It thus provides one of the few works (along with Simpson, Clark and a handful of others) to explicitly examine the constitution of international society in the post-Cold War era. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the thesis attempts

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to provide a more rigorous account of the post-Cold War constitutional revisions that it identifies than either Simpson or Clark.

Indeed, a systematic theoretical account of normative change within international society is something that is generally lacking in the English School’s repertoire. Despite the excellent work of Clark and Simpson, neither outlines any mechanism of change that can explain either a shift towards an ‘anti-pluralist’ form of international society (Simpson) or shifting notions of legitimacy (Clark). Both identify an increasing invocation of liberalism and democracy by Western societies as the new ‘membership standard’ that states are expected to achieve in order to qualify for full membership within international society. However, Clark and Simpson fail to explain what has prompted the emergence of these new standards and changes in prevailing notions of rightful membership. Lacking then is a rigorous theorisation of the causal factors underpinning recent constitutional revision within international society.

To fully understand what form of international society has emerged in the post-Cold war era, we first need to understand what form of international society existed before the end of the Cold War. Although its significance has been largely overlooked, particularly within the English School, decolonisation was a fundamental moment of constitutional revision within international society.\(^\text{10}\) It resulted in the emergence of a truly pluralist international society, one constituted according to the principle that a ‘good society’ is one that maximises the potential range of values and regimes that states may legitimately adopt. A pluralist international society is therefore one in which all states have the equal freedom to

\(^{10}\) However, some scholars, such as Philpott and Jackson, have recognised the importance of decolonisation in relation to international society’s constitution. See Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*; Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
determine their domestic socio-political institutions according to their own societal values. This pluralist constitution provides for the rules of sovereign equality and non-intervention that currently prevail within international society and also renders formal hierarchical relationships between states illegitimate.

With the end of the Cold War, it is precisely this pluralist constitution that has been called into question by the willingness of Western states to intervene in other societies in order to impose liberal values and institutions. Emboldened by the supposed victory of liberal democracy and the removal of power constraints with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West has sought to globally promote its own liberal values. These interventions are distinctly anti-pluralist in that they effectively seek to limit the range of acceptable values and regimes that states can legitimately adopt. They also signal the emergence of new relations of hierarchy within international society, involving the assertion by Western societies that they have the authority to determine the socio-political institutions of other countries. Paradoxically then, as Western societies seek to forge a ‘normatively thicker’ international society based around liberal values, a more anti-pluralist and hierarchical, rather than solidarist, form of international society emerges.

This leads to the second question that the thesis seeks to address – why have these interventions occurred and what underpins the emergence of a more hierarchical form of international society at this particular historical juncture? Further, how can we understand the role of liberalism in the emergence of these new hierarchies? Several scholars have identified the emergence of these new hierarchical trends. For instance, Simpson has identified the contemporary resurgence of anti-
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pluralism and hierarchy within international society.\textsuperscript{11} Likewise, Dunne, Donnelly, Lake and Hobson and Sharman, among others, have also identified the existence of hierarchical relationships within international society.\textsuperscript{12} Despite this, few scholars have satisfactorily explained what underpins the formation and reproduction of these new hierarchies, or the way in which they affect international society’s constitution. For example, Simpson, Anghie and Dunne all fail to adequately explain the emergence of new hierarchies within international society.\textsuperscript{13}

Further, both Anghie and Dunne fail to forcefully link these new hierarchies to shifts within international society’s constitution. Anghie’s discussion, for example, conceptualises contemporary hierarchy as merely a continuance of the old colonial hierarchies.\textsuperscript{14} This ignores the very different features of the colonial hierarchies compared to more recent forms of hierarchy and the different ways in which contemporary hierarchies have been operationalised within international society. Dunne, on the other hand, argues that new hierarchies within international society, particularly those represented by the 2003 United States (US) invasion of Iraq, threaten its existence.\textsuperscript{15} However, the weakness of Dunne’s argument is that it appears to assume that international society is a static pluralist construct that is incompatible with hierarchical relations between states. This ignores international


\textsuperscript{14} As Anglie argues, colonialism is an enduring feature of international law, having shaped many of the doctrines of international law, particularly sovereignty. See Anglie, \textit{Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law}, 3-4.

\textsuperscript{15} Dunne, ‘Society and Hierarchy in International Relations’, 316.
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society’s constitutionally dynamic nature and its ability to accommodate several different forms of interaction between states, including hierarchical relationships. In short, Dunne mistakes contemporary hierarchy as signalling the retreat of international society, rather than its reconstitution.

In order to understand what underpins the formation and reproduction of contemporary hierarchies, it needs to be understood what motivates Western societies to intervene in other countries in an attempt to promote liberalism. One might respond by suggesting that spreading liberalism itself is the primary motivation of these interventions. However, the conspicuous selectivity of these ‘liberal interventions’ indicates that the perceived desirability of spreading liberal values is not the primary motivation. Rather, drawing on the ideas associated with particular liberal international theories that advocate a hierarchical form of international society, Western societies have identified the promotion of liberal values as a means of generating greater security for themselves.16 Importantly, however, contemporary dangers to Western security cannot be conceptualised in terms of the readily identifiable threats of the Cold War era. Overt threats have been replaced with new forms of transnational security risks such as terrorism, providing for the emergence of a much more uncertain and unpredictable international strategic environment.

The nature of these new security issues is best captured through Ulrich Beck’s ‘risk society’ thesis.17 The idea of the risk society, as well as the concepts of risk and risk management, provides a way not only of understanding contemporary security issues, but also the formation and reproduction of contemporary hierarchical

16 These liberal theories include the democratic peace theory, the work of neo-Kantian scholars such as Fernando Teson and new liberal legal theories popularised by, amongst others, Anne-Marie Slaughter. See chapter two.
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relationships and their effects for international society. One of Beck’s main arguments is that his risk society thesis is not about the increase of risks to personal well-being or national security in Western societies, but rather the emergence of new forms of risk that escape established mechanisms of insurance and control. Part of Beck’s argument is that new forms of risk are characterised by their temporally and spatially de-bounded nature. In other words, these risks are not limited in terms of time or space.

Initially, Beck’s focus was on environmental risks such as global climate change, but recently he has also focused on security risks such as terrorism. Terrorism, for instance, can occur in any location, at any time and often with minimal warning. The de-bounded nature of contemporary security risks makes them very difficult to identify and manage. Given this difficulty, Western societies have explicitly focused on environments within international society that are conducive to the origination or fomentation of security risks. These environments have been primarily defined in terms of a lack of liberal institutions or state weakness. The perception on the part of several Western governments is that liberal societies do not produce global security risks. Hence, given the inherent difficulty in directly managing de-bounded security risks, Western societies have attempted to manage potential dangers by reshaping those states or territories identified as potentially risky or dangerous into stable liberal democracies.

Recent ‘liberal interventions’ are in fact exercises in risk management. The hierarchical relationships that these interventions signify are therefore underpinned by what can be termed a ‘liberal social logic of risk’. A social logic is, as Hobson and Sharman suggest, a set of norms and social ordering principles that construct the

18 See Beck, Risk Society and Beck, World Risk Society.
identity of states as either superordinate or subordinate parties and legitimate the hierarchical relationship. More specifically, this new liberal social logic of risk constructs liberal democracies as inherently peaceful and prosperous and non-liberal or weak states as inherently risky and dangerous. This ‘social logic approach’ differs from Beck’s thesis in that it views risk and perceptions of risk as politically and socially mediated constructs rather than objective realities that exist ‘out there’. Viewing risks as objective realities obscures the way in which particular objects or events are defined as risks according to the values and perceptions of the individual or organisation making the risk assessment. This is particularly important as Beck’s ‘realist’ definition of risks as objective realities prevents an analysis of the role of liberal values in constructing Western perceptions of risk.

The main argument of this thesis then is that a new liberal social logic of risk, which seeks to impose liberal values and institutions as a mechanism of risk management, underpins the emergence of a more hierarchical, anti-pluralist international society in the post-Cold War era. The pluralist idea that all states should be free to constitute their socio-political institutions according to their own societal values has been challenged by the notion that fragile states or those lacking liberal democratic institutions are potentially dangerous sites of instability and disorder. This liberal social logic of risk has become central to the governing of social relationships between states, leading to an on-going process of constitutional revision within international society. This new social logic increasingly determines the prevailing notions of rightful membership and conduct within international society. These changes are most evident in new liberal standards of rightful

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20 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, 68.
membership within international society and the West’s claim to hold the authority to conduct interventions within states identified as potentially dangerous.

Importantly, while this thesis can be primarily situated within the English School or constructivist literature, it is also distinctly multidisciplinary in nature. The theoretical framework to be employed, and the main arguments to be made, both borrow heavily from other disciplines. The framework itself is a synthesis of the English School of International Relations and sociological theories of risk. It seeks to incorporate the insights of Beck’s risk society framework into the discipline of International Relations as a way of theorising contemporary processes of normative transition within international society. For some time, the concepts of risk and risk management have received extensive treatment in the fields of economics and sociology, amongst others. A small, yet burgeoning, literature has also emerged that seeks to deal with the concepts of risk and risk management in an International Relations context.

However, the literature on risk, risk management and International Relations is still comparatively small and there is still significant scope for the theorisation and utilisation of these concepts. This need for the further theorisation of risk and risk management occurs at several levels of analysis, but is most apparent at the meta-theoretical or structural level. Most works on risk and International Relations thus far have focused on risk in relation to specific issue-areas such as terrorism, warfare, strategic studies or climate change. However, very little has been said regarding the impact of state perceptions of risk and their attempts at risk management on prevailing modes of international governance or the structure of international society. Part of the aim of this thesis then is to contribute to this emergent literature and push the research agenda on risk, risk management and international relations
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forward by exploring what the risk society thesis and the concepts of risk and risk management tell us about international society’s constitution in the post-Cold War era.

Finally, it is important to note that this thesis is intended primarily as an explanatory, rather than normative, work. That is, the argument to be developed in the thesis is concerned simply with providing a particular explanation or interpretation of recent Western interventions and their effects for post-Cold War international society. It is not intended as a critique of these interventions, nor should it be read as supportive of them. It also should not be read as indicating a preference for either pluralist or hierarchical forms of international society. This thesis is concerned with constructing and testing an explanatory theoretical framework that will hopefully shed light on important aspects of contemporary International Relations and open new avenues of research.

Thesis Structure and Case Studies

This thesis consists of seven chapters split into two main parts. Part one is concerned with investigating the core concepts and ideas to be employed in the thesis. It also outlines and establishes the theoretical framework and main arguments of the thesis. Part two is comprised of case studies designed to test the theoretical framework outlined in part one. Chapter one firstly outlines what a constitution of international society entails. It is argued that international society is a construct of fundamental norms that constitute state identity through the criteria they establish for rightful membership and order social interactions between states. Drawing on pluralist political theory, chapter one also explores the constitutional structure and historical evolution of the pluralist international society that emerged after
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decolonisation. In order to analyse changes in international society’s constitution in
the post-Cold War era, it first needs to be understood what this constitution looked
like before the end of the Cold War.

Chapter two outlines a conception of international hierarchy and explores the
role of liberalism in the emergence of new hierarchies in the post-Cold War era.
Similar to Hobson and Sharman, hierarchies in this thesis are defined as
fundamentally social authority relationships underpinned by particular social logics
or norms. The second part of the chapter surveys the literature on a range of liberal
theories in order to draw out the ideas that underpin the promotion of liberal values
as a mechanism of risk management. If Western societies are intervening to impose
liberal values and institutions in states identified as risky, then what ideas inform the
notion that liberalism is an effective risk management tool? Chapter two thus partly
establishes the social logic that underpins contemporary hierarchy.

Chapters three and four complete the theoretical picture by introducing the
concepts of risk and risk management. Chapter three introduces Beck’s risk society
thesis in an attempt to understand why Western societies have felt compelled to
intervene in non-Western territories in order to promote liberalism in the post-Cold
War era. It suggests that existing accounts of contemporary hierarchy within
international society are inadequate for understanding the nature of these new
hierarchies or their constitutional effects. Chapter three therefore fully outlines what
a liberal social logic of risk entails and considers the impact of this new social logic
on international society’s pluralist constitution. The main argument developed in this
chapter is that Western perceptions of de-bounded security risks, and their attempts
to manage them, have become central to the governing of social relationships
between states. The chapter concludes with a critique of the risk society thesis.
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Chapter four concludes the first part of the thesis by examining risk management and its associated concepts of prevention, precaution and proactive anticipation. The point of this chapter is firstly to broadly outline the particular methods and features associated with risk management activities. Secondly, it outlines the specific risk management approach that Western societies have employed in the post-Cold War era. In particular, it is argued that promoting liberalism is a way of reshaping potentially dangerous environments in order to limit risks. Faced with de-bounded risks that are difficult to locate and define, Western societies have adopted a form of ‘situational risk prevention’. This involves the identification of environments which are conducive to the origination or materialisation of risks which are then subject to a form of environmental regulation and reshaping.

Chapters five, six and seven comprise the case studies of the thesis. To empirically validate the theoretical framework developed, three case studies are examined. A common structure is employed in each of the case studies to allow for comparison and to highlight areas of congruity and incongruity. Broadly, each chapter is broken into three components. Firstly, each chapter begins with an analysis of the security policies and doctrines of the Western country under examination and the justifications provided by government officials for the intervention undertaken. The point here is to identify perceptions of risk as the impetus for the intervention. Questions to be asked include were security issues central to the justification for the intervention? If so, were these issues conceptualised in terms of traditional threats or temporally and spatially de-bounded risks? Were prevention or precaution active components of the justifications provided for intervention?
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The second part of each chapter examines the conduct of the interventions. Questions asked here include did Western interveners attempt to impose liberalism and democracy in the target state? What methods were employed to compel the target state to adopt liberal values and institutions? Was the intervention consensual, and did both parties recognise the legitimacy of the situation? The case studies each conclude with a section considering the implications for international society. These sections provide an analysis of the interventions and the resulting relations of hierarchy to which they give rise in relation to their effects for international society’s constitution. Each of the case studies demonstrate that attempts to manage risk by promoting liberalism give rise to new relations of hierarchy that violate international society’s pluralist constitution.

The three cases selected include the European Union’s (EU) European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Australia’s recent interventions in the Asia-Pacific and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Three basic criteria were used to select the cases. Firstly, each case had to involve an intervention by a Western society or grouping of Western societies in a non-Western territory. Secondly, the intervention had to involve the imposition of liberal institutions and/or notions of good governance. In terms of promoting liberal good governance, this can include a range of liberal values such as the accountability of government to the people, respect for the rule of law, or individual civil and political rights. Finally, each case study had to focus on an intervention by a different Western society in a different geographical region. The cases have been deliberately chosen on the basis of these disparities in order to allow for comparison so as to identify common trends across unlike cases.

This is intended to validate the main argument that perceptions of risk and attempts at risk management are common features of contemporary interventions
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conducted by Western societies, despite other disparities that may exist between these different instances of intervention. Further, the selection of cases involving interventions by different Western countries is intended to strengthen the claim that a preoccupation with de-bounded security risks and attempts to manage them via the imposition of liberalism in identified ‘risky zones’ within international society is common to many, if not most, Western societies. This preoccupation with risk is not only confined to the US, for example, which is partly why interventions in Kosovo or Afghanistan were not selected along with that in Iraq.

Finally, the number of cases selected and the criteria that each intervention must have occurred in a different geographical region is intended to strengthen the claim that these interventions do not simply represent isolated cases or aberrations with only localised or regional effects. Rather, by selecting cases of intervention in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Northern Africa and the Asia-Pacific, the thesis intends to show that new forms of hierarchy underpinned by a liberal social logic of risk are relatively widespread. These interventions (and the hierarchical relationships of which they are representative) have important effects and implications for international society as a whole. When considered together, these various cases demonstrate a systematic pattern of recent behaviour by several Western societies. It is precisely the demonstration of this systematic pattern of behaviour that underscores the claim that recent interventions by Western countries have important consequences for international society as a whole.
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The concept of an international society is arguably the English School’s most distinctive contribution to the field of International Relations. Containing elements of realism, idealism and constructivism, the concept of an international society and English School theory in general provide a unique perspective on how states interact with one another and how these relationships are structured and ordered.¹ As Hedley Bull famously commented

A *society of states* (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.²

This provides an excellent definition of *what* an international society is, but it does not provide much information on *how* an international society is constituted.

Questions that might be considered are how do states arrive at the common rules that they feel obliged to follow? How are the core institutions of international society constructed and implemented and what explains institutional variation over time? Despite the fact that international society is arguably the central concept of the English School, the question of how it is constituted is one that has received little attention, at least until relatively recently. Recently, scholars such as Reus-Smit,

¹ International order is an important issue addressed by English School theorists, particularly in the work of Hedley Bull. See Bull, *The Anarchical Society*.
² Ibid., 13 (italics in original).
Philpott and Clark have highlighted the inherently ideational nature of international society and the way in which it is constituted by certain fundamental norms.\(^3\) Further, these scholars have sought to demonstrate the historically variable nature of the constitution and institutions of international society, something that much of the rest of the English School literature has failed to do.

Indeed, one of the significant weaknesses of Bull’s account of international society is that this account appears to conceptualise its constitutional structure in relatively static terms.\(^4\) This is particularly evident in terms of the pluralist conception of international society, a key element of English School theory. Within most of the English School literature, pluralism has largely been used to describe a particular form of international society exhibiting certain features. However, this ignores the prescriptive elements of the concept and pluralism’s role as a fundamental, and historically variable, constitutive norm of international society. While most English School theorists have described contemporary international society as ‘pluralist’, they have not engaged in any systematic way with pluralist political theory (Jackson’s *The Global Covenant* being a notable exception) or provided a persuasive historical account of the evolution of this pluralist international society.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) Despite his excellent study of pluralist international society, drawing explicitly on pluralist political theory, Jackson’s account of the evolution of this society is not entirely persuasive, for reasons set out below. See Jackson, *The Global Covenant*. 
This failure to historically account for the emergence of a pluralist international society is most evident in the failure of the English School to identify decolonisation as a fundamental moment of constitutional revision within international society. For example, the expansion of international society is conceptualised as merely representing the extension of a constitutionally unaltered European international society to the former colonies in *The Expansion of International Society*. The analyses presented in this work generally do not explore the normative changes and resulting constitutional revisions that such an expansion entailed. This failure is also evident in several recent accounts of contemporary hierarchical trends within international society that do not link these trends to changes in its pluralist constitution.

This is an important point, as it means that the English School literature as it currently stands is largely ill-equipped to adequately account for contemporary constitutional revision within international society. This is precisely the purpose of this thesis. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the way in which international society is constituted, arguing that its constitutional structure is comprised of certain constitutive norms that determine its core characteristics (e.g. hierarchical or egalitarian) and institutions. These norms are dynamic, meaning the characteristics and institutions of international society vary over time. In order to illustrate the role of norms in constituting international society and their historical variability, this chapter examines pluralism as a constitutive norm of contemporary international society.

Drawing on pluralist political theory, this chapter argues that pluralism is more than a descriptive label – it is a prescriptive norm that underpins the key

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7 See chapter three.
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features and institutions of international society. This chapter also provides a brief historical account of the evolution of this pluralist society. Others, such as Simpson or Jackson, have traced the emergence of contemporary pluralist international society to the drafting and implementation of the UN Charter, or even as far back as the Peace of Westphalia. However, this chapter contends that the constitutional structure of a pluralist and global international society developed gradually after Westphalia, but was only ever imperfectly realised until the onset of decolonisation in the mid-twentieth century. The diversity of the European international society, and the rights of sovereign equality and non-intervention that held among the European states, was severely circumscribed by the refusal to recognise the sovereignty of non-European political entities, many of which were incorporated into the European empires during the nineteenth century.

The continued existence of the hierarchical European empires, and the widespread and explicit derogation of norms of pluralism, equality and non-intervention that they represented, means that these norms cannot be said to have formed the underlying constitutional framework of international society until such

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violations were ended. Thus, a truly pluralist international society did not emerge until the onset of decolonisation in the early 1960s. At this point, international society’s constitution was significantly revised and a globalised, pluralist international society emerged. Since the early 1960s, the norm of pluralism has largely determined how political community among states is to be constituted, especially with regard to membership, namely who should be a part of that community and who should not.10

This chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, it discusses the question of how international society is constituted. What exactly is a constitution of international society, and what does it entail? Following this, the chapter outlines a political theory of pluralism and examine what an international society based on this theory looks like. By outlining a political theory of pluralism, the chapter intends to give pluralism more conceptual and theoretical weight than it has previously had in much of the English School literature. The chapter concludes with a brief study of the historical evolution and formation of the contemporary pluralist constitution of international society.

**Constituting International Society**

Within the English School, much emphasis has been placed on fleshing out the concept of international society and outlining its core institutions, rules and principles. Indeed, much of the early English School literature, particularly the work of Bull, Wight and Manning, focused on outlining the English School approach to International Relations and the concept of an international society.11 As Linklater

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and Suganami argue, the primary orientations of the English School’s investigation into world politics have been its focus on structure, function and history.\footnote{Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 43.} In terms of structure and function, the focus of the English School has been on outlining the institutional framework of international society and evaluating the functioning of these institutions. The historical wing of the English School has sought to analyse the historical evolution of the society of states.\footnote{Ibid., 43-80.}

While scholars identified as part of the English School have certainly provided a number of excellent accounts of international society and its institutional structure, most of these works, until recently, have focused on the questions of \textit{what} is an international society and \textit{what} are its core features?\footnote{Important works in this regard include Bull, The Anarchical Society; Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986); Manning, The Nature of International Society and Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977).} However, very little has been said, at least in any systematic way, of \textit{how} an international society is constituted or \textit{how} it comes to exhibit particular features or institutions. While Linklater and Suganami argue that identifying the constitutive and regulative rules of international society has been a core priority of English School theorists, little has been said about its constitution.\footnote{Linklater and Suganami, The English School of International Relations, 52.} Therefore, this section examines how international society is constituted. It is argued that international society is fundamentally ideational, or normative in nature. That is, international society is constituted according to fundamental norms or ideas that inform prevailing conceptions of rightful membership, rightful conduct and international society’s institutional framework.

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\item Martin Wight, ‘Western Values in International Relations’ in Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, edited by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966): 89-131
\item Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 43.
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The relative neglect of the question of how international society is constituted is perhaps most evident in Hedley Bull’s study of international society and order in *The Anarchical Society*. As Reus-Smit, whose work attempts to understand shifts between different forms of international society, persuasively argues, although Bull provided an excellent account of the basic institutional framework of international society and how states can peacefully coexist in an anarchical environment, he did not engage with the question of how these institutions came to be, or how they vary over time. It should be noted, however, that Bull did suggest that within world politics there are three complexes of rules, the first of which he referred to as constitutive or meta-rules which state the fundamental normative principle of that age. As Bull argues, these rules are not static and are subject to change in different eras.

Yet what Bull refers to here are the basic meta-principles along which world politics as a whole was to be organised – as a society of sovereign states as opposed to a cosmopolitan community of mankind, etc. This is in keeping with Bull’s (and the wider English School’s) distinction between an international system, international society and world society. This also reflects Wight’s distinction between the three ‘Rs’ that characterise international politics and theory – realism (system), rationalism (international society) and revolutionism (world society). In sum, Bull was talking of the constitutive rules that order world politics in general. He was not referring to the constitutive norms that structure international society. Bull’s constitutive rules therefore provide a way of understanding shifts between an international system, international society and world society.

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Thus, although Bull concludes that contemporary world politics is characterised by constitutive rules that provide for the existence of an international society of sovereign states, he does not systematically examine the normative foundations of this society itself. While Bull’s constitutive rules can usefully provide an account of the existence of an international society as opposed to other forms of global political organisation, they have little to say about how an international society of states is constituted and structured. Such criticisms also apply to Watson’s historical account of the evolution of international society. Watson’s rather thorough study of international systems and societies (dating back to ancient Greece) examines the way in which they have shifted along a spectrum between hegemony and independence. However, these shifts, and the institutional changes that have accompanied them, are not forcefully linked to underlying normative changes within international society’s constitution.19

Indeed, Watson largely fails to examine how changes within international society towards hegemony or independence are affected by, and affect, its normative constitution. However, Watson does briefly hint at this with his focus on legitimacy. Watson argues that the point of greatest legitimacy for all political communities that are members of a given system or society plays a central role in determining what point on the spectrum is most stable for a given international society at a given time.20 This would suggest that prevailing ideas, or norms, of legitimacy at least partly determine the basic nature (hegemony versus independence) and characteristics of international society. However, unlike Clark’s recent study on legitimacy (see below), Watson does not carefully examine the way in which ideas or principles of legitimacy are constitutive of international society.

20 Ibid., 131.
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Therefore, Bull and Watson, along with other English School theorists such as Martin Wight, have largely overlooked the question of how international society is constituted and the dynamic nature of the norms involved in its constitutional structuring. They appear to view international society in relatively static terms, which is inadequate for understanding constitutional change and transition within international society. This is not to say that the importance of norms has been discounted by these theorists, nor has the English School completely failed to recognise the normative or ideational dimensions of international society. The key role of norms and intersubjective understandings between states is arguably implicit in Bull’s assertion that an international society is comprised of states that are conscious of common interests and values. Still, while these common interests and norms (in part) are outlined (e.g. states’ interest in international order), their role in structuring international society and its institutions is not.

In contrast to Bull and Watson, Jackson’s study of pluralist international society explicitly considers the importance of norms in relation to international society and the scholarly study of international politics. Indeed, Jackson’s understanding of international society as a historical arrangement of norms and institutions which is periodically reconstituted in response to changing ideas and circumstances is largely synonymous with the interpretation of international society provided here. As Charles Manning put it, international society is a game based upon certain rules and conventions. Like any game, international society exists and operates within a set of rules and conventions that are established by the participants and evolve over time.

21 Wight does explicitly discuss the constitutive role of recognition within international society, which I discuss further below, but did not examine the normative content of the criteria used to decide whether or not a political community claiming membership of international society would be recognised as a sovereign state. See Wight, Systems of States, 135.
22 Jackson, The Global Covenant, viii. Gerry Simpson’s conceptualisation of international society’s constitution as a continuous interplay between norms of pluralism and anti-pluralism also draws attention to its historically variable nature. See Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States.
23 Manning, The Nature of International Society, xxiii.
functions due to the intersubjective meanings between the participants, or ‘players’, that render the game meaningful and knowable.\textsuperscript{24} As Wheeler argues, ‘If we want to understand how international society becomes possible, then it is necessary to recognise that the practices that constitute it have no real-world existence independent of the ‘communal imagining’ that conjures them into existence’\textsuperscript{25}

In other words, international society exists as a result of intersubjective meanings between states (or more accurately, state officials). It is thus ideational in nature – as Wilson argues, it is a ‘notional society of notional entities’ (like international society, the state is also an ideational construct).\textsuperscript{26} It is the ideas of what constitutes acceptable interstate relationships, acceptable state behaviour, or an acceptable form of international order that determines the fundamental characteristics and scope of international society. In short, international society is constituted according to fundamental constitutive norms that inform the institutions, rules and practices that order state interactions. As noted above, more recent English School (and constructivist) works have emphasised the importance of constitutive norms in shaping and structuring international society, although theorists have differed as to what these values are or the processes by which they constitute international society.


\textsuperscript{26} Peter Wilson, ‘Manning’s Quasi-Masterpiece: The Nature of International Society Revisited’, \textit{The Round Table} 93, no. 377 (2004): 760.
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For example, Philpott and Reus Smit have both highlighted the centrality of norms in the constitutional structuring of international society.\(^\text{27}\) Reus-Smit suggests that international society is defined primarily by constitutional structures that inform its core institutions.\(^\text{28}\) For Reus-Smit, these constitutional structures can be disaggregated into three components – a norm of procedural justice, an organising principle of sovereignty and most importantly, the moral purpose of the state.\(^\text{29}\) These norms define legitimate statehood, rightful conduct and shape the prevailing institutional designs of a given international society.\(^\text{30}\) Thus at the most basic level, a constitution of international society determines the key questions of which political communities are eligible for membership, what rights and duties these members have, and how these members are to behave. As Finnemore argues, ‘at its [international society’s] core lies some principled rules, institutions, and values that govern both who is a member of the society and how those members behave’.\(^\text{31}\)

Philpott’s understanding of the constitutional structure of international society is very similar to Reus Smit’s. Like Reus-Smit, Philpott’s definition of a constitution of international society focuses on the questions of membership, member rights and standards of conduct. As Philpott suggests:

\[\text{a constitution of international society is a set of norms, mutually agreed upon by polities who are members of the society, that define the holders of authority and their prerogatives, specifically in answer to three questions: Who are legitimate polities? What are the rules for becoming one of these polities? And, what are the basic prerogatives of these polities? Constitutions of international society are both}\]

\(^{27}\) See Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty and Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State.

\(^{28}\) Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State, 6.

\(^{29}\) Ibid.

\(^{30}\) Ibid.

\(^{31}\) Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 18.
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legitimate...and practiced, generally respected by all polities that are powerful enough regularly to violate them.\(^\text{32}\)

Taking a slightly different approach to Reus-Smit and Philpott, Clark highlights the centrality of principles of legitimacy in the constitutional structuring of international society.\(^\text{33}\) For Clark, legitimacy represents societal consensus over important principles and issues. Indeed, core principles of legitimacy express social agreement over who is entitled to participate in society and how members should behave.\(^\text{34}\) This is akin to Philpott and Reus-Smit’s suggestions that core norms shape rightful membership and conduct within international society. Indeed, Clark does not discount the role of norms, arguing that legitimacy is a composite of core norms within international society, including legality, morality and constitutionality.\(^\text{35}\) Most importantly, legitimacy, because it is an expression of a political condition grounded in social consensus over what is acceptable, exists in a mutually constitutive relationship with international society.\(^\text{36}\) On the one hand, legitimacy has no meaning outside a societal construct – it is a product of consensus between society’s members. On the other hand, by studying principles of legitimacy and how they are implemented, we can demonstrate the existence of the shared norms and rules that order social relations among states and provide the basis for fundamental rules and institutions.\(^\text{37}\)

Each of these three accounts thus stresses the role of ideas in the constitutional structuring of international society. Each adopts the constructivist notion that norms both shape and constrain state behaviour and identity. That is,

\(^{32}\) Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, 12.

\(^{33}\) Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 166.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 220.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 245.
ideas of rightful membership and rightful conduct shape what constitutes a legitimate member of international society and how such members may behave.\textsuperscript{38} Indeed, the very notion of what constitutes a legitimate state is constructed by prevailing norms and ideas within international society. During the colonial era, notions of ‘civilisation’ determined what it meant to be a legitimate state and, subsequently, which polities could be admitted into international society as sovereign states and which would be denied sovereign status and remain outside its confines.\textsuperscript{39} State identities, including the identity of a state as a sovereign entity, are thus constructed by international society’s constitutive norms. Further, as Jackson suggests, norms are fluid and dynamic, meaning that the constitution, and hence the nature and scope, of international society is also dynamic and regularly re-constituted at various intervals.\textsuperscript{40}

Shifts in norms can socialise states to behave in different ways and articulate different interests.\textsuperscript{41} They can alter legitimate state conduct and even, as suggested above, what constitutes a legitimate polity within international society. This is an important point because, as subsequent chapters will show, the post-Cold War era has witnessed discernible shifts in the idea of what constitutes a legitimate polity or under what circumstances the norm of non-intervention can be violated. It is these shifts in ideas that have led to new practices of intervention and new relations of hierarchy between Western and non-Western societies that signals an on-going process of constitutional revision within international society. Again though, the dynamism and historical variability of international society’s constitution has generally not received adequate treatment within much of the English School.

\textsuperscript{38} See Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it’.
\textsuperscript{39} See Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ in International Society.
\textsuperscript{40} Jackson, The Global Covenant, 15.
\textsuperscript{41} Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 23.
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literature, particularly when it comes to the historical analyses of contemporary international society’s evolution.

This is most evident in the failure of the English School, including many of those scholars who have explicitly explored the issue of international society’s constitution, to identify decolonisation as a moment of significant constitutional revision within international society.\textsuperscript{42} This failure stems from the tendency of many English School theorists to view contemporary international society as merely an expansion of a constitutionally static and unaltered pluralist European international society. It also stems from the tendency to view pluralism as a descriptive label for a minimalist form of international society exhibiting certain features rather than as a prescriptive and historically variable constitutive norm that actually underpins and informs these features. In order to illustrate the role of norms in constituting international society, the next section examines pluralism as a key constitutive norm of contemporary international society.

Pluralism and the Pluralist Interpretation of International Society

When one examines contemporary international society, one cannot help but be impressed by its scope. The political form of the state has truly become globalised since its beginnings at Westphalia. What is most remarkable about this global society is that despite the enormous diversity amongst its members in terms of territorial size, wealth, population, culture, values, ideology and so forth, major conflict has been a relatively rare occurrence. This order is preserved by the strong emphasis placed upon the respect for cultural diversity and the right of all states to liberty and

\textsuperscript{42} Interestingly, although Reus-Smit and Clark both undertake a historical analysis of the constitution of international society, neither includes decolonisation as a fundamental moment of constitutional revision within international society. Conversely, Philpott argues that decolonisation, along with Westphalia, is a key moment of constitutional transition within international society.
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independence. As Reus-Smit contends, contemporary international society is one which

transposes onto the international stage core liberal ideas of the legal equality of the individual before the law, the individual’s rights to liberty and self determination, and the inviolability of the individual’s physical person. The state becomes the individual ‘writ large’, bearing the right of sovereignty (qua individual liberty) within a putative international society.\(^{43}\)

Crucial to these ‘liberal’ rules and rights within international society is the norm of pluralism. Pluralism is the central structuring principle of international society, determining its basis of inclusion and exclusion and legitimate state behaviour. It provides for a highly inclusive international society in which diversity is tolerated, the consequence of which is the extension of the ‘liberal’ rights of non-intervention and formal equality to all states.\(^{44}\) This high level of inclusivity is demonstrated by the absence of any real positive obligations for membership in terms of the domestic constitution or cultural attributes of political communities applying for membership. In other words, international society’s pluralist constitution means that recognition of sovereign statehood has become largely detached from the internal characteristics of states.\(^{45}\)

Drawing on pluralist political theory, this section will show that pluralism rests on the recognition of diversity, on recognition of the ‘other’, which precludes a


\(^{44}\) This of course is not to say that the norms of formal equality or non-intervention have always obtained within international society since decolonisation. Indeed, the existence of the UN Security Council provides an enduring example of formal inequality and hierarchy between states on the basis of their substantive inequalities in terms of military and economic power, political influence, etc. The point here is that these norms have been generally respected by most states since the early 1960s.

\(^{45}\) It is precisely this lack of concern for the domestic constitution or internal affairs of the state that is central to the solidarist critique of the ethical implications of a pluralist international society that privileges non-intervention and formal equality between states over individual rights.
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restrictive or hierarchical international society based upon distinctions between the internal characteristics of states or societies. The implication of this is that a truly pluralist international society, one which is informed by the idea that diversity is to be at least accepted, is global in scope. There is no legitimate basis for excluding particular states or regions on the basis of their cultural attributes or form of government. Pluralist political theory, when applied to the study of International Relations, suggests an international society which maximises the potential range of values that can be pursued by states, all of which have the equal freedom to constitute their internal social, political and economic institutions as they see fit. Indeed, Williams argues that from a pluralist perspective, societies can be objectively evaluated according to the extent to which they promote diverse values. As he puts it, ‘More, to this extent, must mean better’.46

However, this conceptualisation of pluralism as a constitutive norm of international society is generally not one that has prevailed within much of the English School literature. The pluralist interpretation of international society is an important feature of the English School. Despite this, it is a concept that has not benefited from a systematic treatment in the work of many prominent English School theorists. For the most part, pluralism has been used merely as a descriptive term in the literature, a label or categorisation of an international society that exhibits particular features. There has been little consideration of the prescriptive elements of the concept or their constitutive role within international society, that is, the way in which pluralist ideas constitute many of the features that have been associated with a ‘pluralist’ version of international society.

46 See Williams, ‘Introduction’, xvii.
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This is evident in the definitions of pluralism provided by key English School theorists. For example, Bull, who first introduced the categories of pluralism and solidarism, describes pluralism as a conception of international society in which states are only in agreement for minimal purposes, such as the provision of order through the mutual recognition of sovereignty and the norms of sovereign equality and non-intervention. Bull argues that pluralism and solidarism represent points on a spectrum – pluralism representing a thin version and solidarism representing a thick version of agreed values between states.

Mayall similarly argues that international society can be understood as pluralist in the sense that states do not agree on substantive values other than sovereignty or engage in the pursuit of common projects. In this sense, pluralism simply represents an empirical judgement of the level of agreed values between states.

Pluralism, as it is defined by these scholars, describes international society as a practical rather than purposive association. This means that international society is primarily concerned with sustaining international order amongst states characterised by a large degree of domestic diversity by adhering to a minimalist set of norms and rules. Pluralists are sceptical of the ability of states to agree on any norms or values other than those in which they have a common interest (e.g. those

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50 Linklater and Suganami, The English School of International Relations, 60.
51 The distinction between practical and purposive associations belongs to Nardin, who described international society as a practical rather than purposive association, a society of different states pursuing different ends bound together only by the rules and institutions that allow for the orderly pursuit of these disparate ends. See Terry Nardin, Law, Morality and the Relations of States (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).
52 This is evident in Fawn and Mayall’s description of international society as a consensus which binds states together through a common commitment to certain minimum values. See Rick Fawn and James Mayall, ‘Recognition, Self-Determination and Secession in Post-Cold War International Society’, in International Society After the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered, edited by Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1996): 193.
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that provide for orderly interstate relations). The fundamental distinction between pluralist and solidarist interpretations of international society then is the question of order versus justice. Pluralism is used primarily in most of the English School literature as a label for an international society characterised by a normatively thin constitution that privileges international order over individual justice.

Another key feature of the pluralist interpretation of international society within the English School literature is its inherent statism – the state is taken as the primary unit of international society. Therefore, it is important to note that pluralism refers to a plurality of states. Jackson refers to this as jurisdictionary pluralism – the existence of a multitude of states each with their own territory and population. Pluralism does not refer to an international society in which the state is but one of a multitude of political actors. This is in contrast to socio-political theories of international pluralism, which emphasise the extent to which international politics is shaped by a broader range of interests and groups other than the state. Pluralism, as the term is used by the English School, and indeed as it is used here, does not refer to the ascendance of actors other than the state onto the world political stage. Other forms of political organisation; indeed, even individuals themselves are not recognised as legitimate members of international society.

55 Jackson, The Global Covenant, 178.
57 The extent to which international politics remains the exclusive domain of the state, however, is questionable in light of the effects of globalisation on international society. This was a point that Bull
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Despite the above criticisms, it should be noted that several scholars within the English School have engaged more deeply with the ethical and moral issues associated with pluralist international society. Usually this has concerned the ethics or morality of privileging state sovereignty over individual rights, or the ethical desirability of moving beyond pluralism towards a more solidarist international society.\textsuperscript{58} For example, Jackson’s work on pluralist international society engaged in a robust defence of pluralism and also stands as one of the few English School works to utilise pluralist political theory. For Jackson, pluralism is more than a mere label; as he argues ‘By ‘pluralist’, I mean international society affirms the moral value of independent political communities, sovereign states. And it affirms the moral value of the society of such states’.\textsuperscript{59} But again, aside from Jackson, few English School theorists have explicitly sought to explore the prescriptive elements of pluralist theory or the vision of political community that it gives rise to.

By focusing on pluralism as a description for a minimalist form of international society, the English School has largely missed its importance as a constitutive norm of international society. Further, this focus has served to mask the constitutionally variable nature of international society, particularly in relation to decolonisation and the expansion of international society. The failure to engage with pluralist political theory, and the vision of political community it entails, means that the English School has applied the ‘pluralist label’ to international society without fully exploring whether or not such a society is actually constituted in a way that reflects the prescriptive elements of pluralist theory. In other words, international

\textsuperscript{58} For example, solidarists arguably see such developments as an ethical imperative as it would potentially afford greater protection of human rights. Pluralists, however, might argue that it is ethically undesirable as attempts to forge a normatively thicker international society could undermine international order and lead to conflict.

\textsuperscript{59} Jackson, The Global Covenant, 42.
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society has been conceptualised as constitutionally static, overlooking the fundamental constitutional revisions that underpinned the transition from a European to a globalised form of international society.

Hence, to fully understand this transition, along with the current post-Cold War processes of constitutional revision that signal a shift from a pluralist to a more hierarchical form of international society, it needs to be understood what a norm of pluralism entails. Important here is the distinction between pluralism as a prescriptive norm and pluralism as a constitutive norm, a distinction alluded to above. In terms of pluralism’s prescriptive elements, what is referred to here are the visions of society and political community that pluralism prescribes. The question to be determined here is what does a pluralist social order look like? What sorts of rules and principles does pluralism prescribe when it comes to the ordering of social relationships? On the other hand, when pluralism is discussed as a constitutive norm, what is referred to is the way in which pluralism generates or constitutes an international society by determining its fundamental characteristics (scope, membership, etc) and the rules which guide interstate relationships within this society.

A constitutive norm of pluralism does not merely prescribe certain rules or actions; rather, it gives rise to rules or actions (such as international society’s relatively undemanding rules for membership) that would not exist independently of the constitutive norm. The remainder of this section outlines the prescriptive elements of pluralist political theory before exploring the constitutive role of pluralism within international society. The starting point of pluralist political theory
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is the distinction drawn between pluralism and monism.\textsuperscript{60} As Crowder and Griffiths state, ‘Monism, applied to morality, is the view that a single value or narrow range of values overrides all others. Subject to the super-value or values, all other goods can be comprehended within a single harmonious system’.\textsuperscript{61} Therefore, monism suggests that there is a universal value-set or standard through which all other values or goods can be ranked – it proposes that human values can be hierarchically ordered.

In comparison, pluralism, or value pluralism as it is referred to in the literature, suggests that humans are a species capable of inventing a variety of natures for themselves.\textsuperscript{62} Ultimate human values are irreducibly diverse and often cannot be combined.\textsuperscript{63} Such values often come into conflict, and are therefore incompatible. Pluralism thus denies that there is only one universally valid morality or value-system.\textsuperscript{64} Values or goods may differ widely and may be incompatible or incommensurate with each other, but pluralism holds that they are equally valid and equally genuine.\textsuperscript{65} As Berlin argues, ‘The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate and claims equally absolute, the realisation of some of which must involve the sacrifice of others’.\textsuperscript{66} Pluralists thus reject the idea that such ends or values can be hierarchically ordered according to some common measure or standard. Each value-set is its own measure, meaning that often we will have to make choices between incommensurate values.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{64} Berlin, \textit{The Crooked Timber of Humanity}, 87.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 79.
\textsuperscript{67} Galston, \textit{Liberal Pluralism}, 5.
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The notion that we can achieve an ideal or universally-valid form of life is thus taken to be a fallacy – there is no set of values that can resolve the diversity of differing cultures, of differing conceptions of the good life.\(^{68}\) Indeed, pluralists such as Berlin have warned of the possible dangers of attempting to achieve a type of political perfection by harmoniously combining all human values or conceptions of the good life in one ‘perfect’ political system.\(^{69}\) The promise of such a resolution of human diversity turns out to be illusory and dangerous. If one really believed that such a solution was possible, then no price would be too high in order to obtain it.\(^{70}\) Further, since such a monist system would cut against the grain of the natural human condition, it could only be constructed and maintained forcefully or coercively.\(^{71}\) Berlin’s argument against monism also flags the main argument of this thesis, namely that attempting to impose particular socio-political institutions informed by particularistic values leads to anti-pluralist and hierarchical outcomes within international society.

Pluralism is thus characterised by a strong commitment to diversity. However, despite the pluralist commitment to diversity and the rejection of any attempt to hierarchically order differing values and ways of life, pluralism cannot be collapsed into a form of cultural relativism.\(^{72}\) Relativism is the notion that there are no universal values or moral outlooks, only particular moral judgements made from particular moral standpoints.\(^{73}\) Cultural relativism holds that it is not possible to criticise the practices of a culture on any grounds but its own – there is no external

\(^{70}\) Ibid.
\(^{71}\) Crowder and Griffiths, ‘Postmodernism Value Pluralism and International Relations’, 139.
\(^{72}\) As Wheeler and Dunne argue, Bull rejected the notion that a plurality of cultures or values amongst states necessarily leads to a form of cultural relativism. This is also true of Berlin and Jackson. See Nicholas J. Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, ‘Hedley Bull’s Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will’, *International Affairs* 72, no. 1 (1996): 93; Berlin, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, 80 and Jackson, *The Global Covenant*, 407.
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point of view from which the norms of a culture can be second-guessed.\textsuperscript{74} Thus, meaningful communication and interaction that transcends purely instrumental concerns between different cultures is impossible.\textsuperscript{75} In the international realm, this would preclude the existence of an international society based upon the shared norms and understandings of its member states.

Pluralism, on the other hand, holds that there are universal values, values that are intelligible to all cultures by way of our common humanity.\textsuperscript{76} As Berlin argues, ‘Incompatible these ends may be, but their variety cannot be unlimited, for the nature of men, however various and subject to change, must possess some generic character if it is to be called human at all’.\textsuperscript{77} Such values might include basic human rights, such as freedom from abuse, although this is not clearly specified in the literature.\textsuperscript{78} These universal values, ones that we can make sense of, enable us to understand and communicate with those from differing cultural backgrounds. We might find the cultural practices or ways of life of different individuals or societies repulsive, but we can still make sense of these practices and ways of life, can still recognise them as valid for that individual or society, and ultimately we can still enter into meaningful communication with other people and other societies.

The above summarises some of the main themes of pluralist political theory and hints at some of the main features of a pluralist vision of political community. In sum, beginning from the notion of the inherent diversity of human nature and human values, and its rejection of any ranking or ordering of what are taken to be

\textsuperscript{74} Crowder, \textit{Liberalism and Value-Pluralism}, 123. See also Crowder, \textit{Isaiah Berlin}, 117.

\textsuperscript{75} Jackson, \textit{The Global Covenant}, 407.


\textsuperscript{77} Isaiah Berlin, \textit{The Crooked Timber of Humanity}, 80.

\textsuperscript{78} For instance Berlin, widely acknowledged as one of the leading pluralist theorists, never clearly specified what these ultimate human values were. However, his support for liberalism as the political regime most suited to pluralism suggests that such values might include basic liberal values such as equality and liberty.
incommensurate human values, the pluralist prescription of an ideal form of society is one in which a maximum range of values are accommodated. Within international society, this involves allowing for diverse political communities with differing cultures and forms of government to claim membership of international society and, more importantly, have these claims recognised by other members irrespective of the domestic social or political differences between them.

Indeed, the issue of recognition is crucial to understanding pluralism’s role as a constitutive norm of international society. Fundamental to the existence of a pluralist form of international society is the recognition of the ‘other’ and the ‘other’s’ right to pursue diverse values and conceptions of the good life. As Bellamy argues ‘pluralist international society rests on mutual recognition of the component units’ right to exist’. 79 Indeed, recognition is a fundamental precondition of any form of international society. Reus-Smit suggests that

As English School theorists have themselves noted, the foundation of international society is mutual recognition, the use of standards of legitimate statehood to determine which polities will be granted the entitlements of sovereign statehood.

A deep politics of identity thus undergirds international society, determining its membership. 80

Recognition forms the basis on which any society can be formed. Any actor wishing to enter into social relations with other actors must first be recognised by these other actors as properly participating in the society. 81 Indeed, as Dunne states ‘Clearly the act of mutual recognition indicates the presence of a social practice:

recognition is fundamental to an identity relationship’.\(^{82}\) In other words ‘Recognition is a process whereby an entity is acknowledged by a state as being a state...’\(^{83}\) Wight makes the important point that ‘It would be impossible to have a society of states unless each state, while claiming sovereignty for itself, recognised that every other state had the right to claim and enjoy its own sovereignty as well.’\(^{84}\)

Wight’s comment highlights the extent to which the existence of a sovereign state can be said to depend upon its recognition as such by other members of international society. Reciprocity and mutuality are therefore inherent in the concept of recognition. Sovereignty or statehood is not merely something that is unilaterally claimed. Rather, it is something that has to be bestowed by other political communities who have also claimed the status of a sovereign state.\(^{85}\) The important point here is that pluralism mandates the recognition of a political community irrespective of its internal characteristics. It is to be expected that a pluralist international society would attempt to accommodate the widest range of possible values and political regimes. The mere fact of diversity among states does not necessarily equate with a pluralist international society.

Rather, it is the recognition, tolerance and respect of such diversity that is a crucial feature of a pluralist international society. Recognition of statehood in a pluralist international society is also recognition of the diversity of that society’s membership. It is an affirmation of the moral value of the plurality of human values, cultures and regimes. It is recognition of the equal right of all peoples to freely determine the way in which they should live and the right of all states to constitute

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\(^{82}\) Dunne, ‘Sociological Investigations’, 75.
\(^{84}\) Wight, Systems of States, 135.
\(^{85}\) Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, 26.
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their socio-political institutions as they wish free from external interference.\textsuperscript{86} As such, pluralism is a constitutive norm of international society in the sense that the criteria for recognition that it entails generates an inclusive, global form of international society. This is one in which all political communities are entitled to formally equal membership irrespective of their socio-political institutions or values.

However, the right to freely determine their own socio-political institutions and values and the enjoyment of equal membership also imposes a negative obligation upon states entering international society to reciprocally recognise and tolerate the diversity of its membership. As Buzan suggests, states must be prepared to accept the values of international pluralism, and are therefore obliged to recognise and tolerate varying forms of government and cultural practices.\textsuperscript{87} Failure to do so could threaten the existence of a global international society.\textsuperscript{88} An international society that attempts to predicate recognition of statehood and membership on adherence to particular values or political regimes is therefore not pluralist. Any attempt to impose positive obligations upon states domestically for the recognition of their sovereignty, such as adherence to particular cultural values or forms of governance, is necessarily corrosive of pluralism at the international level. The imposition of such obligations would limit the range of possible values and regimes that different societies could reasonably adopt.

\textsuperscript{86} However, an important point here is that pluralist political theory does not suggest that such freedom means different societies or regimes may treat their citizens in any way they see fit. Although this has not been reflected in practice within international society, at least not in any systematic way, we can objectively distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ regimes or even societies according to their adherence to those universal values that underpin our common humanity. A regime that systematically violates these values is thus illegitimate. This has important implications for the pluralist-solidarist debate that are unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis.


\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
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For example, European international society (like any international society) was formed on the basis of the recognition of each member as a sovereign state by the other members of that society. But in determining the criteria for recognition, European states consciously limited such criteria to particularistic, or monist, standards of domestic conduct and constitution. States had to adhere to European values and notions of statehood and ‘civilisation’ in order to be recognised. In the post-Cold War era similar trends have emerged that involve the conditioning of full membership within international society, particularly the enjoyment of the rights of sovereign equality and non-intervention, on adherence to non-risky (liberal) forms of domestic governance. This leads to a monist or anti-pluralist form of international society.

Again, it is the use of pluralism as a descriptive label within the English School that has blinded many scholars to the fundamentally anti-pluralist nature of international society before decolonisation. Both European international society and its globalised successor may be institutionally similar and both may be minimalist in the level of agreed norms between states. However, simply applying the label ‘pluralist’ to both ignores the varying criteria for recognition, rightful membership and rightful conduct and hence the different constitutional structures of these international societies. Further, it is important to reiterate that similarly attempting to account for hierarchical trends within an international society merely described as ‘pluralist’ prevents an examination of how these trends affect the pluralist vision of political community currently reflected in international society’s constitution.

Finally, it is pluralism’s constitutive role within international society, particularly its emphasis on recognising and accommodating diversity between values, cultures and political regimes that leads to what might be termed the
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‘regulative rights’ of non-intervention, formal equality and self-determination within contemporary international society.\(^89\) For example, the pluralist notion that human values are equally valid and its rejection of any hierarchical ordering of such values provides for an inherently egalitarian vision of political community. Within pluralist international society, this is realised through the norm of sovereign or formal equality, taken by many scholars, particularly those within the field of international law, as the key norm of international society.\(^90\) Likewise, the contention by pluralists such as Williams that a ‘good’ society or regime is one that provides individuals with maximum choice between differing values implies that it is also one that provides individuals with the freedom to choose between these values or ways of life by themselves.\(^91\)

This freedom to choose is intrinsic to a pluralist vision of society for, as Gray suggests, it is precisely our capacity for choice which allows human beings to develop a diversity of natures.\(^92\) Therefore, in seeking to maximise the choices that individuals or societies may reasonably make, the freedom to make such choices in the absence of external interference is an important component of pluralist political theory. This freedom to choose is essentially commensurate with Berlin’s notion of negative freedom.\(^93\) As Crowder argues, non-intervention provides the space in which individuals (or societies) can act without obstruction. That is, it is the space in

\(^{89}\) These rights are regulative in the sense that they regulate and order state conduct and interactions within international society. Further, it is true that these rights obtained between the major European powers before decolonisation. Again, however, such rights were only imperfectly realised given that smaller European states were continually subject to intervention by the major powers right up until the end of the Second World War and of course that much of the world was divided between the European empires and subject to European rule.


\(^{91}\) Williams, ‘Introduction’, xvii.

\(^{92}\) John Gray, Isaiah Berlin, 15.

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which freedom of choice can be exercised, which is a goal that is in keeping with pluralism. This is realised within international society through the rule of non-intervention. Importantly, the point here is that a respect for pluralism and recognition of diversity is a pre-requisite for a strong norm of non-intervention. It is precisely when heterogeneity and difference come to be seen as undesirable features of international society that the rule of non-intervention can be subject to violation.

Pluralist political theory thus provides for an international society characterised by diversity, formal equality and non-intervention. Since the end of colonialism, the above have all been marked features of international society – pluralism is its central constitutive norm. The prescriptive elements of pluralism or its constitutive role have generally not been acknowledged in much of the English School literature, leading to a static view of international society’s constitution. This is most evident with respect to the historical accounts provided by English School theorists of the evolution of contemporary international society. The next section provides a brief analysis of this evolution. As is argued, until the end of colonialism, recognition of diversity within international society can only be said to have been substantially limited. With the end of colonialism, international society’s constitutional structure was fundamentally altered, leading to a new, inclusive form of international society.

The Historical Evolution of Pluralism in International Society

This final section briefly considers the historical evolution of pluralist international society. Historical investigation is a key aspect of the English School, yet notably most English School scholars have generally not considered the role of

Crowder, Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism, 76.
pluralism in international society’s historical development, particularly in terms of its eventual global expansion. The questions to be asked are has pluralism been a continuous feature of the society of states? And if not, at what point did a pluralist international society emerge? As Bellamy suggests, there are two main historical questions that have yet to be answered satisfactorily in relation to international society: how did today’s international society emerge? And why, and how, do the norms and rules underpinning international society change over time?\textsuperscript{95} The point of this section is therefore to assess the extent to which international society has historically reflected the central pluralist idea that the human condition is irrevocably plural and that there can be no universal standard with which to rank values or political regimes other than those universal values which bind us together as human.

Beginning with Westphalia, this section traces the emergence of pluralist international society. Many scholars have taken Westphalia or other significant historical events, such as the creation of the UN, to be the seminal moment in the evolution of contemporary international society. Contrary to these claims, the argument presented here is that only with the end of colonialism did a truly pluralist international society emerge. Decolonisation was, as Philpott suggests, a ‘revolution in sovereignty’ and a moment of constitutional restructuring within international society.\textsuperscript{96} The granting of independence and sovereignty to the colonies represented a fundamental shift in the normative constitution of international society, one which changed the rules of the game and resulted in the ascendance of pluralism as its

\textsuperscript{96} Philpott, \textit{Revolutions in Sovereignty}, 5.
fundamental constitutive norm, something that has not been clearly acknowledged in most of the English School literature.\textsuperscript{97}

Despite the almost mythological status of the Peace of Westphalia as the founding moment of the modern states-system, it did not ‘magically’ create the states-system. Westphalia did not represent an instant metamorphosis, yet it did consolidate centuries of transition and change that would eventually result in the emergence of the modern states-system.\textsuperscript{98} Sovereign states such as England, Sweden and France had already emerged prior to Westphalia, but the changes wrought by the Italian Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation were finally given European-wide effect. After Westphalia, the ideal and reality of a united Christendom was gone.\textsuperscript{99} The result was that Europe had become an assemblage of sovereign states. But the extent to which social relations amongst these new states reflected pluralist ideas is highly questionable.

The notion that a pluralist international society emerged immediately after Westphalia sits uncomfortably with certain features of the post-Westphalian international order.\textsuperscript{100} Even after the treaties had been signed and the new states of Europe began to take shape, most of these new states still saw themselves as belonging to the wider whole of Latin Christendom.\textsuperscript{101} Indeed, the delegates at the peace conferences were happy to designate themselves as the ‘senate of the Christian world’.\textsuperscript{102} As Bull argues, there might have been an international society, but it was

\textsuperscript{97} Ruggie likewise claims that colonialism was a moment of normative change, resulting in a new ‘collective intentionality’ that changed the rules of the game. See Ruggie, \textit{Constructing the World Polity}, 25.


\textsuperscript{100} Reus-Smit, \textit{The Moral Purpose of the State}, 91.

\textsuperscript{101} Watson, \textit{The Evolution of International Society}, 182.

\textsuperscript{102} Philpott, \textit{Revolutions in Sovereignty}, 82.
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one with a Christian core. Diversity and, more importantly, the idea that diversity was to be tolerated and respected among these new states were severely limited. A strong sense of differentiation prevailed between Christian Europe and the rest of the world, but crucially, these differences were not regarded as legitimate or tolerable, evident in the refusal of Christian Europe to admit the Ottoman Empire into international society.

Pluralism, both in the sense of actual diversity and in the commitment of the members of international society to recognise such diversity, was virtually non-existent immediately after the Peace of Westphalia. This was not a pluralist international society; it was more akin to contemporary English School notions of a solidarist international society, one in which member states shared substantive Christian values and principles of dynastic legitimacy. As Reus-Smit suggests, for two hundred years after Westphalia a pre-modern set of Christian and dynastic values determined legitimate statehood and rightful conduct. This lack of a normative commitment to pluralism in the centuries following Westphalia was further demonstrated by the reaction of the dynastic monarchies to the emergence of republicanism as an alternative basis of the internal constitution of the state during the French Revolution.

The reaction of the European monarchies was to form the Holy Alliance, established in 1815. This Alliance was a largely reactionary and loose organisation that eventually came to encompass most of the states of Europe, with the notable exception of Britain. It sought to suppress any further revolutions and preserve Christian, dynastic monarchism within Europe. The Holy Alliance was

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104 Ibid., 29.
105 Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State, 88.
106 Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, 235.
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fundamentally hostile to democracy (republicanism) and secularism.\textsuperscript{107} It was concerned with preserving what Russia’s Tsar Alexander the First and Austria’s Foreign Minister Metternich saw as the legitimate social order of Europe, one founded on Christian values and absolute monarchy. Constitutional reform or republican revolution anywhere in Europe or the Americas was regarded as the legitimate concern of the Holy Alliance, and would be met with ‘military reaction and reactionary militancy’.\textsuperscript{108} At Troppau in 1820, the powers of the Holy Alliance agreed to quash constitutionalism and prevent instability in Europe.\textsuperscript{109}

The intention of the members of the Alliance was to create ‘a regular European directory for keeping the states of Europe in a fixed political system’.\textsuperscript{110} The Holy Alliance was thus distinctly anti-pluralist in its orientation. It was, as Simpson suggests ‘an evangelical pact designed to promote a particular version of the good life and buttressed by certain non-negotiable moral beliefs’.\textsuperscript{111} The attempt by the members of the Holy Alliance to impose one particular set of values and system of governance on all of Europe demonstrated the extent to which pluralism had yet to become widely accepted as a principle of European international society. The Holy Alliance’s repudiation of pluralism and its unwillingness to tolerate internal diversity among the states of Europe also demonstrates the way in which norms of equality and non-intervention are easily eroded in the absence of a respect for plurality. The interventionist doctrine of the Alliance was directly based on its repudiation of any values or forms of governance other than those which it endorsed.

\textsuperscript{107} For more on the Holy Alliance see Harold George Nicolson, \textit{The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity, 1812-1822} (London: Constable, 1946).


\textsuperscript{110} Mowat, \textit{A History of European Diplomacy}, 32.

Further, the assertion that the powers of the Holy Alliance could police Europe and intervene wherever they pleased suggested a fundamentally hierarchical, unequal relationship between the Great Powers of the Alliance and the smaller European states. Yet the significance of the Holy Alliance should not be overstated. While it certainly demonstrated the extent to which most of the major European powers opposed any form of government other than dynastic monarchism or set of values that were not explicitly Christian, international society had already become more diverse with the granting of independence to the United States. This trend continued with the independence of the South American colonies and the admission of the Ottoman Empire into international society. However, again it is important not to overstate the significance of these events.

The states of South America were not treated as equals after independence, and were subject to continued European intervention in their affairs.112 Further, as Bull argues:

This initial expansion, to embrace peoples Christian in religion and European in race and culture, did not strain the criteria of membership and in itself did little to advance the prospects that non-Christian and non-European peoples could gain admission.113 Those territories that were not European or settled by Europeans were not admitted into international society. However, the exception here is the Ottoman Empire, the first non-European, non-Christian state accepted into the European international society in 1856.114 Yet, while the Ottoman Empire was formally recognised by the

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1856 Treaty of Paris, it was not treated as a European state – it did not enjoy parity of status with the other European powers.\textsuperscript{115}

The Ottomans were subjected to continued capitulations with the European powers, which were modified by the Europeans to protect their nationals and trade by ensuring both were subjected to European laws and practices.\textsuperscript{116} Indeed, the Ottoman administration was also required to ensure that it observed European standards in its dealings.\textsuperscript{117} The Ottomans were thus subjected to European interference in their internal affairs in order to compel them to conform to European values and standards of governance. Respect for pluralism and diversity was still limited within international society. While a non-Christian state had been admitted into international society, it was admitted on the basis of capitulatory agreements which enforced European values and standards that were taken to constitute a universal standard for all societies to adhere to. Tolerance and recognition of diversity was thus not consolidated with the admission of the former settler colonies of the Americas or the Ottoman Empire into international society.

In particular, these small steps towards greater respect for pluralism were radically mitigated in the nineteenth century by the invocation of the ‘standard of civilisation’ which was applied to non-Western territories as a precondition for full membership within international society.\textsuperscript{118} Further, European imperialism again demonstrates that a refusal to accommodate the variety of values and ways of life between different societies leads to the derogation of the rights of sovereign equality and non-intervention which the European society of states reserved for itself. Writing on the concept of sovereign equality under international law, Dickinson claims:

\textsuperscript{115} Watson, \textit{The Expansion of International Society}, 270; Albrecht-Carrie, \textit{The Concert of Europe}, 12.
\textsuperscript{116} Watson, \textit{The Expansion of International Society}, 270.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{118} Gong, \textit{The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ in International Society}, 5.
Fundamental differences in the character of civilization have always been the source of important limitations on capacity...Most of the modern publicists recognize that equality can be the rule only among states having common standards of civilization.\(^{119}\)

Those societies with differing cultures or values to that of Europe were deemed ‘deviant’ or ‘backward’ and thus lacked the capacity for self-government. This justified their conquest by the imperial European powers and the denial of the rights of sovereign equality and non-intervention. As Brown states: ‘Among the [European] full members of international society, the norm was non-intervention. On the other hand, in their relations with peoples not deemed members of international society...no such norm of non-intervention was held to apply’.\(^{120}\) In sum, it would not be until decolonisation and the recognition and acceptance of the colonies as sovereign states that pluralism would emerge as the central structuring principle of international society. As Jackson suggests, the significance of decolonisation and the subsequent globalisation of international society is often missed by International Relations scholars.\(^{121}\)

This is certainly true of the English School. As noted, many English School theorists have attributed to international society a relatively static constitutional structure, demonstrated by the tendency to label both European international society and its global successor as pluralist. However, this ignores the anti-pluralist nature of European international society and hence the constitutional revisions that decolonisation represented. Interestingly despite his claim that the significance of decolonisation is often overlooked, Jackson devotes little attention to decolonisation.


\(^{121}\) Jackson, *The Global Covenant*, viii.
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as a fundamental period of normative transformation within international society in *The Global Covenant*. Instead, he argues that sovereignty is expressive of the pluralist underpinnings of international society, and thus pluralism within international society can be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia.\(^{122}\) The problem with this argument is that, as Philpott argues, state practice within international society must actually correspond to its constitutional norms if these norms are to be called ‘constitutive’ at all.\(^{123}\)

What Jackson does not acknowledge is that in the centuries after Westphalia, the explicit refusal of Europe to admit differently constituted political communities into international society suggests the absence of pluralism as a constitutive norm of this society. If pluralism has been a fundamental norm of international society since Westphalia, this certainly was not reflected in state practice until at least 1960. Until then, non-European communities were either excluded from international society or admitted only after their internal political, social and economic institutions had been radically altered. The lack of acknowledgement of decolonisation as representing a fundamental normative shift towards a pluralist international society is also evident in one of the key English School texts dealing with decolonisation, *The Expansion of International Society*.

In this work, the topic of decolonisation is discussed in numerous chapters and in some depth. However, there is virtually no discussion of the relationship of decolonisation to the emergence of a pluralist international society. While Bull suggests that decolonisation involved a transformation of the moral and legal

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122 Jackson has done so at length in other works. Interestingly, although Jackson posits the normative shift involved with decolonisation as one between what he terms negative and positive conceptions of sovereignty, he does not devote much attention to the implications of this shift for the emergence of a pluralist international society, nor does he examine the relationship between pluralism and the respective doctrines of positive and negative sovereignty. See Jackson, *Quasi-States*.

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environment, there is little analysis of the specifics of this normative change. Clark’s work on legitimacy in international society also demonstrates a surprising lack of awareness of the significance of decolonisation for the political constitution of international society. Despite his contention that rightful membership forms one of the central components of international legitimacy, decolonisation, a period where the legitimacy of colonialism and empire was discredited and principles of rightful membership substantially altered, barely rates a mention.

This failure to identify pluralism as a key, and historically variable, constitutive norm of international society, or indeed to even identify decolonisation as a moment of significant constitutional revision, is a crucial weakness of the English School’s conceptualisation of contemporary international society and the analysis of its historical evolution. It means that, generally, the current English School literature is ill-placed to adequately conceptualise the constitutional revisions wrought by Western risk management interventions in the post-Cold War era. Rather than engage with pluralism as a variable norm and consider the extent to which Western interventionism contravenes international society’s pluralist constitution, much of the literature on Western interventionism or attempts at promoting liberal values has focused on how these interventions violate certain principles such as non-intervention or have been unhelpfully ensnared within the pluralist-solidarist debate.

125 Clark limits most of his study of rightful membership within international society to the post-Cold War era. Colonialism and de-colonisation are only briefly mentioned. See Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, 161.
126 Hurrell and Wheeler both argue for the emergence of a more solidarist form of international society. What they do not consider is that contemporary international society is actually becoming more hierarchical and anti-pluralist, rather than solidarist. See Hurrell, On Global Order and Wheeler, Saving Strangers.
However, some scholars have identified pluralism as a historically variable norm of international society. For example, Simpson identifies pluralism and anti-pluralism as historically variable features of international society. However, he traces the emergence of a pluralist international society to the drafting and implementation of the UN Charter. As noted, a case can certainly be made that the Charter symbolically represents the emergence of a pluralist international society. In the final draft of the Charter there is no distinction made between states on the basis of their internal characteristics. Indeed, the Charter, in Article 2(1) affirms the sovereign equality of all of its members, and in Article 2(7) affirms the norm of non-intervention by precluding any interference in those affairs that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the state.\textsuperscript{127}

There is little doubt then that, as Simpson argues, the UN Charter represents the highest expression of the norms of equality and non-intervention.\textsuperscript{128} Yet despite its supposedly pluralist connotations, during the negotiations over the drafting of the Charter, there was no mention of providing the rights of sovereign equality or non-intervention to the colonies. Indeed, the Trusteeship Council was established within the UN to oversee the administration of colonial territories. Sovereign equality and non-intervention were norms that would apply only among the West and those non-Western states that had been seen to meet the standard of civilisation and thus admitted into international society.\textsuperscript{129} The pluralism of the immediate post-1945 period was therefore still substantially limited. While the norms of sovereign equality and non-intervention were enshrined in the UN Charter, as Reus-Smit

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{128} Simpson, \textit{Great Powers and Outlaw States}, 269.
  \item \textsuperscript{129} I use the term ‘West’ instead of ‘Europe’ here as by 1945, the United States had emerged as a superpower and several other European settler colonies had emerged as independent sovereign states. Thus ‘Europe’ had become part of the wider ‘Western’ socio-political and economic entity.
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claims they ‘only became a general organising principle for the international system as a whole when decolonisation replaced the formal hierarchies of empire with the first global system of sovereign states’.\textsuperscript{130}

In other words, the rhetoric of the Charter did not conform to the existing hierarchical relationships (the European empires) prevalent within international society in the immediate post-World War Two period. The sovereign equality and non-intervention of the Charter were mitigated to a large extent by the existence of the formal hierarchies of Western imperialism. However, it could be argued that decolonisation merely represented the codification of a normative shift that had begun in 1945 with the signing of the UN Charter. In this respect, decolonisation was merely a formal acknowledgement of transformations in the constitution of international society that had begun several years earlier. Yet, despite the codification of pluralist norms such as equality and non-intervention in the UN Charter, pluralism was not legitimated as a constitutive norm of international society until decolonisation. It was decolonisation that finally saw the global application (rather than merely codification) of pluralist notions of recognition and norms of sovereign equality and non-intervention to social relationships amongst all political communities.

Indeed, Simpson eventually acknowledges as much:

The Charter era, then, was marked by a commitment to a formally non-hierarchical international order. This is certainly true of a period between 1960 (the Declaration of the Granting of Independence) and 1989...The distinction between civilised and non-civilised peoples had finally been abandoned,

\textsuperscript{130} Reus-Smit, ‘Liberal Hierarchy and the Licence to use Force’, 73.
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previously criminal states were returned to the fold, and democracy was left as a
desideratum rather than a genuine prerequisite of the society of states.131

It is thus the end of colonialism which represents the crucial point in the emergence
of the post-colonial international society. It was at this point that international
society finally affirmed the plurality of human values and culture and formally
abandoned the attempt to hierarchically order societies according to particular values
or standards. The illegality and illegitimacy of colonialism was highlighted in
several resolutions of the General Assembly, the most important of which was
Resolution 1514: The Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial

This resolution effectively outlawed colonialism in all its forms, and
represented a formal codification of the normative shift that had occurred. As stated
in the resolution: ‘All people have the right of self-determination; by virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their social,
economic and cultural development’.132 Here we find an important statement of
pluralism as a fundamental norm of international society. As Robert Jackson argues,
after 1960, the rules of the ‘old sovereignty game’, which justified overseas empire
and made membership in the society of states dependent on the possession of a
capable and ‘civilised’ government, were fundamentally changed.133 Keene likewise
suggests that ‘The toleration of different ways of life has thus become an absolutely
central principle in the new global political and legal order’.134 Most colonial
territories were recognised as sovereign states, regardless of the perceived

131 Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, 276.
132 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 1514 (XV): Declaration on the Granting of
133 Jackson, Quasi-States, 4.
134 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, 9.
disorganisation or illegitimacy of their domestic institutions.\textsuperscript{135} It no longer made sense to speak of a hierarchical world order in which certain states or political communities could be excluded from international society on the basis of their societal values or political regimes.

The end of colonialism thus resulted in a substantial revision of international society’s constitution, particularly in terms of rightful membership. The right of all states to adopt differing societal values or forms of internal political or social constitution was realised. The result of this normative shift was the globalisation of international society. With the ascendance of a pluralist constitution and the accompanying de-legitimation of a hierarchical ordering of political communities based upon their internal characteristics, there was no longer a basis on which to exclude a political community from international society. Between 1957 and 1967 (especially between 1960 and 1966), many colonies gained their independence.\textsuperscript{136} The pluralist constitution of international society is therefore one that underwrites the existence of a diverse range of states irrespective of their internal characteristics.\textsuperscript{137}

With the formal codification of a pluralist constitution of international society, the rights of sovereign equality, self-determination, and non-intervention were likewise globalised. The principles of the UN Charter were globally implemented, with the result that these rights were reified and embedded as key values of the post-colonial international society. Indeed, the norm of non-intervention was one that was repeatedly affirmed in several General Assembly resolutions following the collapse

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 24.
\textsuperscript{137} Jackson, \textit{Quasi-States}, 171.
of the European empires. While these norms, especially non-intervention, have been subject to violation since the end of colonialism, they have generally been respected by most states, including the great powers. In sum, since decolonisation, international practice and state behaviour have reflected the norms and rules of the pluralist constitution of international society.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to address the question of how international society is constituted and has placed particular emphasis on the role of norms in its constitutional structuring. In order to illustrate this point this chapter has explored the constitutive norm of pluralism, arguing that since decolonisation pluralism has represented the core structuring norm of international society, informing the rights of sovereign equality and non-intervention that states enjoy. The result of this pluralist constitution is that international society is global in scope and highly inclusive in nature, a result of the pluralist idea that diversity between human values is to be recognised and accommodated. Further, the historical analysis of the evolution of this pluralist society has sought to reinforce the contention that norms, and hence international society’s constitution, are dynamic and shift over time.

Thus pluralism, rather than a descriptive label or static feature of international society, is both a prescriptive norm that provides a particular vision of political community between states and a historically variable constitutive norm that generates a particular form of international society. Indeed, pluralist international

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society is actually a historical anomaly – for most of its history, international society has been characterised by positive criteria for membership and relations of hierarchy. In the post-Cold War era new hierarchical trends have emerged within international society that signals a shift within its constitution. The pluralist constitution of international society has begun to give way to a new, anti-pluralist and hierarchical constitutional order, one in which the criteria for membership within international society is predicated upon compliance with positive obligations to adopt liberal values and institutions. However, the nature of these new hierarchies and their significance for international society’s pluralist constitution have been largely overlooked.

The next two chapters explore the nature of these hierarchies, their significance for international society’s pluralist constitution and the causal factors that have underpinned their emergence. Drawing on the work of Lake and Hobson and Sharman, among others, the next chapter explores the issue of hierarchy within international society. In particular, it considers the role of liberalism in these new hierarchies, questioning how an ideology supposedly based on the ideals of individual equality and freedom can become encapsulated within structures of international hierarchy. Reviewing the literature on various liberal international theories, the next chapter suggests that liberalism, when applied to International Relations, can give rise to an anti-pluralist and hierarchical vision of international society that suggests that liberalism within the state is much more important than the liberal relations between states which pluralism gives rise to. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, these theories of a hierarchical form of international liberalism are important as many of the ideas that they contain, particularly regarding the pacific effect of liberalism and democracy, have been utilised by Western
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governments as a justification for adopting the promotion of liberal values as a mechanism of risk management.
Two
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Introduction

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, international society has had a pluralist constitution only since the early 1960s. Throughout most of its history, hierarchical political relationships have been a marked feature of international society. With the de-legitimation and ending of European colonialism, formal hierarchy within international society was largely discredited. However, some exceptions remained, most notably the Soviet Union’s hierarchical relationship with East European communist states. Yet, between decolonisation and the end of the Cold War such exceptions were generally not widespread. Rather, interstate relationships within international society were generally ordered by its pluralist constitution. This is particularly so in terms of the prevailing criteria for recognition as a sovereign state and legitimate state conduct. However, since the end of the Cold War, this pluralist constitution has increasingly been called into question by a renewed emphasis on the internal socio-political conditions of states by Western societies. It has also been challenged by several interventions by Western states designed to promote liberalism and democracy in various territories across the globe.

1 See Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, 75-8.
2 For example, the case studies provided in this thesis examine Western interventionism in Eastern Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific.
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Underpinning these new hierarchies has been the increasing Western emphasis on liberal values as the positive criteria states must meet in order to be recognised as full members of international society. That is, new hierarchical trends within international society are informed by the distinction between liberalism as the preferred (and non-risky) form of government and governance and illiberal or undemocratic regimes viewed as potentially dangerous and inherently inferior. The West’s renewed enthusiasm for its liberal values was apparent with liberalism’s supposed victory over communism at the end of the Cold War, an enthusiasm perhaps best captured by Fukuyama with his thesis on the ‘end of history’. The end of the Cold War thus gave rise to a Western reaffirmation of its own unique liberal values.

There has also been a steady increase of academic work since the 1980s (and particularly during the 1990s) that has sought to portray liberalism as inherently different and thus superior to other ideologies or forms of political organisation. These works, spanning disciplines such as International Relations, political philosophy and international law, have provided ideological justifications for the superiority of liberal democracy (such as its pacific effects) and have argued for special governance rights for liberal states within international society. This literature implicitly queries ‘what constitutes a liberal international society’? It suggests that a desirable form of liberal international society is one based upon domestic liberal governance within as many states as possible. In order to achieve this, the literature has sought to justify the establishment of hierarchical relationships

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4 Fukuyama, *The End of History*.
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within international society based on distinctions between states in terms of their adherence to liberalism and democracy.

These claims of liberalism as the legitimate standard of statehood within international society are distinctly monist and anti-pluralist in that they explicitly seek to limit the range of values and regimes that states can legitimately adopt. Curiously then, liberalism, an ideology supposedly based upon the ideals of individual freedom and equality, has become ensnared within structures of international hierarchy.\(^7\) The point of this chapter is twofold: firstly, it seeks to explore the concept of hierarchy within International Relations. Secondly, the chapter aims to outline the ideational framework that underpins the encapsulation of liberalism within international hierarchy in the post-Cold War era. Reviewing the literature on liberal international theory mentioned above, it is argued in this chapter that liberalism, when applied to International Relations, can give rise to a distinctly anti-pluralist and hierarchical vision of political community between states.

As opposed to a pluralist international society, which can also claim to be ‘liberal’ in the sense of the application of liberal rights of non-intervention and formal equality to states, liberalism can also provide an exclusionary vision of international society. This second version of a ‘liberal’ international society is one in which only its so-called core members, the liberal democracies, enjoy the full rights and privileges of sovereign status. The analysis of these ‘hierarchical’ versions of liberal international theory, and especially the ideas that they contain, is important as it is largely these ideas that inform the West’s belief that promoting liberal values within international society is the appropriate solution to new forms of security risks.

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with which they are currently faced. While the next two chapters are dedicated to understanding the causal factors that underpin new structures of international hierarchy and the goals and fundamental characteristics of the West’s ‘liberal interventions’, neither can be fully appreciated without first examining the ideas that underpin the notion that promoting liberalism can provide security benefits for Western societies.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds in two parts. Firstly, it examines what is meant by the use of the term hierarchy. Questions to be discussed here include what is hierarchy? And what does a hierarchical political relationship entail? It is argued that hierarchy is an authority relationship, one in which the superordinate party views itself as having the authority to command, the subordinate party views itself as having a duty to obey, and both recognise this relationship as legitimate. Hierarchy in this sense is fundamentally a social relationship, one underpinned by ideational frameworks or what Hobson and Sharman refer to as ‘social logics’, which determine the nature of the hierarchical relationships. Crucially, and counter to conventional wisdom, this section argues that hierarchy is not incompatible with the notion of an anarchical international society comprised of sovereign states. The second section of the chapter conducts a review of several literatures on liberalism and liberal International Relations theory in order to draw out the ideas, or social logic, which not only underpin a hierarchical form of international liberalism, but also inform the West’s preference for promoting liberalism within international society as a form of risk management.

8 For more on this see chapter four.
9 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, 68.
10 Ibid.
This literature provides a vision of a fundamentally anti-pluralist and hierarchical form of international society, one in which rightful membership is restricted to those states adhering to liberal values and democratic government. However, it is important to note here that the nature of new hierarchies within international society cannot simply be reduced to the ideas that underpin the perceived superiority of liberalism. It is one thing to believe that a particular ideology or mode of social and political organisation is ‘better’ than others; it is quite another to intervene, in some instances forcefully, in order to impose this ideology on other regions. Contemporary hierarchy within international society cannot be fully understood without exploring the causal factors that compel Western societies to attempt to establish themselves as the superordinate (intervening) party in new structures of international hierarchy. Important here are Beck’s notions of risk and the world risk society, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Hierarchy in International Society

Several recent works have highlighted not only new hierarchical political relationships within international society, but have also sought to draw attention to the concept of hierarchy itself and the enduring role of hierarchy within world politics. Several of these works have sought to challenge the conventional image of international society as consisting entirely of sovereign states in a condition of anarchy. Rather, they argue that world politics exhibits both anarchic and hierarchic

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political relationships. For these scholars, hierarchy has always been an enduring feature of world politics. This challenges conventional wisdom, including the English School’s assertion that international society is solely one of sovereign states. The point of this section is to explore the concept of international hierarchy, with a particular focus on the definition of hierarchy as a fundamentally social relationship informed by norms and ideas as laid out by Hobson and Sharman.

This conceptualisation of hierarchy as a social relationship suggests that hierarchical relationships in and of themselves are not incompatible with the notion of an international society of sovereign states. One of the important points to be made in this section is that social relationships within international society need not conform to any particular mode or model (including the pluralist model of an ideal form of international society). The norms that underpin international society’s constitution are dynamic and shift over time, meaning that social interactions and political relationships within international society can take a variety of forms, including hierarchy. This runs counter to both Bull’s and Dunne’s arguments that hierarchy and international society are incompatible.

Hierarchy and inequality are nothing new within world politics. Substantive inequalities between states in terms of wealth, military power or political influence, for example, are a readily noticeable feature of international society. These substantive inequalities are both informally reflected in the distinction between superpowers, great powers and small powers; and formally reflected in the

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14 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, 64.
15 See Dunne, ‘Society and Hierarchy in International Relations’; Bull, The Anarchical Society.
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membership of the UN Security Council, for example.\textsuperscript{17} However, under international society’s pluralist constitution states are for the most part formally equal and the substantive inequalities that exist do not generally provide the more powerful states with any direct authority over weaker states. Further, particularly in the period between decolonisation and the end of the Cold War, the construction of hierarchical relationships between states on the basis of societal values or political regimes was illegitimate and generally absent within international society.\textsuperscript{18} States could legitimately adopt a range of values and political regimes without being subject to a denial of their sovereign rights on the basis of these values or regimes.

With the end of the Cold War, inequalities between Western and non-Western states have widened, particularly in terms of military power, economic wealth and political influence.\textsuperscript{19} However, inequality is not synonymous with hierarchy and the mere fact of increased inequality between Western and many non-Western states is not of itself indicative of new forms of hierarchy within international society. Rather, it has been the attempt by Western societies to claim the authority to intervene and impose liberal values in particular territories that signifies the emergence of new hierarchical relationships between the West and these territories. Western societies have thus sought to limit the range of acceptable values and regimes that states can adopt and subject those states that do not conform to a qualification of their sovereign rights. This contravenes the pluralist vision of social order between states and signals a process of reconstitution within international society.

\textsuperscript{17} Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy’, 142.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 151.
\textsuperscript{19} This was certainly true during the early years of the post-Cold War period, although more recently the economic resurgence of Russia and the growth of China and India signal a gradual shrinking of economic and military inequalities between these countries and Western powers.
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While inequality is an intrinsic element of any hierarchical political relationship, hierarchy is not simply reducible to different forms of inequality between different states. Rather, as several scholars have argued, at its core hierarchy denotes an authority relationship.\(^{20}\) For example, in their definition of hierarchy, Hobson and Sharman start with the concept of authority. For them, hierarchical relationships are fundamentally authoritative, as opposed to purely coercive,\(^{21}\) entailing a social relationship between the superordinate and subordinate parties that both recognise as legitimate.\(^{22}\) As they suggest ‘Hierarchical authority means exactly the opposite — that some are entitled to command and some are required to obey, and that both sides recognize as legitimate the social logic of this unequal situation’.\(^{23}\) Hence Hobson and Sharman define hierarchy ‘as a relationship between two (or more) actors whereby one is entitled to command and the other is obligated to obey, and this relationship is recognized as right and legitimate by each’\(^{24}\).

This notion of hierarchy as an authority relationship is relatively uncontroversial and draws upon the generally accepted definition of hierarchy within the discipline. For instance, Kenneth Waltz defines hierarchy as ‘relations of super- and subordination’ in which ‘actors are formally differentiated according to the degrees of their authority, and their distinct functions are specified’.\(^{25}\) Lake also focuses on hierarchy as a form of authority relation, arguing that external restrictions


\(^{21}\) This distinction between coercion or control and authority is one that has previously been made by Lake, who argues that coercive commands are not authoritative, as authority relationships must contain some measure of legitimacy. See Lake, ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations’, 304.

\(^{22}\) Ibid., 69.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., 69-70.

on states constitute hierarchical authority relationships when one state can compel another to behave in a particular manner and the subordinate state voluntarily complies. Lake, like Hobson and Sharman, argues that external restrictions on a state’s actions that rest entirely on coercion are not authoritative and presumably do not denote a truly hierarchical political relationship. Political relationships that are based entirely on the coercion of one state by another are thus something other than hierarchy – they involve outright domination. Hence, in keeping the subordinate party subordinated, the superordinate party must rely not only on the real or perceived threat of coercion, but also on the perceived legitimacy of their authority by both parties in the hierarchical relationship.

We must be careful, however, not to discount the role of coercion, which partially underpins any form of hierarchical relationship. While coercion and material capacity might not be the only or even the most important factors in a hierarchical relationship, hierarchies cannot function in the absence of the superordinate state’s demonstrated or perceived capacity to punish non-compliance on the part of the subordinate state. As Lake argues, authority and coercion are intimately tied together and while a hierarchical authority relationship entails the obligation to obey on the part of the subordinate party, this obligation creates only an expectation of obedience. Subordinates can flout the rules and commands of superordinates while still recognising the legitimate right of the superordinate party to issue and enforce commands. A perceived or demonstrated capacity for coercion

27 Such a ‘coercive’ capacity need not rely only on military force; it could well include other forms of sanction such as the conditionalities included in the EU’s agreements with European Neighbourhood Policy partner states. See chapter five for more details. It is also important to note here that the capacity for coercion is not simply reducible to the material capacity of the superordinate state, but can also include the idea or perception on the part of the subordinate state that non-compliance will result in sanction.
29 Ibid.
and enforcement is therefore necessary to keep the subordinate party in line and is an important element of a hierarchical relationship.

However, while the coercive capacity of the superordinate party is an important component of hierarchy, Hobson and Sharman, Lake and Goh are all persuasive in arguing that hierarchy is not simply reducible to coercion or control.\textsuperscript{30} Social, rather than purely material, factors are crucial to hierarchy formation and reproduction. Indeed, the definition of hierarchy as an authority relationship recognised as legitimate by each party draws attention to the social aspects of hierarchical political relationships. As Clark argues, hierarchy is ‘a social arrangement characterised by stratification in which, like the angels, there are orders of power and glory and the society is classified in successively subordinate grades’.\textsuperscript{31} At its core, hierarchy is a social relationship, one in which the authority to command and the obligation to obey is constructed by the ideas and norms that underpin the hierarchical relationship. As Goh argues ‘hierarchical social compacts cannot be understood without analysis of the collective norms and beliefs that underpin the legitimacy of such relations’.\textsuperscript{32}

These ideas and norms are what Hobson and Sharman refer to as ‘social logics’: social ordering principles that shape hierarchy formation, fall and reproduction.\textsuperscript{33} These norms shape and construct the identity of the parties involved in the hierarchical relationship, particularly the identity of states as either superordinate or subordinate parties. The idea of European colonialism as a ‘civilising mission’, for example, underpinned the perceived legitimacy of Europe’s


\textsuperscript{33} Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, 68.
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hierarchical relationship with the colonies and protectorates, simultaneously constructing the Europeans as ‘civilisers’ and the various colonies as ‘uncivilised’ or ‘barbaric’. However, Hobson and Sharman focus on assessing the extent to which the traditional image of an international society comprised solely of sovereign states is accurate. In contrast, the focus here is on examining hierarchies between sovereign states and outlining the constitutive role of a particular liberal conception of political community between states which provides a particular social logic that partly underpins these hierarchical relations. As will be discussed below, this differs from Hobson and Sharman’s argument that sovereignty and hierarchy are dichotomous concepts.

Importantly, however, the upshot of the definition of hierarchy as a social relationship underpinned by social logics is that hierarchical social relationships are possible within international society. As noted in the previous chapter, international society is underpinned by certain constitutive norms that inform its membership and order social interactions between states. These norms are not fixed or given, meaning that social interaction within international society need not continuously conform to one particular vision of political community between states. It is possible then to conceive of an international society constituted by norms, or social logics, that provide for hierarchical social relationships between different states. This conceptualisation of hierarchy, and the argument that as a social relationship supported by norms we can conceive of hierarchy within international society, are at

34 Gong, *The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society*, 4-5.
35 While these ideas of liberal superiority are important, they do not fully explain why Western states have sought to construct new relations of hierarchy within international society. The idea that liberalism is a superior ideology that is conducive to peace and security certainly informs the choice of Western societies to promote liberal values when they intervene in non-Western states, and it also informs the identity-formation of states as either super- or subordinate parties. What it does not adequately explain is why they choose to intervene in the first place.
36 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, 70.
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odds with mainstream International Relations theory and indeed much of the English School.

Of note here is the notion of the ‘anarchical society’, one that Bull argued is incompatible with hierarchical relations between states. As Bull argues, ‘International society is based on the rejection of a hierarchical ordering of states in favour of equality in the sense of the like application of basic rights and duties to like entities’.37 Therefore, the existence of hierarchical relationships between states would be contrary to the rules and principles of international society. The idea that there can be no, or little, society where there is hierarchy is also one adopted by Dunne. In his article on society and hierarchy, Dunne questions the extent to which international society is compatible with hierarchy. He suggests that US interventionism, in particular the 2003 invasion of Iraq, represents new forms of hierarchy within international society.38 US behaviour towards Iraq endangers international society in the sense that the US, the world’s dominant power, is now acting with little regard to the norms and rules that constitute international society.39 Dunne notes that ‘we see that hierarchy represents a threat to international society and a source of ongoing tension’.40

The idea that an international society of sovereign states can exhibit hierarchical political relationships is also at odds with mainstream international relations discourse and even those scholars, such as Hobson and Sharman, who have sought to challenge the conventional image of an international system or society comprised solely of sovereign states. According to this view, hierarchical political authority exists only within states; relations between states are characterised by the

37 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 228.
38 Dunne, ‘Society and Hierarchy in International Relations’.
39 Ibid., 204.
40 Ibid., 316.
absence of such authority. This view is borne out of the tendency to conceptualise sovereignty as an indivisible or absolute form of authority in that states either enjoy supreme authority over a given territory and population or they do not. Since all states are sovereign, none answer to any higher authority. This of course is why international society is defined as anarchical – if all states enjoy absolute authority and equal rights then there can be no overarching or centralised authority above them.

This means not only that international society is anarchical in the sense of a lack of centralised rule or government, but also in the sense that states are sovereign equals, all equally enjoying absolute authority and the rights of constitutional independence and non-intervention. This implies that sovereignty, anarchy and hierarchy are incompatible. If two states engage in a hierarchical relationship, then the relationship ceases to be anarchical because the subordinate state ceases to enjoy absolute or indivisible authority over its territory and equal sovereign rights with the superordinate state. Thus, if we define sovereignty as an indivisible form of authority over a given territory and population that is recognised and legitimated by other states within international society, then the emergence of hierarchical social relationships entails the retreat or diminishment of an anarchical international society comprised of sovereign states. In other words, the society of states cannot prevail where hierarchy exists.

41 Deudney, ‘Binding Sovereigns’, 190.
44 Kenneth Waltz likewise argues that hierarchy and anarchy are incompatible concepts. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 114-16.
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In order to highlight that hierarchy is not incompatible with the idea of an international society of sovereign states and that even subordinated states retain their identity as a sovereign entity, the remainder of this section will, for the sake of clarity, outline three crucial points made above and address them in order. These points include the endangered existence of international society in light of hierarchical relationships between states, the definition of sovereignty as a form of indivisible authority and the supposed incompatibility of sovereignty, anarchy and hierarchy. Firstly, this chapter does not seek to challenge the argument that international society is a society of sovereign states, although the impact of non-state actors and processes on international politics and on international society itself must not be overlooked. For the most part, however, these non-state actors are not recognised as members of international society.

Further, Bull’s and Dunne’s claims that modern international society is based on the rejection of hierarchy are quite true. Contemporary pluralist international society fundamentally rejects any ranking or ordering of states, particularly on the basis of their internal socio-political institutions. But this only obtains in a pluralist international society. To suggest that hierarchy and international society itself are completely incompatible overlooks the extent to which international society, as a construct of norms and rules which constitute state identity (through the criteria established for rightful membership and legitimate statehood) and order social interactions between states, is historically contingent and subject to reconstitution over time. Again, the problem here is that Bull and Dunne identify international

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45 As Dunne argues, the rules and institutions of international society existed before states and will likely continue to exist should states disappear. This draws attention to the extent to which international society is influenced and at least partly shaped by non-state actors. One of the implications of the argument of this thesis is precisely that non-state actors and processes, such as globalisation, can greatly influence and affect the norms, rules and institutions of international society. See Dunne, ‘New Thinking on International Society’, 227; Clark, International Legitimacy and World Society.
society in constitutionally static terms. Hierarchy might well be incompatible with a pluralist form of international society, which is the focus of both of their works, but they do not show why hierarchy must necessarily mean the retreat of international society altogether.

There is no reason why international society’s constitutive norms, particularly in terms of the criteria they outline for rightful membership and rightful state conduct, cannot give rise to hierarchical relations between states. As is argued in this thesis, contemporary hierarchical relationships signify an ongoing process of reconstitution within international society and contravene the pluralist vision of political community amongst states which has underpinned its constitution since decolonisation. But this does not entail the end of international society, nor does it mean that those states that do become the subordinate parties in new relations of hierarchy with Western societies cease to be sovereign states. By arguing that contemporary hierarchy is incompatible with, or signifies the end of, international society, Bull and Dunne overlook its constitutionally dynamic nature.

Secondly, the constitutionally dynamic nature of international society means that understandings of what constitutes a sovereign state and what rights sovereign status entails are also historically contingent and subject to change as notions of rightful membership and legitimate statehood shift over time. As noted, sovereignty is traditionally defined as an indivisible form of authority over a given territory and population which is recognised by other states within international society.\(^{46}\) As Hobson and Sharman note

\(^{46}\) For example, see Oyvind Osterud, ‘Sovereign Statehood and National Self-Determination: A World Order Dilemma’, in *Subduing Sovereignty: Sovereignty and the Right to Intervene*, edited by Marianne Heiberg (London: Pinter, 1994): 18-32. International legal theorists have generally defined sovereignty as denoting independence – freedom from intervention and external interference. This implies exclusive authority over a territory and would also appear to be incompatible with hierarchical relationships between states. See Suganami, ‘Grotius and International Equality’, 231 and Anthony
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We thus adopt a standard and hence uncontroversial definition of sovereignty, including an internal aspect where a government is the supreme or exclusive authority within specified borders, and an external aspect under which this authority is recognized as such by other juridically equal entities.47 If sovereignty is conceptualised in these terms, by definition a state cannot be a subordinate party in a hierarchical relationship with another state. To do so, a state would have to cede at least some of its authority to the superordinate state and therefore would also cede its sovereignty.

Two points are of note here. Firstly, as argued in the previous chapter, and as Hobson and Sharman note, the status of a political community as a sovereign state does not depend simply on its authority over a given territory. Rather, it is a product of social practices of recognition, shaped by prevailing ideas of what constitutes legitimate statehood and what criteria states must meet in order to obtain sovereign status. This suggests that sovereignty is a malleable concept, shifting in response to changing ideas and norms.48 The mere fact of supreme authority over a territory, therefore, does not necessarily mean that a political community is guaranteed as being recognised as sovereign. Likewise, it is not self-evident that a state that is subject to the authority of another in a hierarchical relationship automatically loses its identity as a sovereign state. Even states that have no internal authority at all, of which Somalia is the prime example, can continue to be recognised as a sovereign

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47 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, 65. The authors also note that ‘Under sovereignty, political authority...is bundled together in a unitary and absolute fashion rather than shared out’ (p. 72). Also see Jackson, ‘Sovereignty in World Politics’.
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entity despite the lack of exclusive (or any) authority over a given territory and population.\(^49\)

Both Donnelly and Simpson draw attention to what they term ‘sovereign inequalities’ within international society: unequal statuses between states which in some instances provide ‘higher ranked’ states with greater authority over ‘lower ranked’ states, which nevertheless retain their sovereign status.\(^50\) Secondly, as Hobson and Sharman suggest, sovereignty denotes an internal authority relationship, which is very similar to their definition of hierarchy as a form of social authority relationship.\(^51\) If sovereignty is defined as denoting an authority relationship then it becomes unclear as to why sovereign authority must necessarily be exclusive or indivisible. As Lake argues, one of the general characteristics of authoritative relationships is that authority is rarely, if ever, absolute.\(^52\) Sovereign authority therefore can be conceptualised as partial or divisible, which has been recognised within the discipline of International Relations and international law.\(^53\) As Oppenheim argues, ‘as there can be no doubt about the fact that there are semi-independent States in existence, it may well be maintained that sovereignty is divisible’.\(^54\)

More recently, Brownlie has suggested that ‘Sovereignty is divisible both as a matter of principle and as a matter of experience’.\(^55\) Sovereignty therefore need not be defined in terms of absolute or indivisible authority. This means that it is possible

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\(^49\) As Robert Jackson contends, post-colonial international society’s ‘negative sovereignty’ regime provides for the recognition of a state’s sovereignty without regard to that state’s authority over its territory or population. See Jackson, *Quasi States*, 1.

\(^50\) Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy’, 144-52; Simpson, *Great Powers and Outlaw States*.

\(^51\) Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, 65.

\(^52\) Lake, ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations’, 305.

\(^53\) Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy’, 145.


to conceive of gradations of sovereignty based upon the level of authority over its internal affairs that a state or a political community claiming sovereign status enjoys.\textsuperscript{56} This means that a state can be a subordinate party in a hierarchical relationship but still be recognisable as a sovereign state, albeit one of ‘lessers standing’. Thus, we can conceive of an international society of sovereign states in which some states retain their identity as a sovereign entity, but are subject to a qualified form of membership and important limitations on their sovereign rights. This is precisely what has occurred in the post-Cold War era, with certain states becoming the subordinate parties in new relationships of hierarchy with Western countries.

As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, these subordinated states do not cease to be recognised as sovereign entities, nor is their independence completely forfeited or subsumed under Western domination and control. Western interveners have been at pains to describe their interventions as ‘partnerships’, reaffirm the sovereignty of their ‘partners’ and have generally sought quick progress in their attempts to effect liberal reform. Even in the case of Iraq, the US was quick to ‘hand back’ sovereignty and reaffirm Iraq’s constitutional independence. In summary, the identity of a state as sovereign does not necessarily depend on its exclusive or indivisible authority over a given territory or population. Prevailing notions of rightful membership within international society and social practices of recognition between states shape what constitutes a sovereign state.

Finally, if a form of ‘sovereignty under hierarchy’ can be conceived of, then so too can a form of ‘hierarchy under anarchy’. As Donnelly argues, part of the

conceptual confusion when it comes to anarchy, hierarchy and sovereignty within world politics is that anarchy is equated with sovereign equality and defined in opposition to hierarchy. But as Goh and Donnelly argue, anarchical orders need not involve equality between states. An anarchical order can exist, in the sense of the absence of centralised authority or government, but still contain substantive inequalities and hierarchies. Further, as Lake argues, just because the international system is anarchic, in terms of the lack of overarching authority, it does not automatically follow that all interstate relationships within that system are anarchic as well. The problem here is that hierarchy and anarchy are established as dichotomous concepts, especially in the neo-realist literature. Even Hobson and Sharman note that ‘Hierarchy is distinct from an anarchical system of sovereign states in which no state is either entitled to command or obliged to obey’.

However, Donnelly argues that this dichotomy between international anarchy and hierarchy is flawed. As he contends, anarchy is actually opposed to ‘archy’: centralised rule or government. Hierarchy refers not to rule or government, but superordination and differentiation. A domestic example illustrates this point: police officers exist in a hierarchical relationship with ‘ordinary’ citizens. They have the legitimate authority to issue commands which citizens are obliged to follow. However, they do not rule or govern and their authority cannot be equated with that of a centralised government. Within contemporary international society superordinate states (like police officers) claim the authority to issue commands to

57 Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy’, 144.
60 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, 70.
61 Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy’, 141.
subordinates, but this authority does not mitigate international anarchy because it does not constitute a form of centralised authority or rule.\textsuperscript{63} Even Waltz acknowledges in \textit{Theory of International Politics} that all societies are mixed and that international society can exhibit both hierarchical and anarchical ordering principles.\textsuperscript{64} Thus, an international society characterised by hierarchical relationships between different states is still anarchical because there is still no overarching authority that resides over all states.

To summarise, hierarchy is a social authority relationship, recognised as legitimate by both the superordinate and subordinate parties and predicated on certain norms and principles that facilitate the creation, reproduction and fall of hierarchies. This definition of hierarchy is not incompatible with the concept of an anarchical society of sovereign states for four main reasons. Firstly, the identity of a state as a sovereign entity is predicated on social practices of recognition, meaning that what constitutes sovereignty or a sovereign state shifts over time. Secondly, the notion that sovereignty entails indivisible or absolute authority is incorrect. Thirdly, hierarchy and anarchy are not mutually exclusive concepts. Finally, the argument that hierarchical relationships entail the retreat or contraction of international society is based on a specifically pluralist vision of international society, one which ignores its constitutionally dynamic nature.

This pluralist constitution is currently being challenged by new forms of hierarchy within international society that are underpinned by social logics partly defined by a particular strand of liberalism. The next section of this chapter examines the social logics or norms associated with this strand of liberalism, arguing that it provides a vision of political community between states characterised by hierarchy.

\textsuperscript{63} The difference being, of course, that police authority is derived from a government; the authority of a superordinate state is not bestowed by a higher power.

\textsuperscript{64} Waltz, \textit{Theory of International Politics}, 115.
and inequality between liberal democracies and illiberal or undemocratic states. As will be shown via a survey of several literatures advocating particular liberal theories, beginning with the idea that liberalism is fundamentally distinct and superior to other ideologies, this hierarchical strand of liberalism advocates the subordination of illiberal states under the authority of Western societies. Depending on the scholar, the West gains special governance rights within international society or even the right to intervene in non-Western states to impose liberal values while the subordinated states are subject to a qualification of their sovereign rights.

Liberal Hierarchy in International Society

As noted, pluralist international society can be described as liberal in the sense that it provides states with the ‘liberal’ rights of formal equality and non-intervention. However, liberalism is a broad ideological church, and several scholars have pointed to the divisions and tensions between different forms of liberalism, both domestically within societies and internationally between societies. For example, Simpson has identified pluralist and anti-pluralist versions of liberalism within international society, each providing a competing image of international order. Sorensen has likewise identified a ‘Liberalism of Restraint’ broadly based upon Berlin’s notion of negative liberty; and a ‘Liberalism of Imposition’ based upon positive conceptions of liberty. The point is that both Simpson and Sorensen have highlighted competing liberal conceptions of international order, one broadly pluralist and the other hierarchical and anti-pluralist.

65 See Simpson, ‘Two Liberalisms’.
Indeed, this hierarchical version of international liberalism is well demonstrated within academia. Several liberal international theories have been put forward advocating a form of anti-pluralist liberalism involving distinctions and hierarchical relationships between liberal and illiberal states. Taken together, these theories provide an ideational framework, or social logic, that legitimates the establishment of ‘liberal hierarchies’ within international society. The purpose of this section is to investigate the ideas that underpin this hierarchical form of international liberalism. As will be demonstrated, these liberal theories are fundamentally hierarchical and anti-pluralist in that they seek to limit the range of acceptable values and regimes that states may adopt. They also seek to construct formally unequal relations between states on their basis of their domestic socio-political institutions. As Gray argues, ‘when liberals set up one regime as a standard of legitimacy for all the rest, pluralists and liberals part company’. Importantly, as is argued in chapter four of this thesis, these ideas are crucial to understanding the Western perception that the promotion of liberal values is the key to managing risk within international society and hence are crucial to understanding the emergence of contemporary hierarchies.

The arguments and ideas put forth by scholars subscribing to these ‘hierarchical liberal views’ are well summarised by Reus-Smit, who suggests that

Informed by a mixture of Kantian liberalism and democratic peace theory, cosmopolitan sensibilities and activism, neoliberal institutionalism and new liberal legal theory…these scholars question the equalitarian regime’s version of international liberalism, advancing a markedly different formulation. They advocate the formal rehierarchisation of international society, whereby democratic states would gain special governance rights – particularly with regard to the

67 Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, 20.
legitimate use of force – and other states would have their categorical rights to self-determination and non-intervention qualified.\textsuperscript{68}

There are several ideas that are common to these different liberal theories, including their belief in the superiority of liberalism, for various reasons; the idea that the domestic regime of a state is determinative of its international behaviour; and the advocacy of the establishment of hierarchical relationships between liberal and non-liberal states. This is particularly reflected in the arguments of some scholars that liberal states should enjoy special authority and rights within international society that are not afforded to non-liberal states.

Firstly it needs to be understood why liberalism is viewed by some as the ‘best’ basis for ordering social and political relationships within societies. As Jahn has suggested, ‘The political systems of the established democracies are taken to display a ‘clear moral and practical superiority’, thus, occupying the highest level of development and providing the model all other states are expected to follow’.\textsuperscript{69} The question here then is what makes liberalism so ‘special’? The general theme in many of the works surveyed below is that liberal states possess certain distinctive (and desirable) attributes that other states do not. A good example is Francis Fukuyama’s thesis on the ‘end of history’. This thesis suggests that with the end of the Cold War and the defeat of communism at the hands of liberalism/capitalism, the world had reached the end of history: the end of human ideological evolution and the establishment of liberal democracy as the final form of human government.\textsuperscript{70}

For Fukuyama, ‘while earlier forms of government were characterised by

\textsuperscript{68} Reus-Smit’s notion of the ‘equalitarian regime’ is broadly synonymous with what I have described as the pluralist constitution of the post-colonial international society. See Reus-Smit, ‘Liberal Hierarchy and the Licence to Use Force’, 72.


\textsuperscript{70} Fukuyama, The End of History, xi.
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grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual collapse, liberal democracy was arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions’.\(^{71}\) It is this lack of internal contradictions, coupled with liberalism’s recent victory against communism, which forms the basis of Fukuyama’s argument that liberalism and democracy represent the end-point of our ideological evolution. For Fukuyama, liberal democracies are inherently peaceful and are the only form of government that can satisfy the fundamental condition of humanity: the struggle for recognition.\(^{72}\) Because of liberal democracy’s ‘perfection’, ‘there would be no further progress in the development of underlying principles and institutions, because all of the really big questions had been settled’.\(^{73}\)

However, until liberalism has been universalised, Fukuyama suggests that international society will be divided into two realms: a post-historical, peaceful and liberal zone, and an autocratic zone ‘mired in history’.\(^{74}\) Traditional power politics and conflict would continue to characterise the zone of history, and relations between the post-historical and historical zones would be characterised by mutual distrust and conflict. By depicting liberal democracies as ‘post-historical’ and autocracies as ‘historical’, Fukuyama not only establishes a strong dichotomy between liberal and non-liberal, but he also establishes a hierarchical relationship between the two in terms of their relative ‘historical development’. This is reflected in Fukuyama’s suggestions regarding a ‘Liberal League of Nations’ within international society that will be discussed further below.

The democratic peace literature also depicts liberalism as an ideology with particular attributes that make it the preferred form of political and social

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\(^{71}\) Ibid.

\(^{72}\) Ibid., xviii.

\(^{73}\) Ibid., xii.

\(^{74}\) Ibid., 276.
organisation within states. This is largely implicit in the argument that liberal
governance and democratic political institutions within states enhance international
peace and security. As the title of the theory suggests, liberal democracies do not use
force against one another. For example, Michael Doyle, one of the early democratic
peace theorists, suggests that ‘as their (liberal democracies) number increases, it
announces the possibility of global peace this side of the grave or world conquest’. Indeed, in a later work, Doyle suggests that the liberal zone of peace should be
extended, albeit only defensively. Russett’s arguments are also illuminating here:
‘If history is imagined to be the history of wars and conquest, then a democratic
world order might in that sense represent the ‘end of history’.’

Several reasons are provided in the literature for this pacifism on the part of
liberal states. Firstly, because political leaders in liberal democracies rule through the
consent of the governed, they must build public support for aggressive foreign
policies or acts of war. Since it is the citizenry that will bear the brunt of any war or
military action, they will presumably be reluctant to provide support for such
endeavours. Secondly, it has been suggested that free trade between liberal states
and the resultant spread of transnational linkages between these states will compel
them to resolve their differences peacefully in order to maintain the economic
benefits that accrue from trading. In other words, economic interdependence breeds
peace. Thirdly, liberal democracies have arguably externalised their domestic

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78 Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs’, 229.
79 Ibid., 231.
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democratic decision-making processes that permit the peaceful resolution of conflicts.\textsuperscript{80} Finally, liberal democracies are described as strong supporters of human rights which they ascribe universally to others.\textsuperscript{81} Liberal democracies seek their citizens’ true interests and are tolerant and committed to individual freedom.\textsuperscript{82}

However, when it comes to autocratic states, the democratic peace literature paints a very different picture. In autocratic states, decision-makers frequently resort to oppression and violence to maintain political rule. Autocratic states do not rest on the consent of the governed and do not respect the rights of their citizens. Thus we cannot expect them to act any better towards other peoples.\textsuperscript{83} As Russett states:

In non-democracies, decisionmakers use, and may expect their opponents to use, violence and the threat of violence to resolve conflict as part of their domestic political processes…Therefore non-democracies may use violence and the threat of violence in conflicts with other states and other states may expect them to use violence and the threat of violence in such conflicts.\textsuperscript{84}

Again, the theme here is that liberal states possess certain qualities and attributes that distinguish them from other forms of state.

The democratic peace literature’s claims regarding the inherently pacific nature of liberal democracies, including the reasons provided for this pacifism, are inspired by and based in part upon Kant’s essay *Toward Perpetual Peace*.\textsuperscript{85} In his essay, Kant outlined the necessary conditions for the creation of his ‘Pacific Union’


\textsuperscript{83} Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, 32.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.

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and the resultant peace among states belonging to this Union. One of the main conditions for the creation of such a Union was that its members have a republican constitution, taken by most contemporary scholars to be synonymous with a liberal democracy. Kant argued that a republican constitution would prevent a state’s recourse to war because

When the consent of the citizens of a state is required in order to decide whether there shall be war or not (and it cannot be otherwise in this constitution), nothing is more natural than that they would be very hesitant to begin such a bad game, since they would have to decide to take upon themselves all the hardships of war…

On the other hand, in an autocracy, ‘[deciding upon war] is the easiest thing in the world…’ The belief that liberal states are inherently peaceful in their relations distinguishes liberal democracies from other types of regime, which are presumably more aggressive and war-prone. The democratic peace literature thus establishes a strong dichotomy between the pacific liberal democracies and the more aggressive illiberal, non-democratic states. Indeed, as Macmillan argues, one of the more notable features of the democratic peace literature is the ‘almost Manichean’ division between liberal democracies and autocracies, and the stridently negative light in which autocracies tend to be portrayed. Indeed, much of the democratic peace literature ‘tends to emphasise the differences and, indeed, the opposition between liberal and non-liberal states’. Such a division is clearly made by Russett: ‘Thus an international system composed of both democratic and authoritarian states

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86 Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace, 322; Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice, 45.
87 Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace, 323.
88 Ibid., 324.
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will include both zones of peace (actual and expected, among the democracies) and zones of war or at best deterrence between democratic and authoritarian states’. ⁹¹

The division between the liberal zone of peace and the liberal-illiberal zone of war is based on the assumption that the relations between liberal states pose an alternative to the conflict and aggression of the non-liberal realm and the relations between liberal democracies and autocracies. ⁹² These arguments have been taken by many scholars to mean that a world of liberal states offers the best chance of world peace and international stability. Indeed, as will be shown in the fourth chapter, the democratic peace hypothesis has been extremely influential with Western policymakers, informing their adoption of a strategy of liberalisation in territories perceived as potentially dangerous as a means of managing new forms of de-bounded security risks.

The notion that liberal states possess distinctive qualities that separate them from other forms of state is closely linked to the idea that the internal constitution or regime type of a state is determinative or at least influences its international behaviour. Some scholars have also argued that the perception of a state as a liberal democracy or otherwise will determine that state’s relations with others. This line of reasoning is evident within the literature on the democratic peace thesis as a response to the fundamental question of, if democracies are peaceful in their relations with one another, then why is this so? As discussed above, liberal ideology and democratic institutions are taken to be the independent variables behind the pacific behaviour of liberal states towards one another. Hasenclever and Wagner suggest that ‘most liberals agree that domestic politics matter for inter-democratic affairs, and that relations among well-established democracies are characterized by

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⁹² Macmillan, ‘Whose Democracy; Which Peace?’, 476.
compromise, intense policy coordination, and stable expectations for peaceful change’.  

Similarly, some international lawyers, most notably Anne-Marie Slaughter, have attempted to develop a ‘liberal’ international legal theory that builds on the insights of Kant and the democratic peace theorists. Slaughter subscribes to the assumption that liberal states are fundamentally different to other polities, resulting in their peaceful relations with one another.  

Liberal states form a ‘zone of law’, one characterised by intense transnational linkages in which disputes are solved through judicial processes and the rule of law is respected. This is opposed to the ‘rounder’ ‘zone of politics’ that characterises relations between liberal and non-liberal states.  

For Slaughter, traditional international law is insufficient, for like realism it treats states as ‘billiard balls’ and divorces a state’s domestic political constitution from its international status. As she notes, ‘States cannot be generalised about as a unitary category of functionally identical actors. Their preferences and behaviour will differ wildly as a function of their domestic political arrangements’. Liberal international theory, however, explicitly focuses on the internal characteristics of a state as a major determinant of its international behaviour. For Slaughter, this focus on the state’s internal constitution arguably captures greater facets of state behaviour within international society.

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96 Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, 514.
Other scholars have focused more on the perception of a state’s domestic political institutions in determining its foreign relations. For example, Owen argues that ‘Liberalism gives rise to an ideology that distinguishes states primarily according to regime type: in assessing a state, liberalism first asks whether it is a liberal democracy or not’. Once states accept one another as liberal, they will oppose any sort of war against each other because ‘Liberal democracies are believed reasonable, predictable, and trustworthy, because they are governed by their citizens’ true interests, which harmonise with all individuals’ true interests around the world’. Thus, the perception of a state’s internal political constitution is important in determining that state’s relations with a liberal democracy. Any two states that perceive each other as liberal democracies will enjoy pacific relations.

In contrast, if one of the states involved does not perceive the other to be a liberal democracy then hostile relations may ensue. Similarly, Risse-Kappen advances a social-constructivist take on the democratic peace. He starts with the perception that, on the basis of their domestic political structures, liberal democracies are peaceful and trustworthy and autocracies are potentially aggressive and violent. Therefore, the important point here is that the above arguments suggest that either the internal political constitution of a state is determinative of that state’s international relations, or that perceptions regarding the internal political constitution of a state will determine assumptions concerning its international behaviour. Regime type thus becomes the determining factor in international relations.

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This is important because it underpins the idea that international peace and security are dependent upon the ideological character of state regimes. This legitimates the promotion of liberal values in the name of ‘international (or even national) peace and security’, potentially leading to the subordination of non-liberal states that are subject to an imposition of liberal values and institutions by the Western liberal democracies. These two ideas, that liberal states embody distinctive and desirable attributes that make liberalism the ‘best’ form of socio-political organisation, and that the domestic constitution of a state determines its international behaviour, thus form an important part of the social logic that underpins contemporary hierarchical relations within international society. Indeed, it is precisely because of these ideas that some scholars have called for the establishment of formal hierarchies between liberal and non-liberal states. This is usually in the form of the provision of special governance rights to liberal states whilst simultaneously limiting the sovereign rights of illiberal states, particularly in terms of their right to non-intervention.

For example, Buchanan and Keohane attempt to develop a cosmopolitan normative argument for the preventive use of force in humanitarian emergencies. Buchanan and Keohane are concerned not only to construct an argument justifying preventive uses of force to protect human rights, but also to develop an institutional framework that will hold those making the decisions to undertake or refrain from intervention to account.\textsuperscript{102} The authors argue that in situations where the UN Security Council is not willing or able to authorise preventive humanitarian action, states should have recourse to a type of ‘House of Review’ – a democratic coalition

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charged with issuing authoritative decisions on the use of force in these cases.\textsuperscript{103} Buchanan and Keohane argue that only those states that have sound records of respecting human rights can be involved in institutional processes governing the preventive use of force.\textsuperscript{104}

Liberal states are uniquely placed to fulfill the role of ‘governors’ of these institutional mechanisms, not only because they protect human rights, but also because they are deemed to be, at least by Buchanan and Keohane, comparatively more morally reliable than autocracies.\textsuperscript{105} While liberal democracies (like most other states) may violate cosmopolitan principles, when they do so they are more likely to be held to account by their citizens and are forced to alter their behavior accordingly.\textsuperscript{106} The nub of this argument is that only liberal democracies are deserving of ‘full’ rights and capable of discharging their full responsibilities when it comes to responsible and effective international governance. This point is also apparent in Fukuyama’s suggestions regarding the possible establishment of a type of ‘Liberal League of Nations’ responsible for international peace and security and constructed according to Kant’s precepts for a perpetual peace.

For Fukuyama, and others who subscribe to the notion that liberal democracy represents a superior form of government, only liberal democratic states are capable of providing international public goods such as collective security or economic prosperity. Fukuyama believes that international institutions which have been established to maintain international peace and security and promote effective liberal

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 2. The final report of the Princeton Project on National Security, directed by Anne-Marie Slaughter and G. John Ikenberry, likewise argues for the establishment of a ‘Concert of Democracies’ that could provide for collective security when the UN is not able or willing to, including the use of force. See Princeton Project on National Security, \textit{Forging A World of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security In The 21st Century} (Princeton NJ: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2006): 7.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
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International governance, such as the UN, were flawed from the very beginning by allowing for a mixed membership of liberal and non-liberal states and sovereign equality between all states.\textsuperscript{107} Fukuyama states his preference for a liberal hierarchisation of international society and the provision of special governance rights for liberal democracies when he suggests that

If one wanted to create a league of nations according to Kant’s own precepts… it is clear that it would have to look much more like NATO than the United Nations – that is, a league of truly free states brought together by their common commitment to liberal principles. Such a league should be much more capable of forceful action to protect its collective security from threats arising from the non democratic part of the world.\textsuperscript{108}

International governance thus becomes a bounded affair and the old ideal of a universal conference of states is discarded.\textsuperscript{109} Instead, only those states with liberal political institutions enjoy full governance rights within international society. Buchanan and Keohane, together with Fukuyama, effectively seek to establish hierarchical relationships between the liberal democracies that should have greater authority within international society, and the illiberal and undemocratic states that should be subject to this authority. Arguments advocating hierarchical relationships between liberal and non-liberal states have also come from an emerging literature within the field of international law on the possible materialisation of a norm of democratic governance within international society, one which would predicate full recognition of sovereignty on the internal attributes of political communities.

Until recently, international lawyers had relatively little to say about the internal characteristics of the state, which was deemed to be a political, rather than

\textsuperscript{107} Fukuyama, \textit{The End of History}, 282.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 282-3.
\textsuperscript{109} Reus-Smit, ‘Liberal Hierarchy and the Licence to Use Force’, 78.
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legal, affair. International law embodies many of the key rights and principles that are associated with pluralist international society, particularly those of sovereign equality and non-intervention. Since the end of the Cold War, several legal scholars have argued that this has changed, and that international law no longer appears to be averse to considering the internal characteristics of states.\textsuperscript{110} According to some legal scholars, a norm of democratic governance has come to be formulated, both as a human right and as a criterion for the recognition of states.\textsuperscript{111} The main thrust of those who argue that a right to democratic governance has emerged is that the recognition of a state under international law would depend not only on whether that state maintains control over a demarcated territory and population, but also whether it has liberal political institutions or not.\textsuperscript{112}

Democratic governance has come to be seen as something akin to a universal human right, and international law, according to this view, has an important role to play in enforcing this right.\textsuperscript{113} As Franck contends, there is an emerging consensus among states as to the need for a liberal democratic government as a prerequisite for membership in the community of nations.\textsuperscript{114} The legitimacy of a state depends on the prevailing normative standards of international society, which have arguably formed a consensus around liberalism and democracy.\textsuperscript{115} Supposedly, we are moving


\textsuperscript{111} This norm of democratic governance, or the democratic entitlement, is based on 3 suppositions, many of them similar to the views propounded by democratic peace theorists: 1): Democracy engenders respect for human rights; 2): Democracy prevents domestic and international conflict; and 3): Democracy allows for the implementation of other, unrelated norms through democratic processes. See Fox and Roth, ‘Introduction’.

\textsuperscript{112} Susan Marks, The Riddle of all Constitutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 38.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{115} Ibid. Franck’s contention that there is an emerging, solidarist consensus among states concerning democratic governance is not entirely persuasive, given that the only examples he provides of such solidarity amongst states are the UN’s election monitoring activities in the 1990s and the EU’s
towards a situation in which international law will be used to measure the legitimacy of a state according to its adherence to liberal values. Crawford likewise suggests that since the end of the Cold War, liberalism and democracy have become dominant values in international society.\(^{116}\) Fox also argues that participatory rights have moved beyond mere theory and have become treaty-based obligations owed by one state to another.\(^{117}\) The identity of the sovereign has become a matter for international society to judge.\(^{118}\)

For Fox, ‘Governments which obtain power in violation of participatory rights (i.e. without holding proper elections) do so illegally. Presumably, such governments would themselves be considered illegal’.\(^{119}\) The notion of a democratic entitlement is of course highly contentious, given international law’s traditional doctrines of non-intervention and recognition on the basis only of effective control of a territory. However, what is important here is not so much whether there is indeed a recognised legal entitlement to democratic government, but the implications and consequences of such an entitlement itself. The most notable characteristic of the notion of a democratic or liberal entitlement is that it seeks to ensure that the supposed normative commitment to liberal political institutions within international society is codified within international law. Presumably, those states that do not conform to these requirements forfeit their claim to other legal rights such as

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\(^{118}\) Fox, ‘The Right to Political Participation’, 50.

\(^{119}\) Ibid., 52.
souvereign equality or non-intervention, especially considering Fox’s claim that regimes that come to power without the consent of the citizenry would be considered to be illegal.

This could allow liberal states to claim the authority to intervene to ensure that illiberal states ‘comply with the law’, thus potentially providing a legal basis for hierarchical relationships within international society. Different forms of government would cease to be equal under international law. The upshot of this, as Kingsbury argues, is that

Emerging liberal thinking about the international legal order argues increasingly that it is possible to divide the world into zones, with a liberal zone of law, constituted by liberal states practising a higher degree of civilisation, to which other states will be admitted only when they meet the requisite standards…The theory of liberal and non-liberal zones proposes differential treatment where the boundaries of the liberal zone are crossed, conferring privileges based on membership in the liberal zone, and setting high barriers to entry.

However, perhaps the clearest arguments made in favour of establishing hierarchical relationships between liberal and non-liberal states come from those scholars who argue that liberal states should have the authority to intervene in illiberal states to promote liberal values or protect human rights. Given that several literatures on liberalism within international society have advanced claims regarding the ‘superior’ and distinctive attributes of liberal democracies, advocated special governance rights for liberal states and sought to predicate recognition of sovereignty on the existence of domestic liberal socio-political institutions, it is unsurprising that some scholars have also advocated intervention against non-liberal

120 Marks, The Riddle of all Constitutions, 40.
states. Since non-liberal states are deemed illegitimate, they are also deemed not to enjoy the rights of statehood normally afforded within international society. A good example here are the calls for a ‘liberal imperialism’ designed to facilitate the transmission of liberalism and democracy.

The calls for a new liberal imperialism revolve around the perceived need to address the problems of state failure and civil war in various regions of international society. The assumption here is that liberalisation (both political and economic) is the solution to these problems. For instance, Rieff suggests a return to the old mandate or trusteeship system, arguing for the establishment of ‘temporary trusteeships’ in order to build up state capacity in as short a time as possible so that the ‘trust territory’ can take care of its own affairs. As Rieff himself acknowledges, his call for a liberal imperialism is tantamount to a re-colonisation of the non-Western portion of the world. As he argues: ‘However controversial it may be to say this, our choice at the millennium seems to boil down to imperialism or barbarism’.

Cooper likewise suggests that state failure and civil war present the West with a choice between empire and chaos. Implicit here is the notion that liberalism and democracy represent ‘civilisation’, and that undemocratic, illiberal states are ‘barbaric’. The problems of failing states and ensuring the security of the West can be solved, according to this view, through intervention in illiberal, failed and outlaw states in order to extend the benefits of liberal governance. Roland Paris also

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123 Ibid., 10.
124 Ibid. It should be noted that Rieff has significantly moved away from this position over the last few years. Rather than his previous description as a ‘liberal interventionist’, Rieff has recently described himself as a ‘realist’, one who has significant reservations about the ability of the US’ democratising project in Iraq (and the wider Middle East) and the wisdom of such ‘liberal interventions’ in the first place. See David Rieff, ‘Muscular Utopianism’, Wall Street Journal (3 April 2005), http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110006508 (accessed 1 December 2006).
proposes arguments that favour the return of trusteeship in order to deal with the problems that have beset many non-Western states. Paris argues for ‘liberal colonisation’ as a solution to the problem of post-conflict peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{126} He argues that the best way to achieve successful peacebuilding is through marketisation and political liberalisation, adopting the democratic peace thesis that market democracies promote peace both domestically and internationally, and thus represent the apogee of political development.\textsuperscript{127}

A final example here is the work of Fernando Teson, who attempts to construct a Kantian model of international law. Like other so-called ‘neo-Kantians’, Teson argues that the domestic political structures of a state determine its international behaviour.\textsuperscript{128} He suggests that sovereignty resides with the people and that respect for a state’s sovereignty is dependent upon its internal legitimacy, or in other words its possession of liberal democratic political institutions, respect for human rights, etc.\textsuperscript{129} Such internal characteristics are pre-requisites for membership within international society.\textsuperscript{130} Teson classifies a state as an outlaw when it either fails to respect human rights or has an undemocratically elected regime. Such outlaws are not outside the law of nations, but they do not benefit from the rights inferred by full membership within international society.\textsuperscript{131} Teson also advocates intervention against non-liberal states – the norm of non-intervention only holds

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 40.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 54.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 69.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., 89.
among liberal democratic states which ‘deserve’ their independence.\textsuperscript{132} As he contends ‘Sovereignty is to be respected only when it is justly exercised’.\textsuperscript{133}

Therefore, several scholars have explicitly called for the establishment of hierarchical authority relationships between liberal and non-liberal states, whether this involves special governance rights to oversee the preventive use of force in humanitarian emergencies or the authority to intervene in failing states to effect liberal reform. Whatever the specific arguments made, all of these works seek to distinguish between liberal and non-liberal states and subject the latter to the authority of liberal democracies. Importantly, this not only involves claiming special authority for the liberal states, but also removing or limiting the rights that a sovereign state would normally enjoy within international society for any illiberal or undemocratic states. Not only would illiberal states have their rights to sovereign equality and non-intervention qualified but some, such as those advocating a legal ‘democratic entitlement’, even seek to prevent or revoke the recognition of statehood of any political community that does not have liberal political institutions.

Taken together, these different liberal international theories and the ideas that they contain are representative of a social logic partly underpinned by a particular vision of political community between states defined by an anti-pluralist and hierarchical strand of liberalism. It provides an exclusionary vision of political community amongst states characterised by formalised hierarchy and inequality between different societies based on their socio-political institutions and regime type. This form of international liberalism is also fundamentally anti-pluralist and


\textsuperscript{133} Teson, ‘The Kantian Theory of International Law’, 92.
monist in that it explicitly seeks to limit the range of acceptable values and regimes that states may legitimately adopt. It is precisely the ideas or social logic contained in this liberal vision of international society that partly underpins contemporary hierarchy within international society. As demonstrated, this particular liberal vision of international society is notably incompatible with a pluralist vision of political community between states.

Unlike pluralists who reject any hierarchical ranking or ordering of different human values, the theories of international liberalism surveyed in this chapter seek to establish political and economic liberal values as universally applicable and right and true for peoples everywhere. These theories quite clearly repudiate the pluralist notion that humans are capable of devising a multitude of values and versions of the ‘good life’ for themselves or that a good society is one in which the diversity of human values is maximised. While some pluralists have argued that liberal regimes are best suited for fulfilling the pluralist concern for maximising diversity within domestic societies, when applied to international society liberalism can also clearly give rise to hierarchy and anti-pluralism. These liberal theories might thus be termed a form of ‘illiberal liberalism’, simultaneously advocating liberty, democracy and equality within the state at the same time as they advocate exclusion, inequality and subordinate status for any states that do not adhere to liberal values.

While these liberal theories continually speak in terms of the right of all peoples to be free and entitled to liberal democratic government, such freedom simply means the ‘freedom’ to adopt the ‘single sustainable model for national

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135 As Sorensen argues, ‘strong political forces within international society are pursuing a liberal order with elements that are essentially illiberal’. See Sorensen, ‘Liberalism of Restraint and Liberalism of Imposition’, 252.
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success’: liberal democracy (and a capitalist free market). The freedom to choose, which is an intrinsic element of the pluralist vision of society, is noticeably discarded in place of a requirement that all societies adopt liberal political institutions and forms of governance. As Gray notes:

It is a mark of an illiberal regime that conflicts of value are viewed as signs of error. Yet liberal regimes which claim that one set of liberties – their own – are universally legitimate adopt precisely that view. They treat conflicts among liberties as symptoms of error, not dilemmas to which different solutions can be reasonable.

Therefore, the ideas contained in these liberal international theories provide a vision of international society fundamentally opposed to its current pluralist constitution. It is precisely the operationalisation of these ideas via new relations of hierarchy between Western and non-Western societies in the post-Cold War era that signal an ongoing process of reconstitution within international society. Increasingly, liberal values and political institutions are posited as the standard that states must meet in order to be recognised as full members of international society. As Ian Clark argues, since the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed the re-emergence of doctrines advocating a hierarchical form of international society, based on the requirement of states to conform to liberal standards of good governance. Importantly, however, contemporary hierarchy within international society cannot simply be reduced to these ideas of ‘liberal hierarchy’. As will be discussed in the next chapter, perceptions of risks to Western security, including ideas as to what

137 Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, 20-1.
138 Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, 173-4.
constitutes a risk, are a crucial element in understanding new hierarchies within international society.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to outline a conception of hierarchy as a fundamentally social authority relationship underpinned by ideas and norms. Importantly, it has argued that states can be both subordinate and superordinate parties in a hierarchical relationship despite their sovereign status. It has also suggested that hierarchies are possible within an international society constituted according to fundamental norms that provide criteria for rightful membership of international society and order interstate conduct. This chapter has also sought to explore the ideas that partly underpin contemporary hierarchies within international society, focusing on several liberal international theories that posit distinctions and advocate formalised hierarchies between liberal and non-liberal societies. However, while these ideas, or social logics, are important to understanding Western attempts to promote liberalism and democracy within non-Western societies, they do not fully provide an answer as to why Western states have felt compelled to undertake such interventions in the first place.

The next chapter is thus dedicated to outlining the causal factors that compel Western states to intervene in an attempt to promote liberal values. Utilising Ulrich Beck’s notions of risk and the world risk society, it contends that an increasing preoccupation with globalised security risks within international society informs contemporary Western attempts to promote liberalism. The concept of risk and Western attempts to manage the new risks of the post-Cold War era provide one way of understanding the reasons and rationale that provide for the justification and
legitimation of these interventions. In other words, it is not simply a desire to spread liberal norms that leads Western societies to intervene in attempts to promote liberalism, but rather the notion that the spread of liberal values is one way of managing new forms of security risk within international society. New forms of hierarchy within international society are therefore underpinned by a ‘liberal social logic of risk’. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this new social logic of risk is crucial to understanding current processes of reconstitution within international society.
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Introduction

This thesis has so far argued that international society in the post-Cold War era is currently undergoing a process of reconstitution, one which involves increasingly prevalent anti-pluralist and hierarchical trends. The previous chapter outlined a conception of hierarchy as a social relationship underpinned by norms or social logics and also examined the social logics that underpin contemporary international hierarchy. As was argued, new relations of hierarchy within international society are partly informed by the ideas contained within a particular liberal vision of political community amongst states, one that suggests that a liberal international society is one that depends upon liberal political institutions within states. Liberal democracies are constructed as a ‘superior’ form of state, while non-liberal societies are subordinated in new relations of hierarchy with the Western democracies.

However, this particular vision of a liberal international society only forms part of the social logic underpinning contemporary hierarchies within international society. What was not detailed in the previous chapter is why hierarchical and anti-pluralist trends have become prevalent within international society in the post-Cold War era or why the West has felt compelled to intervene in order to promote liberal values. While many scholars have identified these hierarchical trends, few have explored or explained what factors have given rise to them. What compels Western
states to intervene, in some cases forcefully, in order to promote liberal values? While the end of the Cold War may have facilitated the West’s ability to intervene across the globe, this factor by itself does not fully explain why Western states seek to promote liberal values.¹ Further, few scholars have considered what these new hierarchies suggest regarding the underlying pluralist constitution of international society, particularly the way in which they affect legitimate statehood (rightful membership) and legitimate or rightful conduct within international society.

Utilising Ulrich Beck’s notions of risk and the ‘risk society’, this chapter suggests that an increasing preoccupation with globalised security risks within international society compels Western states to intervene in territories identified as ‘risky’ in order to promote liberal values as a mechanism of risk management.² The advent of these globalised security risks has been facilitated in large part by processes of globalisation. Globalisation has been perceived as contributing to a shrunken world, one in which risks cannot be localised either in terms of time or space. This de-bounding of risk is one of the central elements of Beck’s notion of ‘risk society’ and is also crucial to understanding contemporary constitutional transition within international society.³ Confronted with de-bounded global risks, Western states have focused on identifying and reshaping so-called zones of risk – states which exhibit internal characteristics that provide an environment conducive to risk. These risky environments have primarily been defined in terms of a lack of liberal political institutions or state failure.

Contemporary hierarchical relationships within international society are therefore underpinned by a new liberal social logic of risk. This new liberal social

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¹ The end of the Cold War arguably facilitated the ability of Western countries to conduct interventions in other states due to the removal of power constraints with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
² Beck, Risk Society; Beck, World Risk Society.
logic of risk simultaneously constructs Western societies as superordinate ‘risk managers’ with the authority to reshape the domestic socio-political institutions of other states and illiberal or failed states as potentially dangerous sites of instability and disorder in which security risks might originate. These states become the subordinate parties in new relations of hierarchy with Western interveners. The upshot of this is that the tolerance of diversity inherent in the notion of a pluralist international society means that pluralism becomes a risk in itself. This is because it is precisely such a tolerance of diversity that sustains the existence of failed and illiberal states that potentially act as originators of global risks.

A new liberal social logic of risk has thus become a central element in constituting contemporary international society. This social logic has become central to the governing of social relations amongst states – it increasingly determines processes of inclusion and exclusion and modes of interaction between members of international society.4 The definition of illiberal states as potentially dangerous environments and subsequent attempts to manage risk by reshaping these environments via the promotion of liberal values alters the constitutional structure of international society in a way that gives rise to various hierarchical and anti-pluralist trends. This is precisely because the West’s preferred technique of risk management

involves limiting the range of acceptable values and regimes that states may reasonably adopt, contravening international society’s pluralist constitution. International society has become a new type of risk society, one in which the dominant members (the West) define and police so-called ‘zones of risk’.

The invocation of Beck’s risk society thesis as a method of conceptualising constitutional transition within international society is intended, in part, to address the failure of those scholars who have identified new forms of hierarchy within international society to adequately account for the reasons and rationale behind these new hierarchies. It is also intended to address the general absence within the English School of a theoretical account of change in International Relations. As noted in chapter one, international society has generally been viewed in constitutionally static terms within the English School, and it lacks a rigorous theory of constitutional transition within international society. If a hierarchical and anti-pluralist form of international society has ‘returned’, as scholars such as Simpson suggest, then what are the features of the hierarchies and inequalities that anti-pluralism mandates within international society?

It is unsatisfactory to simply claim that there has been a normative shift within international society. What are the reasons for such a shift? Further, what shape do the interventions associated with new forms of international hierarchy take? Questions to be considered here include why has the West intervened in certain situations and not in others? Why are failed or illiberal states now viewed as posing such a threat to the West? Why is disorder on the other side of the globe now such a problem for Western societies? This chapter suggests that the answer to these questions lies in the perception that the West now faces novel globalised security risks in the post-Cold War era. In doing so, this chapter aims in part to bring the
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cancept of risk and risk management into International Relations discourse and build on the minimal body of literature that has so far done so.

International Relations scholars as a whole have generally been lethargic in incorporating the insights provided by Beck’s risk society thesis into contemporary aspects of International Relations. Yet while useful, Beck’s notion of the risk society cannot be brought into the study of International Relations without some conceptual difficulties. For example, when viewed from the perspective of Beck’s risk society thesis, the relationship between risk, risk management and international society presents a paradox. The advent of new globalised risks that transcend national boundaries, Beck suggests, opens a path towards the emergence of a truly cosmopolitan world risk society. Yet, faced with globalised risks, Western states have responded by reifying and reinforcing the territorial state and have adopted state-based risk management techniques such as the promotion of liberalism. Further, rather than truly cosmopolitan, transnational cooperation among states, risk has led to the emergence of a more hierarchical, more exclusionary international society in which some states police international society to manage risk, while subordinated states are subject to the authority of the West.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The chapter begins by outlining the notion of risk and the idea of the world risk society popularised by Beck. It then examines various accounts of hierarchy and constitutional transition within international society, arguing that these accounts have not adequately conceptualised either contemporary hierarchy or the nature of this constitutional transition. Here the argument is made for conceptualising contemporary hierarchy and constitutional transition within international society through the prism of Beck’s

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risk society thesis. Following this, the chapter considers the application of Beck’s notions of risk and the risk society to International Relations. It concludes that while both certainly provide useful and important insights into contemporary interstate relations, neither are wholly adequate when it comes to conceptualising contemporary constitutional revision within international society.

Clearly there is a disjuncture between Beck’s argument of risk as evoking world cosmopolitanism and the argument presented here of risk as the central causative factor of a transition towards a more hierarchical international society. It is argued that two problems afflict Beck’s account of risk and the risk society when applied to International Relations. Firstly, Beck simply argues that nation-states will fade away as world risk society is consolidated without pausing to consider if this is a realistic assumption. Secondly, and more importantly, Beck fails to examine how, if risk does not entail the end of the state, will it impact upon interstate relations, particularly with regard to the norms and rules that underpin a pluralist form of international society? In other words, Beck fails to consider the conditions that underpin a pluralist social order amongst states and the ways in which risk impacts upon those conditions.

**Risk and the ‘World Risk Society’**

Since the early 1990s the concepts of risk and the ‘risk society’ have become increasingly popular and influential within sociological discourse. Pioneered by sociologists such as Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, the basic premise of these sociological theories of risk is that contemporary society is undergoing a period of
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radical transformation. Beck characterises this social transformation, particularly predominant in Western societies, as one between what he terms ‘industrial society’ or the ‘first modernity’ and (world) risk society or the ‘second modernity’. Put simply, the argument is that modernisation has simultaneously (and paradoxically) brought great technological and scientific progress as well as more abstract and disembodied risks. As technological capacity increases, so too does the incalculability of the consequences of the use of such technologies.

Beck’s thesis is centred on two core concepts: risk and reflexive modernisation or reflexivity, a characteristic of the so-called second modernity. This section examines these concepts, focusing first on risk and then the notion of reflexivity. To begin with, we need to be clear what is meant by the term risk. One of the problems of much of the work on risk within both sociology and International Relations is that risk is rarely ever clearly defined. However, Heng has usefully provided a clear and systematic definition of risk. On the one hand, risk can be invoked as a descriptive term describing a particular danger, hazard or dangerous scenario. On the other hand, risk can be used as a normative term that refers to a desire to engage in proactive, anticipatory risk management activities. Further, it is important to distinguish between risk and threat. It is all too easy to conflate risk with threat and use the terms interchangeably. Indeed, much of the literature on risk has done just that, failing to clearly distinguish what is meant by threat and risk.

As Heng suggests, threats can be thought of in terms of capabilities and intentions. It was this notion of threat that clearly characterised the perception of the dangers posed to the West by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Strategists on both sides of the Iron Curtain were primarily concerned with the military capabilities and intentions of the other side. Thus, during the Cold War, the West was faced with a clearly defined enemy with clearly defined capabilities. For instance, Western governments had a rough estimate of the number of Soviet nuclear warheads, they knew where Soviet missiles were targeted and they knew they had the capability to strike back in the event of war. The dangers posed by the Soviet Union could thus be expressed quantitatively: number of warheads, tanks, troops; official Soviet policies and actions; etc.

Threats thus constitute an action-reaction relationship. This implies that threats should normally be relatively well defined. In order to react to something, we need to know what it is we are reacting to. Contrast this with risk, which Heng defines in terms of probabilities and consequences. Unlike threats, risks are not clearly defined or delineated, they are imprecise and uncertain. Thus in the post-Cold War era, in contrast to the Soviet threat, we know there are dangers ‘out there’ such as terrorism or human rights abuses; but the location of these dangers and the consequences of their realisation are often unknown. These dangers thus represent less of a quantitative threat than they do a qualitative risk. They are qualitative in the sense that we cannot know for a fact if a risk is ‘out there’. This is because risk refers to the probability that a postulated scenario or event will materialise at some future point, meaning risk assessment relies upon our own subjective assessments of what the future might bring.

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
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Risk is therefore a concept that marries the present with the future, and can be conceptualised as an estimation of the dangerousness of the future.\textsuperscript{11} Risks can only be understood in the context of futuristic scenarios that may or may not occur. Risk does not refer to a present danger so much as it refers to the possibility that a given object or event will pose dangers in the future. This is another way of distinguishing between risk and threat: a risk refers to a future threat that has not yet materialised and may never do so. When a risk is realised, when the consequences of any given risk become real, then the risk becomes a threat properly so-called. In the risk society, we thus look to the future rather than the past as we did during the first modernity to guide our present actions. As Beck argues, the relationship between past, present and future has been substantially altered – future events become the object of current action.\textsuperscript{12}

However, perhaps the key point concerning the nature of the new risks faced by Western societies, one that, as shall be seen, has direct implications when risk is examined in the context of perceived security risks to the West, is their uncontrollability and tendency to exceed the limits of calculability. This uncontrollability and incalculability is a result of the temporal and spatial de-bounding of risks in contemporary international society.\textsuperscript{13} As Beck argues, the concept of risk society is not about the increase of risks, but about their de-bounding.\textsuperscript{14} Whereas in the past risks were generally localised in terms of time and space and thus predictable, controllable and insurable to a certain extent; today’s

\textsuperscript{12} Beck, World Risk Society, 137.
\textsuperscript{14} Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’, 41.
Risks are characterised by uncertainty, unpredictability and diffusiveness. As Jarvis argues:

With magnitudes of risk so great, with technological hazards and mishaps so extensive that they transcend both place and time by becoming international or global in scope and inter-generational in space, the prospects for the orderly control and distribution of risk across and within populations becomes both impossible and meaningless.

Thus, one of the defining characteristics of the new risks faced by Western societies is their tendency towards globalisation. In the risk society, there are far too many ‘unknown unknowns’ for so-called experts to be able to give authoritative answers on the risks we face. The most that can be expected are definitional struggles over the scale, degree and urgency of risks. The risk society thesis therefore challenges the ‘modern’ notion that risks can be subject to classification, quantification and elimination through rational behaviour.

The above would tend to suggest that risks are, at least in part, a socially constructed phenomenon. Beck himself appears to adhere to both a realist and a constructivist approach to risk,

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18 This phrase is from former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s infamous reply to a question posed at a NATO Press Conference in June 2002, in which he argued that there are ‘no knowns. There are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there are things that we now know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don’t know we don’t know. So when we do the best we can and we pull all this information together, and we then say well that’s basically what we see as the situation, that is really only the known knowns and the known unknowns. And each year, we discover a few more of those unknown unknowns’. See Donald Rumsfeld ‘Press Conference by US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld’, NATO Defence Minister’s Meeting (6-7 June 2002), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020606.htm (accessed 10 May 2007).
19 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, ‘“It Sounds Like a Riddle”: Security Studies, the War on Terror and Risk’, Millennium 33, no. 2 (2004): 381-95.
seeing it as both objectively real and socially constructed. In other words, in his approach to risk, Beck adopts a realist ontology and a constructivist epistemology.\(^\text{21}\)

As Beck argues:

Risk society theory...argues that there is both the immateriality of meditated and contested definitions of risk and the materiality of risk as manufactured by experts and industries world-wide...Risk science without the sociological imagination of contested and constructed risk is blind. Risk science that is not informed about the technologically manufactured nature of risk is naive.\(^\text{22}\)

Heng similarly adopts a realist-constructivist approach, recognising the interplay between material and cultural factors.\(^\text{23}\) Existing objects or events that can be objectively studied can be defined as risks, but the way in which risks are defined, as well as the choice as to which risks to address and which to simply tolerate and live with, are politically, socially and culturally predicated.\(^\text{24}\) Beck’s definition of risk has been criticised due to its emphasis on manufactured risks that exist ‘out there’ and the fact that social constructions of risk are relegated to the selection of risks to address and responses to such risks.\(^\text{25}\) This criticism shall be discussed further below.

Alongside the concept of risk, the second main component of the risk society thesis is Beck’s notion of reflexivity or reflexive modernisation. One of the key themes of Beck’s work is that what he terms industrial society was almost absolutely successful. Unsurpassed standards of wealth and prosperity have been delivered to Western societies and capitalist modes of production have been exported across the globe.\(^\text{26}\) The irony is that it is this very success that is undermining its own material

\(^{24}\) Heng, *War as Risk Management*, 42; Handmer and James, ‘Trust us and be Scared’, 121.
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benefits. Industrial society was guided by linear notions of progress, by certainty, security and controllability. Weberian means-end rationality guided Western societies – the reasons for actions are universal and calculable. All individuals, because of their rationality, were generally alike in the ends they sought; what differs are the capabilities of individuals and the means employed to achieve their ends.

This is essentially the classic realist notion of raison de tat. All states are functionally alike and seek the same ends, but their capabilities and the capabilities of other states influence the means that states employ to realise these ends. Outcomes can thus be calculated on the basis of capabilities. Means-end rationality extended across Western society, economics and politics during the early-middle twentieth century and indeed, informed the Cold War. The actions of both the West and the Soviet Union could be predicted and quantified according to capabilities (means) and intentions (desired ends and interests). But with the transition to risk society, means-end rationality breaks down and is replaced by a reflexive rationality. In industrial society, risks were considered unfortunate and unintended side-effects of industrialisation that could be identified, insured against, and compensated for through scientific expertise and calculations.

According to Beck, the very process of industrialisation that has provided such high levels of prosperity to Western societies has also exposed these societies to new, disembodied and uncontrollable forms of risk. Risk society emerges autonomously as modernisation processes that take no account of the consequences

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30 Ibid.
32 Heng, War as Risk Management, 33.
and dangers that they produce begin to erode the foundations of industrial society.\textsuperscript{34} There is thus a confrontation between the consequences of modernisation and the basis of modernisation. This is one part of what is meant by Beck’s notion of ‘reflexive modernisation’ which is crucial to his risk society thesis. The transition from industrial to risk society, from modernisation to reflexive modernisation, is automatic, unseen, uncontrollable and ambiguous, meaning that the transition can be characterised as reflex-like.\textsuperscript{35}

On the other hand, as individuals, organisations and governments within these emerging risk societies become increasingly aware of the risks and consequences of their own lifestyles, they are compelled to self-reflect on their situation.\textsuperscript{36} As Beck puts it, ‘society becomes a theme and a problem for itself’.\textsuperscript{37} Thus, society ceases to be defined in terms of the achievement of desired ends (such as the production of wealth) and becomes preoccupied with constant reflection on how to manage and properly distribute risks which are products of the very society that is engaged in self-reflection. Beck’s notion of reflexive modernisation therefore means that

a change of industrial society which occurs surreptitiously and unplanned in the wake of normal, autonomized modernization and with an unchanged, intact political and economic order implies the following: a \textit{radicalization} of modernity, which breaks up the promises and contours of industrial society and opens paths to another modernity.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{34} Beck, \textit{World Risk Society}, 73.
\textsuperscript{36} Beck, \textit{World Risk Society}, 81.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 3.
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Reflexivity, in the narrower sense of the term meaning societal self-reflection on the risks associated with modernity, usefully encapsulates the contemporary Western view of the wider international society. In the post-Cold War era, the West has adopted a reflexive rationality in its view of international society, constantly reflecting on the unforeseen consequences and security risks that have arisen within a pluralist international society in an age of globalisation. The result of this new reflexive rationality and Western attempts to manage perceived risks is an erosion of the pluralist basis of international society and the emergence of new forms of hierarchy. The remainder of this chapter examines existing accounts of contemporary hierarchy within international society, before examining more fully the relationship between risk, reflexivity and pluralist international society.

Hierarchy and Constitutional Transition within International Society

This section explores existing accounts of constitutional transition within international society, particularly those that focus on recent hierarchical trends within international society. One of the weaknesses of these accounts of contemporary hierarchy is that they take these hierarchical trends at face value. Little attention is paid to the underlying rationales or causal relationships that inform these new hierarchies. Further, few of these accounts have considered the implications of such trends for the constitutional structure of international society. The next section addresses these weaknesses by employing Beck’s notions of risk and the world risk society in order to account for contemporary hierarchical trends within international society. It suggests that a liberal social logic of risk underpins these hierarchies and represents a fundamental alteration of international society’s constitution. International society is becoming a new type of risk society.
As discussed in chapter one, international society is constituted according to fundamental norms that shape its nature and boundaries – hierarchical as opposed to egalitarian, exclusionary and restrictive as opposed to inclusive and global.\textsuperscript{39} English School theorists and constructivists have recognised the importance of norms and intersubjective understandings among states in shaping not only international society, but also the identity and behaviour of states.\textsuperscript{40} Despite this, however, many English School theorists have failed to identify key moments of constitutional transition within international society, and have attributed to international society a relative stability in its constitutional structure that fails to adequately conceptualise the dynamic nature of the constitutive norms underpinning the society of states. Indeed, in general English School theorists have not been overly successful in accounting for change and transition within International Relations.

One of the main features of English School theory is that a complete picture of International Relations includes an international system, international society and a world society, the main question being which one of these elements dominates in a given era.\textsuperscript{41} Yet there is little discussion of the processes by which an international system gives way to an international society, or how an international society is subsumed under a world society. There has also been limited discussion of constitutional transition within international society itself. It is this constitutionally static view of international society that generally precludes the English School, as it currently stands, from providing an adequate account of contemporary constitutional revision within international society. Another problem here is that most English School works continue to conceptualise international society within what might be

\textsuperscript{39} Philpott, \textit{Revolutions in Sovereignty}, 21.
\textsuperscript{40} See chapter one for more on this.
\textsuperscript{41} Buzan, \textit{From International to World Society?}, 10.
term a ‘modernist’ framework, understanding social interaction within international society primarily in terms of the territorially discrete nation-state. This overlooks the extent to which social relations between states have been shaped and substantially altered since the end of the Cold War by processes of globalisation and the emergence of spatially and temporally de-bounded risks that transcend state boundaries and become global in scope. New forms of risk beyond the ambit of the nation-state, such as terrorism, have become central to interstate relationships within international society. Therefore, such a modernist framework ignores the extent to which contemporary social relations between states are increasingly shaped by a liberal social logic of risk as states attempt to manage perceived future dangers. It should be noted, however, that this does not apply to all English School scholars. For example, Hurrell has outlined the importance of non-state actors and processes of globalisation in regard to interstate relations and international society.\(^{42}\)

The failure to identify the processes that underpin constitutional transition within international society is evident in the work of Simpson. While Simpson usefully draws attention to historical trends of anti-pluralism and hierarchy within international society, he does not consider the processes by which anti-pluralism gains ascendance in a given period.\(^{43}\) Simpson is content in making the argument that the constitutional structure of international society is best understood as a continuous interplay between sovereign equality (pluralism) and anti-pluralism without providing an account of why, in each of his ‘constitutional moments’ where pluralism or anti-pluralism established ascendance, these constitutional shifts

\(^{42}\) See Hurrell, *On Global Order*.
\(^{43}\) See Simpson, ‘Two Liberalisms’.
Thus, one of the problems with Simpson’s account of anti-pluralism is that he fails to establish any mechanisms of change or causal relationships that might account for transitions between pluralist and anti-pluralist forms of international society. To be fair, this could be due to Simpson’s assertion that the two exist in continuous tension with one another, and while one may enjoy ascendancy over the other, both can be identified within international society in any given period.

Arguably, Simpson’s project is simply concerned with outlining the need to understand international society and the international legal order in terms of both their pluralist and anti-pluralist faces, and the cyclical nature of transitions between these two faces. Still, if we do want to understand international society in pluralist or anti-pluralist terms, we need to be able to account for constitutional transitions within international society that reflect either pluralism or anti-pluralism. Why is it that one gains ascendance over the other in any given epoch? As Reus-Smit suggests, different societies of states develop different constitutional structures based upon variable cultural and historical circumstances. What is missing from Simpson’s work then is a careful examination of these variable factors that influence and explain why international society adopts a pluralist or anti-pluralist face.

Other scholars, such as Anghie, suggest that the constitutional structure of international society has actually remained rather constant. Anghie’s study focuses on the enduring significance of colonialism for international law. Part of Anghie’s argument is that old colonial hierarchies thought dead with decolonisation in the

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45 Ibid.
47 This is particularly evident when Simpson considers the war in Afghanistan in the context of his thesis concerning sovereign equality and anti-pluralism. Here, Simpson essentially argues that US intervention in Afghanistan (and Kosovo) is representative of a form of anti-pluralism and hierarchy within international society. What is missing from Simpson’s account is an analysis of precisely why such anti-pluralist and hierarchical trends have re-emerged. See Simpson, *Great Powers and Outlaw States*, 319-51.
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early 1960s have in fact endured and still structure Western relations with the former colonies to this day. Indeed, Anghie’s focus on colonialism suggests that interactions between the imperial powers and the former colonies have remained constant despite the end of colonialism and the obviously new criteria for inclusion within international society that resulted from this.\textsuperscript{48} The main weakness of Anghie’s focus on colonialism is that this focus masks both the different features of colonial hierarchies compared to contemporary hierarchies and the very different ways in which these different forms of hierarchy are operationalised within international society.

Despite the fact that colonialism has indelibly affected and shaped the current contours of international law and international society, Anghie’s argument that contemporary interventions by the West constitute a continuing form of imperialism is misplaced. The colonial continuities within international law and international society that Anghie emphasises are overstated. While we can view the contemporary emphasis on liberal democracy as the basis of legitimate statehood as a reincarnation of the standard of civilisation, Anghie fails to examine the way in which this standard has been operationalised and given effect within international society in the post-Cold War era in terms of risk itself. However, he hints at the unique ‘risk-focused’ nature of contemporary interventions when he argues that ‘the transformation of the offending society into a democracy is the most effective way of ensuring that it will pose no future threat’.\textsuperscript{49}

Anghie’s notion of enduring colonialism, along with those who argue for the re-emergence of empire or imperialism, overlook the extent to which contemporary interventions do not conform to earlier colonial modes of intervention. The aim of

\textsuperscript{48} See Anghie, \textit{Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law}.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 278 (italics added).
post-Cold War interventions might involve the imposition of particular forms of governance, as did colonialism, but it is certainly not motivated by economic exploitation or territorial aggrandisement, nor is the sovereignty of target states completely disregarded or denied. These states remain states, albeit states of ‘lesser standing’. Indeed, Anghie fails to take into account wider social changes that have occurred within Western societies and within international society. Thus, when Anghie examines contemporary Western ‘imperialism’ in relation to the ‘War on Terror’, he asserts that, although this ‘imperialism’ is defensive in nature and aimed at achieving security for the West, it is still a continuation of colonialism and the old colonial legal and political relationships that structure relations between the West and the Periphery.\(^5\)

The question that Anghie’s discussion raises, but does not address, is that if contemporary Western interventions do represent the continuance of colonialism in a new guise, then how do we account for the fact that the previous Western depiction of colonial peoples and territories as inherently inferior and thus ripe for conquest and exploitation has transformed so that these territories are now depicted as representing grave risks that the West must secure itself against? When, and why, did exploitation and paternalism transform into fear and anxiety? This is a question that Bain also does not adequately address in his work on trusteeship, although he acknowledges that the contemporary hierarchies associated with the return of trusteeship are not necessarily similar in character to those associated with colonialism.\(^6\)

Dunne has also identified contemporary hierarchical trends within international society and correctly questions the extent to which a pluralistic

\(^5\) Ibid., 273-309.
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international society is compatible with forms of hierarchy. For Dunne, US interventionism in Iraq threatens the existence of international society. In Dunne’s words ‘the United States stands in opposition to international society...’ Dunne’s argument is built on the notion that the US disregard for the prevailing norms of international society, demonstrated by the lack of a sound legal basis or widespread international legitimacy concerning the invasion of Iraq, means that the US has opted out of international society altogether. This argument also tends to assume that US interventionism is representative of a form of hierarchy that is incompatible with the idea of an international society.

Legitimacy is crucial to Dunne’s understanding of international society – legitimation, or lack thereof, of a particular US intervention by the wider international society is determinative of whether the US is operating within international society or not. What Dunne does not consider is that the very notion of legitimacy within international society itself has changed in response to an increasing Western preoccupation with risk. The problem with Dunne’s account is that he ascribes to international society a relatively static, pluralist constitutional structure – he depicts the US action in Iraq as contrary to the prevailing pluralist norms of international society and thus the US now sits beyond such a society. This overlooks the extent to which the invasion of Iraq is but one example that is representative of constitutional transition within international society rather than a signifier of a US withdrawal from such a society.

In other words, the invasion of Iraq marks an ongoing process of constitutional transition within international society, not the withdrawal of the US

52 Dunne, ‘Society and Hierarchy in International Relations’, 316.
53 Ibid., 315.
54 Ibid., 316.
55 Ibid., 306.
from a pluralist, constitutionally static international society. Indeed, Dunne does not consider the extent to which the intervention in Iraq shares common rationales and motives with other contemporary interventions such as Kosovo and Afghanistan. Heng suggests that all of these interventions were actually aimed at the management of risk.\textsuperscript{56} When one examines these interventions, one finds that the motives and rationales for intervention provided by the US and other Western states revolve around preventing undesirable future occurrences. Contemporary hierarchy within international society has taken on a fundamentally new form, underpinned by a new social logic of risk. The accounts of constitutional transition and hierarchical trends within contemporary international society surveyed have thus failed to either adequately conceptualise constitutional transition within international society or adequately conceptualise the nature of contemporary hierarchy.

These criticisms are also true of the limited number of scholars that have applied risk to International Relations. Scholars such as Heng and Rasmussen have sought to apply risk to contemporary strategic studies and examine the changing nature of warfare through the lens of Beck’s risk society framework.\textsuperscript{57} Although these scholars have explicitly focused on the changing nature of warfare, neither has paused to consider the effect of such changes for interstate relations in general. While the argument that Western warfare is now centred on risk management is persuasive, the more interesting question that this new ‘risk management mode’ of warfare raises is how do such changes impact on the rules and norms that underpin interstate relations? It is this question of the impact of risk upon international society that will be addressed in the next section.


\textsuperscript{57} See Heng, \textit{War as Risk Management}; Rasmussen, \textit{The Risk Society at War}.
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Risk, Reflexivity and Globalisation in International Society

As noted, risk is a concept that has been relatively ignored within International Relations. As Jarvis and Griffiths suggest, there has been scant utilisation, theorisation and application of risk to state-state relationships. Yet, at least in Western societies, risk has become one of the defining concepts of our time. Risk analysis and management are practices that have proliferated throughout all sections of Western society. In the workplace, risk analysis and management are both central features of most occupational health and safety policies; in the media we are confronted almost weekly with medical research that shows a particular activity or a particular food group either increases or decreases the risk of contracting a certain disease or ailment. The risks associated with climate change have become one of the defining global political issues of our time. Sociologists such as Beck, Giddens and Lupton have all provided persuasive accounts of risk and its centrality to Western societies. Given the Western preoccupation with risk domestically that these scholars have identified, it is little surprise that a similar focus on risk has been reflected in the way the West interacts externally with the wider international society.

Such a preoccupation with risk has become increasingly evident since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the end of the Cold War has presented International Relations observers with a paradox. On the one hand, the West no longer faces existential threats to its survival such as it did during the Cold War. Yet on the other hand, the West has seemingly become increasingly insecure, anxious and preoccupied with global security risks. As Beck argues, with the end of the Cold War

and the bipolar order, we are moving from a world of enemies to one of risks.\textsuperscript{61} Prevailing notions of security have been turned on their head, due in large part to the effects of globalisation.\textsuperscript{62} This is due to the temporally and spatially de-bounded nature of modern security issues – potential threats such as terrorism are now imprecisely defined, difficult to locate and potentially uncontrollable.

These new security issues are thus not easily identifiable in terms of capabilities and intentions. Indeed, the material power or capabilities of risks such as terrorism are difficult, if not impossible to ascertain.\textsuperscript{63} Clearly defined enemies have been replaced with globalised security risks. Processes of globalisation have been instrumental in the de-bounding of contemporary security issues, particularly their spatial de-bounding. Scholte defines globalisation as a de-territorialisation of social life; similarly Rasmussen suggests that ‘A global infrastructure allows for the extension of social spaces beyond their traditional geographical confines’.\textsuperscript{64} One of the results of this is that ‘the notion of ‘local conflict’ has been drained of much of its meaning; and seeing that much of what was once local is now unavoidably global, and often dangerously so, distant islands of anarchy are now ignored only at the risk of great peril’.\textsuperscript{65}

Processes of globalisation, particularly technological innovation in transport and communications, give rise to two interrelated consequences: one, they leave the West more exposed and therefore vulnerable to pockets of instability within the

\textsuperscript{61} Beck, \textit{World Risk Society}, 3.
\textsuperscript{62} Beeson and Bellamy have persuasively argued that the effects of globalisation have rendered previous state-centric conceptions of security inadequate for conceptualising a global security environment characterised by the malleability of borders and transnational security risks. See Mark Beeson and Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Globalisation, Security and International Order After 11 September’, \textit{Australian Journal of Politics and History} 49, no. 3 (2003): 339-54.
\textsuperscript{63} Heng, \textit{War as Risk Management}, 49.
\textsuperscript{65} Bain, \textit{Between Anarchy and Society}, 5.
wider international society. Two, they provide the means by which forces within these pockets of instability can potentially strike out at the West. As Coker argues ‘Risk became central in our thinking and behaviour once we entered a global society.

For globalisation has drawn us out of our self-contained national or local communities into a larger world which offers none of the old protections’. Globalisation, once viewed as a force for economic integration, development and the spread of liberalism and democracy, is now viewed as containing a ‘dark side’. For instance, the Australian Department of Defence’s 2007 Defence Update suggests that Australians today are more connected with the wider world than at any other time in our history, but the negative side of globalisation is that this connectedness brings potential security threats closer to us. Globalisation speeds up the impact and significance of existing and new threats, shortening response times, and increasing uncertainty. People, money, and ideas now move faster around the world, not always for the good. While globalisation offers significant opportunities, it also can help the spread of extremist terrorism and diseases such as avian influenza.

The emphasis in this statement on potential security threats is important. In the absence of clearly defined threats, Western societies have become preoccupied with ill-defined risks. Further, this statement highlights the uncertainty that is a feature of attempting to deal with globalised risks that are spatially and temporally de-bounded. Western societies now lack what Giddens terms ‘ontological security’: the firm knowledge of what to expect. As Rasmussen suggests, during the Cold War the risk of destruction for the West (and the East) was arguably much higher.

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69. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 35-69.
than it is today. Yet, the Soviet Union was clearly definable in terms of military, economic and political capabilities and the US could, at least to a certain extent, gauge the intentions of the Soviet government. Thus, perversely, during the Cold War the West enjoyed a higher degree of ontological security – the threat was well defined and in a worst-case scenario, people knew what to expect.

This has changed – as Coker argues, Western societies now share a new ‘risk management ethos which has emerged in response to the greater insecurity that seems to stem from globalisation’. The West’s current lack of ontological security is a derivative of the uncertainty that results from the spatially and temporally de-bounded nature of current security risks. The lack of clearly defined threats has meant that focus has shifted to risks and future undesirable possibilities. This new focus on risk and preoccupation with potentialities is well demonstrated in the work of several scholars. Cooper argues that the twenty-first century risks being overrun by technology and anarchy. The West is exposed to the new risks of a globalising world. According to Cooper, we face the choice of a ‘defensive imperialism’ designed to manage global chaos or to live with chaos itself.

This sort of dystopian narrative is not unique to Cooper. It is present in Huntington’s thesis on the Clash of Civilisations and his warning of future civilisational conflicts facing the West, or the complete breakdown of civilisation itself as envisaged by Kaplan. What these dystopian narratives have in common, aside from their marked pessimism, is the theme of a Western society that faces grave risks and future dangers. None of these works actually describe imminent or

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70 Rasmussen, “‘9-11’: Globalisation, Security and World Order”, 11.
72 Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, 17.
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immediately identifiable threats to the West. Rather, they warn of future possibilities, whether it is Huntington’s future civilisational conflicts or Cooper’s warning of the chaos exhibited in what he terms the ‘premodern zone’. The analysis of these scholars exhibits an inherent reflexivity. In reflecting on globalisation and contemporary international society, all have focused on the risks generated by globalisation and international society. Emphasis is placed on future scenarios and the consequences of such scenarios.

Similarly, in its preoccupation with risk, the West has also become increasingly reflexive in its view of a pluralist international society in an age of globalisation. Western states have conspicuously engaged in reflection on the implications and consequences of a globalised, post-Cold War pluralist international society in which all states, regardless of their internal characteristics or even their ability to govern, are full and equal members of international society. However, while globalisation has played a role in the de-bounding of risk and increasing the vulnerability of the West to such risks, it is a facilitator, not an originator of risk. Rather, globalised security risks have been seen to originate in Cooper’s ‘zones of chaos’ – illiberal states and states beset by conflict and political instability.\(^{74}\) The emergence of a pluralist international society provided independence for the former colonies and finally universalised international society. But one of the consequences of this is that ‘the world’s most destitute states, and the patterns of violence to which they give rise, are sustained in a rather perverse way by the constitutive norms of international society’.\(^{75}\)

Western reflexivity is well-captured by Ian Clark who, although he does not explicitly utilise the concept of risk, argues that there is an ongoing ‘double

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\(^{74}\) Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*, 18.

\(^{75}\) Bain, *Between Anarchy and Society*, 143.
movement’ within international society. As international society evolved into a pluralist society of states during the twentieth century, the West, reflecting on the vagaries, inconveniences and consequences of the open ‘political market’, has sought to forge a more overtly normative, ‘thicker’ version of international society based on liberal values. In other words, in response to the possible risks associated with an open, pluralist international society, the West has responded by attempting to manage these risks via the promotion of its own liberal values. Clark argues that this process is inseparable from the evolution and eventual emergence of the pluralist international society during the twentieth century. Further, this process has intensified in the post-Cold War era.\(^{76}\)

While such a ‘double movement’ has certainly found its most forceful expression in the post-Cold War era, it has not simply been pluralism \emph{per se} that the West has reacted to. Rather, the West’s reaction to the vagaries and consequences of a pluralist international society is better viewed as being conditioned in large part by both globalisation and, to a lesser extent, the end of the Cold War. Globalisation and the breakdown of the Cold War bipolar structure have left the West exposed to the risks posed by the wider pluralist international society, including new risks associated with state failure, ethnic conflict or human rights abuses. In essence, Clark’s argument is similar to that presented here.

Clark’s core argument is that a more overtly normative, hierarchical international society has emerged in reaction to the evolution and emergence of a pluralist international society which has exposed the West to the new risks of the ‘open political market’. As Clark argues:

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However, in the second stage [of the ‘double movement’], the wider West – incorporating most of Europe but led by the United States – has struck back at the very pluralism that the global state system had generated, and of which the World Wars and Cold War were symptomatic. It has sought to reassert a greater central control of the international system. Its chosen instrument has been the forging of a new international society – adhering to a thicker set of legitimating principles embracing democracy, liberal values and capitalism – that has been progressively formed from within the original.\(^77\)

This reflexive view of the risks associated with contemporary pluralist international society encourages the perception of a division between a zone of risk and a zone at risk. Those states that have constituted their internal political and social institutions in an unacceptable way (e.g. illiberal or undemocratic states), or those that have no meaningful political or social institutions to speak of belong to this zone of risk. Illiberal regimes and endemic governance problems in many post-colonial states are nothing new. Pluralist international society affords states the freedom to choose their own domestic institutions for realising their society’s particular version of the good life, even if they should fail in that endeavour. Yet in an age of globalisation, other sections of international society can no longer insulate themselves from the perceived security risks posed by these states. Thus, the rights normally associated with full membership of international society are suspended for states in the ‘risky zone’ which then potentially become subject to Western intervention.

Again, it is important to stress that while states consigned to the zone of risk pose no concrete existential security threats to the West in the way the Soviet Union did during the Cold War, they are perceived as posing ill-specified, amorphous

\(^77\) Ibid., 254-5.
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security risks. The security implications of the internal conditions of these states are defined in terms of potential future occurrences and possible negative consequences. The uncertainty and ill-defined nature of security risks means that in seeking to manage and prevent risk, emphasis is placed on identifying and reshaping those environments deemed to be potentially dangerous or risky. Thus, while it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify exactly what form a security risk will take, when such a risk is likely to be realised or what the consequences of its realisation will be, broad environmental conditions that are conducive to risk, such as undemocratic or illiberal regimes and state failure, can be identified and reshaped so as to prevent undesirable future events.

As such, pluralism, as a fundamental and constitutive normative doctrine of international society, has been eroded by the notion that illiberal states or states suffering from poor governance potentially pose unacceptable security risks to the West. Risk mitigates the recognition of diversity and tolerance inherent in a pluralist international society because it is this very recognition that underwrites the existence of illiberal and failed states that now potentially act as originators of global security risks. International society’s pluralist constitutive values become a theme and a problem in themselves. These values, whilst allowing for diversity and the domestic freedom of states, have also spawned unintended security consequences. International society thus enters a transition towards a reflexive, hierarchical and anti-pluralist form of risk society as the West seeks to police the globe in an attempt to manage risk.

A liberal social of risk has therefore become a central element in constituting contemporary international society. This social logic erodes the pluralist constitutional basis of international society, leading to a novel form of international
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risk society policed by the West. As discussed earlier, other scholars have tended to view Western interventionism as merely representing a re-hierarchisation of international society. However, they have generally failed to recognise the constitutional change that it at stake. International society’s pluralist constitution is distinctly affected by new forms of globalised risk and Western attempts at risk management. It is the very notion of pluralism itself that becomes the problem in an international society in which the dominant powers seem acutely sensitive to potential security risks that they are willing to prevent through interventionist risk management techniques.

Re-evaluating Risk in an International Relations Context

As argued above, the concepts of risk and risk management are useful in explaining contemporary hierarchy and constitutional transition within international society. However, despite their usefulness as explanatory concepts, there are elements of Beck’s risk society thesis that are problematic when considered in the context of International Relations. Most of these problems revolve around Beck’s understanding and definition of risk, as well as his analysis (or lack thereof) of the effects of risk on the state and interstate relations. This final section explores some of the limitations of Beck’s thesis when applied to interstate relations. As is argued, Beck can be primarily criticised for his failure to examine the relationship between risk and international society and the effects of risk for interstate relations.

One significant problem lies with Beck’s understanding of risk. Beck’s earlier work focuses almost exclusively on technologically manufactured risks that arise unintentionally out of processes of industrialisation. However in later works,

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78 Jarvis, ‘Risk, Globalisation and the State’, 33.
Beck also discusses intentional forms of risk such as terrorism, although the defining characteristics of de-bounding and uncontrollability apply to all of these various forms of risk. Further, as suggested above, Beck tends to define risks as objective realities that exist out there – risks are given, not constructed. They are empirical realities that arise out of extant manufacturing processes and technologies or, in the case of terrorism, intentional decisions by given actors. As Beck argues, risks are both real and constituted by social perception and construction, hence he describes himself as ‘both a realist and a constructivist’. However, for Beck, social and cultural factors come into play only when one decides what risks to address and how to address them.

Yet, as Aradau and Van Muster argue, this reduces cultural and social (and political) factors to intervening variables between objective material risks and social and policy responses to them. This downplays and underemphasises the socially constructed and political nature of risk, which includes both the definition of what constitutes a risk and the selection of appropriate responses to given risks. Social, political and cultural factors both construct risks and shape responses to such risks; indeed, how a risk is socially constructed directly influences the measures adopted to manage it. As Coker argues: ‘What the West considers a risk will be moulded by its values and norms, for risks, like anxieties, do not exist independent of our

80 Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’, 44.
82 Beck, ‘Risk Society Revisited’, 219. In more recent work, Beck seems to have shifted towards a constructivist understanding of risk, rather than only viewing risk assessment and management as socially predicated. In his most recent work, Beck has introduced the concept of ‘staging’ – the imagining and identification of risk. As he suggests ‘For only by imagining and staging world risk does the future catastrophe become present...’ See Beck, World at Risk, 10.
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perceptions of them. Consequently, risks are contested. Likewise, Handmer and James suggest that one of the features of complex de-bounded risks is that values are central to definitions of risk and the selection of responses to a given risk.

This is particularly important in the context of Western interventions aimed at promoting liberalism and democracy and the effects risk has for international society’s constitution. Beck’s definition of risk is ill-suited to an analysis of the way in which the West perceives globalised security risks within international society, or the risk management techniques that are adopted in response to such risks. Adopting an objectivist or realist ontology of risk obscures the centrality of Western liberal values to definitions of, and responses to, risk. In turn, this obscures the effects that risk has for the pluralist constitution of international society. The absence of liberal democracy is central to Western definitions of dangerous environments that are conducive as originators of global security risks. Such an absence of liberal democratic institutions (or a lack of social or political institutions altogether) is indeed an existing empirical condition that to a certain extent (depending on how one defines liberalism, democracy or state failure) can be objectively identified.

But state failure or illiberal regimes do not simply constitute objective risks in their own right. While both might be real conditions, the way in which such conditions are defined as risks is socially constructed. That is, the perception and definition of such conditions as threatening or risky is predicated upon perceptions of what Western societies deem to be dangerous or hazardous. Indeed, the definition of risk is extremely fluid – what is considered a risk in one context is not necessarily a risk in another. For example, Iraq attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was presented as a dire risk with potentially catastrophic

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84 Coker, ‘Risk Management Goes Global’.
85 Handmer and James, ‘Trust us and be Scared’, 129.
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consequences. Yet Pakistan, another state previously under the control of an unelected military dictator with an arsenal of nuclear warheads, is not considered risky. Rather, it is an ally of the US in the war on terror.\textsuperscript{86} Despite the empirical facts, Iraq under Hussein was constructed as a risk while Pakistan under Musharraf was not.

The point is that risks cannot simply be reduced to observable phenomena that are then separately subject to political and social contestation concerning which risks to address and how. Both the definition and management of risk are socially constructed. As Eriksson argues, ‘threats, risks, dangers – or whatever they are called – are social constructions’.\textsuperscript{87} When examining risk management, the centrality of values again is apparent in the West’s ‘Grand Strategy’ of risk management, which involves promoting liberalism. There is little, if any, empirical evidence to suggest, as does the 2006 \textit{National Security Strategy (NSS)}, that democracy is the solution to terrorism and other global security risks – this is a response derived from a Western recourse to liberal values.\textsuperscript{88} Western conceptions of risk and risk management are thus specific constructs influenced by liberal values. As argued above, the consequence of defining risks and risk management in terms of liberalism or its absence for international society’s pluralist constitution is that the tolerance of diversity among international society’s members that is central to pluralism becomes a risk in itself.

Thus, the foundations of pluralist international society are eroded and a new international risk society displaying antipluralist and hierarchical trends emerges.

\textsuperscript{86} However, continuing political instability in Pakistan has been deemed to present a worrying risk for the West.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this argument when considered in the context of Beck’s world risk society thesis is its stark contrast to Beck’s analysis of the effects of risk for the state and international society. For Beck, the global nature of new risks means that states will only be able to manage them via increasingly intensified transnational cooperation. As Beck argues, Western and non-Western societies share the same time and space and face the challenges of the second modernity (world risk society) together.\textsuperscript{89} The result, according to Beck, is that true cosmopolitanism emerges – world risk society breaks down the old antagonisms of industrial society (in particular the nation-state) and states, faced with global risks that affect them all, are compelled towards the development of cooperative international institutions.\textsuperscript{90}

In other words, Beck suggests that faced with globalised risks, international society will transform into a form of world society. Further, the nation-state will disintegrate as it is circumvented and annulled by processes of globalisation, particularly its economic processes, and new global risks that escape its control.\textsuperscript{91} As Beck puts it, the nation-state is a ‘zombie category’: it looks alive, but it is really dead.\textsuperscript{92} Yet it is precisely the opposite that has occurred. Firstly, it is clear that Beck’s assumption that the nation-state will fade away as world risk society is consolidated is naive, simplistic and lacking in empirical basis. The state has not faded away and does not appear likely do so in the foreseeable future. As Jarvis highlights, globalisation is what states make of it – there is no zero-sum relationship between globalisation (and risk) and the state.\textsuperscript{93}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{89} Beck, \textit{World Risk Society}, 2.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 16-20.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} Jarvis, ‘Risk, Globalisation and the State’, 34-6.
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The real problem, however, lies with Beck’s prescriptions of a cosmopolitan community in which members of different states and societies share solidarity in the face of globalised risks that affect them all. Beck’s argument that global, transnational risks require transnational cooperation amongst states which will eventually lead to a cosmopolitan world society is inadequate for conceptualising contemporary international society. One of the problems is that Beck is far too quick to assume that globalisation and world risk society erode the foundations of the nation-state and will lead to its eventual usurpation and demise. Such an argument means that there is little need for an emphasis on the effects of risk for interstate relations or processes of interaction within international society, since both will eventually be subsumed under a new cosmopolitan world risk society bound together by the need to collectively manage common dangers.

Indeed, Beck’s analysis of interstate relations in a world risk society goes little further than that the management of global risk will result in transnational cooperation between states. The assumption is that cooperation and negotiation will be the hallmarks of a world risk society in which all peoples face globalised risks. However, Beck never fully explains why this should be the case, nor does he adequately explore the possibility that world risk society will lead to new forms of conflict as states attempt to manage risk within international society. In part, Beck’s assertion of transnational cosmopolitanism is borne partly out his narrow conceptualisation of risk. Beck’s focus on global environmental risks as unintended consequences of technological development and industrialisation that affect all people allow him to suggest that given the mutuality between different societies in managing environmental risks, transnational cooperation and cosmopolitanism will

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result. In this conceptualisation, there is no ‘other’ intentionally creating the risk – all societies contribute to environmental risks through the unintended side effects of industrialisation.95

Yet the perceived security risks faced by the West are defined as arising from the conscious intentions and actions of other states and individuals. International security risks are thus inherently human in nature. Terrorism, WMD proliferation or human rights abuses all arise out of intentional human activity. Security risks, at least as they are perceived and defined by the West, are thus defined in opposition to an ‘other’ – someone or some group of individuals (whether it be terrorist groups or rogue regimes) that constitute a risk that needs to be managed. Such a definition of risk creates an imperative for interventionist and possibly forceful modalities of risk management rather than just transnational cooperation. Globalised security risks thus constitute a different form of risk compared to Beck’s ‘technological risks’. They are, in Heng’s typology of risk, a form of ‘socio-political risk’ that originates in conscious human behaviour.96 The point here is that different types of risk are not only defined in different ways, but they are managed via different activities and lead to differing social and political effects.

Indeed, in a later work, Beck suggests just this, arguing that terrorism is a very different form of risk compared to the ecological and financial risks (both arising out of industrialisation or modernisation) that he had previously identified as part of world risk society.97 Further, Beck argues, correctly this time, that with the advent of the terrorist threat, the state is back because of its role as the provider of

95 See Beck, Risk Society.
96 Heng, War as Risk Management, 45.
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security. 98 Beck also states that definitions of the terrorist enemy ‘other’ by Western powers are ‘deterritorialized, de-nationalized and flexible state constructions that legitimize the global intervention of military powers as ‘self-defence’. 99 Further, in relation to the risk of terrorism, Beck argues that it has produced a quasi-revolutionary moment in world politics, one that could result in two very different situations. One, it could lead to the end of US unilateralism and isolationism, eroding state conflict and differences. On the other hand, it could mean a crusade that results in protectionism, nationalism and demonization of the other. 100

These are curious statements because they would seem to contradict Beck’s broader claim that risks necessarily lead to cosmopolitanism. Global interventionism or crusading is not synonymous with cosmopolitan negotiation and cooperation. Further, these statements highlight the hierarchical and interventionist trends to which a social logic of risk gives rise within international society. Despite this, Beck continues his ‘cosmopolitan argument’, suggesting that global terrorism, like other risks, opens the door for the emergence of a ‘cosmopolitan state’. 101 Beck thus fails to adequately address the tension that arises in attempting to argue that intentional globalised security risks and unintentional ecological and financial risks will have the same social and political effects and lead to the same cosmopolitan conclusion. Beck himself alludes to this tension with his remarks on the way in which Western constructions of terrorist risks legitimise interventionist practices, or how the terrorist risk could lead either to further integration or conflict between states.

101 Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’, 49-50; Beck, ‘The Silence of Words’, 265-66. Interestingly, this idea of a ‘cosmopolitan state’ seems to suggest not the demise of the state itself, but of the nation-state. Thus, Beck’s more recent work could be read as suggesting the transformation of the state, not its complete demise.
Further, Beck’s continued adherence to the ‘cosmopolitan argument’ betrays a lack of consideration and understanding of the impact of risk upon social relations between states. Beck’s analysis lacks a consideration of the social and political conflicts to which risk gives rise within a pluralist international society in which Western powers have increasingly identified and defined zones of risk on the basis of their own liberal values. These efforts at risk management contravene several of the norms and rules associated with a pluralist international society. Beck’s failure to consider such social conflict demonstrates a lack of understanding of the conditions that underpin a pluralist international society. Pluralist international society depends primarily on recognition of the right of other states to internally constitute themselves according to their own societal values, something that is incompatible with a notion of risk predicated on intentional human action and the idea that particular internal characteristics of states constitute ‘risky environments’. Beck’s analysis of risk thus obscures existing social relations among states in favour of the argument that these social relations, indeed international society itself, will eventually be transcended.

Therefore, while Beck’s concepts of risk and reflexivity are useful in understanding the nature of contemporary hierarchy and constitutional revision within international society, one needs to be careful when applying them to the study of International Relations. In particular, Beck can be rightly criticised for his failure to engage in a more rigorous examination of the effects of risk for interstate relations, rather than simply assuming that world risk society will lead to transnational negotiation and a cosmopolitan world society. Instead, as has been argued, the advent of globalised security risks has eroded international society’s...

102 Such contestation was particularly evident during the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq. For more on this, see chapter seven.
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pluralist basis, leading to new forms of conflict and new, increasingly prevalent trends of hierarchy and anti-pluralism. It is precisely this constitutional transformation within international society that Beck has failed to capture. In short, international society is in the process of transformation, not transcendence.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the causal factors underpinning Western interventionism in the post-Cold War era, arguing that a new liberal social logic of risk underpins these interventions and the hierarchical relationships of which they are representative. Stemming in large part from the anxieties and insecurities of Western societies, international society has become a reflexive form of risk society. Yet it is not the world risk society that Beck envisioned. International society has not been replaced by a cosmopolitan world society. Certainly, actors other than the state, particularly transnational actors such as terrorist organisations, now factor heavily within international society. But the state has not been transplanted or eroded by risk, contrary to Beck’s assertions. Rather, the state remains the fundamental actor in world politics – international society remains a society of states. Yet it is a different form of international society that is in the process of emerging, reflected in the changing constitutive values that form the basis of this society.

The reconstitution of international society has seen increasingly prevalent hierarchical and anti-pluralist trends emerge as Western states seek to manage the new risks of a globalised era. Pluralism has become a theme and a problem for itself. The notion that all states should be left to constitute their internal social and political institutions as they see fit, even if these should fail, has been steadily eroded in the post-Cold War era by the potential risks posed by the ‘chaos’ of so-called
‘peripheral’ states. The identification of certain environments as conducive to the production of global security risks creates an imperative to reshape these environments, resulting in interventionist mechanisms of risk management designed to effect the promotion of liberal values and systems of governance. The next chapter examines the West’s liberal interventionism as a form of risk management. Rather than simply the promotion of liberal values per se, the attempts at promoting liberal values in locations such as Solomon Islands and Iraq have more do with preventing and managing risks than they have to do with bringing ‘freedom’ and democracy to oppressed peoples. Security at home for the West is increasingly seen to depend upon liberalism abroad.

104 See chapters 5-7 for more details.
Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, the post-Cold War era has presented Western governments with a range of new security issues, issues that present much less of a concrete threat than they do a future and ill-defined risk. Contemporary security issues, particularly terrorism, are defined by their temporal and spatial de-bounding. These risks are difficult to locate and can be potentially catastrophic should they materialise. As the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) 1991 Strategic Concept states: ‘In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess...’¹ Faced with the high levels of uncertainty that surround de-bounded risks and potential catastrophe, Western governments have become increasingly occupied with anticipating and preventing these risks before they occur.

In effect, Western governments have explicitly taken up the mantle of risk managers, seeking to govern risk and prevent negative future occurrences. In its effort to govern security risks, the West has attempted to police the globe, keeping a close watch over risky areas of instability and intervening to reshape dangerous

environments by imposing liberal reform when the risks posed have been deemed too severe. Indeed, this form of risk management takes its cue from domestic policing models which have replaced the previous focus on crime control and the rehabilitation of offenders with a new focus on crime prevention and the management of criminal behaviour. As Wright argues, high levels of contingency and variability in the social and natural environments means that all possibilities cannot be controlled.\textsuperscript{2} Emphasis is thus placed on surveillance and the implementation of preventative mechanisms.

As noted, one crucial way in which Western societies have attempted to manage risks has been via the promotion of their own liberal values. The promotion of liberalism is not a facet of Western, or more specifically, US foreign policy unique to the post-Cold War era. The idea that democracy and liberalism can be promoted as a way of facilitating international peace dates back to the end of the First World War and the ideological views of US President Woodrow Wilson.\textsuperscript{3} Wilson was one of the first statesmen to articulate the ideas that liberal democracy was the apogee of political development, and that the spread of the liberal democratic governance model would ensure domestic stability and prosperity within states and peace internationally.\textsuperscript{4} Since this time, the idea of promoting liberal values has retained a central place within US foreign policy. With the end of the Cold War, this ideological commitment to the global spread of liberalism has enjoyed a renewed vigour among the US and other Western states.

\textsuperscript{3} These views were encapsulated in Wilson’s address to a Joint Session of Congress in 1918. See Woodrow Wilson, ‘Program for World’s Peace’, Speech delivered to a Joint Session of the United States Congress (8 January 1918).
\textsuperscript{4} Paris, \textit{At War’s End}, 40.
The Management of Risk

However, interventions to promote liberal values have not been undertaken simply for the sake of these values themselves, nor have they been entirely motivated (though they may have been in part) by an altruistic desire to bring freedom and prosperity to oppressed peoples. Rather, Western attempts to promote liberalism in the post-Cold War era constitute a self-interested and utilitarian mechanism of risk management. It is not simply liberal values per se that provide the impetus and rationale for post-Cold War Western interventions, but the more utilitarian and self-interested notion that liberal democratic governance provides a way of minimising and managing the new risks of the post-Cold War era. Security at home for the West increasingly depends upon liberalism abroad.

As Rasmussen suggests: ‘Even the promise of democracy as a recipe for peace and human freedom is today rather a way to manage risk than to realise a liberal utopia’. 5 This prescription of liberalism as a tool for managing risks is derived from the ideological assumptions of a hierarchical and anti-pluralist form of liberalism that were outlined in the second chapter. But as is argued in this chapter, liberalism and democracy are not ends in themselves; they are a means to an end: the management of risk and the mitigation of (perceived) Western insecurity in the post-Cold War era. To argue that liberalism is promoted simply because of the desirability or superiority of these values themselves, one would need to address both the conspicuous selectivity of Western targets of intervention and the illiberal means employed in pursuit of the spread of liberal values.

The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, it investigates different characteristics of risk management, in particular the ideas of the precautionary principle, anticipation and prevention. These characteristics are

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5 Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, 206.
substantial features of the interventions conducted by the West aimed at promoting liberal values and institutions. In particular, the concepts of prevention and the precautionary principle are important components of interventions that are justified by a risk management rationale. The next section of the chapter examines more closely the idea of the promotion of liberal values as a form of risk management, and looks at the similarities between domestic policing models that advocate the removal or reshaping of those environmental conditions deemed conducive to risk and initiatives aimed at promoting liberal values. The final section addresses Heng’s argument that the promotion of liberal values and risk management are two distinct, incompatible activities. It argues instead that promoting liberalism in the post-Cold War era is best understood as a form of risk management, aimed at reducing the opportunities for the origination of risk.

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The management of risk has become a core part of the business of Western governments in the late-modern age. From health to immigration to the environment and of course to new globalised security risks, risk management has become an increasingly important function of government. But what is risk management? What are some of the activities or mechanisms that one might identify as being involved in the management of risk? The simple answer is that there are many. There is no one single technique or activity that constitutes risk management. Rather, risk management involves a multitude of approaches, principles and activities. However, regardless of the methods or principles adopted, all forms of risk management are

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7 Heng, War as Risk Management, 52.
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centred upon reducing the likelihood and understanding the consequences of negative future events. Risk management is thus primarily concerned with prevention – when we seek to manage risk, we ultimately seek to prevent particular future scenarios from occurring.

Risk management’s focus on the likelihood of future events and the consequences of their materialisation means that it is characterised by three key characteristics: proactive anticipation, the precautionary principle and, as mentioned, prevention. This section of the chapter examines each of these features of risk management, beginning with proactive anticipation, which is the first step in any form of risk management process. It then examines in more detail the notion of prevention (as opposed to pre-emption – see below) and the precautionary principle. This section concludes with a brief consideration of the political implications of risk management activities and processes, particularly their potentially un-evaluable nature. When attempting to govern future occurrences that may or may not materialise, it becomes almost impossible to evaluate the efficacy of the implemented risk management processes or whether those attempting to manage the risk genuinely believed that there was a potential danger in the first place.

Before risk management processes can be implemented, there must first be a risk to prevent – adverse future scenarios or events must be proactively predicted. When we anticipate risks, we are also essentially defining the risks that we seek to address. As suggested in the previous chapter, the anticipation and definition of risk is a socially mediated exercise. Risks do not just exist out there; risk anticipation and definition depend in large part upon subjective perception, including the values that

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we bring to bear when defining risk.\textsuperscript{9} The sorts of anticipated scenarios that we
define as risks will be shaped by subjective understandings of what we deem to
potentially dangerous or threatening.\textsuperscript{10}

However, risk anticipation is not only concerned with anticipating and
defining the risk. It also involves assessing the likelihood that the risk will occur and
the consequences of its materialisation. Risk is defined in terms of probabilities and
consequences, which means that a large part of risk anticipation and definition must
be concerned with attempting to understand the likelihood and consequences of
occurrence.\textsuperscript{11} Indeed, anticipation of possible security risks is especially important
when faced with the potentially catastrophic results of their realisation, as was
demonstrated in the aftermath of 9/11. Anticipating risks is thus an attempt to
colonise the future by identifying potential dangers and assessing their probabilities
and consequences.\textsuperscript{12} In an age of risk, society becomes much more speculative as it
seeks to deal with the unknown and manage global security risks.\textsuperscript{13}

This means that surveillance and monitoring are crucial aspects of risk
anticipation and definition. Horizon-scanning becomes a highly important activity in
a risk society. This is most readily demonstrated in the recent advent of various types
of ‘early warning systems’ such as military satellite technologies, improved tsunami

\textsuperscript{9} The centrality of values to the anticipation and definition of risk is crucial to understanding the
West’s invocation of liberal values not only in defining what constitutes a risk (lack of liberalism) but
also its response to security risks (promoting liberal values).
\textsuperscript{10} As Bracken, Bremmer and Gordon note, strong differences are to be expected between individuals
and societies when it comes to the management of risk. See Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer and David
Gordon, ‘Conclusion: Managing Strategic Surprise’, in Managing Strategic Surprise: Lessons From
Risk Management and Risk Assessment, edited by Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer and David Gordon
\textsuperscript{11} Heng, The “Transformation of War” Debate’, 71.
\textsuperscript{13} Beck, Risk Society, 22.
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warning systems in Australia or multitudes of medical scans and ‘check-ups’.\textsuperscript{14} Early warning systems and processes in effect allow us to ‘peer into the future’ through constant surveillance and vigilance. The idea is to mitigate uncertainty and surprise by providing constant information on potential areas of risk and early notification of any emergent ‘dangers on the horizon’. The anticipation, definition and assessment of risk thus depends in large part upon constant flows of information derived from processes of monitoring and surveillance.

Once a potential risk has been anticipated and defined, it must then be prevented from occurring. As mentioned above, prevention is a central focus of risk management. As Van Munster states ‘Because risk management is not focused upon an existing existential threat, the logic of risk management is by definition preventive’.\textsuperscript{15} However, it is important to note that the concept of prevention is not synonymous with that of pre-emption. Much has been made recently of the concept of pre-emption after the Bush Administration’s 2002 NSS outlined a strategy of pre-emptive self defence to meet the threats (or rather risks) of terrorism and rogue states seeking to acquire WMD.\textsuperscript{16} Despite Rasmussen’s claim that prevention and pre-emption are not analytically distinct, prevention is not to be confused with the term pre-emption.\textsuperscript{17} As Yost suggests, ‘pre-emptive attack consists of prompt action on the basis of evidence that an enemy is about to strike, while – in contrast – preventive war involves military operations undertaken to avert a plausible but

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  \item Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, 94.
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hypothetical future risk’. Thus pre-emption involves reacting to a threat defined on the basis of capabilities and intentions, whereas prevention refers to proactively addressing future scenarios that may or may not occur.

The right of pre-emptive self defence is one that has been recognised within customary international law for some time. The criteria employed in assessing whether a state has a right to pre-emption has generally been restrictive, concerned almost exclusively with the imminence of an attack that a particular state seeks to pre-empt. In 1841, US Secretary of State Daniel Webster articulated a legal doctrine of pre-emption when he argued that need to act pre-emptively must be ‘instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’. This focus on imminence and minimal time for deliberating options suggests that pre-emption is an activity carried out in response to a threat that can be clearly located and which is extant. As Van Munster suggests ‘Whereas anticipatory self-defence as it is understood in international law still operated with an image of reactive violence, the war on terrorism replaces this picture with that of proactive intervention’. Pre-emption is geared towards addressing present threats in the here and now, not ill-defined risks that may be realised sometime in the future, as is prevention. Risk management therefore cannot adequately be conceptualised as an activity in pre-emption – it is an activity in prevention.

Despite the somewhat confusing language of threat and pre-emption used in the 2002 NSS, what this document actually outlines is a concept of risk management

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20 Ibid.
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centred on a *preventive* form of self-defence aimed at proactively anticipating and managing globalised security risks. Two passages from the *NSS* are of note. Firstly, the document suggests that ‘Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past’. Rather than reacting to threats as it did before, the US now seeks to proactively prevent these threats, or risks, from occurring at all. Further the *NSS* goes on to state that

The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

This statement outlines a rationale of preventing spatially and temporally de-bounded risks rather than reacting to well-defined threats and is distinctly precautionary (see below). Finally, speaking of rogue states attempting to acquire WMD, the *NSS* suggests that ‘We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients *before* they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends’. This statement clearly outlines a doctrine of proactive and anticipatory action and does away with the criteria of imminence that is central to the legality of pre-emptive action under international law. Thus, despite the confusing language of pre-emption and threat employed in the document, the *NSS* essentially outlines an anticipatory and preventive doctrine of risk management. Faced with ill-defined globalised security risks, the only course of

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24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 14 (italics mine).
action open to Western societies is to proactively prevent these risks from occurring.\textsuperscript{26}

This emphasis on proactivity and prevention is also reflected in the 2006 US Department of Defense’s \textit{Quadrennial Defense Review}, which suggests that the Department has undergone a shift in emphasis ‘From responding after a crisis starts (reactive) – to preventive actions so problems do not become crises (proactive)’ and ‘From crisis response – to shaping the future’.\textsuperscript{27} The \textit{National Defense Strategy} deals with similar issues, arguing that ‘A reactive or defensive approach would not allow the United States to secure itself and preserve our way of life as a free and open society’.\textsuperscript{28} Rather, a preventive and anticipatory approach is required in order to deal with the new global security risks. The document also suggests that ‘Uncertainty is the defining characteristic of today’s strategic environment’.\textsuperscript{29} In an uncertain environment, one cannot simply wait for risks to materialise – one must act to prevent possibly catastrophic future occurrences.

This uncertainty and concern for the possibly catastrophic consequences of realised security risks leads to an emphasis on the third main characteristic of risk management: the precautionary principle, or ‘better safe than sorry’ doctrine. Faced with possibly devastating consequences, it is deemed better to act on the basis of uncertainty and attempt to prevent the risk rather than wait for confirmation that the

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\textsuperscript{26}This preventive approach is also evident in the High Level Panel’s recommendations on dealing with new, transnational and interconnected security issues. See High Level Panel, \textit{A More Secure World}.
\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., 2.
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risk is real when it could be too late to act preventively.\textsuperscript{30} As Heng claims, precautionary principles only come into play when certainty concerning a risk is contested and the potential of catastrophic damage is great.\textsuperscript{31} The precautionary principle first arose in response to global environmental risks and was enshrined in Principle 15 of the 1992 \textit{Rio Declaration on Environment and Development}.

This document states that ‘Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’.\textsuperscript{32} Originally, the idea of the precautionary principle was designed to speed up environmental decision-making if it was being delayed by scientific uncertainty and a lack of knowledge.\textsuperscript{33} The effect of this is that the precautionary principle provides a way of overcoming the need for proving that a risk is real or imminent, legitimating preventive action in the face of uncertainty.\textsuperscript{34} It compels decision-makers to address more false negatives (risks that were thought non-existent or relatively small in likelihood and consequence but were actually real and serious) and be less hesitant in addressing false positives (risks thought real and serious which later turned out to be small or non-existent).\textsuperscript{35}

In dealing with contemporary security issues, Bush and other Western leaders have explicitly invoked precautionary principles to justify actions designed to

\textsuperscript{31} Heng, \textit{War as Risk Management}, 57.
\textsuperscript{34} Stern and Wiener, ‘Precaution Against Terrorism’, 115.
\textsuperscript{35} Stern and Wiener, ‘Precaution Against Terrorism’, 115; Heng, \textit{War as Risk Management}, 57.
manage security risks. In a 2004 speech on global terrorism, Tony Blair outlined a rationale for precautionary and preventive action by the British Government when he suggested that

On each occasion the most careful judgement has to be made taking account of everything we know and the best assessment and advice available. But in making that judgement, would you prefer us to act, even if it turns out to be wrong? Or not to act and hope it's OK? And suppose we don't act and the intelligence turns out to be right, how forgiving will people be?\(^{36}\)

In other words, Blair’s message is it is better to be safe than sorry and act to prevent possible risks before they are realised.

Bush too has explicitly invoked precautionary principles in his justifications for military action against terrorists and rogue states. Speaking of rogue states in his 2002 *State of the Union* address, Bush stated that

By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic...We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.\(^{37}\)

Again, Bush speaks in the language of possibilities – rogue states *could* provide arms to terrorists; they *might* attempt to attack the West. He also speaks in the language of precaution – the US will not wait on such risks to materialise.

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\(^{36}\) Tony Blair, *Prime Minister Warns of Continuing Global Terror Threat* (London: Office of the Prime Minister, 5 March 2004).

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Instead, it will act with precaution and prevent these risks from occurring. Former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also spoke in precautionary terms after 9/11, suggesting at a NATO Defence Ministers Meeting that absolute proof cannot be a precondition for action.\(^{38}\) Further, Dick Cheney is reported to have suggested that even if the probability of a WMD or terrorist attack was only one percent, the US should act as if it were a certainty.\(^{39}\) Both Rumsfeld’s remarks and Cheney’s reported arguments are strongly indicative of the precautionary principle, advocating action even in the face of little or no evidence, uncertainty and imperfect knowledge.

Crucially, this emphasis on prevention and precaution legitimates the management of risk within those dangerous environments in which possible dangers originate. It defeats the purpose of anticipating and preventing risks to simply wait for the risk to arrive on one’s doorstep. Further, from a precautionary perspective waiting for the risk to arrive would be irresponsible. It is better to act cautiously and manage the risk well away from vulnerable areas and avoid any possible disasters.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) follows such a logic, suggesting that in adopting a preventive and precautionary stance, the first line of defence will often be abroad.\(^{40}\) A preventive and precautionary doctrine of risk management, in the context of managing security risks within international society, is thus potentially also an interventionist doctrine. It provides a rationale for anticipating risks that might arise in a risky zone of international society and proactively intervening in this zone to manage potential hazards.

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Finally, it is important to note that risk management’s emphasis on prevention and precaution also means that when assessing the effectiveness of risk management activities, performance is evaluated in negative terms of non-events rather than positive outcomes. If a possibly adverse future scenario never occurs, this can be taken as an indicator of the success of the risk management processes and practices that were proactively implemented to manage the risk and prevent its future realisation. Risk management is an activity or process that is evaluated in terms of what did not happen rather than what did. Because of its focus on prevention, we can only ever conclusively evaluate the failure of a risk management activity – if the risk being managed is not prevented and actually occurs then it is fairly obvious that risk management has failed. But if the possible future scenario never happens, how do we assess whether this was a result of implemented risk management practices or whether we simply incorrectly anticipated a risk that was not going to occur?

Without straying too deeply into this topic, it is important to be aware that as the process of risk definition is subjective and socially mediated, it is also inherently political. This means that the implementation of risk management activities can potentially be useful in serving narrow political interests rather than highlighting a genuinely potentially dangerous object or situation. There is thus an inherent riskiness to the management of risk itself, particularly in an age where Western governments have demonstrated their preparedness to intervene in certain instances in response to perceived global security risks. The upshot is that if a risk does not occur it is difficult to establish whether this was a result of risk management practices, incorrect anticipations of risk (false positives), or a deliberate invocation
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of risk designed to serve ulterior political motives.\footnote{For example, it could be argued that the justifications for the 2003 invasion of Iraq (the risk of WMD proliferation) were merely a cover for the real motive behind the invasion, namely the Bush administration’s desire to secure Iraqi oil reserves. For more on this, see chapter seven.} Preventing future possibilities means that risk management becomes almost un-evaluable.

Thus, paradoxically, while risk perception and definition are inherently political exercises that rely on subjective interpretation and arguably serve distinctive political interests, the very definition of an object or scenario as ‘risky’ serves to mask the social and political context within which such risks are constructed. As Jayasuriya argues:

By conceiving of these threats as various types of risk, these theories of reflexive modernization work to dislodge the social and political context that produces these threats, and end up naturalizing these risks and failing to understand the way in which these risks are both naturalized and politicized.\footnote{Kanishka Jayasuriya, Reconstituting the Global Liberal Order: Legitimacy and Regulation (Oxon: Routledge, 2005): 43.}

Especially within the context of contemporary interventions designed to manage risk, one must be wary of preventive and precautionary doctrines that mandate interventionist actions on the basis of ifs, maybes and probabilities. As Rasmussen notes ‘It is fortunate that people should remain critical about strategic precautionary principles, because the doctrine of managing the flows of insecurity by occasional pre-emption makes it impossible to hold policymakers accountable for their policies’.\footnote{Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, 137.}

Proactivity, anticipation, prevention and precaution are active elements of risk management. As will be demonstrated, they are certainly features of Western interventionism in the post-Cold War era. However, these are broad risk management features and what must also be discussed are the specific practices that have been employed by the West in its bid to manage globalised security risks.
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Important here is the notion of ‘reshaping the environment’ – identifying environments with dangerous characteristics and mitigating or eliminating these characteristics so as to reduce the likelihood that they will produce risk. This form of risk management takes its cue from criminology and doctrines of ‘crime management’ that attained popularity in Western societies in the 1970s. The following section thus focuses on the contemporary management and prevention of crime in Western societies in order to provide insights into how reshaping the environment as a form of risk management has been used by the West within international society in the post-Cold War era.

Managing Crime in Western Societies: Policing Environments of Risk

In their respective works on risk, war and strategic studies in the contemporary age, both Heng and Rasmussen make reference to the importance of criminology in the study of risk and risk management practices.44 In the 1970s, new criminologies emerged that focused on crime not as an aberration or abnormality to be controlled, but as a risk to be managed via a range of different policing techniques and methods.45 These new risk management-focused criminologies contain elements that are useful in understanding contemporary Western interventionism within international society, particularly the focus on managing risk through the promotion of liberal values and political institutions. It is precisely this technique of environmental reshaping that the West has employed in its attempt to manage risk within international society.

Prior to the emergence of new criminologies in the 1970s, the focus of crime control and prevention was on rehabilitating individual offenders and attempting to

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44 Heng, War as Risk Management, 35-8; Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, 106-8.
address the underlying causes of criminal behaviour.\textsuperscript{46} The emphasis on rehabilitation was largely reactionary – once a criminal had already committed an offence and had been caught, they could then be punished and rehabilitated. Obviously, this focus on rehabilitation remains, but as Heng suggests, by the 1970s the overarching theme of criminology had shifted.\textsuperscript{47} There was widespread dissatisfaction with rehabilitation as a method of crime control and prevention.\textsuperscript{48} Faced with rising crime rates in the face of attempts to rehabilitate offenders, criminologists and Western governments admitted that crime could not be wholly eliminated. Instead, it would have to be accepted as a social risk to be managed.

Policing thus became more about the management of the risk of criminal activity. Believing that crime could not be eradicated, Western governments and criminologists turned their attention to preventing criminal acts before they occurred. The modern focus of controlling crime via the punishment and rehabilitation of criminals has given way to a more managerial focus concerned with the prevention of criminal risk.\textsuperscript{49} The focus of policing has therefore shifted from the individual offender to the wider society of potential victims who must be protected.\textsuperscript{50} Managing crime involves managing the environment in which criminals operate rather than managing and controlling individual offenders.\textsuperscript{51} In other words, the previous emphasis on the criminal disposition of the individual has given way to an emphasis on the environmental situation within which crime occurs.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{47} Heng, War as Risk Management, 37.
\textsuperscript{49} Wright, Policing: An Introduction to Concepts and Practice, 40-2.
\textsuperscript{50} Coker, ‘Risk Management Goes Global’.
\textsuperscript{51} Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, 108.
\textsuperscript{52} Hughes, Understanding Crime Prevention, 59.
This focus on the management of crime has given rise to policing approaches that emphasise the prevention of crime by reducing environmental factors that are conducive to criminal activity. In other words, by reshaping risky environments, authorities can remove opportunities to engage in criminal activity and hence mitigate the risk of criminal conduct and the damage that this may entail. This policing tactic is known as ‘situational crime prevention’, which Clarke defines as ‘a pre-emptive approach that relies, not on improving society or its institutions, but simply on reducing the opportunities for crime’. In other words, as Rose argues, the aim of situational crime prevention is to ‘act pre-emptively upon potentially problematic zones, to structure them in such a way as to reduce the likelihood of undesirable events or conduct occurring’. Faced with an inability to influence or change the causes of criminal behaviour, it is preferable to focus efforts on changing environmental factors which are more susceptible to manipulation and change.

As Hughes suggests, the notion of situational crime prevention is essentially a form of risk management. Situational crime prevention views crime as a risk to be managed, focusing on preventing possible future crime by reshaping environments that are conducive to criminal activity. Criminal risk is mitigated by manipulating the circumstances in which such behaviour is exhibited via the establishment of forms of control over risky situations and spaces. There are numerous examples of situational crime prevention measures, such as Closed Circuit TV cameras on street corners in major cities and home alarm systems. These

57 Hughes, Understanding Crime Prevention, 63.
58 Ibid., 72.
59 See Litton, ‘Crime Prevention and Insurance’.
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measures make it more difficult for individuals to engage in criminal activity without getting caught, and in doing so hopefully reduce the incentives for crime. This of course serves to reduce the likelihood that crime will occur, mitigating the risk of criminal activity. This model of situational crime prevention represents a new penology, one which focuses on probabilistic calculations of risk.60

The increasing centrality of risk and risk management within criminology and policing is demonstrative of a wider social preoccupation with risk in late-modern Western societies. But these criminological studies of risk and risk management are important not simply because they demonstrate a preoccupation with risk similar to the West’s view of the dangers posed by a globalised pluralist international society. They are important because this domestic policing model of environmental reshaping is one that the West has adopted in its attempts to manage globalised security risks within international society. As Coker argues:

In this world of uncertainties and risks, the only option open to governments is to police the world. And in a globalised age we see the emergence of a new concept of policing which takes its cue from the domestic model, where people have moved from ‘community policing’ to ‘policing communities of risk’.61

Similar to the domestic policing model, Western interventionism is a form of situational prevention: those territories that are deemed to pose an intolerable risk are reshaped via the promotion of liberal values and democratic governance. Based heavily upon the ideological prescriptions of theories associated with a hierarchical version of international liberalism surveyed in chapter two, Western governments have explicitly invoked liberalism and democracy as the key to managing risk. The next section examines the promotion of liberalism as a form of risk management.

60 Hughes, Understanding Crime Prevention, 141.
61 Coker, ‘Risk Management Goes Global’.
Conceptualising the promotion of liberal values as risk management provides an explanation of many of the key features of the contemporary promotion of liberal values, such as why only particular territories are targeted for intervention and importantly why liberal values are paradoxically promoted via illiberal means. Scholars such as Simpson have identified this paradox, but have failed to provide an account of why this relationship obtains.

Managing Risk Through Liberalism

The notion that liberalism is the solution to global security risks is derived from a Western recourse to its own liberal values, and is heavily predicated upon ideas of democratic or liberal peace. As discussed in chapter two, these theories suggest that international peace and prosperity depend upon domestic liberal governance within as many states as possible. Indeed, chapter two outlined the extent to which a large body of scholars display an ideological commitment to liberal democracy as the only legitimate form of government (or governance). Building on this material, this section examines the extent to which liberal values and institutions are touted by Western governments not only as the standard of legitimate statehood within international society, but also as the primary means by which Western societies can achieve security in the uncertain and risky post-Cold War international society.

Therefore, this section explores the arguments put forth by several Western governments that suggest that liberalism is a means to security. It argues that the inclusion of liberalism within discourses of security and risk management explains many of the features of the contemporary promotion of liberal values, particularly the selectivity apparent in determining which territories will be subject to
intervention and socio-political reshaping and the paradoxically illiberal methods that have been used to promote liberal values. While liberalism is certainly crucial to the definition of what constitutes a potentially dangerous environment and the selection of appropriate risk management techniques, Western interventionism cannot be understood as an exercise in promoting liberal values simply for the sake of these values themselves. Rather, liberalism is established as the primary means by which Western societies can achieve security in the uncertain and risky post-Cold War international society.

As Rasmussen has suggested, faced with uncertainty and unpredictability, Western leaders have sought recourse to values for guidance on how to deal with these new forms of risk.\(^62\) Indeed, Western leaders have explicitly sought to invoke liberal values, deemed to be certain and enduring, as means of generating greater certainty and mitigating feelings of insecurity among a populace faced with uncertainties and risks.\(^63\) Liberal values become the key to managing risks and providing security for an increasingly insecure society. For example, Blair has overtly spoken of the centrality of Western liberal values, speaking of the intertwining of values and interests, and asserting that ‘The spread of our values makes us safer’.\(^64\) Speaking of Iraq, Blair suggested that the fight against rogue states and terrorism was one defined precisely in terms of the defence of Western values against the extremist ideology of the terrorists.\(^65\)

Former US Presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush have also spoken in similar terms concerning the spread of Western values of liberty and democracy.

\(^{63}\) Ibid.
\(^{65}\) Blair, *Prime Minister Warns of Continuing Global Terror Threat*. 

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Clinton’s 1998 NSS asserts that ‘Underpinning our international leadership is the power of our democratic ideals and values. In designing our strategy, we recognize that the spread of democracy supports American values and enhances both our security and prosperity’.66 The subsequent 1999 NSS likewise suggests that ‘Our security depends upon the protection and expansion of democracy worldwide, without which repression, corruption and instability could engulf a number of countries...’67 Bush too has spoken in such terms, the 2006 NSS suggesting that

In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them. The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.68

More specifically, in response to the risk of terrorism the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism suggests that ‘The long-term solution for winning the War on Terror is the advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy’.69 Western liberal values are therefore integral to the definition and management of risk within international society. The way in which the West defines and attempts to deal with risk can only be understood within the context of its liberal values. The Western recourse to values in the face of globalised security risks is unsurprising given the assertions made above by Bush, Blair and Clinton that security and safety for the West is to be found not only in military force but also in the spread of Western values. As Clark suggests, the West has sought to forge new liberal standards of legitimacy for full membership within international society

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precisely as a means to protecting itself from the risks posed by a globalised, pluralist international society.\(^{70}\)

In invoking these standards, Western leaders have drawn heavily on the democratic peace theory and neo-Kantianism. Discussing the Bush Administration, Leffler argues that ‘Wolfowitz, Rice, Powell and their colleagues embrace the idea of a democratic peace’.\(^ {71}\) In particular, Bush overtly draws on ideas of democratic peace in the 2006 NSS which states that

Governments that honor their citizens’ dignity and desire for freedom tend to uphold responsible conduct toward other nations, while governments that brutalize their people also threaten the peace and stability of other nations. Because democracies are the most responsible members of the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity.\(^ {72}\)

Significantly, this passage demonstrates that non-democracies are risky precisely because of what they are. These states are classified as risky or outlaw primarily on the basis of a lack of functioning liberal democratic institutions.

Such states thus might be termed ‘ontological outlaws’ – their outlaw or risky status is derived precisely from what they are, not how simply how they behave.\(^ {73}\) As Hobson suggests, ‘It is what these states are – non-democratic – that becomes the essential problem and the basis of their pariah status’.\(^ {74}\) As such the only way to deal with particularly risky ontological outlaws is to reshape them into something different. Illiberal states must be subject to liberalisation. This again emphasises the

\(^{70}\) Clark, *The Post-Cold War Order*, 238.
\(^{73}\) Hobson, ‘Democracy as Civilisation’, 85.
\(^{74}\) Ibid.
impact of a liberal social logic of risk on the pluralist constitutional structure of international society. When risk (and subsequently risk management) is defined in terms of narrow and contested values of liberalism and democracy, then the toleration of difference and respect of the right of states to constitute their socio-political institutions according to their own societal values is jeopardised. Western security depends upon homogeneity and conformity, for it is the ‘certainty’ of the progressive and universal nature of liberalism that can mitigate the risks and uncertainties of a globalised, pluralist international society.

The problem here though is that the idea that liberal values are an appropriate response to security risks legitimates, in some instances, the forceful imposition of such values. We are thus left with a paradoxical situation in which liberal values and democracy are promoted via illiberal means. It is the conceptualisation of liberalism as a means to preventing and avoiding security risks with potentially catastrophic consequences that establishes an urgency that underwrites this paradox. It is therefore the use of liberalism as a means of risk management that provides an explanation of the contradiction of promoting liberal values via illiberal means. Fuelled by the imperatives of prevention and precaution, Western attempts to manage risks have been characterised by coercion, new relations of hierarchy and in some cases overt violence.

The paradox of attempting to promote liberal values, supposedly a force for emancipation and freedom, via the subjection of local populations in the target territories to foreign authority and interference is exposed by interventions in Iraq or Solomon Islands, for example. Despite the rhetoric of Bush and Blair, the progressive elements of Western liberal values are potentially lost when they become

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a means of risk management, to be spread globally via the subordination of those states identified as potentially dangerous in new hierarchical relations with Western societies. Further, several scholars such as Hobson, Sorensen and Simpson have identified such a paradox. As Hobson notes, the emancipatory and progressive elements of democracy are curtailed by its centrality to ‘new global structures of hierarchy, domination and violence’. Liberalism, because of its perceived potential as means to managing risk, has become part of the discourse of national security in several Western societies.

For example, speaking in relation to the War on Terror, Hehir argues that ‘The contemporary advocacy for democratisation has, however, asserted a security-oriented justification that presents democracy as conducive to counter-terrorism’. Liberalism, as a harbinger of national security, must be quickly implemented to prevent these security risks – liberal values must be promoted swiftly and if necessary, coercively. The doctrines of prevention and precaution mandate against sitting back and waiting for rogue states or risky environments to gradually segue into liberal democracies. The imperative to promote liberty is urgent, an urgency that is fuelled by the uncertainty that characterises the spatially and temporally de-bounded risks with which the West is faced. The progressive aspects of promoting liberalism are therefore mitigated by this perceived urgency and the illiberal methods to which it gives rise in order to ensure the swift establishment of stable liberal democracies in identified zones of risk.

77 Hobson, ‘Democracy as Civilisation’, 76. Hobson’s focus on democracy promotion obscures the extent to which Western governments promote democracy within a broader set of liberal values, such as a strong emphasis on individualism and domestic pluralism, which are not necessarily core components of democracy as such.
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As will be shown in the case studies, despite talk of ‘partnerships’ between Western interveners and those states subjected to Western-led liberalisation, the promotion of liberal values and institutions is conducted with minimal local participation and accountability. Instead, local populations are expected to adapt to externally imposed values, institutions and conceptions of the good life which are deemed to be right and true for peoples everywhere. As Sorensen argues,

A vigorous Liberalism of Imposition, on the other hand, risks undermining what it seeks to achieve, because it invokes a liberal imperialism that removes the local responsibility that is the very condition of freedom and paves the way for illiberal counter-reactions.79

However, while the scholars mentioned above have identified the paradox inherent in promoting liberalism via new relations of hierarchy and coercion, few, with the exception of Hobson, have failed to adequately explain what underpins this paradox or the relationship between security and liberal values in Western societies.80

For example, while Hehir has certainly identified the nexus between liberalism and security in relation to Western counter-terrorist policies, his main focus is on disproving the idea that failed states are havens for terrorists or that democracy can effectively mitigate terrorism.81 This means that little attention is paid to why such ideas obtain in the first place. Hehir says little in regard to this question, except for a brief comment that the idea that democracy reduces terrorism is based upon a conflation of democratic peace theory and counter-terrorism.82 But Hehir fails to examine in more depth why democratic peace theory, and liberalism in general, have become important components of contemporary Western strategic

80 Hobson, ‘Democracy as Civilisation’, 89.
82 Ibid., 322.
doctrines or the tension that arises from the promotion of liberal values via illiberal means. Further, Hehir’s argument that there is no plausible link between failed states and terrorists overlooks the extent to which security issues such as terrorism are now defined in terms of future risks that have not yet materialised.

Taken on its own, Hehir’s argument is certainly plausible. However, the issue of whether there is presently or in the past has been a link between illiberal or failed states and terrorism misses the point. What is important is the perception that these environments might one day potentially give rise to future security risks. This is a perception that again will come to the fore in the case studies. The risk management motivation of contemporary interventions aimed at promoting liberal values means that the question of whether there is presently a link between failed/illiberal states and terrorism is not as important as the perception on the part of Western governments that these states might one day provide an environment conducive to the origination and fomentation of risk.

Simpson’s work on two liberalisms within international society, one pluralist and egalitarian, the other anti-pluralist and hierarchical, also has little to say concerning the underlying factors that explain such a paradox. Simpson distinguishes between ‘strong’ and ‘mild’ variants of anti-pluralism, and it is the strong version that is important here.83 Those who advocate the strong version of anti-pluralism stress the legitimacy of excluding illiberal states from international society and intervening in such states to promote liberalism.84 Simpson does suggest that there is an inherent tension to this ‘strong’ form of liberal anti-pluralism when he states that ‘The idea of intervening to promote democracy through the use of force, then, has

83 Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, 304.
84 These advocates are largely the same scholars who have posed theories or ideas associated with the hierarchical liberal vision of international society discussed in chapter two.
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struck most observers as self-contradictory...'\(^{85}\) The question that is raised then is why contemporary liberal anti-pluralism has manifested, in certain situations, as a strong version of anti-pluralism that has resulted in interventions to promote liberal values.

What compels Western states to adopt illiberal measures that contradict the liberal values that they are trying to promote? This is a question that Simpson does not adequately answer, due in large part to his failure to account for why hierarchical trends have recently re-emerged within international society in the form of an anti-pluralism underpinned by a hierarchical liberal vision of political community amongst states. The absence of any explanation regarding why new hierarchies have emerged means that Simpson is ill-placed to explain why Western societies have paradoxically attempted to promote liberalism via new relations of hierarchy. Indeed, Simpson unsatisfactorily surveys the literature on various ‘mild and strong antipluralists’ and considers the extent to which a norm of democratic governance is emerging within international society.\(^{86}\) But this tells us little about the underlying causal factors that explain contemporary Western interventionism and its inherent contradictions.

It is the imperative of risk management and the encapsulation of liberal values within discourses of national security that explain the contradictions associated with the promotion of liberalism via illiberal methods. The imperative of risk management legitimates the establishment of hierarchical relations between Western interveners and risky states deemed to require socio-political reshaping. This in turn leads to the implementation of liberal reforms with little to no local involvement or participation, minimal consideration of local social values and

\(^{86}\) Ibid., 299-316.
structures and, in the case of Iraq, also involving the use of force. However, some have questioned whether the moralistic overtures and positive prescriptions of the liberal values promoted by the West are compatible with the negative goals of risk management. Therefore, the next section investigates whether promoting liberalism can rightly be construed as a form of risk management, suggesting that those who argue that the two are incompatible ignore the extent to which liberalism has been central to the definition of, and response to, risk in the post-Cold War era.

**Promoting Liberal Values or Risk Management?**

Western governments, particularly those of the US and the United Kingdom (UK), appear to have concluded that the best way to reduce the opportunities for the emergence and realisation of globalised security risks is to reshape risky territories into liberal democracies. This notion of promoting liberalism as the key to addressing security issues is, as mentioned, derived from various neo-Kantian theories and especially the idea of a democratic or liberal peace. It is here that potential tensions emerge between promoting liberal values and risk management. These theories of democratic peace or, for example, Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ seek to achieve the positive aim of progressing towards the endpoint of a global liberal utopia. But risk management does not deal with attempting to improve the world. Rather, it simply seeks to negatively prevent certain future occurrences.\(^{87}\)

However, such a tension only emerges if one focuses on the disparities between the ends of risk management and the ends of the ideological project of promoting liberal values. Rather than focusing on promoting liberalism as an end in itself, it is possible to focus on the promotion of liberalism as a means that has as its

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\(^{87}\) Heng, *War as Risk Management*, 54.
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goal the management of risk. While the prescriptions of the democratic peace and other liberal theories may inform the decision to use democracy promotion as a means of risk management, the utopian ends sought by such theories do not automatically discount promoting liberal values as a form of risk management. Hence, although Western governments have explicitly utilised these theories of democratic peace in developing their strategies for managing risk, unlike these theories the aim of Western interventionism is not to achieve a liberal utopia. The interventions undertaken represent less of an attempt to achieve positive outcomes; instead they are negative activities aimed at preventing particular outcomes.

Indeed, the term ‘liberal social logic of risk’, which underpins contemporary hierarchies within international society, is meant to denote a fusion between the ideas associated with a hierarchical form of international liberalism and Western perceptions of risk and subsequent attempts to negatively prevent possible future events. The result of this is the Western strategy of reshaping potentially dangerous states into stable liberal democracies primarily as a preventive mechanism of risk management, not in order to achieve positive ideological ends. If we were to take liberalism promotion as the end in itself, then one would be faced with some serious anomalies in the Western record of the promotion of liberal values within international society, not least of which include the sporadic pattern of liberal interventions and the willingness of Western governments to ally themselves with illiberal regimes (e.g. Pakistan under Musharaff) in order to combat security risks such as terrorism. While the West’s ‘grand strategy’ of risk management might be ideologically influenced, it is not simply engaged in an ideological crusade. Rather, it is engaged in a much more self-interested, utilitarian process of risk management.

88 Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, 206.
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This notion that liberal values are a means to providing for security is an old one. As demonstrated above, it is evident in the foreign policies of Clinton, Blair and Bush and stretches back to Wilson. The ability of the US and other Western societies to defend themselves is taken to depend primarily on the political character of other states. What is new is that in an age of globalised security risks, in which security has become defined in terms of the prevention and management of amorphous, de-bounded risks, the promotion of liberal values has become a primary mechanism of risk management. Indeed, given the notion that liberalism abroad can provide for security at home, it is not entirely surprising that promoting liberal values has become a means of managing risk.

This is certainly not to say that the democratic peace and other theories associated with a hierarchical form of international liberalism are not important. These ideas have gained increasingly widespread support and significance within both academia and the foreign policies of Western governments. They inform not only what constitutes an environment conducive to risk, but also Western attempts at risk management within international society. As such we cannot understand risk management within international society without first examining these theories of liberal hierarchy. Rather, the point here is that while these ideas are important, their progressive and idealistic connotations are tempered by the more utilitarian motivation of managing risk. Despite the rhetoric of Bush, Blair and others, democracy and liberalism abroad are not the ends; they are the means to preventing risk.

This division between the ideological prescriptions of those advocating positive notions of democratic peace and the more negatively geared objective of risk management has led some, such as Heng to suggest that risk management and democracy promotion are two mutually exclusive activities.\footnote{Heng, War as Risk Management, 145.} Discussing the 2003 Iraq War, Heng argues that the regime change that took place in Iraq was incompatible with regular notions of routine risk management.\footnote{Ibid., 133.} Heng’s arguments revolve around the point made above that promoting liberalism and democracy is an ideological activity guided by grand notions of progress that aspires to achieve positive outcomes, whereas risk management is an activity that merely seeks to prevent possible outcomes from materialising.\footnote{Ibid., 161.}

However, Heng has a problem in arguing that promoting liberalism is not compatible with risk management given that in all three of his case studies (Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq) Western governments replaced the incumbent regimes with new liberal democracies (and as of writing, in the case of Kosovo potentially created a new state).\footnote{For more on Iraq, see chapter seven. As of writing, ongoing instability in Afghanistan poses a threat to the stability of the democratic government installed after the American invasion in 2001. In Kosovo, NATO, the OSCE and EU personnel have worked since NATO’s bombardment of Serbia due to human rights abuses in Kosovo to build a democratic government. The EU in particular continues to oversee the development of Kosovo’s political, legal and economic institutions as part of the Stabilisation and Association Process with Kosovo. See European Commission, Kosovo (Under UNSCR 1244/99) 2008 Progress Report, SEC(2008) 2697 (Brussels: European Commission, 5 November 2008).} This is an important similarity between these cases that Heng overlooks. While Heng’s argument that these interventions represent attempts at risk management is persuasive, largely ignoring the attempts at liberalisation in Kosovo and Afghanistan and questioning whether building liberal institutions in Iraq was consistent with a risk management approach is not. In all three cases risks were identified, Western leaders sought, in part, recourse to liberal values to legitimate the
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intervention, and liberal democratic institutions were constructed. Further, Heng does not explain why the notion of reshaping the environment, which he lists as a risk management practice, should be confined to the military measures such as no-fly zones or weapons inspections that he identifies.\(^95\)

These of course do prevent the opportunities for security risks to emerge, but why does this also not apply to liberalism promotion? Promoting liberal values and democratic governance is arguably one of the more far-reaching forms of environmental reshaping. It involves remoulding the social, political, economic and, possibly over time, cultural institutions of the target territory. Whether the assumption of Western governments that promoting liberal values is the best way to prevent opportunities for the emergence of risk is correct is highly debatable; however what is important is that Western governments perceive it to be. As demonstrated above, Western governments have been explicit in their support for liberalism as the solution to managing globalised security risks. Promoting liberal values is a form of risk management.

Heng is also ambivalent in making his argument about the mutual exclusivity of promoting liberalism and risk management. On the one hand, he suggests that with the shift back to ideological issues by the Bush Administration, risk management’s ‘time was up’.\(^96\) Yet Heng then admits towards the end of his work that ‘an argument could be made that spreading democracy and war as risk management are simply two sides of the same coin, both concerned with and designed ultimately to reduce international security risks’.\(^97\) Heng also states that ‘This more positive moral view of changing the world for the better could thus be in a real sense about risk management, since the goal is ultimately to reduce the risks

\(^{96}\) Ibid., 159.
\(^{97}\) Ibid., 145.
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we face by sculpting the political set-up of other countries’.98 Yet Heng still maintains that evidence points to the conclusion that democracy promotion and risk management cannot be combined into coherent and sustainable policies.99

Perhaps the biggest problem with Heng’s argument is that it divorces the role of values from the definition and management of risk. As Coker argues, what we consider to be a risk will be moulded by our values.100 This has already been seen with Blair and Bush’s responses to potential security risks arising out of the war on terror and will be further demonstrated in the subsequent case study chapters.101 The definition of risk and responses to risk has been defined precisely in terms of the West’s liberal values. Indeed, it is surprising that given that Heng argues that responses to risk are socially and culturally mediated, he does not make more of the notion that responses to risk are selected on the basis of the values that risk managers bring to bear when attempting to prevent perceived future hazards.102

Rather than attempting to establish an artificial dichotomy between contemporary Western risk management within international society and the promotion of liberal values, it is important to be aware of the close relationship between the two. Heng focuses on promoting liberalism as an end-state, an ideological and moral imperative focused on positive outcomes that are incompatible with what he terms the ‘minimalist ethos’ of risk management.103 However, this focus on the promotion of liberal values as a positive end-state obscures its role as a means towards the more minimalist risk management ends that Heng is focused upon. While Heng is correct to suggest that there is a tension between the positive

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98 Ibid., 159.
99 Ibid., 145.
100 Coker, ‘Risk Management Goes Global’.
101 See chapters 5-7.
102 Heng, War as Risk Management, 41.
103 Ibid., 34.
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ends of the theories of liberal hierarchy that inform liberalism promotion and the negative goals of risk management, the centrality of liberal values to the very interventions that Heng cites as examples of war as risk management means that the promotion of such values cannot simply be dismissed as incompatible with the management of risk.

However, the imperative of risk management does, as suggested above, temper the more idealistic and positive aspects of notions of the liberal or democratic peace. This is not only due to the negative use of liberal values as a means of preventing risk rather than realising positive ends, but also the way in which managing risk via the promotion of liberalism has been executed via the use of illiberal methods. However, despite the tensions between the positive and progressive aspects of liberal or democratic peace theories and the more negative and utilitarian gearing of risk management, promoting liberal values has been touted as the means to the end of managing global security risks by Western governments. Terrorism, rogue states seeking WMD or, abuses of human rights can all supposedly be managed and mitigated by reshaping identified environments of risk into liberal democracies. Contemporary Western interventionism within international society thus represents an amalgamation of two distinct yet interrelated trends.

Firstly, we have the increasing incorporation of ideas of liberal or democratic peace within discourses of national security in Western societies. Secondly, we have the emergence of insecure Western risk societies faced with de-bounded risks and uncertainty. Subsequently, we find a Western emphasis on anticipating future security risks and preventing their occurrence. Promoting liberalism and democracy becomes intimately tied to risk and risk management for two reasons. One, liberal values provide certainty and moral clarity in an uncertain and risky world. Two,
Western leaders have determined that promoting liberalism and democracy, in effect reshaping potentially risky environments, will prevent the opportunities for the emergence of security risks. Whether this prescription is true or not is highly suspect and debatable, but nevertheless it is one that Western states have followed in their attempts to manage the risks of the post-Cold War era.

**Conclusion**

Risk management within international society is an activity that cannot be fully understood without first examining the centrality of Western values of liberty and democracy to the process of anticipating and defining risks and the selection of appropriate responses to such risks. Not only have Western leaders identified risky environments primarily according to the absence of liberal socio-political institutions, but they have also explicitly suggested that liberalism is the key to maintaining Western security and the management of global security risks. The result is the emergence of an international risk society characterised by coercion and hierarchy, one in which some states lose their right to internally constitute themselves as they deem appropriate according to the Western perception that these states demonstrate risky environmental characteristics.

Liberal democracy becomes the standard of a new, more restrictive notion of rightful membership within international society precisely because it is this standard that is perceived as reducing the opportunities for the emergence of globalised security risks. The renewed emphasis on the socio-political characteristics of the state has occurred for a specific reason – faced with ill-defined risks, focus has fallen on those environments which are conducive to the origination of risk. Liberal environments provide fewer opportunities for the production of risk than do other
forms of state or indeed, those states with no meaningful socio-political institutions at all. The implication of this is that attaining greater security for the West via illiberal forms of liberalism promotion and relations of hierarchy means ever-less security for non-Western societies.104

The remaining chapters of this thesis deal with the Western attempts at risk management within international society. These case studies primarily explore the extent to which Western interventions have a) been prompted by perceived security risks and the desire to manage such risks, b) demonstrated the key risk management elements of anticipation, prevention, and precaution, and c) focused on the promotion of liberalism as a way of reshaping environments identified as potentially dangerous so as to reduce opportunities for the production of risks. Importantly, the case studies also explore the effects of risk and risk management for the constitutional structure of international society. Examining cases such as the invasion of Iraq, the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy and Australia’s state-building activities in the Asia-Pacific, these case studies demonstrate that in the post-Cold War era the West has become preoccupied with global security risks, attempting to manage them via different (in some instances highly coercive) methods of liberalism promotion. In the process of doing so, these interventions give rise to a more overtly hierarchical and anti-pluralist form of international society.

104 Ikenberry makes the related point that the Bush administration’s vision of pre-emptive intervention and the promotion of democracy involve the attainment of greater sovereignty and authority for America and increasingly conditional sovereignty for those states that fail to meet Western standards of domestic constitution and behaviour. See G. John Ikenberry, ‘America’s Imperial Ambition’, Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (2002): 44.
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Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery: The European Neighbourhood Policy

Introduction

The 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU were highly significant events for the Union, in a number of respects. Not only did these enlargements provide membership to many of the Eastern European post-communist states, but they also posed the question of how an enlarged EU would deal with non-EU states in its immediate region. The expansion of the EU through the accession process brought it much closer to identified zones of instability and risk within international society and created a new hierarchy of states both within the EU and between the EU and its new neighbours.1 As Dannreuther notes, enlargement meant that states on the periphery of Europe in Northern Africa, the Middle East and the former Soviet republics could no longer be ignored.2 Many of the potential globalised security risks that the EU faces, such as terrorism, transnational crime or illegal immigration, are perceived to originate in the areas that now sit alongside the external borders of the Union.3

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1 Although not a focus of this chapter, an interesting aspect of the 2004 enlargement is the unequal membership conditions that were placed on the acceding states. For example, all 15 member states before the enlargement placed restrictions on the movement of migrants from the Central European states, despite their status as full EU members. See Jon Kvist, ‘Does EU Enlargement Start a Race to the Bottom? Strategic Interaction Among EU Member States in Social Policy’, Journal of European Social Policy 14, no. 3 (2004): 301-18.
3 As Jeandesboz argues, the European Neighbourhood Policy is structured through two main discursive structures or narratives, the ‘duty narrative’ and the ‘threat narrative’, which represents the EU’s neighbourhood as posing a range of risks that need to be managed. See Julien Jeandesboz,
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The EU’s concern with its immediate neighbours was clearly recognised in the 2003 ESS, which highlighted the necessity of ensuring stability and prosperity in the regions bordering Europe. Even before this document was released, the EU had begun to develop the ENP, designed to promote European values of liberalism and democracy and bring non-EU members in the region closer to the EU’s governance and regulatory standards. The point of the ENP is therefore to create the EU’s definition of a ‘good neighbour’: states with liberal democratic political institutions, functioning market economies and governance standards in line with those of the EU. Those states that enter into partnership agreements with the EU are expected to meet a range of benchmarks concerning their domestic institutions; in return they are offered the promise of significant political and economic benefits, although they are not offered the prize of EU membership.

The argument presented in this chapter is that the ENP constitutes an exercise in risk management by the European Union. Faced with multifaceted and multidirectional risks to its security, the EU has attempted to manage these possible dangers by entering into agreements with several states in identified zones of risk in an attempt to induce liberal political and economic reform. Like the Australian government in the Asia-Pacific (see next chapter), the enlarged EU views itself as sitting on the doorstep of several risky zones, creating an imperative to engage with states in these zones in an attempt to promote liberal values and standards of governance. As Smith states ‘The process of growing closer to the EU by

3 See Romano Prodi, *A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability*, SPEECH/02/619, speech delivered at Sixth ECSA-World Conference, Jean Monnet Project (Brussels, 5-6 December 2002).
‘approximating’ its values and standards is expected to help increase prosperity and security in the neighbourhood...

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section is split into two parts. Part one involves an examination of the EU’s strategic outlook, particularly its views on the international security environment. The focus here is on the main security issues, such as the delimiting effects of globalisation, that the EU seeks to deal with and the way in which such issues are defined and characterised, with particular reference to the ESS. As will be demonstrated, the EU is predominantly concerned with temporally and spatially de-bounded risks, rather than threats, to its security. The second part of this section deals with the EU’s self-identification as a ‘normative power’, the way in which this structures the EU’s perceptions of what constitutes a ‘good’ international society and its subsequent desire to spread liberal values. The section concludes with a brief examination of the justifications that have been provided for the formulation of the ENP. It is argued that the ENP’s primary function is to manage risks to European security by inducing partner states to adopt liberal reforms.

The next section of the chapter examines the ENP itself. Of special interest here are the EU’s ‘Country Reports’ and ‘Action Plans’ for each state involved in the ENP which outline the reforms that need to be carried out in partner countries and which are used to evaluate progress. These reforms essentially involve a series of impositions upon ENP partners which run counter to the pluralist constitution of international society in that they effectively remove the right of these states to constitute their domestic institutions in line with their own societal values. This section also examines the ENP’s use of conditionality as the primary instrument for

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achieving compliance with its mandated reforms. Rather than attempt to impose liberal reform on ENP countries in a similar vein to American regime change in Iraq, the EU has essentially dangled carrots at its neighbours, compelling them to reform themselves in return for political and economic benefits. Yet while the tactics may differ, like their American (and Australian) counterparts, the EU has adopted the promotion of its own liberal values as its primary strategy of risk management.

The final section of the chapter examines the implications for international society’s pluralist constitution. The ENP represents a manifestation of the EU’s claim to have the authority to determine the socio-political and economic make-up of its neighbours, resulting in new hierarchical relationships between the EU and ENP partners. These hierarchies are underpinned by a liberal social logic of risk, constructing the EU as a benevolent normative power and the ENP partners as unstable, risky, and in need of liberalisation. These new hierarchies are further legitimated by ENP partners who sign up to the ENP and recognise the authority of the EU to direct the reform of their domestic institutions on the promise of the political and economic benefits that are offered as a result of a closer relationship with the EU. In effect, the leverage that the EU obtains as a result of its political and economic dominance in the region allows it to dictate the necessary criteria that ENP countries must fulfil if they are to receive any benefits.

European Security Risks in the Post-Cold War Era

The ending of the Cold War represented a fundamentally altered international security environment, particularly so in Europe which was freed from the Iron Curtain and the divisions that it had represented. However, while the overarching threat of the Soviet Union was gone, a more unstable and uncertain security
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environment emerged in its place, something that was recognised rather quickly in Europe after the end of the Cold War. NATO’s 1991 *Strategic Concept* clearly suggested that a range of new, non-traditional security issues were of growing concern.⁷ These new security issues were non-traditional not only in the sense that they involved non-state groups and actors, but also because they were defined as multi-directional, multi-faceted and highly unpredictable in relation to the threats of the Cold War era.⁸ These new security issues were thus defined in terms of risk. This nexus between security and risk is one that has likewise been adopted in the EU’s evaluation of the contemporary strategic environment (see below).

Until the 1992 Maastricht Treaty which established the European Union, common European security policies were largely confined to NATO and the Western European Union (WEU).⁹ With the establishment of the European Union in 1992 and its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar, one could begin to discuss common European security strategies and policies outside of NATO or the WEU. To date, the high point of the evolution of the CFSP since 1992 has been the publication of the *ESS*, formulated by Javier Solana who serves as both the High Representative for the CFSP and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union.¹⁰ This document is particularly important not only because it represented the EU’s first adoption of an overarching strategic document, but also because it clearly

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⁷ NATO, *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*.
⁸ Ibid.
⁹ The WEU is a separate organisation established in 1948 to provide collective self-defence for its members. See Western European Union, ‘History of the WEU’, http://www.weu.int/ (accessed 10 December 2008).
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outlined Europe’s focus on the effects of globalisation and particular risks to its security in the post-Cold War era.¹¹

The focus on new forms of risk rather than threat is outlined early in the ESS when it states that ‘Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable’.¹² Uncertain, ill-defined and unpredictable risks have replaced the overarching threat of the Soviet Union faced by Europe during the Cold War.¹³ Further, similar to its Australian and American counterparts, the EU is highly cognisant of the security implications of globalisation. The first section of the ESS, which deals with the key risks and global challenges that Europe now faces, begins by discussing the effects of globalisation and what these mean for European security, emphasising both its positive and negative aspects. While processes of globalisation have brought freedom and prosperity to peoples around the world, they have also led to increased European vulnerability and dependence on the global infrastructure erected by these processes.¹⁴

As Javier Solana argues

The world we live in has been dramatically changed in little more than a decade. The geo-strategic scene has been transformed. The process we describe as ‘globalisation’ has facilitated the easy movement of people, goods and ideas, but also of grievances, criminality and weapons.¹⁵

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More pointedly, globalisation has increased European vulnerability to instability and security risks arising in locations far from Europe. As the ESS suggests, ‘In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand’. Solana also highlighted Europe’s vulnerability in a speech to the Institute for European Politics in Berlin in 2003:

Globalisation brings more freedom and wealth, but if not properly managed it can also generate new frustrations. We must be alive to the prospect of new combinations of threats: terrorism capitalising on the persistence of regional conflicts; criminal organisations acquiring weapons of mass destruction, whether through theft, collaboration with rogue States or the collapse of State structures; collusion between fundamentalists, cyber-terrorists and international criminal organisations.

Indeed, in an address to the European Parliament, Solana explicitly suggested that a globalised world is one that presents Europe with new risks: ‘The globalised world we now live in offers new opportunities for increased freedom and prosperity. It has also made some familiar problems worse and brought about a new range of risks’. The theme here, and one that will be repeated in the subsequent case studies, is that of a Western society or collective of societies that is faced with, and becomes increasingly anxious over, new forms of multi-faceted and multi-directional risk. The security implications of globalisation revolve predominantly around the way in which its processes can provide a global operational scope for non-state actors such as terrorists, criminals or illegal migrants that can be difficult to locate and identify.

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Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery

As the Belgian foreign policy think-tank Royal Institute for International Relations suggests ‘Today, nobody can insulate its security from the rest of the world, since the ramifications of globalisation are borne in upon all’.19 This concern with the ‘dark side’ of globalisation is one that has, unsurprisingly, also been readily reflected in the security policies and strategies of several EU members. For example, the UK’s 2008 National Security Strategy argues that

The Cold War threat has been replaced by a diverse but interconnected set of threats and risks, which affect the United Kingdom directly and also have the potential to undermine wider international stability...These and other threats and risks are driven by a diverse and interconnected set of underlying factors, including climate change, competition for energy, poverty and poor governance, demographic changes and globalisation.20

The globalised, de-bounded nature of contemporary security issues is also reflected in the way in which the EU seeks to address such challenges, namely through global engagement and intervention in identified zones of risk. Risk opens up new zones or spaces of governance that require constant monitoring and management. Identified zones of risk (or communities of risk as Coker terms it) within international society are subjected to interventionist modes of regulation.21 This involves a shift from an international society defined in terms of the territorially discrete nation-state to one defined in terms of temporally and spatially de-bounded zones of risk. Accordingly, rather than focusing solely on securing and defending the EU’s external borders against identified threats (such as that of Soviet invasion during the Cold War), securing the EU now depends upon global engagement with

21 Coker, ‘Risk Management Goes Global’. 
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those states or territories deemed to belong to zones of risk. As the ESS states, ‘Our traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad’.22 The Council of the European Union has similarly suggested that globalisation means that European defence may begin in other countries rather than on the EU’s borders.23

The important point here is that European security becomes predicated not only on border control or the EU’s ability to secure its own geographical space, but rather on the EU’s active engagement with the outside world.24 In an international risk society in which risks are not geographically defined or limited, risk management similarly must take on a spatially de-bounded quality. Simply securing the geographical space of the EU will not fully protect it from globalised risks that can materialise in any location. Rather, the EU must engage with and reform territories identified as posing potential dangers. Hence the EU’s identification of the ENP as one of the key planks of its security strategy – engaging with its largely illiberal and potentially unstable neighbours becomes the key to securing Europe. Browning and Joenniemi make a similar point, arguing that ‘Notably, however, instead of simply drawing a line of ultimate exclusion...external threats are to be countered by EU attempts to order the space beyond its borders through the export of

24 This point is similar to that made by Walters in his work on border security and what he terms ‘domopolitics’ which, as he argues, captures several features of the contemporary political meaning of security and governance. Domopolitics is based on the conjunction between home, land and security, and rationalises particular methods of defending the ‘home’ or ‘sanctuary’ (e.g. the state) against the dangerous outside world. But more importantly in the context of the argument made in this chapter, domopolitics also involves the domestication and taming of those forces outside the home which threaten it. Hence domopolitics contains an important tendency to engage in an ordering of the outside world in a bid to domesticate threatening (or risky) elements. See William Walters, ‘Secure Border, Safe Haven, Domopolitics’, Citizenship Studies 8, no. 3 (2004): 237-60.
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EU norms and practices’. This is important as in doing so the EU establishes the hierarchical and anti-pluralist relationships with those territories subjected to its ordering that this thesis argues is the central feature of contemporary risk management efforts within international society.

Another feature of the ESS (and European foreign policy in general) is the emphasis on conflict and threat prevention. Like any risk society, the EU is forward-looking, attempting to anticipate and prevent risks rather than react to dangers once they have materialised. The EU has therefore highlighted the importance of preventive activities in its effort to manage new security risks. Contemporary security issues cannot be dealt with reactively; proactive intervention is the key to risk management. Solana suggests that

Making a stand first requires being more active. The threats are today dynamic.
Left alone, they will become more dangerous. The EU must actively counter these threats. It must be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.

The ESS itself urges European states to ‘develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and where necessary, robust intervention’. This emphasis on proactive anticipation and prevention is indicative not only of a precautionary desire to prevent the materialisation of potential catastrophes, but also the temporally de-bounded nature of contemporary security risks. The EU’s preventative approach puts emphasis on horizon-scanning, early warning and continual vigilance precisely

because it is unclear at what point in time a risk might materialise or a crisis will occur. At any given moment in the future a new crisis could emerge without warning. This temporal uncertainty, along with the perceived catastrophic nature of security risks, leads to future-oriented, anticipatory methods of risk management centred on the proactive prevention of possible future scenarios rather than reacting to emergent threats.

Further, as alluded to above, the EU’s conceptualisation of the contemporary international security environment has included an overt emphasis on precaution and the tendency to assume the worst. This precautionary and pessimistic attitude is one that is often associated with an insecure risk society. The ESS states, in regard to post-Cold War security issues, that ‘The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous’. The ESS assumes that a failure to act against possible risks will only increase the danger confronting Europe and the wider West; as it argues, prevention now will mitigate the potential materialisation of catastrophic risks later. Further, the suggestion by Solana that threat (or rather risk) prevention cannot start too early is distinctly indicative of precautionary principles which likewise suggest that prevention against anticipated risks can never occur too early, regardless of the existence (or not) of conclusive evidence that corroborates the risk assessments being made.

29 Ibid., 11
30 The idea that failing to act or acting inadequately will increase the dangers facing Europe is seemingly confirmed in a recent report on the implementation of the ESS. It also suggests that certain risks, such as WMD proliferation, have increased since the adoption of the ESS while all risks have become more unpredictable and complex. See European Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 3.
31 This precautionary trend is also evident in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy’s emphasis on protection from terrorist attacks. The Strategy focuses on enhanced border controls and ‘target-hardening’ as a precaution against possible terrorist attacks. See Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorist Strategy (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 30 November 2005): 10-11.
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European foreign and security policies have therefore demonstrated a focus on new forms of risk and, subsequently, an emphasis on precautionary and preventive methods of risk management. Importantly, however, they have also explicitly identified the promotion of European values of political and economic liberalism as a central aspect of EU risk management efforts. This has been most clearly demonstrated in the EU’s overt identification of enlargement and the ENP, both centred on the promotion of EU values and standards of governance, as providing key security benefits. The EU’s desire to spread liberalism and democracy is, however, not a new one. The promotion of democracy and liberal values has been well-established in EU foreign policy and practice since its inception in 1992. As Kubicek states, among international actors seeking to promote liberalism and democracy, the EU should be assigned a leading role.32

Indeed, Article III-292 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for the European Union (which was ultimately not ratified by EU members) states that

The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.33

The EU’s explicit desire to promote its values of liberty and democracy has been encapsulated in its self-identification as a ‘normative power’.34 The idea of a

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‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) is one that has recently received a substantial amount of academic interest.\(^{35}\)

Simply put, the idea of NPE suggests that the unique characteristics of the EU predispose it to act in a fundamentally different way than other major actors within international society.\(^{36}\) This fundamentally different behaviour is supposedly encapsulated in the EU’s desire to use its so-called ‘ideational power’ or influence to alter what is considered ‘normal’ within International Relations by promoting supposedly universal norms through non-coercive means.\(^{37}\) More than this though, one can suggest that the concept of normative power denotes the placing of value-promotion above more tangible interests. That is, the promotion of the EU’s norms and values is a good in itself.\(^{38}\) However, it should be noted that there is a lack of clarity within the academic literature as to precisely what normative power means.\(^{39}\)

For example, does it just mean a state or political entity that promotes norms and

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\(^{36}\) Manners has identified nine supposedly universal norms that the EU promotes (the supposed universality of these norms is highly problematic, for reasons discussed below in relation to the inherent distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ norms that is central to the concept of normative power): sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance. See Ian Manners, ‘The Normative Ethics of the European Union’, International Affairs 84, no. 1 (2008): 65-80.


\(^{39}\) Ibid., 239. This point is also made in Elisabeth Johansson-Nogues, ’(Non-) Normative Power EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An Exceptional Policy for an Exceptional Actor’, European Political Economy Review 7 (Summer 2007): 181-94.
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does it necessarily preclude the use of particular instruments for promoting them, such as the use of force? 40

If this is so, then it is merely a descriptive term and is of little utility as an analytical concept. 41 Even if we assume that the concept is analytically useful, it raises further questions, such as is normative power a ‘good’ thing? That is, does it lead to ethical outcomes or is it merely a form of anti-pluralism, involved with the spread of the EU’s particularistic values at the expense of those of other cultures? Further, there is scant theorisation in the literature of why the EU should be regarded as a unique normative power when other actors, most notably the US, have also explicitly identified the promotion of particular values as a core component of their foreign policies. Simply pointing to the unique characteristics of what the EU is in comparison to the US or any other state does not provide an adequate explanation of why the EU should be regarded as a unique normative power when several Western states and regional organisations are also involved in the promotion of liberal values.

But perhaps the most telling criticism of the concept, at least as it is defined by some scholars within the literature, is that the idea that a normative power promotes its norms even at the expense of its own self-interest is one that does not

40 Some commentators, such as Therborn or Stavridis, argue that EU militarisation will actually enhance its credentials as a force for the promotion of democratic norms. Others, such as Manners, Smith and Whitman either argue that militarisation of the EU will corrode its status as a civilian or normative power or, in the case of Manners, reject the idea that normative power requires the instrumental exercise of military force. See Goran Therborn, ‘Europe in the Twenty-First Century: The World’s Scandinavia?’, in The Question of Europe, edited by Peter Gowan and Perry Anderson (London: Verso, 1997): 357-84; Stelios Stavridis, ‘‘Militarising’ the EU: The Concept of Civilian Power Europe Revisited’, The International Spectator 36, no. 4 (2001): 43-50; Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe’, 242; Richard G. Whitman, From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); Karen E. Smith, ‘The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?’, The International Spectator 35, no. 2 (2000): 11-28.

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hold up well to empirical analysis. Western societies do not promote liberal values primarily because of their inherent ‘goodness’ or out of an altruistic desire to spread liberty to people across the world. These may be secondary objectives, but the primary objective of promoting liberalism and democracy is an instrumental desire to increase Western security. However, this does not mean that the concept is not useful in the context of the argument presented here; it is for two main reasons.

Firstly, the EU has explicitly identified itself as a normative power and has defined its foreign policy approach in terms of the spread of its liberal values. As Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and the ENP has suggested, ‘As an organisation founded on respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, we believe democracy is inherently valuable and universally desirable. And we are morally obliged to foster those values in all our international partners’. This quote is particularly important because it shows that the liberal values that the EU seeks to export are also central to its own self-identity – liberalism and democracy are fundamental aspects of what the EU is. Further, these values inform the EU’s perception of the outside world which leads it to behave in particular ways within international society (e.g. as a transmitter of liberal values).

Secondly, the very notion of NPE is arguably premised on a distinction between the norms that a normative power seeks to export and any form of deviance

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42 This is particularly so in light of the publication of the ESS, which explicitly links the promotion of liberal norms to EU security interests. Manners has offered the example of the EU’s bid to persuade the US and China to abolish the death penalty, but this bid has been unsuccessful to date and the EU has not been willing to give up any vital interests in order to pursue this issue. See Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe’, 245-52.


44 Manners has similarly argued that EU norms of liberalism and democracy are crucial constitutive factors that structure its international identity. See Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe’, 241.
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from them.\(^{45}\) Seeking to reform other societies in line with one’s own particular norms and values necessarily implies a dichotomy between the ‘superior’ values that are being exported and deviant norms that are in need of reform or elimination.\(^{46}\) Behr argues that such a distinction has largely informed the EU’s foreign policy outlook, particularly with relation to enlargement and the ENP:

> Common to the politics of ‘standard of civilization’ in the 19th century, the EU perceives the political and economic accomplishments of its member states as universal norms for every system of rule. This universality is constructed antithetically while describing the applicant states and Eastern Europe as backward zones whereas the EU appears as a modernized, safe political and economic heaven.\(^{47}\)

In this respect, the EU’s self-identification as normative power leads it to a distinctly anti-pluralist view of international society. As the above quote from the EU External Commissioner aptly demonstrates, the EU effectively views itself as having a duty to effect a homogenisation of international society’s members by promoting its ‘universal’ liberal values.

The EU’s ‘normative mission’ is to forge a ‘deeper’ version of international society by extending the scope of the shared norms and values that underpin a pluralist international society to include positive obligations regarding the internal

\(^{45}\) As Diez argues, NPE ‘constructs an identity of the EU against an image of others in the ‘outside world’’. This is a point that has been ignored in much of the literature on the subject. See Thomas Diez, ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Europe’’, *Millennium* 33, no. 3 (2005): 613-36.

\(^{46}\) Although he approaches the topic from a Foucauldian perspective, Merlingen argues that NPE has two faces – the celebrated face concerned with promoting liberal values and fundamental individual civil and political rights; and the second face which subjects locals to the EU’s ‘normativising universalist pretensions’. This includes new patterns of arbitrary domination between the EU and local populations in those countries subjected to EU norm promotion. This is very similar to the argument made here that the EU’s attempts to promote liberal norms in its neighbourhood through the ENP gives rise to relations of hierarchy between the EU and ENP partners. See Merlingen, ‘Everything is Dangerous: A Critique of Normative Power Europe’, 449.

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collection of its members. In doing so, the EU effectively establishes a hierarchy between those states or regions adhering to the ‘good norms’ that it seeks to promote and those that do not. This point is crucial because in a post-Cold War security environment in which Western societies have identified liberalism as the panacea to multi-faceted risks, this process of differentiation leads to the establishment of new zones within international society defined in terms of risk: the zone of Western societies at risk and the risky zone of illiberal and undemocratic states. The EU’s role as an exporter of liberal norms therefore becomes much more than simply a reflection of what the EU is; it becomes the key to its risk management efforts.

This argument is readily demonstrated in the ESS. It suggests that the promotion of European values is a key element of not only strengthening and improving the quality of international society, but also achieving security for Europe:

The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.\(^{48}\)

The upshot of this statement is that the ‘best’ or ‘safe’ forms of domestic governance and government are very clearly defined by the EU in terms of liberalism and democracy. Presumably, liberal democratic states stand in distinction to illiberal or undemocratic states that are characterised as inferior or unstable, and thus potentially risky.

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It is precisely this construction of liberal democracy as safe and progressive, coupled with the notion that any deviance from the EU’s liberal democratic standards represents backwardness and potentially dangerous instability, which informs the EU’s desire to promote liberal values as a means to managing risk. Further, such a dichotomy is well demonstrated regarding the EU’s perspective on its ENP partners. As Ferrero-Waldner has argued, ‘it is in our interest to contribute to our partners’ modernisation efforts’.\textsuperscript{49} The use of the term ‘modernisation’ implies that the ENP partners are backward or ‘pre-modern’ compared to the progressive and modern EU due to their lack of liberal values and institutions. Again, this demonstrates the seeming paradox of the EU’s efforts to deepen international society which nevertheless results in new distinctions and new hierarchies between liberal and illiberal states.

The thinking on the part of the EU seems to be that exporting its supposedly progressive values of liberalism and democracy to other states will draw those states into the Western zone of peace and prosperity, thus preventing the danger that the previously illiberal and unstable socio-political conditions of these territories will give rise to risks to European security. Primarily, the diffusion of liberal values has occurred through EU enlargement and the ENP. As Christopher Hill argues, enlargement constitutes the EU’s long-term preventative measure against conflict and instability.\textsuperscript{50} Bringing states into the EU by requiring them to undergo extensive socio-political reforms is the best way for the EU to manage security risks. The ENP serves the same function in lieu of enlargement with regard to the EU’s neighbours.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
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Promoting liberal values is a task which the EU sees as most urgent within its identified neighbourhood or ‘backyard’, which includes North Africa, the Middle East and the former Soviet republics. Within its immediate proximity on the European continent, enlargement has been the main method used to transmit EU values and effect domestic reforms within prospective member states. The EU enlargement process saw ten new members join the Union in 2004, with Romania and Bulgaria joining in 2007 and Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey currently in accession negotiations. The so-called ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ adopted at the 1993 Copenhagen Council were relatively clear in the conditions prospective members had to fulfil: liberal democratic political institutions, a functioning market economy and acceptance of the EU acquis (the body of EU law to date), along with an ability to take on the obligations of membership.

However, enlargement has also had more negative consequences, particularly in relation to the fact that it has brought the enlarged EU closer to states residing in zones of risk on the periphery of Europe and beyond. The enlarged EU’s new neighbours have been perceived and defined primarily in terms of the potential dangers they pose for Europe. As Smith argues, ‘The 2004 enlargement, however, brought the EU closer to them, and thus created an immediate need to ensure that the

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55 Browning and Joenniemi, ‘Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, 531. Indeed, the European Commission has stated in a pamphlet on the ENP that it is a response to the hopes and fears of its citizens about the challenges of today’s world (globalisation, terrorism, organised crime, etc) that are derived from instability and insecurity in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood. See European Commission, Working Together: The European Neighbourhood Policy (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007): 6.
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wider neighbourhood was stable, to avoid the risk of instability spilling over into the larger EU’. These security considerations have constituted a large part of the justifications provided by the EU for the establishment and implementation of the ENP in light of its 2004 enlargement.

The perceived instability and potential risks posed by the EU’s new neighbours have been central to the process of developing the ENP from the very beginning. In 2002 the development of the ENP began with a letter from Jack Straw, then the UK Foreign Minister, to his Spanish counterpart, Josep Piqué, outlining the need to address the instability present in many of the EU’s future neighbours. A year later, the ESS noted that one of the key tasks for the EU in terms of security policy was to build stability and prosperity in its immediate neighbourhood:

The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.

The EU has thus identified the need for engagement with its neighbouring states as a means of mitigating any potential risks that they may pose. Romano Prodi, during his tenure as the President of the European Commission, argued several years before the formal creation of the ENP that ‘We need to institute a new and inclusive regional approach that would help keep and promote peace and foster stability and security throughout the continent, ultimately promoting the emergence

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56 Smith, ‘The Outsiders’, 758.
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of better global governance’. Further, the European Commission suggests that ‘As enlargement brings the EU into direct contact with neighbours marked by political and social instability, its response is to share with them its prosperity and stability, thus consolidating its own security’. The importance of these statements is that they highlight the instrumental security considerations which underpin the ENP and the EU’s role in its neighbourhood.

These considerations, along with notion of an international society divided into differing zones of order, are also reflected in another statement from the European Commission:

In order to realise the vision of building an increasingly closer relationship with our neighbours, and a zone of stability, security and prosperity for all, the EU and each ENP partner reach agreement on reform objectives across a wide range of fields within certain “common” areas such as cooperation on political and security issues, to economic and trade matters, mobility, environment, integration of transport and energy networks or scientific and cultural cooperation.

These statements neatly summarise the security considerations that, at least in part, inform the EU’s objective of facilitating economic and socio-political reform within ENP partner states. As Del Sarto and Schumacher contend ‘Seeking to establish a cushion of new neighbours, some of whom will enjoy a virtual EU membership, may be read as an attempt of preventing the emergence of new fault lines and zones of instability – at least in the EU’s immediate periphery’. The ENP functions as a risk

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59 Prodi, A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability.
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management mechanism designed to export EU values of liberalism and democracy to states within identified zones of risk.

Therefore, this section has demonstrated the preoccupation of the EU with the security implications of globalisation and its focus on new forms of temporally and spatially de-bounded risks to its security. It has also highlighted the importance of the EU’s self-image as a normative power based upon liberal values and the way in which this structures the EU’s anti-pluralist view of international society and its self-defined role as an exporter of liberal values. Taken together, this has manifested in a broadly preventive and precautionary approach to security issues affecting Europe based on the EU’s engagement with zones of risk in its periphery. This engagement is primarily designed to effect liberal reform in these peripheral territories as a means to achieving security for the EU. This latter aspect has been demonstrated by the predominance of security justifications provided for the formulation of the ENP.

The next section investigates in more detail the provisions of the ENP, and the way in which it is used by the EU as a risk management mechanism designed to promote liberal reform. It suggests that the ENP essentially constitutes an intrusive form of regulation based on conditionality, wherein the EU uses its political and economic leverage in order to entice states to adopt the required reforms. It is highly intrusive in the sense that such reforms go far beyond institutional reform or compliance with liberal standards of good governance; they also involve specific legislative and regulatory reforms within the partner states. Further, the progress of each state that is part of the ENP is subject to extensive monitoring and review via periodic reports produced by the European Commission.
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The ENP and the Promotion of Liberal Values along the European Periphery

Prior to, and since its 2004 expansion, one of the EU’s central problems in relation to its new neighbourhood was how to provide suitable incentives for its neighbours to adopt EU values and regulations without offering the prize of membership. As Romano Prodi argued in 2002, the EU needed to offer these states ‘more than partnership and less than membership, without precluding the latter’. In March 2003, the European Commission proposed the ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood’ initiative that would eventually evolve into the ENP. This initiative was initially confined to the former Soviet republics in Eastern Europe. However, pressure from the southern EU members to include Mediterranean countries eventually led to the expansion of the ENP into North Africa and the Middle East. The European Commission formulated the current ENP in May 2004 with the publication of the *European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper.*

The basic method of the ENP is to offer partners the opportunity to move beyond mere cooperation and instead engage in considerable political and economic integration with the EU in return for adopting the required reforms. However, it should be noted that European partnerships with Eastern European and Mediterranean states designed to achieve political and economic reform are not

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63 Romano Prodi, *A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability.*


65 Current ENP partner countries include Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine.


67 This includes a stake in the EU internal market and enhanced political dialogue, among other benefits. See Danuta Hubner (Member of the European Commission responsible for Regional Policy), *Enlargement, Neighbourhood Policy and Globalisation: The Need for an Open Europe,* SPEECH/06/534 (Edinburgh University, 21 September 2006).
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For example, in the Mediterranean, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), launched in November 1995, preceded the ENP. Of course in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, EU enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Agreements have been the primary mechanisms for achieving the desired reforms in partner states. The ENP, however, has become one of the primary initiatives informing the EU’s relations with its near neighbours.

Briefly, it is useful to outline in a little more detail how the ENP works. The core objectives of the ENP were detailed in the Strategy Paper, which suggests that the objective of the ENP is to share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned. It is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation.

In order to do so, the strategy paper proposes that the EU define, in consultation with partners, priority areas for reform, the fulfilment of which will bring them closer to the EU. The latter part of this method, the bringing of partner states closer to the EU, is significant as bringing partners closer to the EU involves adopting the standards that the EU sets itself for ENP partners. This precludes any real consultation with partners over the necessary standards to be adopted.

At the outset of the process, the European Commission prepares ‘Country Reports’ detailing the situation in each country that has agreed to subject itself to the

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68 This language of partnership is one that has also been used in other post-Cold War interventions, notably Australia’s involvement in the domestic governance of several of its Asia-Pacific neighbours. See chapter six.
69 European Commission, ‘External Relations: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm (accessed 23 November 2008). The EMP still exists to this day, but has been supplemented by the ENP.
ENP. The identified priority areas of reform in ENP partner states are then detailed in ‘Action Plans’ that outline the necessary reforms that must be carried out. The EU then provides financial and technical assistance to ensure that the desired reforms are successfully implemented, whilst also conducting periodic assessments and reviews of the progress being made by each ENP partner state.\footnote{European Commission, ‘The Policy: How does the European Neighbourhood Policy Work’.
} As the Commission envisages, the end result of the ENP involves a ring of countries, sharing the EU's fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an increasingly close relationship, going beyond co-operation to involve a significant measure of economic and political integration. This will bring enormous gains to all involved in terms of increased stability, security and well-being.\footnote{European Commission, \textit{European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper}, 5.}

One crucial feature of this statement is the identification of the security benefits to be obtained by the EU as a result of the ENP. These security benefits are twofold. Firstly, by promoting liberal values in neighbouring states, the EU can reshape socio-political environments on its borders and prevent the emergence of security risks. Secondly, the idea of a ‘ring of friends’ surrounding the EU is suggestive of the formulation of a buffer zone, one intended to keep security risks from penetrating the EU’s core (e.g. Western Europe). ENP partner states are thus subject to environmental reshaping not only to prevent the risks that they themselves pose to the EU, but also to effect their transformation into a new ‘liberal buffer zone’ protecting the EU’s core.

Another important feature of this statement is the centrality of the EU’s ‘fundamental values and objectives’ to the ENP and its anticipated outcomes. There is no mention of the values or objectives of partner states, precisely because it is
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des... that the ENP seeks to reshape. As Del Sarto and Schumacher argue, ‘The Commission does not leave any doubts that the ‘commitment to shared values’ – such as democracy, liberty, rule of law, respect for human rights and human dignity – refers to the values of the EU and its Member States’. The point of the ENP is not to engage in negotiation or compromise over the disparate values or governance standards held by the EU and the ENP partners. Rather, the ENP functions solely as an anti-pluralist disseminator of the EU’s liberal values, which is precisely what the EU means when it refers to ‘shared fundamental values and objectives’.

Despite this, the EU has emphasised differentiation in its relationships with ENP partners, arguing that each relationship will be varied and unique. Yet this differentiation really only refers to the variations that occur between ENP partner states in their progress towards assimilating the ‘common values’ that the EU is seeking to export. As President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso has argued

It will be clear that there is a very different relationship between the EU and each of its neighbours, reflecting how close we are to each other in implementing the common values we share, the specific nature of each partner’s economy, and the desires and aspirations you have for your relationship with the EU.

73 Del Sarto and Schumacher, ‘From EMP to ENP’, 23-4.
74 The Commission communication on a new Wider Europe Framework explicitly states that ‘shared values’ means ‘Notably democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, as set out within the EU in the Charter of Fundamental Rights’. See European Commission, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood, fn 2, 4.
75 See European Commission, European Neighbourhood Strategy Paper.
76 Jose Manuel Barroso, Shared Challenges, Shared Futures: Taking the Neighbourhood Policy Forward, SPEECH/07/502, speech given at the European Neighbourhood Policy Conference (Brussels, 3 September 2007) (italics mine).
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Therefore, despite the stress on differentiation between ENP partners in light of their unique circumstances, such differentiation is limited only to the level of liberal reform achieved by each partner state.

The ENP’s central function as a homogenising mechanism for exporting liberal values is also readily demonstrated in the Country Reports and Action Plans which cover common core values and reforms for each partner country. As Smith argues

The action plans are striking for at least two other reasons. The first is the prominence within them of political objectives, including – most notably – respect for specific human rights and democratic principles. Insistence upon these could herald a new era in the EU’s relations with its Mediterranean neighbours in particular, in which human rights and democracy have not usually been an important aspect.\(^77\)

Both the Country Reports and the Action Plans are key documents in the ENP process, outlining the goals and strategic objectives of the partnership between the EU and the state concerned. However, the scope of the Country Reports and the reforms mandated in the Action Plans go much further than simply adopting, for example, institutions of representative government or public sector reforms in line with liberal notions of good governance.

While the promotion of broad EU values remains an important part of these documents, they also involve more specific measures in a variety of policy areas that the EU’s neighbouring states are required to adopt. These more specific measures involve potentially extensive legislative and regulatory reform and are essentially aimed at bringing ENP states into line with the EU’s *acquis communitaire*.\(^78\) The

\(^77\) Smith, ‘The Outsiders’, 765.
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wide scope of the areas that come under the regulatory purview of the ENP are demonstrated clearly in the Country Reports. The Country Report for Armenia, for example, deals with the following areas: political issues, democracy and the rule of law, human rights, foreign affairs, economic and social situation, state involvement in the economy, regulatory frameworks, transport, energy, environment and research and innovation, to name a few.\(^\text{79}\) Other Country Reports are of similar breadth, covering a large range of areas and issues. The wide scope of the Country Reports is of course repeated in the Action Plans, which outline the large number of reforms that ENP partners must undertake in order to meet the requirements for increased integration with the EU.

The reforms contained in the Action Plans are a mix of exhortations to adopt liberal values and abide by particular international treaties and declarations (such as the 1998 International Labour Organisation Declaration or the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime).\(^\text{80}\) They also include more specific regulatory and legislative reforms. For example, some of the priorities for action outlined in the Action Plan for Jordan include:

- Continue to develop an independent and impartial judiciary. Further reinforcing of the administrative and judiciary capacity.
- Take steps to develop further the freedom of the media and freedom of expression
- Further promote equal treatment of women, by preparing a plan to increase women’s participation in political and economic life.
- Strengthen political dialogue and co-operation on issues of international and


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regional interest including the Middle East Peace Process and the fight against terrorism.

• Take measures to improve business conditions to enhance growth and increase investment in Jordan.\(^81\)

Notably, security considerations are also a feature of most of the Action Plans, particularly in relation to counter-terrorism. ENP countries are required to continue to work on developing cooperation with the EU on terrorism and other security issues. This includes the implementation of specific policies and programs such as UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, which deals with the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.\(^82\) The ENP thus also takes what might be termed a more ‘direct’ approach in protecting the EU from security risks by ensuring that ENP countries cooperate extensively with the EU on security matters and align their security policies and capabilities with those of the EU. It is useful to point out that this demonstrates again the wide scope and intrusiveness of the ENP’s regulatory ambit – it goes well beyond enforcing compliance with liberal values.

The intrusive regulatory scope of the ENP is coupled with mechanisms of monitoring and assessment that provide for EU oversight of the implementation of mandated reforms. As noted in the previous chapter, surveillance and monitoring are key facets of risk anticipation and definition – potentially risky situations or objects must be subjected to constant scanning and assessment in order to provide for early preventive action against possible dangers. The EU has engaged in this sort of activity via the various progress reports that it has released since 2005. These reports effectively act as audits on the effectiveness of the implementation of the ENP’s


\(^{82}\) For example, the Action Plans for Armenia, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia all require compliance with UNSCR 1540.
mandated liberal reforms in partner countries. They thus also act as form of horizon scanning, allowing the EU to anticipate and define the possible future risks that each ENP partner poses according to the level of liberal reform that they have achieved.

For instance, in 2008 the Commission released reports reviewing and assessing overall progress, sectoral progress and the progress of most ENP states in implementing reforms. The progress reports for each country cover the areas identified in need of reform in the Action Plans, detailing the achievements that have been made in these areas against the objectives set and those areas where further work is needed.83 The progress report for Moldova, for example, outlines specific legislative reforms that have been undertaken by Moldova under the criteria of strengthening democracy and respect for human rights, including parliamentary reform and anti-corruption initiatives. The report also discusses the shortcomings of Moldova’s efforts in these areas and the next steps Moldova needs to take to meet the EU’s regulatory demands.84 These progress reports further underline the intrusiveness of the ENP – partner countries have their internal affairs subject to constant scrutiny and review. The domestic situations of ENP partners become internationalised, subject to oversight by the EU.

In order to compel ENP partners to adopt the large number of required reforms detailed in the Action Plans, the EU has employed the method of conditionality. Indeed, conditionality is arguably the central aspect of the ENP.85 Conditionality is defined by Collingwood as a ‘form of power that entails the combination of a promise of aid or financial assistance (or other benefits) with a

85 As Johansson-Nogues argues, one of the more novel aspects of the ENP is its forceful language in terms of political conditionality. See Johansson-Nogues, ‘(Non-) Normative Power EU’, 182.
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threat of sanctions’. It is therefore a means of compulsion. The conditional aspects of the ENP are well highlighted by the EU External Relations Commissioner:

ENP gives us a framework for promoting democracy and economic development in the countries around the borders of an expanded EU. It aims to encourage the spirit of democracy by providing our partners with incentives to reform. As countries strengthen the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights; and promote market-oriented economic reforms, we offer a share in the EU’s single market; closer cooperation on energy and transport links; and a chance to participate in the EU’s internal programmes.

Partners are provided with aid and closer political and economic integration only once they have met the necessary prerequisites that have been set by the EU.

The conditional aspects of the ENP were clear rather early in its development, the 2003 European Commission Wider Europe – Neighbourhood communication stating that

In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including in aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU.

This conditionality, and the intrusive transformation of ENP partner states that it seeks to effect, is founded upon the EU’s political and economic leverage. The lure of economic and political benefits, such as access to the EU internal market or enhanced international influence, provides the Union with substantial leverage over

87 Ferrero-Waldner, Remarks on Democracy Promotion.
89 European Commission, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood, 4.
ENP partner countries that will supposedly allow it to achieve extensive socio-political and economic reforms in candidate countries.\textsuperscript{90}

Importantly, the conditionalities imposed by the ENP are heightened by its emphasis on bilateral relations between the EU and ENP partners. Unlike the multilateral focus of the EMP, for example, the ENP is based upon bilateral relationships between the EU and individual partner states.\textsuperscript{91} This bilateralism serves to accentuate the political and economic inequalities between the EU and ENP partners, providing the EU with an even greater leverage.\textsuperscript{92} By engaging with neighbouring states on a one-on-one basis, the bargaining power of the EU is significantly heightened vis-a-vis the neighbouring state. This allows the EU to set the terms and conditions of its relations with its neighbours with very little input from the neighbours themselves. Both the reforms to be implemented and the rewards to be offered for doing so are decided upon solely by the EU. As Tassinari argues, the bilateral partnership approach of the ENP is thus a veiled form of unilateralism – the EU acts individually in setting the standards and values to be promoted.\textsuperscript{93}

The use of conditionality to compel member states to conform to liberal standards and values underscores the point that the ENP partners have little real ownership over these values and standards. The relationship between the EU and


\textsuperscript{92} Smith, ‘The Outsiders’, 762-3.

ENP partners is depicted as a horizontal one between equals negotiating over mutually beneficial reforms. Further, the implementation of these reforms is portrayed by the EU as very much bottom-up in nature. Such reforms are implemented by the ENP partners themselves, in their own time and according to the unique socio-political and economic context of each country, with a helping hand from the EU. However, despite the rhetoric of the European Commission, the relationship is very much a vertical, rather than horizontal, one between fundamentally unequal ‘partners’. The EU has effectively claimed the right to determine the socio-political and economic constitution of its neighbours. Rather than a ‘partnership’, the ENP represents a hierarchical authority relationship between the EU and the subordinated ENP partner states.

This is further demonstrated by the EU’s attempt to impose the same set of liberal values and standards of governance in sixteen different countries stretching in an arc from Morocco to Belarus. Rather than setting individual agendas for reform in consultation with ENP countries based on their unique socio-political and economic circumstances, the Action Plans outline similar sets of regulatory and institutional reforms in each ENP partner. The point here is that the reforms outlined in the Action Plans are actually top-down in nature. The ENP leaves no room for negotiation or compromise over the reforms that must be carried out. Rather, it is an attempt at standardisation and homogenisation within Europe’s neighbourhood that is reflective only of the EU’s core values and principles. The top-down nature of the ENP is further highlighted by Browning and Joenniemi. As they point out, no new

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94 Most of the main documents and information sources on the ENP published by the European Commission and cited in this chapter speak of the ENP in these terms. The emphasis in these documents is of course on notions of ‘partnership’ and ‘mutual ownership’.

95 For example, all of the Action Plans set similar reforms in the areas of strengthening democratic institutions and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. For more see European Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy: Reference Documents’.
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institutions have been established by the EU in order to oversee the implementation, operation and evaluation of the ENP.96

Rather, as its website clearly demonstrates, the European Commission retains control over all aspects of the ENP.97 This has led to a centralisation of all aspects of the ENP in the hands of the European Commission, which as Browning and Joenniemi argue, undermines the levels of ‘joint ownership’ and partnership available in the ENP:

Meanwhile, hierarchical elements in the ENP stem directly from the emphasis on conditionality, which means notions of ‘joint ownership’ ultimately are widely seen to add up to little. Thus, it is the EU that is setting the goals of the specific ENP Action Plans and that will decide if they have been implemented or not.98

The vertical and conditional nature of the ENP is therefore indicative of an authoritative, hierarchical relationship between the EU as the superordinate party and the subordinated ENP partners. The hierarchical and unequal nature of the ENP is legitimated not only by a liberal social logic of risk, but also the unique benefits offered to ENP partners, benefits that are withheld as a sanction for non-compliance.

Conditionality involves both the dangling of carrots to entice states to adopt particular reforms and the use of sticks as punishment for non-compliance with the set conditions. This usually takes the form of a withholding of the benefits being offered.99 This is certainly the case with the ENP, although it goes further than the simple withholding of aid or technical assistance. The ENP only provides closer EU integration for those states that meet the required benchmarks – ENP partners are

97 See the European Commission’s website on external relations and the ENP, available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/welcome_en.htm. The Commission has appointed its own Commissioner for the ENP, publishes the Country Reports, Action Plans and Progress Reports and is the main source of information on all aspects of the ENP.
99 This is certainly the case with the ENP, which does not provide any real benefits until ENP partners meet the set conditions.
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held at arm’s length until the required reforms are implemented. This means that a failure to comply ultimately involves exclusion from a ‘special relationship’ with the EU, which arguably can provide far more tangible and intangible benefits than increased aid or technical assistance. ENP partners thus have an interest in adopting the mandated reforms and legitimating their subordination in new relations of hierarchy with the EU.

It is precisely this attempt to compel ENP partners to adopt external values and standards of governance through conditionality, irrespective of their established domestic institutions or societal values, that underscores the hierarchical and anti-pluralist relationships between the EU and ENP partners. Indeed, although it is somewhat of an oxymoron, Hurrell has argued that conditionality provides an example of a broader post-Cold War movement within international society towards a form of ‘coercive solidarism’. This coercive solidarism is designed to provide more effective enforcement of the normatively deeper version of international society that the EU and other Western powers seek to construct. More accurately, the conditionality of the ENP, along with its intrusive regulatory scope, signals a hierarchical and anti-pluralist shift within international society.

It should be noted that conditionality is not a new method used by international actors to promote particular values or policies, and indeed has been

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100 This is clear in the EU’s frequent assertion that closer integration with ENP partners will reflect their willingness to adopt the ‘common’ values that are ‘shared’ with the EU. For example, see European Commission, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood, 4.

101 For example, in the case of the Eastern European ENP partners, the ENP is potentially a step towards an eventual offer of EU membership. This is particularly the case for Georgia and Ukraine, both of which have already announced their wish to join the EU. For the non-European partners, the benefits of greater integration include the obvious economic advantages associated with entry into the EU market, but also less tangible benefits such as greater international prestige and influence arising out of an intimate association with the EU.

102 See Hurrell, On Global Order, 63-5. The term ‘coercive solidarism’ is an oxymoron because, as Linklater and Suganami argue, true solidarism is a condition rooted in societal consensus. It cannot arise as a result of the coercion of one member or group of members of international society by another. The use of coercion or compulsion to impose particular values leads to the emergence of a hierarchical, rather than solidarist, international society. See Linklater and Suganami, The English School of International Relations, 271.
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used quite extensively in the post-World War Two period. A prime example here are the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) implemented by several international financial institutions (IFIs), most notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Some might question why the EU’s use of conditionality is any different to that of the SAPs or other forms of conditionality that have been used. There are two main ways in which the conditionalities of the ENP, and the hierarchical relations they denote, differ from other forms of conditionality that have been used. Firstly, the logic underpinning the conditionality of the ENP is fundamentally different from that of other forms of conditionality, such as the SAPs.

Unlike the ENP, security considerations have generally not played a large role in motivating the use of conditionality by the IFIs or donor states. Rather, economic considerations, particularly the need to open up markets to free trade and ensure proper governance within state financial and monetary institutions, have motivated these forms of conditionality. Secondly, and more importantly, these conditional agreements have normally placed specific requirements upon states receiving aid in specific economic policy areas. The SAPs, for example, do not come close to the scope or breadth of the conditionalities imposed by the ENP. Unlike other programs underpinned by forms of conditionality, the ENP seeks a fundamental reshaping of several different areas of the governments and societies of the ENP partner states.


104 Ibid.

105 As Hurrell notes, there has recently been a significant expansion of conditional agreements beyond economic policy to include human rights, good governance, sustainable development, democracy, etc. See Hurrell, *On Global Order*, 64.
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In summary, the ENP is a highly intrusive regulatory mechanism, subjecting ENP partner states to extensive socio-political and economic regulation and constant scrutiny and oversight of their internal affairs. In order to participate in the ENP, states must agree to subject themselves to the regulation of several different areas of their societies by the EU. Indeed, the range of priority areas identified in the Action Plans for each country is staggering in its breadth and significantly reduces the range of acceptable values and regimes that ENP states can legitimately adopt. This of course is counter to the pluralist vision of international society. The ENP effectively constructs new relations of hierarchy in Europe’s peripheries as the EU seeks to subject its neighbours to a wide-ranging reshaping of their socio-political environments as a mechanism for managing perceived risks to European security.

Implications for International Society

Both the idea of NPE and the ENP itself are important when discussing the implications of the EU’s neighbourhood policy for international society. This is because both are important elements in demonstrating the way in which a liberal social logic of risk underpins new relations of hierarchy within international society. On the one hand, the concept of NPE not only constructs the EU as an altruistic actor within international society, but it also legitimates the spread of its liberal values. The notion of Europe as an altruistic normative power is a crucial aspect of the legitimation of the new hierarchies to which the ENP gives rise. Further, NPE results in a fundamentally anti-pluralist view of what constitutes an acceptable form of international society. Despite its pretensions towards respect for international law and the values and norms of pluralist international society, the EU’s view of a stable or ‘good’ international society is one in which domestic diversity between states is
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eliminated in favour of liberal notions of good governance and democratic government.

On the other hand, the EU’s recent attempts to promote liberal values in its immediate periphery have been justified in large part as a means through which Europe can secure itself against various risks. Primarily through enlargement and the ENP, the EU has sought to promote liberal values and institutions as a mechanism of risk management. A liberal social logic of risk that simultaneously constructs liberal democracies as peaceful, stable and non-risky; and illiberal or undemocratic states as backwards and potentially dangerous thus underpins the new relations of hierarchy to which the ENP gives rise. As demonstrated above, the EU has been explicit in its attempts to promote liberalism as a means of ensuring greater security for itself. The EU has sought to forge a much deeper form of international society with a constitution based on a much thicker set of common (liberal) values and principles than that to be found in a pluralist international society.106

In doing so, it has claimed the authority to reshape the domestic institutions of other states according to its own liberal values. In one sense, it is tempting to view the EU and its behaviour as representing the emergence of a more solidarist form of international society in place of its previous pluralist face. As Linklater and Suganami argue, true solidarism can only arise in a setting of equal exchange between states – a solidarist international society is one grounded in consensus over the thicker set of norms and rules to be adopted.107 Indeed, the EU’s identification as a normative power, a term that tends to carry with it altruistic and egalitarian

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106 This is reflected in the ESS’s statement that the quality of international society depends on the quality of its members and that the best form of international society is one comprised of well-governed democratic states. Thus would imply a commitment to a normatively deeper constitution of international society that goes beyond the norms associated with a pluralist international society, one entailing positive obligations regarding the domestic constitution of its members.

107 Linklater and Suganami, *The English School of International Relations*, 271.
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c onnotations, and its emphasis on partnership and joint ownership with ENP partners does tend to paint a picture of consensus over shared values.108

But as demonstrated above, these ‘shared values’ only reflect the liberal values of the EU. There is no scope for accommodating the societal values of ENP partners, precisely because such deviance is perceived to be risky and therefore is something to be managed and eventually eliminated. This point is reinforced by the use of conditionality as means of compelling ENP partners to implement the desired liberal reforms. The ENP seeks a comprehensive reshaping of the societies of the EU’s neighbours in line with the EU’s own liberal values. It represents an attempt by the EU to exercise the authority to determine the socio-political constitution of its neighbours. The ENP therefore clearly delineates a hierarchical relationship between the EU, the superordinate party, and the unstable, socio-politically backward and subordinated countries surrounding it. These states must assimilate liberal norms for their own good and that of the EU.

The very existence of the ENP is an acknowledgement by the EU that the countries along its external borders are a source of instability and possible security risks. These countries are not equal partners with the EU – rather, they pose a range of risks to European security. However, an important feature of the EU’s attempts to address these risks has been its adoption of a less coercive approach to risk management than has been the case in other interventions similarly designed to manage risk. The EU’s self-identification as a normative power means that the use of more forceful measures to achieve particular reforms in other countries is not a

108 While secondary to the argument presented here, Hyde-Price makes an important point in relation to the academic study of the concept of Normative Power Europe when he suggests that when the analyst views the object of study as embodying the core values that they themselves believe in, it becomes difficult to achieve any real critical distance, potentially leading to analyses skewed in favour of the concept. This is something that one should be aware of when approaching the literature on this topic. See Hyde-Price, ‘‘Normative’ Power Europe’, 218.
viable option (of course other constraints, such as European military capabilities or the legacy of European imperialism, are also important). Rather, the EU seeks to induce liberal transformations in its peripheries by exploiting its economic and political leverage, providing the benefits of closer integration only on the condition that the mandated reforms are fully implemented.

The promise of these political and economic benefits is precisely the reason why ENP states recognise the authority of the EU to determine their domestic constitution. The ENP partners therefore legitimate their subordinate status within new relations of hierarchy in return for these benefits. This is similar to what Lake refers to as a form of ‘social contract’ between super- and subordinate parties in a hierarchical relationship. Yet while the hierarchical relationship between the EU and ENP partners has not involved the deployment of large numbers of troops or EU officials in ENP states, it does share several characteristics with other recent interventions by Western societies. These include the identification of certain domestic characteristics as constituting environments of risk, the subsequent removal of the risky states’ right to sovereign equality and non-intervention in its internal affairs, and finally intervention designed to reshape the risky environment.

Importantly, the ambitious scope, extensive oversight and extraordinary intrusiveness of the ENP mean that it represents a level of interference in the domestic affairs of these states akin to that in the Asia-Pacific or Iraq. While the EU may have selected less coercive means to ensure that its demands are met, it has still claimed an extensive level of authority over its subordinated neighbours. The EU’s attempt to transform its neighbours into liberal democracies is also distinctly anti-pluralist in that it seeks to limit the range of values and regimes that states may

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legitimately adopt. The ENP effectively replaces the pluralist right of states to freely
determine their domestic constitution in a way that reflects their own societal values
with a positive obligation to adopt the required liberal reforms in order to qualify for
the benefits that the EU is offering. Partner countries are compelled to open almost
all facets of their societies to EU regulation and oversight.

In sum, the ENP represents new forms of hierarchy within international
society, based upon a liberal social logic of risk, which are corrosive of its pluralist
constitution. The EU’s neighbourhood policy provides a regional example of the
broader argument of this thesis, namely that attempts to manage risk via the
promotion of liberal values results in the emergence of a more hierarchical, anti-
pluralist international society. However, the ENP gives rise to a more consensual
form of hierarchy and inequality between the EU and ENP partners than is the case
in Iraq. This is precisely why the ENP provides an important case study of the
effects of risk upon international society. Together with the other case studies, the
case of the ENP shows that risk can give rise to dynamic forms of hierarchy within
international society, from the more consensual hierarchies discussed here to the
overt domination that the invasion of Iraq represented.

This reinforces the contention in chapters three and four that risk assessment,
identification and management are at their core subjective enterprises. This means
that risk management can take a variety of forms, leading to various types of
intervention and thus various types of hierarchy within international society.
Nevertheless, the core relationship between risk, pluralism and hierarchy remains
intact. The EU, like other Western societies, views pluralist diversity as a risk in
itself because it gives rise to illiberal, unstable environments within which potential
hazards can develop. Its response has been to attempt to intervene in its potentially
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unstable neighbours through the ENP. In the process, these attempts at risk management give rise to new and novel relations of hierarchy that are corrosive of international society’s pluralist constitution. As will be shown in the subsequent case studies, this is a pattern that has been played out on several occasions in the post-Cold War era.

Conclusion

Like other Western societies in the post-Cold War era, the EU and its members have become increasingly pre-occupied with the negative aspects of globalisation, particularly its ability to give effect to new forms of temporally and spatially de-bounded risks to their security. The 2004 enlargement of the Union exacerbated these concerns by bringing the EU closer to identified zones of risk within international society. These zones have been identified as risky and unstable by the EU primarily due to the lack of liberal institutions and notions of good governance in many of the countries situated within these zones. Aware that these territories could act as originators of temporally and spatially de-bounded risks, the EU has moved to export its liberal values as part of a situational prevention risk management technique aimed at reshaping the socio-political and economic environments of its neighbours.

The primary means for doing so has thus far been the ENP, a program ‘designed to help our direct neighbours to our east and south come closer to the EU…’ through a program of standardisation and homogenisation in the risky zones surrounding Europe. Its aim is to construct a new zone of peace, prosperity and

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stability stretching from the EU into its wider neighbourhood. Despite its pretensions towards cooperation, partnership and mutual ownership, the ENP actually involves the imposition of EU values of liberalism and democracy in return for the benefits associated with closer political and economic integration with the EU. Indeed, the idea that the ENP is designed to bring neighbours closer to the EU signifies that the ENP is not a normal partnership involving mutual exchange between equal partners. Rather, it is a mechanism designed solely for the purpose of exporting the EU’s liberal values as a technique of risk management.

The ENP thus denotes a hierarchical relationship between the EU and the backward, potentially risky states that are expected to assimilate liberal values. The ENP opens partner states to significant intrusion and interference across most areas of their societies, from the nature of the state’s governing institutions to environmental and energy policy or the commitment of the state to particular international instruments or treaties. The EU has thus demonstrated decidedly anti-pluralist tendencies in its relations with its neighbours, tendencies affirmed by its view that a ‘better’ international society would result through a liberal homogenisation of its constituent members. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the language of partnership and joint ownership has also been heavily employed by the Australian government as a means of legitimating its interventions in the Asia-Pacific. Like the ENP, the language of partnership in the context of Australia’s activities in the Asia-Pacific only serves to legitimate the hierarchical relations that emerge between the interveners and those territories subjected to socio-political environmental reshaping. Like the EU, in its attempts to manage risk, the Australian government has contributed to the ascendance of hierarchical trends within international society at the expense of its pluralist constitution.
Six

‘Cooperative Interventionism’: Australia and the Management of Risk in the Asia-Pacific

Introduction

Since most Pacific island territories achieved their independence in the 1960s and 1970s, Australia has been a major source of foreign aid for these new states. Pacific island nations such as Papua New Guinea (PNG), a former trust territory of Australia until 1975 and, more recently, East Timor and Solomon Islands have relied heavily upon Australia for aid funding and support. In turn, Australia has focused heavily on liberal notions of good governance as the prerequisite for economic development and social and political stability in the Pacific island states.¹ Until recently, Australia’s policy position on development aid was largely centred on a ‘hands-off’ approach – provide aid funding to these states and allow their respective governments to formulate and adopt their own development agendas.² The point was to avoid any suggestion that Australia was interfering in the internal affairs of these states or sought to establish itself as a neo-imperialist regional power.³

³ Ibid.
However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and 2002 Bali bombings, this approach has been cast aside in favour of a new interventionist approach that favours substantially increased Australian involvement in the internal affairs of these states in order to facilitate governance reforms and build institutional capacity. Recent interventions in PNG and Solomon Islands have demonstrated Australia’s newfound willingness to promote good governance in the Pacific islands by intervening directly in their economic, social and political affairs. The argument presented in this chapter is that a pre-occupation with spatially and temporally de-bounded security risks provides the impetus for Australia’s new interventionist approach to promoting good governance in the Asia-Pacific. As will be shown, since 9/11 the Australian government has become increasingly pre-occupied with globalised, transnational risks to its security. Further, it has determined that the primary method with which to manage such risks in its immediate region is to prevent state failure in several Pacific island states by reshaping their socio-political and economic environments via the promotion of liberal standards of good governance.

Australia has come to view itself as positioned on the doorstep of an ‘arc of instability’ or ‘Asia-Pacific zone of risk’. This zone of risk is one characterised by the presence of several small, fragile states beset by political and social instability and economic underdevelopment. These territories are perceived as potentially facing state failure. It is these conditions of state weakness and potential failure, conceived in terms of poor governance and weak state institutions, which pose an

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5 The term ‘arc of instability’ is one that has been popularised by the Australian government and the media. For more on the concept and Australia’s interactions with the region see Dennis Rumley, Vivian Louis Forbes and Christopher Griffin (eds), Australia’s Arc of Instability: The Political and Cultural Dynamics of Regional Security (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2006).
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environment conducive to the origination of globalised security risks. Terrorists or other transnational criminals such as drug smugglers might potentially exploit weak Asia-Pacific states, increasing the risk that they will use these territories as a launching pad for operations within, or attacks against, Australia.⁶ An important point here is that the spatial and temporal de-bounding of risk blurs the distinction between international and domestic space, meaning that securing the homeland requires intervention abroad. As the Australian government has concluded, instability in the immediate region makes it more difficult for Australia to secure itself against globalised risks.⁷

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section outlines Australia’s broad foreign policy approach since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, arguing that Australian foreign policy has become increasingly pre-occupied with de-bounded security risks. Following this, the chapter examines how this broader emphasis on security risks has impacted upon the Australian government’s policies regarding its neighbouring island states, with a particular focus on PNG and Solomon Islands. Here it suggests that the Australian government’s perception that weak or failing states leave Australia more exposed to de-bounded risks informs a new interventionist approach designed to promote good governance throughout the Asia-Pacific. It is the promotion of liberal notions of good governance as a way of reshaping the socio-political and economic environments of Pacific island states that constitutes Australia’s primary risk management technique.

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Next, the chapter discusses Australia’s attempts at risk management, focusing on the interventions in Solomon Islands and PNG. This section concentrates on the type of governance and institutional reforms Australia has sought to achieve in these countries and the methods that have been used to do so. Importantly, despite the consensual nature of Australia’s state-building endeavours (both PNG and Solomon Islands acceded to Australian involvement in their internal affairs) and their description as ‘cooperative interventions’ or partnerships, what these interventions have essentially sought to do is subject Pacific island states to Australian-led socio-political regulation as a way of managing risk.\(^8\) The Australian government sets the parameters of what constitutes good governance and sufficient institutional capacity, often with only minimal involvement of the local officials or populations in the affected states.

This section concludes with a consideration of the implications of Australia’s attempts at state-building in PNG and Solomon Islands for international society. Australian attempts at risk management within the Asia-Pacific have led to the emergence of new relations of hierarchy in the region. Like the hierarchies that result from the EU’s ENP, underpinning new hierarchical relationships in the Asia-Pacific is a liberal social logic of risk which constitutes illiberal or fragile states as potentially dangerous sites of risk fomentation and origination. It also legitimates the Australian government’s claim to have the authority to intervene in these risky states in order to protect Australia’s security. Australia has claimed the right, as a developed and benevolent regional power, to dictate its own liberal conceptions of good governance as the pre-requisite that weak or failing states must meet to achieve development and stability.

Australia and the Management of Risk in the Asia-Pacific

Australia’s Foreign Policy Outlook Post-9/11: Increased Interventionism in the Asia-Pacific

The September 11 terrorist attacks were a watershed moment for international society, one that will be sure to have lasting and significant impacts on international politics and inter-state relations. In Australia, 9/11, along with the October 2002 Bali bombings in which 88 Australians lost their lives, represented a fundamental shift in Australian views of the wider international society. This was reflected not only in Australia’s broad foreign policy stance, but also in terms of its approach to the immediate region. As Wesley argues, 9/11 produced a shock within the Australian government that led to the emergence of what he terms a new ‘foreign policy logic’.9 Former Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer likewise suggests that the world changed fundamentally after 9/11 and the Bali bombings.10

An important component of Australia’s foreign policy shift in the wake of the 9/11 attacks has involved the Australian government’s increasing awareness of, and concern with, a range of temporally and spatially de-bounded security risks and the uncertain strategic environment to which they give rise.

The risks associated with global terrorism and WMD proliferation (and their prevention) has become the defining feature of Australian foreign policy.11 As Downer argues, ‘Australia’s security is at risk from the threat of international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction’.12 Downer later contended during a speech to the UN General Assembly that ‘Where once it was possible to

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11 This includes the risk that terrorists might acquire WMD. See Department of Defence, Defence Update 2007, 9.
12 Downer, ‘Security in an Unstable World’.
view terrorism as the lamentable legacy of a few unsafe regions, today almost no country has been left untouched’. These shifts and new focuses in foreign policy have not been unique to Australia. They are also reflective of broader changes in the international security environment. Following 9/11, most Western societies, particularly the US and the UK, have focused heavily on the dangers posed to their security interests by spatially and temporally de-bounded risks.

Australia’s new foreign policy outlook was clearly articulated in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (DFAT) 2003 White Paper. This document describes Australia as part of an uncertain and dangerous world, one in which globalisation has increased the vulnerability of Australia and other states to transnational risks. Downer has also highlighted the uncertainty and unpredictability inherent in the contemporary international environment that Australia must navigate. Indeed, it is Australia’s increased concern with this uncertainty and unpredictability that is one of the more important features of its post-September 11 foreign policy approach. It gives rise to a more cautious and apprehensive international outlook, one in which the Australian government has become increasingly pre-occupied with de-bounded risks to Australia’s national security.

This increased apprehensiveness is particularly evident in the Australian government’s views regarding globalisation. Prior to 9/11, globalisation was viewed rather positively; Downer continually extolled the virtues of open markets, free trade

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14 See Kabutaulaka, ‘Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI Intervention’.
15 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest, ix.
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and technological advances in communications, transport and production. Further, in the 2000 Department of Defence White Paper, globalisation is also regarded in largely positive terms. It is seen as bringing a number of security benefits to Australia, predominantly because it increases the stake that governments have in a stable international order. Yet by the 2003 DFAT White Paper, this largely positive view had dissipated, replaced with a more cautious and negative view of globalisation and its effects. In the DFAT White Paper, globalisation is regarded as providing several benefits, but also a range of challenges to state institutions and governance.

The 2005 Defence Update, a supplement to the Defence White Paper, likewise considers the negative security implications of globalisation. It argues that

While the international system is never static, globalisation is accelerating the movement of ideas and technologies. It has increased the interdependency between countries and made borders more porous. It has increased the potency of the terrorist threat, and the potential danger of WMD proliferation. Failing states are a significant concern because the insecurity they face can easily move beyond their borders.

It is precisely due to its potential to give rise to spatially de-bounded risks such as terrorism that globalisation has come to be viewed in a more uneasy manner by the Australian government. One of the crucial points that Australian government officials have made regarding globalisation’s security implications is the inability of states to insulate themselves from globalisation’s effects, both good and bad.

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19 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest, ix.
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As Alexander Downer commented, ‘In a globalised world, Australia’s security interests are increasingly affected by lawlessness and disorder in other states’. The demarcation between internal and external security has evaporated in the face of globalised, spatially de-bounded risks. Internal disorder in states across the globe can have negative consequences for Australia’s security. Such a view is expressed in DFAT’s 2003 White Paper:

Changes in the international security environment, too, have added to the blurring between domestic and international issues. The faster and freer movement of people and goods has increased the vulnerability of Australia and other countries to non-traditional security threats, including terrorism, organised crime, environmental degradation and disease.

The point that Downer and the White Paper allude to in these statements is that geographical location no longer offers Australia the protection it once did. This is a view explicitly articulated in the 2003 Defence Update, which suggests that Paradoxically however, in some other important ways, certainty and predictability have decreased because the strategic advantage offered by our geography does not protect Australia against rogue states armed with WMD and long-range ballistic missiles. Nor does it protect Australia from the scourge of terrorism.

An important point made in the above comment is that the advent of spatially de-bounded risks associated with globalisation produces higher levels of uncertainty and unpredictability that the Australian government must deal with in the contemporary security environment. As a result of the uncertain and unpredictable

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22 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest, 124.
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nature of new global risks, attention has fallen on more readily identifiable regions of disorder, or zones of risk, where dangers can potentially grow.

Particular attention in this regard has been paid to the issue of state fragility and failure. As the 2003 White Paper suggests ‘Some regions of disorder have become more volatile, more of a threat to global order and thus more relevant to Australia’s security interests’. Such a view was reiterated in both the 2005 and 2007 Defence Updates. The 2005 Update suggests that

Globalisation can add to the potential fallout from failing states in those situations where economic development, governance and the rule of law break down. Failing states may provide the opportunity for recruiting, training and deploying terrorists. A vacuum of governance and law and order creates an environment within which these groups can flourish. Due to the easy movement of people and goods, the consequences arising from failing states are often transported beyond their borders.

The 2007 Update likewise concludes that

Our national interests as a democratic, trading and globally engaged country are threatened by the rise of terrorism and by instability in areas such as the Middle East. In a globalised world, ignoring problems further afield only invites these threats to come closer to Australia...a more integrated world and ongoing technological and demographic change magnifies the range and number of potential threats and the strategic effect of events, including some distant ones, on Australia’s security.

Again, the point here is that zones of risk within international society cannot be ignored – to do so would only allow potential dangers to develop. Hence, the

24 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest, 18.
26 Department of Defence, Defence Update 2007, 9.
problems that characterise these zones of risk become global problems that can adversely affect Australian, and Western, security interests.

Therefore, the Australian government has placed emphasis, particularly within the immediate Asia-Pacific region, on managing these risks by reshaping the socio-political and economic environments of weak states in an attempt to prevent state failure. A central part of this focus on reshaping risky environments has been the importance that the Australian government has attached to promoting liberal values and good governance.\textsuperscript{27} Roberts et al make a significant point in this regard:

Post 9/11, war on terror geopolitical constructions of regions as potential sites for fomenting terrorism become part of the reason why the governance agenda in the Pacific receives support from foreign policy interests in relatively powerful countries such as the US and Australia...We could say that in the present geopolitical era there is an intensification in the application of the security–governance nexus in certain regions or zones, including the Pacific.\textsuperscript{28}

This focus on good governance is not new – good governance is a concept that has been a key part of development policy since the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{29} Indeed, there has been a strong focus on governance as the panacea to development problems in the Pacific since the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{30} However, good governance is a concept that is

\textsuperscript{27} The idea of re-organising and re-configuring state institutions and processes of governance bears some similarity to Power’s arguments regarding contemporary organisational responses to risk, a key element of which has been the rise of organisational internal control systems that involve organisation or system-wide regulatory mechanisms and processes designed to manage risk. It is possible to view good governance as a form of internal control system of the state, providing regulatory frameworks and processes that manage a range of possible social, political, economic and security risks. See Power, \textit{The Risk Management of Everything}, 24-8 and Michael Power, \textit{Organized Uncertainty: Designing a World of Risk Management} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 34-65.


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generally ill-defined and open to competing interpretations and definitions.\textsuperscript{31} As both Roberts et al and Weiss note, governance is a slippery and malleable concept that can be subject to definitional adjustment.\textsuperscript{32} As Roberts et al argue, the result is that ‘good governance’, as it has come to be defined in the post-9/11 era, is increasingly enmeshed with Western security concerns.\textsuperscript{33} So while the focus on governance as the solution to development problems in non-Western territories is not new, the emphasis on governance as a means to achieving security for the West against globalised risks is. In short, governance has become recast in the post-9/11 period as a mode of risk management. Good governance is simultaneously the means for achieving sustainable development and managing de-bounded risks.\textsuperscript{34}

In this uncertain and dangerous world the Australian government has emphasised the promotion of good governance as the necessary response to the hazards posed by state weakness or failure.\textsuperscript{35} Importantly, state weakness or fragility has been defined precisely in terms of weak institutions lacking sufficient capacity and poor governance. As the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), Australia’s main aid agency, suggests, it is the lack of sustainable institutions or good governance that creates state weakness and hence the risky environment.\textsuperscript{36} However, it is important to note that what constitutes ‘good’ governance, as opposed to poor governance, is not merely an apolitical and technical


\textsuperscript{32} See Roberts et al, ‘Good Governance in the Pacific?’ and Weiss, ‘Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance’.


\textsuperscript{34} The broader nexus between the discourses of security and development is one that has recently received increasing scholarly attention. See Mark Duffield, \textit{Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security} (London: Zed Books, 2001).

\textsuperscript{35} As Hameiri notes, the post-Cold War era has witnessed high levels of growth in the interest of policy makers and scholars with the issue of state failure. See Shahar Hameiri, ‘Failed States or a Failed Paradigm? State Capacity and the Limits of Institutionalism’, \textit{Journal of International Relations and Development} 10, no. 2 (2007): 122.

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affair, but rather is distinctly informed by Australia’s liberal values. Australia’s support for the global promotion of liberal values is well captured by Downer:

We believe that the liberal democratic model provides the best mechanism for addressing political, economic and social problems – globally, as well as locally. We believe that governments and societies which tend towards liberal democracy are better at creating wealth, alleviating poverty, respecting human rights, fostering creativity and bringing stability to the world...Liberal democracy is the soundest basis for peace and prosperity. It's the basis for dynamism and innovation. It's in Australia's national interest for democracy to spread. And so it's a core value of our foreign policy.37

Australia’s explicit support for liberal values and democratic forms of government defines the particular conception of good governance that it seeks to promote. As AusAID suggests, political principles associated with good governance include a representative and accountable government, a pluralistic society with freedom of expression and the primacy of the rule of law.38 Such principles represent the distinctive values that are associated with liberal political ideology and a liberal democratic form of government. As Fukuyama argues, good governance and liberal democracy are functionally linked as the very definition of what constitutes ‘good’ governance or ‘good’ state institutions draws heavily on notions of accountability, transparency and individual freedoms.39 However, this is not to say that the mere existence of these liberal institutions is sufficient in itself. Rather, these institutions must have the capacity to operate effectively and according to sound processes. As

39 Fukuyama further claims that political system design is integral to the efficacy of institutions, further highlighting the linkage between the particular ideologies and values that inform the design of political systems and notions of good governance. See Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004): 26-7.
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Downer argues, ‘Of course, creating and sustaining free societies requires more than just a tradition of regular elections and economic liberalisation. Good governance and effective institutions are essential building-blocks of free societies’.40

Again, while this emphasis on good governance pre-dates the 9/11 attacks and Bali bombings, it is an emphasis that has been employed more forcefully by the Australian government (and Western societies in general) since 2001.41 Through the promotion of good governance in zones of risk, dangerous environments can be reshaped and Australia’s security and prosperity can be enhanced. As the DFAT White Paper argues

Good governance – which includes the rule of law, respect for human rights and development of sustainable policies and institutions – is a basic condition for security and prosperity in all countries. The improvement of governance around the world can help create an environment that contributes to the security and prosperity of Australia…One challenge that good governance imposes on Australian foreign policy is the advancement of human dignity, justice and freedom.42

Unsurprisingly, this is a view that Downer has echoed, and one that he consistently held to during his tenure as Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs. In 2007 he suggested that

Because when we face threats like transnational crime and terrorism, strong nation states are more important than ever. Only effective and robust states – I would argue democratic and free liberal states – are equipped to meet the range of challenges we face, and survive and thrive...To deal with global problems, we

40 Downer, ‘40 Years of Australian Foreign Policy’.
42 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest, xviii (italics mine).
need strong states. We need states that are effectively run. We need states with
institutions that are accountable to their citizens.43

As a result of Australia’s increased concern with fostering good governance as a
mechanism through which to manage perceived risks to its security, the methods
through which the Australian government has sought to promote good governance
have changed.

These changes are particularly evident with regard to Australia’s attempts to
foster development in the Pacific island states. The broad shift in Australia’s foreign
policy outlook was one that had significant implications for Australian policy
regarding neighbouring fragile states in the immediate region. As noted in the
introduction, since attaining their independence, most of the Pacific Island states
have suffered from instability, disorder and underdevelopment. Until 9/11 and the
Bali bombings, the popular view in Australia regarding the development of the
Pacific island states was, as Alexander Downer suggests, that these new states
should be left alone to enjoy their independence.44 Australia’s role was to provide
external aid and support, not to involve itself in the internal affairs of these states.
This view has changed as 9/11 and the Bali bombings caused a rethink in Australian
policy towards the Asia-Pacific, one that would result in a shift from a ‘hands-off’ to
a ‘hands-on’ approach in weak states in the region.45

As Fry and Kabutaulaka argue, what is distinctive about this new approach is
the linking of security objectives to the development agenda and Australia’s
increased readiness to intervene in the affairs of its neighbours.46 This hands-on

43 Downer, ‘Australian Foreign Policy Today and Tomorrow’.
44 Alexander Downer, quoted in Yaroslav Trofimov, ‘Australia Takes Policeman’s Role in Strife-
21720516864888693.html?mod=todays_us_page_one#articleTabs%3Darticle (accessed 31 July
2007).
46 Ibid., 16.
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approach has involved a newly assertive Australia that has undertaken ‘an ambitious attempt at regionwide social engineering...’ State weakness in the Pacific has acquired a new strategic significance, primarily due to the perception that Australia now sits on the cusp of an ‘Arc of Instability’, a risky environment that could be exploited by terrorists or transnational criminals. The issue of state fragility and failure has thus come to the fore in Australian policy regarding the Pacific. The view within the Australian government appears to be that if it is left unchecked, this Asia-Pacific zone of instability in Australia’s backyard could leave it exposed to the risks associated with terrorism or transnational criminal operations.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s (ASPI) report on Solomon Islands summarises the Australian government’s thinking well:

In today’s globalised world, the failure of Solomon Islands as a modern nation state would not simply mean that its people would revert to the Pacific Island idyll of subsistence prosperity among the palm trees...Without an effective government upholding the rule of law and controlling its borders, Solomon Islands risks becoming – and has to some extent already become – a petri dish in which transnational and non-state security threats can develop and breed.

The issue here is that fragile or failing island states such as Solomon Islands or PNG constitute environments within which de-bounded risks can develop and foment. As Dinnen et al argue: ‘Post 9/11, the focus was on the security risks presented to Australia by the region’s ‘weak’ and ‘failing’ states. These, in turn, were viewed as potential havens for transnational crime and terrorism’.

47 Ibid., 1.
49 Wainwright, Our Failing Neighbour, 13.
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Hameiri likewise makes an argument very similar to that presented here, suggesting that Australia’s aid approach in the Pacific has been securitised and that the nature of this securitisation is reflective of a risk management approach that seeks to prevent the spill-over of transnational risks by building institutional capacity in weak Pacific states.\textsuperscript{51} Thus, it is seen as no longer viable to simply sit back and provide aid to weak states in the Pacific in the hope that they will use it wisely to develop capable institutions and undertake governance reforms. The new dangers faced by Australia provide a mandate for a more proactive, preventive approach to promoting good governance in a bid to avoid state failure in the region, one in which Australia becomes the ‘regional sheriff’, policing and regulating Pacific island states as a form of risk management.\textsuperscript{52}

These changes to the Australian approach towards promoting good governance are neatly captured by the Australian government’s back-flip on the issue of intervening in Solomon Islands. Despite continuing conflict and instability in the Solomon Islands beginning in 1998, the Australian government, prior to 2003, consistently rejected pleas from the Solomon Islands government for Australian assistance to curb the violence and halt the conflict. The Australian government persistently stuck to its hands-off, non-interventionist approach to the Asia-Pacific, even in the face of the kidnapping of Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’ală by militants in 2000.\textsuperscript{53} However, by 2003 this had all changed. By this stage, the Solomon Islands state had all but collapsed, to the increasing concern of the


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Australian government. However, this concern with the security implications of the failure of the Solomon Islands state, which was highly probable, was not limited to the Australian government.

Wainwright’s ASPI report on Solomon Islands argued in favour of Australian intervention, outlining Australia’s security interests that were at stake should Solomon Islands descend into complete state collapse. The result was that in June 2003, the Howard government decided to intervene in Solomon Islands to re-establish law and order and build good governance and capable state institutions. Then-Prime Minister John Howard’s justification of the decision to intervene, provided in a ministerial statement to Parliament, was instructive regarding the risk management rationale underlying the intervention:

A failed state would not only devastate the lives of the peoples of the Solomons but could also pose a significant security risk for the whole region. Failed states can all too easily become safe-havens for transnational criminals and even terrorists. Poor governance and endemic corruption provide the conditions that support criminal activities. If Australia wants security, we need to do all that we can to ensure that our region, our neighbourhood, is stable – that governance is strong and the rule of law is just.

The two main elements of Australia’s international outlook since 9/11, a preoccupation with de-bounded risks and the focus on the promotion of good governance within weak states as a means of managing such risks, are evident in this statement. As Howard suggests, failed states provide the conditions within which security risks can flourish. Hence, reshaping the socio-political and economic

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54 Wainwright, Our Failing Neighbour, 39-52.
environment of fragile states becomes a mechanism of risk management. Importantly, the above also clearly suggests that the primary motive or rationale for the intervention was not to improve the lives of Solomon Islanders. If it was, the intervention would have occurred earlier than 2003. Rather, the intervention occurred in 2003 because after 9/11 and the Bali bombings, the Australian government became increasingly anxious over the possible risks to its national security posed by failed states in the region.

However, at the time of the intervention, there was no substantial evidence of a direct threat to Australian security by terrorists or criminals operating out of Solomon Islands, nor was there any credible evidence to suggest that the presence of terrorists or transnational criminal groups within Solomon Islands was an imminent possibility. As Nick Warner, former Special Coordinator of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), suggested ‘And while there was no evidence that transnational criminals were targeting Solomon Islands, there was no point waiting for this to happen’. Rather, the security concerns of the Australian government were defined with reference to the future possibility that if left unchecked, state failure in the Solomon Islands could leave Australia vulnerable to temporally and spatially de-bounded risks at some future point in time. There was thus a distinctive element of precaution in Australia’s decision to intervene in Solomon Islands and later PNG. Despite the lack of any firm evidence that terrorists, transnational criminals or any other form of de-bounded security risk might arise out

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of the situation in either of these countries, the Australian government still justified its interventions with reference to Australian security interests.

The next section examines Australia’s interventions in Solomon Islands and PNG, considering the methods that the Australian government has employed in both countries in order to facilitate the desired governance reforms. The point of these reforms is to subject Solomon Islands and PNG to socio-political and economic regulation in order to control their environmental conditions and manage risk. Despite the assertions that RAMSI or the Enhanced Cooperation Package (ECP) in PNG are representative of a partnership between Australia and the affected state, the populations of the territories have little control over the reforms being carried out. Negotiation, compromise and most importantly local input are largely taken out of the equation. Rather than a partnership, RAMSI and the ECP are representative of new hierarchies in the Asia-Pacific, involving the Australian government’s claim to have the authority to construct and reform liberal institutions in Pacific Island states as a means of managing risk.

**Promoting Good Governance: Liberal Reform in PNG and Solomon Islands**

Since independence, both the Solomon Islands and PNG have suffered from state weakness and developmental problems, yet the concern that the Australian government has expressed regarding the possibility of state failure in these territories is itself rather new. In Solomon Islands, continuing civil conflict and widespread disorder were ignored for a number of years until 2003. Australia’s interventionist activities in PNG are also of comparatively recent origin.\(^{58}\) The remainder of this section focuses on the Australian government’s state-building efforts in Solomon

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Islands and PNG. It firstly examines RAMSI before considering the ECP in PNG. As will be shown, the primary purpose of these interventions is to achieve security for Australia by subjecting the affected territories to environmental reshaping via socio-political and economic regulation.

Briefly, it is important to outline the conditions that led to the deployment of RAMSI in Solomon Islands in July 2003. The problems in Solomon Islands began in 1998 when Guadalcanalese militants, members of the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM), began launching low-level skirmishes against settlers from the neighbouring island of Malaita on Guadalcanal.59 The militants were aggrieved over the presence of these settlers, who arrived on Guadalcanal in the preceding decades. However, despite the appearance of the conflict as a product of ethnic tensions between the two groups, Hameiri and Dinnen et al have noted that underpinning these tensions were fundamental economic and developmental issues associated with the changes brought about by globalisation (particularly uneven levels of development throughout Solomon Islands), state corruption and demographic factors.60

The Malaitans retaliated against the Guadalcanalese militants, forming the Malatian Eagle Front (MEF). It was MEF members who kidnapped Prime Minister Ulufa’alau in 2000. Following this coup, lawlessness and disorder prevailed in Solomon Islands. In response, Australia and New Zealand brokered the Townsville Peace Agreement, which was signed in October 2000. This agreement provided for the disarmament and dissolution of the militias.61 While it significantly reduced open

61 See ‘Townsville Peace Agreement: An Agreement for the cessation of hostilities between the Malaita Eagle Force and the Isatabu Freedom Movement and for the restoration of peace and ethnic
conflict between the militant groups, the Townsville Agreement failed to stop high levels of criminal activity – violence, looting and extortion were all common between 2000 and the beginning of RAMSI in 2003. Further, the economy plummeted as a result of the conflict and disorder (GDP declined by 14% in 1999 and 9% in 2000), and Solomon Islands faced a continuously deteriorating security environment coupled with economic collapse. It became clear by 2003 that the Solomon Islands government did not possess the capacity to halt the decline. This led to a formal request from the Solomon Islands government for a regional intervention in the country.

Despite Alexander Downer’s dismissal of intervening in Solomon Islands as late as January 2003, the Howard government took the decision in June 2003 to lead a regional intervention in Solomon Islands. Soon thereafter, on 30 June, a meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum in Sydney ratified Australia’s proposal for the intervention. A crucial aspect of Australia’s decision to intervene, one that has informed subsequent justifications for RAMSI, is the notion of a Solomon Islands state that was at significant risk of failure, one that the Australian government had a vested interest in managing in order to avoid further risks to Australia’s own security. Importantly, this means that RAMSI was in effect a preventive action, aimed at ensuring that Solomon Islands did not eventually descend into state failure. As Barbara notes:

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63 Dinnen, Lending a Fist?, 4.
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‘The Australian Government justified intervention on the grounds that a failed state in the region would become a haven for transnational security threats (such as terrorism and organized crime) and that action was required to prevent Solomon Islands from collapsing’. 67

This means that the decision to intervene was commensurate with the anticipatory outlook that one would normally associate with risk management activities. Further, it is also important to note that the prevailing failed states discourse, in which state failure is seen as a result of poor governance and weak institutional capacity, has largely informed Australia’s assessment of the situation in the Solomon Islands. The root causes of the dysfunctional Solomon Islands state have been identified as poor governance, insufficiently capable institutions and the resilience of existing socio-political structures. 68 Even before the Australian government had moved to intervene in Solomon Islands, Wainwright had defined the territory as a failing state, arguing that Solomon Islands had largely ceased to function as a capable sovereign state and that a continuance of Australia’s previous hands-off approach would only serve to facilitate state failure. 69

RAMSI was therefore designed from the outset as a comprehensive state-building exercise. Once RAMSI had achieved its immediate objective of halting violence and disorder in the country, which it successfully did shortly after its deployment on 24 July 2003, RAMSI officials quickly set to work on the main task of reforming state institutions and improving governance. Stabilising the security situation was always intended as a prelude to RAMSI’s state-building efforts. 70 A large part of RAMSI’s state-building focus has been capacity building, with

68 Wainwright, Our Failing Neighbour, 18.
69 Ibid., 6-7.
70 Warner, ‘Operation Helpem Fren’.
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institutions in three key pillars, law and justice, economic governance and the machinery of government, targeted for capacity building programs.\textsuperscript{71} As this suggests, RAMSI is a complex and multi-faceted operation, responsible for reforming several key institutions of the Solomon Islands state.

In the law and justice pillar, RAMSI has undertaken a comprehensive rebuilding of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIP). This has involved the dismissal of a sizeable number of officers (including 160 former officers who have been arrested for various offences) and the formation of the Solomon Islands Police Force Capacity Development Management Team, designed to assess and manage capability gaps in the RSIP.\textsuperscript{72} Economic governance reforms have included stabilisation of the government budget and improvement of government revenue collection, building the capacity of the Treasury and Ministry of Finance and a programme of taxation reform, amongst other initiatives. RAMSI’s machinery of government pillar is involved in strengthening many parts of the Solomon Islands government and bureaucracy. This has involved significant work conducted to strengthen the capabilities of key accountability institutions such as the Ombudsman and the office of the Auditor-General.\textsuperscript{73} Perhaps the most notable aspect of RAMSI’s work is the wide scope and comprehensiveness of its mandate.

RAMSI is involved in regulating most areas of the Solomon Islands state, reforming legal, economic, political and social institutions. Its mandate, and indeed its practice since deployment, has been to regulate and reshape the socio-political environment of Solomon Islands by subjecting key areas of the Solomon Islands government to its capacity building programs. Part of RAMSI’s approach to capacity


\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 22.
building has been to embed personnel in ‘line positions’ within key areas of the Solomon Islands government. This has involved RAMSI personnel conducting much of the work within these areas, even to the extent of an Australian Federal Police (AFP) Officer being named as the Commissioner of the RSIP.\(^\text{74}\) Other notable RAMSI appointments within the Solomon Islands government include the Solicitor-General, Deputy Legal Draftsperson and Acting Auditor-General.\(^\text{75}\) The effect of this has been to subject control of key institutions of the Solomon Islands government to RAMSI officials, enabling them to exercise direct control over the governance reforms and institutional capacity building that are supposedly taking place in ‘partnership’ with the Solomon Islands government.

In the Ministry of Finance, for example, RAMSI officials have been extensively involved in improving government finances and financial transactions.\(^\text{76}\) This work has included challenging and amending appropriation bills passed by the Solomon Islands parliament.\(^\text{77}\) This is a highly significant exercise of authority by foreign officials in an ostensibly sovereign state. Also of note here are the immunity provisions of the *Facilitation of International Assistance Act (FIAA)*, passed by the Solomon Islands parliament in 2003. This Act legalises RAMSI’s presence in Solomon Islands and protects its personnel from any form of legal proceeding in the country.\(^\text{78}\) This means that despite RAMSI’s significant influence and, in some

cases, direct control of key government institutions in Solomon Islands, the Solomon Islands government and therefore its people are unable to hold RAMSI personnel to account for their actions.

While the Solomon Islands government supposedly retains its sovereignty and its responsibilities for governing its territory, in effect RAMSI exercises extensive influence and control over several key institutions without any established mechanism of accountability between RAMSI and the Solomon Islands people. Rather, RAMSI personnel are predominantly accountable to interdepartmental committees within the Australian government (involving key departments and agencies such as the AFP, Treasury and DFAT) who make decisions and formulate policy with little to no Solomon Islands involvement.79 Such control is therefore troubling from a democratic standpoint as it means that RAMSI officials can undertake significant action without the possibility of being held to account by the Solomon Islands people. Indeed, this feature of RAMSI’s operation stands in stark contrast to the liberal democratic values that RAMSI seeks to impart via its institutional and governance reforms.

An important point here is that RAMSI’s state-building initiatives, like those that have taken place in other regions, are based on very particular ideas of what a strong and effective state should look like. As Morgan and McLeod suggest ‘However, idealised concepts of state structure and functioning, including assumptions about ideal relationships between individuals, civil society and particular state institutions, are central to statebuilding practices’.80 In the case of RAMSI, good governance and institutional capacity are defined in largely liberal


80 Morgan and McLeod, ‘Have We Failed Our Neighbour?’, 413.
terms. The insistence on applying external notions of liberal good governance is of course reflective of the idea that Western notions of liberalism, democracy and good governance are universally applicable and represent a suite of values, institutions and processes that can be applied anywhere. Part of the reasoning behind this stems from ideological prescriptions that maintain the universality of Western values of liberty and democracy.\(^{81}\)

Despite the tendency of RAMSI to view its work in Solomon Islands in terms of technocratic and apolitical notions of ‘capacity building’, the very institutional capabilities and processes that it seeks to build are reflective of its broader commitment to ensuring a well-functioning, liberal democratic Solomon Islands government. This is so despite the fact that the means RAMSI uses to do so stand in tension with the liberal values that it seeks to promote. Morgan and McLeod suggest that through RAMSI’s activities in Solomon Islands ‘Australia is attempting to build a modern nation-state through state-building activities aimed at replacing local modes of politicking with political stability based on liberal democratic values and practices’.\(^{82}\) Therefore, while RAMSI may be predominantly concerned with ‘technical’ issues in Solomon Islands, its solutions to these issues are based upon political and ideological prescriptions of what constitutes a strong and effective state.

As noted, Alexander Downer has argued that only liberal democracies constitute effective states and AusAID’s definition of good governance is explicitly reflective of liberal values.\(^{83}\) To suggest then that RAMSI’s mission in Solomon

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\(^{81}\) It should be noted however that issues relating to the appropriateness of external institutions and liberal forms of governance in weak states have been discussed by several commentators on state-building. See Sinclair Dinnen, ‘Dilemmas of Intervention and the Building of State and Nation’, in *Politics and State Building in Solomon Islands*, edited by Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth (Canberra: ANU E Press/Asia Pacific Press, 2008): 9.

\(^{82}\) Morgan and McLeod, ‘Have We Failed Our Neighbour?’, 417.

\(^{83}\) See Downer, ‘40 Years of Australian Foreign Policy’ and AusAID, *Good Governance: Guiding Principles for Implementation*. 

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Islands, or state-building in general for that matter, is merely a case of technocratic, administrative reform divorced from political or ideological considerations is incorrect. Such considerations are integral to RAMSI’s state-building project as liberal values inform the reforms undertaken in Solomon Islands. One of the criticisms of RAMSI is that its focus on technocratic notions of institutional capacity and good governance has caused it to neglect the social and political factors that have contributed to the problems in Solomon Islands. However, such a criticism overlooks the fact that the promotion of good governance and building of institutional capacity, despite their supposedly technocratic nature, are underpinned by liberal values and ideology and are intended to have very real social and political effects.

The point of RAMSI’s mission is to reshape the social and political structures that caused state fragility in Solomon Islands, transforming the country into a stable liberal democracy as a means to managing risk. Similarly, Hameiri contends that reconstituting state-society relations in the Solomon Islands is precisely the point of RAMSI’s capacity building programs. Whether this is congruent with existing social practices in Solomon Islands is not considered. Rather, what is important is that RAMSI’s programs attempt to build sustainable institutions practicing Western notions of liberal good governance. It is notable that while the Australian government and RAMSI officials continually speak of improving the lives of Solomon Islanders in partnership with the local population, the prescriptions for such an improvement are based entirely on Australia’s liberal notions of good governance.

84 As Huffer argues, one of the problems with the governance agenda in the Pacific and elsewhere is its heavy reliance on Western thought and its accompanying principles of economic and political liberalism. See Huffer, ‘Governance, Corruption and Ethics in the Pacific’, 119.
85 Kabutaulaka, for example, argues that there are important bases of political power beyond the Solomon Islands state that RAMSI’s focus on good governance and institutional capacity effectively ignores. See Kabutaulaka, ‘Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI Intervention’, 298-9.
86 Hameiri, ‘State Building or Crisis Management?’, 42.
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and the good life. Rarely are we told how the reforms undertaken in Solomon Islands relate to, and affect, existing social and political relationships.

Importantly, the above features of RAMSI’s intervention in Solomon Islands, namely the sometimes direct and always unaccountable control of state institutions by RAMSI personnel and the attempt to reconstitute existing social and political structures in accordance with liberal values and notions of good governance, belies the often-used description of RAMSI as a ‘cooperative intervention’. Rather, the talk of a ‘partnership’ between Solomon Islands and RAMSI serves to legitimate the new relations of hierarchy between Solomon Islands and Australia (as the main contributor to RAMSI) to which RAMSI’s mission gives rise. Of course it is true that unlike other post-Cold War interventions, notably those in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, RAMSI represents an intervention that was not only consented to, but was actually requested by the affected state. Indeed, RAMSI’s continued operation is dependent upon its mandate from the Solomon Islands government.

However, the fact that RAMSI needs the support of the Solomon Islands government in order to continue its work in the country does not necessarily mean that it operates in partnership with the Solomon Islands people. While this support serves to legitimate RAMSI’s presence, the hierarchical nature of the relationship between Solomon Islands and Australia is revealed by the distinct lack of local participation in RAMSI’s work. Indeed, the participation of local officials or the local population is deemed risky in itself, potentially leading to unwelcome interference in attempts to promote liberal good governance by those that are deemed to lack the capacity to effectively operate within liberal institutions and governance processes (precisely the reason why interventions such as RAMSI occur in the first

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87 For example, see RAMSI’s website, http://www.ramsi.org/.
88 Solomon Islands National Parliament, Facilitation of International Assistance Act, s23(1).
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place). We therefore might characterise RAMSI as practicing a ‘top-down’ form of state-building, legitimated by the perceived urgency of building a stable liberal democratic state in Solomon Islands as a mechanism of risk management.89

The perceived dangers inherent in any deviance from RAMSI’s prescribed notions of institutional capacity and good governance militate against any true partnership between RAMSI and the government and people of Solomon Islands. This underscores the contradiction that exists between attempting to promote liberal values and good governance via interventionist and regulatory mechanisms of risk management that often involve distinctly illiberal trends and practices. Hence, RAMSI should not be viewed as a partnership between Australian state-builders who consult and collaborate with local officials and the local populace in an attempt to promote particular conceptions of good governance and institutional capacity that are modified in light of existing socio-political structures and relationships. Rather, RAMSI must be understood as a regulatory exercise, involving the subordination of Solomon Islands in a hierarchical authority relationship with Australia.

Again, part of RAMSI’s operation has involved placing its officials in line positions within the Solomon Islands government, including senior positions. This is reflective of the fact that RAMSI is essentially involved in a regulatory exercise. Despite the talk of capacity building, placing RAMSI officials within important positions in different areas of the Solomon Islands government does little to build the capacity of the local public servants who are eventually supposed to assume these roles for themselves. This is suggestive of a hierarchical relationship between the

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external intervener who ‘knows best’ (Australia) taking control of the poorly functioning institutions of the affected state that must be subjected to regulation and reform. In short, as Hameiri notes, RAMSI’s capacity building programmes denote a power relationship, not a partnership.  

Therefore, RAMSI’s state-building initiatives in Solomon Islands amount to a new form of interventionist socio-political regulation as Australia seeks to reshape the environment in Solomon Islands so as to prevent state failure and the possible materialisation of spatially and temporally de-bounded risks. However, Solomon Islands is not the only Pacific island state to be subject to Australia’s claim to hold the authority to determine the domestic constitution of states in the Asia-Pacific region. PNG, for example, has also been exposed to Australian socio-political regulation through the implementation of interventionist capacity building programmes. Australian development assistance in PNG has been ongoing since the country achieved its independence from Australia in 1975. However, despite the influx of Australian aid, which was largely provided with little to no conditions after independence, PNG has continued to suffer from underdevelopment and state weakness.

This has resulted in a deteriorating law and order situation, economic stagnation and poor delivery of government services. Like Australia’s development policy shift in Solomon Islands, its hands-off approach in PNG has significantly altered since 9/11 and the 2002 Bali Bombings, again reflecting, in part, Australia’s concern with the risks posed by failing states on its doorstep. Also similar to Solomon Islands, the problems in PNG have been defined in terms of possible state

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90 Hameiri, ‘State Building or Crisis Management?’, 43.
91 Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Strengthening Our Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Papua New Guinea (Canberra: ASPI, 2004): 8.
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failure, meaning the Australian government has focused on poor standards of governance and weak institutional capacity. As an ASPI report on PNG stated ‘Underlying all these problems, however, are pervasive and systemic weaknesses in the capacity of the PNG state to provide effective government’.93 Again, similar to RAMSI in Solomon Islands, Australia has adopted a more interventionist, hands-on approach to state-building in PNG.

This new approach was encapsulated in the ECP, designed to reshape PNG’s risky socio-political environment by re-establishing law and order in several regions of the country and building the capacity of several key state institutions.94 The Australian and PNG governments had negotiated the final terms of the assistance package at the 2003 Australia-Papua New Guinea Ministerial Forum, although the final agreement was not signed until July 2004 due to PNG concerns with the Australian government’s insistence on immunity provisions for its officials.95 The ECP saw Australian police and other officials appointed in line positions within the PNG government and Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC), including an Australian appointment to the position of Solicitor-General along with other appointments in the Prosecutor’s office and correctional services.96

While the bulk of Australian personnel committed to this mission comprised 230 police officers, it also included 18 personnel working in non-policing law and justice areas, 36 personnel assigned to economic and finance institutions, and 10 officials assigned to immigration services, border security and aviation safety.97 The ECP thus provided for significant Australian control of PNG state institutions in

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93 Ibid.
94 Patience, ‘The ECP and Australia’s Middle Power Ambitions’, 5.
96 Dinnen, ‘Lending a Fist?’, 8.
which Australian officials were deployed. Despite the fact that the ECP was
described as a ‘cooperative partnership’ between PNG and Australia, similar to
Australia’s relationship with Solomon Islands partnership or collaboration extended
only as far as the formal consent of the affected state to the deployment of Australian
officials within its territory. The necessary governance and institutional reforms that
were perceived to be required were selected with reference to Australia’s own
standards of liberal good governance and institutional capacity. AusAID’s 2004
regional aid strategy for the Pacific reflected this, listing the strengthening of liberal
governance though the improvement of the capacity and accountability of the
machinery of government as one of the key focuses of its development program.98

This was compounded by the placement of Australian personnel directly into
line positions with PNG state institutions, who, rather than operating in partnership
with their PNG counterparts, assumed direct responsibility for key areas within the
PNG government. Further, similar to the FIAA that provides the legal authority for
RAMSI’s presence in Solomon Islands, a key provision of the agreement between
Australia and PNG establishing the ECP was that of immunity for Australian
personnel working in PNG. Australian officials enjoyed immunity from civil and
disciplinary proceedings in PNG, although criminal jurisdiction was exercised
concurrently by Australia and PNG.99 Despite this, Australia retained jurisdiction
over any criminal offences committed by Australian personnel in the course of
discharging their duties.100

This meant that Australian officials would be able to exercise significant
control and influence within state institutions in PNG without being able to be held

99 ‘Joint Agreement on Enhanced Cooperation between Australia and Papua New Guinea’ (Port
Moresby, 30 June 2004), Australasian Legal Information Institute website, http://138.25.65.50/au/oth
100 Ibid., article 8(3).
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to account by the PNG government or its people. Like their RAMSI counterparts, Australian personnel in PNG were effectively insulated from oversight and interference by the PNG government. The immunity provisions reflected Australian concerns regarding its personnel being subject to oversight by the very institutions that they sought to reform. The importance attached to these immunity provisions was highlighted by the fact that the Australian government would not agree to implement the ECP until PNG acquiesced to its demands for immunity for Australian officials, which the Australian government viewed as a precondition for the implementation of the ECP. Again, the immunity provisions of the ECP underscored the unequal and hierarchical relationship that Australia’s intervention in PNG represented. The Australian government has claimed the authority to reform the domestic institutions of PNG without established mechanisms of accountability.

However, PNG objections to the immunity provisions of the ECP agreement did not end with the deployment of the mission. There were several outspoken critics of the ECP in PNG, including the Governor of Morobe Province, Luther Wenge, who eventually challenged the PNG legislation enabling the ECP on constitutional grounds. This challenge was upheld by the Supreme Court of PNG in May 2005, which ruled that the immunity provisions were unconstitutional because, among other issues, they violated the rights of PNG citizens and the authority of PNG’s police and prosecutors. This led to the immediate withdrawal of the majority of the Australian police contingent and those officials working in line positions within

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the PNG government assumed advisory roles. As Downer commented, Australia could not allow its personnel to be subject to vexatious litigation and would no longer allow its aid money to be wasted in countries like PNG suffering from poor governance and weak institutional capacity.

Therefore, many of the issues surrounding Australia’s involvement in Solomon Islands through RAMSI are also present in its intervention in PNG through the ECP. Firstly, the intervention was motivated, amongst other considerations, by the perceived vulnerability of Australia to spatially and temporally de-bounded risks and the need to prevent the failure of Australia’s neighbouring states lest they become environments conducive to the breeding of de-bounded security risks. Secondly, potential state failure was defined in terms of poor governance and weak capacity, and hence the ECP was an intervention designed to reshape PNG’s socio-political and economic environment by promoting liberal good governance and building institutional capacity. Thirdly, the intervention involved the appointment of Australian experts in line positions within key government institutions who, as a result of immunity provisions, were unaccountable to the PNG government or its people. This ensured that Australian officials would be insulated from potential interference in their work.

Finally, despite the description by the Australian government of the intervention as a cooperative or collaborative partnership, collaboration only extended to the consent of the PNG government to Australia’s intervention. Pre-existing socio-political structures and relationships in PNG were not countenanced by the reforms that the Australian government sought to implement, for these


reforms were informed entirely by external notions of liberal good governance. Again, this is unsurprising given that it is existing social and political structures that are perceived as contributing to state weakness and as a consequence, also potentially give rise to an environment conducive to the origination of de-bounded risks. Australia claims the authority to intervene in weak states suffering from poor governance and weak capacity in an effort to reshape their socio-political environments as a technique of managing risk. These features of the interventions in Solomon Islands and PNG thus display the emergence of new regional hierarchies underpinned by a liberal social logic of risk. Like the EU’s ENP, these hierarchies are corrosive of international society’s pluralist constitution in that they involve Australian attempts to limit the range of acceptable values and regimes that Pacific Island states can adopt.

Implications for International Society

The question of the political implications of state-building interventions for interstate relations has become a topic of importance, for both scholars and policy practitioners. The notion that developed states should intervene to build the governing capacity of weak states raises questions concerning international society’s pluralist constitution, especially the right of states to be free from interference in their internal affairs. It also raises questions regarding the pluralist right of states to constitute their domestic institutions as they see fit, whether or not they are successful in that endeavour. The practice of state-building in the post-Cold War era is one based upon a very particular picture of what the state should look like.\textsuperscript{105} Western state-builders have been explicit in their attempts to build liberal democratic

\textsuperscript{105} Downer, ‘40 Years of Australian Foreign Policy’.
states underpinned by liberal notions of good governance, in some instances as a means to managing risk.

Indeed, Australia’s new approach to fostering development in Pacific Island states that emerged during 2003 is one distinctly based upon a liberal social logic of risk. Not only has the Australian government clearly identified state fragility as posing potential dangers to Australian security, but it has also sought to reform domestic institutions in states such as Solomon Islands and PNG in order to construct stable liberal democracies. This social logic of risk has therefore informed the emergence of new relations of hierarchy which are represented by recent Australian attempts at state-building in the region. The talk of ‘cooperative interventionism’ or ‘partnerships’ between Australia and Solomon Islands or PNG serves only to legitimate what are in fact relations of hierarchy. A liberal social logic of risk simultaneously constructs Australia as a ‘superordinate state-builder’ and Solomon Islands or PNG as fragile, potentially risky and subordinated states requiring institutional reform and capacity building.

The supposed partnership between Australia and Solomon Islands, for example, is mitigated by the appropriation of direct control within state institutions by RAMSI personnel and the unaccountability of these officials to the Solomon Islands government and people. The Australian government has claimed, and in Solomon Islands continues to exercise, the authority to reshape the internal institutions of its island neighbours according to its own liberal notions of good governance and institutional capacity. The social logic of risk which underpins this new hierarchical relationship has shaped new spaces of governance within the state, both in Solomon Islands and Australia. In Australia, new spaces are opened (for example, inter-departmental committees) through which the Australian government
exercises authority within Solomon Islands as a superordinate party. In Solomon Islands new spaces of transnational authority are constructed through which external interveners can exercise significant authority over the Solomon Islands state.\textsuperscript{106}

The point here is that state institutions and social and political structures within Solomon Islands and PNG (during the ECP) become subject to the oversight and authority of the Australian government. Importantly, in relation to the definition of hierarchy detailed in chapter two, the exercise of Australian authority is generally recognised as legitimate by Australia and, respectively, Solomon Islands and PNG. For example, Solomon Islands had invited Australian intervention on several occasions before RAMSI’s eventual deployment in July 2003. Further, the requirement that the Solomon Islands parliament must annually review and endorse RAMSI’s presence in the country serves as an important tool that legitimates Solomon Islands’ subordinate status. Although the legitimacy of RAMSI’s operations has been subject to political contestation within Solomon Islands, generally the Solomon Islands government has recognised the legitimacy of its subordination in the hierarchical relationship with Australia.\textsuperscript{107} Indeed, it is precisely Solomon Islands’ consent to RAMSI’s activities that allows the Australian government and RAMSI to depict their activities as a ‘cooperative intervention’.

Importantly though, despite their subordinated status, Solomon Islands and PNG remain sovereign states. Both retain their formal legal identity as sovereign states and continue to enjoy recognition of this sovereignty by other members of international society, despite significant external interference in their internal affairs.

\textsuperscript{106} Hameiri, ‘State Building or Crisis Management?’, 36.

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However, while both remain sovereign states, they are subject to a lesser form of sovereignty, one in which their right to non-intervention and sovereign equality are mitigated by the notion that state fragility or failure could lead to unacceptable security risks for Australia. The mitigation of these rights, along with Australia’s attempts to build stable liberal democracies in PNG and Solomon Islands irrespective of pre-existing social or political structures, signifies a distinctive shift away from international society’s pluralist constitution. The expectation that weak states must conform to imposed standards of liberal good governance and institutional capacity effectively removes the right of these states to determine their socio-political institutions according to their own societal values.

Discussing contemporary state-building, Chandler argues that ‘The pluralist post-World War II framework of the United Nations Charter has been replaced, overnight, by a new hierarchy of Western power. Yet this hierarchy has not been formalised in the way that empire was in the past’.108 Indeed, the social logic underpinning contemporary state-building interventions, including those in the Asia-Pacific, should not be equated with the old colonial hierarchies. Notions of civilisation and the imperative of territorial and economic aggrandisement on the part of European states underpinned these hierarchies. Contemporary state-building interventions, on the other hand, have been characterised by the reluctance of Western interveners to assume direct control over weak states subjected to intervention. Rather, Western governments have continued to emphasise the intervened states’ formal legal sovereignty and status as members of international society.

In short, underpinning new relations of hierarchy in the Asia-Pacific is a liberal social logic of risk, one which constitutes illiberal or fragile states as potentially dangerous sites of risk fomentation and origination. This social logic of risk legitimates the claim of Western societies such as Australia to intervene in these risky states in order to protect their own security. This distinctly contradicts the pluralist constitution of international society that has ordered social interactions between states since decolonisation. Indeed, this shift between pluralist and hierarchical forms of international society is neatly captured in the shift that occurred after 9/11 and the Bali bombings in Australia’s approach to development in the region. In place of its hands-off approach prior to 2003, Australia has engaged in a new proactive and interventionist approach to development in the region designed as a means of managing risk.

Conclusion

The 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and subsequent bombings in Bali in 2002 prompted a distinctive shift within Australia’s foreign policy outlook. Since these terrorist incidents, the Australian government, under the leadership of both former Prime Minister John Howard and incumbent Kevin Rudd, has become increasingly concerned with anticipating and managing temporally and spatially de-bounded security risks. Its focus on spatially de-bounded, globalised risks has been particularly evident in its shifting views on globalisation. In 2000, globalisation was viewed as a largely positive phenomenon, helping to increase integration between states. But by 2003, globalisation was viewed in a more negative light, also being seen to facilitate transnational risks to Australian security. In short, globalisation left
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Australia more exposed and therefore vulnerable to globalised security risks such as terrorism and transnational crime.

One of the more immediate effects of this shifting foreign policy outlook was the formulation of a more assertive and interventionist approach to weak states in the Asia-Pacific, Australia’s ‘geographical backyard’. Compelled by the idea that failed states constitute environments conducive to the origination of globalised risk, the Australian government has embarked on more far-reaching and interventionist state-building exercises, particularly in Solomon Islands and PNG. Gone is the old hands-off approach to development aid; in its place is a new hands-on approach informed by the need to effect an environmental reshaping of failing states by imposing liberal standards of good governance in order to protect Australia’s security interests. The resulting interventions in Solomon Islands and PNG have involved extensive Australian involvement and control within key areas of the governments of both states.

The effect has been that Solomon Islands and PNG have been subject to a form of socio-political regulation. Despite the consensual nature of the interventions and their description as partnerships, the point has been to impose external standards of good governance in both states. This has resulted in the erosion of international society’s pluralist constitution and the emergence of new relations of hierarchy between Australia and weak states in its immediate neighbourhood. These new hierarchical relationships posit a distinction between Australia as the state-builder at risk from fragile states, which gains the right to manage these potential dangers via intervention; and weak states in the region who pose unacceptable security risks and lose their unqualified right to non-intervention and sovereign equality. These fragile states become subordinate partners in new relations of international hierarchy.
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Preventing Risks and Changing Regimes: The 2003 Invasion of Iraq

Introduction

The 2003 invasion of Iraq is an important case study in the examination of risk, risk management and their effects upon international society in the post-Cold War era. The two key elements of the theoretical framework outlined in chapters three and four are readily identifiable in the case of Iraq. Firstly, spatially and temporally de-bounded risks and the perceived need to prevent them were central to the justifications and rationale provided by proponents of the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. Secondly, in response to these uncertain, temporally and spatially de-bounded risks, the US and its ‘Coalition of the Willing’ sought to reshape the environment from which the risks associated with WMD proliferation were perceived to originate by deposing Hussein’s regime and promoting liberal values in Iraq. Indeed, the former Bush administration was explicit that ‘victory’ in Iraq and the management of the risks of terrorism and WMD proliferation would primarily involve a stable and democratic Iraq.1 The invasion of Iraq therefore provides perhaps the clearest empirical example yet of the argument that risk and risk management are integral features of post-Cold War international society.

Not least because of the questionable legality and contentious nature of the so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’ of prevention, the invasion of Iraq aroused a great deal of

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controversy within international society.\(^2\) Many, including prominent US allies, questioned the necessity and legitimacy of the use of armed force against Iraq in the absence of a Security Council mandate.\(^3\) The subsequent inability of coalition forces to find any WMD, links to terrorists or to generate domestic stability within Iraq after the overthrow of Hussein has only served to heighten the controversy and debate surrounding the invasion. Debate continues to this day regarding the question of the need for such an invasion and the reasons why the Bush administration originally decided to use force against Iraq. Part of the argument put forth by those who opposed the invasion was that there was no clear evidence of any overt threat posed by Hussein’s regime to the security of the West.

This is similar to the ‘risk management argument’ put forth here – there was indeed a conspicuous lack of clear evidence that the perceived risks of WMD or Iraqi links with terrorists presently existed in the period leading up to the 2003 invasion. However, several critics have alternatively suggested that this lack of evidence means that the invasion was little more than a grab for oil or motivated in part by Bush’s desire for personal revenge against Saddam (in response to the assassination attempt on George Bush Snr. in 1993).\(^4\) The argument that the US and its allies went into Iraq to secure oil supplies assumes that the subsequent failure to find substantial stockpiles of WMD means that the original justification for the war, disarming Iraq,


\(^3\) Ibid., 3. The invasion caused a significant rift between the US and several of its allies, particularly France and Germany.

\(^4\) For example, Michael Ignatieff advocates a more sophisticated version of the ‘oil thesis’, arguing that the invasion of Iraq was motivated by America’s desire to consolidate its position as guarantor of oil supplies for the Western economy. While Ignatieff does suggest that we also need to take account of Bush’s moralism and his desire to spread freedom to the Iraqis, he effectively dismisses the rhetoric employed by Bush in the lead up to the war, rhetoric that continually affirmed the need to act against the risks posed by Hussein’s regime. See Michael Ignatieff, ‘Why are We in Iraq? (And Liberia? And Afghanistan?)’, *The New York Times* (7 September 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/07/magazine/why-are-we-in-iraq-and-liberia-and-afghanistan.html (accessed 29 June 2008).
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was little more than a smokescreen to cover the real motives behind the war.\(^5\) This argument also effectively dismisses the goal of promoting liberalism in Iraq, suggesting that this was never a serious aspiration of the US or its allies in the first place.

Such an argument overlooks the fact that in the six years since the end of the initial military campaign, the Coalition of the Willing has worked to construct an effective democratic government in Iraq (with questionable levels of success). Notwithstanding the considerable lack of evidence to suggest that oil or revenge were the prime motivators of the invasion, in sum, those who have advocated such notions fail to properly and seriously consider WMD and democracy as the actual reasons behind the decision to engage in military conflict.\(^6\) In particular, advocates of the ‘oil thesis’ have paid insufficient attention to the language and rhetoric employed by Bush, senior administration officials and foreign leaders such as former Prime Ministers Tony Blair and John Howard. During the lead up to the war, Bush in particular conceptualised and framed the dangers posed by Hussein’s regime in terms of future eventualities and possibilities.\(^7\)

Justifications for war were couched in terms of ‘what ifs’ and ‘maybes’, despite confident assertions that Iraq did in fact pose an imminent threat. In large part, notwithstanding the argument that ulterior political goals motivated the


\(^6\) For example, Clark argues that the US invasion of Iraq was not simply motivated by control of Iraqi oil, but also for control of the means by which oil is globally traded. Scott and Ambler also suggest that the ‘grab for oil’ was an obvious political motivation for the invasion in the US that threatened to undermine the Bush administration’s claim that the invasion was consistent with international law. See William R. Clark, \textit{Petrodollar Warfare} (Gabriola Island, Canada: New Society Publishers, 2005) and Shirley V. Scott and Olivia Ambler, ‘Does Legality Really Matter? Accounting for the Decline in US Foreign Policy Legitimacy Following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq’, \textit{European Journal of International Relations} 13, no. 1 (2007): 67-87.

\(^7\) Of course, while perceptions of risk were central to the justifications provided for war, the inherently political and un-evaluable nature of assessments and definitions of risks, discussed in chapter four, means that it is extremely difficult to conclusively say that these risks were the primary motivation for military action. However, it will be demonstrated below that perceptions of risk were the primary justification provided for the war.
invasion, much of the initial debate during the lead-up to the Iraq War arose as a result of differing judgements regarding the risks posed by Hussein’s regime. As noted in chapters three and four, given that risks are essentially defined and selected for response according to subjective and probabilistic calculations of anticipated future scenarios and their likely consequences, risk definition and anticipation is an inherently political exercise. Varying risk definitions were evident in the Security Council in the adoption of UNSCR 1441 in November 2002 and subsequent American and British attempts to gain acceptance for a further UNSCR explicitly authorising the use of force. They were also evident in exchanges between those Western nations that advocated war (US, Britain, Australia and Spain) and those that did not (among others, France and Germany).

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The first section of the chapter examines the period leading up to the 2003 war. As will be demonstrated in this section, the arguments made by the Bush administration and its allies in favour of military action against Iraq were largely defined in terms of the need to prevent a set of possible future dangers. Further, while the promotion of liberalism was put forth as a reason for engaging in military action, this justification was secondary to the primary objective of preventing Iraq from obtaining WMD and providing them to terrorists. Promoting liberalism was not the end itself – it was a means to ensuring that Iraq would not give rise to the aforementioned security risks. The second section of the chapter examines US state-building in Iraq and the bid to replace Saddam’s regime with a new liberal democracy. It is argued here that the push to create a democratic Iraq was informed by the situational approach to risk management –

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reshaping potentially dangerous environments so as to mitigate the potential for the emergence of future security risks.

The final section of the chapter examines the effects of the Iraq invasion on the constitutional structure of international society. The argument here is that the Iraq War was thoroughly corrosive of the norms generally associated with a pluralist international society. There is a question, however, as to whether the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq represents an example of a hierarchical political relationship between Iraq and the US as the leading member of the Coalition. As noted in chapter two, hierarchical relationships rely on the perceived legitimacy of the relationship by both superordinate and subordinate parties.\(^9\) Certainly, the invasion of Iraq was not deemed legitimate by many members of international society, including Iraq itself. There is little doubt that the initial invasion and occupation of Iraq represented a case of coercive domination rather than hierarchy. However, a hierarchical relationship, underpinned by a liberal social logic of risk informing the US’ desire to reform Iraq into a liberal democratic ‘safe-haven’ or ‘outpost’ in the Middle East, did eventually emerge (and continues to prevail) once the US had ‘transferred’ sovereignty back to Iraq.

**Going to War in Iraq: Uncertainty, Precaution and the Prevention of De-bounded Risks**

This section examines the lead-up to the war, concentrating on the period beginning 29 January 2002 (the date of Bush’s State of the Union address) until the end of 2004, with a particular focus on the justifications provided for going to war in Iraq and the way in which the issue of Iraq’s alleged WMD was framed. As will be

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shown, the dangers posed by Iraq’s possession of WMD were characterised as temporally and spatially de-bounded risks with potentially catastrophic consequences.\(^\text{10}\) However, at the outset it is important to note that the point of this section is \textit{not} to evaluate whether or not Blair and Bush were telling the ‘truth’ in their claims of WMD, nor does it seek to evaluate evidence to determine the extent to which Iraq actually did possess prohibited WMD or missile systems.\(^\text{11}\)

Rather, the focus here is limited to an examination of the way in which particular Western leaders conceptualised the dangers posed by Hussein, and the language they employed in making the case for the need for military action in Iraq. Before doing so, however, it is useful to briefly outline the historical context that informed the lead-up to war. The cessation of hostilities following Iraq’s defeat in the 1991 Gulf War was conditioned upon Iraq’s agreement to voluntarily eliminate its stockpiles of WMD and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, pay the appropriate reparations to Kuwait for damage and suffering inflicted and cease its support for terrorism.\(^\text{12}\) To ensure that Iraq complied with its disarmament obligations, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established to conduct, along with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), inspections of Iraqi WMD facilities. UNSCOM was also tasked with verifying Iraq’s compliance with the provisions of Resolution 687, which outlined the conditions of the cessation of hostilities with Iraq.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{10}\) Indeed, the dangers posed by Iraq were often explicitly described as ‘risks’ rather than ‘threats’ – see below.

\(^{11}\) For a thorough overview of the reasons and motivations behind the invasion of Iraq, see George Packer, \textit{The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq} (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).


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In October 1998, Iraq declared that it would no longer cooperate with UNSCOM after several years of allegedly attempting to obstruct its work.\textsuperscript{14} Despite British and American airstrikes during \textit{Operation Desert Fox},\textsuperscript{15} weapons inspectors did not return to Iraq until the passing of UN SCR 1441 in November 2002.\textsuperscript{16} After a relative lull in political interest concerning Iraqi WMD after \textit{Desert Fox}, the issue came to the fore again in 2002 after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Importantly, by the time of Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, which clearly indicated that the US government was considering military action to disarm Iraq, a great deal of uncertainty surrounded the issue of Iraqi WMD due to a lack of inspections over the preceding three and half years.\textsuperscript{17} There were high levels of uncertainty regarding both the location of Iraq’s WMD stockpiles and the timeframes involved regarding possible efforts by Iraq to reconstitute its WMD development programs and stockpiles.\textsuperscript{18} In other words, it was not known when Iraq would achieve a workable WMD capability or what stage in the WMD development process Iraq had reached.

Despite this uncertainty, by mid-2002 the Bush administration, along with former Prime Ministers Tony Blair in the UK and John Howard in Australia, were pushing for action over the alleged risks posed by Iraq’s desire to acquire WMD. One of the defining aspects of the lead-up to the intervention was the explicit invocation of the concepts of risk, prevention and precaution in conceptualising the


\textsuperscript{17} Bush, 2002 State of the Union Address.

\textsuperscript{18} A UN report regarding disarmament in Iraq concluded that the bulk of Iraq’s proscribed weapons had been eliminated by UNSCOM and IAEA inspections. Questions did remain, however, regarding certain elements of Iraq’s WMD programmes, and the report concluded that a level of uncertainty would remain regarding the complete verification of Iraq’s WMD. See Letter dated 27 March 1999, from the Chairman of the Panels established pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council of 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100) addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/1999/356.
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dangers posed by Hussein’s regime and justifying military action. The nature of the alleged dangers posed by Hussein’s regime was clearly defined in terms of the temporal and spatial de-bounding that is a crucial feature of contemporary risk. Not only was the spatial location of Iraqi WMD uncertain, but action against Iraq was also explicitly defined with regard to possible future events. Iraqi WMD was not limited to clear evidence of presently extant threats; it was also inclusive of the possible acquisition of WMD by Iraq in the future.

Indeed, Bush clearly highlighted the globalised nature of contemporary security risks as a justification for preventive action in Iraq. On several occasions, Bush referred to the idea that America used to be able to rely on its geographical location, situated between two vast oceans, to protect it from harm. But with the globalised nature of contemporary risk, geography no longer offers America any protection. As Bush argues

But September the 11th brought home a new reality, and it's important for all our citizens to understand that reality. See, a lot of us, when we were raised, never really worried about the homeland. We all believed that two oceans would forever separate us from harm's way, and that if there was a threat gathering overseas, we could pick and choose whether or not we wanted to be involved in dealing with that threat. September the 11th delivered a chilling message to our country, and that is oceans no longer protect us. And therefore, it is my obligation to make sure that we address gathering threats overseas before they could do harm to the American people.19

Tony Blair also alluded to the qualitatively different dangers faced by contemporary Western societies compared with those faced during the Cold War:

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So these are new and different dangers. It's not like the old Soviet bloc versus NATO. There, defensive alliances were formed; crises occurred, often serious; but in a funny way, the world knew where it was. The year 2002 is different. These dangers can strike at any time, across any national boundary and in pursuit of a cause with which there can be little or no rational negotiation.\(^\text{20}\)

Perhaps the key point in this statement is that even though the West faced complete destruction during the Cold War, at least during this period Western societies knew exactly what they faced – they possessed Gidden’s ontological security.\(^\text{21}\) The problem now is that while no overwhelming threats currently exist, new dangers that do exist today are de-bounded and difficult to locate, meaning that Western societies now find themselves in a highly uncertain security environment.

This emphasis on globalised, spatially debounded risks was matched with a consistent framing of the dangers posed by Iraqi WMD in terms of futuristic, temporally de-bounded scenarios. Bush and Blair in particular continually invoked images of possible future risks that could materialise at any given time. The dangers posed by Iraqi WMD were not limited to any specific timeframe. Rather, they were continually described as open-ended and temporally ill-defined. This focus on future dangers is unsurprising in the context of reflexive Western risk societies constantly pre-occupied with attempting to anticipate and manage future possibilities. As Rasmussen suggests, the notion that Western societies now increasingly perceive their strategic environment in terms of risks is lent credence by the fact that security is now conceived of in terms of future threats.\(^\text{22}\)

Bush was explicit throughout 2002 and early 2003 in his focus on protecting America against future threats. In March 2002, Bush stated that ‘one thing I will not

\(^{20}\) Tony Blair, *PM Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet* (London: Office of the Prime Minister, 11 November 2002).


\(^{22}\) Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War*, 114.
allow is a nation such as Iraq to threaten our very future by developing weapons of mass destruction’. Bush’s pessimistic anticipations of a future in which Hussein had not been removed from power or disarmed were further evident in his discussions with US congressional leaders:

The dangers we face will only worsen from month to month and from year to year. To ignore these threats is to encourage them. And when they have fully materialized it may be too late to protect ourselves and our friends and our allies. By then the Iraqi dictator would have the means to terrorize and dominate the region. Each passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX – nerve gas – or some day a nuclear weapon to a terrorist ally. We refuse to live in this future of fear.

In this statement Bush centres on future scenarios and the consequences of their realisation. Of most importance is that Bush never clearly suggests in this statement precisely when such risks will come to pass. While he does warn that it could be ‘too late’ to act by the time such risks materialise, he does not (and cannot) specify and what point in time they will do so. Bush thus describes temporally de-bounded risks, as there is no specific timeframe provided telling us when the threat will be fully formed. All we are told is that one day, at some unclear and undefined point in time, Iraq will have a WMD capability that will pose severe dangers for Western societies. It is on the basis of these temporally de-bounded dangers that Bush argues for preventive action against Iraq.

Most of Bush’s statements regarding Iraq during 2002 and 2003 therefore employed terms such as ‘could’, ‘might’ or ‘imagine’ – he continually referred to

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possibilities and probabilities rather than immediate or imminent dangers. Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address was indicative in this regard:

With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein could resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in that region…Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans – this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. We will do everything in our power to make sure that that day never comes.25

Absent from this statement is any evidence that Iraq presently has WMD. Also of importance is the notion that a failure to prevent such possibilities could lead to catastrophic consequences. The two main components of defining risk, probabilities and consequences, are at play in this statement. Firstly, Bush points to the probability of rogue states providing WMD to terrorist organisations. Secondly, he emphasises the potentially catastrophic consequences of such an eventuality. We are asked to anticipate a possible future and imagine what it would be like if WMD were deployed on American soil. What was at stake here was not a currently WMD-armed Iraq posing a direct threat to the security of the United States. Rather, the issue was the notion that if Iraq attempted to develop WMD the consequences for American security could be disastrous.

Throughout 2002 and into 2003, Bush maintained his focus on future events and continually invoked future possibilities as the principal rationale for military action in Iraq. In February 2003 he stated that

There are people who worry about the future. I understand that. And I worry about the future. I worry about a future in which Saddam Hussein gets to blackmail

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and/or attack. I worry about a future in which terrorist organizations are fuelled and funded by a Saddam Hussein. And that's why we're bringing this issue to a head.26

Tony Blair shared Bush’s emphasis on future possibilities in his discussions regarding the ‘threat’ that Hussein ostensibly posed. At a speech in Blackpool in September 2002, Blair argued that

if we do not deal with the threat from this international outlaw and his barbaric regime, it may not erupt and engulf us this month or next; perhaps not even this year or the next. But it will at some point. And I do not want it on my conscience that we knew the threat, saw it coming and did nothing.27

Like Bush, Blair does not point to a specific timeframe when he discusses the risks of Iraq and WMD. The argument for action against Iraq (although at this point Blair was not talking only of war, but was hopeful of action through the UN) made above rests on little more than Blair’s subjective analysis of possibly adverse future scenarios emanating from Saddam and his ostensibly cadre of WMD.28 Blair again established this emphasis on future scenarios at a press conference in January 2003 when he stated that

my fear is that we wake up one day and we find either that one of these dictatorial states has used weapons of mass destruction…or alternatively these weapons, which are being traded right round the world at the moment, fall into the hands of these terrorist groups…And I understand of course why people think it is a very remote threat and it is far away and why does it bother us. Now I simply say to

27 Tony Blair, *Prime Minister’s Speech to TUC Conference in Blackpool* (London: Office of the Prime Minister, 10 September 2002).
you, it is a matter of time unless we act and take a stand before terrorism and weapons of mass destruction come together…\(^\text{29}\)

Despite the sense of urgency with which Blair and Bush attempted to portray the dangers posed by Saddam, clearly lacking from their conceptualisation of these dangers was the idea that Saddam, WMD and possible linkages with terrorists constituted an imminent threat. Blair confirmed that Iraq was not considered an imminent threat to Britain in 2004: ‘Had we believed Iraq was an imminent direct threat to Britain, we would have taken action in September 2002; we would not have gone to the UN’.\(^\text{30}\) Indeed, imminence could not be demonstrated given that Blair was dealing with temporally ill-defined risks. Imminence cannot be demonstrated without reference to a specific timeframe, which is precisely what was lacking from the dangers that Blair identified.

Then-Australian Prime Minister John Howard also spoke in futuristic terms regarding the supposed threat that Iraq posed. In a Ministerial Statement to the Australian House of Representatives he suggested that ‘Saddam Hussein will not abandon his chemical and biological weapons programs. He will keep striving to build a nuclear capacity. And he will almost certainly, at some time in the future, use these weapons to fulfil his ambition to dominate his region’.\(^\text{31}\) Howard further added that ‘Proliferation of these weapons will make the world a much more dangerous place for all of us’.\(^\text{32}\) Howard, like Bush and Blair, points to posited speculations of future scenarios – there is no temporal limitation placed on the risks posed by


\(^{30}\) Blair, *Prime Minister Warns of Continuing Global Terror Threat.*


\(^{32}\) Ibid.
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Hussein’s pursuit of WMD. Instead, action against Iraq is justified in order prevent Hussein from acquiring and using WMD ‘at some point in the future’.

The framing of the threat posed by Hussein in terms of future, temporally ill-defined possibilities was especially evident in the discussions regarding Iraq’s possible development or acquisition of nuclear weaponry. Shortly after his speech to the UN General Assembly outlining the dangers posed by Saddam in September 2002, Bush argued in a radio address to the nation that ‘Today this regime likely maintains stockpiles of chemical and biological agents...Should his regime acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year’.33 Bush further added that

If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year. And if we allow that to happen, a terrible line would be crossed. Saddam Hussein would be in a position to blackmail anyone who opposes his aggression. He would be in a position to dominate the Middle East. He would be in a position to threaten America. And Saddam Hussein would be in a position to pass nuclear technology to terrorists.34

It is important to note that during 2002 and early 2003, there was virtually no evidence that Iraq even had the required materiel or capabilities to produce a nuclear weapon. The IAEA, reporting on its inspections conducted between November 2002 and March 2003, concluded that it had found no significant evidence of a revival of any nuclear programmes or attempts to acquire uranium. Further, it found that there had been a substantial degradation of the facilities and finances required to support

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such a nuclear programme. While this report was not released until five months after the beginning of hostilities in Iraq, it is notable that Bush repeatedly spoke about Iraq’s possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, even though the IAEA’s verification mission had yet to be completed.

This lack of evidence and firm knowledge regarding WMD was indicative of a broader level of uncertainty that was a product of the temporally and spatially de-bounded nature of the risks that the US, UK and Australia sought to manage. As Aradau, Guerro and Van Munster suggest, risk introduces ‘uncertainty and the unknowable at the heart of the governing process’. If the Iraq War was an exercise in risk management and was justified and rationalised by the need to prevent the materialisation of perceived de-bounded risks, then one would expect uncertainty and ‘unknowing’ to be a key problem faced by those attempting to control these risks. Such uncertainty was evident in policy statements, speeches by Western leaders and especially in the intelligence assessments of Iraq and WMD. Richard Perle clearly outlined the uncertain nature of dealing with the risks posed by Iraq’s WMD: ‘the whole question of removing him [Hussein] involves a balancing of risks in the face of uncertainty’.

Bush was explicit in addressing the uncertainties regarding the issue of Iraqi WMD in several statements. In a November 2002 press conference he suggested that

And they – no one likes war, but they also don't like the idea of Saddam Hussein having a nuclear weapon. Imagine what would happen. And by the way, we don't know how close he is to a nuclear weapon right now. We know he wants one. But

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we don't know. We know he was close to one at one point in time; we have no idea today.\textsuperscript{38}

Further, in October 2002 Bush suggested that ‘Many people have asked how close Saddam Hussein is to developing a nuclear weapon. Well, we don't know exactly, and that’s the problem’.\textsuperscript{39}

This sentiment, that it is what we do not know rather than what we do that is the problem, was also encapsulated in an Australian Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) report on Iraq and WMD. This report suggested that ‘What is not known about Iraq’s WMD programmes is as worrying as what is known’.\textsuperscript{40} Such statements clearly outlined one of the main problems facing those concerned with Iraq and WMD – high levels of uncertainty and a lack of conclusive knowledge. Leading up to war in 2002 and early 2003, it was precisely such uncertainty and ‘unknowing’ that provided a major impetus for taking action. Commenting in relation to intelligence gathered by Australia’s Office of National Assessments (ONA), a Parliamentary Committee tasked with assessing the quality and presentation of the intelligence relating to Iraq in the lead-up to the war suggested that ‘The early assessments, in 2000 and 2001, suggest the possibility of a revival of the WMD programmes in Iraq. However, there are as many qualifications as there are certainties’.\textsuperscript{41}

More specifically, one of the problems faced by the intelligence agencies, aside from actually proving the existence of Iraqi WMD, was that they could provide little intelligence regarding the location of any WMD that did in fact exist. An ONA

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Bush2003} Bush, \textit{President Outlines Iraqi Threat}.
\bibitem{Committee2006} Parliamentary Joint Committee, \textit{Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction}, 29.
\end{thebibliography}
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assessment in September 2002 concluded that the intelligence on Iraq was ‘slight on the scope and location of Iraq’s WMD activities’.\(^{42}\) British intelligence on Iraq, like that of the Australians, demonstrated a high degree of tentativeness and uncertainty. In May 2001, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) reported that intelligence on Iraq regarding WMD was ‘patchy’.\(^{43}\) Even though British intelligence assessed that Saddam had indeed used the lull in weapons inspections between 1998 and 2002 to resume production of chemical and biological weapons, it could not determine what had been produced or in what quantities.\(^{44}\) Further, British intelligence did not know where Iraq’s supposed WMD capabilities were located, nor did they know where these weapons could be deployed.\(^{45}\)

In sum, like their Australian counterparts, British intelligence reports indicated a firm believe that Iraq did in fact have WMD. However, they could not point to the specific location of these weapons, what weapons Iraq already possessed or when more weapons would be produced. Although the American intelligence agencies were far more assertive than their British and Australian counterparts, their assessments also demonstrated a great deal of uncertainty regarding Iraq’s WMD capabilities and development programs. In July 2003, the White House released declassified excerpts from the October 2002 *National Intelligence Estimate*, which stated that ‘We lack specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD programs’.\(^{46}\) This lack of knowledge was reiterated in the assessment of Iraq’s chemical weapons: ‘Although we have little specific information on Iraq's CW

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\(^{44}\) Ibid.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., 19.

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[chemical weapons] stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents – much of it added in the last year’. 47

Importantly, this uncertainty or ‘unknowing’ manifested in an overt tendency on the part of several Western leaders to assume the worst when it came to Iraq and WMD. This informed the sense of urgency that was apparent in the statements by Bush, Blair and others convinced of the need of preventive military action in Iraq. By assuming that Saddam was in fact developing or did have WMD, or that his regime had contacts with terrorist organisations, the dangers posed by Saddam became characterised as a potentially existential threat warranting urgent and immediate action. As Lawrence Freedman suggests, ‘worst-case analysis was rampant on the subject of Iraq...’ 48 Bush himself outlined the worst-case scenario clearly, suggesting that ‘Understanding the threats of our time, knowing the designs and deceptions of the Iraqi regime, we have every reason to assume the worst, and we have an urgent duty to prevent the worst from occurring’. 49

Bush reiterated this point declaring that ‘To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take’. 50 Consequently, this tendency to assume the worst led to a strong emphasis on precaution. Throughout 2002 and 2003, advocates of intervention in Iraq stressed the need to err on the side of precaution, to take action against Iraq before it was too late and a catastrophic scenario eventuated. Adopting a wary or guarded approach to action against Iraq could, so the argument went, lead to devastation for Western societies. Indeed, both Bush and Blair in particular painted

47 Ibid., 6 (italics mine).
49 Bush, President Outlines Iraqi Threat.
50 Bush, President Discusses Growing Danger.
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an image of risks so severe, of catastrophic potentials so great, that action had to be taken before something terrible happened.

As Blair argued at length, in the face of uncertainty, Western societies could not afford to sit back and hope that the risk would disappear:

Here is the crux. It is possible that even with all of this, nothing would have happened. Possible that Saddam would change his ambitions; possible he would develop the WMD but never use it; possible that the terrorists would never get their hands on WMD, whether from Iraq or elsewhere. We cannot be certain. Perhaps we would have found different ways of reducing it. Perhaps this Islamic terrorism would ebb of its own accord. But do we want to take the risk? That is the judgement. And my judgement then and now is that the risk of this new global terrorism and its interaction with states or organisations or individuals proliferating WMD, is one I simply am not prepared to run. This is not a time to err on the side of caution; not a time to weigh the risks to an infinite balance; not a time for the cynicism of the worldly wise who favour playing it long.51

In its authorisation to use military force against Iraq, the United States Congress also spoke in precautionary terms:

the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend itself.52

Again, the uncertainty surrounding Iraq’s WMD capabilities and the extreme consequences of the possible use of such weapons is utilised as the justification for

51 Blair, PM Warns of Continuing Global Terror Threat.
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precautionary and preventive action against Iraq. Bush put it more bluntly in November 2002, arguing that ‘there's risk in all action we take. But the risk of inaction is not a choice, as far as I'm concerned. The inaction creates more risk than doing our duty to make the world more peaceful’.\(^5^3\)

Finally, these precautionary trends also included not waiting for conclusive evidence that Iraq did in fact possess WMD capabilities or was attempting to produce or acquire them. Conclusive evidence or the demonstration of a clear causal relationship as the basis for action is precisely what the precautionary principle rejects.\(^5^4\) Bush commented that ‘Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud’.\(^5^5\) Interestingly, this ‘clear evidence of peril’ was ambiguous rather than clear. Indeed, as Bush readily admits, the ‘smoking gun’ had not been found. This statement is therefore highly precautionary – the consequences of Iraq obtaining WMD are so catastrophic and severe that we cannot wait for the evidence that they do in fact exist to take action. By that stage, it will be too late.

Therefore, risk and its associated concepts clearly informed the rationale and justifications for war provided by Bush, Blair and other supporters of intervention in Iraq. In particular, it has been shown that the dangers posed by Iraq were framed in terms of temporally and spatially de-bounded risks, high levels of uncertainty and a subsequent emphasis on precaution and prevention. That Bush, Blair and others consistently spoke of in terms of risks rather than imminent, clearly defined threats is lent further credence by the ambiguous and inconclusive evidence that was used to support the arguments for military action. In attempting to deal with de-bounded risks mired in uncertainty, Bush and Blair in particular responded as archetypal risk

\(^5^3\) Bush, *President Outlines Priorities*.
\(^5^4\) Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War*, 126.
\(^5^5\) Bush, *President Outlines Iraqi Threat*. 

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managers, demonstrating a strong emphasis on prevention and precaution. This was shown not only by their willingness to engage in military conflict despite the imperfect and incomplete evidence and intelligence at their disposal, but also by their willingness to assume the worst in the face of the uncertainty surrounding Iraq, WMD and terrorism.

The Iraq War was therefore justified as an exercise in risk management. It was a war intended to prevent globalised security risks by reshaping the social and political environment in Iraq by removing Saddam and supplanting his regime with a new liberal democracy. By promoting democratic governance and a host of other liberal values, an environment inhospitable to the emergence of de-bounded risks such as WMD proliferation or terrorism could be created. The next section of the chapter explores the Coalition effort to transform Iraq into a liberal democracy. It focuses first on the justifications and rationales provided for embarking on the promotion of liberal values in Iraq, before examining some of the specific reforms and modes of governance pursued by the Coalition.

**Situational Prevention in Iraq – Regime Change and the Promotion of Liberal Values**

As suggested in chapters three and four, it is primarily the temporally and spatially de-bounded nature of contemporary risk that compels Western governments to adopt situational risk management approaches in their efforts to govern risk. Unlike the risks themselves, environmental conditions conducive to risk production are readily identifiable and definable. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era, an absence of liberal institutions and good governance has been identified as constituting a potentially dangerous socio-political environment. During 2002 and 2003, Iraq was
identified as a risky environment giving rise to temporally and spatially de-bounded dangers associated with WMD proliferation. These dangers were perceived as sufficiently acute to warrant military action in order to force a liberal reshaping of the Iraqi socio-political environment. It was clear before the commencement of military operations in March 2003 that the Coalition would supplant Hussein’s regime with a liberal democracy – during the lead-up to the war, Bush and Blair discussed bringing liberty and democracy to Iraq.56

However, such a claim was dismissed by many critics of the intervention, who suggested that it was little more than an attempt to provide a moral gloss to an intervention that was inspired by separate motives and goals.57 However, the fact is that once the initial combat phase ended, Coalition forces immediately began working towards the formation of a liberal democratic government in Iraq. Therefore, the argument that the Americans and their allies went to Iraq to promote liberal values and forms of governance cannot be dismissed outright. Yet, the scepticism displayed by many over this issue is not entirely misplaced. To suggest that the promotion of liberal values was the primary goal of the Coalition ignores the fact that bringing liberty to Iraq was very much a secondary issue in the lead-up to the war. As demonstrated above, the focus was firmly on the risks associated with terrorism and WMD.

It was these risks that were put forward as the primary justification for the war – Western governments were far more concerned with their own security than they were with bringing freedom to Iraqi citizens. Tony Blair intimated as much when he argued that despite the foul nature of Hussein’s regime, regime change and

56 Bush, President Bush, Prime Minister Blair Discuss Keeping the Peace.
57 Nevertheless, promoting liberal values or democracy was indeed a part of the justifications provided for the invasion. See Katerina Dalacoura, ‘US Democracy Promotion in the Arab Middle East Since 11 September 2001: A Critique’, *International Affairs* 81, no. 5 (2005): 965.
The forging of a liberal Iraq were not Britain’s primary motivation for taking military action in 2003. Rather, the primary motivation was to enforce Iraq’s WMD disarmament obligations. This section therefore argues that the promotion of liberty and democracy in Iraq was not an end goal of the involved Western governments. Rather, it was a means to the end of securing themselves against globalised security risks. As Hobson suggests, democracy (and a range of liberal values) are being pursued in Iraq and the wider Middle East predominantly for strategic reasons, not because of some altruistic mission intended only to bring freedom to the populations of this region.

Despite the focus on WMD and terrorism in the lead up to the war, bringing liberty and democracy to the Iraqi people was discussed before the onset of military action in March 2003. Indeed, during this period, the solution offered by US officials to the risks posed by Saddam’s regime and its pursuit of WMD was the removal of Hussein and the reshaping of Iraq into a liberal democracy. The 2002 NSS had already clearly outlined not only America’s new preventive strategy, but also the central role that American values of liberty and democracy were to play in addressing the new security risks that the US faced. By February 2003, Bush was speaking much more explicitly of promoting liberal values in Iraq:

The Iraqi people today are not allowed to speak out for freedom, but they have a right to live in freedom. We don't believe freedom and liberty are America's gift to the world; we believe they are the Almighty's gift to mankind. And for the

58 Blair, *PM Warns of Continuing Terror Threat*.
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oppressed people of Iraq, people whose lives we care about, the day of freedom is drawing near. 61

While this statement clearly illustrates Bush’s desire to spread liberty in Iraq, it does not clearly outline the security benefits that would accrue to Western societies as a result. These benefits, however, were articulated in a press briefing at the end of February 2003:

A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. America's interests in security, and America's belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq.62

The intertwining of liberal values and security interests discussed in chapter four is again emphasised here – a free and democratic Iraq is congruent both with American values and with Bush’s interest in securing America against perceived risks. Bush reiterated the idea that reshaping Iraq into a liberal democracy would benefit Western security interests when he claimed that

The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life…A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region. 63

Not only would a liberal and democratic Iraq reduce the opportunities for the emergence of security risks such as terrorism, but it could also lead to a broader social and political reshaping of the Middle East. This region is an identified risky zone within international society, one in which state governments are predominantly

63 Ibid.
autocratic and from which several contemporary security risks are seen to emanate.\textsuperscript{64} The assumption on the part of Bush and other members of the administration was that long-term peace and stability for both Western societies and the Middle East depended on liberal reform throughout the region.\textsuperscript{65} Again, the point here is that liberal values are conceived of in mostly instrumental terms – promoting liberalism is merely one way of managing the ‘Middle Eastern zone of risk’.

After the end of the initial combat phase and the collapse of Saddam’s regime in April 2003, this theme of the need to successfully reshape the political and social environment in Iraq was one that was repeated often. The political focus in Coalition countries shifted from attempting to sell the war to justifying the continued presence of Coalition forces in Iraq. This justification was couched primarily in terms of staying in Iraq ‘until the job was done’ – the ‘job’ being to ensure that Iraq makes a successful transition to a liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{66} Since the war, it has been repeatedly argued by those that favoured military action in Iraq that failure to achieve this outcome would lead to Iraq becoming a haven for terrorists and other forms of security risk.\textsuperscript{67}

Bush has perhaps been the most explicit and consistent Western leader in arguing that the security of America and its Western allies depend on the success of American efforts to build a stable and liberal Iraqi state. In each successive State of the Union address between 2004 and 2008, Bush repeatedly argued that American

\textsuperscript{66} For example, the Howard Government repeatedly made the claim that Australian forces had to stay in Iraq until the job was done while it was in power. See Richard Woolcott, ‘Why We Are a Bigger Target’, \textit{The Age} (10 September 2002), http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/09/09/1094530764777.html (accessed 3 August 2008).
security depended on liberal values and democratic governance taking hold in Iraq. During the 2005 State of the Union address, Bush argued that

the victory of freedom in Iraq will...bring more hope and progress to a troubled region, and thereby lift a terrible threat from the lives of our children and grandchildren...We are standing for the freedom of our Iraqi friends, and freedom in Iraq will make America safer for generations to come.\(^68\)

Reshaping Iraq and forging a new political and social environment based upon liberal values and forms of governance is the key, according to this statement, to governing risks and making America’s future safer.

Such sentiments were restated by Bush in his 2006 State of the Union address:

Abroad, our nation is committed to an historic, long-term goal – we seek the end of tyranny in our world. Some dismiss that goal as misguided idealism. In reality, the future security of America depends on it...Dictatorships shelter terrorists, and feed resentment and radicalism, and seek weapons of mass destruction. Democracies replace resentment with hope, respect the rights of their citizens and their neighbours, and join the fight against terror. Every step toward freedom in the world makes our country safer so we will act boldly in freedom's cause.\(^69\)

The main argument was clear and consistent during Bush’s tenure: America must succeed in building a liberal democratic Iraq for the sake of its future security.\(^70\)

The strategy of effecting liberal reform in Iraq as a means of managing risk was consolidated in the 2005 US *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI)*. This document outlined the conditions for an American victory in Iraq and the strategic

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framework that would be employed to achieve victory. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the document was the way in which victory in Iraq was defined. One might expect that complete victory would result once all insurgents and terrorists in the country had been eliminated. And yet, this is not the primary condition for victory outlined in the NSVI. Instead, the document states that the strategy to be employed in Iraq involves helping ‘the Iraqi people build a new Iraq with a constitutional, representative government that respects civil rights and has security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven for terrorists’.  

Reshaping Iraq into a liberal society with a democratic government is the ultimate strategy of the American government. The document appears to contain the explicit assumption that a liberal and democratic Iraq in itself would mitigate the dangers posed by the terrorists and insurgents operating in Iraq. Not only would a stable democratic government have the capacity to eliminate any remaining terrorists or insurgents, but it would also provide the conditions necessary to reduce the possibility of individuals adopting extremist ideologies and engaging in terrorist activity. The Bush administration’s belief in reshaping the Iraqi socio-political environment into a liberal democracy reflects an optimistic view of the ability of American power, coupled with American ideals, to reshape the world into a better place. This would be a better world not only for the oppressed peoples that

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72 This notion was part of a broader neo-conservative outlook on the Middle East and US foreign policy that had been articulated prior to Bush’s 2000 election victory in a 1998 letter to then-President Clinton. This letter, sent by the neo-conservative group Project for a New American Century and containing several future Bush administration officials, such as Donald Rumsfeld, urged Clinton to consider replacing Saddam’s regime with a democratic government so as to prevent him from acquiring WMD. See Project for a New American Century, ‘Letter to President Bill Clinton’ (26 January 1998), http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm (accessed 20 June 2008).

America’s power and liberal values would liberate; but also for America and other Western societies.

As noted in chapter four, this reflects a series of assumptions concerning the inherently ‘good’ nature of liberal democratic states and the power of liberal values to curb the political and social conditions which give rise to security risks such as terrorism or rogue states seeking to acquire WMD. However, Bush was not alone in his views regarding the nexus between liberal values and security. Blair appeared to share Bush’s sentiments regarding the importance of liberal values in Iraq for Western security, although he was not as explicit or consistent in making the argument that Western security depends upon liberty in Iraq. During an address to British troops in Basra in 2004, Blair suggested that

Democracies don't sponsor terrorism. No country that obeys the rule of law tortures and maims its citizens. No government that owes its position to the will of the people will spend billions of pounds on chemical and biological and nuclear weapons whilst their people live in poverty.\(^4\)

Blair further outlined the argument that it is a lack of freedom and democracy that breeds security risks such as terrorism, and hence that the promotion of liberal values in oppressive environments will lead to a reduction in the emergence of such dangers:

Because it is in a free, democratic and stable Iraq that not just the violence, but the wretched and backward philosophy of these terrorists will be defeated and destroyed…if you've got freedom and democracy, and the rule of law, you can raise your family, you can earn a decent standard of living, you can go about your daily business without fear of the secret police or terrorism. And in those types of

\(^4\) Tony Blair, *PM Thanks UK Armed Forces in Basra Visit* (London: Office of the Prime Minister, 2004).
societies, the terrorists who thrive on hatred and fanaticism, they get no breathing

ground, they get no breathing space.  

Further, in a speech to the US Congress in 2003, Blair again argued that
Western security depended on spreading liberal values: ‘The spread of freedom is the
best security for the free. It is our last line of defence and our first line of attack’.  

Blair reiterated such points in 2004, stating that
That is precisely why the terrorists are trying to foment hatred and division in Iraq.
They know full well, a stable democratic Iraq, under the sovereign rule of the Iraqi
people, is a mortal blow to their fanaticism. That is why our duty is to rebuild Iraq
and Afghanistan as stable and democratic nations…It is a practical recognition
that just as within a country, citizens who are free, well educated and prosperous
tend to be responsible, to feel solidarity with a society in which they have a stake;
so do nations that are free, democratic and benefiting from economic progress,
tend to be stable and solid partners in the advance of humankind. The best defence
of our security lies in the spread of our values.  

It is clear from these statements that liberalism in Iraq is regarded as the solution to
the security risks perceived to have existed under Hussein’s regime.

Importantly, these statements did not merely constitute empty rhetoric – once
the Coalition had control of Iraq, it moved quickly to begin the work of establishing
a new liberal democratic polity. Once Coalition forces had attained control of
Baghdad, control over post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation in Iraq was initially
exercised by the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA),
created by Bush under National Security Presidential Directive 24 of 20 January

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77 Blair, *PM Warns of Continuing Terror Threat*.  

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2003. However, ORHA activities did not last long, and shortly after combat operations had been (prematurely) declared over by President Bush in May 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) assumed the ORHA’s humanitarian assistance and reconstruction missions. It also assumed responsibility for the broader project of building representative political institutions and improving governance within Iraq. Although nominally an international body, the CPA was created by the American government and was headed by American Presidential Envoy Paul Bremer.

The CPA’s mission was to help the Iraqis build what was deemed four foundational pillars of their sovereignty: Security, Governance (emphasising liberal notions of good governance), Essential Services and Economy (again emphasising a liberal notion of good governance). The CPA’s main strategic objective was a stable peace for a unified and democratic Iraq. As outlined in its first Regulation, the CPA vested itself with full governmental authority, assuming all executive, legislative and judicial authority needed to meet its objectives. The assumption of this authority was justified on the basis of the laws of war (the US and UK having designated themselves as occupying powers) and UNSCR 1483. This Resolution called upon the US and UK to effectively administer Iraq so as to provide the

79 Ibid., 2-3.
82 Ibid., 4.
83 Coalition Provisional Authority, Regulation One: The Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA/REG/16 May 2003/01 (16 May 2003).
conditions in which the Iraqi people would be able to assume the responsibilities of self-government.84

Interestingly, this meant that despite the talk of democracy and liberalism in Iraq, during the period of CPA control over Iraq, Bremer essentially ruled by decree, issuing promulgations in the form of regulations, orders or memoranda.85 Such promulgations involved significant measures aimed at reshaping the political and social environment in Iraq. While not all of these reforms were directly related to building representative institutions or formulating an adherence to liberal forms of good governance most, if not all, of these promulgations were informed by the CPA’s main objective of formulating a stable and democratic Iraq. The point here is that despite the liberal pretensions of the Coalition’s risk management activities in Iraq, when put into effect, risk management activities may also involve decidedly illiberal activities or tendencies.

One of the more notable, and controversial, promulgations in this regard was Bremer’s order to undertake the so-called ‘de-Ba’athification’ of Iraqi Society. The CPA announced its intention to pursue the de-Ba’athification of Iraq in April 2003, formalising this announcement one month later with Order One of the CPA.86 Not only was the Ba’ath Party disbanded, but all former members were prohibited from employment in the public service. Ostensibly, this was to ensure that the Ba’ath Party could not threaten Iraq’s future democracy or pose a security risk to the Coalition.87 This measure was coupled with the disbanding of the Iraqi military,

85 For a list of these orders, regulations and memoranda, see the CPA’s website, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/index.html#Regulations (accessed 11 May 2009).
86 Coalition Provisional Authority, Order Number One: De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society, CPA/ORD/16 May 2003/01 (16 May 2003).
87 Ibid.
intelligence agencies, and organisations charged with guarding Saddam Hussein.\(^{88}\) This was similarly designed to reshape the political and security environment in Iraq. Similar to the disbanding of the Ba’ath Party, it was aimed at removing all influences of Saddam’s previous regime that could destabilise Iraq and pose a risk to Coalition efforts to politically and socially reform the country.\(^{89}\)

The intention of the Coalition, particularly the Americans, in Iraq was not simply to supplant Hussein’s regime with a liberal democracy, but to completely eradicate all elements of this regime from the Iraqi political landscape. This evidenced a far-ranging reshaping of the Iraqi social and political environment. Any and all significant members of the former regime or Ba’ath Party (indeed, even insignificant members) were to be relieved of their positions and excluded from the new liberal government being constructed.\(^{90}\) Such measures also highlighted distinctly illiberal trends regarding the way in which the CPA governed Iraq. As noted, these measures were issued in promulgations by Bremer, who was unaccountable to the Iraqi people. Another notable feature of the CPA’s governing of Iraq was the speed with which it moved to begin securing liberal reforms in Iraq and establishing the foundations for representative government.

This reflected the importance placed upon securing liberal reforms in Iraq as a means of controlling risks. It was imperative that Iraq be reshaped into a liberal society as quickly as possible. In July 2003, Bremer promulgated the establishment of the Governing Council of Iraq as part of the Iraqi interim administration. This

\(^{88}\) Coalition Provisional Authority, *Order Number Two: Dissolution of Entities*, CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02 (23 May 2003).


\(^{90}\) See Chandler, *Empire in Denial*, 168.
organisation did not supersede the CPA, although it did have its own set of responsibilities. Notably, the Governing Council was not an elected body, but rather consisted of twenty-five members hand-picked by the US.\textsuperscript{91} Ostensibly, the Governing Council was established to give the Iraqis some representation in the interim administration of Iraq before the formation of a transitional government. In November 2003, the CPA, in consultation with the Governing Council, agreed to a plan outlining the process by which the CPA would relinquish control and hand sovereignty back to Iraq.\textsuperscript{92}

The plan involved the formulation and signing of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and the selection of an interim National Assembly and government, to which sovereignty would be handed by mid 2004.\textsuperscript{93} Again, neither the TAL nor the interim government were acceded to by the Iraqi people – they were issued or appointed by the CPA in consultation with the Governing Council. In March 2004, the CPA issued the TAL, which outlined the process to be followed in Iraq’s transition to full representative governance. Importantly, this document dictated that Iraq’s future government ‘shall be republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic…”\textsuperscript{94} This clause in the TAL reflected not the expressed preferences of the Iraqi people, but rather that of the Coalition, which dictated the form of Iraq’s new government.

In short, liberal democratic government was not chosen by the Iraqi people and could not be given the fact that they were never offered a choice. Instead, liberal institutions were imposed by the CPA in Iraq, reflecting Coalition preferences for a

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
liberal reshaping of the political and social environment in a bid to manage
globalised security risks. Given the thinking that liberalism in Iraq is the answer to
perceived security risks, it is unsurprising that the Coalition did not leave the Iraqis
much room to manoeuvre as they worked towards self-government. It was further
unsurprising that the Coalition were careful to decide for themselves who would be
appointed to the Governing Council and also played a substantial role in deciding
who, along with the Governing Council and UN Special Representative to Iraq
Lakdhar Brahimi, would be a part of the interim government and the interim
National Assembly.\footnote{Katzman, ‘Iraq: Transition to Sovereignty’, 3.}

The actual handover of sovereignty to the Iraqi interim government occurred
on 28 June 2004, at which time the CPA was dissolved and ceased to exist.\footnote{BBC News, ‘US hands back power in Iraq’ (28 June 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middl

e_east/3845517.stm (accessed 23 August 2005).} Bremer
left Iraq immediately after the formal handover of sovereignty was complete.\footnote{Rory McCarthy, ‘Confident Bremer Hurries Away From Baghdad via the Back Door’, The
Guardian (29 June 2003), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jun/29/iraq.usa (accessed 2 August 2008).} Perhaps one of the most notable features of the CPA then is its relative brevity,
governing Iraq for a period of only fourteen months. The quick transferral of
sovereignty was unsurprising given that Coalition countries viewed it as a crucial
first step on the road towards an Iraqi democracy.\footnote{George W. Bush, President Outlines Steps to Help Iraq Achieve Freedom and Democracy (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, 24 May 2004).} However, even after sovereignty
had nominally been returned to the Iraqis and the CPA dissolved, the interim
government continued to be constrained by the Transitional Administrative Law and
Bremer’s edicts, several of which would continue to remain in force.\footnote{David Chandler, Empire in Denial, 167; Encarnacion, ‘The Follies of Democratic Imperialism’, 57.}

While Coalition forces continued to exercise control over security in Iraq
after the handover of sovereignty, political control was now nominally in the hands
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of the Iraqi people. On 30 January 2005, elections were held to establish a transitional National Assembly and government that would draft a permanent constitution in Iraq. This constitution was ratified in October 2005, allowing for the holding of another general election to elect a permanent National Assembly and government.\textsuperscript{100} This election was held in December 2005, achieving a turnout of over seventy percent of the voting population and resulting in a permanent government of Iraq taking office in May 2006.\textsuperscript{101} Thus, in just over three years, the Coalition had built institutions of representative governance in Iraq that had resulted in a freely elected Iraqi government.

However, despite the speed with which the Coalition formed a liberal government in Iraq, the processes by which liberal governance was promoted were themselves decidedly hierarchical and illiberal. Firstly, Bremer had been appointed, not elected as head of the CPA and governed Iraq through the issue of edicts and promulgations, a practice described as ‘autocratic’.\textsuperscript{102} Further, while Bush stressed that it was up to the Iraqis to decide what form of government they wanted, it was clear from the outset that the scope of this decision was limited to what form of liberal government they wanted. The Coalition had not invaded Iraq and overthrown Hussein simply to witness the establishment of another dictatorship.\textsuperscript{103}

Faced with perceivably urgent security risks, the case of Iraq demonstrates the willingness of Western states to employ their situational method of risk management, reshaping risky environments into liberal democracies, via distinctly

\textsuperscript{103} George W. Bush, \textit{President Sworn-In to Second Term} (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, 20 January 2005); Bush, \textit{President Discusses the Future of Iraq}. 
illiberal means. On the surface, one could say that the political and social reshaping of Iraq was a success – most remnants of Hussein’s regime had been eliminated and his dictatorship had been replaced with a liberal government. Theoretically, this should mean enhanced security for Western societies against the perceived risks posed by Iraq under Hussein’s regime. Yet the democratic government in Iraq is not a stable one, continually beset by instability caused by sectarian violence and insurgency. The continued and at times severe violence has necessitated the continued presence of Coalition troops in Iraq, although major allies such as Australia have removed their forces from the country and the British have substantially reduced their troop numbers.\(^{104}\)

The US thus continues to exercise significant authority within Iraq. Despite the initial period of coercive domination in which the Coalition overthrew Hussein’s regime, new relations of hierarchy have been constructed between Iraq and the US. This hierarchical relationship is distinctly underpinned by a liberal social logic of risk, constructing the US and its allies as peaceful liberal societies that hold the authority to impose liberalism in illiberal or outlaw states that are perceived to endanger their security. Not only were risk, prevention and precaution central to the justifications provided for the invasion, but liberal values were crucial to defining the appropriate responses to the perceived risks posed by Hussein’s regime. The next section briefly considers the extent to which this social logic of risk has underpinned relations of hierarchy between the US and Iraq. It also considers the implications of forceful regime change in Iraq for international society.

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International Society after Iraq

The 2003 invasion of Iraq undoubtedly aroused a great deal of controversy within international society regarding the necessity, legitimacy and legality of the invasion. The political fallout of the intervention was significant to say the least. Not only had the efficacy and credibility of the UN been called into question in the face of a superpower which possessed the capability to bypass the UN altogether if it wished (and ultimately did), but some even went so far as to question the continued viability of the post-1945 international order or international society itself.\(^\text{105}\) That such claims have been made, coupled with the high levels of dissent within international society regarding the invasion, demonstrates the cleavages that were wrought by the Iraq War, especially those regarding the incompatibility of the invasion with international society’s prevailing pluralist constitution.

Indeed, several facets of the US invasion of Iraq do not sit well with the norms of pluralist international society. The norms of sovereign equality and non-intervention were both thoroughly violated. The heterogeneity normally associated with a pluralist international society appeared to be replaced in 2003 with a coercive homogeneity, in which the US and its allies dictate liberal democratic governance to illiberal states deemed to be particularly risky. As Dunne argues, the point of the norms underpinning pluralist international society was to prevent diverse political communities from being overrun by the more powerful members within that society.\(^\text{106}\) Yet clearly, this is exactly what happened in Iraq – the pluralist norms of international society had little effect in preventing Iraq from being overrun by the US and its Coalition.

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\(^{106}\) Dunne, ‘Society and Hierarchy’, 306.
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Less clear, however, is how to conceptualise the resulting political relationship between Iraq and the US. As demonstrated above, a liberal social logic of risk clearly informed both the justifications for the war and the risk management methods that the Coalition employed in Iraq. However, in the case of the invasion of Iraq, it is not entirely obvious that this social logic of risk gave rise to or underpinned the emergence of new relations of hierarchy between the US and Iraq. Certainly, the initial invasion and overthrow of Hussein’s regime was a case of coercive domination, not hierarchy. This is because of the lack of widespread legitimacy surrounding the invasion. Clearly, the subordinated state did not initially recognise the Bush administration’s claim that the US not only had the right to prevent possibly dangerous risks to its security, but also the authority to determine the domestic socio-political constitution of other states within international society.

Equally as clear was the use of coercion to compel Hussein’s regime to disband and establish US authority over Iraq. The initial invasion and conquest of Iraq, therefore, cannot be described as a hierarchical relationship recognised as legitimate by both the superordinate and subordinate states. However, this does not mean that Iraq, or the wider international community, did not eventually bestow at least a measure of legitimacy on the US’ claim of authority. The initial invasion may not have enjoyed legitimacy, but arguably the US’ continued presence and exercise of authority in Iraq did, at least partly.\(^{107}\) Firstly, of note are UNSCRs 1483 and 1511 which recognised, and therefore provided a legal basis for, the CPA’s control over Iraq.\(^{108}\) Critics might counter that the Security Council was simply acting

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\(^{107}\) Wheatley notes that while the invasion itself was subject to extensive controversy and debate, the subsequent efforts to establish a democratic regime in Iraq were not. See Steven Wheatley, ‘The Security Council, Democratic Legitimacy and Regime Change in Iraq’, *European Journal of International Law* 17, no. 3 (2006): 532.

pragmatically, and in accordance with established international law, in recognising the Coalition as the occupying power in Iraq.

This argument is certainly plausible, but regardless of the Security Council’s motives in passing the Resolution, the fact remains that it did provide legal recognition, and arguably a measure of legitimacy, of the CPA’s claim as the governing authority of Iraq. Crucially, the Resolution also recognises the US’ claim to hold the authority to promote liberalism and reshape Iraqi socio-political institutions, stating that the UN seeks to work with the CPA ‘to advance efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance, including by working together to facilitate a process leading to an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq’.\(^{109}\) Secondly, the US clearly retained significant authority in Iraq, particularly for security, after the ‘transfer’ of sovereignty in June 2004 and the election of Iraq’s transitional National Assembly in early 2005.

This authority was generally recognised as legitimate by the transitional government and subsequently by the permanent government of Prime Minister Nouri al Malaki, which took office in 2006 after the December 2005 elections. Particularly since the formation of the Transitional National Assembly, the relationship between Iraq and the US can be regarded as hierarchical. The US maintains significant authority in Iraq in an effort to stabilise the country and preserve the liberal institutions that it established after its invasion. In turn, the Iraqi government has recognised the role and authority of US forces in Iraq. Again some might suggest that the al Malaki government has no choice but to accept US authority over Iraq, but the fact remains that the Iraqi government is still dependent upon the US for the

The invasion of Iraq and the subsequent emergence of relations of hierarchy between Iraq and the US also clearly illustrate the corrosive effect of Western risk management interventions upon international society’s pluralist constitution. Rather than an international society defined in terms of the maximisation of the range of potential values and regimes that a state can adopt, Western perceptions of risk and attempts at risk management lead to the emergence of an ‘international risk society’ defined in terms of the imperative to conform to non-risky (liberal) forms of domestic governance. Failure to conform to this model of good governance can potentially result in varying modes of intervention aimed at managing risk.

110 This bears some similarity to Lake’s argument that subordinated states recognise the authority of superordinate states because of the latter’s provision of social goods. See Lake, ‘Regional Hierarchy’.
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depending on the perceived severity of the potential dangers involved. In the case of Iraq, the pluralist vision of political community amongst states and its attendant norms were not simply mitigated; they were forcefully and thoroughly violated because the American government and several of its allies deemed themselves to be at grave risk.

Importantly though, unlike other scholars who have suggested that the US invasion of Iraq threatens the existence of international society, what is at stake here is not international society’s existence, but the way in which it is to be constituted, particularly in terms of rightful membership and rightful conduct. The 2003 invasion of Iraq did not completely invalidate the idea of an international society in which states view themselves as bound by, and act in accordance with, common rules and principles informed by a core set of commonly accepted norms. Nor did the invasion of Iraq represent its complete removal from international society. Iraq did not cease to be a state or separate political community, despite the curtailing of the rights normally afforded to states within international society.

It is notable that the Americans were quick to transfer sovereignty back to Iraq and, despite its subordination, see to the establishment of a democratic and (at least nominally) independent Iraqi state. This suggests that risky territories are not entirely removed from international society, but rather have their membership rights temporarily suspended until they have been ‘rehabilitated’. As Mazzar argues, state sovereignty can be dispensed with, at least temporarily, when the West attempts to enforce its rules on non-Western, peripheral states.\(^\text{111}\) What the governing of risk means then for international society is not a contraction of its membership, but rather a shift in the way in which membership is understood. It is precisely within these

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shifting understandings of rightful membership that we can discern contemporary hierarchical trends within international society. Iraq has shown that a respect for pluralist diversity within international society has been subsumed under the notion that should a state deviate too far from the prescribed ‘non-risky’, liberal standards of domestic governance then it potentially becomes, *in extremis*, subject to coercive interventionism and forceful regime change.

Conclusion

The 2003 invasion of Iraq was motivated primarily by the perception that Saddam Hussein’s regime posed a number of unacceptable and potentially catastrophic risks that had to be prevented. The justifications provided by Bush, Blair and other Western leaders and officials for going to war in Iraq explicitly pointed to future possibilities as the basis upon which action needed to be taken. Indeed, the dangers posed by Hussein, WMD and terrorism were explicitly conceptualised in terms of temporally and spatially de-bounded risks. At no stage did Bush, Blair or any other Western officials supportive of the war point to a specific ‘thing’, one that was spatially and temporally identifiable, and say ‘this is the threat’. While the term threat was often used, this ‘threat’ was spatially and temporally ill-defined and surrounded by high levels of uncertainty.

Despite the talk of threats what was really being referred to were risks. Action in Iraq represented an intention to prevent possible future scenarios from eventuating. Risk management is thus a suitable characterisation of the 2003 Iraq War. In order to manage the risks posed by WMD and terrorism, the Coalition adopted a situational prevention approach, seeking to politically and socially reshape Iraq into a liberal democracy as a means of ensuring that it would no longer act as a
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source of global security risks. By transforming Iraq into a liberal democracy, an environment hostile to the production of such risks, rather than conducive to them, would be created. The promotion of liberalism in Iraq was therefore not so much an end goal as it was a means to the primary objective of enhancing Western security against perceived risks.

There is little doubt that the intervention raised serious questions concerning the pluralist constitution of international society. In the previous cases surveyed in this thesis, the interventions undertaken by Western societies were far more consensual. Liberal values have been promoted by Australia in the Asia-Pacific, for example, but the interventions undertaken by the Australian government were consented to by the target states. The invasion of Iraq, however, represented the subjugation and domination of one sovereign state by another, regardless of the fact that the Americans were seeking to replace a dictatorship with a democracy. The pluralist right of all states to internally constitute their political and social institutions as they see fit was absolutely violated in Iraq, along with other key norms of pluralist international society such as non-intervention and sovereign equality.

Yet after this initial period of coercive domination, discernible relations of hierarchy did emerge between the US and Iraq’s new democratic government. Iraq therefore provides another example of the way in which a liberal social logic of risk underpins the emergence of a more hierarchical form of international society. The notion that Iraq under Hussein’s regime, and indeed the wider Middle East, constitutes an environment conducive to the origination of risks such as terrorism or WMD proliferation creates an urgent imperative to intervene and reshape the region so as to prevent such risks from ever emerging. Of course, this risk management argument is but one of many interpretations of the reasons and rationale for the
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Coalition’s invasion of Iraq. Others have highlighted the centrality of American desires to secure Iraq’s oil reserves or consolidate its’ strategic influence in the Middle East.

However, unlike the risk management approach outlined in this chapter, these alternative explanations do not account for two crucial aspects of the intervention: the constant invocation by Bush and other Coalition leaders of the de-bounded risks posed by Hussein and WMD as the primary justification for war and the subsequent emphasis on liberal governance and institutional reform within Iraq. The former facet of the intervention is dismissed as a smokescreen designed to cover the real motives of the war, despite the lack of evidence to suggest that this was in fact the case; the latter is ignored altogether. The risk management approach overcomes these limitations by actually engaging with the justifications provided for the invasion and the actions of the Coalition in Iraq once Hussein had been deposed. Further, it sheds light on the implications of the invasion for our understandings of contemporary social relationships between states, something that a superficial focus on a ‘grab for oil’ does not. Therefore, the risk management approach provides a more persuasive and comprehensive analysis of the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Conclusion

What form of international society has emerged in the post-Cold War era? That is the question that this project began with. The preceding chapters have argued that international society has recently become more hierarchical and anti-pluralist as a result of a new liberal social logic of risk that underpins new relations of hierarchy between Western societies and supposedly risky illiberal and fragile states. This thesis has drawn attention to the crucial role of risk and risk management in shaping the constitutional structure of international society in the post-Cold War era. Paradoxically, as Western societies seek to construct a more liberal form of international society as a way of managing new forms of security risk, what actually emerges is an international society characterised by hierarchy and anti-pluralism.

This is because the liberal social logic of risk underpinning contemporary hierarchies constructs liberal societies as ‘safe havens’ that are potentially threatened by illiberal environments in which a range of temporally and spatially de-bounded security risks can grow. This division between an illiberal zone of risk and a liberal zone comprised of Western societies at risk creates an imperative to reshape illiberal territories in order to mitigate the possible dangers that they pose for the West. The result has been a series of interventions, especially since the September 11 terrorist attacks, in which Western societies have claimed the authority to determine the domestic institutions of those states which are targeted for intervention. This signifies an erosion of international society’s pluralist constitution in that these interventions explicitly attempt to limit the range of acceptable values and regimes.
that states may adopt. These interventions are thus representative of on-going processes of constitutional revision within international society.

Crucial to these processes of reconstitution is the temporally and spatially de-bounded nature of contemporary risks. It is precisely the inherent difficulties in directly managing risks which are difficult to identify and locate that has led to the West’s adoption of a situational risk management approach that seeks to reshape environments perceived as being conducive to the origination of risk. New forms of de-bounded risk are difficult to identify and locate, meaning that simply securing borders or securing the homeland itself will not suffice in achieving greater security for the West. The three case studies have demonstrated that both the perception of new forms of de-bounded risk and the notion that liberal values and institutions can be equated with greater security have become core aspects of the security policies of several Western states.

The US, EU and Australia have all attempted to manage perceived risks by promoting liberal values and institutions in territories identified as potentially dangerous. These interventions have all demonstrated that the de-bounded nature of contemporary security issues means that securing the ‘homeland’ requires active intervention abroad in order to mitigate risks where they might originate. As the EU highlighted in the 2003 ESS, defence of the homeland now requires engagement with territories identified as belonging to zones of risk.\(^1\) International society has become defined in terms of spatially and temporally de-bounded zones of risk rather than the territorially discrete nation-state. The borders of these zones of risk are fluid and are not geographically fixed. Thus, failing states in the Asia-Pacific suddenly becomes a security issue of grave concern for the Australian government when the security

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implications of state weakness in the Asia-Pacific had previously been paid scant attention.

A liberal social logic of risk has become crucial to the governing of social relationships between states. The attempt to impose liberal values on subordinated states as a mechanism of risk management (and hence forge a new form of liberal international society) actually results in a new form of illiberal international governance between states. This is most clearly demonstrated in the illiberal methods that Australia, the EU and the US have used in order to impose liberal values and institutions in various states. For example, in Solomon Islands unaccountable RAMSI officials have, in certain instances, assumed direct control over key areas of the Solomon Islands government. In Iraq, Paul Bremer, head of the CPA, effectively governed the country for over a year by edict. There is thus a very real disjuncture between the way in which liberal values have been imposed on particular states as a means of managing risk and these liberal values themselves.

The consequence of these attempts to manage risk by forging a more liberal international society via illiberal means is that the pluralist notion that states should refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of others so as to provide maximum scope for all states to freely construct their domestic institutions has been eroded. Indeed, this is clearly demonstrated in the above examples of the governance of risky territories by Western states. Both the CPA and RAMSI have explicitly attempted to limit the range of values and regimes that Solomon Islanders and Iraqis can freely choose for themselves by removing popular accountability of their efforts to impose liberal reform. The upshot here is that these interventions have led to significant changes in prevailing notions of rightful membership and rightful conduct within international society.
Conclusion

Within pluralist international society, the recognition of sovereignty and full membership was largely detached from the internal characteristics of the state. However, the period following the end of the Cold War has seen the application of particular criteria applied to the recognition of sovereignty and membership within international society. In other words, particularistic (liberal) values have ‘come to dominate the conception of an appropriate form of international society’. The result of this is the curtailment of the sovereign rights of those states that fail to adhere to these liberal values – domestic liberal institutions have recently become the guarantor of the enjoyment of full sovereign rights within international society. The invocation of a new liberal standard for full membership has also resulted in considerable shifts in legitimate conduct within international society. Western societies have claimed the authority to determine the socio-political constitution of other states as a means of managing risk.

In the process, the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention have been disregarded in the interactions of Western states with particular, supposedly risky, non-Western states. The 2003 invasion of Iraq provides the most overt example of the disregard for the principles of sovereign equality or non-intervention when a Western state or coalition of states perceives itself as facing particularly acute risks. However, the invasion of Iraq is only one out of series of interventions (such as the EU’s ENP and Australian interventions in the Asia-Pacific) which highlight a broader pattern of behaviour and a consequent shift in the patterns of legitimate state conduct within international society. Together, the three cases of intervention surveyed in this thesis reveal a distinctive shift in modes of interaction between Western and non-Western societies. This is most evident in the

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2 Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, 27.
3 Ibid., 41.
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subordination of territories identified as potentially dangerous within new relations of hierarchy.

Yet, while this thesis has provided a response to the question of what form of international society in the post-Cold War era, it also gives rise to another question: where to for international society from here? The issue of international society’s post-Cold War reconstitution is one that will continue to be an important area of research in the years to come. Will international society continue to exhibit shifts towards hierarchy and antipluralism, or will the norms and rules of pluralist international society be re-asserted? Ikenberry has addressed this question, arguing that what he terms the ‘version 2.0’ liberal international order forged after World War Two is in the process of evolution (broadly, this 2.0 liberal order is similar to what I describe as a pluralist international society and its attendant liberal rights of sovereign equality and non-intervention). Ikenberry recognises, as does this thesis, that international society’s constitutional structure is evolving due to a range of factors and issues in the post-Cold War era. However, Ikenberry’s conclusions regarding this changing constitutional structure differ from those presented here.

Ikenberry suggests that international society might continue to evolve in three ways – towards either a version 2.5 or 3.0 liberal international order, or the complete breakdown of liberal international order. Version 3.0 represents the reduction of international hierarchy as the US relinquishes certain rights and privileges it holds as the world’s superpower and responsibility for international governance is diffused between a greater number of major states. Version 2.5 represents a point somewhere between versions 2.0 and 3.0 in which the US relinquishes some of its rights but not others. Neither of these two possibilities, nor the third of a complete breakdown of

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4 See Ikenberry, ‘Liberal Internationalism 3.0’.
5 Ibid., 80-3.
6 Ibid., 80.
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liberal order, captures the current transformation of international society. Liberal international order has certainly evolved since the end of the Cold War, but the hallmark of this evolution is the paradoxical removal of the liberal rights that states enjoyed in their interactions with one another under international society’s pluralist constitution as Western societies seek to manage risk by imposing liberal values and institutions within states.

Contemporary constitutional revision represents neither a shift towards a 2.5 nor 3.0 version of liberal international order, at least as Ikenberry describes it. Recent attempts to increase the number of liberal democratic states mean that international society has arguably become more liberal. However, if this is so then we need to recognise that this international society is liberal without being pluralist and involves new forms of hierarchical and illiberal governance between states. But as noted above, the question is whether current trends of hierarchy and anti-pluralism will continue to prevail within international society in the long term. This is difficult to answer, particularly with the election of Barack Obama as President of the United States, which has resulted in discernible shifts in America’s foreign policy approach. The Obama administration has thus far appeared to broadly support the norms and rules of pluralist international society, reaffirming the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention and seeking to manage security issues through diplomacy and engagement with other states and international institutions.

However, while it is too early to provide any conclusive answers as to where current processes of reconstitution will eventually lead, it is apparent that as of the writing of this conclusion (May 2009), hierarchical relationships based on attempts to manage risks by promoting liberalism continue to prevail – all of the interventions examined in the case studies are still on-going. For instance, despite the
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change of government in Australia in November 2007, Australia remains the primary contributor to RAMSI. The EU is still engaged in efforts to promote political and economic reform in ENP partner countries. Finally, while the Obama administration has tabled plans for a withdrawal from Iraq, it is looking to bolster NATO forces operating in Afghanistan as it attempts to consolidate the democratic regime under President Harmad Karzai.

Further, it is apparent that most (if not all) of the elements of the liberal social logic of risk continue to pertain to the security policies of many Western societies. Firstly, Western leaders, including relatively new leaders such as Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd or Obama have continued to extol the security benefits of liberal values and institutions. Obama has spoken on several occasions of the need for America to embrace its liberal values in order to enhance its security. As he stated at a recent graduation of US Naval and Marine officers, ‘We uphold our fundamental principles and values not just because we choose to, but because we swear to; not because they feel good, but because they help keep us safe and keep us true to who we are’.  

Secondly, preoccupations with risk continue to be a defining feature of the security outlook of several Western nations. In December 2008, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, established by the US Congress, published its initial report entitled *World at Risk*. The title aside, this report explicitly characterises WMD proliferation and terrorism as temporally and spatially de-bounded risks and argues that globalisation has

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forever changed the international strategic environment.\(^8\) It also demonstrates several characteristics associated with a risk management approach, including active anticipation and horizon scanning, precaution, and an emphasis on prevention.

Indeed, one of the reports’ key statements is a speculated scenario of a possible future event: ‘The Commission believes that unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013’.\(^9\) Therefore, it is not a question of whether or not perceptions of risk and attempts at risk management will continue to be defining features of the security policies of Western societies, but rather how these perceptions of risk and the risk management techniques utilised might vary over time. As was argued in chapters three and four, the assessment of risks and the selection of risk management techniques are social constructs subject to political contestation. One important avenue of future research that this thesis has raised is therefore the analysis of the politics behind risk and risk management. This has been beyond the scope of this thesis, but several important areas of investigation pertain to the politics of risk management.

For example, how are risk assessments conducted and which organisations or individuals within Western governments are responsible for the identification or definition of particular risks? In short, who decides what constitutes a risk and which risks to address? How are these decisions made? This is a particularly important issue, especially when identified risks are subject to intense political contestation. The build-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq (and its aftermath) have demonstrated just


\(^9\) Ibid., xv.
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how politically divisive risk management activities can be when different individuals or groups disagree over the severity of the risks at hand or the risk management techniques implemented. Another area of investigation in regards to the politics of risk management is the selection of particular risk management tools or techniques. The case studies have shown that different Western societies have adopted differing risk management tactics, despite the common strategy of promoting liberal values.

For instance, one might query what informs the EU’s use of conditionality to compel states to adopt liberal reform as opposed to simply utilising military force to achieve regime change and political reform as the US did in Iraq.

Finally, another avenue of further investigation in terms of risk and risk management are the utilisation and theorisation of these concepts in an International Relations context. As highlighted in the introduction, more work is needed on the impact of risk and risk management on prevailing modes of international governance and the constitution of international society. Risk and risk management have the potential to become important conceptual and analytical tools for studying state behaviour and interstate interaction, particularly given the salient nature of contemporary risks such as terrorism or global climate change. International Relations theory needs to take greater account of risk and risk management, as these concepts bear on many of the key issues within International Relations, including questions of international order and justice, sovereignty and global governance.

In summary, this thesis has provided an analysis of the changing constitutional structure of contemporary international society, suggesting that its prevalent features are new hierarchical and anti-pluralist trends based upon a liberal social of risk. This on-going process of constitutional revision suggests a distinctive shift away from the pluralist constitution of international society that has prevailed
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since decolonisation. By promoting liberalism within the state in order to manage new forms of de-bounded security risk, Western societies have contributed to the construction of new modes of hierarchical and anti-pluralist international governance within international society.
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