The Aristocrats of Intellectual Property: How Modern Enclosuristic Practices have Fuelled the Internet Piracy Revolution

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Statement of Presentation and Declaration

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ABSTRACT

Modern intellectual property laws possess an unreasonably narrow focus on economic “incentivism” and pecuniary exploitation, which is problematic because it fails to address larger social welfare issues. This paper explores the genesis of two significant and chronologically overlapping legal evolutionary processes, that occurred in England during the 16th to 18th Century, to account for the development of this overly narrow economic focus.

The first legal process would be the conception of intellectual property laws as a result of British guild influence during the industrial age. This has accounted for the asymmetrical development of intellectual property laws, which favour right-holder protectionism and seeks to combat the growing ease of copying that technology offers.

The second process is the medieval English “Enclosure Movement”, which academics use to draw similarities between the privatisation of common lands used by rural peasants and the contemporary propertisation of intellectual resource. The effect of intellectual propertisation grants right-holders exclusionary rights and contributes to the growing lack of access to intellectual goods by the masses.

Next, this essay explores the role that multinational conglomerates have played in fostering stronger global intellectual property rights and creating informational scarcity. Corporations do so through overzealous lobbying and unfortunately, the effects of which are not confined within a domestic level, and have an upward vertical transfer on an international level as well.

Lastly, the consequential effects of intellectual propertisation are explored through the use of several case studies. Firstly, in the case of the AIDS pandemic, the inflation of pharmaceutical drug prices have effectively deprived those afflicted from accessing the necessary medicines needed to alleviate pain and prolong life. Secondly, in the case of the informational commons of the Internet, continual Governmental attempts to regulate the Internet have instead conversely accounted for the proliferation of illegal file-sharing activities.
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INTRODUCTION
The Present Conundrum

In the simplest of explanations, the term “intellectual property” encapsulates a product borne of an individual’s intellectual labour; the process of thought, imagination, invention and creation. The resultant expression or product of that intellectual pursuit, is then “enclosed” or “privatised” under copyright or patent law, made subject to the right of proprietary ownership. Along with that proprietary ownership is attached a bundle of auxiliary beneficiary and exclusionary rights.\(^1\) This grants the owner a duality of rights to not only exploit his intellectual work through its sale or rent, but at the same time it also affords him a discretionary power to control who may then have access to enjoy or use the said product.\(^2\)

That definition, however, in reality is quite nebulous.\(^3\) As a result, the legal barriers set in place to safeguard a right-holder’s intellectual property have eroded to the point where an ordinary lay-person finds it hard to distinguish between lawful usage and infringement.\(^4\) Contributing to this erosion is the surge in the number of technologically-savvy individuals who are emancipated from the inconvenience of the physical world of print and paper, but are instead well-versed in the ease of file-sharing that is associated with the virtual-plane of the Internet.\(^5\) The freedom, anonymity\(^6\) and neutrality\(^7\) associated with the Internet has thus allowed for the creation of an ill-conceived expectation (amongst modern consumers) that anything and everything freely downloadable from the Internet is in fact free.\(^8\) At a glance, who can blame them? Where the overpricing of books, movies, music and every other


\(^3\) Biogen Inc v Medeva PLC (1997) 114 RPC 1 (UK) per Lord Mustill.


\(^5\) Adam D Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property (Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1997) ii.


conceivable form of intellectual property is the norm in today’s society; it is no wonder that Internet pirates are being hailed by Internet “geeks” as cult-heroes, revolutionaries and virtual Robin Hoods fighting against greedy corporate overlords.  

Mainstream intellectual property theory however persistently insists that the overpricing of intellectual goods are justified. On the basis that pecuniary reward is a necessary mechanism embedded within intellectual property rights to provide creators and authors with an incentive to continually create or innovate and that the element of incentivism is thus directly proportional to the effect of stimulus. Which is to say, the more financial gain afforded, the larger the impetus to create. This assumption conversely condemns piracy since legislation criminalises unauthorised copying and also undermines the future creative output of the creator due to his loss of financial gain. Yet, such an assumption is argued by dissenting academics to be inherently flawed when considering this simple scenario: are markets lost or is harm wrought onto the creator when an individual downloads a song that he never subjectively intended to purchase in the first instance?

Setting aside the debate of whether online piracy is ever justified as a retaliatory response to the overpricing of digital content, consider instead whether the mainstream assumption about the current system of intellectual property is true. Especially with regard to the larger social implications that arise from the issue of global accessibility to medicine. The creation of pharmaceutical drugs is undeniably seen as the noblest of human productions and yet it is neither freely accessible nor freely disseminated. Medication is priced expensively, and is overzealously coveted and protected by large pharmaceutical corporations for the sake of economic exploitation. In that regard, should civil disobedience be favoured instead as a revolutionary response; where the illicit reproduction of generic drugs actually affords society more boon then it does bane?

The crux of this contemporary conundrum is therefore as Jeremy Waldron astutely observed; simply a matter of perspective. The line between infringement and free enterprise is a fine one. Which is to say that if people respect a creator’s right to profit from his intellectual 

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endeavours, then the copier is perceived as nothing more than a thief. If, however, the perspective is inverted; where the author is seen as nothing more than a statutory monopoly, then copying is justified since the copier merely epitomises the ideals of free enterprise.12

This paper argues that the contemporary conundrum posited above is a result of the historical development of intellectual property laws, which has been moulded over time through the influence of corporate entities. This paper further explores the detrimental effect that the incremental strengthening of intellectual property laws has had on consumers. And explains how the marginalisation of consumers has attributed to the proliferation of piracy as a natural counter-intuitive response towards promoting freedom of access to informational and intellectual goods.

First, Part I of this paper explores the historical creation of intellectual property laws, which emerged as a result of the influence British guilds had over the Monarchy during the 16th Century. This proves that from the initial creation of intellectual property laws, social welfare and the ideals of free dissemination of knowledge was of little importance to medieval legislators. This is further contrasted against the modern economic justifications that proponents of intellectual property rights adopt in their bid to promote the strengthening of pre-existing intellectual property rights. Second, Part II then discusses the chronologically overlapping legal formative process of the medieval British “enclosure movement”. And further discusses how the British nobility strove to deprive peasants of common lands and defended their actions by citing the inevitable tragedy of resource overuse if the commons were allowed to persist. Third, Part III then compares the similarities and dissimilarities that modern interpretations of intellectual enclosure had to its medieval predecessor. And also raises the pertinent issue of who the aristocrats are in today’s modern context so as to adequately identify the rationale behind the need for stronger intellectual property rights. And finally, Part IV of this paper focuses specifically on the modern debate surrounding the Internet. Exploring not only the need for fairer-pricing of digital content but also the relaxation of restrictive interference from private and public bodies alike. This is because tighter regulatory control in reality propagates more instances and sophisticated methods of piracy. Lastly, this essay also considers examples of revolutionary market practices which could quell consumer dissatisfaction; by allowing increased affordability and accessibility of intellectual and informational goods for the masses.

PART I - THE HISTORICAL CONCEPTION AND JUSTIFICATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

1. A Brief History of the Anglo-American Model of Intellectual Property Law

In tracing the genealogy of intellectual property rights back to its roots, it would prove futile to identify a singular source of origination since such rights developed separately and independently as a result of geographical and ideological differences. However, the most readily recognisable instance of creation would be that of the British model of intellectual property rights, which arose in response to the emergence of guild monopolies and the later industrialisation of mechanised commercial printing and manufacturing from the 16th to 18th Century.

The significance of British guild influence on the creation of intellectual property laws can be attributed to the high revenue taxes and licensing fees paid to the Monarchy. Any disruption to a guild’s business through the illegitimate replication of their intellectual property thus meant a disruption in Crown payments. The threat posed by both the commercial printing press and mechanised manufacturing equipment, which allowed for the newfound ease by which counterfeiters could replicate literary works and products, was therefore a great cause for concern to the Monarchy. Causing the Monarchy to take responsive legal measures to protect its lucrative guild cash cows which allowed guilds to maintain proprietary control and exclusionary rights over their works and products.

Further, during which time, Britain was in a state of fierce economic and technological competition, not only amongst its European neighbours but also with more technologically

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13 Ken Shao, “Monopoly or Reward? The Origin of Copyright and Authorship in England, France and China and a New Criticism of Intellectual Property” (2011) 41 Hong Kong Law Journal 731, 731 - 2. Dr. Shao’s investigation has revealed that besides the British guild and monopoly related origins of intellectual property laws, there too were independently emerging forms of copyrights and patent laws from France and China during the 16th Century. Both of which did not merely have a monopolistic agenda. In that regard, there are better theoretical bases than just monopoly to criticise the overprotection of intellectual property rights.

14 Ibid.


advanced Asian civilisations (China and India). Intellectual property laws were enacted by Britain as a two-pronged approach towards becoming more competitive, and achieving dominance in the technological arena. First, copyright and patent laws were seen as means of preventing the transfer of knowledge through literature and the transfer of innovation through invention beyond its national border via illegal replication. Secondly, an ancillary purpose of intellectual property laws, as previously mentioned, was then to prevent the sale of illegally replicated products from disrupting the businesses operated by guilds within international markets. By doing so, the British were able to create trade exclusivity over its commodities and was consequently able to generate the requisite pulling impetus necessary to draw merchants to its shore.

The reformation of British immigration laws at that time will further prove how important the Monarchy viewed technological dominance. By offering attractive resettlement incentives, more favourable apprenticeship terms and cheaper rents for guilds. Further coupled with enforceable proprietary rights by inventors, the British were able to procure desirable technologies by inducing defection of the mobile skilled immigrants from its regional neighbours and colonies. The influx of skilled immigrants, brought with them valuable expertise in the fields of mining, metallurgy, tool making, building, chemistry and textile manufacturing. The combination of both aggressive immigration reforms and the effective implementation of intellectual property laws saw the rapid economic development and expansion of the British empire in comparison to that of their Asian competitors.

An additional motive for the British Monarchy to enforce stricter intellectual property laws was for the purposes of censorship. For example, in 1557, the London Stationer’s Company was formed and sanctioned by the Crown. As a result of this royal patronage, the Crown maintained a veto right to ban or prohibit the dissemination of any literary works that were

18 Endeshaw, see note 14 above, 379.
19 Epstein, see note 17 above, 2.
20 For more information on why the British were able to overtake the Chinese’s innovative capacity see: Peter K Yu, “Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure the US-China intellectual Property Debate” (2001) 19 *Boston University International Law Journal* 1, 24. In his paper, Yu states that the Chinese regarded foreigners with much skepticism and xenophobia and rejected King George III’s diplomatic efforts to establish an innovative and informational trade channel between the two nations during the Qing dynasty. This proud “nationalism” according to Yu has “brought China two centuries of tremendous pain and humiliation” in relation to their innovative capacity.
21 Epstein, see note 17 above, 33.
The historical conception of intellectual property, in the context of the British model, was meant to be a self-serving form of protectionism aimed at furthering national economic interests by intentionally suppressing knowledge. The British model was therefore uninterested in the resultant long term side-effects that it would create in terms of stifling harmonious global development; or global social welfare; or knowledge dissemination and accessibility. Unfortunately however, the measure of success that the British intellectual property model offered, in terms of economic growth and development, was far too great for other emerging innovative markets to ignore. And in a bid to be equally competitive, America enacted its own intellectual property regimes, which in essence emulated and built upon the legacy of the British model; granting right-holders exclusive proprietary ownership over any of its registered works/products while at the same time enforcing heavy penalties on infringers and allowing compensation for the wronged parties. The adoption of the British model has worked for the Americans and this has attributed to an indisputable technological frontier shift from the British to the Americans, who in their own right have now become the leading technological powerhouse in today’s global innovation market. But as a result of the adoption of the competitive British intellectual model, the contemporary Anglo-American intellectual property regime has also perpetuated the inherently selfish agendas and shortfalls of its predecessor.

22 Shao, see note 13 above, 11.

23 Endeshaw, see note 16 above, 378.


In spite of the seemingly selfish agendas behind the formation of intellectual property laws, there are also equally persuasive and logical justifications which support the existence of such laws. The first theoretical justification is derived from John Locke’s “Labour Theory”. Locke’s labour theory stipulates that all men have a right to own the fruits of his labour, much like how a harvest belongs to a farmer, then so too should a book belong to an author. With that ownership, comes the natural assumption that the owner can then dispose of or alienate his property as he pleases and that includes the discretionary right to sell or bar usage to anyone so as to protect his own interests.

A novel justification of intellectual property laws can be found in Adam Moore’s contemporary interpretation of Locke’s natural rights theory. In his dissertation, Moore defends intellectual property on two fronts. The first being that intellectual resources are non-rivalrous, which is to say that intellectual works can be created, possessed, owned and consumed by many individuals concurrently without injury. This goes towards satisfying Locke’s rule-utilitarian, which states that ownership over a previously un-owned object should be allowed where granting exclusive ownership causes no harm to any other through deprivation. Moore then argues that the frontier of intellectual pursuit is infinite given that an individual’s ability to create is independent and spontaneous. In quoting Locke: “nobody could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left to quench his thirst…”. Moore stresses his point again; that intellectual property rights are justified at both the level of acts and at the level of institutions since it does not actually cause injury or deprivation to the consumer even though a right-holder has exclusive ownership over an intellectual good.

By way of a simple illustration, it can be argued that in the instance of the popular mobile telephone, no bane is created nor is prejudice caused through the exclusive ownership of patents associated with a mobile telephone. For example, in the ordinary lifespan of a

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29 Madhavi Sunder, “Copyright, Culture, Copyright History: Introduction” (2011) 12 *Theoretical Inquiries in Law* I, II.

30 Ibid, see note 5 above.

31 Ibid, at iii.


33 Moore, see note 5 above, 7 - 8.
consumer, there is no expectation for the consumer to acquire the experiential skills or expend the effort necessary to invent a device that allows him to communicate wirelessly with another. In that regard, though the consumer might have to part with some of his own hard earned money, his life is still enriched by the convenience that comes with the purchase and subsequent usage of a mobile telephone. In fact, the convenience and enjoyment derived from the mobile telephone is directly consequential to the right-holder’s exclusive ownership of the intellectual property.

The next set of justifications are also derived from theoretical Lockean reasoning and is oriented more towards the economical aspect of intellectual property. This vein of Lockean reasoning suggests that property has a vital role in encouraging the expenditure of individual effort since disposal can be initiated with the remittance of money. The commodification, or the propertisation of any intellectual endeavour grants the owner the ability to charge another a pecuniary premium for the use of his property. This carries with it an element of incentivism, in the sense that an author or inventor may be motivated to create or innovate a commercially viable intellectual product, with the promise of financial reward through royalties. And after having gained financial success, the author or inventor would also be in a better position to fund further attempts at creating more intellectual goods. Intellectual property protection also gives an inventor or author the proper assurance that he will be given due recognition for his hard work as others are prevented from branding his protected property as their own or from making illicit replicates. Furthermore, this confidence to present a protected work to the public would also generate social progress and would in theory perpetuate creativity by inspiring others to invent and create.

And lastly, as Douglas North suggests, the economic rationale of propertisation and the subsequent attachment of pecuniary value onto intellectual goods also provides a crucial impetus needed to drive global trade. What North means is that by attaching costs onto intellectual property, it promotes an efficient process of exchange and transference between the vendor and purchaser, since only those who can fully maximise the use of an intellectual good will invest the monies necessary to obtain it. This economic theory as propounded by


North further encourages market segregation and the discriminatory effect that the high pricing of intellectual property creates; by separating those who are both ill-equipped and inadequately financed from obtaining the intellectual goods. This according to North prevents wastage of intellectual resource and encourages innovation.38

3. The Theoretical Conflict: Criticisms of Intellectual Property Laws

Even with all the persuasive arguments for intellectual property laws, there are those who remain unconvinced that the propertisation of intellectual goods benefit human civilisation as a collective. One such criticism argues that commodification of the intellectual commons is perceived to cure an ailment which does not actually exist within the realm of creative thought.39 Proponents of intellectual property advocate the stimulating or catalytic effect financial incentivism has towards innovation, but evidence suggests otherwise.40 For example, prior to the creation of genetic patents over plant biology, there already existed a fertile breeding ground of innovative advances which was independently spurred by enthusiasts and husbandry societies in the absence of financial incentive.41 This exchange of ideas for the improvement of existing agricultural stock occurred through agricultural exhibitions, state county fairs, local newsletters and through the interaction of like-minded enthusiasts.42 Further empirical studies conducted by Moser also serves to rebut the viability of the incentive argument. Moser’s investigation revealed that the effect of patent systems did not evince a clear ability to raise the innovative potential of a nation; since there was little difference in terms of innovative activity between nations with patent laws and those

38 North, see note 37 above, 34. This however contradicts with the notion that intellectual resources are in fact “non-rivalrous” and cannot therefore be subject to wastage or overuse, for more information on this debate, see page 27 below, at notes 131 and 132.

39 Michele Boldrin and David K Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly (Manuscript, Department of Economics University of Minnesota, 2005) Chapter 8, 4 - 5.

40 Ned Rossiter, “Creative Labour and the Role of Intellectual Property” (Report, for Monash University, 2004) 1, 6. According to Rossiter, when surveyed through his report, many commentators stated that income generated from their creative works was of very little importance especially those in the field of academic studies. And also, creative output was not the primary income of most, as such endeavors were pursued during “spare time” and was driven primarily by interest and passion.


without such laws. Academics like Boldrin and Levine also warn against the use of incentivism as a driving impetus for innovation as it often replaces genuine innovational enthusiasm with an insatiable desire for pecuniary gain. It is this notion of capitalistic greed, according to them, that has accounted for the “exclusion of as many people as possible from fruitful intellectual intercourse”. The criticisms of intellectual property are directed at the duality of rights, both the inclusionary and exclusionary, that are inherently created at the time an intellectual good is commodified. By allowing the right-holder to reap financial reward, or as Runge and DeFranesco described as “being included in such a stream of [pecuniary] benefits”, it creates an antagonistic relationship between the right-holder and every other individual. The resultant goal of the right-holder therefore is to maximally exercise his exclusionary rights; to selfishly safeguard his profit and prevent the outward leakage of any such profits.

Besides criticisms made against the pragmatic aspects of economic incentivism, there are also those who criticise intellectual property’s theoretical justifications. Such dissidents, often referred to as control-critics, such as James Boyle and Yochai Benkler argue that the increasing privatisation and control of intellectual property has accounted for the phenomena of “enclosure” and the continual disappearance of the “creative commons”. By legally providing right-holders with control over their intellectual property, it then in turn restricts freedom of access and reduces the availability of information. This reduction of critical creative inputs within the masses would then in turn stifle future creative output since new expressions of ideas are essentially a further development of existing well-known information. As succinctly put by Sir Issac Newton, “[we all] stand on the shoulders of

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44 Boldrin and Levine, see note 39 above, Chapter 8, 5.


50 *White v Samsung Electronics. America Inc.* (1993) 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit) per Judge Kozinski’s dissenting judgement.
giants”\textsuperscript{51}, alluding to the dictum that all human brilliance is based off the efforts of our predecessors and without access to past works, future generations will experience a dearth of creativity.

Control-critics demand that intellectual goods be disassociated from real property rights, owing to the fact that both remain far too distinctive, in nature and subject matter, to be treated as equals. This notion, that “the rhetoric and economic theory of real property are increasingly dominating the discourse and conclusions in the very different world of intellectual property”\textsuperscript{52} has become a growing consensus amongst dissenting academics. One such dissenter, Christopher May further expands and exemplifies this growing consensus by raising two simple yet pertinent questions: (1) who ultimately benefits from the institutions of intellectual property and (2) what problems do they actually address or alleviate?\textsuperscript{53} By urging others to consider who the beneficiaries of intellectual property regimes are, May emphasises the growing asymmetry in the apportionment of rights between users and right-holders, and also the excessive profiteering by intellectual property right-holders.

4. The Governmental Responses of Brazil, South Africa and the International Community: A Case Study of the AIDS Pandemic

In considering the two questions raised above, May uses the case study of the global AIDS pandemic to further drive home the problems that plague intellectual property - at a macrocosmic level, when used to address global social issues, the economic justifications of intellectual property fails miserably. Since, firstly, intellectual property serves only its master; right-holders, which are often large corporations driven by economic incentive.\textsuperscript{54} Secondly, intellectual property does little to address social health issues nor does it allow for increased accessibility of protected goods, since such notions are adverse to the corporation’s own profit-oriented interests.\textsuperscript{55} Even in relation to AIDS medication there is no exception, and it is priced by large pharmaceutical corporations to allow for maximum generation of


\textsuperscript{53} May, see note 34 above, 127.


\textsuperscript{55} May, see note 34 above, 127 - 8.
profit. This over-pricing accounts for the high annual expenditure for an individual suffering from AIDS, which is estimated to be 10,000 times higher than the average per capita health related expenditure of many developing states. The effect of which places the cocktail of pharmaceutical drugs, necessary for the alleviation, suppression and treatment of AIDS, far beyond the financial reach of sorry plight nations such as Ghana, Brazil and South Africa.

As indicative from a survey conducted by UNAIDS in 2002, it is estimated that out of a total of 40 million people infected with the HIV virus living in developing nations, a resounding 90% (36 million) have no access to the cocktail of anti-retroviral drugs needed to prolong their lives. This lack of access is thus the primary cause for the death of millions of the poor afflicted with HIV each year. In a desperate bid to gain access to the necessary medicines, the above mentioned nations sought to import generic versions of the medication from India (which was producing generic AIDS medication in direct contravention of its own TRIPS Agreement provisions). This prompted several pharmaceutical companies to reduce prices, but not significantly enough to allow for affordability. In the case of Brazil, legal action was commenced by America (on the urging of Merck - a pharmaceutical corporation) at the World Trade Organisation (“WTO”) to prevent the use of counterfeit


57 May, see note 34 above, 134.


60 The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreements or also referred to as the “TRIPS Agreement”. Available at the World Trade Organisation Website: <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/TRIPS_e/TRIPS_e.htm> at 29 September 2012.


62 May, see note 34 above, 134.

63 Frederick M Abbott, “Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit” (2009) 1 World Intellectual Property Organisation Journal 43, 47. According to Abbott, there were other ways in which Merck tried to prevent Brazil from receiving other needed medicines as well. For example, Merck asserted pressure on the Netherlands government (in which country Merck held patent rights) in order to seize a generic form of Losartan (a type of medication used to treat high blood pressure), in transit from India to Brazil.
medications protected under American intellectual property laws. This apathetic act by the Americans could only be seen to be encouraged by the pharmaceutical right-holders and caused sceptics to question the antagonistic ulterior motives of the American legislators and governments which, in this case, clearly favoured the enforcement of the owner’s rights over the lives of those who could have been saved if only they were granted access to the medication.

Brazil’s Response: The response adopted by the Brazilian government in retaliation against Merck’s apparent legal actions has been praised by the international community and Brazil has now become a paragon for developing nations leading the fight against large pharmaceutical corporations. Shortly after the commencement of the legal action Brazil responded by threatening pharmaceutical companies within its borders that it would be imposing compulsory licensing. The implementation of such intellectual property reforms would in effect allow the Brazilian government to make use of the patents protected so dearly by the pharmaceutical companies without requiring their consent. And this compulsory license would further allow limitless reproduction of the said protected medicines, all for a fixed nominal fee and without any subsequent payments of royalties. This threat alone, as noted by Pedro Roffe, was sufficient for the large pharmaceutical corporations to withdraw any legal action and to “reduce the price of individual HIV/AIDs retroviral drugs by up to 75 per cent”. Though other nations have tried to emulate Brazil’s actions, by threatening to similarly impose compulsory licensing, there are conditions unique to Brazil which allowed it to achieve the level of success that it did. Firstly, Brazil had at that time, already established a sophisticated indigenous pharmaceutical manufacturing sector and had the means to execute its threat. The second condition was that Brazil’s population,

64 May, see note 34 above, 134.

65 Ibid, 135.


69 Pedro Roffe et al., “From Paris to Doha: The WTO Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” in Roffe, Tansey and Vivas-Eugui (eds), Negotiating Health (2006) 9, 15

unlike other developing nations, comprised of a large affluent middle-class market which many pharmaceutical corporations could not afford to alienate. The combination of these two factors thus heightened Brazil’s bargaining position and allowed them to effectively counter their pharmaceutical bullies.\textsuperscript{71}

**South Africa’s response:** In March 2001, South Africa commenced legal action against a 39-corporation alliance to challenge the justification of intellectual property protection over AIDS medication and the legality of abrogating those rights in light of its nation’s dire healthcare crisis.\textsuperscript{72} At trial, the alliance sought to defend its own rights by leading a primary argument of remuneration, which is to say that the high-pricing of the drugs were necessary and justified as it was to recoup the costs associated with the development of the drugs. The next argument raised by the alliance was that the revenue generated from the sale of the medication had a secondary purpose, which was incentivism. The alliance thus alleged that by undermining a pharmaceutical corporation’s ability to reap economic reward there would be a drastic decline in subsequent medical research.\textsuperscript{73} However, as noted by Sarah Boseley, these arguments were a fallacy since evidence suggested that the drugs developed for AIDS treatment was heavily reliant on public funding and charitable contributions.\textsuperscript{74} Pharmaceutical companies, even in the wake of such revelation, have neither compromised nor budged, and the price of AIDS medication still remains high and access remains restricted to those who cannot afford it. Yet the demand for such expensive medication has not fallen in the least, owing to campaigning by such pharmaceutical companies, which claim that generic drugs lack the stringent quality-control systems of its more expensive counterparts and as a result offer less definitive results.\textsuperscript{75} And this fuels the superstitious belief that the “more expensive product, will usually deliver better results”, and when it comes to a matter of life and death, few are willing to opt for the purportedly inferior product.

\textsuperscript{71} Rovira, see note 68 above, 236.

\textsuperscript{72} May, see note 34 above, 135.


\textsuperscript{74} Sarah Boseley, “Glaxo Stops Africans Buying Cheap AIDS Drugs”, *Guardian* (United Kingdom), 2 December 2000, 25.

\textsuperscript{75} Patricia M Danzon, “The Economics of Parallel Trade”, (1998) 13(3) *PharmacoEconomics* 293, 299.
International Response: Following the two case studies discussed above, the international community was finally urged at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong to address the issue of the public health crises in less developed countries. At the Ministerial Conference, it was decided that the TRIPS agreement would be amended to allow signatories with insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacities to import generic versions of medications. However many criticised this unprecedented amendment as being brought about by developed nations for their own benefit. This was attributed to the fact that developed nations were also experiencing growing problems associated with the access to medicines. These concerns were brought about due to the demographic concentration of aging citizens within a developed nation and as such would pose an increasing strain on state healthcare budgeting. Further, these concerns were exacerbated by the alarming increased instances of the global transmission of deadly flu strains such as Swine flu, Avian flu and SARS. An academic in this new frontier, Peter Yu has remarked that if it were not for the added impetus from developed nations, the issue of access-to-medicines in developing nations might very well have gone unresolved.

This global consciousness shift, regardless of its underlying motivation never-the-less now recognised the need for cheaper forms of pharmaceutical manufacturing such as the

76 Amy Kapczynski, “The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property” (2008) 117 The Yale Law Journal 804, 805 - 8. In her paper, Kapczynski states that this “urging” was a result of what she states to be the Access-to-Knowledge (“A2K”) Mobilisation attributed to the successful campaigning of interests groups advocating the reduction of intellectual property exclusionary rights and conversely accessibility of intellectual goods.


80 Ibid, 29.


82 Yu, see note 67 above, 831. Yu explains that by allowing the sale of generic drugs, it would make the pharmaceutical market more competitive and lower the prices of medicines uniformly for both developed and developing nations. Also, having more available sources of pharmaceutical manufacturing also allows for greater production capabilities in an instance of a global pandemic.
inclusion of generic forms of medication. Many market analysts predicted that pharmaceutical corporations would reduce prices further to remain competitive given the newfound surge of cheaper generic alternatives. However, contrary to these predictions, pharmaceutical companies, as before, remain undeterred. As noted by Barbara Rosenberg, pharmaceutical corporations then commenced a strategic and covert series of operations to prolong its own market exclusivity and undermine the functionality of generic drug manufacturers. First, pharmaceutical companies commenced legal actions against generic drug manufacturers in order to increase the costs of generics entering the market. Secondly, pharmaceutical corporations modified drug molecules or recombined existing drugs, in minimally different ways, for which new patents could be sought to gain an extension of its term of intellectual property protection. Thirdly, pharmaceutical corporations rushed to trademark brand names, before generic drug manufacturers, in a bid to erect more barriers prior to the entry of the generic drug into the market.83

The blatant refusal by pharmaceutical corporations to reduce prices even in the face of social injustice is clearly an indication of their insatiable desire for financial reward and indifference towards larger social concerns. The reasons for this refusal is observed by Keith Maskus through two key economical factors. First, pharmaceutical corporations fear that by granting concessions to developing nations, it would undermine their ability to maintain high prices in the markets of developed nations.84 The effect of granting concessions would reveal the marginal costs of their drug production capabilities. As such pharmaceutical corporations would face mounting pressures in developed markets for lower prices, especially for the supply of medicines to lower-income households. Secondly, pharmaceutical corporations and distributors experience greater profitability in selling low volumes of drugs at high prices rather than higher volumes at lower prices. This is due to the elimination of external costs associated with the transportation of large volumes of stock.85 Lastly, for pharmaceutical corporations waging legal war against their generic-drug-manufacturing rivals, it is merely a waiting game. As Timmermans predicts, the grace-period which allows less developed nations to import generic drugs will expire in 2016. At which time the generic drug market is doomed to collapse owing to the lack of market demand.86


85 Ibid, 566.

1. The Enclosure Movement in Medieval England

Between the 17th and 19th Century (coinciding with the intellectual property law boom and the Industrial Revolution) there too was another formative legal evolutionary process taking place in England, known simply as “Enclosure”. Though the term has become synonymous with the physical act of fencing off the perimeter of a plot of land, its historical significance cannot however be understated since it has accounted for the modern day understanding of the term “private property”. The enclosure movement has thus become critical in the formation of every individual’s basal right to own, enjoy and freely use the land subject to his ownership; free from the interference and intrusion of others.\(^{87}\) In the legal sense of the term, it meant that a designated plot of land was to be converted into “severalty”, and the lawful owner was granted title over that plot. The land was thus severed from any communal rights of ownership or control by the public at large. The legal definition differs from the conventional dictionary meaning of the term “enclosure”, in that an unfenced piece of land could still be held in severalty and a person who crosses the invisible threshold without permission can still be found guilty of trespass. While conversely, a fenced off area might still be a part of the public commons; free for all to enjoy.\(^ {88}\)

The motives behind the formation of enclosuristic laws in relation to land rights, like those of intellectual property, are said to originate from selfish and protectionist ideals.\(^ {89}\) Jeanette Neeson, for example argues that the enclosure movement was a result of upper-class lobbyists, comprising of nobles and aristocrats, who were already entrenched in influential positions within the ruling British Government or Monarchy. These nobles did so to alter the social structure of rural England, which was predominantly common land left for the usage of commoners.\(^ {90}\) The commoners, under the quasi-feudal system of the English Monarchy, held proprietary interest over common land through customary rights owing to the fact that


\(^{88}\) Ibid, 1.

\(^{89}\) Ibid, 9.

the land “hath been in use, time out of mind of man”\textsuperscript{91} and those rights were then transferrable through familial inheritance.

The nobles, of that time, viewed commoners as a race all unto their own and regarded commoners with a great deal of racist, xenophobic and instinctive distrust.\textsuperscript{92} Furthermore, due to the profound social, economic and educative divide, commoners were often described by the nobles as wild, morally apathetic, lazy and barbaric.\textsuperscript{93} Nobles also viewed the notion of land-sharing as primitive and economically unviable, since valuable arable land was left untitled and unexploited, and was instead occupied by homeless squatters or used by nomadic farmers for livestock grazing, as was their right to do so under customary law at the time.\textsuperscript{94} To better portray the resentment that the nobles had towards commoners, a quote from the then President of the Board of Agriculture, Sir John Sinclair, is most apt at illustrating such sentiment: “Why should we not attempt a [military] campaign also against our great domestic foe... let us subdue Finchley Common; let us conquer Hounslow Heath; let us compel Epping Forest to submit to the yoke of improvement”.\textsuperscript{95} The extent of the hatred towards commoners, as articulated by Sir John, did not stop short of the annihilation of the commoners by military genocide and it was this fervent disdain for commoners that the nobles lobbied the English Parliament to have those common rights extinguished. The result of this lobbying was famously described by E. P. Thompson in his dismissal of the enclosure movement, as nothing more than a “plain enough case of class robbery”.\textsuperscript{96}

Thompson explains that the tainted bias amongst nobles towards the commoners were unwieldy, and in reality a large proportion of common land was engaged in more than just low-yield subsistence farming. Squatters, who were thought to be incorrigible and ill-disciplined, had both sophisticated domestic and intra-village markets, trade channels and had even built permanent dwellings out of stone and mortar, rather than tarps and twigs.\textsuperscript{97}


\textsuperscript{92} Agricultural History, \textit{Gazetteer and Directory of the County of Huntingdon} (1854) at 76.

\textsuperscript{93} George Crabbe, “The Village” Book I, (1783) at line 85, reproduced in Howard Mills (ed), \textit{George Crabbe: Tales, 1812 and Other Selected Poems} (1967), 3.

\textsuperscript{94} Arthur Young (for the Board of Agriculture of Great Britain), \textit{General View of the Agriculture of Oxfordshire} (Neely & Jones Publishing, 1813) 94 -95.

\textsuperscript{95} Sir John Sinclair, Memoirs of Sir John Sinclair, II, 111 as quoted in E Halevy, \textit{England in 1815} (1949, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edn) 230.

\textsuperscript{96} E P Thompson, \textit{The Making of the English Working Class} (Gollancz, 1963) 218.

\textsuperscript{97} M Weekly (ed), \textit{Memoirs of Thomas Bewick} (Cresset, 1961) 27.
And yet, the purpose of enforcing enclosurist laws was to simply deny the commoner use of the land; as any occupier who was unable to establish a claim over the land or produce a valid title was evicted swiftly and without compensation. While even those who had a valid right to remain were relegated to infertile terrain, unfit for subsistence, and were still apportioned high rental fees for tenancy.  

An example in demonstrating the inequality of land distribution and rent apportionment is evinced from the commons of Barton-on-Humber at the time of conversion into severalty. Of the total 6,000 acres available, 81% of the total land area (4860 acres) was owned by just 10 aristocrats, while the remaining 19% (1140 acres) was allotted to and divided amongst 116 commoners. Furthermore the average rental value of the enclosed arable land tripled from 6 shillings 6 pence to 20 shillings an acre. By privatising the commons, the nobles effectively caused the redistribution of income from the commons back onto themselves by creating a dizzying upward spiral of increased land and food prices. Firstly, because land became more scarce, competition amongst tenants drove land prices to become unreasonably high. Secondly, by depriving the commoners of land used for gathering, grazing and subsistence farming, it also created a secondary scarcity of food which in turn caused the higher demand for agricultural commodities to exponentially increase arable land values as well.

The arrogance of the rich aristocracy towards the commoners however left them blinded to the adverse effects enclosure would have on the spatial displacement of the rural population. By making rental practically unaffordable and thereby forcing commoners out of their land, lawmakers neither accounted for nor foresaw the backlash effects. Such as the sudden desertion of the periphery and the subsequent polarisation of ex-field-labourers within the urban city-centre in search of housing and income. And much to the regret of landowners and aristocrats alike, this sudden influx of people into London accounted for overpopulation, appalling hygiene, epidemic, increased waste and pollution. In their paper, Runge and DeFrancesco found a correlation between the outbreak of the Black Death (the Great Plague of London from 1665 - 1666) and enclosure, which occurred at the peak of British enclosure; at a time when enclosure accounted for about a third of England’s total

98 Thompson, see note 96 above, 216 - 7.
99 R C Russel, The Enclosure of Barton-on-Humner and Hibaldstow (Barton Worker’s Education Association, 1961).
101 Runge and DeFrancesco, see note 45 above, 1716.
102 Thompson, see note 96 above, 223.
land mass. The nobles also experienced increased poor-dependency through “bounties” (derived from the old English word “boon-ity” – much like modern day welfare grants for the unemployed) established by the Poor Law Commission in the aid of the commoners.

However, there are still those that argue that privatisation was necessary to avert Hardin's proposed “tragedy of the commons”. Hardin’s tragedy predicted social disintegration due to increased competition for the use of common land and environmental degradation due to fierce over-exploitation owing to the fact that each herdsman will try to rear as much cattle as possible on the commons. Defenders of enclosure also argue that by granting ownership of arable agricultural land to wealthy and educated feudal lords, it prevented the land's overuse or underinvestment. It is these perceived (or misconceived) benefits which academics account for the resilience of the medieval English; being able to thrive despite constant warring and widespread epidemic at the close of the 16th Century. However, recent studies by Robert Allen question the true benefit that the enclosure movement actually produced. Allen dispels enclosure and instead argues that the marginalisation of the commoners through increased rents accounted for their diminished bargaining power and allowed the rich aristocratic landlords to amass more wealth. Allen again emphasises the fact that for the general masses, enclosure had little to no beneficial effect and merely redistributed any windfall to the already rich landowners.

103 Runge and DeFrancesco, see note 45 above, 1714.
104 Thompson, see note 96 above, 221.
106 Ibid, 1244.
107 Boyle, see note 48 above, 36.
108 Allen, see note 100 above, 939.
PART III - THE ENCLOSURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL COMMONS

Modern Interpretations of Enclosure

1. The Second Enclosure Movement

In retrospect, it is clear that the enclosure movement was unjust and had a particularly disastrous effect on a singular segment of society; evident in its causal role attributing to the social upheaval, geographic displacement, and the economic asymmetry between the aristocrats and the commoners in England.\textsuperscript{110} In comparison, there are uncanny similarities between the on-going propertisation of intellectual products and the medieval English enclosure of common land.\textsuperscript{111} In their fervent desire to achieve absolute control over their property, right-holders are unfairly marginalising consumers\textsuperscript{112}, overcharging them for intellectual goods and unceremoniously forcing users out of the informational commons.\textsuperscript{113} The resultant desertion of privatised land by the commoners due to exorbitant rent inflation is also echoed in the practice of modern-day consumers; which is to find cheaper alternatives to obtain intellectual products far beyond their financial means. And in this instance, consumers seek out cheaper and more readily accessible illicit counterfeits or pirated copies instead. The relevance of the study of the historical enclosure movement in today’s global intellectual property climate should therefore serve as a cautionary tale for modern intellectual property policy-makers and the lobbyists who incite them; fixated in their relentless pursuit for the privatisation of intellectual goods that was once common property or entirely beyond any prior classification of property altogether.\textsuperscript{114} Despite the wealth of empirical evidence available against enclosure, there is still a failure to heed those warnings and a dearth of enlightenment in the approach taken by intellectual property proponents.

In today’s context, the emergence of privatised informational goods and services as an unequivocally profitable market, brings us back again to yet another critical consideration for the use of economic incentivism and intellectual enclosure as a valid justification for defending intellectual property rights – is the enclosure of the intellectual commons more so

\textsuperscript{110} Thomas Moore, \textit{Utopia} (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992) 32.

\textsuperscript{111} Hannibal Travis, “Pirates of the Information Infrastructure: Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment” 15 \textit{Berkeley Technological Law Journal} 777, 780.


\textsuperscript{113} Ibid, 828.

\textsuperscript{114} Boyle, see note 48 above, 34.
justified because it has now become an important facet within the global economic market? Boyle’s answer to the fundamental query posed above is “no”, and he resolves it by again making a comparison between today’s enclosure movements and that of England’s historical enclosure. During the Napoleonic War (1803 – 1815), the English defended enclosure due to its effectiveness at driving agricultural yields up, not only to feed troops on the domestic front, but also to produce enough agricultural surplus to aid the war effort by generating revenue through surplus crop sales in a starved wartime economy. Boyle states that unlike crop production, informational output does not necessarily increase with stricter governmental regulation. Every increase of intellectual protection instead has the effect of erecting additional barriers affecting accessibility. This reduces the ability one has to access the intangible raw material needed for his or her own intellectual outputs. Thus according to Boyle, enclosing information from the public domain and subjecting it to exclusive control poses a detrimental to public welfare and social progress; in terms of the informational and educative enrichment of the masses. It is this argument that control-critics firmly stand behind and use to counter the push for stronger intellectual property rights and rebut any economical justifications put forward by lobbyists.

Sadly however, the current global climate of intellectual property is irrefutably driven by an element of profit. This global obsession with the economic importance of intellectual property is evident in this plain observation: among the world’s richest men are the co-founders of the technological giant, Microsoft. For the past century, the world’s wealthiest people have always been associated with the physical resource of oil. The title of the “World’s Richest” began in the late nineteenth century with John D. Rockefeller and subsequently was subsumed by the Sultan of Brunei in the late twentieth century. Today however it is knowledge workers who rank at the top of the world’s rich lists: Bill Gates and Paul Allen with their combined wealth of USD$81.0 Billion.

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115 Boyle, see note 48 above, 43.
117 Wagner, see note 47 above, at 996 - 7.
Given the enviable wealth amassed by today’s knowledge workers, it is therefore unsurprising that we now find ourselves in the midst of “the second wave of enclosure”. A term coined by James Boyle to express the current “intellectual property land-grab”, or “the enclosure of the intangible commons of the mind”, where public fair use and private intellectual property rights are being reconfigured more and more in the favour of right-holders. This continual enclosure of intellectual property is propelled by rich and highly influential corporations engaged in intellectual-property-intensive trade (such as informational, technological and pharmaceutical industries). Further, one must understand that as nations develop and reach maturity, its gross national product becomes increasingly reliant on value-added informational goods and services. There is therefore an inextricable connection between such corporations and its host nation; which have a vested interest in the successful enterprise of corporations reliant on its ability to exploit intellectual property without interference.

2. The Dissimilarities between Real and Intellectual Enclosures

The phenomena of the inappropriate assignment of real proprietary rights onto intellectual goods, is said by Hannibal Travis, to have begun with Blackstonian reasoning. Blackstone was the foremost jurist that favoured perpetual common law copyright as proposed in his Commentaries on the Laws of England. In it, Blackstone analogised and compared the exclusive rights over real property and that of intellectual property to a simple key. Akin to how a person may duplicate and distribute a set of keys to allow guests to enter his home, an author gives a publisher the right to make copies of his work, and yet the receiver is prohibited by a natural understanding that he may not then forge or sell the key for those

120 Runge and DeFrancesco, see note 45 above, 1718.


124 This relationship between corporations and host nations are discussed further below at Part III, 3.

125 Travis, see note 111 above, 783.

uninvited. Blackstone further states that any attempt by another to take that work without authorisation will amount to an act of theft and an invasion of the right-holder's private property. Blackstone's definition, however, makes the assumption that all persons implicitly recognise a piece of intellectual work as being as intimate and private as that of a person's home. In reality however, the human psyche does not draw similarities between invasions of privacy and that of intellectual property infringement. Thus the legal barriers that are to be set in place, on a psychological level are ineffective due to the difference of perception between real property and intangible intellectual property.

The dissimilarities between real property rights and those of intellectual property are not merely limited to the notion of personal privacy, but are in fact numerous and profound. By understanding these differences, it will further assist us in understanding whether the imposition of stronger intellectual property laws through enclosures are ever justified. Firstly, and for proper clarification, the term “commons” encapsulates two very different subject matters, depending of course on its context. Though a commons in relation to land is straightforward, the latter intellectual commons is not so, as it refers to the intangible notion of ideas or creative thought, an ability shared by all humans collectively. Secondly, as mentioned before, intellectual property is by its very medium and nature non-rivalrous, unlike common land usage that generally only supports one user and activity at a given time. For example digital format files can be accessed simultaneously, while any intangible thought can be had by any number of persons. Furthermore, Hardin's tragedy of aggressive competition can thus be easily avoided, as one would not have to worry about the overuse or sustainability of an intellectual commons as opposed to land, which can become depleted.

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128 Blackstone, see note 126 above, Volume 2, 405 - 6.


130 Boyle, see note 48 above, 41.

131 Please see note 31 above: The fact that intellectual property is “non-rivalrous”, is used by Moore as a contradictory means to justify the granting of intellectual property right-holder’s exclusive rights over their protected works since no-one is to be left worse-off through deprivation. In this instance, the fact that intellectual property is non-rivalrous is contrasted with Hardin’s Tragedy to mean that intellectual resource can never be depleted and should therefore should be free to use. The fact that intellectual property therefore is “non-rivalrous” is used by different academics, often with contradictory perspectives either justifying or criticising a right-holder’s ownership over intellectual property.

132 Hardin, see note 105 above for more information on Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons.
barren from repeated use. The fact that an intellectual good is by nature and medium non-rivalrous also poses a problem for right-holders enforcing their exclusionary rights. For example, a single digital file can be replicated an infinite number of times, and could therefore potentially satisfy an infinite number of consumers at virtually no cost.\textsuperscript{133} Which brings us to the third point, unlike common land, the intellectual commons is perceived to be non-exclusionary. This perception is further exacerbated and perpetuated by the advent of technology and the ease with which digital files can be uploaded, downloaded, printed, copied, pasted, converted, “burned”, saved and sent.

The fact that intellectual goods are non-rival and non-excludable has become the basal argument underlying the pro-intellectual property rights maxim employed by lobbyists. Such lobbyists argue that with every instance of cost depreciation in relation to the copying or transmission of informational goods, so too should the level of intellectual property protection increase in response. In that sense lobbyists argue that equilibrium must be maintained, and Boyle points out that this trend, to achieve absolute and perfect proprietary control over intellectual goods as copying costs approach a zero-minimum, has been clearly evident throughout the history of intellectual property.\textsuperscript{134} Tracing back to the roots of intellectual property history, Boyle has identified three milestones that have greatly reduced the exclusionary nature of informational goods and has also identified the corresponding regulatory response. (1) Physical copying gave rise to a need to control the tangible replica. (2) The Gutenberg printing press spawned the birth of intellectual property rights through the Statute of Anne.\textsuperscript{135} (3) While the Internet, and the perceived disastrous impact that it could have on informational goods, caused the United States to enact the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the No Electronic Theft Act, the Sonny Bono Term Act and the Collections of Informational Anti-piracy Act.\textsuperscript{136}

All of the incremental legislative measures stated above serve to propertise and enclose intellectual goods in two main methods. Firstly, by extending the duration of protection (either over a patented process or a copyrighted work), the effect of which extends the

\textsuperscript{133} Boyle, see note 48 above, 41.

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid, 42.

\textsuperscript{135} Statue of Anne 1710, 8 Anne, C.19: an English statute which conferred exclusive rights upon the author of books not yet published for a term of 14 years and with a further renewal term of another 14 years provided the author was still alive at the expiry of the first term of protection (effectively making the protection term a full 28 years). Books already in print were also granted a single 21 year term of protection. For more information see: R Deazley, \textit{On the Origin of the Right to Copy: Charting the Movement of Copyright Law in Eighteenth Century Britain}, 1695 - 1775 (Hart Publishing, 2004).

\textsuperscript{136} Boyle, see note 48 above, 42.
exclusionary period the process or work has from becoming part of the public domain. The second method employed by existing right-holders/lobbyists would be to expand the actual scope or classification of intellectual property. This alters the requisite conditions necessary for a process or work to be eligible for protection, making it less onerous, and in effect means that more and more processes and works can be protected and excluded from the public domain.137

An example of modern enclosure through an extension of the scope of proprietary classification would be the broadening of patent rights to include human genetic material. Predictably, proponents for the enclosure of the human genome then chimed in unison that by doing so, it would guarantee investors the certainty of subsequent rights of exploitation. And owing to that certainty, it would allow for the inward flow of financial investment and lead to medical breakthroughs in the form of novel drug and gene therapies.138 In that sense, the appropriation of proprietary rights over genetic material would seem a noble endeavour, to spur medical progress and give due credit to the mantra that “property saves live”.139 However, looking again at the case study of the AIDS pandemic. In relation to the field of medical development; initial innovate enthusiasm is often abrogated by capitalistic greed140, and the subsequent fruits of the medical research will be rendered unobtainable to those who need it most. Opponents also argue against the enclosure of the human genome on an ethical basis, claiming that all human genetic material forms a part of the collective heritage of humankind, and should by right remain common to all. The conversion of the human genome into intellectual property was thus seen as a gross invasion of individualism and privacy since it challenged the universal assumption that a person is master over himself and his body.141 This highlights another key difference between that of intellectual and real property, as intellectual property penetrates further into the realm of scientific human self-discovery, it raises ethical issues that were never previously a cause of concern with inanimate real property.

137 Travis, see note 111 above, 808.
140 Boseley, see note 74 above. Sarah Boseley states that the legal justifications which pharmaceutical corporations sought to use were in fact a fallacy.
141 Margaret J Radin, Contested Commodities (Harvard University Press, 1st Ed, 1996) 137 - 41.
3. Modern Aristocrats: Who Does the Enclosing?

In the modern context of intellectual enclosure, who are the aristocrats in today’s modern intellectual land grab? By resolving this query, it will allow for a better understanding of how these modern aristocrats’ agendas have shaped today’s intellectual property climate. As alluded previously, the creation and continued strengthening of intellectual property rights are predominantly driven by market concerns. Also, “intellectual property right-holders” are the main beneficiaries of intellectual property exploitation and therefore place express emphasis on the economic criteria and the remunerative nature of enclosure above any other concerns of public welfare or social progress.\(^{142}\) To reiterate, the “lobbyists” or “intellectual property proponents” of such market concerns are corporations that seek to commodify as much intellectual goods as possible.\(^{143}\) As Marian Miller observed, corporations are held accountable by shareholders to produce dividends, and it is this internal mechanism of capitalistic dynamism which fuels their insatiable drive to privatise informational resources, processes and markets.\(^{144}\) Enclosure, according to Miller, is a symptom caused by the deepening of corporate capitalism and its continual penetration into areas of daily life and social interactions, done so in the hopes of gaining a competitive edge in today’s competitive economic environment.\(^{145}\)

Corporations, much like their medieval aristocratic counterparts employ similar tactics in achieving the propertisation of the informational commons. Corporations manipulate domestic governments to enact favourable local intellectual property laws by using their dominant bargaining position. A position which is as a result of a nation’s economic reliance on large corporations for investment, job creation and economic stimulation. This allows for a symbiotic relationship to be established between a corporation and its host nation\(^{146}\), and this relationship is based on the promissory trade-off that a host nation will do its utmost to legally protect and enforce the corporation’s intellectual property rights, so long as the


\(^{145}\) Ibid, 113 - 4.

corporation passes on a significant amount of its financial benefit onto its host. In that sense
developed nations are the next greatest stakeholders in the global technological and
informational market and also stand to lose a great amount of revenue with the continual
decline of transmission and copying costs. Though it is the national governments that are
the ones who enact the laws which ultimately cause the enclosure of the informational
commons, they do so at the behest, manipulation and even coercion of powerful
conglomerates. This power, the ability to create and amend international intellectual
property laws, has been said by independent academics like Vaitsos to have now shifted from
once powerful state-authoritarian control to large multi-national corporations.

Stephen Barley proffers that corporations manipulate the global politics of intellectual
property because by their nature, corporations are abhorrent to change and are more inclined
towards moulding their environments rather than being moulded by it. There are several
key mechanisms which corporations utilise to mould their environments. First, corporations
have strong public relations and advertising campaigns, which they use to legitimise their
actions and gain public support. The second mechanism is “lobbying”, a term first used in
England in the 17th Century to describe the process where non-members of the British
government would argue their case in the “entry hall in the British House of Commons” (or
the “lobby”). The modern expression of the term has essentially remained the same,
except for the underlying implication of corruption that now permeates the term’s usage;
stemming from the fact that it is now seen as the process for which money is exchanged for
political favours.


148 Vaidhyanathan, see note 143 above, 69.

149 Constantine Vaitsos, “Patents Revisited: Their Function in Developing Countries” in
Science, Technology and Development: The Political Economy of Technical ADvance in
Cooper Charles (ed), Underdeveloped Countries (1973) 71, 72 - 3.

150 Stephen R Barley, “Building an Institutional Field to Corral a Government: A Case to Set

151 Frank R Baumgartner and Beth L Leech, Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in

152 Barley, see note 148 above, 781. According to Barley, this novel association with the term
“lobbying” and the payment of money in exchange for political favours, arose after the
formation of American Political Parties in 1824.
At the forefront of such criticisms is America, which is said to be highly susceptible to manipulation by large corporations.\footnote{Keith E Maskus, \textit{Reforming U.S. Patent Policy: Getting the Incentives Right} (Council on Foreign Relations, 2006) 3.} The reason being that America is home to many technological, pharmaceutical and informational Goliaths, which also have far-reaching transnational affluence and clout. The influence of such corporations on American legislators and judges are evident from the trend of domestic reforms, which contributed to the upward strengthening of patent and copyright protection laws within America in the last two decades.\footnote{Nancy T Gallini, “The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent United States Patent Reform” (2002) 16(2)\textit{Journal of Economic Perspectives} 131, 131.} The extent of the influence that corporations had on the American government was exemplified with the passing of the Tillman Act in 1907\footnote{The Tillman Act of 1907 (34 Stat. 364) (January 26, 1907) - Following the 1904 Presidential Elections, President Theodore Roosevelt was charged for accepting corporate contributions to his campaign. In response, President Roosevelt called for the prohibition of further corporate campaign contributions and in 1906, Senator Benjamin Tillman of South Carolina sponsored a bill to criminalise any of such corporate campaign contributions. For more information please refer to: Asghar Zardkoohi, “On the Political Participation of the Firm in the Electoral Process” (1985) 51(3)\textit{Southern Economic Journal} 804.}, which was aimed at quelling public outrage over exorbitant “campaign contributions” which corporations poured into backing Presidential candidates. The cause for such public outrage stemmed from public sentiment, which reflected that this practice undermined the ideals of the “American-democratic-process” and the people were also unconvinced that their leaders would be able to remain neutral given the potential President’s conflict of interests; which was to repay corporate-backers with political favouritism in lieu of large campaign funding. The Tillman Act however was never stringently enforced and corporate entities continue to influence American federal policies through a multitude of ways, from funding political aspirants to lobbying politicians through trade associations and even resorting to full-fledged threats of withdrawing direct investment in development schemes.\footnote{Barley, see note 150 above, 781.}

Today, American politics is greatly influenced by the presence of Political Action Committees or “PACs”\footnote{Ibid, 785.}, which are essentially non-profit organisations set-up and directed by corporations.\footnote{Larry J Sabato, \textit{PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees} (W.W. Norton, 1984) 48. Note also that, though a PACs formation is also a combination of other trade associations, citizen groups and individuals, they however have very little say in the direction as to which political candidate the PAC chooses to support. This is due to the fact that the Committee appointed as the directing body of the PAC is elected and chosen by the Corporation’s CEO.} The purpose of a PAC is to choose and then subsequently support viable
political candidates, whose policies are agreeable to the interests of the PAC’s founding corporation. After which, the PAC will offer campaign contributions and further the chosen candidate’s political convictions through wide-reaching mediums, such as television, radio and newspaper advertisements.\textsuperscript{159} Also, as Golden discovered from her investigations, corporations accounted for more than 67% of all information relied upon for the decision-making processes adopted by US regulatory agencies. The remaining 33% consisted of comments made by citizen groups, unions and other governmental agency groups (which were the second highest contributors).\textsuperscript{160} This led Golden to remark that this was due to two inherent aspects of corporations: (1) the superior organisational skills that corporations had in comparison to other smaller interest groups and (2) the strong informational networks available to corporations.\textsuperscript{161}

Under the current provisions of the law, Corporations are recognised as artificial beings and are granted the same legal rights as any natural individual.\textsuperscript{162} As exemplified above however, Corporations have the ability to amass and efficiently organise vast pools of financial wealth and manpower, far greater than any natural person ever could. In the realm of intellectual property law, this is problematic because a corporation is granted the same control rights as an independent creator and yet both have differing limitations in their respective abilities to enforce those rights.\textsuperscript{163} And in reality, the law thus creates an often overlooked social injustice. Christopher May argues that this inequality should be corrected through a reconsideration of the current legal priorities between artificial and natural persons and that the classification of both under the law should not be one-and-the-same given the vast differences between the two.\textsuperscript{164}

For example, a survey conducted by the American Intellectual Property Law Association, found that the average litigation costs to defend against a patent infringement suit ranged from a jaw-dropping USD$650,000 to USD$5 million depending on the amount of damages

\textsuperscript{159} Barley, see note 150, 785.


\textsuperscript{161} Ibid, 255.

\textsuperscript{162} Tomas Lipinski and Johannes Britz, “Rethinking the Ownershipof Information in the 21st Century: Ethical Implications”, (2000) 2(1)\textit{Ethics and Information Technology} 49, 66.

\textsuperscript{163} May, see note 34 above, 142.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid, 142 - 3.
sought by the plaintiff.\textsuperscript{165} In that regard, it is unfair given that a corporation would be able to defend itself against an expensive lawsuit, while an individual would not. The second problem that this unfairness creates would be the ability of a corporation to access information, which is not uniformly applicable to a natural individual either.\textsuperscript{166} An example of which would be a corporation’s ability to afford expensive technological licenses, which was a USD$22 billion industry in and of itself in 2008.\textsuperscript{167} The culmination of both inequalities are effectively stomping out weaker independent creators; since they are unable to legally acquire the technology necessary to compete with other technological giants. Independent creators often do not even dare contemplate using such technologies on the sly, as simply defending a patent infringement suit can be financially ruinous.\textsuperscript{168} To cite Lawrence Lessig, the effect of this combination of issues has therefore led to the deterioration of intellectual property to the point where protection merely means having the sufficient finances “to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create”.\textsuperscript{169}

Next, Stephen Barley also states that it is logical to expect that the level of corporate influence is not merely confined to domestic governments and has corporations also have the ability to affect regional (e.g. the European Union) and even international institutions (like the WTO, WIPO and the UN).\textsuperscript{170} The reasons for why corporations seek stronger global protection over intellectual property is self-explanatory. Since having an internationally uniform regime grants uniform enforceability of rights and allows corporate right holders to deepen their control over the domestic regulatory environment in any nation.\textsuperscript{171} Corporations manipulate global policies through their host-nations, which act as their political mouthpiece within international forums.

\textsuperscript{165} Jim Kersetter, “How Much is that Patent Lawsuit going to cost you?” CNET News.com (2012) <http://news.cnet.com/8301-32973_3-57409792-296/how-much-is-that-patent-lawsuit-going-to-cost-you/> at 11 October 2012. For a detailed breakdown of the costs for the defendant: if the claim is up to (USD) $1 mil., legal fees will cost up to $650,000; if the claim is for $1 mil. to $25 mil., legal fees cost up to $2.5 mil.; and if the claim is upwards of $25 mil., then the legal fees will cost $5 mil.

\textsuperscript{166} May, see note 34 above, 142 - 3.


\textsuperscript{168} Kersetter, see note 165 above.


\textsuperscript{170} Barley, see note 150, 798.

\textsuperscript{171} Sell, see note 147, 13.
An example of which would be the 1990 incident between Chile and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America (or “PMA”).\(^{172}\) During which time, Chile was struggling to resist diplomatic pressure from America which was pushing for Chile to reform domestic intellectual property laws and in turn grant legislative patent protection over the alliance’s pharmaceutical products. Chile resisted so as to prevent the inflation of domestic medicine prices, which would ensue once PMA was granted a localised monopoly over medicines manufactured within Chilean borders. In 1991 however, under the mounting pressure, Chilean law-makers offered a compromise and finally agreed to grant PMA’s medicines a 15 year protection scheme, rather than remaining resolute on its initial stance which called for the absolute rejection of PMA’s demands for patent protection.\(^{173}\) The historical significance of this international incident is said by Susan Sell to be the starting point for the subsequent establishment of the TRIPS Agreement as a valid source of public international law in 1994.\(^{174}\) Sell states that the TRIPS agreement enshrines the right-holder-biased protectionism left in the residual wake of the Anglo-American intellectual property model. This is because the TRIPS agreement was crafted by an ad hoc alliance of 12 members, consisting of American corporations and their counterparts from Europe and Japan.\(^{175}\)

The effect of the TRIPS agreement has institutionalised the metaphorical relationship linking intellectual goods to real property and supports the commodification of knowledge. The TRIPS agreement has also extended the scope of intellectual property by introducing new forms of protectable information such as micro-organisms and micro-chip architecture.\(^{176}\) Furthermore, the TRIPS agreement has deep-reaching regulatory consequences for all participating nations (whether developed or developing\(^{177}\)) as it seeks to formally harmonise the intellectual property regimes of all its signatories through the importation of public

\(^{172}\) Sell, see note 147 above, 1.

\(^{173}\) Ibid.

\(^{174}\) Ibid, 2 - 3.

\(^{175}\) The members of the 12 member alliance known as the Intellectual Property Committee were Bristol-Meyers, CBS, Du Pont, General Electric, General Motors, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Monsanto and Pfizer.

\(^{176}\) May, see note 34 above, 123.

\(^{177}\) The uniform application of the TRIPS Agreement as a “one-size-fits-all” intellectual property regime has little consideration for the differences inherent in industrialised developing nations and developing nations. This has many ill side effects for developing nations at the time of implementation ranging from high implementation costs and structural deficiencies, to stifling a developing nations growth since it prevents industry growth through imitation - which is the necessary freedom of enterprise needed for such nations to catch-up to the rest of the developed world - for more information on the criticisms against TRIPS. Please note that this issue is also discussed in Part III, 4.
international law into domestic law. Therefore as Sell aptly observes, the implementation and causative role played by private interests groups in the creation of the TRIPS agreement was monumental and a profound show of global power by corporate conglomerates.

4. The Enclosure of International Policy Space

In his paper titled “The International Enclosure Movement”, Peter Yu cautions commentators and policy makers not to be excessively focused on the concerns related to the enclosure of the public intellectual domain. He instead insists that the global politics underlying intellectual property must be as equally scrutinised. Yu also offers his own novel interpretation of the modern enclosure movement of international policy space as one such alternative academic study. The significance of this novel approach to the study of intellectual enclosure stems from the fact that modern intellectual property laws are implemented at an international level and has a trickle-down effect. Making its way into localised legal systems, either through wholesale adoption or through legislative rewording. This practice, if not properly critiqued, according to Yu “will not only take away the policy space individual countries have in their attempts to respond to problems within their borders, but also limit their abilities to independently resist and respond to the enclosure of the public domain”.

This newer formulation of international enclosure movement, unlike previous interpretations, does not involve the privatisation of intellectual commons, or what information was free for all to use. It instead concerns the enclosure of “attractive policy options for less developed countries”. To put this notion plainly, the enclosure of policy space envisions the reduction of political space that nations require to “manoeuvre” and make independent decisions concerning its own state affairs. And in the case of intellectual property, the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements, and the implementation of TRIPS as a restrictive set of basal intellectual property protection standards has attributed to the “fencing off” and shrinkage of such policy space. This in effect has especially denied less developed nations the use of their own discretionary powers and autonomy in matters that concern the flexibility of domestic intellectual property systems. Especially for a less

179 Sell, see note 147, 2.
180 Yu, see note 67 above, 902.
181 Ibid, 906.
182 Ibid, 828.
developed nation to enact laws which would best cater and give due deference to the respective nation’s social, economic, cultural and technological conditions.

Less developed nations are particularly disadvantaged and are especially susceptible to the enclosure of their own policy space due to their reduced bargaining position at the international level. And also due to the emergent neo-liberal trends and practices of developed nations; which seeks the harmonisation of intellectual property laws and thereby promote uniformity of protection over its own exported goods. This push for the process of harmonisation has been predominantly led by America and members of the European Union (where corporate lobbying is at its strongest) and has transformed the myriad number of domestic patchwork and piecemeal systems of intellectual property into a global “supranational code” that imposes fixed obligations on all members under this new unified system. It is because of this profound power disparity between American and European states as opposed to the rest of the world, that has led to this process of harmonisation being often referred to as the process of “Westernisation” of intellectual property regimes.

Proponents that support the implementation of western models of intellectual property rights onto less developed nations argue that the introduction of intellectual property protection is essential for the inward flow of foreign direct investment. And with the inward flow of investment, it too brings with it consequential and horizontal benefits of technological transfer and acts more importantly as a stimulus for industrial development and domestic economic growth. This inward flow of investment is directly attributed to the new-found

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185 Yu, see note 67 above, at 906.


188 Yu, see note 67 above, at 902.


190 Yu, see note 67 above, 892 - 4.
certainty and confidence that intellectual property guarantees, since right-holders will be able to enforce their intellectual property rights against counterfeitters and seek legal compensation for any infringement of those rights.\textsuperscript{191} Because of this, trade negotiators often seek to minimise financial risks associated with piracy and counterfeiting\textsuperscript{192} when bringing its technological goods to a developing nation which offers more competitive manufacturing capabilities as a result of its cheaper unskilled workforce. This risk-minimising practice is done by bundling intellectual property protection provisions with enticing trade deals. Less developed nations, eager to experience the advantageous effects that investment brings, often do not hesitate to adopt such onerous intellectual property provisions and in the process neglect to address the imbalance that such terms create in relation to its own innovative capabilities.\textsuperscript{193} The seemingly advantageous inward flow of investment, associated with the imposition of Western patent systems, however, are actually more costly than beneficial for a less developed nation.\textsuperscript{194} This is because a vast amount of resources are required to be diverted to set in place infrastructure for the policing of domestic industries for intellectual property infringements.\textsuperscript{195} This expenditure depletes a less developed nation’s scarce resources, money and manpower, that would have been better used in other forms of infrastructural development.\textsuperscript{196} However in reality, for less developed nations there is no real choice in the matter, since becoming a TRIPS signatory has now become a prerequisite condition for a nation’s entry to the WTO.\textsuperscript{197} Therefore less developed nations are effectively coerced into the adoption of the basal intellectual property protection obligations set out in

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the TRIPS agreement. The alternative to that would be to face total exclusion from the global trade market, which in reality is never an option.\textsuperscript{198}

The implementation of the TRIPS agreement is seen as the main mechanism which leads to the enclosure and reduction of a nation’s policy space and it does so through several significant ways. Firstly, the TRIPS agreement created non-discriminatory patent rights over all fields of technology\textsuperscript{199} and includes any invention be it a product or process.\textsuperscript{200} This requirement to extend patent rights over all areas of technology thus diminishes a nation’s ability to effectively choose which of its technological industries it should protect or not. For example, fledgling industries are more likely to flourish in an absence of protection and instead requires free enterprise which gives leeway to certain forms of intellectual property infringement. Since in reality it is necessary for a nation to enforce a wide spectrum of varying levels of protection in varying fields,\textsuperscript{201} As in the field of pharmaceuticals manufacturing, the production of generic drugs would allow for more effective mass utilisation of medicines and also place less burdens on a nation’s healthcare system since the pricing of medical goods and process are not subject to monopolistic price control mechanisms.\textsuperscript{202}

Second, the TRIPS agreement further limits the power of local governments from issuing a compulsory license. This was done through the inclusion of TRIPS Article 31(b), which is essentially a set of complex procedural rights, legal prerequisites and exceptions establishing the circumstances for when a compulsory license may or may not be issued against an intellectual property right-holder.\textsuperscript{203} For example a signatory may not issue a compulsory license unless it “has made efforts to obtain authorisation from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a\textsuperscript{198} Peter Drahos, \textit{Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting} (Study Paper 8, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 2002) 35. In his paper, Drahos described coercion as being a “web” since there are numerous methods, subtitle (including extraneous clauses in TRIPS+ Agreements or Free-Trade-Agreements) and direct (threat of embargo), which the international community (predominantly America and Europe) employes to force less developed nations into becoming TRIPS signatories.

\textsuperscript{199} Roffe, see note 69 above, 9.

\textsuperscript{200} Please refer to Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement.


\textsuperscript{202} Yu, see note 67 above, 860.

\textsuperscript{203} Roffe, Supra note 69, 9.
reasonable period of time”. Signatories can forego this requirement if compulsory licensing is necessary to address state crisis and where the usage of the patent is for non-commercial domestic usage only. The usage of patents acquired in such instances of state emergency however must cease when the urgent circumstances are abated and at which time the local state government is to pay “adequate remuneration... taking into account the economic value of the authorisation [for the use of the patent]”. The inclusion of Article 31 was consequential from the success of Brazil and the subsequent lobbying of pharmaceutical corporations to reduce the ability of state governments from using coercive economic threats to ensure discounts over medicines. The resultant inclusion of Article 31, on its face, therefore diminishes the discretionary powers that state governments have concerning the issuance of compulsory licenses, which was a necessary bargaining chip for governments to protect themselves from pharmaceutical bullying. In today’s post-TRIPS environment however that is no longer the case and the use of compulsory licenses must always be compliant with a right-holder’s ultimate prerogative to reap financial reward.

Thirdly, the TRIPS agreement stipulates that all intellectual property disputes arising under the agreement must be settled via the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body. This mandatory arbitration process therefore removes a nation’s ability to effectively settle its own disputes internally and instead transfers the process into the hands of a third-party. A third-party which is often criticised for its positivistic approach towards the enforcement of the law, favouring the absolute enforcement of international intellectual property laws rather than considering the actual social or economic ramifications that such laws might impose onto a nation.

Peter Yu further explains how the three examples listed above has attributed to the plight that less developed nations experience with the implementation of the TRIPS agreement. Yu proffers that the TRIPS agreement was “designed with a focus on setting only the floor, rather than the ceiling, of protection”. Which means to say that the agreement merely focuses on the minimum standards of intellectual property protection and not the maximum

204 Please refer to Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement.
205 Please refer to Article 31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement.
206 Yu, see note 67 above, 861 - 2.
207 Please refer to Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement.
208 Benvenisti and Downs, see note 60 above, 21.
209 Yu, see note 67 above, 902.
level of restriction that may be imposed.\textsuperscript{210} What this perpetuates therefore is a limitless level of intellectual protection, which would overtime be subject to incremental strengthening and cease only once absolute control has been achieved.\textsuperscript{211} This is explicitly stated in Article 1 of the TRIPS agreement which states that “members may, but shall not obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement”.\textsuperscript{212}

This misguided focus, according to Yu, produces two negative effects for the global intellectual property regime. (1) This base-oriented approach only allows for the strengthening of intellectual property laws but never its weakening. And (2) to quote Yu, “[the TRIPS Agreement] has made it difficult for countries to take a holistic perspective and offer package legislation that includes strengthened protection and public interest offsets, especially when the rules are scrutinised by the WTO dispute settlement panels”.\textsuperscript{213} This supports the notion that the WTO dispute settlement panel operates merely as a “one-way ratchet”.\textsuperscript{214} Meaning to say that any complaints to the dispute panel can lead to the rescission of domestic laws that reduce the level of intellectual property protection, but fail to address any laws which might unreasonably increase protection. It is this positivistic approach which has led Dreyfuss and Dinwoodie to incisively comment that disputes “will always unravel in the same direction, requiring nations to change those features of their legislation that benefit user groups while protection-enhancing provisions stay in place”.\textsuperscript{215}

A practical example of which would be the striking down of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act\textsuperscript{216} which waived the requirement for a public performance license to be necessary for bars, restaurants, retail stores and other small business boutiques that wished to play protected music within its premises. Yet the companion legislation (the “Sonny Bono Act” 1998) under the same package deal was left untouched and accounted for the extension of

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\item \textsuperscript{212} Please refer to Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement.
\item \textsuperscript{213} Yu, see note 67 above, 855.
\item \textsuperscript{215} Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss, see note 214 above, 99 - 100.
\item \textsuperscript{216} \textit{Fairness in Music Licensing Act} 1998 17 USC § 110.
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Dreyfuss and Dinwoodie further caution that if this unfair bias is not addressed then it might allow for the perverse practice of encouraging right-holders to initially agree to protection reductions as part of legislative package deals. Given that such packages might later be successfully challenged at the WTO dispute resolution panel and still allow right-holders to experience the residual benefits granted through the surviving legislation.

Though Yu does not support the global harmonisation of intellectual property laws, he does not call for total disharmony either. And even acknowledges that in some instances contextualised policy space enclosure can even be beneficial; that is to say that the nation’s unique local conditions are not ignored as a result of the eminent enclosure. To further emphasise how much international policy space has shrunk in the wake of the TRIPS agreement, Yu nostalgically recalls the period when global intellectual property law was governed under the Paris Convention. During the late 1960s, many countries had misgivings and conflicts over issues of compulsory licenses, parallel importation, working requirements and schematic filing systems. Many countries also had ideological differences in opinion concerning the concept of intellectual property, for example neither Switzerland nor the Netherlands had any recognisable form of patent systems and even Germany was highly abhorrent to the idea of patent laws. As a suitable compromise therefore, the Paris Convention favoured an anti-discriminatory stance towards each individual member’s level of patent protection. This thus left considerable policy space in which member nations could explore the optimal level of localised patent protection. This allowed for member nations to make either incremental or reductive adjustments to their

217 Dreyfuss and Dinwoodie, see note 214 above, 99.


219 Yu, see note 67 above, 906 - 7.


patent protection legislature in an effort to provide sufficient entrepreneurial freedom within struggling or fledgling industries. The concept of contextualised enclosure is not entirely novel nor is it unobtainable, and it could simply be a matter of backtracking through years of global legislative strengthening. And in today’s digital age the need for autonomous decision-making to create viable localised intellectual property systems has never been more crucial.


Thus far, this paper has explored the processes by which intellectual goods are enclosed and the reason for its enclosure by the respective right-holders who wish to exploit them. This paper has also explored some of the more pragmatic resultant consequences of the enclosure of intellectual goods and has alluded to the causative role that monopolistic price inflation has had; paying particularly close attention to the issue of access to medication in less developed countries. The issue to be addressed now, explores the market forces and the underlying factors characteristic of trade; all of which drives the need for corporations to price their goods highly and thus create market segregation through discriminatory pricing.

On the matter of price discrimination\(^\text{225}\), Boyle states that corporations seek to establish an efficient monopoly which is able to achieve perfect price discrimination.\(^\text{226}\) That is to say, corporations ideally want to be able to charge every consumer the exact maximum price for its products as the consumer’s ability and willingness to pay will allow.\(^\text{227}\) Market segregation is important to corporations since it successfully identifies and isolates consumers with large spending power in any given population and allows for more strategic marketing practices through demographic targeting.\(^\text{228}\) In economic terms, this is advantageous as it gives corporations which are essentially intellectual goods vendors, an indication of the nature and number of products that should be manufactured and prevents wastage through the stockpiling of surplus. This practice also further identifies the most

\(^{225}\) Previously discussed, price discrimination occurs when a market is divided and where a clear disparity is pronounced by products entering the market. This effectively separates the rich from the poor, or rather those who can afford and those who cannot. This bars not only the poor but also increasingly middle-income households from having access to informational, technological and pharmaceutical goods which are all priced highly to cater to the richer classes within society.


\(^{227}\) Boyle, see note 48 above, 50.

suitable places and methods necessary for maximum sale and distribution of any intellectual goods entering a market.

Under the current legislative regimes, the granting of statutory rights over intellectual property is not indefinite, and only allows for a temporary monopoly. Right-holders must therefore continually reinforce the chronological terms which they might have over their intellectual property. Besides lobbying for extended terms and thus effectively prolonging their monopolistic rights over an intellectual good, right-holders must also ensure that the maximum amount of profit is derived before the subsequent expiry and extinguishment of their temporary rights. This also goes towards explaining the aggressive attitude with which corporations take in their approach towards the pricing of intellectual products. Bearing in mind also that a corporation is accountable to all its shareholders and is itself driven by a capitalistic agenda; both of which act as the driving force behind a corporation’s persistent need to inflate product prices. One must thus realise that the main prerogative of any profit driven entity is to maximally exploit any and all available revenue streams and in light of the influence of external market forces, corporations have adopted certain responsive measures to ensure that their monopolies are maximally exploited.

An example of such a responsive approach, would be the practice of corporations to minimise the effect of external costs upon their profit margin. Corporations do so by internalising the cost of such externalities and then including it within the sale prices of their intellectual goods and as such transfer the burden of externalities onto consumers directly. As noted by Christopher May,

> the key aspect of the imposition of a property regime over commons is not the enjoyment by users of absolute property over their resources, but rather the cost they have to take into account when their use conflicts with another owner’s interests. By awarding property rights, what was previously an externality, a cost others had to bear, can now be included by charging users on the basis of their liability where other’s resources are degraded.

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229 May, see note 34 above, 125.


232 May, see note 34 above, 129.
What May emphasises in this particular quote is that the externality costs envisaged by corporations are derived from two main sources, (1) the cost of acquiring another’s intellectual resources for the creation of the product and (2) an anxiety that users will illegally use, copy or transmit the right-holder’s intellectual property and thereby undermine their right to economic reward through missed markets.

Firstly, externalities derived from the acquisition of resource includes the purchasing of patent licenses and other licensing fees associated with the use of another’s technological discoveries and processes. And with the increase industry usage of “reach through license agreements” (“RTLA”) and overlapping technological patents and protective measures, the cost of “intellectual raw-materials” are becoming more expensive and harder to secure.

For example an RTLA is created between a patent owner and an individual who wishes to use the respective patent as an intellectual resource for his or her own subsequent creative efforts. This RTLA thus allows a patent owner the right to reach downstream to collect rents, royalties, or options on any discoveries or lucrative products created as a result of the secondary user’s own intellectual pursuits. In such an instance, the pricing of a product is inflated so as to allow for the remuneration and profit of the subsequent creator and any multiple upstream patent contributors.

Secondly, externalities attributable to intellectual property also involves the expensive process of lobbying for legislative protection and even the enforcement of intellectual property rights against infringers through litigation. Both of which are costly processes and are also external costs which are transferred onto the final consumer. Right-holders also fear the degradation of profit through infringement and take into account such potential losses by inflating prices. This market practice of externality transference thus has detrimental effects going toward the increasing market segregation and unfairly prejudices bona fide consumers; those who have no desire or intention of infringing the right-holder’s intellectual property protection.

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234 Lessig, see note 7 above, 97.

235 Runge and DeFrancesco, see note 45 above, 1720.


Another method by which corporations seek to maintain and justify higher pricing, as attributed to the influence of market factors, would be through the construction of “scarcity”. Market concerns encourage the concept of “scarcity” because higher prices can be justified where resource availability is low. And also where innovative steps have been taken to streamline process of creation to reduce resource wastage through the creation of lower yield but higher value-added products in favour of mass production. However as Kenneth Arrow argues intellectual goods have many characteristics which distinguishes it from any other physical goods modelled in economics and cannot therefore suffer from resource scarcity.

The construction of scarcity over intellectual raw-materials can be explained by means of deductive reasoning. For example, if no proprietary rights are afforded over information, then there is no control, and no construction of scarcity since the protected information would be freely available to all. However once the information is freely disseminated or made available, it loses any notion of value simply because any product which has no demand becomes meaningless as a commodity. Take for instance rudimentary scientific knowledge that is freely available, it would thus be absurd to expect an individual to pay a premium to ascertain that gravity causes objects to fall towards Earth. As such, the central purpose of intellectual property rights therefore is to construct an artificial scarcity where none exists. And as Arrow notes, there are many paths and instances where knowledge diffuses readily: (1) piracy, (2) transfer of technology through skilled migration, (3) introducing an intellectual product to the market itself increases the probability of successful duplication, (4) the sale of written or oral materials for the motive of income generation and (5) informal knowledge sharing practices. As such corporations suppress and limit the dissemination of its informational, technological and scientific discoveries so as to prevent

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239 Arrow, see note 238 above, 119.

240 The construction of scarcity over intellectual raw materials can also be explained thusly: creating a lack of access to intellectual raw materials. If intellectual raw materials is scarce, it would then mean that it would be expensive to secure. In that sense secondary right- holders, having paid a premium to secure a patent or licensing fee, can then justify selling his own product at a high price. This notion of scarcity therefore perpetuates this dictum: intellectual resources are expensive and therefore intellectual goods are expensive.

241 Arrow, see note 238 above, 126 - 7.

242 May, see note 34 above, 128.

243 Arrow, see note 238 above, 125 - 6.
any of their intellectual goods from suffering from the consequence of demand-degradation and subsequently price devaluation.\textsuperscript{244}

The fundamental and prophylactic tactic employed by corporations to retain control over their intellectual resource would be to maintain secrecy\textsuperscript{245}, which is allowed under the TRIPS Agreement since it has established a basal level of protection for trade secrets under Article 39(3).\textsuperscript{246} Alternatively, and more importantly, scarcity is established through the assignation of proprietary rights over intellectual goods. This has accounted for the increased consciousness shift within the political economy to employ exclusionary rights as a predominant power to restrict use rather than to seek compensatory actions after illicit usage has occurred.\textsuperscript{247} It is this move from “holding to withholding”\textsuperscript{248} that has key implications toward understanding the contemporary intellectual property conundrum; or the antagonistic relationship between the practice of unfair pricing and its consequential effects of scarcity, against the ideals of “social good” in terms of public access to information and intellectual goods.\textsuperscript{249}

6. A Case Study of the Impact of Scarcity on Scientific Information

The creation of scarcity which seeks to suppress the freedom of intellectual raw-material is especially profound and problematic in the field of medical discovery and scientific research. Fiona Murray and Scott Stern stated that formal intellectual property rights have detrimental impacts on the “production and diffusion of ‘dual knowledge’”.\textsuperscript{250} Which is a term coined by them to encapsulate ideas which (1) have value as scientific discovery and which (2) are an inventive construct for future innovation and discovery. Murray and Stern further stress that more instances of scientific knowledge is falling within the category of protected and withheld information; safeguarded by corporations. The withholding of these ideas for

\textsuperscript{244} May, see note 34 above, 129.

\textsuperscript{245} Arrow, see note 238 above, 124.

\textsuperscript{246} TRIPS Agreement Article 39(3), this provision allows for the protection of undisclosed information which has not been covered previously by any other multilateral agreement.


\textsuperscript{248} John Commons, \textit{Legal Foundations of Capitalism} (University of Wisconsin Press, 2nd ed, 1959) 53.

\textsuperscript{249} May, see note 34 above, 132.

commercial exploitation is in turn stifling the subsequent outputs of both contemporary and future academics in the field of scientific research.\(^{251}\) The reason for this continual entanglement between corporate commercialisation and academic research is due to the practice of privatised academic funding.\(^{252}\) This elevates the role of universities from mere educational institutions to external sources of research and development for wealthy private corporations which seek tangible benefits from funding commercially viable scientific discoveries.\(^{253}\) The fostering of such relationships between universities and corporations has been the subject of much controversy as commentators claim that corporate influence has compromised the “purity” of academic research and shifted the focus of research from scientific altruism to mere commercialisation.\(^{254}\)

An instance of the intertwining relationship between academia and corporate capitalism can be clearly seen from the development of the “Oncomouse” by Phil Leder, a professor in the Genetics department at the Harvard Medical School.\(^{255}\) The Oncomouse was the first genetically engineered mouse, and was created through novel transgenic techniques employed by Professor Leder when an onco-gene was inserted into a mouse embryo.\(^{256}\) This resulted in the birth of a mouse which was highly susceptible to cancer and in effect meant that a strain of carcinogenic genes had been successfully discovered and isolated.\(^{257}\) This research was subsequently published in medical journals and was granted a broad patent by the U.S Patent Office in 1988. The successful patenting of the Oncomouse sparked controversy since it was the first instance where a living mammal was recognised under the law as property. And also because this meant that Harvard’s licensee, Du Pont, could then aggressively enforce its proprietary rights over the Oncomouse.\(^{258}\) Du Pont sought to enforce RTLAs on subsequent inventions made using the Oncomouse and also demanded review of

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\(^{252}\) Lee, see note 251 above, 36.

\(^{253}\) Murray and Stern, see note 250 above, 35.


\(^{255}\) Murray and Stern, see note 250 above, 34.


\(^{257}\) Ibid, 630 - 2.

any scientific research publications that used the Oncomouse. This in effect prohibited scientists and academics from freely accessing or sharing any raw-scientific-material related to the Oncomouse and its contributions to cancer research.\(^{259}\)

The protectionistic approach which corporate interference has had on the field of scientific research is said to have accounted for the “tragedy of the anti-commons”. A hypothetical concept created by Heller and Eisenberg\(^{260}\), which is an intended play-of-words on Hardin’s original \textit{tragedy} argument aimed at dismissing the idea of the commons.\(^{261}\) In the anti-commons hypothesis, it is argued that too many entities have been granted exclusionary rights over privatised scientific knowledge. And this causes the intellectual resource to experience under-utilisation rather than over-use or depletion.\(^{262}\) The hypothesis as explained by Heller and Eisenberg further stipulates that the control of intellectual property rights by corporations can not only inhibit the free flow of scientific knowledge and prevent future researchers from cumulatively building upon their predecessor’s discoveries but also creates additional access barriers due to a significant increase in transaction costs given the fragmentation and overlapping of patent rights necessary for subsequent creation.\(^{263}\) Heller and Eisenberg explain this by stating that as the norm of scientific research approaches total corporate ownership, then any subsequent attempt at scientific discovery and invention would consist of a combination of fragmentised research data belonging concurrently to several patent owners each demanding licensing fees or RTLAs.\(^{264}\) A practical example of such an increase of access barriers would be patents over biomedical “receptors”.\(^{265}\) In Hellen’s and Eisenberg’s words,

\begin{quote}
[a] recent search of the Lexis patent database disclosed more than 100 issued U.S. patents with the term “adrenergic receptor” in the claim language. Such a proliferation of claims presents a daunting bargaining challenge. Unable to
\end{quote}

\(^{259}\) Murray and Stern, see note 250 above, 34.

\(^{260}\) Heller and Eisenberg, see note 258 above, 698.


\(^{262}\) Heller and Eisenberg, see note 258 above, 698.


\(^{264}\) Heller and Eisenberg, see note 258 above, 699.

\(^{265}\) Receptors are molecules found on the surface of a cell and are important in discerning the effect that chemicals have on the longevity of a cell.
procure a complete set of licenses, firms choose between diverting resources to
less promising projects with fewer licensing obstacles or proceeding to animal
and then clinical testing on the basis of incomplete information.266

Heller and Eisenberg do recognise that the involvement of corporations do allow for an
injection of innovation. Not so much as an incentive, but rather as a tool of enablement,
since it grants self-motivated scientists the financial means to further their respective fields
of research. And as other academics add, the benefit of intellectual property rights can be
seen through its facilitative contributions in the creation of a market for ideas and in so doing
encourages the disclosure and exchange knowledge, rather than trade secrecy.267 Yet even in
light of all its seemingly beneficial consequences, Heller and Eisenberg caution against the
continual existence of an anti-commons within the field of medical research due to causal
role in increasing transaction costs, fragmentation of intellectual property ownership and the
heterogenous interests amongst corporate owners all of which erects barriers to a scientist’s
access to pre-existing medical research and stifles future scientific outputs for the betterment
of society.268

PART IV - THE ADVENT OF PIRACY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET

1. The Need for Fairer Pricing and the Internet

As is the case in any debate involving two radically opposing ideals held by differing parties,
at present between intellectual property users and right-holders, the logical solution would be
to find a fair and median compromise. In this situation, the pricing of an intellectual good
must not be inflated, but instead should be set reasonably, enough that both the demands of
users and right-holders can be met. By doing so, a right-holder still maintains his right to
profit from allowing another the privilege of using his intellectual property, while still
allowing the said property to be made maximally available to users to access owing to its

266 Heller and Eisenberg, see note 258, 699.

267 Murray and Stern, see note 250 above, 36.

268 In their paper, Heller and Eisenberg argue that diversity in the field of medical research is
also threatened. This is because corporations are more “end-product” oriented and seek to
invent medications which cater for more wide-spread and common illnesses. And therefore
address more common diseases and ailments such as cancer and AIDS, but also fail to spur
research in other less-well-known diseases. For more information please refer to: Heller and
Eisenberg, see note 258 above, 700.
affordability. Or in the case of medicines, Flynn, Hollis and Palemedo state that medicines should be accessible to consumers through more competitive pricing and yet the pricing should remain profitable enough to allow pharmaceutical corporations to subsidise further research and develop medicines for future generations to come.

Yet, the very thought of placing a seemingly “reasonable” price on a particular product is itself cause for much discourse. Since an author or inventor values the creation of a product or work based on abstract sums of: (1) how much effort and resource is expended in the process of creation, (2) the perceived benefit that the product or work provides to society and lastly (3) an element of profit-incentive. The next requirement that is to be satisfied would be the constructive knowledge present within the consumers themselves, which is to say: the consumer must fully appreciate the qualities and characteristics present within that particular product, and having internalised those qualities, must come to the objective conclusion that the product is of good value-for-money.

Despite the fact that the complexities associated with price estimation are daunting, intellectual property owners nevertheless must still bear the onus of ensuring that the pricing of their goods are non-discriminatory, meaning that it is not inflated to the point where consumers are barred access through no fault of their own, except that the goods are simply beyond their financial capacity. This may not seem like a serious issue in relation to technological luxury goods; an individual certainly would not experience any serious impairment without the latest mobile phone or tablet. This “don’t-buy-it-if-you-can’t-afford-it” approach however is inadequate if it is to consider larger social welfare implications such as the overpricing of medication crucial to sustaining life or even the overpricing of or cultural content necessary for educative enrichment.


270 Flynn, Hollis and Palemedo, see note 56 above, 4.

271 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2011, Aspen Publishers, 8th ed) 11 – 12. Take note of point (2), because medicines are seen to greatly benefit society, they are often sold at greater prices due to this justification.


273 May, see note 34 above, 141.
Professor Wendy Gordon has warned that high pricing also poses a detriment to intellectual property owners/vendors themselves, as it could allow for “market failure”. In her paper, Professor Gordon posits that stronger intellectual property protection schemes could cause products to become too expensive and inefficient to sell within a market and the result of which would effectively cause the alienation of any potential consumers and drive them to seek cheaper alternatives instead. A solution proposed by Professor Gordon, was that high-pricing could be cured through accessible, low-cost marketing and smaller automated transactions (or “micro-transactions”). By establishing an accessible and direct market channel that consumers can readily rely on, they will then have no need to find illicit means to obtain the desired product. Vendors can also reduce the number of resellers and additional external costs within the chain of sale, which the product takes en route to the consumer, and can thereby reduce price inflation resultant from the number of increased transaction costs.

The two notions raised above, (1) the need to increase consumer knowledge of an intellectual product and (2) the need for international “micro-transactions” can be taken in combination as a viable approach to combatting high price inflation. And as James Boyle points out, the Internet embodies the ideal mechanism to do just that. Online stores have the potential to offer widespread accessibility across the globe and also offer a direct market linkage between vendors and consumers. Transactions through online stores are also automated and thereby eliminate externalities associated with distributorship and operating conventional retail shopfronts; such as staff wages, shop rental and utility fees. The reason why such intellectual property vendors have yet to fully embrace such an Internet phenomena would be due to the consequential effect that the increased competitiveness of online transactions will inadvertantly have on their conventional shopfront businesses, which will undoubtedly suffer from a decline in profitability. However, for the sake of consumer satisfaction and welfare, business models must be adaptable and must be flexible in its approach towards revenue generation.


275 Gordon, see note 274 above, 1628.

276 Ibid, 1629.

277 Boyle 2, see note 122 above, 18.


Boyle further states that the Internet does offer several disadvantages as it also lowers the cost of copying and obviously attributes too to increased instances of illicit transmission and file-sharing. The advantages of the Internet however far outweigh its disadvantages, since it also allows for lowered costs of production, distribution, advertising and exponentially increases the exposure that vendors have to that of the potential global market. And as aptly put by Boyle, “[a] large leaky market may actually provide more revenue than a small one over which one’s control is much stronger”. This analogy is used to rebut any arguments put forward by fearful and skeptical intellectual property right-holders which present the Internet in a negative light; as a dangerous medium for trade owing to the ease of digital content infringement and which should be strongly regulated.

2. A Case Study of Corporate Culture Embracing the Internet

In April 2003, Apple Computer launched its new flagship store. The difference, however, between this store and any of Apple’s pre-existing conventional stores was that this store was located online: the iTunes Music Store. The launch of Apple’s iTunes store was a resounding success; having sold 30 million downloads by the end of the year. Apple’s 99-cent-song business model, pioneered through its iTunes store, has since revolutionised the way in which digital medium files are sold and transmitted over the Internet. The store charged a mere 99 cents for an individual song and about USD$9.99 for an entire album. For the first time in history, low-priced music downloads from five major record labels were made legitimately available online in one concise source. At the close of 2003, both Fortune and Times Magazines crowned iTunes as the “Product of the Year” and the “Invention of the Year” respectively. Since then many corporations have tried to mimic Apple’s success. Other less successful emulations have faded into obscurity, but some have

280 Boyle 2, see note 122, 19.


284 Peter Lewis, “Product of the Year”, Fortune (New York) 22 December 2003, 188.

experienced equally triumphant results.\textsuperscript{286} For example, Roxio subsequently purchased Napster’s\textsuperscript{287} name and intellectual property assets during Napster’s bankruptcy proceedings in October 2003\textsuperscript{288}, following Napster’s infamous litigation against Heavy Metal band Metallica.\textsuperscript{289} Roxio subsequently relaunched Napster as a music downloading service which also offered 99-cent-songs and a $10 subscription free which granted users unlimited access to music content and faster “tethered downloads”.\textsuperscript{290} And in a bid to compete with Apple, the newly relaunched Napster entered into subsequent agreements with Samsung to co-market Napster’s music store.\textsuperscript{291} This co-venture with Samsung has since become the basic foundation for Apple’s biggest rival; the Android Store.

The appeal and success of iTunes, besides its cheap prices, was also attributed to its notion of legitimacy; which for customers meant guilt-free downloads, and the avoidance of spyware and viruses which were often piggy-backed onto illegal downloads.\textsuperscript{292} However there is growing discontent with Apple’s iTunes amongst contemporary users, ranging from


\textsuperscript{287} Napster is a significant technological milestone because it was a massively utilised database or online informational commons. It was built by a network of volunteers and users. It was an online directory of music files and was enlarged with each user’s input - by converting a CD into an MP3 file, which was then made available for others to download, while at the same time also granting the uploader access to any other files available in the network itself as reward for his or her initial contribution. For more information see: Dan Bricklin, “The Cornucopia of the Commons” in Andy Oram (ed), \textit{Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Power of Disruptive Technologies} (2001) 41, 42 - 4.


\textsuperscript{290} A song file downloaded from a music subscription service that can be played only on computers registered to the account, as opposed to untethered downloads, which can be played on compatible portable devices. Definition from: <http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-6029_7-6447112-1.html> at 11 October 2012.


\textsuperscript{292} Yu 2, see note 288 above, 432.
security breaches and unauthorised charges on users’ accounts\textsuperscript{293} to the recently debated fact that iTunes subscribers do not have ownership rights over their content downloads and purchases.\textsuperscript{294} Though this recent debate has been brought about by questionable sources\textsuperscript{295}, it however does not detract from the important social issues which such a debate raises. (1) iTunes users do not actually own the music they have purchased and are therefore not extended any form of proprietary rights over their digital music collections. And (2) this late realisation of the fact is due to the complex and arduous nature of Apple’s iTunes Licensing Agreement which spans over 56 iPhone screens\textsuperscript{296} or 41 conventional A4 sized pages.\textsuperscript{297} The implementation of Apple’s mass licensing practice was launched at the time of its creation in 2003 but has now become a topic of hot debate only 9 years later. As author Mel Martin satirically remarks, “I’ve bought cars with less paperwork. [Come on], Apple. Get it together.”\textsuperscript{298} Such a quote exemplifies the outrage and dissatisfaction that consumers have towards Apple, and has caused consumers to view the unnecessarily long and complex agreement as a means employed by Apple to intentionally confound and prevent consumers from fully understanding their rights under Apple’s terms of use. The phrase also emphasises the difficulties that a lay-person would have with deciphering such a lengthy agreement; provided that the ordinary lay-person even entertains the slightest desire to read the agreement at all. 

By converting intellectual products from a proprietary good into a mere “service for use” in Apple’s mass licensing approach, it denies consumers the same protections or rights they

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\textsuperscript{295} Charles Arthur, “No, Bruce Willis isn’t Suing Apple Over iTunes Rights”, \textit{Guardian Technology Blog} (2012) \texttt{<http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/blog/2012/sep/03/no-apple-bruce-willis> at 11 October 2012. Proper investigative journalism has revealed that Bruce Willis is not in fact behind the litigation. The use of famous actor Bruce Willis’ name is instead seen as an attempt by the media to give more exposure to the debate, or even to sensationalise the debate itself. Nevertheless this issue it still raises pertinent considerations and does deserve academic deliberation.}


\textsuperscript{297} Full Licensing Agreement available here: \texttt{<http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/uk/terms.html#SERVICE> at 11 October 2012.}

\textsuperscript{298} Martin, see note 296 above. 
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would ordinarily have if they were to purchase an intellectual product through any other legitimate or conventional means.\textsuperscript{299} As aptly noted in The Digital Dilemma, “[b]uy a book and you own it forever; pay for a service and when the period of service is over, you (typically) retain nothing”.\textsuperscript{300} The effect of which means the lost of hundreds and even thousands of dollars of purchases for minor or accidental breaches against Apple’s onerous Licensing Agreement (termination of an account is a discretionary right held by Apple at all times) or even a hardware failure on the consumer’s part.\textsuperscript{301} And this also allows Apple and the respective music copyright holders to extend its restrictive control over downloaders unreasonably. Since licensed downloads grant only a right to use, it does not transfer ownership of the digital content onto the consumer, who are therefore not extended the privileges within Fair Use exceptions. For example, a consumer may not employ the legal justification governed under the “first-sale doctrine” to legally create or acquire copies of a copyrighted work following the user’s \textit{bona fide} purchase of the intellectual property. Also, consumers are barred from transferring music files from their computer to other mediums disallowed under Apple’s Licensing Agreement. For example, though a consumer is allowed to synchronise his music onto his iPod, he may not however move his music onto a third-party music player or home entertainment system.\textsuperscript{302}

Another problematic issue associated with the use of iTunes’ mass licensing practice is that it fails to recognise the fact that many record companies do not have the rights to release all of its content onto the Internet.\textsuperscript{303} The reason for this is because recording companies may own the copyright in the sound recording (the expression) but may not have statutory rights over the use of the composition of the song itself. For example, recording companies might

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\textit{Yu 3, see note 291 above, 702.}
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therefore have the right to release a song on a physical medium (such as compact disks) but may not do so in a digital format for online consumption which requires rights for both the sound recording and the actual composition. Further, record companies may even be unwilling to provide content to which it does have the rights to release, since iTunes downloads are susceptible to unauthorised hacking by third-party softwares which allow users to import songs from their iTunes libraries directly onto their hard-disks. As such, though the iTunes store may offer more than 20 million songs for download, this figure however pales in comparison to the number of songs available on illegal peer-to-peer (“P2P”) networks.

As Peter Yu remarks, “[u]nless music content is released without restrictions, consumers are unlikely to be satisfied and will eventually turn to black markets in the Darknet or use illegal means to relocate their legally purchased music files”. What Yu stresses in this quote is


306 There are also other considerations, for example a music content provider maybe unwilling to allow its music on iTunes arising out of negotiation disputes and pricing. For example please see Greg Sandoval, “Music Publisher Blocked iPhone 5 Music Service” CNET News.com (2012) \(\text{http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57522219-93/music-publisher-blocked-iphone-5-music-service-report-says/}\) at 11 October 2012.


309 P2P networks are synonymous with the names Napster and KaZaA which were software programs which pioneered the process by which users were able to connect to one another through software. This software enabled the users to simultaneously upload and download files through a network which consisted entirely of fellow users and therefore did not require any file hosting services. For more information, see: Parameswaran Manoj and Susarla Anjana “P2P Networking: An Information Sharing Alternatives” (2001) Computer Practices 31, 31 - 2.

310 Fred von Lohmann, “A Better Way Forward: Voluntary Collective Licensing of Music File Sharing” (2008) Electronic Frontier Foundation White Paper 1, 2 - 4. Lohmann also explains the reasoning behind why P2P networks can offer more songs, which is because users can upload esoteric genres of content and not just popular mainstream content for download. P2P networks also offer out-of-print content which can no longer be found commercially. All of which, makes content more readily available on illegal file-sharing networks as opposed to legitimate networks.

311 Yu 3, see note 291 above, 702.
that legalised and commercialised methods of online transactions are often subject to unnecessary hassle and restrictions owing to right-holders trying to fervently protect their intellectual property. This is off-putting for consumers and will leave users, whom have had bad experiences with such legalised online stores, to shun legitimate practices and instead encourages more users to seek out more attractive illegal alternatives. In simple terms, if legalised stores want to compete with illicit download platforms, corporate right-holders must strive to be as attractive, if not more attractive, to entice and retain its consumer base\footnote{Vivian Reding, “Digital Europe - Europe’s Fast Track to Economic Recovery” (Speech, delivered at the The Ludwig Erhard Lecture, Brussels, 9 July 2009), 9.} and justify why consumers should purchase their products and not illegally download free content.

At the close of 2011, Apple announced that it had delivered 16 billion song downloads to consumers since its launch in 2003.\footnote{Rao, see note 308 above.} However economic and tech-analysts maintain that iTunes itself is not a monolithic “money maker” since its 99-cent-business-model actually allows for very little direct profit. As explained by Peter Kafka, the iTunes store is seen by Apple as a supplementary mode of service-provision which is meant to compliment Apple’s primary form of business; the sale of technological products.\footnote{Peter Kafka, “Apple: Billions of Songs, Billions of Apps, But Not Much Profit” \textit{All Things Digital} (2010) \texttt{<http://allthingsd.com/20100225/apple-billions-of-songs-billions-of-apps-not-much-profit/>} at 11 October 2012.} Though the iTunes store, as a valid money-making business model, is being questioned, as a case study however, it is significant because it raises the pertinent issue of whether the cheaper pricing of intellectual goods will be sufficient to encourage legitimate purchases and ultimately to discourage online piracy. In this instance the marriage of cheaper prices and the transference of intellectual property rights onto consumers has not been as seamless as it ought to be. Given the long-reaching and intrusive restrictions that are subsequently placed on content that consumers have legitimately purchased. What this case study therefore exemplifies is this: (1) consumers are willing to pay for legitimate intellectual goods provided the price is reasonable and affordable. And with that exchange of money, (2) consumers also expect a certain level of protection and freedom over the goods which have now come under their possession. This unwillingness, by intellectual good vendors to embrace either of the two consumer prerequisites, is what is driving the upward swell of online piracy.
3. The Proliferation of Internet File-Sharing

In 2011, researchers at markmonitor.com classified 43 unique websites as being “digital piracy sites” which offer file-hosting services and direct download capabilities for illegally uploaded copyrighted content.\textsuperscript{315} According to their investigations, the online traffic generated by these sites exceeded 146 million distinct visits per day or 53 billion visits per year.\textsuperscript{316} From those 43 sites, the Top 3 sites (rapidshare.com, megavideo.com and megaupload.com) alone were estimated to generate 21 billion visits per year.\textsuperscript{317} These figures however are merely the tip of the iceberg, since they reflect but one form of illegal file-sharing activity. In truth, there are myriads of zero-cost alternatives and forms of illegal file-sharing which online denizens use to download songs, ebooks and movies. Other alternatives besides those direct download websites also include file-sharing P2P networks\textsuperscript{318}, video streaming sites and even softwares which allow “reverse ripping”.\textsuperscript{319}

In the United States, Vice President Joe Biden openly condemned illegal online file-sharing in a press conference in 2010. Biden, introducing the American government’s latest Joint Strategy Plan on Intellectual Property Enforcement\textsuperscript{320}, stated that “piracy is theft. Clean and simple. It’s smash and grab. It [is] no different than smashing a window at Tiffany’s and

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\item \textsuperscript{316} Visits or “hits” are counted on the basis of being “distinct” since each individual visitor has a unique “Internet Protocol” or “IP” address allocated to him or her. IP addresses distinguish a person’s Internet service provider and identifies a person’s geographical location. This means that such digital piracy sites experienced 146 distinct user visits from isolated sources all over the globe.
\item \textsuperscript{318} Other P2P networking tools like BitTorrent has 100 million worldwide monthly users and at least 20 million daily active users. Please see J Moya, “BitTorrent Mainline, uTorrent reach 100 Million Combined Monthly Users”, Zeropaid.com <http://www.zeropaid.com/news/91839/bittorrent-mainline-utorrent-reach-100mln-combined-monthly-users/> at 11 October 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{319} Reverse ripping software allows users to enter a video’s URL into its program, and after a short conversion process, converts the nominated video link into a downloadable file (either in pure audio format, or in a video and audio format). This software is used to predominantly download videos from youtube.com, a legitimate streaming website often used by major record labels to promote their music through viral marketing. For an example see: <http://www.ytddownloader.com/> at 11 October 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{320} Available here: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/intellectualproperty/intellectualproperty_strategic_plan.pdf> at 11 October 2012.
\end{itemize}
grabbing [merchandise]”.\(^{321}\) The Vice President’s comments reflect the prosophobia\(^{322}\) that governments and intellectual property right-holders have in relation to Internet file-sharing. The reasons for this discourse is because file-sharing is seen to attribute to two consequential effects: (1) criminality which defies state law and authority, and (2) missed markets which causes intellectual property right-holders a loss of income for every instance their digital goods are enjoyed for free.\(^{323}\) Yet the justifications for the condemnation of Internet file-sharing fails to address larger issues such as the psychological mindset of consumers, the non-rivalrous nature\(^{324}\) of digital intellectual property or its self-perpetuating and causative role in propagating Internet piracy. As Brett Caraway astutely observes, “[o]ur current understanding of the social dimensions of file sharing is inadequate. In some sense, the term ‘piracy’ camouflages the complex structural foundation of file-sharing activities”.\(^{325}\)

Just this year, Caraway conducted an independent survey which queried 357 active file-sharers to investigate and identify the “structures which condition file-sharing activities”.\(^{326}\) The question posed was this: “Why do you use P2P applications to acquire music, movies or television programs?”. And as Caraway discovered, many respondents to the survey cited economic motivations as their top reasoning (183 votes out of 357 participants, or 51.3% of the total participants). These respondents also went on to further elaborate that unemployment, financial hardship and the generally high cost of content were some of the economic motivations alluded to. Other reasons cited by file-sharers also included the fact that P2P networks offered higher quality content as opposed to conventional mediums (ranked 2nd with 171 votes), and that some content was unavailable in local markets (ranked 3rd with 121 votes). This was especially the case where expatriates from Western nations desired access to content from their country of origin or content in their own mother tongue. Also, a significant number of file-sharers stated that in some instances they merely wanted to


\(^{322}\) A psychological term used to describe the fear of progress.


\(^{324}\) As previously discussed, intellectual property is non-rivalrous, meaning to say that an individual is not deprived if an intellectual good is privatised owing to the fact that many individuals can enjoy it simultaneously. This argument has also been reversed to justify piracy which states that the right-holder need not defend his intellectual property rights so vehemently since copying is not actually theft since the right-holder is not actually deprived of his own use of the intellectual property either. For more on this debate, please refer to Green, see note 9 above.

\(^{325}\) Caraway, see note 323 above, 564.

\(^{326}\) Ibid, 567.
preview the content prior to deciding whether or not they would purchase the content through legitimate channels (this reasoning ranked 4th with 71 votes in total). Lastly, another significant finding of the survey also showed discontent and dissatisfaction with digital rights management systems such as those employed by Apple’s iTunes store which prevents the transference of music files from one storage device to another. As such, file-sharers were forced to re-download content which they had already purchased so as to avoid the restriction of format-shifting (this ranked 8th with 34 votes).  

Though the survey results above are merely exploratory and are not truly indicative of the general sentiments of the entire file-sharing community. It does however give us a practical indicia of the problematic effects that intellectual property regimes have on content pricing and market segregation. And these practical results further reinforce the theoretical stance that academics like Clay Shirky take. Shirky states that Internet piracy is not so much an unwillingness by file-sharers to abide by State laws or an open display of civil disobedience or even the extreme scenario of outright theft as posited by Vice President Biden. What Shirky argues instead is that the behaviour of file-sharers is merely an unexpected turn in consumer demand for cheaper prices and not the absolute rejection of any recognisable pricing system. As shown through the previous case study of Apple’s iTunes Store, consumers are willing to pay for legitimate content provided the price is reasonable. However to reiterate, the set of schemes implemented by the music industry known as the Digital Rights Management, seeks to place as many restrictions on digital format content as in the physical world; the inconvenience of copying and transferring music between devices associated with compact disks is to be similarly placed on digital downloads so as to discourage piracy. And furthermore, the music industry’s approach towards digital content pricing is said by Shirky to be an uneducated estimate since the rationale is thus: “the music-loving public should be willing to pay the same price for a song whether delivered on CD or downloaded”.  

327 Caraway, see note 323 above, full results collated at pages 567 - 582.  


331 Shirky, see note 328 above, 27.
In reality however, savvy consumers know the economic costs involved with physical commodities, such as the pressing of compact discs, shipping and distribution costs and retail inflation does not however plague digital content. As such, the pricing system which makes digital downloads comparable to its physical counterparts is unreasonable given that digital content is cheaper to sell and distribute. The approach adopted by the music industry is therefore seen by other academics such as Cenite, Wang, Peiwen and Chan, as being counter-productive since it perpetuates market imperfections, which then promotes the practice of online piracy that costly lobbying seeks to eradicate. In an attempt to downplay the element of consumerist civil disobedience, Shirky compares the online piracy movement to that of Prohibition in America. In the context of the 1920s ban on alcohol, the criminalisation of alcohol actually increased instances of illegal-bootleg alcohol consumption and caused illegal alcohol manufacturing to flourish as black-market trade blossomed. Following the dissolution of Prohibition laws however, illicit alcohol manufacturing and consumption dropped drastically and has since been abolished. This is because alcohol became “legally available at a price and with restrictions people could live with”, there was therefore no longer a demand for illegal alternative sources of alcohol.

Similarly, what is needed in the context of Internet piracy is therefore neither the drastic collapse of legal and commercial mechanisms of control proposed by Internet anarchists, nor the absolute tightening of regulatory control demanded by fanatical intellectual property proponents. It is simply this: the relaxation of restrictions and the reformation of business models to evolve and suit the economics of the Internet age. As Shirky proffers, the relaxation of the music industry’s interference with Internet politics will not diminish their functionality in any other way besides the physical production of compact discs. Rather the music industry should embrace the dissolution of the vexatious problems associated with the distribution of physical compact disks. And focus instead on bankrolling and publicising musicians on a global forum through low-cost innovative viral marketing and reap the abundant profits derived from global content sales.

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332 Shirky, see note 328 above, 27 - 8.


334 Shirky, see note 313, 27.

335 Ibid, 28.
In early 2012, the United States congress was in the midst of deciding the workability of the passing of the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA). Both of which were intended to combat against the increasing surge of online piracy and counterfeiting taking place beyond America’s legal jurisdiction. Simultaneously the Internet community was in uproar. For the first time in its history Wikipedia intentionally turned off its servers in protest, and other popular social news websites like Reddit followed suit. Even Google placed a black banner over its iconic four-coloured logo in an attempt to emphasis its distaste of involuntary censorship of Internet content. And for weeks leading up to the 18th January protests, individual “hacktivists” took to popular social networking website Facebook to educate the masses of the detrimental effects that SOPA and PIPA would have on the online intellectual commons. Fortunately, the congressional critics were heard and their arguments were sufficient to denounce the proposed laws, which were seen to be overly broad and would be ineffective as a regulatory tool for the Internet. Making direct reference to certain parts of the legislation, critics attacked the judicial reasoning behind holding search-engines like Google and YouTube directly accountable for leading users to pirated content. Additionally SOPA and PIPA would have granted Internet service providers (ISPs) the right to remove any websites that allegedly hosted protected content under existing intellectual property laws. Both the SOPA and PIPA, as part of the same legislative package, were heavily backed by both the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the Record Industry Association of American (RIAA) which spent an estimated USD$8 million lobbying the bills in congress.

338 Yoder, see note 336 above, 1.
This overly aggressive approach coupled with the unabashed “money-throwing” of the film and music industry was a throwback to 2003 when the RIAA commenced thousands of legal proceedings against alleged music copyright infringers. And in the RIAA’s crosshairs was “virtually everybody”, including telecommunications service providers, consumer electronics developers, Internet entrepreneurs, universities, college researchers, students and even individual claims against ordinary users en masse. As Yu noted, in the wake of such actions, the general public has become increasingly educated in the pitfalls of online piracy but have also grown to regard copyright protectionism with disdain. The strong-arm tactics employed by the RIAA has in effect antagonised and alienated its consumer market and has altered consumer opinion of the RIAA in this public relations fiasco. Consumers now view the music industry as a ruthless power-hungry-entity bent on punishing even the most trivial of infringements with severe and costly lawsuits brought against ordinary citizens with shallow pockets. Worse still, such unnecessarily aggressive tactics will threaten to drive illicit copying and transmission activities further underground and force file-sharers to innovate and sophisticate the current methods of illicit file-sharing.

For example, Internet pirates have turned to proxy file-hosting servers, the creation of offshore websites in nations with more relaxed laws towards online intellectual property infringement, and encrypted P2P systems which are able to mask data; thus making the

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343 Yu 3, see note 291 above, 682.

344 Ibid, 665.

345 Yu 2, see note 288 above, 442 - 3.
transmission of protected files virtually undetectable. As Geek.com reports, citing directly the RIAA’s and MPAA’s insistence on seeking out individuals through unique IP addresses in an attempt to prosecute with legal action. The Pirate Bay (one of the largest online P2P and BitTorrent file-sharing websites) has launched two Virtual Private Network (“VPN”) services. The first VPN service (iPredator) is available to users for a fee, costing EUR$15 for 3 months worth of unlimited access, while the second VPN (PrivitizeVPN) service embraces the “free-to-use-advertising” business model. This allows users to freely access the VPN service without any fees, but forces users to install advertising software (or “adware”) which intrusively alters a users homepage and Internet search preferences to the VPN sponsor’s nominated webpages. Further reports also announced The Pirate Bay’s goal of launching the world’s first unmanned aerial server drones. Citing the recent prosecution of Megaupload.com’s founder Kim Schmitz, and in anticipation of the passing of SOPA and PIPA, these server drones are to be built with the intention of hovering beyond the jurisdiction and policing of any Earth-bound authorities. Though it might seem like an idea that borders on the realm of science-fiction, such flying drone servers do actually exist

346 Internet service providers track data not so much on the basis of what files are actually being transmitted, but engage in what is known as “traffic management” which identifies the download usage or activity related with P2P services and de-prioritises the bandwidth consumption of such users, which in effect slows download speeds of P2P users to a crawl, making it a painfully frustrating means of file-sharing. This is in an effort by ISPs to regulate and prevent illegal file-sharing under the guise of a network management practices to reduce user “congestion”. Therefore to prevent such “de-priorisation”, pirates allow for the encryption of data transmissions and prevent the slowing of P2P users’ capped download and upload rates. For more information on such congestion combatting practices see: Benjamin Lennett, “Dis-Empowering Users vs. Maintaining Internet Freedom: Network Management and Quality of Service (QoS)” (2009) 18 Commlaw Conspectus 97, 97 - 9.


348 VPNs are private network servers which are isolated from mainstream internet networks. With the addition of varying levels of security, data traffic streams and user IP addresses are kept totally separate from any form of conventional tracking or regulatory monitoring. For more information please see Microsoft’s technical assistance page: <http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb742566.aspx> at 11 October 2012.

349 Humphries, see note 347 above.


and are guided by GPS satellite data which automatically and randomly directs its position at any given time.\textsuperscript{352}

At the forefront, of such a resurgence of innovative regulatory-countermeasures by Internet pirates, is Kim Schmitz.\textsuperscript{353} Schmitz, who was indicted for racketeering charges by the American Federal Bureau of Investigation and whose website, \textit{Megaupload.com} was shut down for copyright infringements causing hundreds of millions of dollars worth of damages to the film and music industries since its operation in 2005.\textsuperscript{354} Schmitz, or more commonly referred to by his monikers, “Dotcom” and “the Pirate King”, however remains undeterred and has announced plans to relaunch a brand new \textit{Megaupload} website by the close of 2012. In a series of twitter messages, Schmitz stated that the new site, dubbed “\textit{new Mega}” will offer a simple one-click encryption option for users to protect their data from being tracked or monitored by United States regulatory watchdogs.\textsuperscript{355}

Schmitz also further went on to state that all data transfer and file-sharing services will be hosted outside of the United States so as to avoid American jurisdictional interference. Along with the relaunching of \textit{megaupload.com}, Schmitz plans to introduce a revolutionary direct download music portal which seeks to eliminate the need for any music industry representation and industry royalty fees related to musician marketing and endorsement. The music portal site, to be called “\textit{megabox}”, also further promises to pay all respective musicians 90\% of the revenue generated from the sale and download of their music.\textsuperscript{356} \textit{Megabox} also embraces the “\textit{free-to-use-advertising}” business model and goes so far as to

\textsuperscript{352} Bea, see note 350 above.

\textsuperscript{353} For a full video interview of Kim Schmitz with New Zealand’s Broadcasting Campbell Live news program please see: \texttt{<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZvrRaeHD5TE&feature=related>} at 12 October 2012. Also, for the full interview transcript, please see: \texttt{<http://www.daftpixel.com/2012/01/20/megauploadbust/>} at 12 October 2012.

\textsuperscript{354} Julian Harris, “The War Against On-line Piracy” (2011) 88 \textit{Institute of Advanced Legal Studies Amicas Curae} 1, 1. According to Harris, \textit{Megaupload.com} has cost copyright owners more than USD$500 million worth of losses while at the same time has generated USD$175 million of proceeds for its own investors and shareholders.


\textsuperscript{356} Stephanie Mlot, “Kim Dotcom Teases Upcoming Megabox Music Service”, \textit{PC Magazine} (2012) \texttt{<http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2410249,00.asp>} at 11 October 2012. According to Mlot, Megabox is already very appealing to users since it has already attracted a wide range of music sensations including popular bands and musicians such as Coldplay, Muse, Radiohead, Foo Fighters, David Bowie, Blur and Rihanna.
pay musicians money even for music offered for free, owing to rentable advertising space available on individual musician’s profile pages.

This novel approach to the way music is marketed and sold; directly from the creator to their audience via the Internet, is a fresh alternative to what Schmitz claims to be the “outdated monopolistic business model” of the RIAA. This echoes the sentiments of Professor Schumpeter who observed that “[e]very piece of business strategy acquires its true significance only against the background of process and within the situation created by it”. This quote embodies the keys for success required in today’s modern Internet age very appropriately and emphasises this: there is no importance in how an industry struggles to protect its existing business model, but rather, how it adapts that model to the new conditions of its ever-fluctuating technological climate. And unless the RIAA or the MPAA can keep up with today’s Internet revolutionaries, then such industries will surely be left behind when the Internet and all its denizens reach the plateau of Internet singularity or what is to be the new “digital information commons”.

CONCLUSION

The key point of this paper is that the existence of proprietary rights over an intangible concept or idea is inherently problematic since it allows for the attachment of monetary value over something that by its very nature had none to begin with. As Karl Polanyi suggests, real property rights were merely reconceptualised so as to alter the notion of what property actually encompassed and was expanded to include the commodification of an intangible good. This process of “legal fictionalisation” occurred solely for the purpose of justifying the exchange of an intangible matter within a market for financial gain, and was neither concerned with its social production (how much labour and effort was actually expended in its creation), nor was it concerned about the freedom of access and dissemination of intellectual goods.

Consequently, control-critics are of the belief that intellectual goods should remain, as a natural right, within a public domain that is either free or at a low cost for all to access,

357 Please refer to full interview transcript available here: http://www.daftpixel.com/2012/01/20/megauploadbust/ at 11 October 2012, at Part 1 paragraph 35.
359 May, see note 34 above, 124 - 5.
peruse and study. As eloquently put forth by Gary Flake in his presentation – entitled “How I learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Imminent Internet Singularity”\(^{361}\), human civilisation now possesses the technology and resources to recreate a monolithic online database of knowledge. A modern legendary library of Alexandria so to speak, containing every imaginable musical score, literary work or technological blueprint. If such a digital realm truly existed, it would undoubtedly spawn a wealth of creative thinking from any individual who engages and interacts with it. Though this has yet to come to pass, it is not so far-fetched since the current world-wide-web seems to be unconsciously growing and gaining momentum toward this end.\(^{362}\)

Intellectual property rights, however, threaten the realisation of this utopian dream. In March of 2011, the United States District Court ruled against Google’s continued attempts to create the world’s largest online library.\(^{363}\) Since early 2004, Google has commenced scanning and cataloging millions of books from various sources, including some of the world’s greatest libraries such as Oxford’s and Harvard’s University libraries.\(^{364}\) In his *ratio decidendi*, Chin J stated that “[w]hile the digitisation of books and the creation of a universal digital library would benefit many”, he added that Google had gone “too far” in its ambitious project to make the millions of scanned books accessible online through Google’s own eBooks\(^{365}\) reading platform. And would “give [itself] a significant advantage over competitors, rewarding it for engaging in wholesale copying of copyrighted works without permission”. This judicial reasoning reinforces the modern belief that the law and the judicial system is to uphold proprietary rights as being supremely sacred; far above any other notions of social welfare or benefit.\(^{366}\)


\(^{365}\) Google’s ebook reading platform is still available here: <http://books.google.com/> at 11 October 2012. It however does not allow the viewing of full content or entire books, rather it allows a limited preview, of up to 10% as allowed under current fair use exceptions.

\(^{366}\) Lessig 2, see note 169 above, 260.
Looking back almost a century ago, in 1918, Brandeis J eloquently enshrined the baseline of where intellectual property laws should be drawn, or rather what kinds of information should not be subject to protection in order to give due deference to the basic human rights of liberty and free access.\(^{367}\) In *International News Service v Associated Press*, Brandeis J states that the general rule of law should never falter in upholding a person’s right to access “the noblest of human productions of information”, such as knowledge, ascertainable truths and ideas, which should be as “free as the air to common use”.\(^{368}\) And that the freedom to access such information should only be restricted in extreme situations where public policy demands it.\(^{369}\) By comparing the two judicial reasonings presented above, it would seem that human civilisation has regressed far beyond what Brandeis J envisioned.\(^{370}\) And humans now inhabit a world where the noblest of human productions are more commonly protected and barred from public access even where public policy demands it.\(^{371}\)

Though this essay has painted a rather bleak landscape of the current global intellectual property climate, the Internet however does offers us a glimmer of hope for the survival of the free informational commons. In spite of the continual attempts to regulate and control it, the Internet will continue to thrive as a result of its neutrality, that is to say pirates and right-

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\(^{367}\) Benkler, see note 49 above, 354 - 5.

\(^{368}\) *International News Service v Associated Press* (1918) 248 U.S. 215, 250 per Brandeis J (Dissenting).

\(^{369}\) Ibid, at 251 per Brandeis J (Dissenting).

\(^{370}\) Benjamin Coriat and Fabienne Orsi, “Establishing a New Intellectual Property Rights Regime in the United States: Origins, Contents and Problems” (2002) 31 *Research Policy* 1491, 1491 - 2. In their paper, Coriat and Orsi state that intellectual property rights have been extended to include software patents, business models and living entities - all of which mark a relaxation of the patentability and protection criteria of intellectual property laws.

\(^{371}\) Also, another troubling modern encroachment into the realm of the informational commons, would be the extension of copyright laws over “mere compilations of facts”, or “mere expressions of truth” which could further stifle the dissemination of scientific fact and data. This position is prevalent in Australia, following the High Court case of *IceTV Pty Limited v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd* [2009] HCA 14 (appeal case) - which opined that if a plaintiff can demonstrate that sufficient skill and labour has gone into the factual compilation and if its reproduction is expressed in a similar manner, then the plaintiff can rightfully enforce their rights against the infringer through Australian copyright Laws. Also this legal principle has be codified in America via statute, see *Collection of Information Antipiracy Act* 1999 H.R.354 for the 106th Congress, s 2291.
holders share the digital-space of the Internet concurrently as neighbours. Moreover, the Internet is structured in such a way that it is impossible to expect users to adhere linearly to a singular legitimate content source. In reality users engage in a blend of both activities; legitimate content purchasing and illegitimate file-sharing. Therefore, unless corporate entities respect this co-existence, then their repeated attempts at restricting users’ liberties will only encourage more users to embrace the liberatory potential that illicit alternatives offer.

In his testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee, Lawrence Lessig aptly puts across this sentiment as he stated that “in the world of digital communication infrastructures, the Internet is everything, supporting a multiplicity of content, applications and services” and that the Internet’s function was to “support the widest possible variety of services and functions”. This shows the duality of content made available on the Internet - which is neither solely legitimate or illegitimate, but is structured such that both are readily available to users. Please see: Lawrence Lessig, C Wendell and Edith M Carlsmith, *The Future of the Internet* (Hearing Before the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation) on 22 April 2008, 7.

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