The spatial image of the world created by culture ... is always universal while the world is given to human beings through experience only partially. (Lotman, p. 204)

As a scientific study of literature, poetics is a challenge to all forms of cultural and academic parochialism. (Doležel, p. 8)

Home and away

‘Home’ is a crucial category in Yuri Lotman’s cultural semiotics. Beyond our body-space it defines the first boundary between ‘our space’ / ‘their space’, ‘my own’ / ‘other’, ‘cultured’ / ‘hostile’, ‘safe’ / ‘dangerous’ and ‘harmoniously organized’ / ‘chaotic’ (Lotman 131). The Russian semiotician illustrates these symbolic spaces on a dizzying tour through Russian medieval sermons, allegories, travellers’ tales, saint’s lives, a story by Gogol — and Ulysses’s journey in Dante’s La Divina Commedia. Lotman’s profound knowledge of his own culture provides the readiest illustrations, but the most fully worked example of a character who ‘has the right to move freely’ across geographical, moral, spiritual and narrative boundaries is taken from the Italian masterpiece. However, the rational analysis of ‘The Journey of Ulysses in Dante’s Divine Comedy’ (Lotman, pp. 177–185) is followed by a further Russian example which is a set of poignant variations on the theme of ‘home’: Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita (Lotman, pp. 185–191).

In Bulgakov the home is an internal, closed space, the source of security, harmony and creativity. Beyond its walls lie chaos, destruction and death. A flat, and especially a communal flat, is chaos masquerading as home and making a real home impossible. The home and the communal flat are antipodes: this means that the common feature they share — being a dwelling place, living quarters — loses its significance, and all that remains are the semiotic qualities. The home becomes a semiotic element of the cultural space. (Lotman, p. 191)

This paragraph is a good example of the scope of Lotman's semiotics of culture, relating the spatial and the emotional, the semiotic and the ethical, but there is a note of personal pathos here: 'home's best', and in the Soviet Union of Stalin and his successors a real 'home' was a rare phenomenon.

The geographical space covered by Lubomir Doležel's 'occidental poetics' is also considerable. Starting in Ancient Greece with Aristotle, he moves through Switzerland (Bodmer and Breitung), Germany (Goethe and von Humboldt), England (Wordsworth and Coleridge), France (Bally, Grammont, and Lansan), Germany again (Seuffert, Schissel, and Dibelius), Russia (Petrovskij, Reformatskij, Gippius, and Propp) finally to reach Czechoslovakia (Jakobson, Mukafovsky, and Vodička). In Doležel's Occident, all roads lead to Prague. As we shall see, the temporal structuring, the choice of models for discussion, for exclusion as well as inclusion, and the very definition of poetics imply the chaos which threatens from 'out there': 'home's best'.

Shifting centers and the power of the periphery

A brief sketch of the geographical, intellectual, and political situation of the two theorists may help to clarify the orientation of their ideas — which we will come to shortly — and even their expository styles. We can use Lotman's model of the dialectic between the center and the periphery of a culture to situate both of them.

Doležel served his academic apprenticeship as a junior member of the Prague School of Linguistics and Poetics at a time when it represented a major theoretical paradigm in the humanities, but eventually settled abroad, in Toronto, where he has both promoted the study and appreciation of Prague School work and developed his own model of structural poetics, particularly in the field of narratology, with significant borrowings from Russian Formalism, and logical and 'possible worlds' semantics.

A migrant with loyalties to his Central European home culture, he has also been a central figure in the evolution of structuralist poetics and
East/west, home's best

semantics in the West, particularly in North America. In his book he writes with the authority of one who has been participating, as Lotman would say, in the 'normatization process', helping to establish the norms of the dominant paradigm. Since the mid-seventies, however, the center has shifted in the humanities, and previously 'peripheral' models such as psychoanalysis, deconstruction, and feminism have become the center, making structuralists — especially in poetics, but even in linguistics — feel increasingly marginalized. An important element in the rhetoric of Occidental Poetics is a kind of rearguard assertion of the virtues of explicit, articulated theories and consistent, replicable methods of analysis, which structuralist poetics promoted and epitomized.

For Lotman, the political center has moved, or rather fragmented, and a new phase of struggle has started to negotiate the intellectual center. Born in Leningrad, Lotman has been Professor of Russian Literature at the Tartu State University in Estonia for thirty years. As a distinguished and highly active historian of the dominant culture, a 'center' at the geographical and governmental periphery of the Soviet Union (since Tartu, as many would-be semiotic pilgrims from the Occident know only too well, is not even the capital of the erstwhile Estonian Republic). This peripheral situation enabled Lotman to achieve and sustain an activity which was ideologically and organizationally impossible at the actual center of Soviet life, in Moscow, namely, the forging of an alternative intellectual center, a counter-paradigm of semiotics and cultural studies, which posed a threat to the theoretical foundations of Soviet humanities scholarship. Even the bans on travel to overseas conferences, the obstacles to emigration, the delays in publication, the political threats, and academic sniping failed to stop the ideas of Lotman and his distinguished colleagues at the Tartu Summer Schools from percolating to the West.

Lotman's command of the high ground in terms of both subject matter (Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol, the undisputed classics, and Russian literature and socio-cultural history of his native city in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries) and the dominant paradigm (semiotics and structuralism) enables him to write with a sort of unyielding authority, a total conviction that he is right. Of course, his sheer energy and brilliance as a scholar, the geographical and disciplinary range of his erudition, his skills as an academic organizer and university politician have enabled him to maintain that high ground, and in the eyes of most semioticians and younger Russian scholars he is right. On the other hand, in the highly conservative world of Soviet scholarship he has not been subject to the pressures of the shifting paradigm in the way that Western scholars in this field, like Doležel, have. In contrast to Pushkin and his contemporaries — the focus of Lotman's cultural history — he has not
felt the pressures of the latest French intellectual revolutions of deconstruction and post-modernism. Like Doležel, he can choose his own models and mentors, but because in the Soviet Union the political dimension, though always a threat, was so banal and obvious, he does not need to write, as Bakhtin put it, 'looking over his shoulder for the alien word' ('s ogljadkoj na čužoje slovo'), which has become a habitual posture for structuralists in the West.

Models and mentors (1)

A comparison between Doležel and Lotman is instructive in terms of both their choice of formational models and the way they have chosen to write about them.

Doležel has written a highly tendentious history of Occidental poetics, and its very tendentiousness is one reason that it will be required reading for all my graduate students. The term 'Occident' itself constitutes a challenge, for, as Edward Said has shown, it takes two cultures to make an 'Orient' (Said 1978), the 'home culture' and the alien culture that it constructs as 'other'. As we have indicated, Doležel's tour of the 'Occident' starts in Athens and ends in Prague and never goes further West than the English Lake District, so the map is selective, to say the least. No less selective is the time frame. In part 1, 'Formation of the Tradition', we leap twenty centuries at a single bound from Aristotle to Bodmer and Breitinger, since Medieval, Renaissance and Baroque poetics would involve some inconvenient digressions from the dominant themes of structure, function and mimesis. In part 2, 'Structural Poetics', the twentieth century extends from the early French work on stylistics and poetic semantics only as far as the 1930s with the 'semiotic poetics of Mukařovský, Havránek, and Vodička (with some recognition of post-war continuations of their enterprise). All calendars, like all the roads, point unerringly to Prague! Thus, a book with the global title (well, semi-global) Occidental Poetics omits the revolutionary contributions — precisely to 'structural poetics' — of French, Italian, Russian, Polish, Israeli, British and American theorists and practitioners — although most of them earn a footnote and one entry in the index with reference to the dominating themes.

Now, admittedly, there are already a number of books which comprehensively survey and assess all these contributions to structural poetics and semiotics since 1960, and some of the best of them show how the various post-structuralist tendencies which challenged structuralism were not only historically but theoretically inevitable, so there was no need to
repeat that story, particularly since the theorists themselves were so explicit about the grounds for their disagreements. On the other hand, Doležel’s own thesis about the interplay of structure and function in literature, about the representation of the ‘real world’ and ‘possible worlds’, about static and dynamic views of literary evolution, has remained relevant throughout the half century since the forced demise of the Prague School.

Up to this point, I have perhaps seemed over-critical of Doležel’s book. It is primarily the claims being staked in the title which have irritated me: both the ‘Tradition and Progress’ of the subtitle are unashamedly, but misleadingly, Pragocentric. On the other hand, the book offers a lucid and well-argued thesis concerning the continuity and evolution of a number of theoretical concepts which are central to structural poetics and which constitute its strongest challenge to other approaches to literature, whether before 1900 or since the mid-1970s. Moreover, Doležel’s fluency in Czech, Russian, German, French, and English, allied to his qualifications as a structural poetician, enable him to discuss the stages of ‘the tradition’ with considerable authority. I do not know if Classical Greek is also part of his armory, but he uses the latest commentaries on Aristotle to open the book with the best critical discussion of that philosopher’s flawed and misinterpreted, but lasting, contribution to poetics. The crucial distinction between descriptive (‘mereological’) and evaluative (‘critical’) poetics is adumbrated here.

Aristotle is also seen as the originator of one of three main theoretical threads running through the book, the distinction between structural and functional norms, which provides, as Doležel puts it, ‘the foundations of criticism’:

Structural preferential norms are postulates of properties which Aristotle deems necessary for a ‘well-structured’ tragedy. As a rule, these norms concern the ‘size and order’ of the tragedy or its parts, parameters which are considered decisive for poetic ‘beauty’. … Structural preferential norms express Aristotle’s aesthetic ideal; the functional norms reflect his teleological view of mimetic works: ‘Of the products of man’s intelligence some are never due to chance or necessity but always to an end, so for example a house or a statue’. (Doležel, p. 27)

Doležel then makes the important point, which will colour much of his subsequent discussion of this important issue: If poetic works are viewed teleologically, that is, as structures shaped by their functions, then all structural descriptions can be read as functional norms. (Doležel, p. 28)

This issue is at the heart of an excellent discussion in chapter 3 of the influence of Goethe’s morphological model on poetics at the end of the eighteenth century, notably on the poetics of Wilhelm von Humboldt.
The five major postulates of Goethe’s morphology are: (1) that an organic structure in the natural and cultural world is a self-contained and complete entity formed by the interrelations of the whole and its parts; (2) that the whole is more than the sum of its parts; (3) that structure is a unity of polar opposites; (4) that the ‘rank’ of a natural phenomenon is determined by the complexity of its structure; and (5) that organic structures exist in a constant interface with their environment. Doležel discusses each of these acutely in relation to poetic structures, noting that Goethe’s own poetics was surprisingly naive and uninformed by his biological morphology. Neither Goethe nor Doležel appears to have noticed that the five postulates form a cline from ‘pure’ structuralism to functionalism. Doležel sees Wilhelm von Humboldt as realizing in his analyses of Goethe’s Hermann and Dorothy the promise of a functional-structural poetics implicit in the earlier writer’s morphology.

In his discussion of von Humboldt’s poetics, which is detailed and full of insights, a further theoretical issue is raised which has important implications for later models of poetics, both structural and non- or post-structural. Humboldt, he claims, foresaw, and indeed attempted, the combination of universalistic and particularistic poetics: ‘His is a zigzag method whereby the researcher proceeds by switching from universal categories to concrete descriptions and back again, a method that became essential for theoretical poetics with analytical aims’ (Doležel, p. 67). This is an important methodological point, and Doležel is probably right in claiming that von Humboldt was the first poetician to say explicitly that this was how he worked. It is extraordinary, however, that he makes no connection here with Leo Spitzer’s concept of the ‘hermeneutic circle’, the search for a ‘point of entry’ and the well-demonstrated ‘zigzag’ method of the later German scholar. Spitzer, indeed, is one of the many names missing from Doležel’s account of Occidental poetics: where are the Stoics, Kant, Anglo-American New Criticism, T. S. Eliot, F. R. Leavis, I. A. Richards — all with a strong orientation to the poetic text; where, from further East, are Bakhtin’s radical reclassifications of poetic and everyday speech genres, Žirmunskij’s close studies of metrics, verse structure, and language in lyric verse, or Vinogradov’s monumental studies of the linguistic features of Pushkin’s and Gogol’s style? Even if structural poetics really had culminated and stopped in Prague in 1939, these earlier founding figures deserve a mention either as directly influential or as exploring alternative paradigms in poetics.

The Anglo-American omissions are understandable, since for many structuralists they represent either the tradition in academic, critical, and pedagogical literary studies (Leavis, Eliot) which had to be opposed and replaced, or a kind of formal textual poetics which went off at half-cock.
and never engaged with patterns of language (New Criticism). These figures and movements, however, are the direct heirs of a debate to which Doležel does devote considerable space — that between Wordsworth and Coleridge on ‘the idea of poetic language’ (chapter 4). Doležel discusses the debate between the English Romantics in some detail, but fails, I think, to recognize how far it contained the seeds for the destruction of structural poetics. On the one hand, the elitism which grew out of their insistence on the opposition between poetic and ordinary language, the humanistic mission which saw poetic language as based on ‘the real language of men in a state of vivid sensation’, and ‘by cultivating “affections” poetry will “ameliorate” the sensibilities of its readers at a time when modern civilization has reduced the human mind to “a state of almost savage torpor”’. (Wordsworth 1802: 44; quoted by Doležel, p. 81, but not in his bibliography). This elevation of the poetic sensibility and language above the passive savagery of ordinary mortals runs directly counter to the urge for a democratization of the discourses of literary criticism among Russian Formalist and Prague School structural poeticists, and has remained a bone of political and pedagogical contention between structuralists and traditional literary scholars.

At the same time, the Romantics stressed certain psychological tendencies in poetry that undermine the claims of an explicit rational model of literary analysis, whose ‘tradition and progress’ Doležel is mapping, and open the way for the post-structuralist and post-modernist forms of criticism which have largely replaced structuralism as the dominant paradigm. Wordsworth’s assertion that ‘The end of Poetry is to produce excitement in coexistence with an overbalance of pleasure’ (1802: 56) seems to point forward to the post-Freudian insistence on the pleasure principle as central to the experience of art, while his insistence on the tension between semantics and metrical patterning already foreshadows the role of the unconscious and the non-symbolic in Julia Kristeva’s semiotic:

From the tendency of metre to divest language in a certain degree of its reality, and thus to throw a sort of half consciousness of unsubstantial existence over the whole composition, there can be little doubt but that more pathetic situations and sentiments … may be endured in metrical composition, especially in rhyme, than in prose. (Wordsworth 1802: 42)

(One is tempted to inquire whether it was inevitable that the Post-Structuralists would share with the Romantics their elitist attitudes to both ordinary language and its uninitiated users.)

The oddest aspect of chapter 4, ‘The Idea of Poetic Language’, is the attempt to relate Frege’s semantics to the Romantic poets’ ideas on
poetry and language. Some rather forced connections are made, but there is no natural link conceptually or temporally or geographically. The reason, of course, is that Doležel needs Frege as a link in that tradition of Occidental poetics that leads not just to the Prague School, but to himself. The distinction between 'reference' and 'sense' is an important stage in general semantic theory, and Frege is clearly an important stepping-stone from the 'possible-worlds' poetics of Bodmer and Breitinger so well discussed in chapter 2 to Doležel's own work on fictional structures in narrative, but this kind of opposition of the pragmatic and aesthetic is a distraction at this point in the book. It is also a relatively superficial issue in the context of the conflict and interplay of structural and functional issues which were so well foregrounded in the previous chapter and are to be developed in depth in the closing chapter.

Part 2 of *Occidental Poetics*, entitled 'Structural Poetics', traces the sources of linguistic stylistics to the three great French poeticians of the early years of this century: Charles Bally, Maurice Grammont, and Gustav Lanson. Doležel sees the preoccupations with language of these three masters as signaling a paradigm shift from the earlier *organic* model of the literary text to a *semiotic* model. From the hindsight of later French dominance in literary, linguistic, and anthropological semiotics, this chapter comes as a pleasant surprise, and Doležel clearly enjoys adjusting the picture of Saussure as the sole founding father of European semiotics. He outlines very clearly the distinctive contribution of each of these French linguists and his account of the 'progress' they represented from Bally's 'expressive semantics', through Grammont's insistence on the interplay of stylistic choice and poetic form, to Lanson's focus on style in narrative is convincing.

More recent functional models from Jakobson to Halliday have, of course, made obsolete some of their concepts, such as Bally's notion of 'a semantics of *secondary, expressive* constituents of meaning additional to the *primary, intellectual* meanings of verbal signs' (Doležel, p. 101), since an authentic functional grammar denies that ideational or intellectual meaning is primary in everyday language, let alone in poetry. The concept of marked/ unmarked forms and of collocability has largely superseded Bally's 'quantitative' notion of degrees of affective intensity, but the enormous amount of textual analysis he undertook to distinguish 'qualitatively' between neutral, pejorative, and laudative lexical items has been of lasting value. Similarly, Grammont's pioneering work on 'sound figures' in verse may well have provided a model for the similar work done by Osip Brik and Roman Jakobson in the heyday of the Russian Formalist movement.

Chapter 6, 'Formalist Poetics: From Germany to Russia' is the most
surprising, and disappointing, chapter in the book for a number of related reasons. Firstly, the work of Seuffert, Schissel, and Dibelius in Germany and the work of the Formalist theorists in Russia each deserve a chapter to themselves. Secondly, although the Germans clearly had more influence on the Russians than is often recognized, this was still only partial and was largely confined to the field of narratology. Thirdly, although the work of the Germans has been freely available since it was first published, it has had nowhere like the same influence on later structural poetics as the banned and scantily translated Russian Formalists.

The contributions of the German poeticians to theories of poetic form and narrative composition, their distinction between inventio and dispositio and their systemic study of characters in the novel are well discussed and Dibelius’ monumental study of the English novel from Defoe to Dickens is given the detailed treatment and the credit that it deserves. For some reason, Doležel chooses to discuss Russian Formalism almost solely as a continuation of German narrative morphology. This involves concentrating on the work of two quite minor ‘fellow-travellers’ of the Formalists, M. A. Petrovskij and A. A. Reformatskij, and ignoring the far more original and far-reaching narratological models of Viktor Šklovskij, Boris Ejchenbaum, and Jurij Tynjanov. Now, admittedly, Doležel was partly instrumental in ‘rediscovering’ Petrovskij and Reformatskij in a well-known contribution to one of the earliest English language surveys of Russian Formalism in the early 1970s (Bann and Bowlt 1973), but a great deal of detailed study of Formalist narratology has been published in the last twenty years and it is clear that Petrovskij and Reformatskij are not only minor in terms of their output and prominence, but even in terms of their contribution to the history of the very structural poetics that Doležel is tracing. He does give some space to Vladimir Propp and ‘rediscovers’ — for Western readers at least — A. I. Nikiforov, but the anthropological poetics of Propp (who also was not considered a Formalist by the Formalists) is well known and documented. Meanwhile, there is no mention of the pioneering work of Šklovskij on structural ‘functions’ in the detective story (Šklovskij 1920) (which pre-dated Propp’s narrative functions in the fairy tale) and on the connection of devices of plot-construction with general devices of style (Šklovskij 1919); or of Ejchenbaum’s work on stylized narrative mode (skaz) (Ejchenbaum 1918) or on the projection of plot to the narratorial level (Ejchenbaum 1919); or of Tynjanov’s specific work on parody (Tynjanov 1921), and on literary evolution (Tynjanov 1927), and his general insistence on and theorizing of functional relations in the organic work of art — all of which directly influenced the work of Mukařovský and the
Prague School and laid the foundations for much of the Occidental poetics of the second half of this century.

The 'figure in the carpet' of Doležel's narrative becomes fully visible in his final chapter, 'Semiotic Poetics: the Prague School Design'. As might be expected, this is the full and balanced account of a scholar who can not only read the Czech scholars in the original, but who finds himself entirely 'at home' with their ideas. In a section on 'The specificity of literary communication', he provides a useful account of the functional linguistics of Bühler and Jakobson, which so influenced the Prague School linguists — though there is no more than a passing reference to the fully functional grammar and theory of social context of M. A. K. Halliday, who has actually clarified some of the woollier concepts of the Prague linguists. A useful section on Prague School mereology — one of the recurrent theoretical motifs of the book — leads on to a discussion of those areas where the Czech poeticians were already anticipating the opening up of structural poetics to a 'poetics of the subject and of the social environment of literature' (Doležel section 3, pp. 158–164). Doležel's final paragraph on the contribution of the Prague School is worth quoting in full:

The semiotics of literary communication is a project that unifies in a coherent theoretical framework the perennial themata of poetics, ranging from the 'intrinsic' properties of literary works and poetic language to the 'extrinsic' relationships of literature to its producers, recipients, and the world. In view of the variety and difficulty of these problems, the ideas of the Prague School semioticians can hardly be expected to be definitive and final; rather, theirs was the first attempt to formulate a semiotic poetics in a systematic way. They have designed a bridge from the past of poetics to its future. (Doležel, pp. 174–175)

If, like the mythical readers of detective stories, I had started by reading the last page, I would have understood the plot — and the conspiracy of the 'away teams' — better.

Before leaving Doležel's book, it would be worth congratulating the author, editor, and publisher on a beautiful piece of publishing craft. Elegantly printed on good quality paper, the book is well bound in a handsome purple cloth cover, and even the plain blue dust cover with white and purple titles is simply elegant. Doležel tells his story well and there are only a very few misprints or Slavic slips in the English (misplaced articles or wrong verb aspect). The 175 pages of text are followed by 33 pages of notes and 32 pages of bibliography, which may seem a high proportion of the book, but the notes are scholarly and full, and often point to new dimensions of the theories being discussed. The publishers have adopted the admirable device (which one would have welcomed in
Models and mentors (2)

Yuri Lotman’s *Universe of the Mind* is not a tidy book. If Doležel’s history is somewhat partisan, nevertheless he sustains a good story line. The story in Lotman’s ‘Semiotic Theory of Culture’ is not at all easy to follow. This is not the fault of the translator, Ann Shukman, who has translated the complex abstractions of Lotman’s theories and the competing styles of his examples very lucidly. Nor is it the fault of the publishers, who have made the author’s very diverse text and notes look presentable. As far as the notes are concerned, however, I personally would have welcomed a normal alphabetical cumulative bibliography for the book. It is easy to lose track of valuable references in the three separate sections of notes, especially since some of the references are incomplete.)

It must have been the decision of either Lotman himself or the general editor of the ‘Second World Series’ published by Indiana University Press to hurl together such a mass of disparate material. Is there a unifying theme? Yes, Lotman moves from the level of the individual mind realizing its meanings through individual texts (part 1) to his concept of the ‘semiosphere’, which is a kind of battleground for texts (part 2), and thence to ‘Cultural Memory’ and the problems of ‘History and Semiotics’ (part 3), but the result is ‘a great baggy monster of a book’ — as an English critic referred to Tolstoy’s novels. It is as if the Russian semiotician had been seized by a sudden urge (or persuaded by an ambitious publisher?) to take a mass of unpublished writings from his ‘long drawer’ (*iz dolgovo jaščika*) and string them together along a theoretical line with extended digressions and repetitions.

The reasons are, I think, both intellectual and ideological — and for Lotman, this amounts to the same thing. As Umberto Eco points out in his excellent introduction to the volume, one of the main principles of Lotman’s research methods is a refusal of the opposition of the exact sciences and the humanities. Thus, Lotman’s mentors include Roman Jakobson (phonologist, poetician, psychologist, anthropologist, cultural historian, etc; it is Jakobson’s protean quality that makes him such a worthwhile model); L. S. Vygotskij (psychologist, linguist, poetician); V. I. Vernadsky (naturalist, chemist); A. D. Aleksandrov (mathematician);
P. Florenskij (mathematician); W. Ross Ashby (information theorist); and Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers (system theorists).

Now, one of the things these disparate mentors have in common is that, apart from the last two, they were writing much earlier in this century. It is another of Lotman's virtues that he sees himself as writing in a well-established Russian intellectual tradition. He has helped to revive interest in many earlier thinkers who have virtually disappeared from view, either through the march of successive scientific paradigms or through the labyrinthine workings of Soviet censorship and publishing policy. On the other hand, he neglects — or refuses? — to engage with many contemporary semiotic, literary, and linguistic theorists who are broaching the same questions as he is and offering alternative analytical frameworks.

I will mention three whose writings have changed the intellectual scene in the West over the past twenty-five years and whose work Lotman's close colleagues have been well aware of: Julia Kristeva, Michael Halliday, and Michel Foucault. As it happens, each of these theorists explores areas covered in the three sections of Lotman's book.

**Missing dialogues**

In part 1, Lotman devotes a fascinating second chapter to one of the most challenging areas of contemporary semiotics: 'Autocommunication: "I" and "Other" as addressees'. This confronts directly questions of the social and psychological constitution of the text-producing and text-receiving 'subject', the functions of mixed codes and genres, the role of free indirect discourse in the novel, and of intertextuality in all kinds of discourse. Lotman argues that the case of a subject transmitting a message to him/herself, what he calls the 'I-I system', is not confined to diaries and self-reminders, but occurs quite frequently and has an important part to play in the general system of culture' (Lotman, p. 21). All of the examples he gives — rocking and galloping movements in poems by Tyutchev or Goethe, the flicker of flames or the patterning of print on a page in *Eugene Onegin*, the arrangement of pebbles in a Japanese garden — have one thing in common: the referential, semantic code of language or horticulture is dominated by *rhythm*. Two opposed principles are at work simultaneously:

These various rhythmical series, ranging from musical repetitions to repeated ornamentation, are constructed according to clearly expressed syntagmatic principles but have no semantic meaning of their own; we can treat them as external
codes whose effect is to restructure verbal communication. However, for the system to work there has to be a confrontation and interaction between two different principles: a message in some semantic language and the intrusion of a purely syntagmatic, supplementary code. Only when these principles are combined can there be the communicative system which we term an ‘I-I’ language. (Lotman, p. 25)

This is remarkably similar to Kristeva’s description of ‘rhythm become substantive’ in the Futurist poetry of Mayakovsky and Khlebnikov:

this other of the linguistic and/or social contract, this ultimate and primordial leash holding the body close to the mother before it can become a social speaking subject. ... [Khlebnikov] invented words by onomatopeia, with a great deal of alliteration, demanding of him an acute awareness of the articulatory base and instinctual charge of that articulation. This entire strategy broke up the lexicon of the Russian language, drawing it closer to childhood soliloquy. But above all, it threaded through metaphor and metonymy a network of meaning supplementary to the normal signifying line, a network of phonemes or phonic groups charged with instinctual drives and meaning, constituting what for the author was a numerical code, a ciphering. (Kristeva 1982 [1974])

It is intriguing that both Lotman and Kristeva have been inspired in this line of thought by Roman Jakobson’s pioneering essay on the language of the Futurist poets (Jakobson 1921), but appear to have been unaware — two of the most internationally known names in contemporary semiotics — of this convergence in their work! Of course, Kristeva’s interest in the interplay of the rhythmic and semantic codes in poetry (and folklore) is motivated primarily by her psychoanalytic theories, whereas Lotman’s is more culturally oriented. The psychological interest for him is in the implications this double coding may have in relation to the bicameral structure of the brain and the spatial, iconic orientations of the right hemisphere interacting with the sequential, symbolic operations of the left hemisphere. Nevertheless, these distinct approaches to human psychology ought to be in dialogue with one another, and Tartu and Paris are not so very far apart, either geographically or conceptually — especially when they both read Russian.

Lotman defines the ‘semiosphere’ in part 2 of his book as ‘the whole semiotic space of a culture’, within which any one language or code is immersed and with which it interacts. All semiosis is defined and described in relation to the semiosphere, which is ‘the result and condition for the development of culture’ (Lotman, p. 125). The semiosphere is marked by its heterogeneity insofar as the different codes of which it is composed develop at different rates and in response to different pressures from outside. The whole semiosphere is a ‘generator of information’ due to
the asymmetry of the semiotic codes and the mechanism of translation by which they are related.

It is here that Lotman develops the opposition between the centre and the periphery to which we referred at the beginning. In a brilliant series of illustrations of the evolutionary dynamics of cultures, ranging from Renaissance Italy to the France of Louis XIV, from Charlemagne's conversion of the Saxons to Vladimir's conversion of Kievan Russia — with examples plucked dazzlingly from early cinema, Renaissance painting, Parisian précieuses culture, Pushkin, Peter the Great, Ivan the Terrible, Stalin, then back to the legions in ancient Rome — Lotman plots the wave pattern whereby a culture interacts with other cultures beyond its boundary. His metaphor here is of a nuclear reaction: a relatively inert stage of a culture due to a lull in the flow of texts from more active cultures is followed by a highly active stage when it learns the languages and consumes the texts of those cultures until it reaches a stage of saturation. At this point it turns from a receiver to a producer, setting off mechanisms of text production and bombarding other structures with them. Here it tends towards its highest degree of structural organization and codifies itself and attempts to extend its normative influence over the whole semiosphere. This stage of self-description, Lotman says, is a necessary response to the threat of too much diversity. On the other hand, it reduces the culture's reserves of indeterminacy, hence its potential to generate new and flexible meanings. 'The system which has now come to a state of activity gives out more energy than the system that provoked it and extends its influence over a much larger area. This explains the tendency in cultural systems to universalism.' (Lotman, p. 145)

The grandeur of Lotman's model of the semiosphere in action is undeniable, and the apparent ease with which he plucks telling examples from diverse levels of a vast range of cultures is impressive. The question then becomes one of methodology. If vivid metaphors and dazzling examples are the name of the game, can we all play, or does 'the universe of the mind' have to combine Lotman's vision and erudition for one to play at all? I mentioned earlier Lotman's authoritative tone: how can we argue with his grand generalizations, how can we check the relevance of his examples? How, in the final analysis, can we build replicable — and falsifiable — bridges between the general picture of a culture and its textual manifestations?

I believe that the British linguist, Michael Halliday, offers an answer. His concept of the 'social semiotic' is quite similar to Lotman's 'semiosphere'. The social semiotic is Halliday's term for what a given culture chooses to communicate and how it does so. It thus not only connects,
but theorizes, the dynamic interplay between the code of the language and the social situations in which it is used. For Halliday,

the text is the linguistic form of social interaction. It is a continuous progression of meanings ..., selections made by the speaker from the options that constitute the meaning potential; text is the actualization of this meaning potential, the process of semantic choice. A text is embedded in a context of situation ... an instance of a generalized social context or situation type ... a semiotic structure ... which is formed out of the three sociosemantic variables of field, tenor and mode. These represent in systematic form the type of activity in which the text has significant function (Field), the status and role relations involved (Tenor) and the symbolic mode and rhetorical channels that are adopted (Mode). [This] presupposes an interpretation of the social system as a social semiotic: a system of meanings that constitutes the 'reality' of the culture. (Halliday 1975)

Halliday, like Lotman, is concerned with the relation between text and culture, but for him the text is not an exemplum plucked from world history to illustrate a general thesis, but a 'realization', or actualization, of the language code made available by the social semiotic. The evolutionary stage of a given social semiotic is still highly significant, as with the semiosphere, and ultimately both concepts are about relations of power in a society. Moreover, as recent work by Halliday’s colleagues shows (Kress and van Leeuwin 1991; O'Toole 1994), the concept of semantic potential as field, tenor and mode are as applicable to visual and other codes as to the code of language. What is more, the 'scale of realization' extends from the semantic potential to the level of form: actual choices from syntactic systems and lexical sets, and all the way to the level of substance: speech sounds, the writing on a page, paint on canvas, or sculpted marble.

Thus, to take one of Lotman’s examples, the monument to Peter I in St. Petersburg, the serpent writhing beneath the hooves of Falconnet’s equestrian statue is not merely an allegory in the Roman style of the envy and hostility which strove to undermine Peter’s great historic task (the traditional interpretation), nor an eschatological image of the Antichrist, whereby horse, rider, and snake combine to signify the end of the world (Lotman’s new interpretation based on religious prophecies whose texts would have been known to eighteenth-century Russian readers). A ‘systemic-functional’ reading, following Halliday, would see at least three types of meaning being realized both simultaneously and interactively in the figure of the serpent: allegorical meanings of field realized in the contorted but trampled position of the snake; interpersonal meanings of tenor in the rearing figure of the horse being dragged down and tethered to the ground by the snake; textual meanings of mode
realized by the use of the snake as a third anchorage-point for the statue's tail behind the two rear hooves, and as a mediating (reptilian) element between the 'natural' rock of the monument's plinth and the animal and human representations in artificial bronze of the horse and its rider. An approach of this kind avoids the oversimplification of binary oppositions, encourages complex readings negotiated between three sets of functional frameworks and offers a theorized connection (through the concept of realization) between textual and socio-cultural meanings.

If I were asked to find a single term that would define a unified theme for the three parts of Lotman's *Universe of the Mind*, I would choose the word *discourse*. Michel Foucault uses the word in the senses required by part 3 of the book, 'Cultural Memory, History and Semiotics', but he also uses it for the kind of cultural mechanisms explored in part 2 and the textual mechanisms discussed in part 1. Lotman might not be particularly interested in the psychoanalytic terrain explored and politicized by Julia Kristeva; among the many competing models in linguistics, he might have overlooked Michael Halliday's systemic-functional grammar (even though it represents a clear advance over Roman Jakobson's 1958 model of language-functions, which Lotman uses to launch his own discussion of 'auto-communication', see above). It is a mystery, however, how he has failed to see the degree to which Foucault's concepts of 'discourse', 'discursive formations', and 'surfaces of emergence' coincide with his own preoccupations throughout *Universe of the Mind*.

Given the scope of his ideas and examples, one would be cautious of accusing him of ethnocentrism (though we might note that the vast geographical canvas depicts eras long past, not the present). He certainly is not claiming that all roads lead to Tartu, as Doležel's lead to Prague. Nonetheless, the range of exemplification and reference in this interesting and important book does suggest that, in the end, 'Home's best'.

**Notes**

1. I hasten to add that this rather clinical account is written in a spirit of considerable sympathy.

2. For a detailed discussion of these meanings within a Systemic reading of the whole monument, see O'Toole (1991).

**References**


Michael O’Toole (b. 1934) is Professor of Communication Studies at Murdoch University in Perth, Western Australia. His principle research interests include semiotics of art, stylistics, narratology, and Russian literature. Among his publications are *Passport to Moscow* (1972), *Passport to Odessa* (1975), and *Structure, Style, and Interpretation in the Russian Short Story* (1982); he was founder-editor, with Ann Shukman, of the series *Russian Poetics in Translation* (1975–82) and has also edited, with David Birch, the volume *Functions of Style* (1988). His latest book, *The Language of Displayed Art*, was published in 1993.
Review article

Representation and the body in Gertrude Stein*

LORRAINE WEIR

Focusing on such texts as Three Lives, Tender Buttons, Ida, and Blood on the Dining-Room Floor, Harriet Scott Chessman wishes to develop a theory of the dialogical relations between representation and 'the Body' in Gertrude Stein. Since, as Chessman argues, 'Stein's forms resist location solely within a "female" or a maternal and presymbolic realm' (p. 13), it is also necessary for her to attempt to theorize Stein beyond the cultural semiotics of both patriarchy and heterosexuality. However, it would be incorrect to deduce from this that Chessman's project is concerned either to situate Stein as lesbian writer within a Bakhtinian paradigm of otherness or to think a lesbian dialogical poetics through Stein. In fact, as she points out, Chessman relies more heavily on Patricia Meyer Spacks' work on gossip than she does on Bakhtin while at the same time wishing to avoid feminist essentialist claims with reference to body and language. This is an ambitious project, and certainly one well worth Chessman's efforts. However, the dialogical model which Chessman repeatedly invokes (although she takes little time in the actual development of it in this book) is inadequate to the challenge of Stein's complexity.

Chessman proceeds on the basis of a series of logical equations which serve as the skeleton of her argument. Most fundamental of these equations is that between what she terms 'readability' and 'referentiality'. The reverse equation is also invoked. This modernist strategy to bring together what are classified here as Stein's 'two impulses — toward the world as entity, and the world as made present in the word' (p. 87) produces a densely configured prose which attempts, according to Chessman, to move 'outside' history. Thus Stein's notorious 'unreadability' is aligned with the 'unreferentiality' of her prose as Chessman asserts that 'Only an unreferential language can call her [Stein's] "Arden" into existence'


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L. Weir (p. 87). Marking ‘a struggle between linear modes of narrative identified with public and patriarchal forms of discourse, and narrative possibilities grounded in alternative social and erotic relations’ (p. 69), this strategy of ‘unreferentiality’ undergoes a Gestalt inversion for Chessman when, in the context of Tender Buttons, dialogism is invoked and one term shifts into the other. Thus unreferentiality associated with redemption, purity, and play flips into referentiality which is associated with ‘significance’ (p. 93).

That Tender Buttons effects ‘redemption’ via the distillation and conversion of experience into language is not an assumption which all Stein readers would make, but it does have the advantage of enabling Chessman to conceive of Steinian eroticism in a text like ‘Lifting Belly’ as avoiding the reproduction of ‘the structures of representation in which the female has been constrained’ (p. 101). Further, Stein’s ‘redeemed mode of storytelling, involving at least two figures in a situation of intimacy’ in a text like ‘Mildred Aldrich Saturday’, is also, according to Chessman, an attempt ‘to capture within her writing, the sensation of an intimacy outside writing’ (pp. 117–119), thereby enacting the redemptive conversion of the ‘unreferential’ into the referential in the act of reading.

It is surprising to see that this classical reader response theory of textual enactment is the paradoxical outcome of Chessman’s rejection of similar, Iserian theories on the ground that they attempt a ‘mastery’ of the text which is ideologically objectionable to her. Yet Chessman’s own mode of mastery is surely at least as hegemonic as Iser’s, sharing with him a commitment to traditional humanist values within which her feminism is inscribed. Further, in Chessman’s case if not in Iser’s, these values are not simply communitarian, but utopian. Consider, for example, Chessman’s assertion that ‘the newly constructed Steinian reader may be either male or female’, since s/he must ‘leap beyond the constructions of masculine and feminine, and ... enter into dialogic forms in which the old hierarchy has no place’ (pp. 209–210, note 28). Elsewhere in Chessman’s book it is evident that what is imagined here is a ‘leap’ into empathy, into ‘humanness’, which Stein’s texts are seen both to construct and to inculcate. As Chessman maintains,

To become a reader who participates in the writing intimately and as an equal, one sheds (at least for the duration of the reading) a mode of structure and response reliant upon the hierarchy of masculine over feminine. Therefore, although a reader may be literally male, he may accept Stein’s invitation to leap beyond the constructions of masculine and feminine, and to enter into dialogic forms in which the old hierarchy has no place. (pp. 209–210, note 28)

The essentially theological ground of this notion of what Chessman
elsewhere explicitly terms 'transcendence of gender' (p. 121) will be obvi-
ous, as will Chessman’s ambivalence about the locus of gender, whether
‘within language’ (p. 121) or, as quoted above, in some posited ‘literal’
place. Chessman’s concept of dialogism thus appears to be grounded in
a process of transubstantiation involving a kind of transient conversion
experience for the reader in the act of reading a Stein text. What she
refers to as ‘alternative social and erotic relations’ (p. 69) are thereby
placed under the aegis of the transformative, communitarian, utopian
mode which elicits the designated reader response. This inscription of a
lesbian feminist poetics as an ‘alternative’ to patriarchal power is a
normalizing move which legitimates deviance in terms of the safe codes
of convention and ‘humanness’ while apparently refusing patriarchal
values. It could be argued, however, that ‘In the midst of writing there
is merriment’ for Stein (to cite Chessman’s epigraph) precisely insofar as
that writing refuses simplistic equations of the nonreferential with the
lesbian or the referential with the heterosexual, and sets out to language
a world which refuses — in fact, tries altogether to abjure — both
stereotypes, both grounded in assumptions about sexuality and writing
which Stein rejected. In the linguistic specificity of Stein’s writing is not
transcendence or ‘intimacy’ (p. 119) — a furtive experience of otherness
for Chessman — but simply the syntax which is Stein. It is precisely that
specificity which such readers of Stein as Chessman and Catherine
Stimpson have rejected.

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The two mysteries; or, This is not narcissistic nominalism*

RICHARD L. LANIGAN

This [pipe] is not a pipe —
This [image of a pipe] is not a pipe —
This [painting] is not a pipe —
This [sentence] is not a pipe —
[This] this is not a pipe —
[This] is not a pipe —
— Anthony Wilden (1987)

Persons familiar with the paintings of René Magritte and the writings of Raymond Roussel will immediately recognize one of the Surrealistic allusions in my paper title and its shadow in the epigram. During 1966, Magritte completed his painting Les deux mystères (The Two Mysteries — see Gablick 1985: 128, Plate 133), which is an artistic creation of discourse, yet another artifact of Inscriptions: Between Phenomenology and Structuralism. Magritte’s surrealist canvas — that is to say, his intensely realistic painting — inscribes both the smoker’s pipe without ‘perspective’ which one imagines as belonging to a transcendental ego, and secondly, a smoker’s pipe with ‘perspective’ as we might expect to be the prized possession of a semiotic structuralist. This is an old, but originary transcendental ego found most poignantly in the cave drawings of ‘primitive’ human artists whose surface of inscription knew no boundaries. The drawings have no perspective, no frame! They are truly presentations of the real image. And yet in the structuralist cum post-structuralist painting of Magritte, there is the destruction (Heidegger) and deconstruction (Derrida) of perspective — too many frames! The meaning of the pipe is mysteriously a duality, a double articulation, both one and an other, and yet either one or the other. The pipe as Julia Kristeva’s significance is meaning transpositioned (intertextuality; re-presentation) between the iconic inscription of the transcendental ego and...
tal ego as a metacommunication and the symbolic inscription of the social ego of Roland Barthes' (1977) 'modern sceptor' who enunciates a metalanguage.

Within the painting The Two Mysteries, the immanent image of one large pipe suspends itself in transcendent space as a concrete universal (Hegel) with neither foreground nor background to support an immanent frame, a perspective. This pipe presents a *living-image* in its metacommunicative function. The pipe is *inscribed* appropriately for play. To modify appropriately Gregory Bateson's (Innis 1985: 133) famous axiom for play, 'This image which we now perceive does not denote what that image for which it stands would denote'. This is to say, the pipe is the imagination of meaning (Husserl's view of the phenomenon as 'appearance' or *eidos*), properly understood as that which is abstracted as essence from the consciousness of existential experience. This pipe is simultaneously statement, sentence, utterance, and proposition; to follow Benveniste's distinction, it is the discourse of *énoncé*. This imagination is true because it is surrealist; it 'attacks the familiar, provoking the irruption of otherness — the unexpected' (Clifford 1988: 145). This pipe presents one mystery, the *mystos* of phenomenology. Phenomenology 'keeps silent' about its subject, the better to present the object of consciousness: a 'Templar phenomenology' (Eco 1989: 258).

By comparison, hence by an opposition of combination, the image of the other, second and smaller, pipe is *inscribed* appropriately for display: i.e., (1) it is a picture 'framed' for display; (2) it is a picture placed on an easel, yet another supporting frame (whose very structure indexes the realistic perspective of three lines converging on a point in idealistic infinity); and (3) it is an inscription that is itself inscribed by discourse — a sentence beneath it proclaims 'Ceci n’est pas une pipe' [This is not a pipe]. This pipe re-presents a *lived-image* in its metalinguistic function. This pipe is simultaneously not a statement, not a sentence, not an utterance, and not a proposition; it 'has retreated to the far side of the horizon, it can be identified only by what it is not' (Foucault 1986: 2; see Foucault 1983). To again follow Benveniste's distinction, it is the discourse of *utterance*, an utterance whose status as an image instantiates Foucault's 'law of communication' by saying 'I lie, I speak' (1987: 9 ff.). This *imagination* is realistic because it is a narcissistic nominalism (the second allusion of my paper title and its epigram); it 'begins with the different and renders it — through naming, classifying, describing, interpreting — comprehensible. It familiarizes' (Clifford 1988: 145) that which is 'beyond the letter' (Lanigan 1980). This pipe presents another mystery, the *mystos* of structuralism. Structuralism 'keeps silent' about its object, the better to present the subject of experience. 'And as we sought secret
The two mysteries

meanings beyond the letter, we all took leave of our senses' (Eco 1989: 567).

The notion of 'inscription' is, of course, a mystos, a keeping silent. On the one hand, the silence is thematic for the hermeneutic practice of the phenomenologist. 'The narcissistic project originates from the beginning — the arché of the interpretation is the interpreter, whose objective is self-knowledge' (Silverman, p. 338). The phenomenologist keeps the silence of the object as the Self enveloped within the inscribing, hence interpreting, voice of silence that is mythos (Barthes 1977: 165). On the other side of discourse, the silence is thematic for a semiotics that wishes to produce 'an interpretation, i.e., the self as a system of signs' (Silverman, p. 340). Thus, the semiotician keeps the silence of the subject as Self contained in the inscribed, hence structured, voice of silence that is logos.

Indeed, there are two mysteries about which we can inquire as between phenomenology and structuralism. In their proper phenomenological surrealism as an 'imaginative free variation', these mysteries are announced in Silverman's chapter titles: I. Phenomenology; II. And Structuralism; III. Versus Structuralism; and IV. The Difference Between (and Beyond). After the title of the book which announces 'inscriptions: between phenomenology and structuralism', we find ourselves literally seated in our place at the table of 'contents' whose very structure as a table (much like Roland Barthes' famous example of the restaurant menu) announces the theme of the écriture (enunciated utterance) with a 'nameless voice' (the trope of prosopopoeia). The nameless voice of inscription is beyond the difference between phenomenology and structuralism precisely because it is the originary opposition that grounds them both. (1) The opposition is positive because it is combinatorial. Recall the example of the Inaugural Lectures before the Collège de France given by Merleau-Ponty where the trope of prosopopoeia is grounded by naming it, and that given by Foucault where it is not named (again!), but rather is ruptured by defining it in use as the 'nameless voice' who is speaking. (2) The opposition is Jakobson's 'poetic function', in which the combination at the syntagmatic level grounds the oppositional selection at the paradigmatic level, and thereby explicates the discovery of reversibility and reflexivity. Or, to use the more familiar language of Foucault, the combinatorial ruptures of utterance discovered by archaeology ground the genealogical birth of enunciation and serve as the critical discovery of the subject beyond utterance (structuralism) and yet prior to enunciation (phenomenology). In this context of positioned meaning, Silverman is articulating 'a hermeneutic semiology of the self' (cf. Lanigan 1984, 1988, on 'semiotic phenomenology').

As I have been implicitly suggesting, Silverman's hermeneutic
semiology is best appreciated for its genius of invention in constantly counterposing the phenomenological dimension against the structural. As noted, he gives us this readerly advice with the phenomenological experience of a deliberately structured table of contents. Like Magritte's image of a small pipe framed on its easel, the table of contents in its small way announces to us 'This is not the book'. And in his various essays, Silverman takes us toward a semiotic consciousness of the hermeneutic inscription. Like Magritte's image of the large pipe in its glory as a concrete universal, each essay, as Roland Barthes would say, is available to be taken in its own way according to its own law: 'This point of meaning is always the Law: law of society, law of struggle, law of meaning', because 'all speech is on the side of the Law' (Barthes 1977: 76–77, 191). So I have not been, nor shall I be, concerned with the individual essays of Silverman's book, save 'For a hermeneutic semiology of the self', which is both its problematic and thematic core (Husserl's sense).

Let me turn first to a discussion of the hermeneutic self made semiotic, and then second, to the semiotic self made hermeneutic. In this way, and without being distracted by either the Author or the Work (Barthes' sense — 1977: 145, 155–164), I can gloss the signature of the nameless voice, the 'modern scriptor', who inscribes, and is inscribed in, this text. It is, indeed, the appreciation of this signature that allows the nameless voice (which is uneventfully sitting beside me\(^1\)) to enunciate his code and utter his message. In my gloss of the signature 'Hugh J. Silverman' embodied in the text in its hermeneutic form as enunciation and in its semiotic form as utterance, I engage Merleau-Ponty's 'third term' and Barthes' 'third meaning' in discourse which is, as Heidegger says, 'the original outside-itself, the \textit{ekstatikon}' (Heidegger 1982: 267). This is to say, in the originality of my oral discourse engaging us in the present moment, we discover the text outside itself in its moment of \textit{freedom} (Merleau-Ponty) and \textit{jouissance} (Barthes).

The hermeneutic self made semiotic is best illustrated by the French aphorism turned epigram — that is, the expression \textit{le même et l'autre}. This textual proposition ostensively inscribes multiple translations, although in practice the expression is a choice between meaning 'the self and the other' or signifying that something or somebody is 'the same or different'. These are the two choice possibilities within the prescribed boundary condition of a hermeneutic self. Such a self may choose to be speaker or listener, writer or reader, author or signature. Indeed, the reality of the question 'What is an author?' is overpowering, as we realize it has no traditional opposition as do speaker and writer, no Other by which to glimpse the self, except by signature, by the utterance of enuncia-
tion that is narcissistic otherness. Recall Wilden’s insightful comment that ‘the mediation of communication by particular others, by the Other or by Others, and by otherness in general is essential to our humanity’ (1987: 124). Signature is the practice (utterance) of the hermeneutic self made into the performance of the other (enunciation). In this sense there is no need of an ‘implied author’, since the author is an originary creation of the rupture in discourse performance. We accept the creation of the author because this person is the same source of performance and practice in which the persona is constituted as different. In Roman Jakobson’s sense of the ‘addresser’ and the ‘addressee’, the author and signature are the site of address, of ‘public address’, of ‘public speaking’, of oratory. Recall that the ‘oratory’ is the place in which we pray, the location in which the Other as Self addresses the Different as the Same. To pray is to sign: a realization of humor made in Umberto Eco’s *The Name of the Rose* (1983) and an actualization of horror narrated in *Foucault’s Pendulum* (1989).

Rather than cope with the aphorism that renders the code of ‘le même et l’autre’ into the alternative messages ‘self/other’ and ‘same/different’, we interpret the power of the Self to diagnose its own desire for alterity in its form as an epigram. This epigram merely renders ‘le même et l’autre’ as a hermeneutic semiology of the self by expressing the ratio {Self:Same::Other:Different}. Recall the divisions of the text under signature: ‘I. Phenomenology’ ‘II. And Structuralism’ (Self:Same) and ‘III. Versus Structuralism’ ‘IV. The Difference Between (Beyond)’ (Other:Different). Let me illustrate the epigrammatical point with Silverman’s chapter titles.


ism'. The last and fourth term of the ratio, 'different', in Part IV labeled 'The difference Between (and Beyond)', in its turn consists of five chapters, respectively: 'the limits of logocentrism', 'Self-decentering: Derrida incorporated', 'Foucault and the anthropological sleep', 'From utopia/dystopia to heterotopia: an interpretive Typology', and that with which have first dealt, namely, 'For a Hermeneutic Semiology of Self'. Given the thematic signification of the title of Part IV as 'The Difference Between (and Beyond)', it is a matter of hermeneutic clarity to note that this part of the table of contents is printed overleaf from the other three parts (a Difference Between), and that the page numbers are (mis)printed by being offset three vertical lines (a Difference Between [and Beyond]).

The images of discourse thus inscribed as a text in the Table of Contents are a calligram of enunciated signature — i.e., an image of images that is part discourse and picture (Foucault 1983: 19ff.). This calligram is compatible with, and in its innocence of authorship alludes to, the calligram uttered by the Magritte painting The Two Mysteries. The Table of Contents is truly neither a 'table' (taxonomy) with its chapter titles performing as 'floating signifiers', nor does it have 'the' content for page numbers that are the practice of signifieds — merely symbols becoming metaboles of signification. Neither the Work nor its Author are to be located.

While I have thus far concentrated on the hermeneutic aspect of the semiology of the Self, I now want to shift our focal emphasis to the reflexive condition, that is, the semiotics of the hermeneutic Self. For this purpose I shall now expand the French aphorism of 'le même et l'autre' to include its underlying metasemiotic rule. This rule has several formulations, ranging from 'double articulation' in linguistics to 'tropic logic' in cultural criticism. However, the best formulation is the human science formulation in the discipline of Communicology. This formulation is known variously as 'the three way rule' or 'Context Theory' (Wilden 1987: 253, 310), although I prefer the more familiar name of the 'binary analogue logic' (Lanigan 1988). Simply put, we have a choice between performance and practice, or as Foucault would express it, between genealogy and archaeology.

First, the semiotic rule of analogue performance governs consciousness to allow inclusive distinctions by combination — i.e., the 'both/and' conjunction rule familiar to us as the paradigmatic function in language. Second, there is the semiotic rule of digital practice that governs experience by permitting us to making distinctions of exclusion — i.e., the 'either/or' logic of disjunction familiar as the syntagmatic function in language. In each case, that of the analogue and that of the digit, the relationship is binary. Two elements include and two exclude. What is at
issue, then, is the metasemiotic rule. Which semiotic rule explicates the hermeneutic self? It is the binary analogue. The existential choice of context must be reflexive, it must include itself in the distinction by combination. As Silverman suggests, ‘In the coordination of interpretation (the how) and the system of signs (the what), the self is formed’ (p. 343). For convenience, let me avoid symbolic formalism and express this rule linguistically as a discourse function in which the Self makes a choice of context (the Other) that both includes the (Same) choice as such and contextualizes any further (Different) choice. A particularly good, but unexpected, example of this logical process is realized in the reading of Norman Mailer’s poem ‘Set Theory’ (1976). In short, the proposition of ‘le même et l’autre’ is identical with the metasemiotic rule known as the ‘binary analogue’: Both (Both/And) And (Either/Or).

If you desire to exercise the voyeur’s power of judgment here, look at Magritte’s *The Two Mysteries*; the image (Gablik 1985: Plate 133) of the images (the ‘pipes’) performs for us the eidetic ritual of illustrating itself as a necessary condition of itself while also being a sufficient condition of its empirical possibility as a practice. What is especially interesting about *The Two Mysteries* is the fact that in it, Magritte uses the binary analogue rule to realize (eidetically) and actualize (empirically) the binary analogue rule. Here, I should also take note (as does Silverman) of the fact that the painting by Velasquez called *Las Meninas* that figures so centrally in Foucault’s methodology is also an illustration of the aphorism ‘le même et l’autre’. As we recall, the Velasquez painting greets the readers opposite the title page in Foucault’s *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*. Yet, it is the rule of ‘le même et l’autre’ that opens the first paragraph of the Preface to explicate both the performance of discourse that is enunciated in the example of ‘a certain Chinese encyclopedia’ and to explicate the practice of discourse that is uttered by Foucault’s Chapter I: *Las Meninas*. Both these paintings, the Magritte and the Velasquez, form a calligram with the aphorism of ‘le même et l’autre’. The paintings, to be literal in our image of the binary analogue rule of existence, embody the Self which [Both] is [both] a self [and] the other [And] is [either] the Same [or] Different. In Silverman’s plain English, ‘The identity of the self is created through its difference. I am different from the other because our basic structure is the same. Differences can be ascertained when repetition of the same structure indicates variations on the same theme’ (p. 343). Thus, it is with great appreciation that I, as the other, have been able to offer you a slight variation on a theme of the self, namely, the *Inscriptions: Between Phenomenology and Structuralism* by Hugh J. Silverman in whose text we find a scholar’s existential signature.
Note

1. Professor Silverman, as the author, was sitting beside me when the original (real signature?) version of this paper was presented at a review program honoring his book at the 1989 conference of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. I am especially grateful for his positive response to my paper at that meeting.

References


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