ECOFEMINISM

AS PRACTICE, THEORY, DISCOURSE:

An Archaeological and Genealogical Study

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I declare that this dissertation is my own account of my research and contains as its main content work which has not previously been submitted at a university or tertiary institution.

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ABSTRACT

The central aim of this thesis is to examine the usefulness of the archaeological and genealogical methods, as explicated by Michel Foucault, for exploring ecofeminism as a liberation movement and emerging field of academic inquiry. In particular, I will be using Foucault's concepts of "discursive formations", "discursive practices" and "power/knowledge relations" in order to investigate the factors which constrain and enable the circulation of ecofeminism as it enters the academy and appears in grass roots liberation movements. The purpose of studying ecofeminism in this way is to enable a bringing into play of the activist voices displaced by some philosophical commentaries. On a more implicit level, the inquiry is guided by Donna Haraway's concepts of "situated knowledges" and "cyborg politics". Together, the works of Foucault and Haraway will be employed to argue for a politics which aims at avoiding the use of essentialist and universalising frameworks. I am also arguing that it is, perhaps, a shared ethics and politics, rather than a unified epistemology, that gives rise to ecofeminist positions.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION:
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND THE ACADEMY
EXCERPTS FROM THE WOMEN'S PENTAGON ACTION UNITY STATEMENT

For two years we have gathered at the Pentagon because we fear for our lives. We still fear for the life of this planet, our Earth, and the life of the children who are our human future... We came to mourn and rage and defy the Pentagon because it is the workplace of the imperial power which threatens us all. Every day while we work, study, love, the colonels and generals who are planning our annihilation walk calmly in and out the doors of its five sides. They have accumulated over 30,000 nuclear bombs at the rate of three to six bombs every day...

We are in the hands of men whose power and wealth have separated them from the reality of daily life and from the imagination. We are right to be afraid. At the same time our cities are in ruins, bankrupt; they suffer the devastation of war. Hospitals are closed, our schools deprived of books and teachers. Our Black and Latino youth are without decent work. They will be forced, drafted to become the cannon fodder for the very power that oppresses them. Whatever help the poor receive is cut or withdrawn to feed the Pentagon which needs about $500,000,000 a day for its murderous health...

We women are gathering because life on the precipice is intolerable...

We understand all is connectedness. The earth nourishes us as we with our bodies will eventually feed it. Through us, our mothers connected with the human past to the human future. We know the life and work of animals and plants in seeding, reseeding and in fact simply inhabiting this planet...

With that sense, the ecological right, we oppose the financial connections between the Pentagon and the multinational corporations and banks that the Pentagon serves...

We know there is a healthy sensible loving way to live and we intend to live that way in our neighborhoods and our farms in these United States, and among our sisters and brothers in all countries of the world (Women's Pentagon Action quoted in McAllister, 1982: 415).
The essential objective of the ecofeminist project has been to explore the links between the domination of nature and the oppression of women (for some ecofeminists, this latter aspect is generalized to include the oppression of all minority groups) and to develop a liberatory political praxis based on a synthesis of feminist and ecological sensibilities...

Ecofeminist Scholarship has drawn attention to the conceptual parallels, symbolic resonances, and areas of practical overlap in both the critical and constructive tasks of the radical ecology movement and certain strands within the women's movement. It has pointed to a range of philosophical antecedents and historical events that have undoubtedly contributed to our understanding of the dialectical interplay between these two phenomena. Philosophical dualism, the rise of modern science, the process of gender formation, and the changing division of labour under capitalism all clearly have an important bearing on the question. Yet our critical survey makes it clear that no single current of ecofeminist scholarship has been able to demonstrate a necessary link between patriarchy and the domination of nature...This merely underscores the chicken-and-egg nature of the question that ecofeminism has raised and the pitfalls involved in any attempt to reduce a complex interrelationship to a single cause (Eckersly, 1989).
We have before us, two excerpts that may be situated in the field of ecofeminism. The first excerpt, from the Women's Pentagon Action (WPA) unity statement, initially appeared in leaflet form to identify the participants of this act of civil disobedience; to articulate why they came together; and to offer a vision for what they hoped to achieve. The participants speak, as ecofeminists, in opposition to the mentality and manifestations of militarism. They named the Pentagon as a symbol of U.S. imperialism and violence that was directly contributing to the fear for life on earth and, hence, organised their demonstration at this location. The tone of their statement is tempered by a fear for their lives and a fear for the future of this planet.

The second excerpt differs from the first in a number of ways. Firstly, the context in which 'The Paradox of Ecofeminism' was delivered was at a conference on Eco–Politics, at the University of Adelaide. In comparison to speaking as an ecofeminist, at a political protest, Eckersley situates herself as a commentator of ecofeminist scholarship, where ecofeminism is considered as an object of analysis for theoretical investigation. As a critic, she surveys a variety of ecofeminist scholars who have connected patriarchal culture with the 'destruction of nature' and the 'oppression of women'. Her paper is concerned with evaluating the adequacy of such a link, with its implied contention that women have a special relatedness to nature, for building an emancipatory, ecological movement. The paradox she arrives at is that; if no necessary link between women's special relatedness to nature can
be made, then a distinctive position for ecofeminism becomes theoretically suspect.

Theoretical inquiry may be seen as a form of activism, and activism may be viewed as implicitly espousing theory. The two can be distinguished from one another through their different forms of articulation. Theory and activism circulate in two different contexts, one within the academy and the other within grass roots movements and contexts of a less academic nature. I have juxtaposed these two excerpts, the WPA Unity Statement and Eckersley's, "The Paradox of Ecofeminism", to draw attention to the conception of ecofeminism as a liberation movement as well as an emerging subject area of theoretical inquiry. The purpose for doing so is to examine how the context in which a movement may be articulated may change the form in which the the production of knowledges and the effects of power relations are challenged or negotiated. In particular, I am interested in exploring how the institutional practices and relations of power in the academy may help or hinder a liberatory politics, such as ecofeminism, further its aims.

My question has emerged from a personal dilemma concerning my own political positioning in relation to my involvement with grass roots activities and as a student of academic inquiry.

When I began this project, I had no intention of focussing on ecofeminism as an object of analysis. I initially wanted to compare 'the' framework of feminist mysticism, or spirituality, with 'the' framework of feminist socialism. I planned to argue that the ontological and epistemological positions of the former were
politically dangerous to liberatory politics. My desire to compare these two frameworks was motivated by the conflicts I experienced in my participation within the women's movement whilst working on a collective in a refuge for women and children escaping domestic violence. I experienced a lot of frustration because my beliefs were not as widespread as I had supposed. As a feminist socialist, my agenda for change was to work toward the transformation of material conditions. This would involve the intervention into the economic structures and the social and political institutions that disadvantage and marginalise women and children. I could not see how a woman's consciousness could change when basic needs, like housing and income were inadequate.

I was angered by the view of other feminists (who were sympathetic to various brands of mysticism and feminist spirituality) advocating that the empowerment of women could follow from a 'positive' frame of consciousness. From this perspective, it was argued, social change could only occur if individuals changed themselves first. It seemed that the input of a spiritual dimension to one's consciousness could overcome the historical disposition that women had found themselves in.

These conflicting agendas meant different priorities for how we sought to challenge the pervasiveness of domestic violence. That is, I observed that different codes of ethics emerged from different world views. By re-entering the academy, I wanted to resolve (or should I say dissolve?) the differences in these two feminist perspectives by arguing for the epistemological superiority of feminist socialism. Though I could see that the differences in
our social positions conditioned our world views, and hence the way we situated our priorities, I still believed that there was one correct framework (that of feminist socialism) which had the privilege of the 'true' perspective for understanding the world.

Whilst feeling frustrated with the conflicts I was experiencing in this women's collective, I was also frustrated with the conversations I was having with students in the academy who described themselves as postmodernists/poststructuralists and deconstructionists. On many occasions, as I opened my mouth to speak about the women's movement, I was asked which women was I speaking about; how was I able to speak of 'women' as a category (as each attempt at offering a definition would 'essentialise' women to an innate quality that would exclude other women); and how could I assume that all women should have the same agenda in formulating strategies for social change. My frustration with such questioning was not so much situated in an objection to these questions, but rather one of finding a point of intervention from where I could speak.

My encounters with feminist mysticism on one hand, and students sympathetic to postmodernism/poststructuralism and deconstruction on the other, had presented me with problems of situating myself in liberatory politics. Whilst I did not want to assume that I could speak for all women, I found myself moving toward the other extreme of only being able to speak for myself. Whilst I did not want to argue that women possessed innate qualities, there appeared to be no other linguistic category to draw upon. Nevertheless, it was clearly 'women' I wanted to write about. Furthermore, while I did not want to be dogmatic, I found my own agenda rife with
notions of what was right and wrong in asserting strategies for social change. I did not want to espouse a singular 'Truth'. Whether my tendency to do so is remnant of my Catholic background or as a result of my rigid adherence to a Marxist feminist tradition, I am unclear. Nevertheless, such a tendency would manifest when confronted with particular versions of poststructuralism and deconstruction which seemed to discount my attempts to claim a speaking position. I wanted to claim a credible space for my materialist sympathies in response to these challenges presented by students of poststructuralism and deconstructionism. Hence, I was interested in examining how different epistemological positions would produce different ethics and politics. At the same time, I wanted to resolve my dilemmas with feminist mystics whom I encountered in the women's movement. It seemed that a comparison between feminist spirituality and feminist socialism in the academy could provide a site to explore these questions and dilemmas.

I began making moves to enrol in the honours course in the School of Communications. I felt that by enrolling in this school (my previous education was in sociology and economics) I would become more conversant with poststructuralist challenges. This was necessary in order to find a space that enabled me to speak of 'women'. If I could achieve this, my endeavour could then be to assert that feminist socialism held a superior truth claim to feminist spirituality.

In the meantime, a colleague had recommended that I read a book by an ecofeminist, Susan Griffin, titled, Woman and Nature: The Roaring Inside Her. This book was remarkable and quite different
to my notions of what a feminist spirituality could mean. At the
time, I did not know what to make of it, *theoretically*, but was
deeply affected by what she was saying. As a result, my endeavour
to make a truth claim for feminist socialism was becoming suspect.

In the initial meeting with my supervisor, Zoe Sofoulis, we
discussed my interests and dilemmas. One of the readings she
recommended to me was "A Manifesto for Cyborgs" by
Donna Haraway. It was a relief to read Haraway's anti-essentialist
arguments in contrast to the cynical, anti-essentialist arguments I
had been hearing from friends. For whatever versions of
poststructuralist readings may exist, my friends who were English
students from Curtin University and Communications students from
Murdoch University had come out with an anti-essentialism that
made it highly problematic to talk about anything without endless
deconstruction. Although Haraway is as suspicious of
universalising theories and essentialising categories in identities and
social structures, her arguments also concern constructing a
politics rather than despairing at the impossibility of being able to
speak or fix a truth.

Haraway demonstrates how post-modernist strategies may be useful
to "socialist-feminist culture and theory" by evoking the image of
'cyborg politics'. 'Cyborgs' are hybrids of a machine and an
organism who have; no essence to their identity; are 'wary of
holism' or universalising their experiences and ways of categorising
the world; but are 'needy for connection' in forming a united
front politics as a means of survival. This article offered me
an avenue to work through my dilemmas and frustrations that I was feeling from my experiences with differences between women in the women's movement and some of the questions that had been raised by students of poststructuralism. As Haraway argues, confusion and contradictions in conceptual categories, like 'women', does not have to lead to a flight from ethics. Rather, something can be made from the way women have come to be categorised. Haraway states:

Cyborg writing is about the power to survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that has marked them as other (1985, p93–94).

Finding productivities that may arise from the way we have come to be categorised, or marked as 'other', is a point that Haraway shares with other feminist philosophers and critics of science and technology . It is also a trait that runs through the works of Michel Foucault, whom Haraway refers to in selected parts of her essay.

I began reading some of the works of Michel Foucault to acquaint myself with some of the anti-essentialist and non-totalising frameworks dominating communications studies. Foucault's notions of 'power/knowledge' and 'discursive practices' shifted my understanding of concepts of truth.

In brief summation, both these notions situate how exclusionary practices follow from the way different truths are produced and legitimated in different contexts. Foucault posits that the
most powerfully sanctioned producer of truth, in Western society, is embodied in the discourse of science. If conceptions of science are seen in terms of the relations of power that interact with the production of knowledges – as opposed to it's conception as a presenter of 'pure' knowledge and the bearer of 'Truth' – then it becomes easier to see that the production of knowledges are rife with political investments. This is not to say that knowledges can be reduced to power moves. If that was the case, then theoretical investigation would be rendered redundant as it would not matter what was being postulated, but only who had the power to do so. By denying this interpretation, Foucault argues that theoreticians should be concerned with analysing 'techniques and procedures' that are involved in the determination of what may be counted as true. That is, to ask what mechanisms are operating in a society so that some productions of 'truths' are given more legitimacy than others?

It is not scientific knowledge, as such, that Foucault criticises but, rather, the procedures and methods in it's 'discursive practices' that conflate scientific knowledge with a particular way for evaluating 'Truth'. A 'discursive practice' may describe, "a delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories" (Foucault, 1977:199). In other words, discursive practices delineate what can be spoken of, who can do the speaking and how this speaking must take place. The particular form that the discursive practices of science has come to be characterised by, is embodied with notions of reason that make it's 'other' – unreason, or madness – in comprehensible within this framework. Hence, what is relegated to the realm of 'other' is
excluded as unlegitimated knowledge. As mentioned earlier, the notion of 'other' is also characteristic of some feminist criticisms of science.

The feminist critiques of science I read included Carolyn Merchant's, The Death of Nature, Evelyn Fox Keller's, Rejections on Gender and Science as well as anthology of essays relating to feminist epistemology compiled by Sandra Harding and Merill Hintikka. A common theme to some of these works was an examination of the relationships between science, gender and nature.

The critiques offered by Keller and Merchant exemplify analyses that situate an historical connection between the 'masculinization of science' and an association of women with nature as emerging as its 'other'. Through such analyses, criticisms are levelled at Western scientific practices for; the genderisation of knowledges that explicitly or implicitly subjugate the position of women (and by association nature), the primacy of dualistic thinking (for instance, the separation of the mind from body, objects from subjects and emotion from intellect), and its emphasis in knowledge being pursued in order to control or 'master' the world as opposed to attempting to understand ourselves as a part of it.

Critics, like Keller, argue that stereotypes of 'masculinity' are associated with the stereotypes of what is needed to make valid knowledge claims. Hence, feminist criticisms of science have extended liberal feminist notions that demand more women scientists be in scientific practices to questioning the very
categories and modes of analysis that construct and shape the way we may see the world, understand it and hence, participate in it. Such criticisms also extend the charges against rationalising discourses that male theorists, such as Foucault posit. As Diamond and Quinby state (1989: xvi):

While Foucault's works are certainly critical of the rationalizing process of power/knowledge, feminists have been far more astute in showing how reason has been constructed as a masculine domain that is divorced from and deemed superior to the senses, emotion, and imagination (my emphasis).

That is, particular forms of reason that associate objectivity with the impersonal, non-emotive and disembodied subject are also traits that are bound to notions of masculinity. (I once heard Dale Spender say at a lecture that this form of objectivity is better termed as 'men's subjectivity'.) With this being the case, Foucault's notion that the discourse of science places unreason and madness as it's other can be extended to conceptualising the 'other' as the 'feminine' (i.e. women and nature).

As 'other', the 'feminine' occupies a subordinate position in dualistic thinking. The primacy allotted to the masculine part of the binary has reinforced traits that this masculinity, associated with the intellect as opposed to emotion and the mind as opposed to the body is bound with greater legitimacy for producing knowledges. Following a feminist slogan from the '70's, 'The personal is political', some feminist critics have argued for more embodied accounts of the world which recognise the knowers interaction with what comes to be known. This involves
conceiving of the way our personal stakes, our bodies and our emotions, are caught within the ways the world may be constructed. In her article, 'Situated Knowledges' and her book, *Primate Visions*, Haraway presents an alternative conception of 'objectivity' by arguing that embodied forms of knowledges allow more accountability and responsibility from 'knowers' for how their knowledge claims are made. Embodied accounts of the world also allow us to view ourselves as a part of the world and not in control of it. It allows a possibility of recognising the way 'scientific knowers' may "...carry the marks of their own histories and cultures" (Haraway, 1990:2) in constituting the categories that help us understand our interactions with each other and the world we live in.

The objects of study of feminist critics of science and the issues raised by Haraway and Foucault began to shift the terrain of inquiry for the basis of my thesis. I was attracted to Haraway's 'cyborg politics' and 'Situated Knowledges' because her use of postmodernist theory could provide productive and constructive tools for forming an oppositional consciousness and alternate conception of objectivity. I was similarly attracted to Foucauldian methods of observing relations of power and knowledge through the discursive practices of more marginalised knowledges. I also became interested in examining the relations between gender, science and nature that seemed to be common themes to both Keller and Merchant.

The project of comparing feminist mysticism to feminist socialism was rapidly losing it's appeal as I was no longer assured of the epistemological supremacy of the latter. As mentioned earlier, my
notions of spirituality were profoundly affected when I read Griffin's, *Woman and Nature*. It occurred to me that Griffin had much more in common with feminist critics of science than I had acknowledged. The block I had with placing her among these critics was due to my perception of her book as non-academic and non-philosophical. I became concerned with my own practices of exclusion and how I distinguished between legitimate and non-legitimate knowledges. When placed beside Foucault's critiques of exclusionary procedures embodied in the discourse of science, Griffin's 'poetic essay' offers a challenging example of a work attempting to cut against the grain of scientific discourse. It was at this point that I considered using ecofeminism as an object of analysis.

As a constant object of analysis, ecofeminism could provide a space from which I could explore the questions that postmodernist critiques had posed for my participation in the women's liberation movement. In addition to this, such a choice seemed to fit well with the connections between Haraway, Foucault and feminist critics of science.

Although the style, content and philosophical assumptions of some ecofeminists differ greatly from Haraway, they intersect with her calls toward forming an oppositional consciousness for planetary survival. By drawing links between the power relations embodied in the categorisation of gender, science and nature, ecofeminists share a conceptual field with some feminist critics of science. Finally, as an emerging subject area in the academy, ecofeminism readily lends itself to Foucauldian methods of observing the
constraints and power effects that may circulate through the production of marginalised knowledges.

It was these connections that formed the shape of my current question; what institutional practices embodied in the production of 'academic' knowledges may help or hinder the espousal of a liberation movement such as ecofeminism? To be more specific, what are the possibilities for a liberation movement to develop strategies for social change when their bases of 'truth' and 'identity', upon which their ethics may rely, are challenged by anti-essentialist and non-totalising frameworks?

Primarily, I am answering this question by following the procedures of Foucault's archaeological and genealogical methods. On a more implicit level, I am also employing some of the insights and critiques offered by Haraway in her essays on 'cyborg politics' and 'situated knowledges'. The focus of my thesis will be to observe ecofeminism as a discursive formation whose discursive practices circulate within and outside the academy in the endeavour to find a speaking space for a feminist politics to engage with environmental concerns.

Having situated the question in this chapter, Chapter Two describes the process of researching this field. Here, I discuss the accessibility of ecofeminist knowledges through library classificatory systems. This will serve to exemplify the constraints of the technical processes acting upon ecofeminists voices entering the academy. Chapter Three discusses the archaeological and genealogical methods. These tools enable an explication of the constraints imposed upon a discourse striving for wider legitimacy.
as well as offering strategies for bringing more marginal knowledges into play. Following this, Chapter Four applies these methods to observing ecofeminism. The mapping of different circulations of ecofeminist discourses aims to appreciate its multiple points of dissension without reducing ecofeminism to a preferred political or epistemological position. Chapter Five explores feminist criticisms of science and philosophy with the intent of aligning with ecofeminist discursive practices. This alliance engenders a productive and critical dialogue between these two discursive fields. To conclude, the final chapter briefly discusses other possible discursive allies. It also reflects upon how liberatory politics, both within and outside the academy, may be asserted without relying on a monolithic politic or totalising epistemology.
CHAPTER TWO

DESIRE AND THE INSTITUTION:
FRUSTRATING TAXONOMIES
Desire says: 'I should not like to enter this risky order of discourse; I should not like to be involved in its pre-emptoriness and decisiveness; I should like it to be all around me like a calm, deep transparance, infinitely open, where others would fit in with my expectations, and from which truths would emerge one by one; I should only let myself have to be carried, within it and by it, like a happy wreck'.

The institution replies: 'You should not be afraid of beginnings; we are all here in order to show you that discourse belongs to the order of laws, that we have long been looking after its appearances; that a place has been made ready for it, a place which honours it but disarms it; and that if discourse may sometimes have some power, nevertheless it is from us and us alone that it gets it.

—Michel Foucault, "The Order of Discourse"
As I approach the task of exploring the field of ecofeminism, I have a desire to be the 'happy wreck' that Foucault describes. I wish to be carried through an unrestricted field of discourse where I do not have to consider how I will be interpreted. Different truths would unfold as if the conveyence of meaning was unproblematic. However, I want to speak about the emergence of ecofeminism in the academy so that I can observe how some of the institutional practices surrounding academic inquiry may constrain or enable the development of ecofeminist theory and its espousal as a liberation movement. Such a task relieves me of my status as 'happy wreck' as I enter a field of discourse that is not unrestricted. Institutional practices set limits and develop rituals for how discourses are to proceed. In the context of the academy, this pertains to how disciplinary boundaries are drawn, what voices can legitimately speak and what rules and procedures must be followed in order to be heard.

These limits and rituals regulate how power relations operate in developing discourses in the academy and how these relations may act as exclusionary practices. In this chapter, I shall focus on one institutional practice: the way in which ecofeminist material becomes accessible (or not, as it often turns out) through the technical process of library classificatory systems.

DELIMITING THE FIELD OF ECOFEMINISM – WHERE TO BEGIN?

...[B]eginnings have to be made for each project in such a way as to enable what follows from them...The idea of beginning, indeed the act of beginning, necessarily involves an act of delimitation by which something is cut out of a
great mass of material, separated from the mass, and made to stand for, as well as be, a starting point, a beginning;...there is not simply the problem of finding a point of departure, or problematic, but also the question of designating which texts, authors, and periods are the best suited for study (Said, 1978:16).

The act of delimiting the field of ecofeminism and, therefore, determining what will and what will not count as ecofeminist knowledge has not been an easy task. As I entered this project with a very limited knowledge of ecofeminism, I had little idea of what the scope of this field would be and thought that the most fruitful way of accessing information on ecofeminism would be to start with the computer cataloguing system at the library of this university. I was to be disappointed.

The Murdoch University Library states in an explanatory guide for finding books that 'classification numbers' bring items of the same subject together on the library shelves. Murdoch, in common with all other tertiary libraries in Perth, uses the Dewey Decimal Classification System. I presumed that ecofeminism would be listed as a subject area on the 'on-line library catalogue', ALIEN (The Automated Library Enquiry Network). However, when I typed the subject heading of ecofeminism into this computer catalogue, ALIEN did not respond. I then tried typing in Feminism and Ecology. No response. Then, Women and Ecology. No response. This surprised me as I knew that Susan Griffin's, Woman and Nature and Carolyn Merchant's, The Death of Nature were available in this library. When I queried a librarian about my (lack of) findings, I was told that Ecofeminism had not yet been listed in the Library of Congress Subject Headings volumes, which is ALIEN's main reference for assigning subject headings to items as they come into
the library. I was also told to expect a time lag between terminology used in the subject headings and the emergence of 'new' subjects. Whilst this all made sense to me, I still could not understand why there was no cross referencing between the subject headings, 'women' and 'ecology'. I shall return to this point later in this chapter. In the meantime, let us continue with the research process.

On having no luck with ALIEN or the Library of Congress Subject Headings, I made my way to the Social Sciences Citation Indexes. Thankfully, my experiences were not so bleak here. In volume v of the 1988 edition, I found two entries under ecofeminism/eco-feminist.

In one of these articles, it was mentioned that ecofeminism was first termed by a French feminist, Francoise d'Estaube in 1974 (Diamond, 1988:368). I therefore made the cut off point for searching through the indexes the same year as this. Whilst searching through thirteen years of these indexes, I found the first appearance of ecofeminism/eco-feminist as a category, of its own, in 1985. Prior to this, the closest categorisation to ecofeminism is Ecological – with women as a sub-category. I grant that there will be a time lapse between the coining of a movement from one side of the world to the other and that ecofeminism only became more widespread in the late seventies (Diamond, 1988:368). However, I am still curious to know what sorts of procedures belie a seven to eleven year gap between a liberation movements emergence and the acknowledgement of this emergence in referencing indexes (not to mention the absence of ecofeminism from subject catalogues).
ALTERNATIVE PATHS TO ECOFEMINIST KNOWLEDGES

The citation indexes had given me some leads for accessing ecofeminist texts but there were books cited that were unavailable in the library. Amongst these were Francoise d'Eaubon'sne's, *Feminisme Mort* (1974), Elizabeth Dodson Gray's, *Green Paradise Lost* (1979) and Charlene Spretnak's, *The Politics of Women's Spirituality* (1982). I was also unconvinced that the articles and books I was led to were the only texts available on ecofeminism. It was time to try alternative methods of accessing knowledges. I began asking friends to raid their bookshelves. One of my friends, Reece, came up with an anthology on ecofeminism, *Reclaim the Earth: Women Speak Out For Life on Earth*, edited by Leonie Caldecott and Stephanie Leland (1983). I was later to find that the library did hold a copy of this book. However, the lack of accessibility to ecofeminist texts through the subject catalogues offered me no leads to obtain this copy. It is also interesting to note that this text is not listed in the Permuterm Subject Index of the Social Sciences Citation Indexes.

*Reclaim the Earth* not only contains valuable information concerning the issues, growth and development of ecofeminist politics and theory, but it also provides a selection of texts relating to ecofeminism for further reading. Of the thirty-five recommended texts for reading, twenty-eight of them can be found at the Murdoch University Library. As much as I was pleased to

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*A multitude of texts relating to ecofeminism had been ordered and made available at the Murdoch University Library over the last year in particular. Ecofeminism was introduced as a special topic of study in the school of Politics, Philosophy and Sociology and was taught by Freya Matthews in semester one, 1990. The unit will be offered again next year through the support of an endowment of $100,000 from an anonymous person wanting to support the sort of work Patsy Hallen, an ecofeminist and lecturer in philosophy at Murdoch University, was engaged with. It seems that if not for this endowment, ecofeminism would probably be unavailable as a unit of study next year.*
find these texts, I was disappointed that such leads could not be accessed through the available cataloguing and indexing systems.

Though I was gathering a substantial amount of information, I was still missing texts which seemed vital. I visited Lespar, A Women's Liberation library located just outside of Perth, on the off chance that they would have something. I was hoping to find something obscure or unusual but did not think that a small library, made from a private collection of books and archives, would have much. Thankfully, I found more than I expected. I came out with ten books which included, *Green Paradise Lost* and a special issue of the journal, *Heresies* featuring the theme; 'Feminism and Ecology'. Both have been crucial texts for leading me to new sources of information.

I was also directed to additional sources of information by a bibliography on ecofeminism compiled by Patsy Hallen for her course on Environmental Ethics. Patsy also forwarded me a number of articles and unpublished papers that provided extensive bibliographies on ecofeminist literature. A lot of this literature was written in the context of the academy, outlining different theoretical positions of ecofeminists, exploring connections between ecology and feminism and engaging with debates concerning the relationship between ecofeminism and deep ecology. Such literature indicated the growing presence of ecofeminist theory in the academy.

**ECOFEMINISM – THE ACCESSIBILITY OF ACTIVIST AND ACADEMIC TRENDS**

As I was led to more books and articles it became apparent that there were two contrasting trends in the production of ecofeminist knowledges. One trend was the production of descriptive accounts
of direct actions and political protests organised by women speaking out against the destruction of earth. I shall refer to this as the activist trend. The other was the development of more abstract theoretical connections between feminism and ecology. I shall refer to this as the academic trend. Both trends seemed as important as each other in the constitution and circulation of ecofeminist knowledges. As I was conducting this research in the academy, I became interested in exploring how these two trends were related to one another. For instance, are they concerned with the same questions? How do they organise themselves into an ecofeminist 'we'? How much legitimacy are activist knowledges assigned in the academy and vice versa? Is the activist trend submerged when the academic trend becomes predominant? And if so, how can we create room for activist voices in the academy?

The reproduction of the WPA unity statement together with the reproduction of leaflets, poetry and protest songs in a number of texts relating to ecofeminism, inspired me to look for further documents from activists that were contributing to the growth of ecofeminism. However, the activist materials I had at hand were mainly accounts of particular actions and it was only on rare occasion that I would come across archival documents like those mentioned above. I felt the activist components of ecofeminist knowledges were too important to omit as they revealed challenges to dominant truth claims in quite a different manner from ecofeminist challenges circulating in the academy. I was forwarded a number of archival documents relating to ecofeminist activism in Perth and other localities in Australia by Zoe Sofoulis. These provided me with local examples of how ecofeminism had made an impact on environmental, feminist and anti-nuclear grass roots organisations in the late 1970's.
The production of ecofeminist knowledges pertaining to the academic trend I had observed stimulated my interest in studying the way disciplinary boundaries could be drawn. There was no clear classificatory subject heading for ecofeminism, though some inter-related texts were in small clusters. By and large, however, the texts that I sought were scattered through a vast range of classificatory headings. To name a few of the texts recommended by Caldecott and Leland (1983): Griffin's *Woman and Nature* was classified amongst novels under 'American Literature'; Merchant's *The Death of Nature* under 'Factors Affecting Human Ecology'; Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* under 'Agriculture—Pesticides'; Annie Dillard's *Pilgrim at Tinker Creek* under 'Science—American'; Sukie Colegrave's, *The Spirit of The Valley* under 'Differential Psychology—Sex Differences'.

As previously mentioned, I was curious to know why there was no means of cross referencing subject headings such as 'women and ecology', 'feminism and ecology' or even 'women and nature'. The Dewey Decimal Classification System is designed to enable extensive cross referencing. This is achieved by splicing together general subject headings with more specific sub-headings. While this explains why texts relating to ecofeminism are scattered through a vast range of subject headings (from theology to science), it does not explain why there is no means of cross referencing these texts to the field of ecofeminism, or at least to a heading such as 'women and ecology'.

How long a time lag are we to expect between the coining of a term and its entry into the *Library of Congress Subject Headings* volumes? Grass roots movements had picked up on ecofeminism in the late 1970's (see Elliffe, 1978). An international conference on
ecofeminism was held in the U.S.A. in 1980 (see King, 1983). In the same year a summer program on 'Feminism and Ecology' was organised at the Goddard College in Plainfield, VT., U.S.A. (see King, 1981a). The network known as 'Women for Life on Earth' in the U.K. instigated the women's peace camp that took place at Greenham Common (See Caldecott and Leland, 1983:7). The University of New South Wales held a M.A. Seminar on ecofeminism in 1984 (See Salleh, 1984). In 1987, a conference on 'ecofeminist perspectives' celebrated the twenty fifth anniversary of Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* (see Merchant, 1989:xv). In 1990, Murdoch University offered a unit on ecofeminism as a special topic. During the span of the last twelve years, we can see that ecofeminism is growing. Amongst the explosion of books connecting feminism to ecology is the entry of ecofeminist perspectives in academic journals such as *Environmental Ethics, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Women's Studies International Quarterly* and *Canadian Women's Studies*. The term 'ecofeminism' has circulated through grass roots movements, international conferences, academic studies, books and journals. It has even been entered in the Social Sciences Citation Indexes since 1985. Surely, it is time for the Library of Congress to add the subject of ecofeminism to its next supplement.

NOTHING IS INNOCENT

The process of researching this field and gaining accessibility to ecofeminist literature deepened my understanding of Foucault's contention that the power invested in the production of knowledges, amongst other things, is tied to pedagogic practices including 'the system of books, publishing [and] libraries' (1981:55). That is, we can now see how the concept of discursive practices ties the production of a discourse to other social and political practices:
Discursive practices are not purely and simply ways of producing discourse. They are embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behaviour, in forms for transmission and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms, which, at once, impose and maintain them (1977:200).

The absence of ecofeminism as a subject heading is one way in which the institutional practice of classifying items, for the library shelves, confines ecofeminist voices to the margins of knowledges. So far, I have only expressed curiosity and distaste for the time lag between the terming of ecofeminism and its entry to the citation indexes as well as its absence from the *Library of Congress Subject Headings* volumes. Let us now speculate on why this may be so.

**ECOFEMINISM AS A SUBJUGATED KNOWLEDGE**

A possible explanation for ecofeminism's marginality could be that its knowledges have been 'subjugated' in the sense that Foucault employs the term. Foucault (1980a:81) identifies two processes whereby knowledges may be subjugated: disguise and disqualification. Firstly, they may be seen as the "historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or formal systemisation." For instance, in *The Death of Nature*, Merchant (1989: 253–274) devotes a chapter to retrieving the scholarly contributions of "Ann Conway and Other Philosophical Feminists" to the philosophy of nature. She argues that the erudite contributions of these women have almost been totally neglected by historians of philosophy. That is, the works of these women were present in "blocs of historical knowledge" (to use Foucault's [1980a:82] terms) concerning the philosophy of nature, but have been *disguised* by the particular way the history of the philosophy of nature has developed.
Similarly, a text like *Woman and Nature*, a text extensively researched and remarkably insightful for critiques on philosophy and science is absent from mainstream/malestream discussions of science and philosophy. We find *Woman and Nature* amongst American novels in the Murdoch University Library with no cross reference to philosophy, science, or ecology. We do, however, find an appearance of this book in a bibliography of feminist critiques of science (see Wylie et. al., 1989:379–386). It seems that the participation of women's voices in the present ecological crisis (and with the philosophy and science of nature) is mainly heard by other feminists and a few deep ecologists. If we browse through the indexes and bibliographies of many malestream books concerning the ecological crisis we can note the glaring omission of ecofeminist references. These books give the same impression as ALIEN and the *Library of Congress Subject Headings* volumes; ecofeminism does not exist. Ecofeminist knowledges, however, like a subjugated knowledge, is presently circulating, even though the 'formal systemisation' of classifying subjects in the library may suggest otherwise. In other words, it seems that the existence of ecofeminist knowledges is presently disguised.

The second process for subjugating knowledges is quite different from the first. These are "...a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity" (Foucault, 1980:82). Could it be that some manifestations of ecofeminist knowledges have been disqualified in this way?

Once again, to use Griffin as an example, the classification of *Woman and Nature* as American literature seems to have
discounted the credibility of its circulation in scientific and philosophical debate. I shall refer to this again when I discuss commentaries on ecofeminism in chapter four.

Other examples of disqualified knowledges pertaining to ecofeminism are its spiritual manifestations as well as archival documents and literature that more readily fit in the activist trend of ecofeminist knowledges. Feminist spirituality forms a crucial component to many ecofeminist positions. Likewise, manifestoes, songs, poetry, handbooks on activism, unity statements, and discussion papers circulating amongst grass roots organisations are all crucial elements that constitute ecofeminist knowldges. Both spirituality and activism, however, are "popular knowledges" (Foucault, 1980a:82) which may be disqualified from making truth claims for their lack of scientificity. In not subscribing to the rules and procedures adhering to scientific discourse, spiritualist and activist voices are easily pushed to the margins of knowledge.

The common point identified for these two cases of subjugated knowledges, those which are buried/disguised and those which are disqualified, was that "[t]hey were concerned with a historical knowledge of struggles." Both cases of subjugated knowledges are marked by "hostile encounters which even up to this day have been confined to the margins of knowledge" (Foucault, 1980a:83). Hence, if we consider ecofeminism as a subjugated knowledge, in both of its senses, it is hardly surprising that accessing ecofeminist knowledges is so arduous.

A QUESTION OF METHODOLOGY

The hypothesis of considering ecofeminism as subjugated knowledge raises a methodological question of how such knowledges can be
released from such constraints. Another question of methodology raised in this chapter brings us back to the initial question; how do we classify ecofeminism? While both these questions may appear different, they are related and can both be explored by employing Foucault's methods of 'archaeology' and 'genealogy'. To put these questions another way, we may ask, "What constrains the production of ecofeminist discourses?" and "In what way can we classify ecofeminism so that its knowledges can oppose the constraints imposed by the rules and procedures adhering to scientific discourse?". In this chapter, we have observed constraints imposed on the production of ecofeminist discourses through the institutional constraints of classification and accessibility to knowledges. In the next chapter, we shall observe how it is not only these institutional practices, but the rules and procedures governing scientific discourse that constrain the acceptance of ecofeminism as a credible knowledge.
CHAPTER THREE

TRUTH AND METHOD:
ARCHAEOLOGY AND GENEALOGY
Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.

_Michel Foucault, _Truth and Power_.

REASON

They said that in order to discover truth, they must find ways to separate feeling from thought. _Because we were less._ That measurements and criteria must be established free from emotional bias... _Because according to their tests we think more slowly..._ and thus these calculations, they said constitute objectivity _because we are more emotional than they are..._ and emotions they said must be distrusted _because we are filled with rage_ that where emotions colour thought _because we cry out_ thought is no longer objective _because we are shaking_ and therefore no longer describes what is real _shaking in our rage, because we are shaking in our rage and we are no longer reasonable_.

_Susan Griffin, Woman and Nature: The Roaring Inside Her._
Susan Griffin, an ecofeminist, shares a common point of contention with Foucault by questioning the *rules and procedures* established in Western scientific and philosophical practices for determining what will be awarded the status of truth. Neither Griffin nor Foucault ask, "What is truth?", nor do they question what has been 'discovered' and 'accepted' as truth in scientific enterprises. Their questions are of a different sort. They are more concerned with the rules and procedures at work in the production of truth; those which determine methods for separating the true from the false and those which legitimise some forms of knowledge, whilst excluding and silencing others. By focussing on the formation of truth in this way, we can observe how such rules and procedures affect the formation of ecofeminism as it enters the academy. That is, what rules and procedures are at work in the constitution of ecofeminist discourses in order for it to be awarded the status and legitimacy of being an academic subject? To answer this, let me elaborate on some of the methodological procedures explicated by Foucault.

**A FOUCAULDIAN FRAMEWORK?**

In the introduction of his book, *Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth*, Alan Sheridan (1980: 1) poses the question "Who is Foucault?" and "What is he?". He goes on to describe the difficulty in categorising Foucault into any one field or discipline. He reminds us of Foucault's own remarks to this problematic in the *Archealogy of Knowledge*: "Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order". Such a request to his readers implicitly asks us not to treat his works as if they were a coherent, unifying system of knowledge. As Sheridan (1980:225) states in his conclusion:
There is no "Foucault system'. One cannot be a "Foucauldian" in the way one can be a Marxist or a Freudian: Marx and Freud left coherent bodies of doctrine (or 'knowledge') and organizations which, whether one likes it or not (for some that is the attraction), enjoy uninterrupted apostolic succession from their founders. If Foucault is to have an 'influence' it will no doubt be as a slayer of dragons, a breaker of systems. Such a task should not be seen as negative; indeed it is the system-building that is the real negation. Its positive achievements may be measured by the range and variety of its effects, not by some massive uniformity.

If there is no 'Foucault system', and if the writer refuses to unify the shifts and qualifications appearing in the cumulation of his works, then it seems that a more practical application of Foucault's methods is to extract particular concepts that can perform specific functions for theoretical inquiry. As Jana Sawicki (1988: 176) contends, Foucault does not offer us a theory of society, but ways of looking and reflecting upon theories we may subscribe to. It is my intention to follow the strands of what Foucault describes as power/knowledge and discursive practices, as they appear through his archeological and genealogical methods, to reflect upon the constraints and productivities surrounding the articulation of ecofeminist discourses.

TRUTH AND POWER

As stated in my introduction, Foucault develops the notion of power/knowledge to accentuate the inseparability between knowledge and relations of power. As Foucault claims, truth is not 'outside power'. To put this another way, 'regimes of truth' are invested with relations of power. To conceive of truth as being value neutral and a pure, untainted realm of knowledge is to
place truth outside of the realm of power relations and thus, politics and ethics. If we concern ourselves with the political and ethical investments situated in the production of 'regimes of truth' then we need to move away from the notions of truth that separate it from these investments. In order to scrutinise the sanctity of truth as pure knowledge, Foucault asks us to look at the ways in which truth functions in our own society. For Foucault (1980b:131–132), the 'general politics' of truth production in Western society is characterised by five traits:

'Truth' is centred on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political incitement (the demand for truth, as much for economic production as for political power); it is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, not withstanding certain strict limitations); it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media); lastly, it is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation ('ideological struggles').

The "political debate" and "social confrontation" surrounding the status of truth in Western society dominated the intellectual climate in the 1950's when Foucault began publishing his works. During this period, the "political status of science and the ideological functions it could serve" pervaded the agenda of philosophical inquiry. Before entering into a discussion of Foucault's particular participation with this problematic, let us pause with one very brief version of how science has come to be associated with truth.
SCIENCE, REASON AND TRUTH

According to Raymond Williams (1976:232–235), the term 'science' entered the English language in the fourteenth century and was associated with knowledge. The term science was often used interchangeably with that of art. By the seventeenth century, science became distinguished from art and became known as that which demonstrates 'proof' in an argument. At this point, science did not refer to a particular subject but to the skills of methodological demonstration. A century later, notions of science proposed a distinction between 'inner (subjective) knowledge' and 'external (objective) knowledge'. The demarcation of science as a subject began to emerge with the specialisation of methodological demonstrations being applied to the 'external world' (i.e. nature). By the nineteenth century, a distinctive field of 'natural sciences' (viz., physics, chemistry and biology) were taken to represent the 'objective' method that divided scientific theory from other theoretical studies. Such a method created a model of science which required a 'neutral methodological observer and [an] external object of study'. Williams argues that this model of science has been generalised as 'fact', 'truth', 'reason' and 'rationality'.

From Williams' account we can see that the acquisition of terms such as 'truth' and 'reason' are closely associated with 'scientific' method. However, it must be stated that within and around the field of scientific inquiry, conflations of science with 'Truth' are not necessarily the norm (see Haraway, 1989: 576). Nevertheless, the relationship between truth, science and its methods continues to mark the ground of passionate debate, particularly as conflations of science with 'Truth' remains a model of science for many non-scientists. A voluminous range of literature which takes science and its methods as an object of study
can be found under the category of the history and philosophy of science. I will consider how feminist critiques of science and/or philosophy have entered the arena exploring relations between science, truth and reason. This particular branch of the history and philosophy of science bears most resemblance to ecofeminist concerns and can therefore serve as an ally to the expansion of ecofeminism in the academy. However, for now, let us return to Foucault to see how his works offer productive methodological tools for contesting the way the 'regime of truth' centred on scientific discourse influences the circulation and acceptance of ecofeminist discourses as ecofeminism moves from its articulation as a liberation movement to its articulation as a body of theory.

THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHOD — A SELECTION OF ITS SALIENT FEATURES

For Foucault, the task of evaluating 'the political status of science' would be 'excessively complicated' if it were put to the examination of 'theoretical physics or organic chemistry'. It seemed that his conceptions of power/knowledge could examine this question more readily by taking a more 'dubious' subject, like psychiatry, as his object of analysis. In Madness and Civilisation (a work described as his first archaeological text), Foucault tackles the 'epistemological profile' of psychiatry to investigate the way madness has come to be analysed, not with its own voices but, through the framework of reason. By focussing on a domain of knowledge that was less established than the physical sciences, and more overtly related to social and political institutions, Foucault situated his study where demarcations between science and ideology were more blurred and contestable. Further to this, a study mapping the
moves of psychiatric discourses, to acquire scientific status could exemplify the constraining rules and procedures imposed on marginal discourses striving for more credibility and legitimacy. In other words, in attempts to break out of its marginality, psychiatry attempted to position itself as a 'true discourse'. It is Foucault's contention that such attempts enter themselves into practices that exclude and silence the very subject they try to analyse (in this case, the voices of madness).

The examination of a marginal knowledge in relation to dominant modes of producing truths is a trait of Foucault's archaeological method that readily lends itself to the study of ecofeminism's striving for legitimacy in the academy. The "epistemological profile" of ecofeminism is low and the traces of striving for a 'discourse of truth' can be found amongst some ecofeminist writers. Similarly, in order to gain credibility and acceptance as an academic subject, a relatively new subject must ground itself in the current dominant questions, debates and 'in vogue' methodologies. Ecofeminism therefore provides a good case study for examining how these pedagogical considerations may affect its articulation and may even exclude and silence particular ecofeminist voices.

Another trait that features in Foucault's archeaological methods is that which questions the continuity and coherence of an historical lineage in a body of knowledge. Rather than observing the formation of a specific knowledge in terms of categories such as 'science', 'discipline' and 'theory', which tend to order the development of a knowledge as if it were an "uninterrupted text", Foucault proposes an alternate category which he terms as a "discursive formation" (Sheridan, 1980: 96–97). Such a category attempts to avoid an analysis which strives to link "disparate events",
synthesises contradictions and attains a causal explanation in the formation of a body of knowledge. A discursive formation may exhibit a regularity between a certain field of objects, specify a set of circumstances that give rise to the emergence of these objects, and map the development of rituals attached to the way these objects get spoken about whilst attempting to maintain the formation of knowledges as they appear in fragments, discontinuities and counterpositions:

A discursive formation is not, therefore, an ideal, continuous smooth text that runs beneath the multiplicity of contradictions, and resolves them in the calm unity of coherent thought; nor is it the surface in which, in a thousand different aspects, a contradiction is reflected that is always in retreat, but everywhere dominant. It is rather a space of multiple dissensions; a set of different oppositions whose levels and roles must be described (Foucault, 1972: 155)

By viewing ecofeminism as a discursive formation, we can see how its emergence as a body of theory has been subjected to commentaries that attempt to synthesise its multiple and varied forms. The recent inception of ecofeminism as an academic subject area allows us to observe the practices of delimiting and unifying its "space of multiple dissensions" at its moments of implosion.

As described in the previous chapter, ecofeminist texts are presently shelved amongst a vast range of subject classifications at the Murdoch University library. That is, the intertextual relations that exist between ecofeminism and other bodies of knowledge have only recently started to be pieced together, by way of 'commentary', from their fragmented and discontinuous existence. This may often
have the effect of synthesising counterpositions found within the space of ecofeminist knowledges to a favoured framework or position. Viewing ecofeminism as a discursive formation can maintain a certain fluidity in its conceptualisation which does not subscribe to one politically correct line or philosophical position. Furthermore, discursive alliances may be formed by observing ecofeminism through its intertextual relations. That is, points of intersection between ecofeminism and its discursive relatives can enable a ground to join forces where political and ethical commitments are shared.

The study of a discursive formation values "juridical texts, literary expressions, philosophical reflections, political decisions and public opinions" (Deleuze, 1988:19) as integral parts to its existence. Foucault's reliance on such archives for research material form another major trait in the archaeological method. For Foucault, documents and unofficial texts are to be treated with the same value as the texts of 'master thinkers', 'great texts' and 'grand discoveries' (Deakin University, 1987: 78). When researching fields of 'low epistemological profiles' and "dubious"scientific status, such archives can exemplify the intricate relationship existing between corpuses of knowledges and their links to structures of power.

The 'archive' provides a particularly effectual tool to map the path of a liberation movement, such as ecofeminism, entering the academy. The WPA Unity Statement is but one example of an archival document occupying a point in the grid of ecofeminism. Political speeches, fly posters, newsletters form grass roots groups, poetry and anecdotes from peace camps have all been (and still are) integral to the emergence of ecofeminism as a discursive formation. Unfortunately, most of these archives remain in the homes and
rented offices of the women and grass roots organisations that produced them. As undocumented material and unofficial texts, the voices of activists are often neglected or dislodged by commentaries on ecofeminism in the academy. In the following two chapters I observe how some academic procedures participate in exclusionary practices that silence the voices of ecofeminist activists.

Another trait of an archaeological method is to conceive of subjects as being constituted by discursive practices rather than conceiving of subjects as the sources of knowledge. In a gesture to highlighting the "formidable materiality" (1981: 52) of a discourse, Foucault avoids explaining the formation of discourses in terms of the relationship between the intentions, beliefs and personal imprints of authors to their chosen objects of analysis. He is more concerned with the development of rules and procedures that enable a discourse to be formed and, thus, position a subject to speak. While such a strategy may be productive in the sense that we may acknowledge a certain autonomy and materiality in the realm of discursive practices, and observe the interpretations and circulations of texts beyond the author's intent, there is a danger of removing the accountability and responsibility for what does get articulated if the subject is removed in studies of the processes of discourse formation.

The appeal for a more accountable and responsible treatment of knowledge claims is made by Donna Haraway in her article on "situated knowledges". It seems that Haraway would not disagree with the contention that subjects are constituted by 'regimes of truth' (as well as the material structures of social, economic and political institutions). However, for Haraway, positions of subjects, in the formation of knowledges, are granted significance insofar as they
are pressed to take responsibility for the knowledge claims they make. In stating that the production of knowledges have serious consequences for the way we live and relate to the world, she argues that we need to develop some way of making producers of knowledges answerable to their claims. One way is to acknowledge the limits, contradictory positions and partiality in the construction of our knowledges. We may not be able to provide a totalising, accurate and impartial understanding of the world. Nevertheless, we all have various stakes and inscribed subjectivities that enter us into arenas of power/knowledge relations where accounts of the world are claimed. By providing an embodied account of the ways we understand the world we can locate or situate our knowledge claims and thus be answerable to them.

Most of the ecofeminist works I surveyed were concerned with the author's personal stakes in the production of their knowledges. For many ecofeminists, their knowledges are seen to emerge from the particular subject positions that they have been inscribed by in Western society. Their interpretations of their own positions in relation to the world, their accounts of their own oppressions and their fear for life on earth are inextricably bound to the formation of their knowledges. The formation of ecofeminist discourses relies heavily (see articles in Caldecott and Leland, [1983] and Plant, [1989]) on anecdotes of personal experiences and an insertion of the speaking subject as a relational object to the objects under study. They do not claim that all knowledges should be based on personal experience. Rather the aims are to situate the personal and political stakes that people may have in the production of knowledges, as well as to locate the consequences and effects, on all life forms, of power that specific knowledge claims may influence. For knowledge claims to be accountable, they must be located
somewhere. One of these somewheres is the limited, contradictory and partial view of the 'scientific knower' or author.

So far, I have outlined some of the salient features of Foucault's archaeological methods with a commentary of how they may provide a means to explore the movement of ecofeminism into the academy. In his later works, Foucault reflects upon the usefulness of these methods for observing the constraints surrounding power/knowledge relations, but comes to regard archaeology as constraining in itself in the way it views power/knowledge relations as negative and repressive.

A move away from this negative conception of power/knowledge has been identified with the delivery of his lecture, 'The Order of Discourse' in 1970. This move has been articulated as a change in emphasis from his archaeological methods: where analysis proceeds by means of a synchronic analysis dealing mainly with the constraints imposed upon a discourse through dominant systems of thought to his genealogical methods, which analyse the productivities that may emerge from such constraints through a more overt mapping of discourses to other social practices (Young, 1981: 48).

**GENEALOGY – SOME OF ITS SALIENT FEATURES**
There is no clear cut off point between Foucault's archaeological and genealogical methods. Most of the above mentioned traits of Foucault's archaeological texts remain in his later genealogical works. However, a shift in emphasis surrounds Foucault's conception of power, bringing into play possibilities for resisting and opposing grand, unitary and totalising frameworks (Foucault, 1980a: 85).
Throughout his interviews in *Power/Knowledge*, Foucault refers to the inadequacy of conceiving power as that which says 'no', that which represses and forces prohibition. In the *History of Sexuality*, Foucault contends that sites of power bring with them possible strategies of resistance:

Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are. We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it (Foucault, 1978: 100–101).

If we look back at the quote from Susan Griffin at the beginning of this chapter, we can see how she destabilises the rules and procedures of the form of scientific discourse that associates itself with absolute truth. At the very point where the bold faced 'professorial/patriarchal' voice asserts the separation of feeling from thought, Griffin inserts an italicised opposing voice from women and nature that reclaims an embodied knowledge. Throughout ecofeminist literature and feminist critiques of science and philosophy, the tools which have marked women and nature as 'other' are seized and utilised to produce counterpositions and promote other ways of knowing. The personal, poetic, fictional and polyvocal styles of writing are amongst some of the strategies employed by ecofeminists and feminists as points of resistance to 'master' discourses. However, points of resistance have also been situated within 'master' discourses.

Having been situated as subjects who are not 'objective' or 'neutral' in the production of knowledges, many feminists have questioned
the criteria for what constitutes objectivity within the realms of scientific discourse. Having been excluded or silenced by particular notions of objectivity, feminists and ecofeminists have participated in producing and establishing alternate strategies and criteria for making knowledge claims (See chapter five).

Alongside Foucault's resistance to conceiving power as primarily repressive is his rejection of conceiving power as being centralised. Rather than explaining relations of power through a hegemonic core (such as the economy, the state or the law) that filters down to institutions and practices of a society, Foucault begins with specific and local analyses of power:

One must rather conduct an *ascending* analysis of power, starting, that is, from its own infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own techniques and tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of power have been – and continue to be – invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended, etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination (Foucault, 1980a:99)

Hence, in *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality* we witness a more microcosmic analysis of mechanisms of power by focussing on the way in which bodies have been inscribed to function in specific environments. The architecture, methods of surveillance and timetabling of prisons materially inscribe the body with effects of power that induce docility and constitute the behaviour of subjects. Similarly, the practices of confession, family relations, medical and psychiatric practices all play a role in disciplining the body with relations of power.
The attention given to local struggles coupled with perceiving the body as a site of power creates another shared space between many ecofeminists and Foucault. Anthologies of ecofeminist literature are filled with accounts of specific actions and campaigns administered by women in their immediate environment. Their insistence on making connections between their daily existence and general forms of environmental degradation appeal to Foucault's 'ascending analysis of power', while their focus on the politics of food production, health systems, childbirth and reproductive and sexual choices exposes the intricate mechanisms of power affecting their bodies. Though there is a convergence between ecofeminists and Foucault concerning the issue of bodies as a site of power and resistance, Foucault's works are almost exclusively concerned with the bodies of men and ecofeminists works are mostly concerned with the bodies of women.*

A third conceptualisation of power found in Foucault's genealogical texts is the notion that power is exercised rather than possessed. Similar to the criticism of perceiving power as centralised, Foucault rejects the idea that power is something that can be seized. Power is not a thing that can be captured and appropriated for redistribution (such as the State aparatus or social and political institutions). Nor is power to be solely conceived as a relation between the dominators and the dominated. Instead, power is to be conceived as a complex network, or grid, that constantly shifts and passes through individuals as well as social formations. That is, individuals are conceived as vehicles of power:

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*Rosi Braidotti (1986) offers an account of Foucault's treatment of the body as non-gendered, although she notes a shift in his later works where he acknowledges his specificity in speaking of the male body. She contrasts Foucault's implicit notion of sexual sameness with Irigaray's attempts to speak of sexual difference.
Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application. (Foucault, 1980a: 98)

It must be noted, however, that some individuals ability to exercise power is far more limited than others (eg. the 'insane'). We all occupy extremely different points in the grid of power but this does not mean that we escape being invested with particular forms of power and are free of being complicit with forms of power we attempt to resist. By focussing on 'micro-powers' and the ways we may become vehicles of power, Foucault suggests strategies of resistance that may be targeted at many levels rather than one, central manifestation of power relations. By localising and specifying particular effects of power, an 'overall strategy' of resistance, that opposes general forms of domination (such as 'capitalism' and patriarchy), can be formed through the 'tactical integration' of multiple sites of power/knowledge relations.

The political strategies that are implied by the notion of power being exercised rather than possessed, and the observation of the individual being a vehicle of power, supports some of the strategies of resistance employed by ecofeminists. Ecofeminist actions are usually oriented towards disrupting power rather than trying to seize power. The Women's Pentagon Action and the women from Greenham Common are two examples of such actions. As previously mentioned, the emphasis on local and personal power relations neatly parallel Foucault's analyses of 'micro-powers' and the effects of power interpolating the individual. As Diamond and
Quinby (1988: xvi) note, ecofeminists have extended the meaning of the slogan, 'The personal is Political' by:

...revealing how global toxic contamination is registered at the most local and personal level, from the contamination of women's breast milk to the death and disfigurement of human beings and cultures wrought by such disasters as Bhopal, Love Canal, and Chernobyl. Because so much of women's political activity occurs at the local level and stems from their involvement in the sustenance of life, they often manifest an ethic of activism that confronts domination without the smashing and terror so characteristic of masculinist revolutionary action.

Though we may note the many parallels between ecofeminist practices and opposing strategies explicated by Foucault, it is equally important to acknowledge the essentialising and totalising tendencies of ecofeminist literature as endeavours are made to develop ecofeminist theory. Particualr political and theoretical dangers that emerge from such tendencies warrant critical reflexivity in the construction of ecofeminist knoweldges.

There are dangers with assuming that particular experiences of women can be applied universally to all women and are easily translated and interchanged with the experiences of women from other cultures. For instance, ecofeminist positions which attempt to explain the current environmental crisis through the psycho–sexual roots of masculine identity assume homogeneous notions of family structures and child rearing that are specific to a homogeneous notion of Western, heterosexist culture. Also through the psycho–sexual roots (see Gray, [1979]) of identities may be a contributing factor to the maltreatment of our environment, its explanatory power falls short of being applied to all circumstances, contexts and determinations of our current ecological crisis.
It is equally dangerous to assume that there is an innate quality, *common to all women,* that claims a special relatedness between women and nature. The cycles of menstruation, the capacity to reproduce and the traits of nurturance and care, that are associated with 'motherhood', have been perceived as qualities which place women in a closer alliance with nature (See Gray, 1979:109–117). Joan Griscom (1981: 8) rejects such an argument in stressing 'that our biology *not* be our destiny'. She claims that'...simply because women are *able* to bear children [this] does not mean that doing so is *essential* to our nature'.

The supposed special qualities of women that have met with the most opposition within ecofeminist circles, as well as from the broader feminist community, however, is the notion that women are naturally more caring and nurturing. The fear of perpetuating traditional images of women and closing off the possibility of allowing women to be angry are amongst the objections raised (King,1983: 44). As Sofoulis (1978:22) puts it, appealing to such images of women is objectionable '...not because the ground for concern is invalid, but because it reinforces the notion that woman is incapable of being concerned about anything beyond her uterus'.

The criticisms that may be levelled at the essentialising and totalising tendencies of ecofeminism are of crucial importance to ensure non–closure and critical re–examinations of the developments surrounding the construction of ecofeminist knowledges. However, to dismiss the whole ecofeminist project on the basis of essentialism and totality would be guilty of invoking an essentialist and universal conception of ecofeminism that would not do justice to the plurality of positions and multiple forms in which ecofeminists have attempted to counter planetary destruction and various forms of
oppression. Rather than concentrate on the faultlines of ecofeminism and submit to a position of despair and inaction, we can approach the ecofeminist project with a caution that is also enthusiastic to find its points of productivity and thus inspiration for activity for furthering the goals and concerns of ecofeminism.

It seems that the movement of ecofeminism to the academy has brought with it the birth of new questions and constraints concerning its articulation and circulation as well as an opening of possibilities for its strategic intervention in the construction of knowledges. *Let us now look at the various forms and places in which ecofeminism has surfaced so that we can observe what may constrain or enable its project in the power/knowledge games it participates with.*
CHAPTER FOUR

MAPPING ECOFEMINISM
. . . [T]his research activity, which one can call genealogical, has nothing at all to do with an opposition between the abstract unity of theory and the concrete multiplicity of facts. It has nothing to do with a disqualification of the speculative dimension which opposes to it, in the name of some kind of scientism, the rigour of well established knowledges...What it really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true science and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes science and its objects.

. . . [I]n contrast to the various projects which aim to inscribe knowledges in the hierarchical order of power associated with science, a genealogy should be seen as a kind of attempt to emancipate historical knowledges from that subjection, to render them, that is, capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of a theoretical, unity, formal and scientific discourse. It is based on a reactivation of local knowledges – of minor knowledges, as Deleuze might call them – in opposition to the scientific hierarchisation of knowledges and the effects intrinsic to their power: this, then is the project of these disordered and fragmentary genealogies.

_Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures"
The genealogical method attempts to bring into play fragments of knowledges that become "disguised" and "disqualified" in the process of establishing grand theories of society. It does not replace old theories with new theories, nor does it set itself the task of constructing a new metaphysics for science and philosophy. Foucault characterises genealogy as the "tactics" of releasing subjugated knowledges that can be revealed through an archaeological analysis of describing "local discursivities". When applied to the question of ecofeminism entering the academy, the archaeological and genealogical methods can illustrate the way academic commentary participates in the subjugation of some ecofeminist knowledges. This chapter outlines some of the fragments constituting ecofeminist knowledges in the hope of resurrecting some of the voices that have been silenced or excluded from academic commentary. My argument is that Foucault's notions of discursive formations and discursive practices can allow a theoretical appreciation of ecofeminism in its diversity without necessitating the adoption of some prescriptive or totalising account of it. These fragments will then be reflected upon to consider ecofeminism(s) as discursive practices which engage with a variety of sites of power/knowledge relations.

ECOFEMINISM: CREATING A NEW ACTIVIST/ACADEMIC SPACE

Bringing a new term into practice to describe a cosmology and political position suggests that available world orientations and political frameworks are felt to be unsatisfactory or inadequate. The adoption of a new term, such as 'ecofeminism' is a process of naming something so that the construction of particular politics and alternate epistemological positions may be claimed. As politics, it
is a way of opposing and exposing dominant frameworks for organising and setting agendas in structures that silence and marginalise those who have little or no access to them. As epistemology, it is a means for developing a voice without being consumed or dislodged in the supposed 'meta' frameworks of grand theories like Marxism or Liberalism.

For many feminists, including myself, participating in grass roots activism and engaging with theoretical enquiries requires being more than an appendage to already existing frameworks of political movements and academic theories. This is not to relegate or trivialise the importance of other liberatory struggles, but to be able to specify what may be particular concerns for particular women without forgoing this specificity in the name of a 'broader struggle'. Under the name of 'socialism', 'peace', the 'environment' and '(hu)mankind' feminist issues have been pushed to the margins, or lost in consumption, by a 'broader struggle'. In other contexts, for example, the white, middle class, feminist movement, it may be that feminism occupies the space of a 'broader struggle' whereby Black activists, 'people of colour', 'women of colour', lesbians and gay men (to name a few) may be marginalised. The crossovers and intersections between different liberation movements are often clustered together to suggest common goals for social change (for instance, the survival of the planet). However, for all that the goals of liberation movements may be shared, there are differences in the stakes and means of participation for different liberatory groups realising such goals. Such differences present liberatory movements with problems of advocacy, representation and prioritisation of issues on the agenda for social change.
DIFFERENTIATION IN POWER RELATIONS BETWEEN ECOFEMINISTS

It appears that the label of ecofeminism is predominantly used by Western women, though the sentiments and actions of ecofeminist principles are articulated by women in many countries around the world. These shared sentiments are manifest by an ever increasing number of women organising around issues and developing analyses that tie their personal lives to planetary survival. Anthologies espousing ecofeminist concerns have attempted to show the global spread of this movement (for example, Caldecott & Leland, 1983; Plant, 1989). However, while political and analytical connections may be made between Western ecofeminists and women organising around ecological issues in other countries, the stakes in promoting planetary survival are variable and relative from one region to another. If proponents of ecofeminism articulate this movement as one of world wide connections, their advocacy needs to acknowledge differences in the prioritisation of issues of survival from one context to another. For instance, Shiva (1988:9) highlights differences of environmentalist concerns between 'industrially advanced countries' and 'Third World' in terms of survival options posed by processes of production:

Political struggles based on ecology in industrially advanced countries are rooted in [the] conflict between long term survival options and short term over-production and over-consumption. Political struggles of women, peasants and tribals based on ecology in countries like India are far more acute and urgent since they are rooted in the immediate threat to the options for survival for the vast majority of the people, posed by resource intensive and resource wasteful economic growth for the benefit of a minority.
Such differences in survival options suggest that connections between ecology and feminism need to be contextualised. It would be dangerous and inappropriate to espouse strategies for social change as if all spaces of intervention were the same. Similarly, as Foucault (1977, 209) advocates, it is dangerous and insulting to speak for others as "...only those directly concerned can speak in a practical way on their own behalf". The translatability of concepts and categories from Western culture to other cultures is dubious. This point was raised in the previous chapter concerning the appropriateness of extending the object relations model of gender inequalities in Western family structures to family structures of other cultures. However, this does not foreclose the possibility of speaking about, and with, others to make connections between communities on a global scale. As Haraway writes:

We don't want a theory of innocent powers to represent the world, where language and bodies both fall into the bliss of organic symbiosis. We also don't want to theorise the world, much less act within it, in terms of Global Systems, but we do need an earthwide network of connections, including the ability partially to translate knowledges among very different – and power-differentiated – communities. We need the power of modern critical theories of how meanings and bodies get made, not in order to deny meanings and bodies, but in order to build meanings and bodies that have a chance for life (my emphasis, 1988:579–580).

Possibilities for making an 'earthwide network of connections' may proceed in a manner reflective of Foucault's ascending analysis of power. Local and regional power struggles in different communities may be a starting point for linking specific threats to survival to more general forms of global domination. The production of ecofeminist anthologies is one process through which
women from different cultures share dialogues of their particular ecological actions.

In this space, we hear women speaking on their own behalf of the particular struggles of ecological restoration that they have been involved in. For instance, the 'Chipko' (meaning tree hugging) movement, in India, is an environmental group led by women in opposition to the deforesting of the Himalayas (see Anand; [1983]: Bhatt,[1989]; Shiva,[1989:] and [1990]). Protests against desertification and soil erosion in Kenya have been organised by the 'National Council of Women of Kenya's Green Belt Movement' (Jones and Maathi, 1983:112-114). In opposition to the colonialist and capitalist projects of mining sacred land, the voices of Native American and Maori women speak out to demand respect for their spiritual connections with land (Wilson, [1989] and Awekotuku, [1983]). Such examples suggest that there are women from a variety of cultures at the forefront of an ecological revolution and that the discursive field of ecofeminism is beginning to make world wide connections and networks. However, the advocates of an ecofeminist label have, by and large, been Western feminists. In this sense, ecofeminism is a Western feminist framework which has non-Western links circulating through its discursive formation.

In addition to dealing with a Western bias in ecofeminist discourses, I am writing from a Western context, specifically, as a student of academic inquiry. The examples that follow, which aim at situating ecofeminism as a discursive practice, will consequently be drawn from archives and texts of Western feminist origin. This focus also situates the circulation of activist and academic trends of ecofeminism in the context of power/knowledge relations where I can be specifically engaged. Let me now turn to particular sites of
power/knowledge relations where ecofeminist discursive practices have appeared.

THE SCOPE OF ECOFEMINISM
The examples of ecofeminist practices/theory presented in this chapter are by no means comprehensive. Rather, they are fragments of the discursive formation of ecofeminism that circulate as points of dissension. These fragments have been compiled in an order that begins with power/knowledge relations contextualising voices of ecofeminist activists and proceeds through to ecofeminist works which have a greater interaction with power/knowledge relations in the academy. There has been no grouping of ecofeminist positions into different factions as many of these groups overlap and contradict one another. Furthermore, there are a number of discursive fields which intersect the discursive formation of ecofeminism. In the following chapter, the field of feminist critiques of science and philosophy is identified as a discursive ally to the discursive practices of ecofeminism. In the conclusion, I briefly summarise possible discursive allies in other areas. The points at which these discursive fields intersect with ecofeminism can be conceived as points of pressure where ecofeminist positions may apply strategic force to realise some of its goals (I remember reading a quote from Lenin which suggested that strategy is knowing where to apply force). The following examples, therefore, are points which map various discursive practices that form the fragments of ecofeminism as a discursive formation.

VOICES FROM ACTIVISTS – PROPOSALS FOR ORGANISATIONAL AUTONOMY
According to Eckersley (1989: 1) '[t]he women's movement and ecology movement represent the two most influential new social
movements that have arisen since the 1960's. The emergence of ecofeminism has been described as the convergence of these two movements. Commentatess on ecofeminism, like Eckersley, as well as proponents of ecofeminist perspectives, have described this convergence as a ploy to explore the links between the domination of nature and oppression of women. Defining ecofeminism in this way, however, may displace the voices of some activists, who have employed the term 'ecofeminism' to argue for organisational autonomy for women participating in environmental movements. These activists do not necessarily make links between abstracted categories of 'women' and 'nature' but rather, address practical concerns. Such positions, rarely found in commentaries of ecofeminism circulating in academic journals, are predominantly found in archival documents and minor texts. The following extract is taken from the Australian network of the environmental grass roots organisation, Friends of the Earth:

Today I read of a Norwegian group which calls itself the "Ecofeminists", which has 'arisen of the perception that the environmental movement is too little preoccupied with women's lib and vice versa'. I immediately wrote to them, asking if they had come up with any good ways to tackle the problem. The same subject has been causing a fair bit of discussion within Australian environmental groups recently. And it is only recently that the problem has become immediately relevant to myself as an environmental activist and as a feminist (Elliffe, 1978:1).

Elliffe's 'problem' is presented as a gap between the camps of feminism and environmentalism. One of the issues she raises in her paper concerns the way organisational structures marginalise women who participate in male-dominated activist groups. Formal meeting proceedings and hierarchic ways of organising are identified as barriers that alienate newcomers to activism – in particular women.
Women's caucuses are argued for with the aim of building greater solidarity between women so as to strengthen their participation in a male dominated environmental movement.

I have isolated this issue, from Elliffe's paper, to demonstrate that notions of 'ecofeminism' may be deployed as part of a discursive strategy to increase feminist autonomy in the environmental movement (this may be extended to others). Environmental concerns are not negated by Elliffe. In fact, her paper argues that feminists need to address the struggles articulated by environmentalists, such as creating a "sustainable society which lives in harmony with nature rather seeking to subdue and exploit it". It seems that 'ecofeminism' is employed in this context as a linguistic sign condensing the names of two movements to encourage a larger and more accessible space for women to participate in environmental movements.

Elliffe contextualises her arguments for women developing autonomy in relation to environmental groups of mixed gender. On the other hand, there are ecofeminists (I am also thinking of peace and anti-nuclear activists) who have organised as women's only groups. The Women's Pentagon Action group (American based), the women from Greenham Common (English based), the women's peace camp at Cockburn Sound (Australian based) have all organised direct actions for women only. Heated debates around the issue of 'male support' and participation in women's organisations emanated from all of the above actions. Lynne Jones recorded some of these arguments when a decision was made for Greenham Common to be a women's only peace camp:
'Do you want a lesbian separatist peace movement? Is that what you want?'
'We want everyone to work in the way they find most effective.'
'Well some of us women like working in mixed groups.'
'Yes, but some of us don't. We need space to find our own ways of working...we need space to find our strengths, how to assert ourselves, make speeches and so on – we don't do that in mixed groups.'
...'If your ways are so good, why don't you let us stay and learn from you?'
'Couldn't you be more useful somewhere else?'
'Start another peace camp!'
'...if you, the men, support us, why can't you support our decision?' (Jones, 1983:88)

Such arguments become tiresome for women trying to develop some autonomy and strength for themselves. For some feminists (like myself) working in an all women environment is a choice based on a preference for developing skills in a space that is less intimidating, more empowering and more fun than working with men. I do not claim this space on the basis of a notion of female supremacy nor on a privileged standpoint for viewing the world. I claim it on the basis of wanting a greater degree of self determination in organising agendas for social change. I want to stress that organising as an autonomous group does not preclude forming affinities with other groups of similar concerns. I also want to stress that many activists who organise around women's issues do not claim to represent all women nor do they presuppose any innate quality that can bind women together. Rather, it seems that some ecofeminists organise as autonomous women's groups for practical preferences rather than claiming innate connections with nature or privileged positions for guiding environmental movements.
PROPAGANDA

Besides displacing the proponents of 'ecofeminism' as a form of autonomous political organisation for women, academic criticism tends to marginalise those who employ tactics of propaganda to deliver ecofeminist perspectives. In this space of power/knowledge relations, distinctive perspectives for women leading an ecological revolution are made on the basis of countering 'regimes of truth' that have marked women as 'other'. Such propaganda circumvents justifying why the domination of nature and the oppression of women are necessarily linked. Rather than debate the nature of this linkage, propaganda operates as a device which is unafraid and unapologetic of its own biases:

We won't achieve peace and environmental harmony until the technocratic warriors realize:

- we cannot destroy the Other (the Enemy, Nature, other races, Woman) without destroying ourselves;
- we are all part of the one and only living planet Earth;
- the Other is already part of us.

The Other, as a deviant, exists in all communities. Although I haven't personally met many flag-loving dickheads opposed to nukes, I'm sure they are out there somewhere, so I've taken it upon myself to be their representative.

After all, they've been claiming to be my representative for years (Snake, 1983).

The excerpt above forms part of a flyer, "Big Pricks Against Nukes", which parodies the power wielded by the generic term, Man and the phallic overtones of nuclear technologies. In this flyer, Zoe Snake takes it upon herself to be the Australian representative of Big Pricks Against Nukes – a woman who has "...the knowledge to represent man, because he has forced his way inside [her] from an early age setting [her] mind about what Woman is not and should be, colonizing [her] organs with drugs, laws and mechanical
implements." At the right hand corner is a hand drawn graphic of a woman – allegedly Zoe Snake – in a pose resembling the statue of liberty. This erect figure, however, is dressed with an American flag and carries a giant penis on the top of her head. The penis is primed like a missile while her hand gestures a sign of peace.

Flyers, such as this one, circulate informally at direct actions, bookshops, outside the premises of policy makers and public gatherings (ranging from street corners and coffee shops to conferences). Not all flyers employ the genre of parody but, by and large, they aim to contest public truths that affect our daily lives and the world we live in. Claiming a distinctive position for women to participate in such contestations is a strategy to disrupt militaristic rhetoric concerning 'freedom', 'democracy' and representation. The Womens Pentagon Action, the women from Greenham Common and the women from Cockburn Sound have all produced flyers as a part of their protests. Such tools form a part of the discursive formation of ecofeminism but are often subjugated in arguments concerning whether or not it is theoretically sound to claim a distinctive position for women organising around environmental issues. Resurrecting subjugated knowledges that dwell in the archives of activists may enhance a "system of relays" between theory and practice (see Deleuze, 1977: 206–207) to strengthen arguments for a distinctive space for ecofeminist knowledges.

A WORD ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACADEMICS AND ACTIVISTS

Viewing ecofeminism as a discursive formation rather than a theory enables an interactive approach to examining the relationships between activists and academics. For the discursive practices of ecofeminism do not easily fall into a dichotomy where we have
activists on one hand and academics on the other. There are academics who participate in grass roots struggles and there are activists who theorise. Similarly, there are academics who employ propagandist techniques in their writing (for instance, Haraway's 'Manifesto for Cyborgs') and those who argue for feminist autonomy in the academy. In these senses, activists and academics mutually inform and shape one another. However, a distinction can be drawn between the two in terms of the contexts of power/knowledge relations in which they are situated. Organising women only protests and women only grass roots groups creates physical space in which to work separate from men. Autonomy in the academy is more subtle. Here, ecofeminists have argued for an autonomous 'theoretical space' so that feminist issues are not submerged in 'broader frameworks' (such as environmental ethics and deep ecology) that may carry androcentric biases:

The annihilation of seals and whales, the military and commercial genocide of tribal peoples, are unforgivable human acts, but the annihilation of women's identity and creativity by patriarchal culture continues as a fact of daily existence. The embrace of progressive attitudes toward nature does little in itself to change this (Salleh, 1984:341).

Salleh is arguing for a feminist analysis on the environmental agenda. In drawing attention to the need for a feminist analysis, Salleh infers that 'progressive attitudes' fail short of actually being progressive if they lack a gender analysis. Salleh accompanies this contention, however, by arguing for a link between women and nature. This contrasts with the activist arguments for an autonomous space for ecofeminists that do not make such links. However, the predominant definition of ecofeminism in the academy
emphasises the links made between 'women' and 'nature'. The following section examines such links more closely.

ECOFEMINISM AND THE LINKS BETWEEN WOMEN AND NATURE

The principal role of women in an 'ecological revolution' is voiced by a substantial proportion of ecofeminists. Francois d'Eaubonne, who coined the word 'eco-feminism' in 1974, exemplifies such a vision:

...with a society at last in the feminine gender meaning non-power (and not power-to-the-women) it would be proved that no other human group could have brought about the ecological revolution; because none other was so directly involved at all levels... the planet in the feminine gender would become green again for all (d'Eaubonne quoted in Marks and Courtivron, 1980:236).

In a special report following a conference on Ecofeminist Perspectives: Culture, Nature and Therapy, Irene Diamond (1988: 368) draws on d'Euabonnes's contention that women are in "...a privileged position to bring about the ecological revolution because no other human group is so directly concerned at all levels in the sustenance of life". However, this view does not necessarily advocate an innate link between women and nature. Many ecofeminists argue for links between women and nature in non-essentialist terms, exemplified on the basis of the way women have been, and are, positioned in society. I shall consider such positions later. However, for other ecofeminists, women are perceived as having an inherent privileged perspective for ecological restoration.
ARGUMENTS FOR AN INNATE CONNECTION BETWEEN WOMEN/ FEMINISM AND NATURE/ECOLOGY

Elizabeth Dodson Gray espouses such a view of women in Green Paradise Lost. Gray begins her argument by linking environmental degradation to the world views advocated by patriarchal theology (located in the Judeo-Christian tradition). She argues that the myths of creation elaborate a conception of the world in a 'pyramid of dominance and status'. Being only second to God, men sit at the apex of a 'natural order' in dominion over women, children, animals and plants. A feminist theology, on the other hand, elaborates a non-hierarchicalised view of the world. Gray supports this assertion by drawing on feminist object relations theory (discussed in the next chapter) to argue that the psycho-sexual formation of women involves a more continuous sense of connectedness and inter-relatedness within the mother-child bond than is the case for men, who as boys have to transfer their gender allegiance to the father in the process of individuation and separation from the mother. Further to this, Gray argues that the bodily experiences of women (such as menstruation and bearing children) situates women with a closer alliance to nature than men:

...[T]here is a definite limit to the perception of men...a limit imposed upon their consciousness by the lack of certain bodily experiences which are present in the life of a woman. No matter how androgynous men may become, it is therefore not possible for men alone to lead us into a society with a fully developed sense of its limited but harmonious place in nature...because the male's is simply a much diminished experience of body, of natural processes, and of future generations (Gray, 1979: 113–114)
In addition to holding the above views, Gray is in accord with ecological frameworks that conceive all inhabitants of earth as inter-related, diverse and complex. Within such frameworks all species and ecosystems can not be ranked in a hierarchical order as all are necessary for the sustenance of life. The psychology of female identity and the bodily experiences of women are seen to lead to the valuing of connectedness and interactiveness with the immediate environment. From this, it is argued that women are in a more privileged position to understand the interrelatedness between the human species and other life forms.

While Gray proposes innate connections between feminine psychology and ecological consciousness, other ecofeminists perceive an inherent connection between 'feminism' and 'ecology'. The principles of an ecological ethic are connected with the principles of some feminist perspectives to articulate the legitimacy of fusing ecology with feminism:

Ecology is universally defined as the study of the balance and interrelationships of all life on earth. The motivating force behind feminism is the expression of the feminine principle. As the essential impulse of the feminine principle is striving towards balance and interrelationship, it follows that feminism and ecology are inextricably linked (Leland, 1983:72).

The views of Gray and Leland differ quite radically from activists arguing for women organising as autonomous groups around ecological concerns (although many activists may hold the above views also) as both Gray and Leland perceive inherent connections between feminine psychology/feminism and ecological consciousness/ecology rather than strategic connections between
feminist and environmental activist organisations. Their views also
differ from positions that claim links between women and nature
from the way both women and nature have been historically
constructed and consequently treated. Gray and Leland respectively
take for granted the categories of 'women' and 'nature', and
'feminism' and 'ecology'. Both positions foreclose discussions on
variations between (and within) women and feminism. Furthermore,
such conceptions prevent speculation on what women and feminism
have the potential to be. In assuming innate qualities for categories
of feminine psychology/feminism/women and ecological
consciousness/ ecology/nature Gray and Leland imply an
unchangeable subject position for women.

THE FEAR OF ESSENTIALISM IN CONSTRUCTING
ECOFEMINIST POSITIONS

Ecofeminists who draw innate links between women and nature pose
problems to those ecofeminists who wish to transcend traditional
stereotypes of women constructed solely in terms of biology and
'psychological identity'. Viewing women in this way may not only
reinforce stereotypes that have been oppressive to women (i.e.
women's place is in the home rearing children); but can also confine
women to occupying only one subject position (i.e. woman as
nurturer and carer). Hallen (1988:7) refers to this as 'problematic
talk' of some ecofeminist writing. In place of such essentialism, she
posits an explicitly existentialist view: "...women should be free to
choose, to create their nature through their actions">

From a more social constructionist perspective, Andree Collard
Women's experience with oppression and abuse, as well as their experience of mothering, can make them more sensitive to the oppression and abuse of nature, as well as better situated to remedy it (my emphasis).

By asserting that women's experiences can (but do not necessarily) contribute to a greater sensitivity toward nature, Collard leaves open the possibility for women refusing this subject position. Such an openness allows diversity to flourish at the same time as establishing these provisional links. By eradicating the necessity of a link between women and nature ecofeminist discursive practices are less prone to perpetuating essentialist and universalist positions.

The problem of essentialism has prompted a response from Merchant (1989:xvi) in her preface to the republished version of The Death of Nature. The nine year gap between the original publication of this book and its republishing seems to indicate that ecofeminist subject matter is compelled to address current academic concerns (like suspicion of essentialism) if it is to participate effectively with trends in critical theories. This would be not merely because it is fashionable to do so but because essentialist categories have the effect of excluding and misrepresenting diverse and contradictory positions circulating through a discursive formation. Merchant prefaces the latest edition of her book by claiming that 'there are no "essential" characteristics of sex, gender and nature'. She goes on to say that people's conception of nature is dependent on how they internalise the 'norms' and 'ideas' of the society into which they are 'born, educated and socialised'. This assertion sets the framework for her ensuing project of examining historical evidence in order to explicate the particular constructions of women and
nature that have become dominant in Western scientific thought (1989:xvi).

The 'woman' and 'nature' question is contextualised by Merchant through an analysis of shifting metaphors in the history of scientific thought. She analyses the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth century as shaping a mechanistic world view which superceded a view of the world as an organism. From the material cited, Merchant argues that the category of 'nature' has an historical alliance with the category of 'woman'. When the metaphor of the world as an organism prevailed, the categories of woman and nature were socially constructed as life giving forces which were highly valued. As the metaphor changed to a mechanistic view of the world, the categories of woman and nature were perceived by scientific thought as unruly forces which required containment and control so that human society could attain a path of 'progress'. Merchant links the capitalist mode of production, the pervasiveness of patriarchal institutions, and a mechanistic world view as contributing factors to the development of a competitive, aggressive and dominating attitude over women and ecology. Though this is a crude summary of her argument, it seems that Merchant's treatment of woman and nature as metaphorical historical social constructions centres her contentions that the ordering of humans and nature as resources is leading to the earth's destruction.

Merchant's analysis of the woman and nature question is a fruitful resource for ecofeminists insofar as it describes the the links between women and nature as historically contingent. No necessary, or essential, relationship between both categories is argued for, and therefore, she avoids conflating them. Where Merchant's arguments may become problematic are at points where there is a slippage between the historical/metaphorical category of 'woman' and notions
of actual, contemporary 'woman'. (Further criticism of Merchant is asserted by Haraway, discussed in the next chapter).

THE PRACTICE OF ACADEMIC COMMENTARY
The fragments of ecofeminism presented so far cover a diverse range of perspectives and positions. Their presentation aims to demonstrate the diversity of ecofeminist thought, rather than trying to capture a complete picture of all positions that can be named under the heading of ecofeminism. Before observing how ecofeminism has been conceptualised in academic commentaries, let us briefly reflect upon these positions.

It seems that the term 'ecofeminism' has been employed by some activists as a strategy to strengthen the participation of women in the environmental movement. Other activists have claimed a distinctive position for women organising around environmental issues as a strategic tool to disrupt prevailing masculinist trends in theories and practices. On the other hand, theorists, such as Gray argue that women have a special position in raising ecological consciousness on the basis of their inherent connections with nature. These connections are seen to be grounded in women's bodily experiences as well as the psycho–sexual roots forming feminine identity. From a different perspective, Leland has argued for inherent connections existing between the principles of feminism and ecology. Moving away from conceptions that propose an innate connection between 'women' and 'nature', and 'feminism' and 'ecology', are perspectives from a more social constructionist position. Writers like Merchant exemplify positions which describe connections between the exploitation of women and the domination of nature from the way
the categories of 'women' and 'nature' have been historically constructed.

These fragments can only offer a partial picture of the different voices circulating through the discursive formation of ecofeminism. There are, however, a number of commentaries classifying different ecofeminist positions circulating through the scope of this field (See Eckersley [1989]; King [1981]; Merchant [1990]; Plumwood [1986] and Warren [1987]).

Commentators do not necessarily subscribe to ecofeminist positions themselves. Rather, they attempt to define and delimit a field in order to critically evaluate the different positions circulating within it. Such commentaries can, and do, provide insights to the scope of ecofeminism. However, classificatory procedures employed in commentaries often constrain or silence voices that do not easily fit with 'working definitions' for what may be incorporated within ecofeminism. Furthermore, rules and conventions for determining what is, and what is not, worthy of academic citation may exclude crucial texts which have had profound influence on the constitution of the discursive formation of ecofeminism. The commentary by Eckersly (to which I have referred a number of times so far) and a commentary by Val Plumwood (1986) exemplify such practices.

As mentioned in my introduction, Eckersly provides a critical survey on ecofeminist scholarship to evaluate whether a necessary link between patriarchy and the domination of nature can be made. She notes that not all ecofeminists subscribe to such a view but goes on to argue that if no necessary link is made, a distinctive position for ecofeminists becomes redundant. Hence the paradox of arguing for
a distinctive position. There are two ways in which Ekersly's view subjugates some ecofeminists voices.

Firstly, as demonstrated earlier in this chapter with examples from archives from activists, ecofeminists may assert a distinctive position for organisational autonomy. Though knowledges emerging from these positions predominantly circulate outside the academy, they nevertheless interact with knowledges circulating within the academy. Conferences (such as the one in which Ekersly's paper was delivered), and the compilation of ecofeminist anthologies, are spaces where activist and academic trends often meet one another. There is no paradox in asserting a distinctive position for ecofeminist organisation based on practical preferences.

The second, and more debilitating, way in which Ekersly's paradox subjugates ecofeminist knowledges lies in her lack of recognition of discourses carrying androcentric biases. Many feminists and ecofeminists have argued for a distinctive space to construct theoretical positions on the basis that the concepts, categories, rules and procedures of dominant philosophical and scientific thought are masculinist (see following chapter). Such positions converge with Foucault's contention that discourses are material practices which produce effects of power. If this is the case, then ecofeminists arguing for a distinctive theoretical position, with, or without, drawing links between women and nature, can do so on the basis of challenging masculinist biases in the construction of language and meaning and the way these are put to use (i.e. through biases in discourses).

In form as well as content, Griffin's Woman and Nature, challenges the androcentric biases embedded in scientific and philosophical
thought. However, in a critical review of ecofeminist positions concentrating on *philosophical literature* of ecofeminism, Plumwood (1986: 123–124) omits an in depth analysis of Griffin. She argues that Griffin's text "does not present closely reasoned consecutive arguments or major enunciations of theses, but rather assembles material to illustrate its themes, which are usually suggested rather than stated". While this may be one way of describing this text, Plumwood goes on to argue that she "...will not further consider it...because it does not sufficiently or explicitly develop the philosophical arguments or positions". The justification of such an omission assumes a very rigid conception of what the philosophical can be. Such a conception of the philosophical bears close resemblance to, if it is not the same as, the rules and procedures of 'scientific discourse' which feminists and ecofeminists attempt to challenge. If boundaries are delineated with the rigidity that Plumwood advocates many ecofeminist voices will remain subjugated in academic discussions.

The commentaries provided by Ekersley and Plumwood are indicative of commentaries that Foucault opposes with his genealogical method. Both Ekersley and Plumwood treat the explication of ecofeminism as if all ecofeminists argue for a grand, totalising theory of society and politics. While that may be the case for some ecofeminists (as it is with Henderson in 'The Warp and the Weft: The Coming Synthesis of Eco-Philosophy and Eco-Feminism', 1983: 203–214), such practices of commentary *subjugate* the many voices that don't aspire to totalising theories. These voices are those that appear in many sites of resistance (like grass roots organisations, flyers), but are "disguised" or "disqualified" when some academic commentaries attempt to present ecofeminism as a theory seeking uniform cohesion. Presenting a
movement/theory in a fragmentary way, one that avoids synthesising different positions into a coherent definition, brings to attention the specific locations of various sites of power/knowledge relations. Rather than attempt to synthesise different positions into something that may resemble a unitary philosophical/scientific theory, these positions may be viewed as different sites of resistance that embody different sets of power/knowledge relations. Each site has its own set of discursive practices which regulate the form in which the movement/theory proceeds and struggles with specific sets of power relations. It seems that viewing ecofeminism as a discursive practice can allow a certain fluidity in definition that is absent from other forms of academic commentary. To elaborate, let us return to Foucault's formulation of discursive practices referred to in my introduction.

ECOFEMINISM AS A DISCURSIVE PRACTICE
Discursive practices have been described as having three characteristics. Firstly, a discursive practice can be identified through the demarcation of a set of objects determining what can be spoken of within a discursive field. Secondly, discursive practices form rituals surrounding the circumstances of speech which designate who has the authority to speak within a field and has the "legitimate perspective" for discussion to take place. Finally, rules and procedures "for the elaboration of theories and concepts" are established within a discursive practice to determine the way in which knowledge is to proceed and be constructed.

The examples of ecofeminist theory/practices presented so far, share a delimitation of the field of objects under study. Some of these are the categories pertaining to 'woman', 'nature', 'feminism', 'environmentalism', 'ecology' and the 'feminine principle
A discursive practice not only delimits what objects are spoken of but characterises the way such objects derive their meaning. For instance, the category of 'feminism' varies in meaning depending on the context in which it is asserted. Activists, such as Elliffe, appear to employ the term 'feminism' in a general manner referring to it as an emancipatory movement for the liberation of women. For Leland, the term 'feminism' is employed as an 'expression of the feminine principle'. In the next chapter, 'feminism' is employed as an umbrella term to represent various positions pertaining to interventions opposing masculinist biases in scientific and philosophical practices. This implies that the object of feminism does not remain constant from one context to another. However, there are instances where these different conceptions of feminism may intersect with one another. For example, Elliffe's conception intersects with notions of feminism in the next chapter where the site of science and philosophy can be viewed as one space of intervention to struggle for the emancipation of women. Such intersections can be highlighted to further the aims of both contexts (i.e. the aims of grass roots organisations and the aims of academic theorising). Each context, however, has its own rules and procedures for articulating such views. For instance, activists may prefer to use terms such as 'patriarchal' rather than 'phallocentric' a term that is more widely circulated in the academy.

The "legitimate perspective" for ecofeminist discursive practices also varies from one position to another. Ecofeminists like Gray, for instance, would consider women to have a privileged position for leading the path to ecological restoration by virtue of women's biology.
Others would argue that women are in an authorised position to speak of ecological issues because '...no other human group is so directly concerned at all levels in the sustenance of life' (Diamond, 1988:368). There are also ecofeminists who have assigned themselves an authority to speak for ecological restoration as a strategic move to counter derogatory and oppressive notions of women and nature. All these positions converge in the sense that they see that the legitimate perspective for ecofeminist discursive practices relies on being a woman oriented toward eradicating oppression of women in society together with striving for planetary survival. However, the qualifications for delivering the legitimate perspective are not so simple.

Foucault (1981: 63–64) argues that the procedures for qualifying as speaking subjects within a discursive practice, can be likened to the formation of 'societies of discourse'. There are rituals surrounding the delivery of a discourse which determine who can speak and who must listen. In the case of ecofeminism, as with many other discourses, the occupancy of a specific speaking position depends on the circumstances and context in which such rituals of speech take place. The qualifications for speaking as an activist may differ from the qualifications for speaking in an academic context. For instance, in an academic context a person who has written a PhD on chemical wastes is more likely to be assigned an authoritative voice to speak on the topic as an undergraduate studying the same phenomena. In the context of activism, a person who has been engaged with organising grass roots groups for a number of years is often awarded more legitimacy to speak than a newcomer who has no experience in this field.
It is obvious that certain qualifications are required to speak with authority and transmit knowledges in a given context, but it is often understated that these qualifications solidify exclusionary practices that regulate who can enter different 'societies of discourse'. As demonstrated with the exclusionary practices proceeding from the commentaries of Ekersley and Plumwood, the perspective authorised in the academy silences the voices of some activists and ecofeminist writers who form an integral part of ecofeminist knowledges and practices. As Foucault claims, disqualified, illegitimate, popular knowledges should be brought into circulation to oppose the constraining effects of totalising unitary theories.

A discursive practice also has the task of the 'fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts'; that is, the rules and procedures employed to construct knowledges and to establish what can be counted as 'true' within a discursive practice. With such diversity amongst ecofeminists it appears that there are different rules and procedures for different ecofeminists. The fixing of norms is dependent on which ecofeminist is talking, to who and where. For instance, propagandist techniques form knowledges without constructing the logical arguments found in ecofeminist debates with deep ecologists. Through ecofeminist anthologies different writers express their own truth claims by means of poetry, personal anecdotes, descriptions of political actions, the exploration of feminist theology and spirituality and the elaboration of theory. The vast range of ecofeminist literature and practices exhibits extremely diverse ways of constructing knowledges.
However, it appears that there are some regulatory principles governing the circulation of ecofeminist discursive practices. Most ecofeminists place an emphasis on the interconnectedness and dependency of all living things and conceive of an interconnectedness between theory and practice. What appears to be an overwhelming link between different ecofeminist positions, however, is the commitment to making connections between different 'truths' on the basis of how they contribute to developing a politics that can save the destruction of earth. As Griffin states in *Reclaim the Earth*:

If there is one idea that can be said to link together all that is said and reported here, this idea is also a feeling. It is grief over the fate of the earth, that contains within it a joyful hope that we might reclaim this earth. Does this one idea answer all our questions? It is not meant to. It is meant to make us ask more questions. And it is not necessary that we agree on every point, for what we have in common is not small (1983:4).

It seems that philosophical commentaries, intent on binding ecofeminists with epistemological cohesion, miss the *ethical* and *political* links binding ecofeminists together to create a distinctive space to ask epistemological questions. The genealogical method does not aim to discount the importance of epistemology or to dismiss the speculative dimension of critical reflection upon the construction of knowledges. Rather, it aims to "emancipate historical knowledges" from subjection to rigid rules and procedures circulating through some forms of scientific and philosophical discourses which "disguise" and "disqualify" certain knowledges from its circulation.
Conceiving of ecofeminism as a discursive formation with multiple discursive practices removes the notion of ecofeminist theory/practice as a stable fixed terrain. It also assigns validity to the incorporation of archival documents as integral parts to the formation of a knowledge. Sharp demarcations between 'theory' and 'practice', 'science' and 'ideology' are blurred to be replaced by analysing specific effects of resistance particular discursive practices have in specific sites of power/knowledge relations. That is, discursive practices stress the effect of context on the formation and articulation of knowledges. If meanings change with context, then certain positions may be appropriate in one context and not another. For instance, examining the psycho-sexual roots of environmental degradation may be useful in the context of white, nuclear heterosexual family structures (especially as such structures are those that breed men in powerful positions). Such a position becomes objectionable when it is applied to all circumstances and contexts.

Another positive effect of conceiving ecofeminism as a discursive practice is that it draws attention to the intertextual relations existing between its own field with other discursive fields. Furthermore, attention is drawn to the materiality of discourse. As Haraway asserts:

[A]. discursive field...is a field of meanings. Such a field... is one kind of material determinant, influencing the course of peoples lives and influenced by them...Discourses are not only social products, they have fundamental social effects. They are modes of power. The life and human sciences are powerful actors in an age of bio-politics, in which the management of the efficiencies of bodies is a major constructive practice. Scientific discourses both bound and generate conditions of daily life for millions. To contest...[them] is a form of social action (1990:289).
The next chapter concentrates on the intertextual relations existing between ecofeminism and feminist critiques of science and philosophy. This arena is one site of power/knowledge relations where ecofeminist discursive practices can align with another discursive field as an intervention to the most central "regime of truth" in Western society.
CHAPTER FIVE

A DISCURSIVE ALLY:
FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
Recent liberation movements suffer from the fact that they cannot find any principle on which to base the elaboration of a new ethics. They need an ethics, but they cannot find any other ethics than an ethics founded on so-called scientific knowledge of what the self is, what desire is, what the unconscious is, and so on.

_Michel Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress".

Feminists have stakes in a successor science project that offers a more adequate, richer, better account of the world, in order to live in it well and in critical reflexive relation to our own as well as others' practices of domination and the unequal parts of privilege and oppression that make up all positions. In traditional philosophical categories, the issue is ethics and politics perhaps more than epistemology.

_Donna Haraway, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective".
Does the dismantling of science as bearer of Truth and neutrality necessarily cause us to abandon our reliance on it for understanding the world and creating spaces where scientific knowledges can help elaborate our ethics and politics? I think not. It may be the case that rules and procedures of 'scientific discourse' activate limitations and exclusionary practices for what forms of knowledge may be counted as true. Many feminist and ecofeminist voices have been amongst such exclusions. It may also be the case that scientific knowledges are not as stable and innocent from power relations as some empiricist models of science would have us believe. There are a number of competing paradigms circulating through scientific knowledges, and it is evident from the close ties scientific practices have to the military-industrial complex that the production of scientific knowledges is invested with power relations (Hallen, 1989). Nevertheless, questioning the sanctity of science and its nihilistic tendencies does not have to lead to an abandonment of scientific projects aiding the elaboration of an ethics for a liberation movement. As implied in the quote from Haraway above, the creation of a 'successor science' emerges from ethical and political committments aiming to change the rules and procedures for constructing scientific knowledges so that power relations invested in scientific practices can be life affirming rather than life threatening. In this sense, Haraway offers a more optimistic and inspiring conception of the relationship between ethics and scientific knowledge than does Foucault. For Haraway (1988:579), it is not enough to employ critical theory as a tool to expose "radical historical contingency and modes of construction for everything". We need a "better account of [the] world" so we have a better chance of preserving it and countering relations of domination and oppression. Scientific discourse is too powerful a site of
power/knowledge relations to ignore as a site for interventions and resistances by liberation movements.

But what may a "successor science project" look like? How can it aid the foundation of ethical orientations for ecofeminists? The following survey of literature, on feminist critiques of science and philosophy, aims to explore these questions by explicating different feminist positions, interventions and resistances to scientific knowledge and discourse. This discursive field shares many objects of study, perspectives and rules and procedures for constructing knowledges with the discursive practices of ecofeminism. This being the case, feminist critiques of philosophy and science can be perceived as allies to ecofeminism, circulating in a site of power/knowledge relations that can critically inform, as well as be informed by, ecofeminist discursive practices.

A SHARED CONCERN BETWEEN ECOFEMINISTS AND FEMINIST CRITICS OF SCIENCE
A shared concern for ecofeminists and feminist critics of science is the question of how scientific and philosophical knowledges exercise gender biases in theory, practice and policy making. However, how gender bias in scientific theory and practice is to be examined is a ground for much contestation.

The literature available for feminist critiques of science is diverse and growing in volume. A selected bibliography of this area is offered by Wylie et. al. (1989: 379–386) listing works primarily concerned with epistemological and methodological issues. Their introduction provides a short outline of the different positions and categories found circulating through this body of literature. More extensive descriptions of these positions can be found in texts such
as Haraway (1988), Harding (1986), Hawkesworth (1989) and Jagger (1983). The positions and categories of feminist critics of science used in this chapter have been extracted and combined from these works.

The types of themes and patterns identified as feminist concerns with science varies from one writer to another. For most writers, however, the shared concern over gender biases begins with looking at how the exclusion of women as participants in scientific practices is both a product and producer of material circumstances that subjugate women. This proposition can serve as a starting point to ask, what are the consequences when theoretical assumptions, the collating of data and the production of truths have predominantly been in the hands of less than half the population? Depending on what a priori assumptions are held and what epistemological frameworks are used, the answers to this question may vary from ecofeminist positons fearing the destruction of the planet to feminist empiricist claims fearing nothing more than the reflection of practioners' own biases in making knowledge claims.

FEMINIST EMPIRICISM
Through her categorisation of different feminist positions criticising science, Harding (1986) identifies feminist empiricism as a position which claims that the eradication of male bias in theory is attainable through a more rigorous application of 'scientific' methods. This position assumes, and sees it possible, for phenomena to be understood primarily through the procedures of observation. 'Objective' knowledge can be produced if the observer's own biases are controlled. There is also an assumption that an observer's 'subjective' views can be distanced from objects under study where a correct application of scientific method is associated with concepts
of rationality. According to Hawkesworth (1989:535), feminist empiricists assume that the world can be known, via human senses, as 'unmediated truth' which leaves little room for self-reflexivity in questioning the way in which 'truth' about the world may be constructed. The model of empiricism described above conflates scientific knowledge with the type of 'Truth' criticised by both Griffin and Foucault in the opening of chapter three to this thesis. Though feminist empiricists may be the least audible voices amongst ecofeminist discourses, the faith and commitment directed toward 'scientific rationality' aligns itself to a discourse that bears the greatest sanction of speaking 'truth' in Western society. As Harding (1986:30) states:

Neither God nor tradition is privileged with the same credibility as scientific rationality in modern cultures... The project that science's sacredness makes taboo is the examination of science in just ways any other institution or set of social practises can be examined. If we are not willing to try and see the favoured intellectual structures and practises of science as cultural artifacts rather than as sacred commandments handed down to humanity at the birth of modern science, then it will be hard to understand how gender symbolism, the gendered social structure of science, and masculine identities and behaviours of individual scientists have left their marks on the problematics, concepts, theories, methods, interpretations, ethics, meanings and goals of science.

Many concerns posed by ecofeminists are silenced within the sort of framework Harding is criticising. Notions of intuition, feelings and personal experiences for guiding methods and concepts are dismissed as 'bad science' in this empiricist model. However, it is important to note, as Haraway (1988:576) does, that "disembodied scientific objectivity" is a doctrine held mostly by nonscientists and a very few "trusting philosophers". To state that scientific rationality
is all prevailing or merely rhetorical, in the field of science, would be misleading and dangerous. Rather than dismissing notions of rationality altogether it seems more fruitful to look at the ways in which scientific rationality has produced and constrained the way in which feminist discourses may be articulated.

The perception that scientific rationality permeates theory with a masculine bias shifts the focus of feminist critics from biases contained in individual practitioners to biases that are embodied within the models of science themselves. The juxtaposition of rationality with masculinity (and by implication, irrationality with femininity) that seemingly emerges at the apex of a hierarchy of knowledges, has laid the ground for much debate within and around feminist knowledges.

SCIENCE, REASON AND WOMEN
An interest in the history of scientific thought has emerged from efforts to trace some of the processes in which the man–science–reason and woman–nature–unreason links have come to be categorised. However, the appropriation of different texts to inform these conceptions can be quite complex (or dangerous, depending on your politics) as differences in epistemological assumptions will suggest different political and ethical orientations. For example, McMillan (1982) explores the relationship between women, reason and nature and concludes that sex roles traditionally assigned to women in the practises of reproduction and childrearing should be embraced rather than undermined. She argues that feminist concerns of women being restricted to the domestic sphere of life is only a problem if the domestic sphere is undervalued. Though McMillan's attempts to give value to domestic life activities is not, wholly, a dangerous suggestion, she implies that the
association of woman with the domestic sphere is a natural biological destination. Such an argument rules out the possibilities for contesting the way in which the feminine has been constructed in different discursive practices. If ecofeminists use a framework like McMillan's to understand links between woman and nature, it seems that the choices available for political agendas are restricted to conceptions of the feminine that have been used against feminists who have argued for reproductive rights, free choice in sexuality and the call for greater social responsibility in child care. This text has been included in this survey to illustrate how philosophical frameworks carry consequences that may reproduce the very effects of power ecofeminists may be trying to challenge. The choice of categories to understand the world then is a serious question for anyone engaged in social change.

As previously discussed, Merchant's *The Death of Nature* examines the changing metaphors of women and nature in the history of Western scientific thought. She illustrates how the choice of categories to view the world have serious consequences for the way people interact with one another and treat the environment. Particular conceptions of reason in mechanistic science have produced conceptions of women and nature that have been instrumental in the oppression of women and degradation of the environment. Merchant's work circulates through ecofeminist discourses as well as feminist critiques of science. The historical connections found between women and nature have incited an exploration of such connections by ecofeminists arguing for an ecological revolution led by women. That is, links made between the domination of nature and oppression of women have been seized upon by some ecofeminists and feminists to argue for women occupying a privileged position in understanding the world and
setting agendas for social change. Feminist critics of science most sympathetic to this view are found amongst those who can be grouped as standpoint theorists.

FEMINIST STANDPOINT THEORISTS – OBJECT RELATIONS

Standpoint theorists have been described as feminists who claim that women have a "privileged perspective" for understanding the world from the way women have been oppressed and positioned in it (See Harstock, 1985). The category of 'standpoint theorists' have been used by many feminist commentators on the philosophy of science to describe a range of feminist scientists who may not identify with this category but, nevertheless, concur with many of the propositions emerging from standpoint theorists. For instance, as Klein (1989:270) states, Evelyn Fox Keller is described as a standpoint theorist by Jaggar (1983) and Harding (1986).

In *Reflections on Gender and Science*, Keller (1980) shares many of the same questions as Merchant concerning the categories of 'woman' and 'nature'. Similarly, she refers to the scientific revolution as a marked point in history where the maltreatment of woman and nature began. Keller and Merchant both concern themselves with the breakdown of an organicist conception of the world, but Keller slants her approach to look for gender biases in theories as having psychosexual roots. In this sense, Keller is aligned to standpoint theorists such as Jane Flax.

Both Flax (1983) and Keller align themselves with the discursive terrain of object relations theory. Keller relies on writers such as Nancy Chodorow, Melanie Klein and Dorothy Dinnerstein to inform her analysis of gender bias in theory which occupies a small section of her book, *Reflections on Gender and Science*; she presents a
similar argument elsewhere (1983). Jane Flax offers more detail on the basic propositions of this theory.

As Flax (1983:250) explains, the most basic assumption of object–relations theory is that a person's identity is formed through interacting in social relations. Her outline stating the premises from which this theory is formed shares themes which converge with ecofeminist positions. Firstly, there is a proposal that female identity will be different from male identity as males are positioned differently in the mother–child bond (it is assumed that the mother is the primary care giver) in which their first interactions in social relations take place. The realisation of a 'self' for boy children is explained as an experience which encounters an identity crisis from having to shift identification from the mother's sex to the sex of a man (most often assumed to be the father). For boys, this involves a disconnection and denial of dependence on the mother which leads to a search for autonomy and control over the 'object' which once nourished him. The feminine characteristics of the boy experienced in a symbiotic stage of growth are repressed in order to reap the social benefits of identifying with the 'law of the father'. As girls are of the same gender as the mother, it is proposed that they are in less need to strive for autonomy, domination and control over the mother.

Though object relations theory and the implications drawn from it are more complex than outlined here, the patterns of convergence with ecofeminist discourses are readily identifiable. The historical association of the earth as Mother has provided a ground for theorists to make connections between psychodynamic relations and ecological crises (As illustrated by Gray [1979]). The treatment of the earth/mother as an inexhaustible resource, the desire for
disconnection, control and autonomy are seen as consequences of male predominance in the institutions that conceptualise and act upon phenomena. It is implied that the positioning of females in psychosexual relations offers a more connected and interactive basis on which knowledge may be founded.

In a similar fashion, it is argued that the connectedness experienced in the formation of female identities positions feminist knowledges away from subject/object, body/mind dualisms. As Keller (1983) and Flax (1983) propose, mainstream/malestream science is premised on a subject/object dichotomy which conceptualises what is 'other' as possessing little credibility and value. The object, or other, may be mother/woman, nature, other people, the body, etc. As Flax (1983:269) states:

...separation–individuation cannot be completed and the reciprocity emerge if the "other" must be dominated and/or repressed rather than incorporated into the self while simultaneously acknowledging difference. An unhealthy self projects its own dilemmas on the world and posits them as the "human condition".

The call to dissolve rigid dualisms suggests an acknowledgement of objects under study having some agency. Such a conception may allow for objects to be redefined as other subjects (or objects with agency), allowing emotional and creative experiences as valid informers and shapers of knowledge (Keller, 1980: 71). Other writers who share similar concerns in their work are Bordo (1986), Grant (1987), and Wylie (1988).
So far, standpoint theorists have been discussed in terms of identity formation being shaped through social relations of psychodynamic roots. Standpoint theorists also argue that wider material forces in social relations (i.e. patriarchal, capitalistic, colonialist) shape the "human condition". Though object relations theory holds to this as an integral assumption for locating the social context of psychodynamic relations, feminist writers like Nancy Harstock (1983) argue that a feminist standpoint can also use the tools of a Marxist historical materialist method for a more adequate understanding of social relations and knowledges. This extends feminist standpoint theory from a psychosexual investigation to a more materialist one.

FEMINIST STANDPOINT THEORY – A MARXIST PERSPECTIVE
The most fundamental premise of a Marxist ontology and epistemology is that in the production and reproduction of life, people enter into relations with nature and other people whereby their consciousness is determined by their activities of 'being'. The way people understand the world is specific to the historical epoch in which they are situated. Like other theorists of a Marxist persuasion, Harstock argues for the primacy of labour as the activity and practice of human beings that mediate how reality can be known. Hence, the positioning of people in the production process provides the material grounding for the way they will perceive the world. The social relations of production between the two major classes are such that workers have to sell their labour (as a commodity) to the owners of capital, in return for a wage, which may give the appearance of an equal relation. Though the owners of capital have the ideological support of the major institutions of society (e.g. law, the family, education), and social relations are such
that the working class are subjugated both ideologically and economically, it is only through the view from where the working class are positioned, that the unequal relations of production can be perceived. It is argued that it is only from this point of view that an undistorted and 'correct' view of the world can be offered to create a society free of domination.

By maintaining the same analogy and unit of analysis (labour), Harstock argues that the positioning of women in the relations of production offer a standpoint, from where to envision and create a more egalitarian society. The particular way in which capitalist society oppresses women stems from the positoning of women as unpaid labourers in the reproduction of the labour force (what a way to talk about having babies!) coupled with the disparity in wages and job opportunities between men and women. Hence, as the life activities of the proletariat positions this class with a privileged understanding of the relations of production, so it is argued that the life activities of women offer a "better" insight for understanding gender relations. These privileged positions are articulated as follows:

The experience of continuity and relations —with others, with the natural world, of mind with body — provides an ontological base for developing a non-problematic social synthesis, a social synthesis which does not depend on any of the forms taken by abstract masculinity (Harstock, 1983: 303–304).

This theory of a 'women's standpoint' readily intersects with certain ecofeminist discourses in so far as it is argued that women maintain a privileged position to form emancipatory politics. Though the approach of standpoint theorists is more concerned with articulating itself in discourses of philosophy and science, the parallels that may
be drawn between these writers and different ecofeminists is remarkable. For instance, many ecofeminists described in the previous chapter perceive women to be in a privileged position to save the earth. However, the context in which such views are articulated varies considerably. Feminist critics of science, most of whom work in universities, use philosophical jargon oriented toward the institution where their theories appear (i.e. for academic journals, books and courses). Hence, the relationship between feminist philosophers of science and ecofeminists is an important strategic site to develop and assist the articulation of ecofeminist ethics in the academy.

If there are theoretical similarities between standpoint theorists and ecofeminists, so too are there similarities in the criticisms levelled at them. For all the insights that standpoint theorists may provide, there is a growing concern over the claims to universality and holism adopted in the use of their categories. As Hawkesworth (1989[545]) states:

Although proponents of feminist standpoint theories are careful to note that conceptions of knowledge are historically variable and contestable, certain aspects of their arguments tend to undercut the force of that acknowledgement. For to claim that there is a distinctive women's "perspective" that is "privileged" precisely because it possesses heightened insights into the nature of reality, a superior access to truth, is to suggest that there is some uniform experience common to all women that generates this universal vision.

Hawkesworth points out that western feminists have been criticised for assuming that 'their' agendas and priorities would reflect the same concerns of non-western feminists. Objections raised against the generalisations projected from psychodynamic relations in the institution of western families, and and against the non-specificity
of terms often used in speaking of capital–labour relations. In attempts to counter these criticisms, standpoint theorists have added variables, such as race and sexuality, to the privileged positions for perceiving unequal power relations. This appears to suggest that the more subjugated a person is, the better s/he is positioned to perceive of 'reality' accurately. As Donna Haraway (1988:586) has observed, such trust in the possibilities of attaining a privileged position from where, and how, to see is highly problematic:

There is no way to "be" simultaneously in all, or wholly in any, of the privileged (i.e. subjugated) positions structured by gender, race, nation and class. And that is a short list of critical positions. The search for such a "full" and total position is the search for the fetishised perfect subject of opposition history, sometimes appearing in feminist theory as the essentialized Third World Woman. Subjugation is not grounds for ontology; it might be a visual clue...Identity, including self identity, does not produce science, critical positioning does, that is, objectivity.

Hence, we are left with a question of how to see and position a discourse without assuming a 'collective singular subject' in 'woman' (Hawkesworth, 1989:553). This is of particular relevance to ecofeminist discourses, where 'woman' features as a central category for situating how understanding is taking place. The focus on meanings, how categories are (mis)used, how particular instances may be universalised, and differences understated, are points of contestation that feminists engaged in debates on postmodernist discourses have brought to attention.
FEMINIST POST-MODERNIST THEORY

Hilary Manette Klein (1989) offers a useful argument for challenging the way categories, such as 'woman' and 'nature', have been appropriated amongst feminist standpoint theorists and, by implication, ecofeminists. She argues that the feminist standpoints emerging from Marxist and Psychoanalytic conceptualisations of woman and nature dangerously reproduce notions of "women's inferior immanence, 'otherness', and final invisibility as autonomous subjects" (p274). The affinity between woman and nature may be more a product of the way both concepts have been categorised, rather than the symptom of a natural alliance. Such a critique appears to change questions from placing subjects as sources of knowledge, to focussing on how subjects are themselves produced by particular 'regimes of truth' (Hawkesworth, 1989:550–551). Similarly, Genevieve Lloyd (1984) argues that the questions that feminists raise in projects seeking to contest mainstream/malestream notions of women are shaped by the same parameters that are held under question. Klein suggests that contestations of power relations must be concerned with contestations of meanings also:

A semiotic method would not accept the connection between "mothering" and "nature" as explanation for women's experience and consciousness, no matter how emphatically it stresses that their connection is mediated by the Marxian equation of labour...Rather, a semiotic method would interrogate how the meaning ascribed to the category "nature" is consistently worked and reworked, mobilizing capitalist relations of production and differentially including the dynamics of race, class and sex in its constitution, maintenance and metamorphoses (Klein, 1989:275).
Klein raises issue with the instability of meanings and categories, such as 'woman' and 'nature'. Such instability suggests that ecofeminist discourses relying on categories of 'woman' and 'nature', to elaborate their theoretical positions, need to carefully re-examine the way in which these categories may be put to use. For example, as seen through the standpoint of Gray (1979), 'woman' is conceived as having innate qualities which disallows variations in women's class, ethnicity and sexuality.

A further complication of describing 'woman' as a 'collective singular subject' is raised by Luce Irigaray, a French feminist, psychoanalyst and philosopher. Irigaray (1985:122) argues that "women are trapped in a system of meaning which serves the auto-affection of the (masculine) subject". In other words, women's identity as 'other' is constructed within a realm of "masculine' representations". Her critique of Freud exemplifies her contention that, in Western thought (be it science, philosophy or literature), ..."[t]he feminine is always described in terms of deficiency or atrophy, as the other side of the sex that alone holds a monopoly on value: the male sex." (Irigaray, 1985:69) If discourses and practices are "masculine through and through" (p127) then discourses and practices for 'women' to speak are bound by this.

Philosophical discourse is described as the "discourse on discourses", a "master discourse" which women have to pass through in order to be interpreted (hence, the importance of ecofeminists aligning with feminist critics of science). To circumvent speaking the language of the same (i.e. masculine) Irigaray advocates a "jamming [of] the theoretical machinery". Similar to Haraway's suggestion of "seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other", Irigaray employs a strategy of embracing the tools that mark women as
'other' in an extreme form of the patriarchal discourses that define women. As she explains in *The Sex Which Is Not One*:

this philosophical mastery ... cannot simply be approached head on, nor simply within the realm of the philosophical itself. Thus it was necessary to deploy other languages ... and even to accept the condition of silence, of aphasia as a symptom – historico-hysterical, hysterico-historical – so that something of the feminine as the limit of the philosophical might finally be heard.

Patriarchal definitions of woman as 'hysteric' are employed with excessiveness in Irigaray's works. As Grosz (1989:138) describes this:

The hysteric's symptom is a response to her annihilation as active subject, a resistance or refusal to confirm what is expected of her... she lives out and uses her passivity in an active defiance of her social position. Irigaray shares the hysteric's excessive mimicry... by taking on, in the most extreme forms, what is expected, but to such an extreme degree that the end result is the opposite of compliance: it unsettles the system by throwing back to it what it cannot accept about its own operations.

Techniques of excessiveness and polyvocal writing circumvent defining women, whilst employing theory as a strategy to disrupt particular notions of the way women have come to be defined. Such a view of philosophical discourse enhances reading works like Griffin's, *Women and Nature*, as works pushing at the defining boundaries of the philosophical. Rather than excluding ecofeminist texts of this nature from philosophical consideration, as Plumwood (1986) has, the works of Irigaray enable the creation of alternate speaking/reading spaces for women in the philosophical realm.
The limits of philosophical boundaries are also pushed in Haraway's "Manifesto for Cyborgs". In the explication of this "political myth", Haraway criticises writers like Merchant and some standpoint theorists for articulating the categories of 'woman', 'nature' and 'organism' with a holism and innocence that disallows contradictions, partiality or confusion with their dual opposites, 'man', 'culture' and 'machine'. Haraway argues that we live in a world where machine and organism are fused. The cyborg (or cybernetic organism) described as "a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction" is representative of such hybridisation (1985: 65). Cyborgs cannot return to an organicist world as the mechanistic order has already shaped their identity.

Haraway moves between 'fictions' and critical analysis where non-innocent cyborgs attempt to create a united front politics for 'feminism', 'materialism' and 'socialism'. By blurring the boundaries between animal and machine, organism and machine and the physical with the non-physical she avoids implications of essentialism while still remaining 'faithful' to articulating her political orientations:

Feminisms and Marxisms have run aground on Western epistemological imperatives to construct a revolutionary subject from the perspective of a hierarchy of oppressions and/or a latent position of moral superiority, innocence, and greater closeness to nature...[W]ritten into the play of a text that has no finally privileged reading or salvation history, to recognize 'oneself' as fully implicated in the world, frees us of the need to root politics in identification, vanguard parties, purity and mothering. Stripped of identity, the bastard race teaches about the power of the margins and the importance of ... transform[ing] ... the evil mother of masculinist fear into the originally literate mother who teaches survival (1985: 95).
Teaching survival, however, calls for responsibility and accountability in the construction of meanings. In the "Cyborg Manifesto" as well as "Situated Knowledges", Haraway is equally suspicious of conceptions of 'postmodernist theory' that privilege the endless play of "arbitrary meaning" (1985: 75). Such a concern stems from a fear of neglecting responsibility in reconstructing meanings and affirming political and theoretical frameworks that can be useful for emancipatory movements. Though this may not be the project for some writers, Haraway (1988) is fearful of tendencies to interpret social constructions of meanings as a licence to discount any prioritisation of meanings at all. As Haraway warns with extreme social constructionist arguments, perceiving the world as a text can be as dangerous as it is useful:

We unmasked the doctrines of objectivity, because they threatened our budding sense of collective historical subjectivity and agency and our "embodied" accounts of truth, and we ended up with one more excuse for not learning any post–Newtonian physics and one more reason to drop the old self–help practices of repairing our own cars. They're just texts anyway, so let the boys have them back (Haraway, 1989: 578).

If extreme social constructionist arguments are used to classify all positions of 'truth' as rhetoric, then it would be easy to conclude that there is no need for feminists to contest them. The danger of aligning with relativities of truth positions is that it becomes easy to forget that the effects of power yielded by their discursive circulations do have material consequences. If feminist knowledges do not contest the articulation of 'truths' in institutions where masculinist traits and interests prevail (particularly scientific practices), then there will be less space for feminists to challenge the
consequences for what these truths may produce. For instance, the way women's bodies are defined in biology has consequences for the way women's bodies are treated in medicine, and few feminists would wish to argue for relativity in truth claims when it comes to the right to control your own body.

By locating feminist participations in science with a slant toward ethics rather that a will to a singular Truth, Haraway avoids being encapsulated in a rut that does not move from a universalist vs relativist framework for debate. Instead, she argues for accountability in what knowledge claims say. Where knowledge claims can be located, they can be contested and scrutinised for their possible consequences.

To reiterate Haraway's assertion in the opening quote of this chapter, "Feminists have stakes in a successor science" (my emphasis). If the "issue is ethics and politics perhaps more than epistemology" we may argue for the recognition of these categories as guiding threads for the construction of academic courses. This is one reason why ecofeminism should have a distinctive space as a topic of study in the academy: such a space allows an autonomous contestation of androcentric biases in mainstream/malestream environmental ethics whilst being explicit about our stakes in the constructions of knowledges. That is, the academy can be viewed as one site of power/knowledge relations which can either help or hinder the realisation of our stakes in contesting dominations and promoting planetary survival.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION: SITUATING KNOWLEDGES
Possibly we're in the process of experiencing a new relationship between theory and practice. At one time, practice was considered an application of theory, a consequence; at other times, it had an opposite sense and it was thought to inspire theory, For us...[t]he relationships between theory and practice are far more partial and fragmentary... [F]rom the moment a theory moves into its proper domain, it begins to encounter obstacles, walls and blockages which require its relay by another type of discourse (it is through this other discourse that it eventually passes to a different domain). Practice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from one practice to another. No theory can develop without eventually encountering a wall, and practice is necessary for piercing this wall.

_Gilles Deleuze, "Intellectuals and Power"._

Feminist theory is an interweaving of strands that are simultaneously theoretical and practical. It is a site where dominant discourses, subjugated discourses, voices hitherto silenced or excluded..., forms of coercion and control as well as concerted forms of resistance are able to be worked through in relation to each other. It is a threshold for the intervention of theories within concrete practices, and the restructuring of theory by imperatives of experience and practice, a kind of hinge doorway between the two domains. In aiming at a destruction of misogynistic theory and its fundamental assumptions and at establishing a positive influence on day-to-day and structural interactions between the sexes, it is neither a prelude to practice, nor a reflection on practice because it is already a form of practice within a specific region of patriarchy's operations.

_Elizabeth Gross, "...What is Feminist Theory?"_
The above quotes help focus the concern with the interplays of theory and practice which has been central to this investigation of ecofeminism as discourse. Both Deleuze and Gross conceive of theory and practice as inter-related domains. Deleuze describes the relationship as a "system of relays" where theory and practice permeate one another, shaping knowledge and multiplying sites of resistance against dominant power relations. Gross describes the relationship from the point of view of feminist theory: a specific region intervening in 'patriarchy's operations' as "theoretical practice" and "practical theory". Neither of them sets up a dichotomous conception of the two domains that allots one domain causal determinancy over the other.

Both writers adopt Foucault's notion of theory as strategy, a strategy which avoids a conflation of theory with 'Truth'. Theory, in this context, is conceived as one form of power/knowledge relations that can exist alongside and within liberatory struggles; it need not be solely "illumination from a safe distance" (Foucault, 1977:208). Particular relationships between theory and practice are determined by the specific locality and region of power/knowledge relations. Together, the notions of power/knowledge relations and discursive formation/discursive practices can enable an analysis of ecofeminism's entry into the academy in terms of movements between different sites of struggle rather than a move from practice to theory. It seems the notion of a discursive formation (and the discursive practices arising from this) serves as a more useful category than 'theory' for examining the interconnectedness between the "multiplicity of parts" of a liberation movement that is "both theoretical and practical". To conclude then, this chapter reflects upon the enabling features of Foucault's methodological tools to
further the growth of ecofeminism in its "system of relays" of theory and practice.

ECOFEMINISM AND POSSIBLE DISCURSIVE ALLIES
The concept of discursive formations stresses observing a discursive field by juxtaposing it with other discursive fields, bringing its intertextual relations to the foreground. The effect of such a gesture expands the boundaries of a knowledge's circulation instead of confining them. In this thesis, ecofeminism has been juxtaposed to feminist critiques of science and philosophy. As a discipline with a higher "epistemological profile" and greater legitimacy in the academy, feminist critiques of science and philosophy serves as a discursive ally, as well as a critical informant, to ecofeminism in this site of power/knowledge. By adopting this same principle of juxtaposition, ecofeminist alliances may be extended to other contexts of power/knowledge relations with other discursive fields. Some of these connections are outlined in the following paragraphs.

Ecofeminism and Deep Ecology
Within the academy, ecofeminism has recently formed a dialogue with Deep Ecology. The relationship between these two fields, however, is not always expressed in terms of co–operative alliance. In particular, the journal Environmental Ethics seems to have provided a forum of academic controversy pertaining to what has come to be known as the "Ecofeminism–Deep Ecology Debate". This debate concerns a third party – reform environmentalists–whom deep ecologists have charged with an anthropocentric bias, and the development of insufficient models for relating with the non–human world (Zimmerman,1987). On the other hand, there are ecofeminists who claim that deep–ecologists fail to acknowledge
these biases as androcentric rather than anthropocentric (Salleh, 1984). It seems that the ecofeminism–deep ecology debate centres on whether or not environmental reformists are anthropocentric or androcentric (see also Cheney [1987] Fox,[1989]). Commentators, such as Hallen, (1990) and Zimmerman (1987) have argued that the two camps can mutually inform one another in critical dialogue.

The concerns emerging from such dialogues raise questions pertaining to the construction of a new metaphysics and ethic for relating to nature and other human beings. Such metaphysical questions have not been raised in this thesis as I have used Foucauldian methodological tools to explore the possibilities for the discursive expansion of ecofeminism; my aim has not been to to develop an ecofeminist metaphysics. However, issues raised when claiming a distinctive space for the articulation of ecofeminist knowledges (such as androcentric biases in discourse) can be extended to this arena of debate. Furthermore, the development of new metaphysical positions is one site in which ecofeminists can, and do, engage to develop enabling strategies that aim to counter oppressions and planetary destruction.

Ecofeminism and Jungian Psychology

Another discursive field sharing intertextual relations with ecofeminism can be found amongst the literature of Jungian Psychology. This discursive field circulates through academia as well as sites outside the academy, such as therapy and spirituality groups. Of particular interest to some ecofeminist discursive practices are Jungian conceptions of the feminine principle and masculine principle. As cited in Chapter Four, Leland (1983) evokes the 'feminine principle' as "the motivating force behind feminism". While I disagree with Leland's contention (on the basis that there are
anthology, *Healing the Wounds: The Promise of Ecofeminism* edited by Plant (1989). Setting themselves against the dualistic, hierarchical nature of patriarchal theology, feminist theologians and spiritualists propose an earth-based spirituality that values interconnectedness and diversity of all life forms. Spirit and matter, mind and body, the physical and non-physical are perceived as interwoven parts of one living organism, earth. Such views stress the need for people, as a part of this living organism, to develop a sense of connectedness with other living organisms in order to build new communities that can strive for ecological restoration as well as for personal empowerment. Like other discursive fields considered here, feminist theology and spirituality are by no means coherent. Proponents of these views range from writers such as Mary Daly (1984), whose allies must be women "journeymen" who share her spiritual enterprise (Morris, [1988] offers an excellent critique of Daly's views), to Rosemary Radford Reuther who draws on liberation theology to construct a more general feminist theological approach for people opposing patriarchal forms of domination and alienation.

**Ecofeminism and Science Fiction**

Feminist science fiction is not only a discursive field that circulates for the purposes of leisurely activity, but has been acclaimed by academic writers such as Donna Haraway (1985: 99) for offering "different political possibilibites and limits" to explore power relations between genders as well as examining different power effects of science and technology. The genre of science fiction has offered one avenue for many feminists to explore our imaginations in order to create a different world; many concur with the visions and concerns of ecofeminist writers (see Pearson, [1981]; Day [1982]; Lefanu [1988] and Kaveney [1989]). For instance, Marge Piercy's,
Women On The Edge of Time juxtaposes the life of one woman, Connie, in contemporary society with her journey to a place in the future, Mattapoissett. Mattapoissett is constructed as a place of ecological harmony and gender equality. This is not the only possible future, however. At one point Connie finds herself in a different future society where humans, as commodities, are awarded more worth the closer they resemble machinery. Such grim prospects of a future motivates Connie toward wanting control of her life so she that she is active in shaping the direction of a future world. This is a brief summary of one story that invites readers to think about possible directions for shaping our future. As Haraway asserts in her Cyborg Manifest, we can be responsible for our interactions with science and technology rather than seeing them as entities that "dominate and threaten us". Feminist science fiction is one genre which explores these possibilities; a genre that Haraway (1990: 15) embraces to situate her recent publication, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science.

Ecofeminism and the Peace and Anti-Nuclear Movements
The ties between ecofeminism and the peace and anti-nuclear movements overlap considerably. Though archival documents from the peace and anti-nuclear movements have been used in this thesis, little has been said about the structures for organising as groups and the sharing of information. Such structures are rarely discussed in the academic arena as much of this information is undocumented. However, there are some anthologies and handbooks which document personal anecdotes of particular actions, and reproduce various archives that can be used to explore ways for organising liberatory movements (See McAllister, [1982]; Cambridge Women's Peace Collective, [1984]; Jones, [1983] and Koen and Swaim [1980]). Amongst these collections are suggestions for organising
direct actions and forming groups and networks for community-based action. For example, many feminist activists have pointed out that challenging hierarchical thinking involves challenging hierarchical ways of organising. Such challenges have emerged through the implementation of 'collective' structures and 'consensus decision making processes' in community groups. In brief, collectivity aims to organise in a non-hierarchical fashion by valuing all members of a group with equal worth. People contribute to the best of their abilities while sharing and rotating tasks to be carried out. Consensus decision making involves a process of arriving at a position when all members of a group agree to it, rather than relying on a majority vote. These structures and processes are explained with more detail in King (1981b) and Starhawk (1982). The value of documenting archives from such groups is that people wanting to form their own community groups can find models to work from.

The fields of deep ecology, Jungian psychology, feminist theology and spirituality, feminist science fiction and the peace and anti-nuclear movements have briefly been discussed to illustrate possibilities for voicing ecofeminist liberatory politics through their intertextual relations with these discursive fields. Such fields mark areas for further study in the treatment of ecofeminism as a discursive formation, where each field may be perceived as a potential area for critical dialogue with ecofeminism. Rather than granting any one of these sites epistemological or political superiority to ecofeminism, or one another, they can be described as allies exploring different questions concerning strategies for survival.
THE ACADEMY: POSSIBILITIES FOR THE ESPOUSAL OF ECOFEMINISM

Having approached ecofeminism through various fragments of its discursive formation, it is time to return to the question of how the institutional practices of the academy may help or hinder the espousal of this liberation movement. The question itself poses contradictions. That is, the question is situated in the academy and has been explored through methodological tools established in the academy. The keyhole for viewing ecofeminism is thus immersed in the matter it wishes to observe, in many ways presupposing the academy as a site to espouse emancipatory politics. This does not necessarily render the question redundant, however. It simply means that the constraining features of academic institutional practices have been made manifest by a different set of academic institutional practices: the methodological tools explicated by Foucault and, on a more implicit level, Haraway.

It seems that the treatment of ecofeminism as a discursive formation allows a method of criticism that does not measure it by its conformity to the rules and procedures governing the more legitimated discourses of science and philosophy in the academy. The archaeological method has been used to observe some of the constraining features imposed upon a discourse when it enters the academy, while the genealogical method has been used as a tactic to resurrect some of the knowledges that get subjugated in this process.

This exploration of ecofeminism has deployed these methodological tools in order to find ways that people may participate in a liberation movement without assuming a politically correct line or universal subject position. In a more personal context, my impetus has been
to see if, and where, I could find a place, both in grass roots movements and in the academy, for this Anglo-Indian, lesbian and feminist to speak for a liberatory politics.

It seems that the act of speaking so as to avoid (or at least attempt an avoidance of) a monolithic politic and a totalising epistemology requires some qualification. As both Foucault and Haraway assert, no reading [or writing for that matter] is innocent. The choice in questions asked, choice of methodological tools and choice in materials reflect my vested interest in finding a distinctive space for feminists to participate in environmental politics and academic enquiry. To evoke Haraway's concept of "situated knowledges", the act of speaking is also qualified by a recognition that my views can only be partial and incomplete. I do not want to be guilty of the "god trick", the trick of "... being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere equally" (Haraway, 1989:584) By using Foucault's and Haraway's methodologies, a politics of location and locatability in our construction of knowledges is possible. This enables me to acknowledge that, as my perspective is always limited, I cannot assume a speaking position for others, nor assert that the knowledge claims I make are suited to all circumstances and contexts. However, locating my knowledge claims for specific purposes allows my limited perspective to enter into dialogues where meanings are contested whilst being responsible for the meanings I assert. The struggle over meaning is a struggle over what counts as truth and what consequences follow these truths. And where these truths have oppressive, destructive and exclusionary consequences, I share the ecofeminist conviction propagated by the Women's Pentagon Action, that "we are right to be afraid". Such a fear, however, need not lead to political paralysis; it may form part of the motivation for increasing communication, thought and action.
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