THE BUREAUCRATISATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN INDONESIA

by

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Policy statements on rural development in New Order Indonesia devote considerable attention to engaging the participation of the rural population. To some extent this rhetorical posturing reflects a recognition of the central government's real dependence on local organisation in the realisation of its political and economic agenda. The policy outlines for Repelita IV and V state that the greatest attention must be given to furthering rural development by increasing the participation (partisipasi masyarakat), preparedness (prakarsa) and self-reliance (swadaya) of village society (GBHN 1983:56; 1988:56-57). The Department of Home Affairs proclaims the desa (village) the "bulwark...for implementing Pancasila," "the site for guiding and increasing the spirit of gotong royong" and the "pillar of public participation in all facets of government, development and society" (Depdagri 1986b:2). The emphasis on popular participation and local self-reliance in economic development does not extend to the political sphere, however.

The rhetoric of participation is contradicted by ingrained assumptions regarding the limited capacities of a traditionally oriented rural populace to deal with modern social change and by the higher priority given to insuring central government hegemony in all aspects of the political process. These instrumental priorities and paternalistic perceptions are reflected in central government policies on the bureaucratisation of village-level government throughout Indonesia. Through the 1979 Village Government Law (Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No.5 Tahun 1979 tentang Pemerintahan Desa - henceforth UU 5/79)1 and subsequent ministerial regulations over the last decade a thoroughgoing reorganisation has been undertaken, coopting local government in the name of more efficient development.

This paper considers the internal contradictions in Indonesian state policy toward local government. As a case in point, it focuses on the impact of the 1979 legislation on village institutions in Bali where traditional forms of organisation such as the banjar (hamlet) operating within the administrative village (desa) have proved themselves valuable in engaging precisely the self-help participation which has enhanced the effectiveness and reduced costs to the state of implementing its rural development policies.2
'Re-forming' Local Administration

The 1979 Village Government Law sets out to establish uniform local administrative structures across Indonesia with the stated objectives of increasing the level of public participation in development and the effectiveness of village administration, the weight of emphasis falling heavily on the latter. According to the explanatory notes appended to the legislation, the previously existing heterogeneous situation in which each region had its own style of local organisation constituted an obstacle to the "guidance and intensive direction" necessary to an improved standard of living and to the effective conduct of government (UU 5/1979, penjelasan).3

Some features of the legislation, such as those related to the regularisation of local voting practice, financial accountability, involvement of women and the role of village councils appear at first sight to offer positive reforms to aspects of desa-level administration. Apparently some of these changes were introduced in response to criticism of the fairly monolithic authority structure which developed historically around the position of desa head (lurah) in Java (Zacharias 1979; Breman 1982; Schulte Nordholt 1982; Tjondronegoro 1984).4 Unfortunately, most of the changes, undermined by elitist presuppositions and an overriding concern with drawing the village more firmly into the orbit of state "guidance and control", have had the reverse effect of reinforcing the powers of this position.

The bureaucratisation of local leadership - Under the 1979 law the village head, kepala desa, becomes the sole popularly chosen leader in the local government hierarchy (See Figure 1). The legislation and associated regulations specify in some detail the responsibilities of this office, procedures for election and limits on tenure (UU 5/79, §4-10; Mendagri 6/81). The kepala desa is to hold office for an eight year term and may be reelected for only one additional term. Under normal circumstances at least two candidates must contest elections for village head. In the event of a single nominee, regulations require the provision of an unmarked ballot box to permit voters to reject a sole candidate.5

On the one hand, these provisions should work against the monopolization of local office. In a number of instances where individuals had dominated local government for decades, regulations limiting office holding provided the opportunity to replace them and in some communities to alter the local balance of power. On the other hand, supra-village scrutiny of candidates at kecamatan (district) and kabupaten (regional) levels during the mandatory 'screening' process severely limits local autonomy in choosing the village head,6 and the powers vested in that position leave little scope for the expression of other political perspectives in the local decision-making process. All other village functionaries are nominated or appointed directly by the kepala desa.
Figure 1 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY UNDER THE VILLAGE GOVERNMENT LAW (Undang-Undang No.5 1979)

NOTES: Italics below each administrative body indicate the title of the government official responsible at each level.

* The sub-Dusun units Rukun Warga and Rukun Tetangga were created by a subsequent decree of the Minister of the Home Affairs (Mendagri 7/1983) and are not mentioned in the original law.

More critical for local community organisation, and especially the role of the banjar in Bali, are those provisions of the 1979 law concerning the manner of selection of sub-desa leadership. Under the legislation hamlet heads (formerly klian dinas, now called kepala dusun) are to be appointed by superordinate authorities with indefinite tenure, instead of elected by their banjar for five-year terms of office as was previous practice. From the point of view of public involvement, the hamlet in Bali (that is the banjar dinas, called dusun7 under the new law) is more important than the desa8. Tjondronegoro (1984:236) makes an analogous case for Java.

Despite the policy focus on the desa as the smallest unit of local administration since colonial times, the administrative desa has no direct basis in local organisation. The real foundation of local social and political life in Bali is actually the banjar, where direct popular participation in decision-making through monthly banjar meetings (sangkepan) is a customary feature of local politics. In the post-colonial framework, elected
klian dinas represented banjar interests on village councils. This key representative link to the popularly based banjar units, critical to the effective functioning of the administrative desa, is broken under the 1979 legislation. Heads of dusun are henceforth to be appointed by the camat, a civil-servant who normally comes from outside the district he heads, from nominees submitted by the kepala desa (§16).

The transformation of local government into an arm of the central bureaucracy is more thoroughgoing still among those villages which have their status changed from 'desa' to 'kelurahan'. As defined in the legislation, kelurahan are distinguished from desa by virtue of the fact that they "do not have the right to conduct their own affairs" (UU 5/79, §1). In consequence, kelurahan lose control over their leadership and over financial affairs. While at least the kepala desa as head of government in the desa formation remains an elected official, this does not apply to the kepala kelurahan (lurah) as head of an 'upgraded' village. In the latter structure, officials at both village (kelurahan) and hamlet (in this case called lingkungan) level are to become appointed civil servants who have unlimited tenure of office and whose obligations are entirely to the administrative hierarchy (UU 5/79, §24,31).

Criteria for designation as kelurahan are primarily the degree of relative modernisation of a village and its centrality to the administrative hierarchy. For example, desa in urban areas and those located at the seat of regional or district administration (kabupaten or kecamatan) have been the first to be reclassified. By 1984, of 594 administrative desa in Bali, 79 had their status changed to kelurahan. Balinese regional and provincial officials responsible for implementing the legislation expressed the expectation that eventually kelurahan would become the predominant form of village organisation in Indonesia.

Apparently a thoroughgoing bureaucratisation of local government along the lines of the kelurahan model had been the original intention of the legislation. According to Schulte Nordholt, the Minister of Home Affairs planned to incorporate all village heads within the civil service and eliminate elections (1985:15). Financial considerations dictated against this move and in the final form of the legislation these changes were restricted to a smaller number of centrally located and administratively strategic villages designated as kelurahan.

Desa councils - The structure and role of village councils under the 1979 Village Government Law further reflects the contradictory objectives of central government policy toward popular participation. In place of previously existing village councils, which had been brought under the uniform label of Lembaga Sosial Desa (LSD) by the Ministry of the Home Affairs in 1972 (Inst Mendagri 5/1972), two bodies have been created: the Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa (LKMD - Village Public Security Council) and Lembaga Musyawarah Desa (LMD - Village Consultative Council) (UU 5/79 §17; Mendagri 27/1984; Depdagri 1986a,1986b).
The LKMD, a predominantly elected council operating in both desa and kelurahan, is intended to provide the main organ for public participation in development. In replacing the previously established Lembaga Sosial Desa (LSD Village Social Council), its allegedly expanded role is to "activate public participation to carry out development in a coordinated way whether it originates from various government activities or through community self-help initiatives (swadaya gotong royong masyarakat)" (Mendagri 27/1984, §2-3). The kepala desa/kelurahan is ex-officio head (ketua umum), assisted by a 'prominent villager' (pemuka) as First Officer (ketua I) and by the head of the women's organisation, the PKK (specified as the wife of the kepala desa) as Second Officer (ketua II - See Figure 2). Members of the LKMD are to be nominated through public deliberations in each dusun or lingkungan and elected at a public meeting of the desa/kelurahan. They are confirmed for a period of service of five years by the bupati via the kepala desa/kelurahan and camat and are responsible to the village head (§6-8).

Figure 2

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE - LKMD

KETUA UMUM

KETUA I

KETUA II

SECRETARY

TREASURER

COORDINATION RESPONSIBILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KETUA UMUM</th>
<th>KETUA I</th>
<th>KETUA II</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Religion</td>
<td>5. Environment</td>
<td>10. PKK</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Education &amp; Information</td>
<td>8. Youth Sport &amp; Art</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9. Social Welfare</td>
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Source: Attachment to Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Nov. 27, 1984

The LMD, The Village Consultative Council, which does not exist in villages designated as kelurahan, is charged with "realising Pancasila Democracy in local government" and "conveying the aspirations of the village public" (UU 5/79, §17, notes; Mendagri 2/1981; Depdagri 1986b:29). It
has the authority to deliberate on and approve all decisions (keputusan desa) of the kepala desa, to constitute the Electoral Committee for nominating candidates and conducting the election of kepala desa, and to advise the kepala desa concerning the nomination of candidates for desa secretary and kepala dusun (Mendagri 2/1981; Depdagri 1986b:10). The LMD is required to meet at least once a year to receive the report of the kepala desa, and to approve keputusan desa, including the budget (APPKD). The head of the LMD (as of the LKMD) is also the kepala desa and its membership is to be comprised of an equal number of kepala dusun, leaders of important local social institutions and prominent villagers (UU 5/79, §17).

Given that the LMD is supposed to realise 'democracy' in local government, it is more than ironic that aside from the kepala desa, its members are not elected and have indefinite terms of appointment. It is the kepala desa who nominates the members of the LMD in consultation with 'prominent persons' in the village (UU 5/1979, §17). Since the kepala desa appoints the LMD and is in turn nominated by it (Depdagri 1986a:10), the two are clearly not intended to be independent representatives of the public interest. In one of its publications on the new law, the provincial Bureau responsible for local government points out that the LMD is structured explicitly to prevent it from becoming a forum of opposition: "In order to protect the authority (kewibawaan) of Desa Government and in order that this body not be used as a forum oposisi, the head of the aforementioned Lembaga Musyawarah Desa will be the kepala desa ex-officio...." (Biro Bina 1984/85:13). Furthermore, the LMD operates under the surveillance of the camat who is to attend all of its deliberations as pengarah - literally, 'director' (Depdagri 1986b:41).

Understandably, no little confusion exists at local level over the differences in functions of the two councils and the relation of the whole apparatus to the wider public it is supposed to involve. Theoretically, engaging public participation is the purpose of the LKMD. It must be consulted on the desa budget (APPKD) and on decisions (keputusan desa) related to development, but it has no powers. The LMD has formal powers in village government, but is not popularly constituted. The only mention of direct public participation in the form of village meetings (rapat desa) occurs in vague references to a role in the election of members of the LKMD (Kep Mendagri 27/1984) and public discussion of the proposed annual budget (Depdagri 1986b: 39).

Neither the LKMD nor the LMD constitutes a check on the exercise of authority by the kepala desa. In contrast with the intent, structure and functioning of village councils which had been established spontaneously in many communities after the Indonesian revolution, the role envisaged in the legislation for the LMD and LKMD that replaces them can only be regarded as regressive. The desa council established in Desa Tarian, one of the villages of my research, was originally formed in the 1950s with the explicit objective of balancing the administrative powers of the village head with those of a representative decision-making body. The klian banjar and
additional proportionally elected representatives from each banjar in Tarian formed the *Dewan Desa*. In the first years of its existence, meetings of the Dewan Desa rotated among banjar in order to familiarise the population with its workings. Important proposals were forwarded to monthly banjar meetings for discussion before action was taken at desa level. In practice, the pivotal role of banjar assemblies in securing public involvement in local government and of banjar leaders as the key representatives on the desa council prevailed, despite many of the subsequent changes imposed on village administration. When the Dewan Desa was renamed the *Lembaga Sosial Desa* as a result of the government's earliest efforts to systematise village councils (Keppres 81/71; Inst Mendagri 5/72), its composition and operations remained unchanged.

According to Schulte Nordholt, the Democratic Party of Indonesia (PDI) voted against the provisions of the 1979 legislation related to village councils, foreseeing that the structure and division of functions between the two bodies would eliminate whatever independent voice had been centred previously on the single village council, the LSD (1985:15). Schulte Nordholt's study documents the changes in the role and function of the original LSD, initially promoted by the Department of Social Affairs as a mechanism for encouraging autonomous local action in community development. The conversion of village councils into instruments of 'top-down' administration began with the increasing involvement of the Department of Home Affairs in village administration after 1965. Home Affairs was much more concerned with asserting central control in the interests of its administrative priorities than the Department of Social Affairs had been. It increased its influence over local councils during the 1970s through the introduction of desa subsidies and competitions. The process was sealed with the full transfer of control over desa administration from the Department of Social Affairs to the Ministry of Home Affairs (see Keppres 81/71) which now has sole authority to implement the 1979 law.

**The participation of women** - The importance of women's participation in national development is specifically dealt with in Home Affairs Ministerial Decrees concerning the new structure of desa councils and the role of the official women's organisation, the PKK (*Pembinaan Kesajahteraan Keluarga* - the *Family Welfare Association*), in them. Here, once again, rhetoric and practice find themselves at odds. While the preamble to the ministerial decree on the PKK notes the necessity for participation of "all the people" for the success of national development and points to the role of women through the PKK as the "motivating force" behind the development of society "growing from below" (Kep Mendagri 28/1984), the most striking feature of the 1984 directive is the explicitly dependent and unrepresentative character of women's participation. At every level of the organisation from national down to local bodies, the head of the PKK is specified as the wife of the relevant government official (Kep Mendagri 28/1984,§9-13). The entire membership of the village-level PKK Action Team (*Tim Penggerak*), which has at its disposal a proportion of the budget
for projects related to women, is appointed by the village head, the kepala desa/kelurahan (§16). The explicit function of local PKK units, according to the government's own official statements, remains a passive one of transmitting government directives and promoting state ideology to the mass of ordinary women (Sullivan 1983:160).

The vision of women's role in Indonesian development which has characterised the PKK from its inception exhibits the classic model of domestication and dependency. It assumes a subordinate political and economic position in the household and promotes an ideology of the family and women's role in it (as wife, mother, housekeeper and prime socialiser) which is more compatible with the state's interest in social control than with its stated economic objectives of expanded production and improved living standards. Women's participation in development projects as conceived in policy-making circles is usually confined to those areas which revolve around housework and child-care - nutrition, health, family planning, etc. - while ignoring women's productive needs and political invisibility. Hull remarks that the order of the five major 'duties' promulgated by the PKK tellingly places the Indonesian woman's role as 'citizen' last, after those of 'producer' and 'socialiser' of the nation's next generation, 'husband's companion', and 'household manager' (1976:21-22).

If the activities of the PKK serve women's interests at all, it is primarily those of middle-class women who benefit from bureaucratic state policy through their husbands' positions. Sullivan observed very different patterns in PKK meetings at local and district levels which she suggests reflect the great distance between rural needs and the bureaucratic class interests that PKK ideology and practice actually serve. Financial transactions, informal politicking and socialising dominated the urban kampung level gatherings she observed at the expense of the official part of the meetings which "passed quickly" and "largely unnoticed" (1983:162). At district level meetings, on the other hand, official PKK business dominated. I found Sullivan's discussion of ward meetings in the Jogjakarta kampung she studied typical of banjar-level PKK activities in Tarian. On the whole they were not well attended except when they were used to organise rotating credit funds (arisan).

Although Balinese women are very active in economic affairs outside the home, their lack of direct involvement in traditional local political organisation is notable, and there is considerable scope for improving their participation at banjar and desa level. The patrilineal and patrilocal social structure of Bali compounded by the central government's focus on the male head of household (kepala keluarga - kk) in all official matters have the practical effect of excluding women from formal involvement in political affairs at hamlet and village level. Lack of direct voice at banjar meetings should not be construed to mean that women have no influence on banjar practice, of course. Informal networks are an extremely important part of decision-making processes. The
acclaimed success of the family planning program through 'Sistim Banjar' appears less of a paradox than at first sight when the importance of family, work group (seka) and other informal information networks within the banjar are taken account of. Still, as the heavy stress on women's responsibilities for contraception would indicate, women's interests are likely to be served through these structures only so long as they do not conflict with those of men.

The lack of genuine representation within the new village government framework thwarts any possibility that the PKK might become a forum for expressing the particular concerns of village women in the public sphere or for asserting women's claims with respect to local development strategies. The wife of the desa head, as the one prescribed agent concerned with women's affairs on the village council, could not be expected to question the orientation of local programs publicly. Informal pressures are even less likely to be forthcoming or effective if the village is a kelurahan and the village head himself is not an elected, and possibly not even a local, figure.

The cumulative effect is to place women at the bottom of both a bureaucratic and a gender-based hierarchy. Their purported role as 'motor force' under the new legislation gives them no more opportunity for taking initiative than they had previously, and in some respects less. In Desa Tarian, with the reorganisation of the LKMD that followed the 1984 Decree of the Home Affairs Ministry, the two women who had been chosen to sit on the council because of their personal qualities and experience as a teacher and public health nurse were replaced in the new formal structure by the gentry wife of the village head who had no active involvement in the PKK previously. The comparative weakness of PKK programs in my observation can be attributed to both the lack of a customary foundation for separate women's organisations in Bali and the general irrelevance and hierarchical structure of the modern PKK organisation which alleges to fill this vacuum. The form of 'special emphasis' on women reflected in the present reorganisation of village government, only exacerbates their political alienation.

Implementation in Bali

The establishment of a separate bureau within the office of the Governor of Bali, the Biro Bina Pemerintahan Desa, specifically to oversee the introduction of the Village Government Law, and the production of a series of publications on its implementation in the province (Biro Bina 1984a,b,c,d;1984/85) indicate the significance which must be attached to it. Nevertheless, a decade after its introduction, the full impact of the 1979 Law has yet to be felt. Restructuring has been very slow and cushioned by informal concessions to customary practice.

One reason for the limited implementation of the provisions of the new law has been the cost of increasing the number of civil servants on the
national payroll. A letter from the Minister of Home Affairs to Provincial Governors (11/1/84) indicates that kepala lingkungan have not been officially instated to the civil service because there is no budget to cover their salaries. For the same reason, despite the expectation that bureaucratised kelurahan would increasingly replace administrative desa, no further reclassifications have taken place in Bali since 1984. Nor have the necessary funds been provided for kelurahan budgets, leaving them to cover their own costs despite the fact that under the Village Government Law they have no authority to do so. The provincial government is also treading softly because of the recognised sensitivity of the law's provisions regarding local leadership. A district official charged with introducing the new system, said he had avoided the disruption experienced elsewhere by beginning with villages that had been least politically active in the past and making adjustments in methods as he moved to those that were more likely to put up resistance. The first stages of restructuring were introduced piecemeal in one village after another, where possible using village competitions (lomba desa) as the main vehicle for putting in place the provisions of the legislation. In Desa Tarian klian banjar were installed as kepala dusun only in 1984.

Provincial authorities informally apply 'discretion' (kebijaksanaan) in implementation procedures, muting the impact of the most serious changes. In most cases, where desa have become kelurahan, the status of lurah was simply conferred upon incumbent elected officials. With respect to the appointment of kepala dusun as administrative heads of banjar, kepala desa are advised by provincial authorities in Bali to consult banjar before nominating the requisite minimum two candidates to the camat. Effectively, the traditional election procedures continue, with the name of the banjar-chosen leader and one of his assistants presented to the camat in ranked order. The head of the Bureau established to implement the new law in Bali explained that this informal modification was necessary since "there is no doubt that a banjar official appointed without the support of the membership would be completely useless", an argument reiterated by numerous local leaders I interviewed.

Despite the bijaksana policy, a number of officials admitted that there have been instances where camat had rejected banjar-elected candidates and insisted on appointments in accord with other criteria of suitability. One camat stated that he had several times failed the first-ranked banjar candidate, on one occasion turning back both nominees and requesting a new slate. Above and beyond the officially prescribed test of the candidates' knowledge of national programmes and philosophy - Pancasila, Undang Undang Dasar 1945, the Broad Outline for State Policy 1983 (GBHN), and the Work Program of the Fourth Development Plan - his own selection criteria included factors such as whether the candidate had a deformity or appeared nervous during screening. Such personal characteristics would detract from the image of authority he thought appropriate to government office.
The new legislation gives district and regional officials a degree of involvement in banjar affairs which had never existed before. Neither the camat nor the perbekel previously had a role in the selection, approval or installation of banjar heads. The camat cited above complained that before implementation of the new law, changes in banjar leadership were often not even reported to him. In the case of Tarian, all klian who were proposed by their respective banjar were in fact appointed kepala dusun. But the mere knowledge that selection must be confirmed by higher authorities inevitably introduces new considerations into the process of choosing local leaders.

The regulations stipulate lower secondary education as a minimum qualification for appointment to the position of kepala dusun (as well as village-level offices of secretary and division heads, kepala urusan). Since only 14% of Indonesia’s adult population have been educated to this level (Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia 1986), rigid educational requirements would seriously limit the potential pool of local leaders, and certainly their class base. Most banjar heads have only primary schooling. This is the case in Desa Tarian, where only two of the ten klian banjar have secondary qualifications. Although the clause "or equivalent experience" in the legislation provides sufficient flexibility, the emphasis on formal qualifications provides a convenient rationale for the rejection of some nominees when supra-village authorities are so inclined.

Bijaksana (discretion) was also applied in the process of restructuring desa councils. Regulations regarding the composition and size of the LMD (maximum of 15) would have precluded the membership of a proportion of kepala dusun/banjar in large villages, leaving some banjar with no voice at all on the LMD. Appointive procedures established by the law notwithstanding, kepala dusun continue to be elected in Bali and are expected by their constituencies to represent banjar interests. Given the extent of the administrative desa’s dependence on component banjar for its operations, the exclusion of banjar leaders from any formal decision-making body at desa level would undoubtedly cut off communication and abort the one working relationship which has proved capable of making village administration effective and representative. Concern over this issue precipitated correspondence between the Governor of Bali and the Department of Home Affairs. In response to the Governor’s letter indicating the problem posed by the exclusion of some banjar heads, however, the Department of Home Affairs directive simply reaffirmed the prescribed formula and obliquely advised ‘selectivity’ in filling the positions (Biro Bina 1984c: 68-79).

If the requirement to assure a balance among the three categories of “kepala dusun, leaders of local social organisations and other prominent figures” in the appointment of LMD membership had been rigidly adhered to in Tarian, only half of the ten heads of dusun/banjar could theoretically have been included. This problem, compounded by another ministerial directive (Mendagri 27/84) reducing the total number of LKMD members who had
already been elected by their respective banjar, caused considerable difficulties. The newest regulations precipitated lengthy discussions at a 1984 council meeting in an effort to work out some compromise between local principle and official prescription. It was finally decided that all of the klian banjar would remain on the LMD, taking up ten of its fifteen places. Because of overlapping adat and dinas roles of klian banjar in Tarian, they could technically qualify as appointees under either of the other two categories, thereby remaining within the letter of the law. Recently elected council members who were in excess of the now prescribed number of positions on the LMD were coopted informally to one of its subcommittees or to the LKMD.

Modifications to comply with local traditions of representation were rationalised once again by the judicious application of bijaksana. In practice, the klian banjar remain the core representative group in Tarian, handling village affairs at weekly meetings with the kepala desa and village secretary. Important matters and long-term planning are given a public airing at banjar meetings and subsequently by the desa councils. There is little but formal distinction between LMD and LKMD which meet as a single unit, although decisions are occasionally recorded as if separately concluded to comply with structural formalities. Since the LMD and LKMD continue to operate for all intents and purposes as a single village council and popularly chosen klian banjar/kepala dusun are still fully represented, the legislation to date has in most respects not radically altered the internal workings of village administration in Tarian.

Discretionary adjustments are rationalised on the very reasonable grounds that the local formula for village representation is simpler and more democratic than the new one. How successful the strategy of modified compliance will be depends very much on the sensitivity of intermediate levels of government. Discretion is of course an amorphous commodity in politics, and may be used to different ends depending on the balance of power in particular situations. For some officials bijaksana justified informal modifications important to insuring the continuity of what they also regarded as more democratic and effective local practices. In 1989 an official circular from the bupati of Gianyar to desa in his regency advised the continued practice of 5 yearly elections for kepala dusun/ klian banjar, while retaining the outward form of the appointment system stipulated by law. In other contexts bijaksana was simply a temporary instrumental strategy. The camat referred to above, also remarked, "At the moment, because of possible problems we are not concerned to push the letter of the law. This is a 'transisi'. Later we can tighten up".

The Impact of Reorganisation - Sanur

In many parts of Bali, discretionary practices have limited the impact of reorganisation on local government to date and muted the effects of the central government's bureaucratisation policies. Such accommodation
proved short-lived, however, in the village of Sanur which was more acutely affected than most villages because it experienced both sub-division and 'upgrading' to kelurahan status. The case of Desa Sanur is particularly interesting since this village represents something of a model example of self-help community development, having initiated an extraordinary program of local public investment in the late 1960s. Over several decades Sanur's leaders built up an impressive range of village owned industries including a bank, several restaurants and a motor repair shop which eventually employed several hundred villagers and subsidised educational, health and other public facilities in the desa.

Since the colonial period Desa Sanur had been a single administrative unit. With the introduction of the Village Government Law in 1979, it was divided into three separate administrative villages, one of which was officially designated a kelurahan, while the other two became independent desa. This administrative sub-division appears not to have changed the practical functioning of Sanur's development program in the first years following promulgation of the new law. The status quo prevailed largely because the village head since 1959, and one of the pioneers of the desa's self-help projects, Ida Bagus Beratha, became the head of the new kelurahan of Sanur in line with the provincial policy of discretionary appointment of incumbents. Beratha was able to keep intact the organisational structure Sanur had established for managing its affairs until his death in 1986.

Several aspects of the restructuring and "loss of control over its own affairs" as a kelurahan posed serious problems for the village development program which Sanur had built up over two decades. First of all, kelurahan no longer being autonomous villages lose their fiscal independence. They are meant primarily to administer development projects as directed from higher levels of government. The complicated question of whether a non-autonomous village could or could not 'own' an enterprise in the name of its members is circumvented to some extent in Sanur's case by the existence of the registered Desa Development Foundation (Yayasan), operating under the direction of the desa council, which acts as the holding body for commonly owned village industries. Opinions among provincial and regional officials differed on whether the loss of fiscal independence would technically preclude such village based enterprises. Beratha believed that under the present circumstances it would have been much more difficult for Sanur to get its development program off the ground. The Head of the Biro Bina Pemerintahan Desa agreed that what Sanur had undertaken in the 1960s would theoretically be outside its jurisdiction as a kelurahan, since among other things, it has lost its right to raise public funds. But because to date no subsidies for the administration of kelurahan have been forthcoming, the Bureau necessarily turns a blind eye to fund-raising by kelurahan.

Secondly, when the core village of Sanur became a kelurahan, its members lost the right to elect all local officials. Beratha, as previously elected head of the desa, had simply been appointed kepala kelurahan when the law was
put into effect in Sanur. What happened following his death in 1986, however, gives some indication that the 'bijaksana' policy of discretionary concession to public opinion will give way over time to increasingly more direct exercise of control by upper levels of the bureaucracy. During the following year the Sanur village council proposed a string of nominees, who were one after another rejected by provincial authorities without explanation. A local leader and early collaborator in establishing the village projects commented:

According to the law the kepala kelurahan is appointed from above. But there should be discretion. ... Because a principle of development is that it must be by and for the people.... Don't go giving something to people that they don't want. That isn't good and conflicts with religious law. We made overtures both formally and informally. We had to provide reasons for every name we put up, but from the government we never received a reason for their rejections. (recorded interview 1987)

In April 1987 a naval officer who had spent the last ten years away from his home village on assignment in Java, was seconded from the armed forces and appointed to fill the position left vacant by Beratha's death.22

Finally, restructuring threatens to undermine the successful working relationship between the banjar and village level administration in Sanur which had developed over two decades. Sanur had founded its own Desa Council in 1963. The later introduction of Lembaga Sosial Desa (LSD) as village councils in 1973 (Inst Mendagri 5/72) throughout Indonesia involved no serious adjustments, "having no more effect than a change of name" (Sanur LKMD 1982:2). But later changes were to alter significantly the machinery Sanur had established for managing its industries and its capacity to maintain some degree of public control over local development. Elected banjar and desa officials had played key roles in building public confidence and getting Sanur's village-owned industries off the ground. The desa council (BPD, later LSD, now LKMD), comprised mainly of klian dinas representing each banjar, had served as guardians of the public interest.

Like Tarian, Sanur attempted to retain a more broadly based and representative composition on its Desa Council. For several years after subdivision into three villages, a single council continued to operate covering the three administrative desa and including all banjar heads.23 In its report, published by the provincial government's Directorate of Village Development for emulation by other villages, Sanur noted that it had not fully succeeded in accommodating ministerial directives with respect to the desa council: "The organisational structure of the LKMD Sanur is not precisely the same as that stipulated in Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 225 Tahun 1980, but differs somewhat according to the history of its local institutions" (Sanur 1982:13,30).
As well as the division which took place at village level, fifteen new geographically rationalised subvillage units (dusun in the two desa, lingkungan in the kelurahan) were supposed to replace the twenty-four banjar dinas which had corresponded to the traditional banjar adat. This caused considerable resistance because, as Beratha said, "these ties are so deeply connected to traditional beliefs" (recorded interview 1984). The loss of the banjar as the base to Sanur's administrative structure would cripple it. Public confidence rested on its role in vetting the distribution of employment opportunities and of budgetary allocations. "We had to register a protest, because with Keputusan [Mendagri] Number 17, 1984 we saw that there was no klian [banjar] dinas. Without the klian dinas there would be nobody to examine records, no advisory group" (recorded interview 1984). Restructured lingkungan existed only on paper until Beratha's death, when Sanur began to experience greater pressure to put into effect a full reorganisation. Reflecting continued resistance, another village leader remarked,

The implementation of this regulation is not yet 100%, not even 50%...There has yet to be cooperation. Excuse me if I speak rather negatively, I think there must be negotiation....I was on one occasion interrogated by a government official, 'Why had we postponed establishing the lingkungan boundaries?' 'Yes, of course,' I said, 'but how is it to be done? It's easy enough to play at putting lines on a piece of paper!' (recorded interview 1987)

The future of the village industries and the direction of local development in Sanur, matters of deep concern in that community, depend ultimately upon the character of local leadership and the level of public involvement it is able to maintain. These experiences of local government 'reform' in a village regarded by provincial authorities as a model for self-help development initiatives do not augur well for the direction in which bureaucratisation policies will take other communities in Bali.

Misplaced Priorities

The 1979 Village Government Law is predicated on the assumption that the desa is the basic unit of local government, whereas in Bali the level of local organisation which involves direct public participation is in fact the banjar.24 Village government and development programs in both Tarian and Sanur depended on component banjar for their effectiveness. The cooption of banjar leadership is in practical terms most serious because the banjar does approximate a natural community and because there is no established convention of choosing leaders from the traditional elite as is frequently the case at desa level.25

Although informal discretionary concessions to customary practice continue to prevail, banjar are inevitably constrained to take account of official policies regarding formal qualifications of age, education and
political orientation at the expense of ideal notions of banjar leadership which place much greater emphasis on personal qualities of honesty and disposition to public service. Furthermore, banjar are no longer at liberty to replace unsatisfactory leadership at will. District and provincial officials tended to see turn-over in banjar leadership as petty and improvident. In the opinion of the head of the Biro Bina Pemerintahan Desa the indefinite term of office still left room for removal when a banjar head did not fulfill stipulated conditions, "but the reason has to be investigated from the bupati's office to be certain it is not merely a personal squabble. They can't just change klian whenever they feel like it anymore, or dump one because they simply don't like him. There has to be order in administration - and it is not very orderly if there is constant turn-over in leadership". In conventional practice, however, testing leadership qualities is necessarily a matter of trial and error and the capacity to replace klian in the face of public disaffection is a crucial part of the diffuse forms of popular control which operate at hamlet level.

An incident which occurred in one banjar not long after the official installation of kepala dusun there illustrates the extent to which the new 'formalities' had begun to influence local political process. On that occasion moves were made by the membership of one dusun/banjar to dismiss their recently installed head as a result of accusations that he had misappropriated a government-granted water pump. At the meeting banjar members challenged his misuse of public office, but were persuaded that control over the position was no longer technically in their hands and that a request for dismissal to district level was unlikely to be well received since his appointment had been made official only a few months before. Other banjar leaders resigned in veiled protest, but the klian was in the end only reprimanded after making a formal apology to the banjar membership. Interestingly, in his defense the offending banjar head argued that as kepala dusun he believed he was responsible only to the government department concerned in administering such grants and therefore had not been obliged to consult the banjar assembly.

The outcome of the case is an indication of the longer term consequences of the cooption of banjar leadership. Appointment by superordinate officials will subvert leaders' perceptions of their obligations toward their constituencies and erode popular support and involvement in decision-making. The conversion of desa to kelurahan, and therefore of all village and hamlet-level leaders to civil servant status, is all the more cause for concern. As well as the substitution of appointment for election (which effectively returns desa administration to the colonial situation) and the security of tenure of civil service positions, the option of installing non-local officials as village or hamlet heads will eliminate even the indirect social pressures which communities may exert over officials of local origin. Since the banjar is the only level of government in Bali which can be said to involve direct public participation, the consequences of ignoring its rights to control over local leaders are self-evident. The Dutch scholar-administrator V.E. Korn's remarks on the consequences of installing
appointed functionaries in the colonial reorganisation of village government in Bali during the early part of this century are not without relevance to the extension of bureaucratisation policies more than a half century later:

It is clear that the independence of the village and banjar administration initially would have received a telling blow. Because what remains after all of the right of the people to be under their own heads, when these are arbitrarily replaced by people with whom one would not ordinarily have any dealing?... Perbekel who replaced bendesa were regarded in the villages as cronies of the government, who did not belong to the village institutions... (1924:229-330).

The more recent addition by ministerial decree (Kep Mendagri 7/1983) of sub-dusun units, Rukun Warga (RW) and Rukun Tetangga (RT), with locally elected leaders may have been intended to ameliorate the effects of the original legislation on grass-roots organisation. But it does so only by further elongating and complicating the channels of communication between village and state. There are now seven levels of administration below that of central government (see Figure 1). The adjustment leaves popular participation too far down the chain to enable active involvement in the political process, with communication cut off by appointed intermediaries at dusun/banjar level.

Official Images and Local Competencies

While reiterating the importance of decentralisation and of encouraging the goals of self-help and participation expressed in the Guidelines for State Policy (GBHN 1983,1988), central government policies in Indonesia continue to reflect paternalistic and condescending attitudes toward village-level organisation and leadership common among urban elites. A Department of Home Affairs paper on rural development in Indonesia complains of "the scarcity of dynamic, creative and fair leadership, inefficient coordination of development, low level quality and quantity of village administrative machinery, lack of capability to plan, weak implementation" (1981:65) which hinder its programs.

The Village Government Law and subsequent regulations were framed with the intent of more efficient direction of local government from the center. Insofar as decentralisation and regionalisation of local development planning have occurred, they are aimed at levels of bureaucracy beyond the village, and within the purview of direct central control. The Department of Home Affairs' focus on a kecamatan-based management system "to maintain the concept of unity of command" (1981:65) is indicative of the limits of decentralisation and participation actually envisaged.

Decentralisation in Indonesia has not involved genuine devolution of authority which as Uphoff et al.(1979) argue must be closely tied to an
elective as opposed to a bureaucratic locus of power if it is to be effective and responsible. "[F]or increasing popular participation, devolution of authority, giving lower echelon elected officials greater power, is more promising than administrative deconcentration. Compared to bureaucrats, elected decision-makers at the regional, district, or sub-district level are much more accessible and more easily held accountable for the choices that affect people's lives" (1979:69).

What deconcentration has taken place in the form of regionalisation policies, it has been paralleled at the same time by a gradual transfer of power from desa to kecamatan. This has been government policy since the founding of the New Order (see Tjondronegoro 1984:89-90). The Home Affairs Ministry favoured kecamatan focused 'decentralisation' because of the convenience of larger, more uniform administrative units and the advantage of dealing with camat, who by virtue of their education and civil servant status were regarded as less inclined to "cling to tradition" than village headmen. Camat tend to be recruited from urban areas and their authority is grounded in the bureaucracy. Officials with a cultural background and structural position so firmly attached to the center, as Tjondronegoro (1984:132-33) has pointed out, could not be expected to represent or defend village interests within the administrative hierarchy.

Despite lip-service to the principle of wider representation of the public in village administration, the new legislation actually formalises the centralisation of authority in the hands of the kepala desa and supra-village officials - the camat and bupati - to whom he is in turn responsible.\footnote{Under the legislation the village secretary, all administrative assistants, kepala dusun and members of the LMD are nominated or appointed directly by the kepala desa (UU 5/1979; Mendagri 8/1981). Predictably these powers of appointment invite abuse. A letter to provincial governors from the Department of Home Affairs indicates that the stipulation that appointees be "able to cooperate with the kepala desa" was mistakenly being interpreted to encourage nepotism. A subsequent directive consequently prohibits the appointment to these positions of any members of the immediate family of the kepala desa (Biro Bina 1984d:118ff). This, of course, does nothing to change the likelihood that vertical linkages of other sorts could enable the total domination of village government by this single elected official.} Not surprisingly, given their composition and marginality, the two desa councils were not found to be taking the 'dynamic' role in rural development envisaged by central government. A manual on the LMD was issued in 1986 because it had become apparent that this council "was not yet functioning as intended...to realise Pancasila Democracy". It expresses particular concern that kepala desa were frequently enacting their own decisions without first consulting the LMD (Depdagri 1986a:4,29). The unexamined assertion that the source of these failures lay in the "very limited capabilities" of local authorities,\footnote{Not surprisingly, given their composition and marginality, the two desa councils were not found to be taking the 'dynamic' role in rural development envisaged by central government. A manual on the LMD was issued in 1986 because it had become apparent that this council "was not yet functioning as intended...to realise Pancasila Democracy". It expresses particular concern that kepala desa were frequently enacting their own decisions without first consulting the LMD (Depdagri 1986a:4,29). The unexamined assertion that the source of these failures lay in the "very limited capabilities" of local authorities, underscores the patronising paternalism at the heart of many aspects of the legislation. The Manual notes the "limited level of knowledge" and "limited capability of members of these councils to understand the legislation" (Depdagri 1986a:4).} underscores the patronising paternalism at the heart of many aspects of the legislation. The Manual notes the "limited level of knowledge" and "limited capability of members of these councils to understand the legislation" (Depdagri 1986a:4).
of the LMD to take in, understand and carry out decisions based on UU #5 1979" (Depdagri 1986a:5). No cognisance is taken of the extent to which these problems arise from basic contradictions in the legislation and ministerial directives themselves.

The lack of checks and balances within the local government system was the subject of incisive comments by the previous head of the village of Sanur:

What is funny about the LMD as a deliberating body under Undang Undang Number 5, I notice, is that its head is the kepala desa. So who is going to exercise control? In my opinion it is clumsy. The secretary to the LMD is also the secretary to the kepala desa - so he is going to oversee his own work! And LMD members aren't likely to take issue with anything when the head of the LMD is the kepala desa himself. As village head, is it possible I will be able to criticise myself? (recorded interview 1984)

Dealing with constant changes in regulations regarding local government structures is regarded everywhere as disruptive and wasteful. A new apparatus has barely the opportunity to start functioning before it is revised, reorganised or replaced. A local leader in Tarian remarked,

Everytime there is a new minister everything has to be changed for no better reason than to show that he has authority (berwenang). When there's a new Education Minister, the children have to buy a new colour uniform...when there's a new Home Affairs Minister the village councils get reorganised. How are we supposed to be making progress when we are always having to revamp what was just starting to work? (recorded interview 1984)

Widespread complaints in Tarian about the debilitating effects of continual changes in government legislation and programming were echoed in Sanur. "Before any new plan can be put into action, it has already changed; just as a work plan is prepared, it is cut off" (recorded interview 1984).

While the importance of communication and participation as prerequisites for any kind of effective and equitable rural development policy has become a truism of government and academic discourse (Uphoff et al.1979; Hainsworth 1982; GBHN 1983; Gow and VanSant 1983; Hendrata 1983; Esman and Uphoff 1984; Mubyarto 1984; Rondinelli et al. 1989), both political and economic strategies for Indonesian development remain centralised and hierarchical. From the central government's perspective, village autonomy and popular participation are conceived in terms of economic self-support and local contribution to state programs, not public inclusion in decision-making. The notion of village 'autonomy' inferred in the expression "conduct its own affairs" in the 1979 Law is explicated in the Home Affairs Department manual on village government only as "the ability to cover the costs of routine and development activities as well as public services" (1986b:2).
In the Balinese case, established local systems already provided the basis for information exchange, for pooling and managing common funds and for high levels of routinised participation and accountability. To a remarkable degree the mechanisms institutionalised in the obligations and conventions of banjar organisation have been extended to incorporate new economic and social initiatives. Put in economically 'rational' terms, the customary basis of local institutions effectively subsidises the organisational costs of carrying out the development programs of the state. For this pragmatic reason, at least, the state ought to take local institutions for cooperative action seriously (Wade 1988:217; Rondinelli et al. 1989: 69ff).

Indeed, cost-saving is the one sense in which the rhetoric of public participation has real meaning in Indonesian government circles (Depdagri 1986b:2). But here New Order policy is at odds with itself, for the organisational energies of local systems cannot be harnessed effectively without a political stake in the process. In this regard, the relationship of the Indonesian state to what it regards as local instrumentalities is a crucial issue. Comparative studies suggest that the imposition of externally created structures has been a common factor in the failure of rural development initiatives (Anderson 1982; Gow and Vansant 1983:428; Gondolf 1988; Esman and Uphoff 1984).

A corroborative indication of the deleterious effects of bureaucratisation on local institutions in Bali comes from an intensive study of two irrigation associations (subak) sponsored by the Ford Foundation and conducted by staff at Udayana University (Sutawan et al.1984). One of the two subak had experienced a very long period of government involvement which originated with the construction of permanent irrigation canals in 1941 under the Dutch and its subsequent integration into the irrigation programme of the Public Works Department (P.U.). The other subak has operated entirely independently of government involvement. The study found a poor level of maintenance and repair in the P.U. subak (which remained responsible for the secondary irrigation channels, while the Public Works Department had responsibility for the primary system) by comparison with that of the non-P.U. subak. The authors attribute the degree of apathy in the subak which is partially managed by the Public Works Department to the low level of members' involvement in planning the government's part of the program, which had resulted in technical changes incompatible with the system of water division preferred by most subak members (1984:257-58), and to related authoritarian and nepotistic leadership arrangements in the P.U. subak.33

Conclusion

The 1979 Village Government Law involves more than a rational reorganisation of local government. It institutionalises a hierarchically oriented administrative structure which, contrary to its proclaimed
objective of increasing participation, will exacerbate the lack of communication between central government and the Indonesian population. In the process, it threatens to undercut long-evolved and highly effective mechanisms for community cooperation which already exist in different forms throughout Indonesia.

Not the least telling paradox is that the kelurahan pattern of village reorganisation under the Village Government Law is premised on an assumed disappearance of cooperative gotong royong traditions, still officially touted as fundamental to the Indonesian national character and philosophy (GBHN 1983, 1988; Depdagri 1986b:2). Development policy is predicated on the assumption, even promotion, of a decline in the political and economic autonomy of communities as they move through specified stages of development from traditional swadaya (self-help) through transitional swakarya (self-activating) to modern swasembada (self-sustaining) villages. The disjunction between appeals to the involvement of collective subjects implicit in the language of these classifications and the actual loss of local power to central authority as villages are guided through each of these 'progressive' stages couldn't be more stark, and is another example of the ideological 'misrecognition' intended in the state's use of populist discourse (see Bowen 1986; Van Langenberg 1986; Warren 1989).

Tjondronegoro cites a Home Affairs Ministry paper which defines these three developmental stages in revealing terms. In government planning traditional swadaya desa with strong primary group relationships and self-sustaining orientations are to give way to swakarya desa where "customary and traditional law is in transition and external influences have penetrated, making for changes in the way of thinking...and gotong royong is decreasing." Swasembada villages are described as "free from stringent, limitative, traditional laws; there are rational relationships between villagers...and a clear institutional framework" (1984:90-91). The aspiration of the Home Affairs Ministry is to have all 60,000 villages in Indonesia achieve swasembada status by the first decade of the 21st century (Department of Home Affairs et al.1981:64). Since a decline in the spirit of gotong royong is one basis for converting desa to kelurahan and for the thoroughgoing transfer of authority to central bureaucratic management, this is presumably the ideal form that "a clear institutional framework" would take (See Mendagri 2/84).

Historically, state and market penetration have operated to undermine local organisational structures which make cooperative action possible, more often than not without establishing workable alternatives (See Lipton 1985; Uphoff 1987a:218; Uphoff 1987b:42; Dove 1988:22ff; Wade 1988:216). In this regard, Wade argues, "a malfunctioning approximation to a formalised system of state control... based on a distant authority only dimly aware of local conditions, may be worse ... than a strategy which aims to improve, or at least not impair local systems" (1986:105). Lipton makes a similar case for the strengths of localised decision-making (1985:101). And Rondinelli et al. point to growing evidence that "local services can be performed by
community associations more efficiently than by an overburdened central government" (1989:73).

But there is little evidence of the respect for local competencies in Third World government circles that a genuinely collaborative approach to community development would require. This is not only because of the advantages (which are decidedly short-term) of direct social control to power elites, but also because of the great cultural disjunction between the paternalist values of these urban elites and the practical concerns and local knowledges of rural people (Anderson 1982; Dove 1985;1988). If, as these writers conclude, the possibility of genuine community development rests heavily on striking a balance between local and central government roles in political and economic processes (Gondolf 1988:156; Gow and Vansant 1983:430; Esman and Uphoff 1984), radically different approaches from the Indonesian state will be needed. Taking its own rhetorical position on local participation seriously, genuine reform would necessarily begin by redressing the undemocratic and authoritarian features of the 1979 Village Government Law.
1. The following short forms will be used to refer to the sources of related regulations and documents: Keppres - Keputusan Presiden; Instr/ Kep Mendagri - Instruksi/ Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri; Depdagri - Departemen Dalam Negeri; Biro Bina - Biro Bina Pemerintahan Desa; Perda I - Peraturan Daerah Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I; Perda II - Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Daerah Tingkat II. For complete references see the Government Documents section of the Bibliography. Between 1979 and 1986 thirty-five regulations, decrees and instructions were issued by the Home Affairs Ministry concerned with implementing the Village Government Law. Only the most important are listed here.


3. A more recent statement from a Department of Home Affairs Manual on village government reiterates the point: "... [T]he consequence of various forms and styles of desa government, each possessing its own unique characteristics, is a frequent hindrance, within the framework of intensive guidance and control, to efforts to increase the standard of living and effective conduct of government" (Depdagri 1986b:2-3, my emphasis).

4. In Java bengkok lands associated with village office formed the basis of deeply entrenched patronage arrangements.

5. The single candidate/empty ballot box (kotak kosong) alternative is widely adopted in Bali because of a distaste for overt competition for local office. It is not unusual, however, for the anonymous box to win. See, for example, the letter to the editor of the Bali Post, "Keluhan Terhadap Nasib Desa Kami" (3/12/84).

6. The camat along with representatives of police and military comprise the official Supervisory Committee for the election of the kepala desa. They coordinate and give advice to the Electoral and Nominating Committee and scrutinise nominees (Mendagri 6/1981, §5). On advice from the camat, the bupati must approve all nominations to the office of kepala desa. Keeler (1985:118) mentions complaints in Central Java of manipulation of the screening tests to eliminate significant competition in elections. See also N. Schulte-Nordholt (1982:123) on the influence of supra-desa authorities on the election process via the screening committees.

7. Indicatively, the Indonesian word dusun has pejorative connotations of backward rusticity. Undoubtedly reflecting more serious concern over the political effects of the 1979 law on local institutions, the Governor of Bali declared in 1983 that the name banjar should not after all be displaced under the new system and that 'dusun/banjar' would henceforth become the standard designation of hamlet units in his province (Letter from the Governor of Bali to Heads of Kabupaten, 5/9/83). This symbolic gesture did not touch the structural consequences of the legislation, however. Provincial and regional implementing legislation present verbatim restatements of the national law and there was a decided anxiety among intermediate officials in Bali to avoid overt conflict with central government.

8. Although the administrative (dinas) and customary (adat) units of local organisation at desa and banjar level are theoretically distinct, this is not the case in practise. The separation of adat and dinas affairs in colonial policy had considerable effect at desa level where the administrative unit rarely today coincides with that of the desa adat. Even so, considerable coordination and interaction among adat and dinas leaders within the desa is necessary since so many aspects of civic life in Bali impinge on both spheres. At banjar level the dinas unit remains so thoroughly dependent on the banjar adat that the two domains are difficult to distinguish, and in some parts of Bali, including the entire Gianyar region, klian banjar adat automatically acted as klian dinas, even in cases where they did not receive formal recognition from higher levels of government for the administrative functions they performed.
9. "Kelurahan adalah suatu wilayah...yang tidak berhak menyelenggarakan rumah tangganya sendiri" (UU 5/1979, §1).

10. Lingkungan parallel the dusun as subunits of kelurahan and desa respectively in the new scheme (see Figure 1). Both replace the banjar dinas in Bali. But while dusun within desa continue to coincide with the old banjar dinas, and therefore in most cases also with the banjar adat, this was not intended to remain the case with lingkungan established under the kelurahan. Attempts were made at rationalisation of lingkungan boundaries along geographic and demographic lines with little apparent success to date. See below for a discussion of the difficulties which the village of Sanur has experienced as a consequence of these changes.

11."...mewadahi perwujudan pelaksanaan Demokrasi Pancasila dalam pemerintahan Desa." - literally, to 'embody the realisation and implementation of Pancasila Democracy in Village government" (Depdagri 1986a:7).

12. This is acknowledged in a letter from the Minister of Home Affairs to Provincial Governors, 5 November 1981 and in the subsequently published manuals regarding the functioning of the LMD (Depdagri 1986a;1986b).

13. Desa meetings are unrealistic in Bali because of the size of administrative villages which typically include over a thousand households. Nor are there public meeting places on a desa­wide scale equivalent to the customary banjar meeting hall. Most villages to my knowledge have never held meetings of the entire membership of the administrative desa. The business of soliciting popular opinion on village administrative matters has since independence been handled at the monthly meetings of component banjar.

14. See Mendagri 28/80; 225/80; 4/82; 27/84; 28/84. Figure 2 shows the relationship of the PKK to the overall organisational structure of the LKMD.

15. See Staudt (1986) for a theoretical discussion of the role of the state and bureaucracy in institutionalising and reinforcing male privilege. She argues that there is an entrenched bureaucratic resistance to women's participation arising out of the redistributive threats that comprehensive development programs would pose (1986:329).

16. Membership in the banjar council is customarily as a pair (banjar luh/banjar muani ; but the male partner as lineal descendent through the patri-line, inheriting the houseyard (karang ayahan) and associated civic responsibilities is the usual public representative of the married couple. Technically under Balinese adat, a woman becomes the recognised head of household if, for lack of a male descendent, she becomes the 'substitute heir'(sentana). The in-marrying husband is then considered the juridical female. In this case, a woman theoretically should represent the household at banjar assemblies and in public labour service. In some villages this is customary practice. Hobart reports that one woman in the village of his research had a reputation as an influential orator (1979:579). Generally, however, women claim they are embarrassed and prefer to send a male representative in their place. In the case of widows who have no adult sons to perform these services, customary legal codes (awig-awig) usually provide special dispensation (tapakan) from banjar/desa service.

17. A 1983-84 study commissioned by the Department of Education and Culture to document leadership systems in village Bali makes no reference to the 1979 law in its discussion of dinas officials, nor does it use the term 'dusun' in place of banjar (Swarsi et al. 1986).

18. See also Bali Post 7/11/84, "80 Persen Penduduk Indonesia Berpendidikan Rendah".

19. I should stress that there was no apparent correlation between level of formal education and generally acknowledged competence among the local leaders I studied. In fact, some of the most active and efficient did not possess secondary school qualifications. Among these was the village
head of Sanur who was instrumental in establishing an innovative development program based on village-owned industries, and who possessed exceptional leadership qualities by any standard. See below for a discussion of the particular effects of government policy on local leadership in that village.

20. Such incidents are apparently still rare or unpopular enough to warrant reporting in the Bali Post. See "Camat Tegallalang tidak akui Darsana Kepala Dusun Pakudui" (27/4/89) which reports a recent instance in which the elected kepala dusun/banjar who had already been carrying out the duties for office for two months was refused formal appointment by the camat of Tegallalang on the grounds that he lacked a primary school certificate. I concur with Dove's expression of concern (1988:7ff) at the over-valuation of formal education in both Indonesian and international development policy circles. As formal education conventionally operates, it often has the effect of cutting short children's informal schooling in the local knowledge system and of devaluing the place of that knowledge system in the global one.


22. Throughout the New Order period there has been increasing involvement of the military in local affairs. Members of the armed forces are now routinely attached to district-level bureaucracies across the country. Every kecamatan has a 'trouble-shooting' task force (TRIPIDA) comprised of the camat and representatives of the armed forces and police. Retired or seconded ABRI members appear to have been heavily favoured in appointments to newly bureaucratised local government positions. The current Home Affairs Minister, fortunately, appears to be committed to reversing aspects of this policy and 1989 regulations require that henceforth civilians be appointed at regional government level and below.

23. In some banjar in Sanur the positions of klian adat and dinas were separate. In others, as in Desa Tarian, one person acted as both customary and official banjar head.

24. Prijono and Prijono (1983) and Tjondronegoro (1984) make the point that sub-desa units are the primary locus of strong community ties and collective action in contemporary Java as well. "...[A]t this level, elements of 'primitive democracy' and mutual-help practices are still functioning effectively" (Tjondronegoro 1984:236).

Numerous observers of local government in Java have commented on tensions between desa leaders' representative and administrative roles (Zacharias 1979; Schulte Nordholt 1982; Tjonderonegoro 1984; Keeler 1985:127). These tensions also press heavily on village officials in Bali, but close social interaction, elective practices, and the power of formal and informal sanctions maintained some sense of control over leadership in local communities. While popular control applied more directly at banjar than at desa level, the fact that desa were for practical purposes dependent on constituent banjar meant that village government on the whole could not afford to ignore popular sentiments. See also N.G. Schulte-Nordholt (1985:7) on the representative character of the Rukun Tetangga leadership in Java and their role in insuring expression of popular interest within the LSD.

25. In a study of economic development in the rural Philippines, Anderson found that it was "the overwhelming continuity of established power and wealth that dictated most of the adverse consequences of rapid rural development there" (1982:164). These forces have been ameliorated to a much greater extent in Balinese communities by the counterbalancing importance of banjar leaders who do not normally represent such established interests and whose primary orientation has been to their constituencies.
26. Similar observations were made by William Cole on the impact of new procedures on the selection of banjar heads in the Karangasem and Gianyar areas where he was working (personal communication 1984).

27. There is no little inconsistency in the views held by intermediate bureaucrats. The positive convictions expressed in the same interviews about the power of the banjar relative to that of central government and the importance of acceding to popular electoral conventions undoubtedly reflect their own ambivalent positions as agents of the state, but banjar members themselves with strong ties to their own communities.

28. Although not immediately removed from office, innuendo in the banjar continued and the kepala dusun /klian banjar concerned did eventually resign.

29. Although standard practice has been to appoint these officials from within their own locality, I was told of a number of instances where heads of kelurahan were in fact appointed from elsewhere. The objective of assuring that primary loyalty be directed to superiors will doubtless result in an increasing number of appointments circulating from within the bureaucracy as occurs at kecamatan level.

30. See §1 of the decree defining the structure and purpose of these two levels: "RT and RW adalah organisasi masyarakat yang diakui dan dibina oleh Pemerintah untuk memelihara dan melestarikan nilai-nilai kehidupan masyarakat Indonesia yang berdasarkan kegotong-royongan dan kekeluargaan serta untuk membantu meningkatkan kelancaran pelaksanaan tugas pemerintahan, pembangunan dan kemasyarakatan..." (Kep Mendagri 7/1983). RT were originally created in Java during the Japanese occupation and remain as local units of village organisation there (Tjondronegoro 1984; Schulte Nordholt 1985). I was told by the head of the regional Bureau of Government that it was unlikely that RT and RW would be established in Bali since tempeken, as formal subdivisions of the banjar already fulfilled this function.

31. Desa "control over its own affairs" is in any case strictly limited. As we have seen, district and regional authorities vet the selection of kepala desa. Desa ordinances may not be implemented without formal approval of the bupati, who may reject any village decision which he regards as "conflicting with higher regulations or with public interest". The camat attends all LMD meetings as pengarah (director) to insure that decisions at village level are in accord with higher authority. He also has the obligation to "give direction" when the LMD has difficulty achieving consensus (mu'afakat) (DepDagri 1986a:17). Under specified conditions the camat may recommend the dismissal of the village head (Mendagri 6/1981, §28), and when he considers public order to be at stake, he may appoint an acting village head for no longer than a year. In Gianyar in 1987, two village heads were replaced by interim appointees because they had "lost public support" in the view of district officials.

32. For example, the Home Affairs Ministerial Instruction on the role of the LMD begins: "...mengingat tingkat kemampuan para penyelenggara pemerintahan Desa sangat terbatas..." (Inst Mendagri 140-100 in Depdagri 1986b).

33. In the non-P.U. subak the subak head and his assistants were elected every five years, whereas the P.U. counterpart had been in office for forty years without reelection, virtually since the permanent irrigation project had been initiated. Meetings in the P.U. subak attracted only a 35% rate of attendance on the rare occasions when they were held. By comparison, the non-P.U. subak held regular monthly meetings with attendances averaging 90%. Members' participation in discussion was observed as being more active and critical (1984:238). Mobilisation in the non-P.U. subak in the form of organised work-service (gotong royong) was active for both religious and irrigation purposes. In the P.U. subak collective work was only rarely conducted for any purpose other than ritual obligations (1984:247).

34. A parallel example of the arrogance of bureaucracy and the adverse consequences of restructuring local organisations to centrally determined ends comes from the Philippines. There
too decentralisation policies reshaped the community-level barangay, turning it into a subservient instrument of federal government (Paget 1983:126). As in Indonesia, the government of the Philippines appealed to a selective version of traditional ideologies to 'revitalize the cooperative spirit', while at the same time preempting opportunities for the exercise of local decision-making powers. In the process of restructuring existing institutions to conform to its master blueprint, the Philippine government debilitated the barangay and induced a state of pervasive cynicism in the rural populace, from which Anderson says local institutions have not recovered (1982:150ff). The degradation of local organisational capacities in the Philippines, in Anderson's view, was "perhaps mostly an unintended consequence of the assumptions that no institutions and organizations worthy of the name exist or could develop indigenously in villages" (1982:151-52).
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