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Partial belief as a solution to the logical problem of holding simultaneous, contrary beliefs in self-deception research

Gibbins, K. (1997) Partial belief as a solution to the logical problem of holding simultaneous, contrary beliefs in self-deception research. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20 (1). pp. 115-116.

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    Link to Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X97360038
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    Abstract

    A major worry in self-deception research has been the implication that people can hold a belief that something is true and false at the same time: a logical as well as a psychological impossibility. However, if beliefs are held with imperfect confidence, voluntary self-deception in the sense of seeking evidence to reject an unpleasant belief becomes entirely plausible and demonstrably real.

    Publication Type: Journal Article
    Murdoch Affiliation: School of Psychology
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press
    Copyright: © 1997 Cambridge University Press
    Notes: Commentary
    URI: http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/5490
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