Policy options when giving negative externalities market value: Clean energy policymaking and restructuring the Western Australian energy sector
McHenry, M.P. (2009) Policy options when giving negative externalities market value: Clean energy policymaking and restructuring the Western Australian energy sector. Energy Policy, 37 (4). pp. 1423-1431.
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Uncertainty surrounds the choice of instruments that internalise fossil-fuel pollution at the local, regional and global level. This work outlines the considerable growth in the Western Australian (WA) energy sector and explores the available options and potential hazards of using specific instruments to internalise externalities. These core options are discussed with respect to liberalising energy markets, providing private investment certainty, and imparting commentary on the developments and consequences of reform in the WA context. As a large energy exporter, providing certainty for the WA energy sector investment and the community is necessary to maintain the current prosperity. Remarkably, in the decades of market reform progress, the absence of one essential element is evident: economic externalities. Policymakers are under increasing pressure to understand economic reform, new energy markets and the multifaceted repercussions they entail. With modern energy reform sitting squarely within the milieu of more efficient governments and climate policy, there are clear economic advantages to internalising negative and positive externalities and other market distortions during energy market developments. Ignoring market failures when commercialising government-owned energy utilities in de-regulated and competitive markets invites continued ad-hoc government interference that generates investment uncertainty in addition to a perplexed electorate.
|Publication Type:||Journal Article|
|Murdoch Affiliation:||School of Engineering and Energy|
|Copyright:||© 2008 Elsevier Ltd|
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